CIAO DATE: 09/04

The Transformation of an Ally? Present Status and Future Prospects for the New Zealand Defense Forces

Colin Robinson

Center for Defense Information

January 2003

While the U.S. military moves toward rapid, fundamental, transformation of its combat capabilities, other U.S. friends and allies have less resources for change and other factors bearing on their defense development. This article will examine the situation for the military in New Zealand, a country with a currently troubled military relationship with the United States.

In New Zealand, since the commitment of combat forces to Vietnam, the armed forces have increasingly played more a foreign policy than a military role, emphasizing the government’s commitment to particular causes. This has been made possible because of the lack of immediate threats to the country. The last time New Zealand was significantly threatened was in May 1942, when the U.S. Pacific Fleet defeated the oncoming Japanese at the Battle of the Coral Sea. New Zealand then began part of the Western Cold War alliance, and signed a defense treaty with Australia and the United States in 1951. Apart from a slow decline in force levels and the eventual final abandonment of conscription in 1972, little changed until the mid 1980s.

After the election in July 1984 of a Labour Party government, legislation was eventually enacted that banned nuclear–armed or powered ships from New Zealand’s ports or territorial waters. Six months later, a test visit by the destroyer USS Buchanan was mounted as opinions swirled in both New Zealand and the United States as to the right policy to take. The Buchanan was conventionally powered, but capable of carrying nuclear weapons. In line with standard U.S. policy, the State Department declined to disclose whether the ship was in fact armed with nuclear weapons. On Feb. 1, 1985, the Buchanan was denied entry, as the New Zealand authorities could not be positive that she was not carrying nuclear weapons. In response, the United States suspended its ANZUS security obligations toward New Zealand. The resulting suspension of defense ties hurt the New Zealand defense forces — the community which was closest to the United States — the most, as most of their training and other cooperative activities were cut off.

Since that time, high–level official contacts and defense cooperation have resumed to a point where New Zealand forces are now fighting alongside those of the United States in Afghanistan, but training together is still not permitted by the United States.

Changing Governments, Changing Policies

The past five years have seen a notable change in the direction of New Zealand’s defense policy, directly attributable to the 1999 change of government from the conservative National Party to a Labour–Alliance coalition government. The previous government was a ready supporter of balanced armed forces and put a high priority on contributing forces to coalition collective security operations. In the National Party’s view, balanced forces were a necessary response to New Zealand’s oceanic environment, where island archipelagos are separated by long distances.

When the Labour–Alliance coalition government took power in 1999, the emphasis changed sharply, and New Zealand began to change the nature of its overseas military engagement. The government’s defense policy priorities became the protection of New Zealand, the alliance with Australia, support to island states of the South Pacific, and the “playing of an appropriate role” in the security of the Asia–Pacific region, including as a member of the Five Power Defense Arrangements between the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, and Singapore, as well as UN peacekeeping operations globally. ¹ The primary form of international involvement will increasingly become the deployment of Army units on UN peacekeeping operations.

Armed Forces Development — developing primacy of the Army

Thus New Zealand’s recent defense evolution had less to do with a ’transformational’ strategy than refocusing attention upon a more limited, less expensive, land–force centric policy backed by air and naval forces that are approaching constabulary status. The government decided to rationalize spending to provide depth in what it perceived to be the force of greatest utility, rather than spreading the limited funds to purchase a breadth of capabilities that gave them fewer options for employment.

At the time of the 1999 election, preparations were underway to replace New Zealand’s aging McDonnell Douglas A–4K Skyhawks, then almost 30 years old, with second–hand General Dynamics F–16 Fighting Falcons. The F–16 aircraft in question had been originally ordered by Pakistan in 1988, and as a result of the U.S. arms embargo caused by Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons had sat in the Arizona desert in limbo for eight years. The deal was to be a cheap one, costing around $105 million for the lease costs (training, maintenance, and other through life requirements would, however, have raised the price). Following the election, the F–16 buy was quickly cancelled, and the existing Skyhawk force was retired, as the new government said it was unneeded. The Skyhawks were removed from service in December 2001.

Also at the time of the 1999 election, a study was proceeding within the New Zealand Ministry of Defense on the shape of the future surface fleet. For much of the late postwar period the Navy had four anti–submarine frigates. That was the minimum number necessary to support one frigate operationally deployed overseas continuously. Two replacements had been ordered for the aging ships in the late 1980s after bitter controversy, but the acquisition of a third was cancelled in December 1998 as a minority coalition member in the then government felt it would lose public support if the buy went ahead. The result was that operational frigate numbers fell to three in early 1995 and drop to two in 2005 when HMNZS Canterbury retires.

The result of this stripping away of naval and air capability was that the Army, by design, became the major beneficiary of the new government’s policy. The Labour government believes that the Army gives the maximum return for investment because of its utility in international fora (of the approximately 820 personnel deployed operationally at present 720 are Army personnel.) New Zealand’s prime future military capability will be two motorized infantry battalion groups, with support from appropriate brigade–level combat support units (artillery, engineers, signals, and the like). Six reserve regiments provide top–up personnel. They will be equipped with the new New Zealand Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs), which will start to be delivered in late 2003. The first battalion group equipped with the new vehicle will be ready for operations in mid 2005, after some LAV–equipped elements are first integrated into the existing infantry battalions, prior to the full conversion. New command and control equipment, light operational vehicles, and direct fire support and anti–tank weapons (possibly the U.S. Javelin) will also be bought. The Army is already in the process of updating its tactical communications by replacing the Vietnam–era PRC–77 system, which suffered some trouble during the East Timor deployment, with SINCGARS, the U.S. Army’s standard radio. The Army’s Land Rovers, thoroughly worn out, could not cope with Timorese conditions and will be replaced by a new ’Light Operational Vehicle’. As the new battalion structure is finalized, other equipment, such as a new surveillance vehicle, is likely to be purchased.

The New Zealand Army has great expertise, as a small army, at company level, where the individual soldier and sub–unit tactical skills are most developed. The breach in defense relations with the United States has had most effect on formation and unit training at the battalion level and above; while some brigade level exercises have been held with Australia and Malaysia under the aegis of Closer Defence Relations and the Five Power Defense Arrangements, given the nearly 17 years absence of training with U.S. forces, brigade and division integration with a coalition force might well present some difficulties.

The fall in frigate numbers to three (and, after 2005, to two) has resulted in the Navy having a decreased ability to maintain ships abroad on operational deployment. ² The Navy holds that its frigates have different response times for operational deployment depending where they are in their maintenance and training cycle. These response times are 28 days, 60 days and 180 days. New Zealand always has a frigate available for operational deployment, however the Navy’s ability to maintain that deployment (or a new deployment) beyond six months is not guaranteed. When Canterbury retires in 2005, its replacement will be a Multi–Role Vessel (MRV) primarily focused on troop transport, with the capability to carry 250 personnel. The vessel’s cost has been capped at $100 million. Its primary functions will be the tactical sealift role for peace support operations and disaster relief, and patrol and maritime presence operations in the Asia–Pacific region and the Southern Ocean.

In addition to the MRV, an inshore and offshore patrol and response capability is to be acquired, partially to assume the patrol role of the departing frigates. These vessels will form the Naval Patrol Force with the primary role being the conduct of multi–agency (Fisheries, Customs, etc) operations encompassing maritime surveillance and response tasks in the New Zealand Exclusive Economic Zone, the South West Pacific and the Southern Ocean. Up to 420 offshore patrol days at sea per year will be provided by the MRV and up to three Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs). The OPVs will be required to have a maximum speed of 24 knots, a 2,400 nautical mile range, and in common with the MRV, a gun of 40–57mm caliber. An inshore patrol capacity may be provided by existing patrol craft, to be supplemented by new vessels as funds become available. Details of the projects are still being defined and there may be some movement in the requirements to provide best value for money before the final shape of the project emerges.

The Navy as a whole is suffering from personnel retention problems. The shortages are in technical ratings (mainly electronics technicians), seaman officers (bridge watch–keepers) and also significantly in communicators. ³ The ability to keep the fleet at sea has not been compromised as a result of personnel shortages and the fleet operational program has, and continues to be, maintained. However, as the manning priorities remain with the ships, personnel shortages mean that the shore establishments are hurting a bit. The annual exit rate is reaching 12–18 percent, which does impact the fleet’s operational capability through increased training requirements and reduced experience levels. Within some of the critical specialties, the exit rate is still reaching or exceeding 15 percent or more, but the Navy is recruiting aggressively and successfully to replace exiting personnel with some productive new initiatives in place. The training pipelines are full.

Following the demise of the A–4 Skyhawks and the associated jet trainers, the Air Force has six maritime patrol as well as transport and training aircraft. The core operational force is split between two bases, Auckland and Ohakea, both in the North Island. In Auckland, reside the six P–3K Orions of 5 Squadron, alongside the C–130 Hercules and Boeing 727s of 40 Squadron. The Naval Flight of 3 Squadron, re–equipping with Kaman SH–2G Sea Sprites, is also in Auckland. However, December 2002 announcements by the government indicate that the Auckland base is to close and its aircraft be relocated to Ohakea. Ohakea, near Palmerston North, currently is home to the flying training establishment and the UH–1H ’Huey’ utility helicopters of the rest of 3 Squadron, and will become home to the entire aircraft fleet by 2007. Much of the aircraft fleet is aging and is shortly to receive upgrades; while the Huey fleet is likely to be replaced (the aircraft are 35 years old). The C–130s are to be upgraded at a cost of between $50 million and $85 million; and the 727s replaced by two Boeing 757s. The P–3 Orions, originally bought in 1966 as anti–submarine aircraft, have lost much of that capability over the past few years due to their systems’ 1960s vintage obsolescence. ⁴ However, the P–3s have been partially upgraded with an “in–house” acoustic processor, and the anti–submarine role is not a critical mission in New Zealand waters. The Air Force is now suffering some morale problems since the abandonment of the air combat capability, the core of an air force’s mission, and the resulting loss of 700 staff. However, the Air Force now has a renewed focus and morale has improved after a significant drop.

Both Australia and New Zealand have in recent years tried to take a more joint service approach to defense command and control. New Zealand formed a HQ Joint Forces New Zealand on July 1, 2001, based at the Army’s former Land Command HQ site at Trentham near Wellington. This followed the Australian formation of Headquarters Australian Theatre in July 1997. Uniquely, given New Zealand’s small size, the three former single–service operational headquarters have been subsumed within the new headquarters, which initially started with a staff of around 180. ⁵ The headquarters runs all small overseas operations, and would direct any major unilateral New Zealand operation. It was also announced on Jan. 30, 2002 that a Wellington–based chemical and biological improvised explosive device response unit will be established by the Defence Force, in response to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks in the United States and a perceived higher risk of terrorism, in addition to the other explosive device response capability around the country. ⁶

Current Operations Abroad

New Zealand has been an active contributor to the U.S. war on terror. An undisclosed number of New Zealand Special Air Service special force personnel are fighting alongside U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and there are seven New Zealand personnel assisting the logistics efforts of the International Security Assistance Force, which is guaranteeing security in the Kabul area. Also, Air Force C–130Hs have also conducted re–supply flights and some tactical support tasks in Afghanistan from time to time.

New Zealand’s greatest force abroad recently has been in East Timor, where approximately 700 troops were deployed with the UN Support Mission in East Timor with the final New Zealand battalion group which was on the island until November 2002. At this point, six New Zealand battalion groups will have served rotations there. Following the withdrawal of the sixth battalion group the New Zealand Army as a whole will be in need of a reconstitution period, while it also already commencing transition to the new motorized configuration. A small support unit of 11 personnel is based in Singapore, a last remnant of combined Australian, British, and New Zealand forces that at their height in 1971 numbered 7,500. ⁷ Twenty–six New Zealanders serve with the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai, separating Egypt and Israel. On the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea, 19 New Zealanders are with the Peace Monitoring Group monitoring the peace accords there. There are also 27 personnel with the Bosnian peacekeeping force, S–FOR. ⁸ Approximately 50 more defense personnel are spread between Cambodia and Laos in South East Asia, Sierra Leone and Mozambique in Africa, Kosovo in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Afghanistan on peacekeeping duties.

Conclusions – What Partnership with the United States?

New Zealand’s international defense relations with the United States are still somewhat troubled, but much better than they were during the crisis years of 1984–86. New Zealand’s participation in the key international Navy, Army, and Air Force interoperability working groups has remained relatively unaffected by political turmoil and has provided valuable continuity in professional military liaison. New Zealand military personnel are operating alongside U.S. forces in a variety of combat and non–combat assignments, including many conferences and experimental development demonstrations. Only events which are designated ’exercises’ are still banned.

New Zealand’s reductions of its air and naval combat forces, while generally in line with the trends in its public opinion, have caused some difficulty in relations with countries of the region. Australia, most importantly as New Zealand’s closest ally, is somewhat concerned about the erosion of New Zealand’s capacity for air and naval operations in what is an essentially maritime environment. While New Zealanders may point to the lack of any immediate threat, Australians, if only by virtue of their geographical position, are more worried about a range of potential contingencies that might need forces that New Zealand no longer maintains. South–East Asian countries, such as Malaysia, are also concerned to an extent.

Whatever the merits of these concerns, New Zealand under its current government has set its course firmly in a less overtly military direction that breaks with past tradition. There is very little immediate military risk in this approach. Any cost to New Zealand in a less militarily engaged defense policy will only emerge slowly into the New Zealand public eye as other countries are feel less inclined to bend their policies to suit New Zealand wishes. Any trend in this direction may well have been slowed by the recent decision to commit combat troops into action alongside U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Even if such deterioration occurs, the New Zealand public may well accept it as the price of maintaining a foreign policy which is more in line with the country’s geographically isolated and altruistic outlook on the world.

Acknowledgements

This article would not have been possible without the great help given by the New Zealand Defense Force Staff in Washington D.C., under the direction of Air Commodore Richard Newlands, the defense attache. My particular thanks go to Lt. Col. Kevin Burnett, the military attache, for his continuing and very helpful support and comments on the draft. Wing Commander Keith Graham and Commander Peter Sullivan both also gave their time to be interviewed, while Wing Commander Russell Sowden also gave comments on the draft. Squadron Leader Colin Marshall was also very helpful.

Endnotes

Note 1: New Zealand Government, Defence Policy Framework, June 2000, p.4   Back.

Note 2: personal conversation with Commander Peter Sullivan RNZN, assistant naval attache, Embassy of New Zealand, Washington D.C., mid 2002.   Back.

Note 3: ibid.   Back.

Note 4: Personal conversation with Wing Commander Keith Graham RNZAF, (former Commanding Officer No.5 Squadron), Aug. 21, 2002.   Back.

Note 5: New Zealand newspaper reports and correspondence with NZ Defense Force staff.   Back.

Note 6: Hon. Mark Burton, Minister of Defense, ’Responding to chemical and biological terrorism’, Press Release, January 30, 2002.   Back.

Note 7: International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001&-;02, Oxford, 2001, p.204.   Back.

Note 8: ibid.   Back.