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Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation

Susan L.Shirk

Michael Stankeiwicz

Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation

March 1998

Table of Contents

Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Proposals for Nuclear Cooperation

Gaining access to energy resources has long been a source of contention among established and rising powers. IGCC Policy Papers 35-37, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia, examine the significance of Northeast Asia's rising energy demands on regional and global energy and security politics.

In Policy Paper 35, Kent Calder and Fereidun Fesharaki debated the fundamental issue of whether rising energy demand generates new security dilemmas or whether efficient energy markets mitigate potential security risks arising from increased competition for energy resources. Calder argued that energy rivalry might deepen tensions among the major powers in Northeast Asia. Fesheraki sees manageable market competition where Calder sees more fundamental rivalries.

In Policy Paper 36, Fesharaki and his colleagues at the East-West Center's Program on Resources, Energy, and Minerals examined supply and demand projections of fossil fuel usage and argued that markets can solve looming energy crises, obviating the need for multilateral solutions. Their analysis of the inefficacy of certain proposals for regional cooperation regimes based on intra-regional pipelines suggests caution about the prospects of current proposals for multilateral cooperation, highlighting the enormous political and social distrust in the region--the basis of Calder's fears about regional tension and rivalry.

Policy Papers 35 and 36 contain two common themes. The contributors to both noted the increasing primacy that Asian economies place on nuclear power as a future energy source, especially relative to the dwindling post-Chernobyl and Three Mile Island nuclear programs elsewhere. They also provided evidence supporting Calder's proposal that energy rivalry not only provides potential for major power tension, but also the opportunity for major power cooperation. In this era of cheap oil supplies and even cheaper development technologies, and with all of the governments in Northeast Asia maintaining a primary goal of economic growth and higher standard of living for their constituents, Northeast Asia has a shared priority in guaranteeing safe, stable energy supplies without risking the shortages that historically led to competition and conflict. 1

Policy Paper 37 introduces prominent proposals for multilateral Northeast Asian nuclear energy cooperation advanced by Kaneko Kumao, Suzuki Atsuyuki and Jor- Shan Choi (an analysis by Suzuki Tatsujiro about lessons from the European experience (EURATOM) appeared in IGCC Policy Paper 24, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia). 2 Cooperation on nuclear energy would have a direct impact on political and security relations among Northeast Asian states. Nuclear power is an attractive alternative for all the Northeast Asian states, especially Japan and South Korea, which have no energy resources of their own and have to import all their fuels. Nuclear energy is much cleaner than that extracted from fossil fuels, and it is a symbol of technological modernity.

Nuclear programs raise a series of issues that transcend national borders, including the safety of nuclear energy production; the dangers associated with reprocessing (i.e., risk of diversion for military purposes), the challenges of disposal of spent fuel and nuclear waste, and safety issues related to the security of nuclear materials and facilities. Therefore, it is not surprising that as nuclear energy has developed in Northeast Asia, there has been a parallel growth of multilateral cooperative initiatives, including from governments in the region. 3 However, it is not clear that these efforts have yet addressed the full range of concerns encompassed by what the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) calls the "new realities" of the fuel cycle. 4

Although some proposals for regional nuclear power cooperation include technical assistance on the operation of power plants, particularly dealing with safety, all of them concentrate on the problem of the disposal of spent nuclear fuel (please see Appendix A for a description of this, related to what is known as the back end of the nuclear fuel cycle). Each country building nuclear power plants faces the challenge of disposing of radioactive wastes. The political problems of siting such waste repositories are immense, and the international community, particularly the United States, worries about having the waste recycled into military uses. For China, Japan, South Korea, Russia, and possibly North Korea to devise a joint solution to the waste disposal problem by establishing a regional temporary or permanent storage site in some remote area would ease fears of nuclear threats and enhance trust throughout the region. For example, public concerns about Japan's excess plutonium supplies emanating from its recycling program would disappear if Japan stored this plutonium in a regional repository, with regional and global safeguards and real-time monitoring--accounting for all waste at all times.

Together, Kaneko, Suzuki, and Choi shed light on the diverse range of actors initiating activity in this topic. As Edward Fei characterizes in his analysis of the three proposals, Kaneko's approach is shaped by his long and distinguished career as a diplomat, seeking to develop regional confidence-building measures in a part of the world where major powers lack trust. Kaneko delves into the country-specific problems faced by each Asian country with a civilian nuclear weapons program, conceding that global regimes such as the IAEA or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are not sufficient to address the region's suspicions regarding neighbors' nuclear programs. Iraq and North Korea are examples where IAEA safeguards were insufficient, and the NPT lacks sanctions against violators. Kaneko proposes a regional ASIATOM that would include annual meetings of ministerial-level government representatives, an ASIATOM committee to oversee operations, and functional/technical committees comprised of nuclear technicians. Three centers are proposed, focusing on safety, storage, and research and development. But Kaneko emphasizes that the key aspect of any ASIATOM would have to include a regional safeguards/ inspection system administered by ASIATOM representatives that would complement the existing insufficient NPT/IAEA safeguards.

Suzuki's less ambitious proposal belies the perspective of an academic, one of the leading nuclear experts in the region. Suzuki, who was recently named to head up the reform committee of the PNC, Japan's national nuclear program, proposes a regional intermediate storage facility for deep underground storage until long- term issues regarding NIMBY (not in my backyard) concerns are resolved. This would harness the collective financial and technical resources of Northeast Asian countries to solve short-term storage concerns until permanent solutions are devised, either technically or politically, in the next 50 years. In addition, Suzuki suggests a regional facility devoted to research for underground geological nuclear waste disposal, which would be devoted to overcoming technical concerns about permanent underground storage and--more importantly-- engage in public education about the safety of geological disposal to overcome NIMBY resistance.

Choi lays out the wide realm of possibilities for technical cooperation based on his extensive background as a nuclear engineer. Choi's chapter provides the most extensive documentation about the current status of Northeast Asia's civilian nuclear weapons programs, including the governments' current plans for waste disposal. He identifies many of the same problems that Kaneko does, and supports the formation of a regional cooperative framework soon to resolve current problems hindering civilian nuclear power development in Northeast Asia. Unlike Kaneko, Choi chooses no specific name, such as ASIATOM, but narrows initial membership from all Asian countries to just those areas currently possessing nuclear programs (China, Japan, North and South Korea, Taiwan, and the Russian Far East). Choi argues that while the six areas share proximity, mutual security interests, interdependent economic objectives, and common energy needs, their distrust stemming from historical hostilities, potential military and territorial disputes, and competition for natural and energy resources makes it vital that the most likely catalyst of such a regime, the United States, be a member too. Choi's proposed compact includes many of the same features suggested by Kaneko and Suzuki: radioactive waste management, nuclear non-proliferation safeguards, safety, and economic cooperation. What distinguishes Choi's proposals is its fixed three-year period devoted to dialogue and information exchange about a regional nuclear compact. Energy policy planners, nuclear experts, nuclear industry representatives, foreign ministry officials, and defense ministry officials would all participate in track two meetings (with government officials participating in their private capacities, not as representatives of their government) devoted to overcoming barriers and concerns about a regional compact. At the end of the three-year period, the appropriate governments then would face a decision about whether or not an East Asian regional nuclear compact is feasible and should be implemented. This eases prototypical concerns in Northeast Asia about premature institutionalization.

Discussions of plans for possible nuclear power cooperation in Northeast Asia are at an early stage. Whether they ever materialize depends largely on the policies of the U.S. government. At present, Washington officials remain ambivalent: On the one hand, they see the positive value for peace and security of regional nuclear cooperation. On the other hand, they are leery of any regional policies that in effect encourage countries to build nuclear power plants because these plants produce material that can be used to build nuclear bombs. From this perspective, the best guarantee against proliferation would be to discourage nuclear power altogether.

In Policy Paper 37, Fei, of the United States Department of Energy, offers a summary and critique of the proposals by Kaneko, Suzuki, and Choi, in which he focuses on their political feasibility. Fei points out the limitations of Kaneko's and Choi's top-down approach to nuclear cooperation based on establishing organizations to lead nuclear cooperation. In Suzuki's proposal, Fei highlights the benefits of understanding the role that utilities play in nuclear programs, of establishing a scheme that aligns Japanese and American interests, and recognizing the potential gains of postponing a decision on permanent storage of nuclear waste by settling on an interim plan. Finally, Fei notes that while the proposals highlight the important role the United States plays in nuclear policy in the region--Choi and Suzuki emphasize the importance of US involvement, while Kaneko sees US leadership as a hindrance to regional cooperation--none adequately address the complex role that China must play in this field if nuclear cooperation is to become a regional confidence building measure (CBM).

IGCC Policy Papers 35-37, Energy and Security in Northeast Asia, examine the energy-security connection in Asia with an eye towards a greater challenge. As exemplified by the papers in this volume, numerous energy experts and technicians believe multilateral cooperation can help Asia meet its rising energy demand, especially in an era of low-cost availability of fossil fuel resources. However, as noted by Calder, many diplomats are struggling with efforts to increase confidence among Northeast Asian nations, to mitigate what are seen as a potentially explosive set of security conditions in the region.

Both sets of actors, technical and diplomatic, have viable goals, but without joining forces, neither has had the political will to move forward. Perhaps together they do? If technical collaboration is seen as a CBM, then skepticism about technical merit may not be as important. It can be argued that cooperation per se on technical issues will not necessarily yield political spillovers. But two reasons distinguish cooperation on nuclear energy as a vital first-step CBM in Northeast Asia. First, it is only through multilateral cooperation that the fundamental concerns about nuclear energy (dwindling capacity for waste storage and suspicions related to potential diversion of weapons-grade material for military purposes) can be resolved. There is no other viable alternative that can be achieved unilaterally or even bilaterally. Second, other efforts at multilateral CBMs in Northeast Asia have proven to be too sensitive, too premature, with aversion to the institution-building that accompanied multilateral security in Europe.

If other CBMs are premature, maybe cooperation on nuclear issues is a good test case for confidence-building among the major powers in Northeast Asia, of beginning to overcome the region's deeply-held suspicions arising from the 20th century's history of acrimonious relations? One example of the political benefits of technical collaboration is the United States-Russia lab-to-lab program, which developed trust and confidence at the grass-roots level through dialogue and exchange between the countries' leading nuclear weapons lab technicians, eventually paving the way for political, technical, and financial cooperation on nuclear weapons disposition.

One theme works its way throughout Energy and Security in Northeast Asia: Only when diplomatic policymakers--such as those involved in NEACD--join the dialogue of technical experts focusing on multilateral energy cooperation will these proposals gain the political acceptance necessary to justify the national risks associated with their implementation.

Endnotes

Note 1: Oil prices sank to their lowest price in real terms in history when they hit $10/barrel in early 1998. Back.

Note 2: Many papers in this collection first were presented to a September 1996 Northeast Asia Cooperation Dialogue (NEACD) workshop on Northeast Asian energy and security held in Seoul, Korea. IGCC founded NEACD in 1993 as an informal track-two dialogue exploring the potential for cooperation on security issues among China, Japan, Russia, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, and the United States. This workshop on energy and security offered participating government officials and private experts an opportunity to explore the ramifications of increasing energy demand on future relations among their countries. After the workshop, IGCC solicited additional papers to fill gaps and analyze basic premises among our initial contributions. Permission to reprint Appendix A: Nuclear Power Technology and The Nuclear Fuel Cycle, Nuclear Power Generation and Fuel Cycle Report 1997, Washington, DC: Energy Information Administration, pp. 43-46, granted by the U.S. Department of Energy. Back.

Note 3: See CSCAP (Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific) Working Group Report, Asia Pacific Multilateral Nuclear Safety and Non-Proliferation: Exploring the Possibilities (December 1996). For example, the idea of an Asia Nuclear Safety Consultation Organization (ANSCO) was first raised by South Korea at the September 1992 36th General Conference of the IAEA. This proposal was refined over successive years but is still considered "premature" by many governments (especially Australia and China) when it was last discussed at the October 1997 Seoul Conference on Nuclear Safety in Asia. Back.

Note 4: For details on the IAEA "new realities," as proposed by IAEA Director General Hans Blix, please see Edward Fei's chapter in this volume, "New Realities of Nuclear Energy: Analyzing Three Proposals for Cooperation in Asia." Back.

 

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