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CIAO DATE: 04/02


Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis

Andrew Scobell

Asia/Pacific Research Center

January 1999

China conducted a series of military exercises and missile tests in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait between July 1995 and March 1996. On July 18, 1995, Beijing announced that missile tests would be conducted targeting an area some 90 miles off the coast of northern Taiwan. Then, on three consecutive days, July 21, 22, and 23, a total of six DF-15 missiles were launched from sites in Fujian province–two per day. The following month, after a five-day advance warning, PLA naval vessels and aircraft conducted ten days of live-fire tests off the coast of Fujian. Further military exercises were conducted in mid-November to the south of the Strait, including joint operations involving air, land, and naval arms of the PLA. On March 5, 1996, Beijing announced it would soon begin another round of missile tests. This time they were to be targeted at seas less than fifty miles from Taiwan's busiest ports. On March 8, three DF-15 missiles were fired from bases in Fujian. Five days later, another DF-15 missile was launched. Finally, also after advanced warning, live-fire tests and war games were conducted off the coast of Fujian to the north of the Strait and to the south of the Strait between March 12 and March 25. The maneuvers included amphibious landing exercises and aerial bombing. Some forty naval vessels, two hundred and sixty aircraft, and an esti-mated 150,000 troops participated.

The military exercises of the summer of 1995 were meant to signal China's displeasure at the visit of Taiwanese president Lee Teng-hui to the United States that June. The maneuvers and tests of March 1996 were meant to intimidate Taiwan in the lead-up to a presidential election and to chasten the incumbent, President Lee, who seemed certain to be reelected (which he was). The more general aim of these shows of force was to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence from China. And in both instances, China was also addressing another important audience: the United States. The message for Washington was that Beijing was deadly serious about Taipei and was prepared to use force if necessary to unite Taiwan with China, American intervention notwithstanding. This message was intended to deter the United States from promoting Taiwan's independence.

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