CIAO DATE: 03/03

Europe: Neither Plan Colombia, nor Peace Process — From Good Intentions to High Frustration

With the public announcement of a reshaped Plan Colombia in mid-2000, European attitudes toward involvement in attempting to solve the crisis of Colombia's endemic violence has oscillated from alarm to hope and, finally, to frustration. The overall scene has been dominated by a sense of powerlessness, mixed with realism and internal contradictions between member states and institutions of the European Union (EU).

In the early stages, Europeans remained cautious of the U.S.-inspired Plan Colombia, poorly promoted as a credible Colombian project. "A virtual contribution" to what appeared to be "a virtual Peace Process," in the off-the-record words of European Union Commission staff, accurately described the European attitude. "Good intentions" became the label attributed to European involvement in Colombia, illustrating not only its willingness but also its limitations. "Don't look a gift horse in the mouth" seemed to be the Colombian attitude in view of the pledged, yet ambiguous, European contribution. High expectations were detectable in public declarations, considering that significant diplomatic capital had been invested.

From the beginning of European involvement, therefore, the message was clear that Europe wanted to distance itself as much as possible from Plan Colombia, which it understood to be a project centered around counterinsurgency and security issues. After a brief period of uncertainty, followed by the successful revival of the peace process in January 2002, European diplomacy seemed to have its role strengthened from that of mere observer to the status of participant in brokering the peace process. The renewal of the process was credited to the role of the international community, with heavy European involvement. However, European leaders experienced apprehension, pessimism, and a certain degree of realism finally set in the minds of European leaders in view of the decision of President Andrés Pastrana of Colombia to terminate the peace process on February 20, 2002. In addition, the continuation of violence perpetrated by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia — Ejército del Pueblo — FARCEP) that culminated in the kidnapping of prominent Colombian Senator Eduardo Gechem Turbay, led Pastrana to order Colombian troops to enter the territory previously awarded as sanctuary.

Although these actions were an admission that the Colombian government's negotiation efforts of more than two years had failed, European expectations for resolution had been raised. Pastrana's successor, newly elected President Alvaro Uribe appears to have anticipated this harder European attitude when he declared a state of emergency on August 12, 2002, and confronted the increased level of hostility shown by the FARC and the social pressure exerted over months of frustration.

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