CIAO DATE: 09/04

The Patriot Missile Defense System in Iraq: Newly–released Army History Raises Serious Questions

Victoria Samson

Center for Defense Information

October 2003

The military is still finishing up its analysis of the Patriot missile defense system’s performance in Iraq this past spring. Also coming soon are the results from investigations into the three friendly fire incidents the Patriot was involved in, which killed one American and two British pilots. However, these studies have been delayed time and again, although they reportedly have long been completed and are waiting for sign–offs by higher–ups. Reading the unofficial yet highly illuminating “Operation Iraqi Freedom Theater Air and Missile Defense History,” written by the 32d Army Air and Missile Defense Command (32d AAMDC, the command responsible for the Patriot), the delay in releasing the reports mentioned above becomes obvious. The Patriot may have made nine intercepts but it almost certainly did not bat 100 percent, as officials have been claiming from the start of the war. This history shows that when the Army claims nine hits, they are only counting their successes. There were many challenges, technical and logistical, which detracted from the Patriot’s performance. And the 32d AAMDC describes many areas where the Patriot needs significant improvement.

To begin, the 32d AAMDC claims that the Patriot made nine intercepts out of nine engagements, allowing it a 100 percent success rate. This seems to be the result of a rather tortuous portrayal of the facts given in their own history. Reading through it, 23 Iraqi missile launches are documented (9 Ababil–100s, 4 Al Samouds, 4 CSSC–3s, 4 FROG–7s, and 2 unknowns). Of these, indeed, 9 apparently were intercepted by U.S. or Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, thanks to the at least 24 Patriot–type missiles (PAC–2, GEM, GEM+, and PAC–3) that were fired. However, that leaves 14 Iraqi missiles which were not intercepted. Excluding the one Ababil–100 which malfunctioned and blew up shortly after launch and the four FROG–7s which were outside of the Patriot’s range, leaves 9 Iraqi missiles which were not destroyed by the Patriot. The fact that they landed “harmlessly” in the desert or the Persian Gulf, in the words of the authors of the report, does not change the fact that they were not intercepted. In the CENTCOM area of responsibility at the time of the war, there were 1069 Patriot missiles (54 of which were PAC–3 missiles), and 29 U.S. and 5 Kuwaiti Patriot batteries, so there should have been ample assets on the U.S. side to counter these Iraqi threats. Claiming that the Patriot had a 100 percent interception rate seems disingenuous at best and an outright manipulation of events at worst. Also surprising is that after 12 years of criticism, following the dismal performance of Patriot in the first Persian Gulf War, the Army is still calling an “engagement” an interception, when by their own descriptions sometimes “engaged” Iraqi missiles were not intercepted. For example, the history for March 21, 2003, reports six Iraqi TBMs “successfully engaged and destroyed by Patriot systems to date.” But that counts an Ababil–100 and an Al Samoud that were NOT intercepted on March 20th. This calls into question what evidence the Army has for the nine intercepts it does claim.

The final chapter of the history gives the 32d AAMDC’s recommendations on possible changes for future usage of the Patriot. The first is the limited time available to detect, decide and engage the Iraqi missiles and rockets. The engagement time shrunk from 4.5 minutes in 1991 to about 1.5 minutes in 2003, due to the use of shorter–range missiles and rockets (like the FROG–7, an old Soviet–type system with a range of roughly 70 kilometers). The history points out that the shorter engagement time translates into the need for quicker decisions and a greater change of friendly fire incidents. Thus it suggests that “the Army may want to examine changing the rank structure of firing elements, while ensuring the necessary experiences and education are provided to those who may have to make launch decisions in the future.”

A second warning is given about the dangers of electromagnetic interference. The history paints a telling picture of the problem around Karbala on April 2 where electronic clutter may have contributed to three fratricides: “in the space of a single hour an F–18 was mistakenly engaged and destroyed by Patriot missiles, an Air Force attack aircraft mistakenly bombed a friendly field artillery unit and an Army helicopter crashed.”

Cruise missiles continue to be a serious threat to U.S. forces, as seen by the complete failure by the Patriot to defend against the CSSC–3 Seersuckers Iraqi used against Coalition forces. The history points out that “the ability of these older cruise missiles to penetrate friendly airspace and reach their targets should serve as a warning to joint and Army leaders that the emerging cruise missile threat must be addressed.” The Patriot’s radar did not even pick up the four CSSC–3s launched during the war, much less notice them in time for them to be engaged. Moreover, after the first cruise missile was lobbed against Kuwait City’s harbor early in the morning on March 29, Coalition forces took active steps to prevent the possibility of a repeat: Kuwait deployed Amoun batteries around its capital to create a Missile Engagement Zone, coalition forces were sent to the Al Faw peninsula in attack operations mode to seek out and prevent future cruise missile launches, and the United Kingdom sent the HMS York to reside off of Kuwait City so that it could attempt to intercept any more cruise missile attacks. Even with all these preventative measures in place, Iraq was still able to launch three CSSC–3s on April 1, prompting U.S. authorities to order the local Patriot batteries “to execute cruise missile simulation tests to find better ways of intercepting the Seersucker cruise missiles due to their low flight elevations.”

According to the 32d AAMDC’s history, “Another challenge is maneuvering Patriot in support of offensive operations. The Patriot system is mobile in that it can move from place to place on its organic wheeled vehicles. However, it was not originally designed to maneuver cross–country as part of a combined arms team.” There were several instances of the lumbering Patriot trucks getting bogged down in soft sand and either stopping their teams’ forward movement while they got dug out or causing the supply lines to stretch out for miles as the stuck vehicles lagged behind others in their batteries. Also at times, the Patriot’s early warning capability could not keep up with divisions’ movements.

The 32d AAMDC’s history notes the need for redundant detection and warning systems. According to the authors of the report, “During OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] two effective means of warning were the Patriot radars and the Aegis cruisers. While these were effective, it must be noted that most Iraqi launch sites were within range of the ocean. The same may not be true in future conflicts, and no commander wants to rely on a single detection and warning system.” This may be giving too much credit to the Patriot’s radar, which apparently was undergoing grave maintenance problems prior to the war. At times, five to eight of the Patriot radars on a daily basis were not mission capable. By the time hostilities started, all the radars were reported to be up and running, but that does leave them open to the question of how effectively they actually were working through the figurative fog and literal dust of war. Additionally, in October 2002, a simulation support exercise was held by the 32d AAMDC in Ft. Bliss, Texas, in which it became clear that the Patriot needed to work on its ability to provide early warning of short–range ballistic missiles. The Patriot operators had the chance to improve on this area and did not; one hopes that they will act differently this time around.

There were many other technical or logistical problems not listed as an area of improvement but which were glaringly obvious. Communications across the widely–stretched Patriot batteries were difficult. At times, the UHF line of sight capabilities which they had were insufficient and there were communications gaps. Adding to that were compatibility issues between difference versions of the Patriot: at one point, some Patriot Configuration–2 batteries could not communicate with their Configuration–3 commanders, leaving them in autonomous operation mode with no positive contact for a brief while. The Patriot’s patchy communications came into play several times when multiple batteries attempted to intercept the same Iraqi ballistic missile. If they had stronger communications between themselves, they probably would not all have acted simultaneously and resources would have been used more effectively.

Logistics cannot be underplayed as a challenge to the 32d AAMDC. At one point, the Patriot’s supply chain was 400 kilometers long. As could be expected, there were serious snafus in distributing the equipment. In one striking instance, a battery quickly brought over from Germany was given battle dress uniforms to wear instead of the desert fatigues that everyone else was kitted with. And that was for batteries fortunate enough to actually receive their equipment or sufficient manpower. Despite the long lead time (the first deployment order for additional air defense to the region was issued on Sept. 30, 2002, nearly six months before fighting began), many batteries were short of needed supplies or operators. This resulted in the creation of “shortstop” batteries, or pulling Patriot operators in–theater but without their equipment to man for short periods of time — maybe 48 to 72 hours — PAC–2 configuration equipment that could be shaved away from larger battalions to allow for a minimum engagement package. These shortstops were a creative way of providing Patriot coverage; however, they placed additional maintenance strain on and stretched already–thin communications assets further for their supporting battalions. At one point, the 2–1 ADA was in charge of 1150 soldiers, instead of the 450 personnel it normally supported, but it had no increase in its battalion staff to correspond with its augmented responsibilities.

Again, the 32d AAMDC’s history is not the official assessment of the Patriot’s performance and it barely touches upon the three friendly fire incidents that the Patriot was involved with. However, it provides much–needed context on how the Patriot operated. It shows that, contrary to what proponents of the system have been asserting, the Patriot was used sometimes in a chaotic manner. In other times the Patriot appeared to have done what it was set out to do, but the truth is much muddier than a crystal clear 100 percent interception rate. The danger lies in believing that there is no room for improvement. Only by figuring out where the Patriot faltered in combat and where there were gaps in coverage can we take steps to ensure that our military will be adequately defended in the future.