Japan's Dual Identity and the U.S.–Japan Alliance

Introduction

The main purpose of this paper is to explain why and how the U.S.–Japan alliance has been essential for Japan’s postwar security policy. While any alliance relationship is necessarily affected by the national interests and priorities of both sides of the alliance, this paper will focus on the Japanese logic for the formation, consolidation, and evolution of the U.S.–Japan alliance. It will thus shed light on at least one aspect of why the alliance has been robust throughout the postwar years.

The robustness of the alliance is obvious from the fact that it survived the turbulent Cold War years and is now being revitalized under the new post–Cold War situation. The robustness is even more striking when one considers several fundamental ambiguities innate in the alliance. First and foremost, the asymmetric nature of the alliance is evident; it is an alliance between the world’s superpower, which has worldwide security missions, on the one hand, and a country determined not to play a security role beyond its national defense in the strict sense of the term on the other. As such, the alliance has been an essential component of the regional and global strategy of the United States, whereas independent decisions by Japan as a sovereign state have been discouraged. The Japanese have accordingly tended to feel that the United States has gotten the best side of the bargain, while the American side has often felt that Japan is free riding on the United States. In addition, the alliance has functioned to both restrain and facilitate Japan’s defense capability and its regional security role, as symbolized by the simultaneous use of the terms “cork in the bottle" and “burden–sharing" to describe the function of the alliance. These ambiguities have often caused irritations in the management of the alliance, but have not grown into a serious crisis. On the contrary, the Japanese side has generally accepted these ambiguous premises in the alliance relationship, thus contributing significantly to the sustenance of the alliance throughout the postwar years.

The key concept this paper offers to explain both the robustness and the ambiguities of the alliance is the dual identity of postwar Japan as a security actor in the international system. Japan’s own judgment, as presented by the central decision–makers as well as the general public, has been that it has ceased to be a relevant independent actor in postwar international and regional security due to various constraints stemming from its wartime aggression. Much of Japan’s postwar security policy has indeed been premised on its national determination not to reemerge as a traditional great power in the game of regional and international security. The realities of East Asian security, however, have not allowed Japan to enjoy this luxury entirely. Because of its geopolitical location and its potential to resurface as a traditional great power, Japan has in fact faced many hard security issues as a power in Asia. By the same token, many regional countries have responded to Japan’s actions and inaction as if it were a traditional great power, responses which have formed the actual security environment for Japan. In short, the dual identity of Japan as a security actor has stemmed from the gap between Japan’s dominant domestic constraints on security policy and its concomitant determination not to play a security role as a traditional great power, on the one hand, and the external realities and security environment in which Japan indeed carries the weight of a great power, on the other.

This paper argues that the origins and evolution of the U.S.–Japan alliance cannot be grasped fully unless one puts this dual identity of Japan into perspective. Only in this way can one understand as well the central significance of the U.S.–Japan alliance for postwar Japan’s security policy. In today’s context, too, the Japanese government’s commitment to the joint security declaration with the United States announced in April 1996 is an indication of the strength of the dual identity, continuing to render the alliance the essential component of Japan’s security policy in the post–Cold War era. ₁ Needless to say, if the U.S.–Japan alliance is discontinued for one reason or another, Japan’s basic strategy, as well as that of the United States, would have to go through a fundamental reworking. An examination of Japan’s security policy under such circumstances would naturally require a completely different framework of analysis from the one used in this paper. Such an approach, however, is not only bound to be speculative, but does not capture the essence of Japanese thinking and practices today and in the foreseeable future.

In the same vein, this paper also contends that changes in and evolution of the U.S.–Japan alliance up to now and in the foreseeable future could and should be explained under the premise of Japan’s dual identity. Indeed, the U.S.–Japan alliance has undergone dynamic changes in response to shifts in the regional security environment and the configurations of Japan’s domestic political forces. Central aspects of such changes and evolution have included (1) the relationship between Japan’s self–help efforts and the U.S. military presence, (2) a balance between the two missions of the alliance, i.e., defense of Japan and regional security, and (3) the explicit and implicit functions of the alliance in a regional context, i.e., written (in the security treaty) and unwritten implications of the alliance for regional security.

Whereas the central analytical focus of the paper is to explain the strength of the U.S.–Japan alliance throughout the postwar years, these dynamic changes will also be examined in the course of tracing the evolution of the alliance. It should be stressed, however, that there is no convincing evidence that these changes will break the fundamental mold of the alliance premised on Japan’s dual identity.

An examination of Japan’s dual identity as a fundamental determinant of Japan’s security policy is first in order.

Determinants of Japan’s Security Policy: Dual Identity and Postwar Realism

Dual Identity

The history of Japanese expansion since the Meiji Restoration into an “imagined Asia" has determined the basic parameters of Japan’s postwar security policy. In the postwar years this history has been not only a source of concern among regional countries, but the fundamental factor compelling a postwar Japan to step off the stage of major power politics, particularly in the realm of military security.

Domestic constraints on Japan’s postwar security policy have formed at three levels: constitutional and other legal constraints, the dominant social norm of pacifism and the political culture of anti–militarism, and the polarization and immobilism of domestic politics over security policy.

The fundamental legal constraint stems from the pacifist clause of Article 9 of the postwar Constitution, which reads:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.

While the majority of Japanese constitutional experts have read Article 9 as prohibiting all armaments, including the Self–Defense Forces (SDF), the government’s interpretation has been that the stipulation does not deny the right of self–defense innate in any independent country, and therefore does not prohibit armaments if they are maintained for purposes of self–defense and not as “a means of settling international disputes." Japan’s strictly defense–oriented policy is the direct result of this interpretation of the constitutional stipulation, which is also bound by various legal arrangements and government statements as discussed below.

These domestic constraints are supported by the strong public sentiment of pacifism. In academia, particularly in the West but in some parts of Asia as well, that the Japanese domestic situation places basic constraints on Japan’s security policy is reasonably understood. Examples are a study emphasizing the importance of ideational factors in explaining Japan’s behavior, and an analysis focusing on the strategic culture of Japan as a factor in security policy. ₂

The culture of anti–militarism is a product of the war experiences of the Japanese, who felt victimized by their own military. By the same token, the central theme in the Japanese discourse on the causes of the war has been how the military came to power in the “irresponsible" domestic political system, where there were not effective checks and balances against the military. Accordingly, “The negative view of the military is shared all along the political spectrum in postwar Japan. ... Where these groups differ, however, is in how they propose to prevent the military from becoming a danger again." ₃

The third constraint is immobilism in security policy–making deriving from the polarization of political forces on security policy. Three distinct orientations toward security policy emerged in Japan’s postwar domestic politics: advocacy of “compliance" with the United States, of policy “autonomy" from U.S. control but within a sustained U.S.–Japan alliance, and of “independence" from the U.S.–dominated system. ₄ The first, compliance, was an expression of the determination to live in Pax Americana to regenerate war–torn Japan without revising the Peace Constitution and with a minimum level of self–defense forces. The desire for autonomy arose among conservative politicians who argued for the revision of the Peace Constitution and the equal status of Japan in the U.S.–Japan security arrangements. Running directly against this policy line was a course advanced by opposition parties which advocated that Japan abrogate the U.S.–Japan security and political ties to become “independent" of the United States, thus in effect calling for Japan to dissociate itself from Pax Americana.

In this conflict, the heated rivalry between the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the progressive opposition parties was easy to observe from outside Japan. Less so, however, was the division of nationalism among the three schools: the “reserved nationalism" of the “compliance" school, “assertive nationalism" of the “autonomy" school, and “progressive nationalism" of the “independence" school. The LDP, not necessarily monolithic in its security policy disposition, embraces the first two types today. These divisions often led to immobilism in Japan’s security policy–making, providing both rationale and incentive for the centrist “compliance" policy to prevail in the end.

Despite these strong constraints on Japan reemerging as a traditional great power in regional and international security, arguments that Japan will “remilitarize," including even the possibility of nuclearization, have never weakened. A strong academic argument in recent years is neorealism, which predicts that an economic power like Japan is bound to become a military power, even to the extent of possessing nuclear weapons, because of “structural pressures" from the shifting balance of power among major powers. Kenneth Waltz argues that “[s]ome countries may strive to become great powers; others may wish to avoid doing so. The choice, however, is a constrained one. Because of the extent of their interests, larger units existing in a contentious arena tend to take on system–wide tasks." ₅

Although this is a “weak" theory in that the central arguments have not helped explain actual Japanese behaviors (other than as “conspiracies"), its theoretical value lies in its parsimony. It reminds us that Japan is indeed a power in the structure of international politics even if the Japanese themselves refuse to perceive their nation as such.

In addition, the actual Japan policies of many countries, including the United States, often have been responses to a perception of Japan as a major power. In the initial stage of the Cold War, for instance, George Kennan characterized Japan as one of the five power centers of the world along with the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and Germany. ₆ This was a strategic judgment that Japan’s position in the structure of international politics would decide the nature of the international system. In a way, given Japan’s geopolitical location and its potential as a traditional great power in the East Asian security system, such judgment was a natural one, and indeed countries surrounding Japan such as China, Russia, and Korea often have responded to Japanese security policies on the assumption that Japan is behaving as, or is interested in becoming, an independent security actor. Accordingly, Japan has in fact had to deal with security issues beyond the scope of strictly defense–oriented security policy.

Coping with these two apparently contradictory components of its identity as a security actor has constituted the essence of Japan’s “postwar realism," as examined next.

Postwar Realism

The central element of Japan’s “postwar realism" has been the sustenance of its dual identity through the U.S.–Japan alliance. It is “postwar" because of the fundamental normative and legal constraints on its security policy arising from the legacies of militarism and aggression in Asia; it is “realism" because the choice of the U.S.–Japan alliance as the basic component of Japan’s security policy reflects the Japanese government’s determination to deal with security issues arising from its structural position as a major power in the East Asian security system. The “Yoshida Doctrine" was none other than the original embodiment of this postwar realism. Shigeru Yoshida’s choice as he achieved independence from the American occupation in the early 1950s was both to uphold the Peace Constitution and to take care of Japan’s security needs through the U.S.–Japan security treaty.

As briefly discussed above, two major challenges to this postwar realism emerged in the postwar domestic politics of Japan. One came in the 1950s from traditional nationalists such as Ichiro Hatoyama, who was highly motivated by his rivalry with Yoshida. Hatoyama argued for Japan’s reemergence as a traditional major power with full–fledged military capabilities. The other challenge came from progressive–pacifist forces that advocated Japan’s neutrality in international power politics and a pure commitment to the cause of the war–renouncing Peace Constitution. The Yoshida Doctrine was thus entangled in and challenged by the “divided nationalism" of postwar Japan.

Interestingly enough, both challenges were an attempt to resolve the ambiguity inherent in the dual identity as well as in Yoshida’s security policy, albeit for totally different ideological reasons. They naturally diverged regarding the importance of the Peace Constitution, with the former advocating its revision and the latter defending it as the bible of a postwar Japan. In both cases, however, their positions on the Peace Constitution revealed their dissatisfaction with the ambiguity in Yoshida’s postwar realism. It is equally revealing that both groups argued for the mutation or the abrogation of the U.S.–Japan security treaty, indicating that the alliance was correctly perceived as the backbone of Japan’s ambiguous security policy.

The strength of Japan’s dual identity based on the negative legacy of wartime aggression, however, did not allow the traditional nationalist option to become the central foreign policy of postwar Japan. Traditional nationalists soon learned to live with the premises of the fundamental dual identity and the paramount importance of the U.S.–Japan alliance. In this postwar context, the progressive–pacifists became the major source of challenge to the Japanese government’s postwar realism and thus the U.S.–Japan alliance. In the early 1950s, supported by the dominant pacifist norm in Japanese society, the power of the progressive–pacifists grew so strong as to threaten the power base of the conservatives. This triggered the merger of the two rival conservative parties, the Liberal Party under the leadership of Yoshida and the Democratic Party led by Hatoyama, into the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in 1955. This pseudo–Cold War confrontation in Japanese domestic politics provided the dominant political context in which Japanese central decision–makers managed the U.S.–Japan alliance throughout much of the postwar period.

Within this broad picture, the remnants of traditional nationalists have occasionally attempted to take advantage of the alliance and have pushed for a larger mission and capability for Japan’s self–help efforts. The most typical examples, as examined below, were Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi’s attempt to revise the U.S.–Japan security treaty in the late 1950s, a move by the defense establishment toward “autonomous defense" in the early 1970s, and Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone’s efforts to strengthen the alliance in the 1980s. These nationalist moves, however, have not come close to breaking the postwar mold of the U.S.–Japan alliance. After all, their nationalist urge was satisfied as long as they remained within the fundamental confines of the alliance. Thus, the U.S.–Japan alliance, the essential component of Japan’s security policy premised on its dual identity, has both restrained and facilitated Japan’s defense mission and capability. Over the course of Japan’s postwar development, Japanese society and its political elites gradually accepted this premise of postwar realism, and this trend has basically continued into the post–Cold War era.

The Evolution of the U.S.–Japan Alliance

Origins

When Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution was imposed by the occupation authorities under Douglas MacArthur in 1946, the Japanese leaders correctly took it as a prerequisite for the preservation of the Emperor system, which was considered essential also by Washington for successful occupation policies despite strong resistance from other Allied countries and Asian victims of Japanese aggression. Yoshida’s motives for accepting the Peace Constitution were mixed; they included his distrust of Japanese militarism, sensitivity toward Japan’s Asian neighbors, and devotion to economic recovery, but defending the Emperor was an important part of Yoshida’s determination as a Japanese leader as the war ended.

Despite the outbreak of the Cold War in 1947 and the Korean War in 1950, Yoshida continued to defend the Peace Constitution. After 1947, however, U.S. strategy toward Japan drastically shifted and Washington pushed for rearmament of Japan under the realities of the Cold War.

Yoshida, and indeed Japan as a whole, was thus caught between the two divergent currents of the time: the old current, stemming from wartime considerations, that called for demilitarization of Japan, and the new current of the Cold War, which made Washington realize the importance of Japan as a major power in East Asia. Under these circumstances, Yoshida’s goal as he strove to gain independence from the occupation was to meet Japan’s security needs without substantial rearmament nor changing the Constitution. The U.S.–Japan security relationship was the answer, albeit an ambiguous one.

The initial source of ambiguity was the gap between Japan’s unwillingness to meet the U.S. request for full–fledged rearmament, on the one hand, and Washington’s hesitation to commit itself fully to defending Japan because of the Vandenberg Resolution obligating its security partners to provide their own self–help efforts and mutual assistance. In order to fill this gap, Yoshida had to commit himself in his talks with John Foster Dulles in January 1951 to the establishment of the 50,000–troop Security Force, ₇ which came into existence in August 1952 and became the Self–Defense Forces (SDF) in July 1954. Due to its dual identity, Japan’s de facto rearmament was thus decided in the context of Yoshida’s determination to maintain the Peace Constitution and to refrain from full–fledged rearmament.

Second, from the dominant perspective of the Japanese government at the time, the U.S.–Japan security treaty signed in September 1951 benefited the United States in its regional strategy more than Japan, sacrificing Japan’s priority of securing U.S. commitment to the defense of Japan. ₈ The preamble of the treaty stated:

...Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement for its defense, that the United States of America should maintain armed forces of its own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon Japan.

The United States of America, in the interest of peace and security, is presently willing to maintain certain of its armed forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression...

By the same token, the security treaty clearly placed a greater premium on “the peace and security of the Far East" than the defense of Japan. Article 1 of “The Security Treaty between the United States and Japan" read as follows:

Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air, and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of the international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large–scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside Power or Powers.

These ambiguities fueled intense political strife in Japanese domestic politics, causing immobilism in its security policy–making. First, the existence of the SDF itself and Japan’s self–help efforts was greatly contested from the standpoint of Article 9 of the Constitution. Second, the U.S.–Japan security relationship was quite unpopular among the general public and the pacifist forces, because it was believed that it could entrap Japan into regional conflict and encourage its rearmament.

The Japanese government devoted its efforts to arguing that its defense policy and the SDF were constitutional as long as they were maintained strictly for self–defense purposes and not as “a means of settling international disputes." This government interpretation was first articulated in December 1954, a few months after the establishment of the SDF. In April 1954, in the course of the Diet deliberations on the establishment of the SDF, the government also came up with the three conditions for the execution of the right of self–defense: the existence of an imminent and unrighteous attack against Japan, the lack of other relevant means to dispel it, and the minimum use of force. These government positions on the range of self–defense were further consolidated in May 1956 with the articulation of the government’s interpretation on the question of the right of collective self–defense:

It is natural that Japan, being a sovereign state, should have this right of collective self–defense from the standpoint of international law. The government, however, interprets that the right of self–defense permitted under Article 9 of the Constitution should be used within the minimum range of need to defend Japan, and believes that the exercise of the right of collective self–defense exceeds the range and thus is not allowed constitutionally.

Since then, these interpretations ₉ have continued to dictate the government’s defense policy. They have not changed to date. The government endeavors to avoid having its security policy cause domestic political problems and to satisfy the pacifist urge of the general public.

Accordingly, there were no deliberate efforts by the Japanese government in the 1950s and 1960s to establish an organic link between Japan’s defense efforts and the U.S.–Japan security relationship. Before the 1976 “National Defense Program Outline (Taiko)," Japan’s defense policy was articulated in a series of four defense programs, adopted in 1957, 1961, 1966, and 1972. The guiding principles for these programs were stated in the “Basic Policy for National Defense (Kokubo no Kihon Hoshin)" adopted in 1957. It did not spell out how the U.S.–Japan security ties and Japan’s own defense were related; it simply said that the U.S.–Japan security system was the “basis" of defense efforts against foreign aggression, while stating that the acquisition of an effective defense capability for Japan should be “gradual," “commensurate with its national power and conditions and within the limits necessary for self–defense."

In sum, while the U.S.–Japan security relationship took care of Japan’s traditional security concerns during the Cold War, it simultaneously allowed the Japanese government to live up to the cause of the Peace Constitution. Thus, the dual identity of postwar Japan began to be consolidated under the umbrella of the U.S.–Japan security relationship.

The Revision of the Security Treaty

As discussed above, challenges to Japan’s postwar realism came from both progressive political forces and traditional nationalists, albeit for totally different reasons. The former called for the abrogation of the U.S.–Japan security treaty and for Japan to be “neutral" by remaining true to the Peace Constitution in its strict sense. The latter attacked the ambiguity of the Yoshida Doctrine and aspired to a security policy that would make Japan an “equal" partner of the United States. The revision of the 1951 security treaty with the United States was an example of this thinking. ₁₀

The revision was proposed and promoted by politicians with a nationalist bent, and Yoshida’s group naturally was critical of such a move. For instance, Yoshida wrote to Hayato Ikeda in November 1958 words to the effect that he could not agree to Nobusuke Kishi’s policy to seek autonomy or equality with the United States.

According to Kishi, who accomplished the revision in 1960 as prime minister (1957–1960), his goal was to open up a new age in U.S.–Japan relations by making it an “equal" relationship. ₁₁ The inequality as embodied in the 1951 security treaty included the need for a clear U.S. commitment to defend Japan, the lack of a scheme for consultation between the two governments, the breach of Japanese sovereignty represented by the authorization of U.S. intervention in domestic disturbances, and the absence of stipulations on the life of the treaty and the termination procedures. All these symbolized the Japanese government’s loss of sovereignty in the security relationship.

The Japanese wish to revise the security treaty was first presented to the U.S. government in August 1955 by the leaders of the Democratic Party forming the Hatoyama government. The United States responded that revision was premature, and that for such a revision to take place the Constitution had to be revised and Japan rearm. When Kishi, former secretary–general of the Democratic Party, took office as prime minister of the LDP government in 1957, however, Washington began to worry seriously about the negative impact of anti–American feelings in Japan on the security relationship, and concluded that meeting the Japanese demand for “equality" would be the best policy.

Accordingly, almost all the Japanese requests were accepted in the revised “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan" signed on January 19, 1960. Of particular importance are the stipulations of Article 5 and Article 6:

Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes.

For the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.

In the original proposal by the U.S. government, “in the territories under the administration of Japan" in Article 5 read “in the Pacific," which in effect called for Japanese participation in collective defense with the United States. Given the established interpretation on collective self–defense and the domestic political situation, the Japanese government resisted the American proposal and successfully changed the provision. ₁₂

Regarding Article 6, there were legitimate concerns on the part of Japan about the introduction of U.S. nuclear forces into Japan and about the “entrapment" in regional conflict initiated by the United States. These concerns were handled by recognizing room for independent decision–making by Japan in an exchange of notes dated January 19, 1960, which confirmed the following:

Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States armed forces, major changes in their equipment, and the use of facilities and areas in Japan as bases for military combat operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those conducted under Article V of the said Treaty, shall be the subjects of prior consultation with the Government of Japan.

Rather than abating anti–American feelings in Japan, however, the revision of the treaty aggravated opposition to the U.S.–Japan security relationship among the Japanese public. From the leftist–pacifist perspective, the revised treaty embodied the consolidation of U.S.–Japan military alignment and thus enhanced the danger of “entrapment." The revision of the security treaty satisfied the traditional nationalist urge but was attacked by another camp of nationalists who called for Japan to dissociate from the Cold War into the paradise of “neutrality."

Although the revision satisfied the desire of traditional nationalists for “equality," the relationship was only nominally equal. The new treaty may have increased the margins of Japanese “autonomy," but it did not modify the fundamental scheme of the United States maintaining military bases in Japan for regional security including the defense of Japan. There were no deliberate efforts to contemplate an organic link between Japan’s defense efforts and the U.S. military presence even for the defense of Japan, not to mention for regional security. This situation basically continued throughout the 1960s, until the Nixon–Kissinger diplomacy triggered an important change in the regional security environment for the U.S.–Japan alliance.

Nixon–Kissinger Diplomacy and Japan

The Richard Nixon administration, which took office in January 1969, pursued three major diplomatic agendas simultaneously: withdrawal from Vietnam, détente with the Soviet Union, and rapprochement with China. In short, Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger thought that they would be able to withdraw from Vietnam in a credible fashion only if they succeeded in the creation of a “structure for peace" sustained by manageable balance–of–power relations with both of the communist giants, with the United States taking the “swing position" in the strategic triangle.

Rapprochement with China was to provide a breakthrough in this ambitious plan. The greatest asset for such U.S. diplomacy was the intensifying Sino–Soviet rift. This placed North Vietnam in a difficult position between China and the Soviet Union, and served as a significant impetus for China and the Soviet Union to give priority to improving relations with the United States over Vietnam. ₁₃ The American design toward North Vietnam was to isolate Hanoi and draw its belligerent leadership into settling the Vietnam War through negotiations. This plan was accomplished through Nixon’s China trip and the signing of the Shanghai Communiqué in February 1972, Nixon’s trip to Moscow and the signing of the SALT and ABM treaties in May 1972, and the Paris Peace Agreement to end the Vietnam War in January 1973.

A new international structure thus emerged in the Asia Pacific which in effect amounted to the reconstruction of Pax Americana. This in turn affected the U.S.–Japan alliance. The core concept of the new U.S. diplomacy in the Asia Pacific was reflected in the Nixon Doctrine, initially expressed as an “informal" remark by Nixon in July 1969 in Guam and eventually formulated into a three–point policy in Nixon’s address to the nation in November 1969 and in his first foreign policy report to Congress in February 1970. The three points read as follows:

First, the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments.

Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

Third, in cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested in accordance with our treaty commitments. But we shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility of providing the manpower for its defense. ₁₄

The first and second points assured U.S. commitment to its treaty obligations and a nuclear umbrella for the allied countries, while the third asked the allies to assume primary responsibility for their own defense.

Accordingly, Japan was expected to strengthen its own defense efforts and to assume to some extent responsibility for regional security. The Sato–Nixon joint communiqué announced in November 1969 included important stipulations in this respect; the so–called “Korea clause" and “Taiwan clause" stated, respectively:

The Prime Minister...stated that the security of the Republic of Korea was essential to Japan’s own security...

The Prime Minister also said that the maintenance of peace and security in the Taiwan area was also a most important factor for the security of Japan.

Due to the strength of Japan’s dual identity, however, the Sato administration did not see the implications of these strategic developments exclusively from the dominant international logic described above. The most telling case was the reversion of the administrative right of Okinawa, which was also promised in the 1969 Sato–Nixon joint communiqué. From an American perspective, the return to Japanese territory of Okinawa, the essential military base in the Far East, was acceptable only along the lines of the Nixon Doctrine. It was natural, therefore, that the reversion would bring about more Japanese responsibility for the maintenance of regional stability as symbolized by the Korean clause and the Taiwan clause of the Sato–Nixon joint communiqué. Knowing that these clauses would run counter to Japan’s strictly defense–oriented security policy, however, Sato accepted them as “concessions" to the United States for returning Okinawa rather than as substantial components of Japan’s security policy in a new post–Vietnam security environment.

A nuclear–free Okinawa was important for Sato for reasons of domestic politics and the pacifist profile of Japan’s dual identity. Indeed, the three non–nuclear principles of “not possessing nuclear weapons, not producing them and not permitting their introduction into Japan" were established in the context of the reversion of Okinawa, which was first articulated by Sato in the Diet in December 1967. Perhaps, Nixon and Kissinger understood these peculiar Japanese imperatives, and attempted to take advantage of them in order to gain as many political concessions as possible on other outstanding issues, particularly the textile dispute. ₁₅

While these patterns of impact reflected the profile of Japan as a non–traditional power, Nixon–Kissinger diplomacy approached Japan also as a great power. This involved how American and Chinese leaders perceived Japan and the role of the U.S.–Japan security relationship in the context of strategic Sino–American rapprochement. ₁₆

Both Nixon and Kissinger, respectively, addressed this question in their memoirs:

If we were to leave Japan naked and defenseless, they would have to turn to others for help or build the capability to defend themselves. If we had not a defense arrangement with Japan, we would have no influence where they were concerned. ...

...it is the world as I see it, and when I analyze it, it is what brings us, China and America, together, not in terms of philosophy and not in terms of friendship—although I believe that is important—but because of national security I believe our interests are in common in the respects I have mentioned. (Nixon’s remarks to Zhou Enlai on February 18, 1972, in Beijing) ₁₇

...From an early hostility to the American alliance with Japan (still to be found in the Shanghai Communiqué), the Chinese leaders soon came, in part under our persistent persuasion, to view it as a guarantee of America’s continued interest in the Western Pacific and a rein on Japanese unilateralism. Soon they strongly supported close relations between Japan and America. ₁₈

Both of these remarks emphasized the “cork in the bottle" function of the U.S.–Japan security relationship, where they saw common national interests with China. This reflected a fundamental distrust of Japan as an independent security actor, and the U.S. and Chinese leaders were using a common language to talk about such a Japan. To these leaders, Japan as an independent security actor was not a fantasy but indeed a conceptual reality in the context of a highly strategic game they were playing. For China, the “remilitarization" of Japan was an immediate concern in the context of reduced U.S. presence in the region, and for Nixon and Kissinger Japan as an independent actor was a natural extension of their conception of a new international order based on a manageable balance of power among major powers.

Nixon’s handwritten personal notes prepared for the occasion of his meeting with Zhou Enlai are more revealing. Nixon wrote that the question is “do we tell the 2nd most prosperous nation to go it alone or do we provide a shield?" and “is a Japan policy with a U.S. veto more dangerous than a Japan only policy?" According to Nixon’s notes of the meeting, Zhou Enlai responded, “Japan’s feathers have grown on its own wings and it is about to take off," and “Can U.S. control the `Wild Horse’ of Japan?" ₁₉

Another of Nixon’s notes said, “Don’t say `we oppose rearmament of Japan.’ We oppose Nuclear Japan." Nixon then wrote that “Best to provide nuclear shield—to keep Japan from building its own—to have influence for US. We oppose Japan `stretching out its hands’ to Korea, Taiwan, India. But if we didn’t have a treaty, our remonstration would be like `empty cannon.’ `Wild Horse’ would not be controlled." ₂₀

In sum, these developments bring into relief the function of the U.S.–Japan security relationship in the context of Japan’s dual identity. On the one hand, the bilateral security setup as the mechanism to encourage Japan’s burden–sharing was directed against Japan’s profile as a non–traditional, self–restrained country. On the other hand, the U.S.–Japan security relationship as a “cork in the bottle" was a function directed against Japan as a potential independent security actor. The ambiguity originates from Japan’s dual identity, and Japan has had no alternative but to accept this ambiguity as long as it cannot escape from its dual identity.

Japan’s Policy Response to the “Nixon Shock"

Despite Nixon and Kissinger’s intention to rebuild a sound foundation for U.S. strategy, the new U.S. diplomatic strategy was initially perceived by many Japanese, including policy–makers, as signaling the decline of Pax Americana. The immediate response by some of Japan’s defense experts was to push for “autonomous defense" to compensate for a predicted decline in the U.S. role. The goal was again to achieve “equality" with the United States.

In late 1969, Defense Agency Director–General Kiichi Arita instructed the drafters to insert the posture of “autonomous defense" in the fourth defense program, and stressed the importance of maritime defense, air defense, and nationalization of weaponry production. ₂₁ Yasuhiro Nakasone, who replaced Arita in January 1970, was convinced that the 1957 Basic Policy for National Defense should be revised and that the SDF should become the basis of Japan’s national defense, with the U.S.–Japan security treaty playing a supplementary role. ₂₂ Nakasone’s initiative led to a draft plan for the fourth defense program, released in April 1971, which included the following passage:

...The United States will emphasize the need of self–help to its allies on the basis of the Nixon Doctrine and reduce U.S. forces stationed in the Far East including Japan. Therefore, Japan should promote its efforts for autonomous defense, with a view to coping with acts of aggression with limited purposes, modes and means. ₂₃

Understandably, this move came from traditional nationalists, but as had been the case before, such nationalist urges were unable to break down the fundamental framework of Japan’s postwar realism premised on its dual identity and gradually found their place in the overall scheme of U.S.–Japan security relations. In fact, due to mounting criticism both inside and outside Japan of the aspirations for an “autonomous defense," the contents of the fourth defense program, adopted in February 1972, were scaled down to what appeared to be a simple continuation of the third defense program.

Nonetheless, a dramatic shift in the security environment and Japan’s response to it triggered an important change in the U.S.–Japan security arrangement. What followed was a serious attempt to establish an organic link between Japan’s self–help efforts and the U.S.–Japan security ties, eventually made manifest in the “National Defense Program Outline (Taiko)," adopted in October 1976. Taiko saw in the international situation “a pronounced trend toward more diversified international relations." It dismissed the likelihood of full–scale aggression against Japan because “within the general neighborhood of Japan, an equilibrium exists, involving the three major powers of the United States, the Soviet Union and China," and because of the existence of the U.S.–Japan security arrangement. It saw the possibility of only limited military conflict in Japan’s neighborhood, while acknowledging that “deeply rooted factors for assorted confrontations remain within the East–West relationship revolving around the United States and the Soviet Union." ₂₄ In this context, it is symbolic that the government decision to establish a ceiling on the defense budget of one percent of GNP was made in November 1976, one month after the adoption of Taiko, and thus apparently as an important part of the Taiko regime.

Under these circumstances, Taiko defined “the most appropriate defense goal" of Japan as “the maintenance of a full surveillance posture in peacetime and the ability to cope effectively with situations up to the point of limited and small–scale aggression." Defense capabilities to meet the goal are embodied by the concept of “Standard Defense Force." According to Takuya Kubo (then vice minister of the Defense Agency and a main drafter of Taiko), the Standard Defense Force was what was required of Japan in order not to lose a contest of “limited and small–scale aggression," if not to win it. ₂₅ Major military attacks on Japan beyond such aggression were to be deterred and coped with by the U.S.–Japan security system. In this respect, Taiko stated that “a defense posture capable of dealing with any aggression should be constructed, through maintaining the credibility of the U.S.–Japan security arrangement and insuring the smooth functioning of that system. Against nuclear threat, Japan will rely on the nuclear deterrent capability of the United States."

The consolidation of the Taiko regime, therefore, proceeded hand in hand with a search for institutionalized U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. An important outcome of the institutionalization of U.S.–Japan security ties was the “Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation," approved by the U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee in November 1978. The guidelines defined the broad responsibilities of each side and called for joint studies on operational issues in three areas: prevention of aggression against Japan, responses to military attacks on Japan, and U.S.–Japan cooperation in case of a conflict in the Far East. The guidelines also called for joint exercises and training, cooperation in intelligence activities, and the study of how facilitative assistance should be extended to U.S. forces.

The shifting international environment in the 1970s was also an important factor in the formation of the concept of comprehensive security. The concept of comprehensive security is often treated as tantamount to preoccupation with economic security, allowing Japan to disregard military security issues under the protection of the United States. It must be emphasized, however, that it was the perception of declining American hegemony, not of the predominance of the United States, that initially propelled Japan’s thinking on comprehensive security. Indeed, for the drafters of the “Comprehensive Security Strategy Report" presented to Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira in 1980, the new U.S. security policy based on the Nixon Doctrine “augmented (the importance of) military security issues for Japan." ₂₆ Therefore, the report argued, “for the first time in the postwar years, Japan has to think seriously about its own efforts toward [military] self–help, and to prepare for the effective functioning of not only the overall friendly relationship but the military relationship with the United States." ₂₇

Thus, the new security environment in the 1970s forced the Japanese government to conceptualize its own defense efforts and security cooperation with the United States by taking the state of the regional security environment into account. In addition, the fact that China came to regard the U.S.–Japan alliance as an asset to its strategy in the new security environment inflicted a severe blow to the leftist political forces in Japan which had formed a strong alliance with China in their fight against the U.S.–Japan alliance. This resulted in a gradual decline of political forces against the U.S.–Japan alliance in Japan’s domestic politics throughout the 1970s, which encouraged the Japanese government to consolidate security cooperation with the United States under the new Cold War in the 1980s in the aftermath of the demise of the short–lived détente.

Consolidation of the Alliance

After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, momentum gathered for the expansion of Japan’s defense efforts and U.S.–Japan defense cooperation. In particular, U.S.–Japan security cooperation in the 1980s developed in four areas: joint defense planning, joint exercises and training, support for U.S. forces stationed in Japan, and cooperation in military technology.

Two sets of studies were conducted on joint defense planning as stipulated in the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation: one presupposing an attack on Japan and the other seeking cooperation in case of an emergency in the Far East. The latter proved not very productive, due to constitutional and political constraints on Japan’s security policy, and the study was suspended. The former, however, resulted in an important development after the May 1981 meeting between Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki and President Ronald Reagan, when Suzuki agreed to make efforts to protect 1,000 nautical miles west of Guam and north of the Philippines. Thereafter, defense of sea lanes was an important contingency in U.S.–Japan joint defense planning, the study of which was completed in December 1986.

Concurrently, U.S.–Japan joint military exercises and training were expanded significantly. The Air SDF began exercises with the United States in 1978 and the Ground SDF followed suit in 1981. The Maritime SDF participated in the RIMPAC exercises for the first time in 1980. ₂₈

In addition, Japan expanded defense cooperation with the United States by extending financial support for U.S. forces in Japan and by supplying military technology. Japan’s expenditures for support of U.S. forces in Japan came to account for about 10 percent of its total annual defense expenditure. The Japanese government also decided in January 1983 under the leadership of Prime Minister Nakasone to supply arms technology to the United States, as an exception to its ban on arms exports. Since then, Japan agreed to transfer to the United States technologies for portable surface–to–air missiles, for the construction and remodeling of U.S. naval vessels, for the next–generation support fighter, for the Digital Flight Control System to be installed on P–3C anti–submarine patrol aircraft, and for joint research on ducted rocked engines. ₂₉

It was quite revealing that the U.S.–Japan security relationship appeared most consolidated during the administration of Nakasone, an unambiguous nationalist. Nakasone attempted to expand the scope of the alliance with the United States beyond the bilateral framework, and actively committed himself to international security issues such as the INF negotiations. Here, the U.S.–Japan security system was not an obstacle to an expanded international profile for Japan, but was its facilitator. After Sino–American rapprochement, China also came to support such a function of the U.S.–Japan security ties as well as Japan’s defense capability.

Alongside these developments, however, there were cases where the U.S.–Japan alliance functioned to curtail Japan’s profile as a potential military power. The most telling case in the 1980s was the 1986–88 FSX controversy. Initially, Japan’s Defense Agency and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) exhibited interest in the national production of a next–generation support fighter to replace the existing F–1 fighter aircraft. Met by a negative reaction from the United States as well as cautious attitudes from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance, the Defense Agency agreed in mid–1978 to a co–development plan. Negotiations over the plan with United States were not smooth, however, given both countries’ keen interest in gaining an advantageous position in the work–share. Finally, a memorandum of understanding was signed in November 1988 in which Japan agreed to use the McDonnell–Douglas F–16 as a prototype and the United States agreed to assume about one–third of the cost of the co–development project, which would cost $7 billion. ₃₀

In sum, the consolidation of U.S.–Japan security cooperation since the late 1970s signified two important changes. The first was the development of joint planning and exercises for the defense of Japan, linking Japan’s self–help efforts and the U.S. military presence in an organic way for the first time since the signing of the security treaty. The second was Japan’s financial and technological support for the U.S. military presence. These new developments, however, did not expand into U.S.–Japan military cooperation in the domain of regional security, indicating that the consolidation of U.S.–Japan security cooperation developed within the confines of Japan’s postwar realism premised on its dual identity. The facilitating and constraining functions of the alliance for Japan’s security profile also indicated the tenacity of Japan’s dual identity. This dual identity continues to be the key element in Japan’s defense policy in the post–Cold War era, but under new circumstances.

Post–Cold War Developments

New Domestic Environment

The fluid security environment after the end of the Cold War gradually affected the domestic environment in Japan in which security issues and policy are addressed. The Gulf Crisis and the Gulf War in 1990–91 were a crucial turning point in raising Japanese awareness of the post–Cold War realities, as well as the inadequacy of Japan’s security policy, when Japan’s financial contribution of 13 billion U.S. dollars did not receive due credit in the international community. The Japanese government’s desire to share responsibility for international peace and stability through active manpower contribution became apparent, culminating in the passage in 1992 of the peacekeeping operations bill legalizing the participation of the SDF in UN peacekeeping activities. The Great Hanshin (Kobe) Earthquake that hit the Hyogo Prefecture in January 1995 and the deficient response by the Japanese government was another reminder, albeit from a totally different dimension, that Japan’s security policy had much room for improvement. The combination of these events from opposite ends of the security spectrum has contributed significantly to creating a domestic environment in Japan favorable to the reconsideration of its security policy.

While Japan’s dual identity is tenacious, there have been signs that the domestic tension over Japan’s security policy has eased considerably. The Socialist Party (now formally the Social Democratic Party, SDP), the largest opposition party under the 1955 regime, reversed its stance on Japan’s basic security policy with the ascendance of its leader, Tomiichi Murayama, to prime minister in June 1994. Murayama declared that the SDF was constitutional and that he would support the U.S.–Japan security treaty. Indeed, the most important impact of the summer 1993 elections, in which the LDP and SDP were the biggest losers, ₃₁ was the sharp decline of the influence of the SDP in the Japanese political process and system.

These changes in domestic politics have contributed to the rise of a less restrictive climate in which to discuss the Peace Constitution, including its possible revision, which was practically a political taboo when the SDP remained a strong opposition party. Reflecting this new atmosphere, the Yomiuri Shimbun, which with a circulation of 10 million is Japan’s most widely read newspaper, began to advocate the revision of the Peace Constitution; on November 3, 1994, it devoted four full pages to its own proposed revision. ₃₂ As in the current Constitution, the Yomiuri’s proposal does not recognize “the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes." It does, however, clarify the constitutionality of the SDF by clearly stating that “Japan shall form an organization for self–defense to secure its peace and independence and to maintain its safety." Further, the proposal states that “[i]n case of need, it may dispatch public officials and provide a part of its self–defense organization for the maintenance and promotion of peace and for humanitarian support activities."

It should be remembered, however, that the spirit of the proposed revision is to make the existing defense and security policies of Japan compatible with constitutional stipulations. The central rationale for a proposed revision of the Constitution, therefore, was to remove the sources of unproductive domestic conflict over Japan’s security policy, but within the confines of Japanese postwar realism.

It was in this new political environment that Taiko was revised in late 1995 and the U.S.–Japan alliance was revitalized through the “U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security" in April 1996. All this signifies that domestic developments in Japan in the post–Cold War era have encouraged the Japanese government to take a new look at the U.S.–Japan alliance, but still under the premise of Japan’s dual identity.

New Taiko

Japan’s first official response to the changing security environment of the post–Cold War world was the adoption of “National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996" (New Taiko) on November 28, 1995. New Taiko summarized the new regional trend in the following two points. First, “while the possibility of a global armed conflict has become remote, complicated and diverse regional conflicts are taking place in the Asia–Pacific and new kinds of dangers such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction are on the increase." Second, “in the areas surrounding Japan, the possibility of a situation which would seriously affect the security of Japan cannot be excluded." New Taiko made specific references to Russia’s large–scale military capabilities, including nuclear arsenals; the expansion and modernization of the military capabilities of regional countries; various unresolved territorial issues; and the uncertainty and unpredictability of the security environment in Asia such as tensions on the Korean peninsula.

New Taiko discussed the roles of Japan’s defense capabilities in the following three areas: (1) national defense, (2) response to large–scale disasters and various other situations including situations in the areas surrounding Japan “which would have an important influence on national peace and stability," and (3) contribution to the creation of a more stable security environment including participation in international peacekeeping activities, promotion of security dialogues and exchanges among defense authorities, and cooperation in the areas of arms control and disarmament. Accordingly, it dropped a reference to “limited and small–scale aggression" as a target of Japan’s defense preparedness discussed in the 1976 Taiko, although it continues to employ the concept of a Standard Defense Force.

There are unmistakable signs here that the role of the SDF is being expanded beyond the defense of Japanese territory into two new areas: “various situations including a situation in the areas surrounding Japan" and the creation of a stable security environment. The former presupposes the self–help efforts of the SDF in coping with, among other contingencies, large–scale disasters, terrorist activities, and inflows of refugees, on the one hand, and the SDF’s support for military operations by the United States in Japan’s vicinity for the security of Japan on the other. The second refers to a new rationale attached to the SDF under Japan’s efforts to create a stable security environment through noncombative measures such as participation in UN peacekeeping operations.

The U.S.–Japan security relationship is considered the fundamental and indispensable premise for these new dimensions of Japan’s self–help efforts. New Taiko recognizes four functions of the U.S.–Japan security relationship: it is indispensable to (1) “Japan’s security"; it will continue to play a key role in achieving (2) “peace and stability in the surrounding region of Japan" and establishing (3) “a more stable security environment"; and it facilitates Japanese efforts for (4) “peace and stability of the international community, including promotion of regional multilateral security dialogues and cooperation, as well as support for various United Nations activities."

Of particular importance is the new emphasis on the regional implications of the U.S.–Japan alliance. In this, New Taiko apparently attempted to establish a new balance between the alliance’s function to defend Japan and its implications for regional security. Despite this new orientation, however, how Japan could contribute to the function of the alliance for regional security remained unclear due to the postwar political and legal constraints on Japan’s security policy, which remains basically unchanged. It was in this context that the cabinet secretary issued a statement upon the release of New Taiko which emphasized that “there is no change in the previous interpretation of the government on items prohibited by the Constitution such as the right of collective defense," and that the expression “in achieving peace and stability in the surrounding region of Japan" in the section on U.S.–Japan security arrangements did not entail a change in the government’s understanding on the range of the “Far East" stipulated in the U.S.–Japan security treaty.

The U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security

The “U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security," ₃₃ signed by Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto and President Bill Clinton in April 1996, reaffirmed the regional logic of the alliance. The subsequent development of the security cooperation between the United States and Japan gradually made clear a new direction of the alliance, in particular the nature of the Japanese contribution to the United States under the alliance setup.

Regarding the regional implications of the U.S.–Japan alliance in the new age, the joint declaration stated:

... They [the Prime Minister and the President] reaffirmed that the Japan–U.S. security relationship, based on the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America, remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives, and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia–Pacific region as we enter the twenty–first century.

The joint declaration then listed five areas in which the two nations would “undertake efforts to advance cooperation": (1) continued close consultation on defense policies and military postures, as well as exchange of information and views on the international situation; (2) review of the 1978 Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation and studies on bilateral cooperation in response to situations that may arise in areas surrounding Japan and affect Japan’s peace and security; (3) promotion of the bilateral cooperative relationship through the Acquisition and Cross–Servicing Agreement signed on April 15, 1996; (4) promotion of mutual exchange in the areas of military technology and equipment; and (5) prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, and cooperation in the ongoing study on theater missile defense.

As a result of these developments, the U.S.–Japan alliance has begun to have a dual function. One function is explicit: the alliance must work to deal with potential short–term regional conflict such as the situation on the Korean peninsula. This function derives primarily from the actual stipulations and arrangements of the bilateral security treaty. Of particular importance as stated in the joint security declaration are the Acquisition and Cross–Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and a revision of the “Guidelines for Defense Cooperation between Japan and the United States." The ACSA defined ways and means of U.S.–Japan cooperation in such areas as joint military exercises, UN peacekeeping operations, and international humanitarian relief activities. As examined closely below, the revision of the guidelines included the study of possible methods of military cooperation between the United States and Japan for the explicit purpose of preserving Japan’s security in case of regional emergencies.

The other function that has gradually emerged after the joint declaration is implicit: on the abstract level of the international structure, the alliance functions as a de facto stabilizer in the long–term international dynamics of shifting major power relations.

The Explicit Function of the Alliance

Much of the U.S.–Japan security cooperation promoted by New Taiko and the joint security declaration has a direct bearing on the security of the Korean peninsula. Of particular significance in this respect is the agreement to review the guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation. The review’s interim report was released in June 1997, to encourage public debate and increase transparency, followed by the release of the final report on September 23, 1997. ₃₄

The review was conducted in conformity with “the peace and security of Japan," not with that of the United States nor regional security, and this was due to Japan’s constitutional limits prohibiting the use of force beyond self–defense and for settling international disputes. In addition, self–defense is still interpreted by the Japanese government to exclude collective defense actions, such as U.S.–Japan joint military operations on the Korean peninsula, even if such contingencies are interpreted to have significant impact on Japan’s security. Accordingly, the new guidelines stated: “Japan will conduct all its actions within the limitations of its Constitution and in accordance with such basic positions as the maintenance of its exclusively defense–oriented policy and its three non–nuclear principles."

Due to these fundamental limitations on the security policy of Japan, the bilateral cooperation called for by the new guidelines appears amorphous in several respects.

First, whereas U.S.–Japan cooperation should be relevant in “areas surrounding Japan," the new guidelines justified such cooperation only for the security of Japan and not for U.S. military objectives per se. By the same token, U.S.–Japan cooperation should be based on the Japanese Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s use of force outside of Japanese territories for settling international disputes. Japanese cooperation with the United States in “situations in areas surrounding Japan," therefore, should not involve Japan’s “use of force," and what constitutes use of force was a central issue in the Japanese policy–making process and U.S.–Japan negotiations over the revision of the guidelines. The agreement in the new guidelines, for instance, that Japan can transport U.S. weapons and ammunition in logistical support but cannot provide the weapons and ammunition of the SDF to the United States reflects these fundamental constraints on Japan’s role.

The kind of cooperation that Japan can provide for the United States is therefore limited in both scope and quality. Areas of such cooperation in “situations in areas surrounding Japan" listed in the new guidelines are relief activities and measures to deal with refugees, search and rescue, noncombatant evacuation operations, activities for ensuring the effectiveness of economic sanctions, use of facilities, rear area support (supply, transportation, maintenance, medical services, security, communications), surveillance, minesweeping, and sea and air space management. The new guidelines listed forty concrete items of cooperation as examples.

In sum, although the logic of the post–Cold War era and a major power profile of Japan call for Japanese contribution to regional security within the broad context of the U.S.–Japan alliance, the other profile of Japan, shaped by its historical record of military aggression, makes it inevitable that such contribution be kept within the confines of Japan’s postwar realism. Its contribution may be too small in the eyes of those wanting more cooperation from Japan, and too large to those concerned about Japan’s profile as a major power. In fact, these items of cooperation are the result of compromise between the military rationale presented by the United States and constitutional and legal constraints on the part of Japan. Under these circumstances, the motivation on the Japanese side has been to do as much as possible within the constraints. This is so because the lack of understanding of the Japanese situation among the American public, including influential members of Congress, is correctly perceived by Japanese policy–makers as a central source of American frustration about the U.S.–Japan alliance, and therefore an intractable source of alliance instability.

Second, there is the question of the compatibility of the U.S.–Japan security treaty and the bilateral cooperation promoted by the guidelines review. This hinges upon the relationship between the two missions of the U.S.–Japan alliance: defense of Japan and regional security. According to Article 6 of the security treaty, the United States has the right of use of its bases in Japan for peace and security in the Far East, such as in case of a Korean contingency. The ambiguity, however, arises in connection with Japanese cooperation with such U.S. actions, which is provided for by Article 5 in defense of Japan but not by Article 6. In other words, Japanese contribution in the framework of the U.S.–Japan alliance is still justified for the security of Japan, but such new arrangements would have de facto regional implications.

Naturally, any regional situation with national security implications has always been of concern to Japan. Increasing security uncertainties in the region caused by the demise of the Cold War make a response by Japan inevitable in certain cases such as on the Korean peninsula, but any such response still hinges upon the Constitution, which prohibits Japan’s use of force in military conflict outside the Japanese territory. The United States would respond anyway, regardless of Japanese constitutional limits. Given the alliance relationship, both Washington and Tokyo thought that such U.S. military actions should necessarily be coordinated with the feasible Japanese contribution, and that such Japanese contribution should not entail the “use of force"; therefore, the review of the guidelines was initiated and progressed as it did.

Third, there is the question of what constitutes “situations in areas surrounding Japan." The Japanese government’s official stance is that this is not a geographical concept, and that whether or not such situations would become security concerns to Japan depends on individual cases. Under the current circumstances, the Korean peninsula is clearly considered a security concern to Japan; the Taiwan Strait is not included although it could theoretically develop into a concern in the future. It is against this backdrop that Director–General of the Defense Agency Akio Kyuma stated on July 29, 1997, that there was no need to prepare for a Taiwan crisis in actual joint military planning based on the guidelines review.

The Implicit Function of the Alliance

The importance of the China factor hinges upon the implicit function of the U.S.–Japan alliance, which is to stabilize the process of the shift in the balance of power among the major powers. This does not necessarily derive from particular stipulations of the security treaty but will become apparent in the long–term dynamics of shifting great–power relations. The reference to the security of the Asia Pacific region in the joint security declaration of April 1996 implies this function of the redefined alliance relationship.

While China’s victim–mentality response to the joint security declaration and the guidelines review was clearly an overreaction, given China’s predisposition to think strategically for the long term its response may have suggested that China is prepared to oppose this implicit function of the alliance in the long run. In the end, Chinese actions themselves will decide whether the U.S.–Japan security setup, in its counterbalancing capacity, will be brought into play against China. The common objective of Washington and Tokyo for the time being is to prevent this worst–case scenario from becoming a reality.

For better or worse, China is a central factor in this overall picture—not because it is destined to be a threat, but because it is at the center of the dynamic changes in the Asian order. In recent years, China has increasingly emphasized its hundred–year history of national humiliation and imperial aggression, which is an important source of rising nationalism and external assertiveness. The Taiwan crisis in March 1996 was one concrete example of this. A series of Chinese missile tests and military exercises aimed at unsettling Taiwan’s presidential election in March exposed the fundamental character of Chinese foreign policy at this time of transition—assertive projection of its long–term desires. Beijing had undoubtedly planned in advance the steps it took right after the election: issuing a “victory declaration" and wrapping up its military exercises. The U.S. dispatch of two carrier groups to the region was also based on a long–term systemic consideration of maintaining the balance of power, rather than a response to an immediate threat.

Today’s “China problem" is thus essentially an issue of great–nation power politics affecting the structure of the international system. China itself is increasingly seeing regional and international political issues in the context of classic power politics. ₃₅ In the final analysis, the United States remains the only nation that can stabilize this major–power political game.

Japan, on the other hand, has had the postwar destiny to live with its dual identity. Herein lies the fundamental significance of the alliance with the United States for Japan, which is premised on a Japan that can not and is determined not to develop a level of power politics comparable to that of China (or for that matter to that of the United States).

Conclusion

This paper has demonstrated that preoccupation with only half of Japan’s dual identity, either with a Japan as a potential independent security actor or with a Japan as a constrained security actor, is bound to miss the nature of Japanese security policy and the importance of the U.S.–Japan alliance for Japan. The security policy of Japan could not have been complete without the U.S.–Japan alliance filling the gap in Japan’s dual identity, and this situation is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.

As such, as the postwar years have progressed the U.S.–Japan alliance has been accepted by Japan’s central decision–makers as well as by the majority of the general public, despite its asymmetric and ambiguous arrangements and the dominant perception among the Japanese that the alliance has benefited the United States more than Japan. The alliance has been justified and accepted by many Asian countries, as well as by the United States itself, due to its alleged function as a “cork in the bottle" against a possible remilitarization of Japan, while the Japanese themselves have been developing an effective mechanism domestically to curtail such a possibility. The loss of Japanese sovereignty in the management of the alliance, whose primary utility for the United States has been as part of its regional and global strategy as the world’s superpower, has been obvious. In Japan’s domestic politics, these apparent inequalities and a wounded sense of Japanese pride have often been taken up by the political forces opposing the U.S.–Japan alliance, but not by the central decision–makers. The reaffirmation or the redefinition of the U.S.–Japan alliance through the joint security declaration in April 1996 demonstrated that Japan’s fundamental disposition toward the alliance, as well as the premise of its dual identity, has not changed, even under the post–Cold War realities.

Changes in the function of the alliance and in Japan’s role in the alliance have occurred within the confines of these fundamental parameters in response to the shifting security environment in the region and domestic developments in Japan. Since the 1970s in particular, the Japanese government began to conceptualize its defense policy as an integral part of the U.S.–Japan alliance and in conjunction with the security environment surrounding Japan. The result, however, was not an expansion of Japan’s security policy beyond an exclusively defense–oriented policy, but closer cooperation with the United States and increased support for the U.S. presence.

Advancing security cooperation with the United States without breaking the postwar mold of Japan’s security policy has been a complicated endeavor. Particularly complex is when and where Japan’s contribution is justified in a regional context. As demonstrated by the review of the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation, Japan’s logistical support of U.S. military operations in cases of regional contingencies is justified strictly for the security of Japan and does not entail the “use of force" by Japan outside the Japanese territory, as prohibited by the Peace Constitution.

Despite these fundamental limitations on the role of Japan, the consolidation of security cooperation up to the limits of Japanese legal and political constraints has clearly strengthened the explicit function of the alliance to meet regional contingencies. The new commitment by the Japanese government to the security of the Asia Pacific through the joint security declaration in April 1996 was also significant, because, at the level of political will, it has strengthened the implicit function of the alliance as a stabilizing factor in the long–term process of the shift in the balance of power among the major powers.

Needless to say, all this would have been impossible if Japan had attempted to break the postwar mold of its security policy premised on its dual identity. The strengthening of the U.S.–Japan alliance has been possible throughout the postwar years because of Japan’s determination to build its security policy on the basis of its dual identity and to uphold the U.S.–Japan alliance as its core.

Endnotes

Note 1: I have recently developed the same thesis elsewhere, with particular attention to Japan’s relations with China and Southeast Asia. See Yoshihide Soeya, “The Japan–U.S. Alliance in a Changing Asia," Japan Review of International Affairs 10, no. 4 (Fall 1996); and Yoshihide Soeya, “Ajia no Chitsujo–hendo to Nihon–gaiko" [The changing Asian order and Japanese diplomacy], Kokusai Mondai, no. 444 (March 1997). Back.

Note 2: Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1993); Thomas U. Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum: The Japanese Culture of Anti–Militarism," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993). Back.

Note 3: Berger, “From Sword to Chrysanthemum," 137. Back.

Note 4: See Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon–gaiko to Chugoku, 1945–1972 [Japanese diplomacy and China, 1945–1972] (Tokyo: Keio University Press, 1995). Back.

Note 5: Kenneth N. Waltz, “The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 55. Back.

Note 6: George F. Kennan, Memoirs 1925–50 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968), 359. Back.

Note 7: Akio Watanabe, “Kowa–mondai to Nihon no Sentaku" [The peace problem and Japan’s choice], in Seigen Miyazato, ed., Sanfuransisuko Kowa [San Francisco peace] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 1986). Back.

Note 8: Akihiko Tanaka, Anzen–hosho [Security] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbun–sha, 1997), 65–69. Back.

Note 9: For these interpretations by the government, see ibid., 146, 150, and 178, respectively. Back.

Note 10: Soeya, Nihon–gaiko to Chugoku, 1945–1972, 13–17. Back.

Note 11: Nobusuke Kishi, Kishi Nobusuke Kaiko–roku [Memoirs of Nobusuke Kishi] (Tokyo: Kosaido, 1983), 312. Back.

Note 12: Tanaka, Anzen–hosho, 182–185. Back.

Note 13: Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American–Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985). Back.

Note 14: “Address to the Nation on the War in Vietnam. November 3, 1969," Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States, Richard Nixon, 1969 (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1971), 905–906. Back.

Note 15: Wakaizuki Kei, Tasaku Nakarishi wo Shinzemu to Hossu [There were no other alternatives] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1994). Back.

Note 16: For an earlier analysis of mine on this, see Yoshihide Soeya, “Beichu–wakai to Nichibei–kankei" [Sino–American rapprochement and U.S.–Japan relations], Hogaku Kenkyu (Keio University), Vol. 69, No. 8 (August 1996). Back.

Note 17: Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 567. Back.

Note 18: Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 1089. Back.

Note 19: “Nixon’s Handwritten Personal Notes Regarding US–China Visit," Record Number 74177, Set: U.S.–Japan, Date: 02/15/1972, National Archives Name/Subject File, 1969–1974; Box 7; Folder–China Notes. Back.

Note 20: “Nixon’s Personal Handwritten Notes on US–China Meeting," Record Number 74176, Set: U.S.–Japan, Date: 02/19/1972, National Archives Name/Subject File, 1969–1974; Box 7; Folder–China Notes [by Richard Nixon]. Back.

Note 21: Hideo Otake, Nihon no Boei to Kokunai Seiji [Defense of Japan and domestic politics] (Tokyo: San’ichi–shobo, 1983), 32. Back.

Note 22: Yasuhiro Nakasone et al., “Kokubo wo Saikento–suru" [Reconsidering national defense], Kokubo, no. 212 (October 1970), 23–24. Back.

Note 23: “Shin Boei–ryoku Seibi Keikaku (Yoji–bo) Boeicho Gen’an" [A Defense Agency draft plan of the Fourth Defense Program], Kokubo, no. 220 (June 1971), 33. Back.

Note 24: For the full text of Taiko in English, see Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: The Japan Times, annual). Back.

Note 25: Takuya Kubo, “Boei–hakusho Atogaki: Shiken" [A postscript to the Defense White Paper: A personal view], Kokubo (August 1976), 25. Back.

Note 26: Comprehensive Security Study Group, Sogo–anzenhosho Senryaku [Comprehensive security strategy] (Tokyo: Okura–sho Insatsu–kyoku, 1980), 33. Back.

Note 27: Ibid., 33. Back.

Note 28: Research Institute for Peace and Security, Asian Security 1980 (Tokyo: Nikkei Business Publishing Co., 1980), 188–189. Back.

Note 29: Defense of Japan 1994, 74. Back.

Note 30: For a detailed analysis of the controversy as well as issues of military technology in Japan’s defense, see Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan’s Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1992). Back.

Note 31: The LDP gained 223 seats, losing its majority of the 511 seats in the Lower House for the first time, whereas the SDP lost almost half of its seats, dropping from 134 to 70. Back.

Note 32: The Yomiuri Shinbun, November 3, 1994. English translation is from The Yomiuri Shinbun. Back.

Note 33: “U.S.–Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the Twenty–first Century" (April 17, 1996). Back.

Note 34: U.S.–Japan Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation, “The Interim Report on the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation," Honolulu, June 7, 1997. U.S.–Japan Security Consultative Committee, “Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.–Japan Defense Cooperation," New York, September 23, 1997. Back.

Note 35: Tatsumi Okabe, “Chugoku–gaiko no Koten–teki Seikaku" [The classic nature of Chinese diplomacy], Gaiko Forum, no. 88 (January 1996). Back.