CIAO DATE: 04/02

Japan's China Perceptions and its Policies in the Alliance with the United States

The People's Republic of China is now a major economic and military actor in the international relations of the Asia Pacific region, and thus we cannot afford to ignore China in reviewing the U.S.-Japan alliance. The Chinese economy has been growing rapidly over the past decade and a half, at an annual rate of about 10 percent, and it is expected to sustain a similar pattern of growth for the foreseeable future. Beijing's defense spending has also been increasing every year at a double-digit level for some time. Consequently, China's domestic and foreign policies will from now on significantly influence the course of international relations in this region, and perhaps elsewhere as well.

Will China develop into a peaceful, status-quo power, or will it continue expanding its military strength to establish a new hegemony in the region? Will it try to resolve the Taiwan question and its territorial issues in the South China Sea in peaceful or in military ways? Will its economic growth lead to more pluralism and greater political liberalization in its society, or will its authoritarian leadership manage to keep a tight lid on such societal changes for years to come? Will China be able to distribute the benefits of its growing economic pie more evenly across the nation, or will the income disparity between the rich coastal regions and the rest of the country continue to widen, thereby increasing the possibility of internal disorder and chaos? And what will happen if China cannot keep enlarging its economic pie?

While much will no doubt depend on the internal dynamics of the Chinese political economy, external factors will be no less important in shaping China's behavior in the post-Cold War era. In particular, the United States and Japan, working together, are in a good position to affect the future course of China. The United States is the only military superpower today, and Japan is the largest creditor nation in the world. The world's two largest economies are tied together in a mutual security alliance. Indeed, Washington and Tokyo would be able to maximize their influence over China if they could effectively coordinate their policies and thereby send consistent, coherent signals to Beijing. But should they fail to coordinate their policies, and instead send out conflicting signals, then China will capitalize on these divisions and play the two countries against each other to promote its self-interests to the detriment of the bilateral alliance across the Pacific.

Unfortunately, the past record of U.S.-Japan policy coordination over China leaves much to be desired. The most notable example is President Richard Nixon's sudden announcement of rapprochement with China on July 15, 1971, made "over the head of Japan." More recently, in 1990, Japan resumed its development assistance loans to China; too quickly, in the eyes of U.S. officials, after the June 1989 Tianamen Square Incident. Generally, American and Japanese approaches to such important China-related issues as Taiwan, human rights, and trade have been subtly different - different enough to deserve serious consideration from the standpoint of better alliance management. In a somewhat exaggerated way, Hisahiko Okazaki, former Japanese ambassador to Saudi Arabia and Thailand, states: "Japan and the United States had followed an identical policy toward China until Henry Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing more than 25 years ago. Since then, however, Tokyo and Washington have been unable to see eye-to-eye on policy. The two sides have yet to bridge their differences."

While part of this problem comes from the inconsistent nature of U.S. policy toward China, reflecting intra-governmental and inter-branch politics, much of the problem may have to do with differences in dominant Japanese and American perceptions about China. According to the theories of cognitive behaviorism, decision makers act only on the basis of what they perceive; policies, therefore, are inseparable from perceptions. So long as the Soviet threat still existed, China was seen as a card to be played in Cold-War politics (particularly for the United States). Therefore, Washington and Tokyo could maintain basically friendly relations with China from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. But the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the "common enemy" have changed the picture altogether. Now China is an important player in its own right and needs to be treated as such. Under these circumstances, Japanese and American perceptions of China have become more important in explaining their countries' policies.

This study, therefore, will first examine Japan's perceptions of China, including threat perceptions, in comparison with those of the United States, with a view to exploring the extent to which Japan's China policies may be compatible and consistent with America's China policies. We will also explore a framework through which the two countries could seek and carry out their common policies toward China. Today, both Washington and Tokyo largely agree on the idea of emphasizing a broad engagement with China. But "engagement" is not clearly defined. A ranking Chinese official has been quoted as saying: "Engagement can mean a battle in a war, or it can mean the beginning of a marriage. We are not clear which it is. Moreover, other words are often used: 'containment, sanctions.' So we are puzzled." We will need a framework or concept that gives substance and coherence to engagement policies and that can facilitate effective U.S.-Japan policy coordination in managing relations with China. "Without a glass in which to pour the water of engagement and cooperation," writes one analyst, "policy toward China risks becoming little more than a messy spill of competing interests and objectives, with nothing to give it shape."

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