Director of Operational Test and Evaluation FY03 Report: Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

CIAO DATE: 09/04

Director of Operational Test and Evaluation FY03 Report: Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS)

Victoria Samson

February 2004

This report is Director Thomas Christie‘s unclassified assessment of the adequacy and sufficiency of the BMDS element test program during FY03. Classified discussions of these topics will be included in the annual Test & Evaluation Assessment of the BMDS Test program submitted in February 2004.

The BMDS is intended to provide a layered defense for the entire United States, deployed U.S. forces, friends, and allies from all ranges of threat ballistic missiles during all phases of flight. The BMDS will consist of land–, sea– and space–based sensors (both optical and radar), battle management systems, communications networks, long– and short–range interceptors, and directed–energy weapons.

On December 17, 2002, the President directed the Secretary of Defense, “ . . . to proceed with plans to deploy a set of initial missile defense capabilities beginning in 2004.” The Missile Defense Agency (MDA) is working to develop a set of Initial Defensive Capabilities (IDC), which can be deployed to conduct Initial Defensive Operations (IDO), using Ground– based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (Aegis BMD), and other BMDS elements. Each of these elements’ support of the IDO is discussed in its respective section.

It is prudent to identify and exploit defensive capabilities inherent in the BMDS infrastructure during the development phase. However, it is important to understand that assessments of these capabilities are based primarily on modeling and simulation, developmental testing of components and subsystems, and analyses — not end–to–end operational testing of a mature integrated system. Due to the immature nature of the systems they emulate, models and simulations of the BMDS cannot be adequately validated at this time. Confidence in assessed capabilities will improve as more system performance data is gathered to anchor the simulations or directly demonstrate these capabilities.

Planned operational assessments of IDO capability will focus on system performance against nation specific threats, as documented in a series of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) threat assessments. MDA is designing BMDS based on the capabilities of broad threat classes. MDA and the operational test agencies (OTAs) are working to connect the MDA threat capability document to the DIA threat assessment. IDO capability will be assessed for four engagement sequence groups consistent with North Korean Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) attack scenarios. The Command and Control, Battle Management and Communications (C2BMC) element will integrate the other BMDS elements into a system capable of providing integrated, layered defenses against all types of ballistic missile threats. For Block 2004 and IDO, C2BMC is planned to provide enhanced situational awareness for the warfighter. Specifically, this will consist of a common operating picture that provides early launch warning and impact point predictions to the warfighter and voice authorization for weapons release provided through an appropriate concept of operations. Plans call for enhancing C2BMC capabilities in Block 2006.

Due to immature BMDS elements, very little system level testing was performed by the close of FY03. Therefore, BMDS capabilities assessed for IDO will he based on test events planned for FY04. The OTAs are involved in the planning of these events and DOT%E is reviewing and approving operational test objectives for combined developmental test/ operational test events. These tests will be executed using simulated or theoretical performance characteristics for some elements. Scenarios are still being developed for the system level integrated ground–test (IGT–2), planned to support the initial deployment of BMDS. Flight tests planned to support validation of the ground–testing modeling efforts have slipped to the point that data will not be available prior to IGT–2. Data from flight testing and ground testing is needed to support extensive validation, verification, and accreditation efforts currently underway. Without the results of the flight testing, the ground testing efforts are at risk. If models accurately reflect flight test performance, IGT–2 results will be validated after the fact. At this point in time, it is not clear what mission capability will be demonstrated prior to IDO.

GROUND–BASED MIDCOURSE DEFENSE (GMD)

The Ground–based Midcourse Defense (GMD) element is an integrated collection of components that perform dedicated functions during an ICBM engagement. As planned, the GMD element includes the following components:

GMD Fire Control and Communications. The communications network links the entire element architecture via fiber optic links and satellite communications. For IDO, all fire control will be conducted within the GMD element.
Long–range sensors, including the Upgraded Early Warning Radar, the COBRA DANE radar, and the Ground–Based Radar Prototype. In December 2005, a sea–based X–Band (SBX) radar is to be incorporated.
Ground–Based Interceptors and emplacements, consisting of silo–based ICBM–class booster motor stack and the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV). The plan for the 2004 Test Bed plan places six Ground Based Interceptors at Fort Greely, Alaska, and four and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. In 2005, plans are to place ten more at Fort Greely.

Major GMD Test Limitations and MDA Mitigation Plans.
Limitation	Comments	MDA Mitigation Plan
Lack of deployable boost vehicle	The Orbital booster has been tested in developmental flight tests without attempted intercepts. The Lockheed booster testing has slipped such that it may not be available for IDO.	MDA is proceeding with deployment plans emphasizing the Orbital booster. Testing will continue with both designs as Lockheed booster production resumes.
Lack of realistically placed midcourse sensor	The GMD test radar is collocated at the interceptor launch site. The FPQ–14 radar, a non–deployable asset that tracks a transmitter attached to the test target, currently accomplishes the midcourse tracking and discrimination functions.	GMD is developing a mobile, sea–based radar. The scheduled employment of this radar in the GMD Test Bed occurs in the post–2005 time frame.
Fixed intercept point	All of the flight tests to date have had similar flyout and engagement paramenters. This limitation includes range contraints and a requirement not to create space debris.	The 2004 Test Bed expands the flyout range and engagement conditions. Space debris creation remains a problem.* Transitioning between testing and operations is a concern.

* These factors constrain test engagements to relatively low target intercept altitudes and downward directed velocities for both the target and interceptor.

GMD soon plans to interface with other BMDS elements and existing operational systems through external system interfaces. Through FY06, these plans include GMD interfacing with the Aegis Spy–1B radars and satellite–based sensors and communications.

To date, the GMD program has demonstrated the technical feasibility of hit–to–kill negation of simple target complexes in a limited set of engagement conditions. The GMD test program in FY03 was hindered by a lack of production representative test articles and from test infrastructure limitations. Delays in production and testing of the two objective booster designs have put tremendous pressure on the test schedule immediately prior to fielding. The most significant test and infrastructure limitations and mitigation plans are described in the table below.

Intercept Flight Test–9 (IFT–9) took place On October 14, 2002, resulting in a successful intercept. The target suite consisted of a mock warhead and a number of decoys launched from the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, towards the Reagan Test Site. IFT–9 (largely a replay of IFT–8) was designed to increase confidence in the GMD capability to execute hit–to–kill intercepts. Overall, the test execution was nominal although the EKV experienced the track gate anomaly previously observed in IFT–7 and IFT–8. The software changes incorporated in IFT–9 to mitigate this problem were not successful. Further changes were made prior to IFT–10.

In December 2002, GMD attempted a night intercept in IFT–10. In this test, the EKV failed to separate from the surrogate boost vehicle and therefore the ability to intercept the target could not be tested. The failure to separate was attributed to a quality control failure combined with shank and vibration loads on the EKV. As a result, corrective measures taken to fix the track gate anomaly found in previous tests could not be tested.

GMD suspended intercept flight testing after the EKV failed to separate from the surrogate booster in IFT–10. IFT–11 and IFT–12 that employed the problematic surrogate booster were eliminated from the schedule. This decision was reasonable given the increased risk of surrogate boost vehicle failure, the resources that would have to be diverted from tactical booster development to fix the problems, and the limited amount of additional information to be gained in IFT–11 and IFT–12 over that available from previous flight tests. It does, however, leave very limited time for demonstration of boost vehicle performance, integration of the boost vehicle to the new, upgraded EKV, and demonstration of integrated boost vehicle/interceptor performance. IFT–13A and IFT–13B remain in the schedule as non–intercept flight tests to confirm booster integration and performance. IFT–13C was added to the schedule and represents a significant exercise of the Test Bed infrastructure. It will be the first system–level flight test to use the Kodiak, Alaska facility to launch a target missile. While it is not a planned intercept attempt, it will fully exercise the system and may result in an intercept. IFT–13C also addresses a long–standing concern over target presentation that has not yet been tested. IFT–14 and IFT–15 are the next official intercept attempts and are scheduled for May 2004 and July 2004, respectively.

The Orbital Sciences Corperation booster was successfully tested with a mock EKV on August 16, 2003. Shock and vibration environments were measured and compared to previous test levels. Preliminary analyses suggest that the new booster produces lower than expected vibrations at the EKV. Performance of the real EKV mated with the Orbital booster will be demonstrated in IFT–14 prior to IDO. Similar demonstration flights for the Lockheed Martin booster design are slipping due to technical difficulties and several explosions at the missile propellant mixing facility. Silos and related construction projects at Fort Greely, Alaska; and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California, are proceeding on schedule. Due to safety considerations, no tests are currently planned to launch interceptors from the operational missile fields.

To date, EKV discrimination and homing have been demonstrated against simple target complexes in a limited set of engagement conditions. Demonstrations of EKV performance are needed at higher closing velocities and against targets with signatures countermeasures, and flight dynamics more closely matching the projected threat. In addition, system discrimination performance against target suites for which there is imperfect a priori knowledge remains uncertain. GMD is developing a SBX radar mounted on a semi–submersible platform. The SBX radar, scheduled for incorporation into the GMD element in December 2005, is designed to be a more capable and flexible mid–course sensor for supporting GMD engagements. This radar will improve the operational realism of the flight test program by providing a moveable mid–course sensor.

A flight demonstration of the BMDS capability using Aegis SPY–1B data (particularly for defense of Hawaii) is planned for IFT–15 in FY04. A flight demonstration of COBRA DANE is currently not planned, and its capability will need to be demonstrated by other means until an air–launched target is developed. IFT–14 and IFT–15, scheduled for FY04, are intended to provide demonstrations of integrated boost vehicle/EKV performance. Even with successful intercepts in both of these attempts, the small number of tests would limit confidence in the integrated interceptor performance.

AEGIS BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (AEGIS BMD)

The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) element is intended to provide U.S. Navy surface combatants with the ability to defeat short–range (less than 1,000 kilometers), medium–range (1,000 to 3,000 kilometers), and long–range (greater than 3,000 kilometers) ballistic missiles during exoatmospheric flight. The Aegis BMD element consists of two major components: the shipboard System Aegis Weapon System (AWS) and the Standard Missile–3 (SM–3) missile. The AWS detects and tracks the threat and provides midcourse uplink information to the SM–3 missile. The SM–3 missile is a four–stage hit–to–kill missile launched from an Aegis ship.

The Aegis BMD flight test program has achieved four successful intercepts in five attempts. These flight tests have demonstrated the capability to intercept short–range, simple unitary targets in both descent and ascent phases of flight, and in the case of FM–6, have shown the capability to destroy the target warhead. In FY03, two intercept attempts of a unitary target in its ascent phase were conducted. In the first test, the Aegis MBD element successfully intercepted the target. Using a newly designed divert system onboard the SM–3 missile, the Aegis BMD failed to intercept the target in the second test. The cause of the failed intercept has been attributed to a malfunction in a divert valve in the attitude control system onboard the kinetic warhead. Testing is continuing based on the consistent performance of the sustained pulse mode, while mitigation options are evaluated.

In FY03, the operational robustness of the Aegis BMD Block 2004 test program was enhanced by increased operational realism in the test strategy. Efforts to add operational realism as part of the developmental test strategy provide significant risk reduction in advance of operational testing and potential deployment of the element. The planned growth in flight test realism is consistent with the maturity of the system. Although the Block 2004 flight test plan includes operationally realistic aspects, some important operational scenarios will remain untested by the end of the Block 2004 test Program. These include multiple simultaneous engagements and separating targets. Development and integration of critical technologies pertaining to threat discrimination (e.g., AWS discrimination logic, radar and infrared seeker upgrades) and missile propulsion (e.g., kinetic warhead divert system, SM–3 booster propulsion) could improve operational capability as they are introduced in Block 2004 and subsequent upgrades.

Initial assessments of the Aegis BMD Surveillance and Track (S&T) capability to support integrated BMDS missions were also conducted as part of the FY03 flight test program. The goal of the Aegis BMD S&T effort is to allow GMD to use Aegis tracking data to generate search cue commands for the Ground Based Radar Prototype in order to acquire and track ICBM class targets. As part of this effort, Aegis BMD is participating in the GMD IFT program. Depending on the accuracy of Aegis track data, the Block 2004 Aegis BMD S&T capability could contribute to GMD detection and tracking. Aegis BMD participated in both IFT–9 and –10 to evaluate its capability to support more integrated missions in future flight test.

THEATER HIGH ALTITUDE AREA DEFENSE (THAAD)

The Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) is an element defense segment of the BMDS and is a mobile ground–based missile defense element designed to project forward–deployed military forces, allies, and population centers from short– and intermediate–range ballistic missile attacks. THAAD uses kinetic energy “hit–to–kill” technology to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the late mid–course or terminal phases of their trajectories, at either high endoatmospheric or exoatmospheric altitudes.

The THAAD radar has progressed in maturity and is now in manufacturing and integration testing. Assembly of the first radar is nearly complete, with end to end testing of subarrays completed. Radar component hardware has successfully completed reliability testing and accelerated life testing of critical transmit/reveive assemblies. The first radar component is on schedule for a spring 2004 delivery to White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico, for final integration, calibration, and ground testing.

The production facility in Troy, Alabama, has been activated and is preparing to produce the first THAAD missiles this fiscal year. Recent safety incidents at propellant mixing facilities of the Pratt & Whitney, Chemical Systems Division booster manufacturer are causing a revision to the missile development schedules. The Missile Critical Design Review (CDR) was completed in FY03 and developmental testing supports the mission control flight test in late–CY04.

No integrated system–level testing occurred in FY03. However, during FY03 the THAAD contractor test program completed several successful assembly/subassembly level tests and simulated interoperability exercises. Although some failures and anomalies associated with the missile design were encountered during this testing, mitigation strategies are sufficient to address the problems with little or no impact on the flight test schedule.

Flight safety analyses for testing at the Pacific Missile Range Facility are taking longer than expected. It is unclear if all range safety constraints can be met with current targets. Debris from intercept events or flight termination is a serious safety concern. If unresolved, this could limit the use of a long–range target, forcing testing to the Reagan Test Site (RTS). This would likely conflict with GMD testing at RTS.

Budget adjustments caused the ground and flight test programs to be repeatedly restructured over the past year. The flight test schedule emerged from these changes with minimal deferments, with the first intercept against a threat–like target planned for 2005. The government’s ground–test program, which includes system safety and performance qualification, has been delayed. This could impact plans for deploying interim hardware buys. Mobility, logistics, climatic and dynamic environments, reliability, and maintainability will all be tested between 2007 and 2009. If this acquisition concept is implemented, Block 2004 and Block 2006 THAAD systems will be procured and fielded with little or no government performance qualification or operational testing.

At this time, the THAAD element has no deployable hardware, except for the prototype radar. The THAAD radar technology is being developed by the Sensor Directorate at MDA for it forward–deployed, mobile, X–band radar to enhance early launch detection and tracking capability.

PATRIOT ADVANCED CAPABILITY (PAC–3)

The PATRIOT air defense system is designed to detect, track, engage, and destroy air–breathing threats (ABTs) and tactical ballistic missiles (TBMs). PATRIOT Advanced Capability–3 (PAC–3) Configuration–3, the latest version, completed an eight–month IOT&E in September 2002. The Army manages the PAC–3 Program and interfaces with the BMDS through data and communications exchange. The PATRIOT system is designed to defend against multiple hostile TBMs and ABTs in electronic countermeasures and clutter environments. The ABTs include fixed–wing and rotary–wing aircraft, cruise missiles, tactical air–to–surface missiles, anti–radiation missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.

In December 2002, DoD approved the limited production of 100 PAC–3 missiles during FY03 and 109 missiles during FY04 to equip PAC–3 batallions and support ongoing military actions. PATRIOT battalions with PAC–3 fire units were employed in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) against TBMs. In OIF, PAC–3 interceptors were ripple–fired against ballistic missile threats, a user requirement that was not demonstrated during operational testing. This eliminated the need for a follow–on test to demonstrate this capability. All PATRIOT engagements were conducted in a complex operational environment. Three instances of erroneous engagements between PATRIOT batteries and friendly aircraft are under investigation and are not discussed here. System performance against TBMs appears to have been highly effective and consistent with expectations documented in DOT&E’s beyond low–rate initial production report submitted to Congress in October 2002. PATRIOT performance during OIF is detailed in the classified FY03 BMDS annual report.

System shortcomings identified in the IOT&E require a Follow–On Test Program, which is not yet fully defined. There are three flight tests scheduled in FY04, twelve in FY05, five in FY06, and seven for FY07. The adequacy of this testing cannot be fully assessed because the detailed objectives for most of the flight tests in FY05 and beyond are not yet defined. The Mobile Flight Mission Simulator Hardware–in–the–Loop facility provided much of the data to assess PAC–3 system performance during IOT&E, but it has significant limitations and needs improvement. In order to conduct an integrated battalion–level test, two additional Mobile Flight Mission Simulator systems should be procured. It is essential that the Army provide the funding resources needed to properly execute this program.

PATRIOT PAC–3 provides the Only BMDS poerational capability that can be assessed with high confidence at this time. PAC–3 demonstrated effectiveness, suitability, survivability, and lethality against a limited set of threats during the IOT&E in 2002. PAC–3 successfully engaged missiles that threatened defended assets during OIF. As with all defensive systems, significant improvements are needed in our capability to positively identify “friend or foe.”

MEDIUM EXTENDED AIR DEFENSE SYSTEM (MEADS)

The Army manages the Medium Extended Air Defense system (MEADS) program, which is intended to be a highly mobile air defense system for the protection of maneuver forces and fixed assets. PATRIOT will either evolve to the MEADS capability or be replaced by the MEADS system, depending on the acquisition strategy adopted for the program. The system should provide area and point defense capabilities against multiple, simultaneous, 360–degree attacks by ballistic missiles, large caliber rockets, fixed–wing and rotary–wing aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, cruise missiles, tactical air–to–surface missiles, and anti–radiation missiles. It should be strategically deployable by C–130 roll–on/roll–off, and tactically mobile to keep up with maneuver forces. MEADS has not yet entered the System Design and Development phase and currently has no operational capability. Testing has been limited to demonstrations using prototype software in digital simulations.

MEADS is an international program that DoD is reevaluating to determine if it can be integrated with the PATRIOT product improvement program. The evaluation is ongoing with the international community.

AIRBORN LASER (BLA)

The Airborne Laser (ABL) program is employing a spiral development concept. The Block 2004 effort develops, integrates, and tests the initial weapon system on a Boeing 747 aircraft. ABL is intended to engage and destroy enemy ballistic missiles during their boost phase. The ABL engagement concept places laser energy on the threat missile booster motor casing. This energy damages the casing, causing the missile to rupture or lose thrust and flight control, failing short of its target. Engagement in the boost phase negates the missile before decoys, warheads, or submunitions are deployed.

Three different Block configurations are planned. Blocks 2004 and 2008 are on Boeing 747 transport aircraft modified to accommodate ABL subsystems. Block 2006 continues testing the Block 2004 aircraft, with minimal hardware and software update, against a wider variety of ballistic missile targets. Also, during this spiral, deployable ground support equipment will be developed to support early operational capability and MDA test activities.

To date, the program has been concentrating on activities associated with the “first light” through six fully integrated laser modules, and integrating the beam control system. All Block 2004 efforts are focused on achieving a successful, live shoot–down of a ballistic Missile during FY05.

In order to demonstrate system performance as soon as possible, the Block 2004 program will delay some integration and testing until after the ballistic missile shoot–down. For example, integration and testing of the Active Ranger System is now scheduled to occur after the shoot–down.

The program has also reorganized the High Energy Laser (HEL) Lethal Edge Irradiance characterization, reducing the number of tests and engagement geometries occurring prior to the ballistic missile shoot–down. This limits the amount of data available through FY05, for extrapolating ABL’s negation capabilities against other missile threat classes. HEL beam characterization flight tests will be re–planned to the degree possible after the shoot–down event. Characterization of the HEL beam should continue in the Block 2006 test program to increase understanding of ABL lethality.

A thorough lethality test program is planned in the Block 2006 program but is not completely funded. The plan addresses primary negation parameters and includes the procurement of about a dozen targets, their engagement flight tests, and the necessary preliminary lab and flight testing. The execution of this plan, combined with good HEL beam characterization, should result in a thorough understanding of ABL’s negation capabilities under a range of conditions and threats.

SPACE TRACKING AND SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM (STSS)

The Space Tracking and Surveillance System (STSS) is planned as a low Earth orbit satellite constellation with cross–link capabilities, and is a sensor element of the BMDS. The STSS is intended to acquire, track discriminate, assess, and report ballistic missile events from lift–off through intercept using multi–spectral sensors and stereo tracking. The STSS may eventually consist of a large constellation (up to 27 spacecraft) to provide continuous coverage of most of the globe.

Block 2004 STSS test activities will consist of ground–based test, simulations, and rehearsals using the STSS Surrogate Test Bed (SSTB). Communications protocols and procedures will be evaluated, including the ability for STSS data to be disseminated through C2BMC to other BMDS elements. Other pre–launch tests include system and software integration test, which are scheduled to begin in FY04.

The STSS is currently at the Block 06 CDR stage. STSS currently has no operational capability. The earliest feasible capability will occur during FY07 if the first two satellites are launched as planned. Early STSS capability will have significant onboard power constraints and coverage limitations. A STSS Development Master Test Plan and a GMD/STSS Integration Test Plan have been drafted. STSS participation in BMDS test during Block 2004 involves SSTB to resolve C2BMC interface issues. The full capabilities of the STSS cannot be tested until Blocks 2006 and 2008.