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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 08/04
Worldwide reorientation of U.S. military basing in prospect
Colin Robinson
Center for Defense Information
September 2003
In May and June, 2003, it became apparent that serious planning was underway within the U.S. Department of Defense to dramatically change the shape of U.S. military basing abroad toward a less static structure relying more on temporary forward deployments to Spartan bases. While Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld had plans for changing deployments under development even before he took the department’s helm in early 2001, only after the Iraq war did the initiative start to gather momentum.
The Bush administration’s new intent for U.S. basing is to create a web of far–flung, austere forward operating bases, maintained normally only by small permanent support units, with the fighting forces deploying from the United States when necessary. The resulting footprint of U.S. military presence would be much less, giving up the paraphernalia of welfare and family support arrangements that have marked overseas basing since the end of World War II. Troops would deploy to these bare bases leaving their families behind, instead of serving accompanied tours.
Until now, the U.S. military presence around the globe had not been fundamentally reassessed since the end of the Cold War. The biggest innovation during the 1990s, the build–up of forces in the Middle East around Iraq , has been primarily centered upon the bases in Saudi Arabia from where the U.S. managed the 1990–91 Desert Shield and Desert Storm campaigns. Placed against this background, Rumsfeld’s belief that the U.S. cannot predict who its adversaries are likely to be seems to have prompted a fresh look at U.S. military basing posture around the world. The move also ties in with U.S. President George W. Bush’s belief that he personally is an ’agent for change,’ happy to make broad changes to U.S. policies if that is what the situation calls for. [1]
The other side of the coin, not acknowledged in public statements, is that dependence upon host nation support has significantly hampered U.S. military operations. The most spectacular case was that of Turkey immediately before the U.S. attack on Iraq, when the Turkish government declined to admit U.S. troops slated to man a northern front into Iraq. However, there also have been problems with other countries denying overflight rights for U.S. aircraft, and unending difficulties with U.S. stationing of troops in Japan (especially on Okinawa) and South Korea. Given the Bush administration’s preference for a more unilateral mode of operations, host nation difficulties are something that it is willing to spend a good deal of effort to reduce.
In private, senior DoD civilian and military officials further admit that the speed of the European relocation moves has had a great deal to do with tensions with Germany, France and Turkey. [2]
Initial reports in May and June focused upon changes in troop deployments in Europe, and the apparent shift eastward to bases in the new NATO member states such as Romania and Bulgaria. It seems that the U.S. military’s the long reluctance to deal with the withdrawal of thousands of U.S. troops in Europe who lack a threat is passing, and what is intended to be substituted will look much different than the Cold War deployment scenario.
East Asia, Hawaii, Australia, and Africa, particularly West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, are also regions that may be affected by this change in policy. Meanwhile, the impact is already being felt in Central Asia and in the Middle East, especially in Saudi Arabia, where the bases of a decade’s near obsession with Iraq are being abandoned partially to ease relations between the U.S. and the House of Saud. However, unlike the welcome being extended to U.S. forces in Eastern Europe, the Pentagon’s wishes to explore new basing possibilities have in other places met far more opposition than support. While the intent to establish these new bare bases is clear, DoD will not be able to achieve its aims in a number of countries, such as Australia and the Philippines.
A totally restructured U.S. force in Europe
Initial reports in early May centered on the removal of some U.S. troops from Germany and the establishment of new bases in Romania and Bulgaria. In an early and surprisingly specific indicator, it was reported by the Los Angeles Times that the 1st Armored Division, based in Europe throughout the Cold War but at the time deployed in Iraq, would not return to its German bases. Instead, air bases opened up specifically tied to the war against Iraq, such as Bulgaria ’s Sarafevo airfield where U.S. KC–135 aerial refuelling aircraft were based, joined by further establishments such as the Bulgarian port of Burgas and the Romanian port Constanta, both on the Black Sea, and the Romanian military airfield of Mihail Kogalniceanu. [3] Thousands of U.S. military personnel were stationed at these bases during the war against Iraq.
Following the war, U.S. officials were only willing to guarantee the retention of a few of the most major U.S. bases in Germany , such as Ramstein Air Base near Frankfurt. Originally Marine Gen. James Jones, the new commander of U.S. forces in Europe, called for a “lily pad” concept under which the new bases would house only mobile fighting forces able to shuffle from country to country very quickly. However, that plan was opposed by from Army officials whose troops normally spend two–year tours in Europe, and who argued for small permanent support units, and potentially, pre–positioned equipment — ideas that were subsequently added to Pentagon plans.
Jones said in early May that the aim was to develop a “family of bases” that could go “from cold to warm to hot if you need them,” and to be efficiently built without replicating the “small town USA” of schools and families that have, as noted above, previously accompanied such installations.
U.S. military plans also include huge ex–Warsaw Pact training ranges and other bases in Poland and Hungary. Foremost on the list are the large training ranges already in use by U.S. and other NATO forces. Thousand of U.S. and British troops have been conducting exercises on the Drawsko Pomorskiy and Wedrzyn training areas in Poland since 1996, taking advantage of the lack of restrictions and larger training areas compared to the sometimes cramped ranges in Germany. Use of the Krzesiny airbase outside Poznan, Poland, is also anticipated, with a Polish news report in May even suggesting that a U.S. squadron of F–16 fighters would be redeployed there, though this was quickly denied by Polish government officials. The Taszar airbase in Hungary is also a possible candidate for an increased U.S. presence, as it has been supporting U.S. operations in the region since the U.S. entry into Bosnia in 1995. Training airspace for fighters over the Blalck Sea is also being mentioned.
Most importantly, it is becoming clear that the base changes will mean a dramatic reduction of the entire U.S. European force. The initial reports about the 1st Armored Division — half the U.S. Army’s Europe combat force — have been increasingly amplified as the months have gone by. The Army is now making detailed plans to move both the 1st Armored and the other Europe–based division, the 1st Infantry, home after they serve their tours of duty in Iraq, though the draft arrangement have not yet been approved by DoD leadership. [4] Given the rift between the United States and Germany over the Iraq war, it seems likely these plans will indeed go ahead, with the U.S. ground force in Germany possibly being reduced only to a single Stryker Brigade of new light armored vehicles, to be based in the Grafenwoher–Vilseck area where training ranges are available. In addition, there were media reports in mid–June that Heidelburg, Wiesbaden, Grafenwoher and Wurzburg, major garrison towns of the U.S. Army in Germany, are likely to have forces pulled from them. Gen. Charles Wald, deputy commander of U.S. European Command, said the U.S. presence in Europe “is definitely going to get smaller” and that some of the changes will take place “fairly quickly.” [5] Various options, including withdrawing up to 70 percent of U.S. forces in Germany, are under consideration currently, and no final details have been decided. If both divisions return to the United States , a chain of re–basings and re–designations is almost certain to occur as no one current Army post in the continental United States has space to accommodate them whole.
Meanwhile, action is also being taken to cut forces elsewhere in Europe where the U.S. administration believes that the changing international situation has made them unnecessary. Washington informed the government of Iceland in early May that it wished to withdraw the last of the fighters it had stationed at Keflavik air base since the early 1950s. Keflavik was an important NATO submarine hunting station throughout the Cold War, but the removal of the Soviet threat meant the monitoring tasks for both the fighters and the submarine–hunting Orion aircraft at the base diminished drastically. However, Russian reconnaissance aircraft still fly though the area occasionally and the Icelandic government protested the fighters’ removal. In mid–August, Washington announced that the overall situation would be reviewed, and in the meantime the detachment would stay. [6]
An Expanding U.S. Presence in Africa
Amid the flurry of news reports surrounding Bush’s trip to Africa in mid–July, it emerged that one of the aims of the visit was to investigate expanding the austere bases concept to Africa. This would reverse previous a previous lack of interest in Africa by the U.S. military, exacerbated by the humiliating Somalia experience in 1994. Previously, most U.S. military operations in Africa have been dominated by humanitarian relief, and basing facilities limited to landing rights agreements with half a dozen Western and Southern African countries: Ghana, Senegal, Gabon, Namibia, Uganda, and Zambia. [7]
Two principal reasons are driving the new U.S. military interest in Africa. First is Africa ’s potential as a “terrorist breeding ground,” as it was characterized by Jones in late April. European Command oversees U.S. military operations in most of Africa. He later said that there was “evidence,” at least preliminary, that more and more of these large uncontrolled, ungoverned areas [such as parts of Africa] are going to be potential havens for that type of activity.’ [8] U.S. officials say that vast swaths of the Sahara from Mauritania to the Sudan, traditional smuggling routes, have become operating areas from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. In a first step, European Command is now sending trainers to work with four North African states on gathering intelligence and patrolling.
The other reason for increased U.S. interest in African bases is oil. U.S. oil industry officials have been emphasizing that the U.S. intelligence community has estimated that the United States will buy 25 percent of its oil from Africa by 2015. The increased importance of the region to the U.S. oil supply is prompting greater efforts from industry to interest the Pentagon in the area. A 2002 report published by the African Oil Policy Initiative Group, a panel that included oil executives and DoD officials, recommended the establishment of a U.S. joint sub–unified command, primarily focused on the Gulf of Guinea region — which is rich in oil, as well as a regional homeport to support U.S. naval vessels. [9]
The military response, apart from increasing the number of training programs and exercises in the region, is the consideration of plans for semi–permanent bases that might accommodate up to a brigade of 3,000 to 5,000, perhaps with an airfield nearby. Separate reports indicate up to a dozen of these bases might be being considered, with up to 5,000–6,500 troops based there. Forward operating locations are being planned, where small infantry or Special Forces units could be landed and built up as the mission required. Jones also predicted that carrier strike groups and marine expeditionary units would spend much more time patrolling the African coast.
Prospective U.S. base locations definitely include Senegal, Mali, and Algeria, though a number of other countries seem to be attracting the attention of the administration. Others mentioned include Morocco, Tunisia, Mali, Ghana, and Kenya.
Following the oil industry’s declaration of its interest in the Gulf of Guinea, the then second–in–command of the European Command visited Sao Tome and Principe last year, which led to a claim by the Sao Tome government that the country had an agreement with the United States to build a port in the country. That was denied by Washington, but the State Department did say the U.S. would offer naval and coastal patrol assistance.
Still, bases in Africa are definitely on the way, wherever they may finally be built. Getting the initial approvals will not present the major problem. More difficult will be the task of making sure the economic and security benefits the bases will bring contribute not to the livelihood of corrupt dictatorships, but to the improvement of the lives of African people.
Endnotes
Note 1: Bob Woodward, Bush at War, Simon & Schuster, 2002, pp.281&-;2 Back.
Note 2: Esther Schrader, “After the War: U.S. Expedites Reshuffling of Europe Troops,” Los Angeles Times, May 1, 2003 Back.
Note 3: Schrader, “After the War,” op. cit. Back.
Note 4: Amy Svitak and Vince Crawley, “Germany–based divisions may move stateside,” Army Times, Aug. 4, 2003 Back.
Note 5: Greg Jaffe, “US shifts troops to Caucasus, Africa ,” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2003 Back.
Note 6: Christopher Brown–Humes, “US delays plan to close Iceland base”, London Financial Times, Aug. 15, 2003, and AP Wordstream, “Icelandic officials say U.S. suspends action on withdrawing jets,” Aug. 14, 2003 Back.
Note 7: Eric Schmitt, “US military plans African expansion,” International Herald Tribune, July 5, 2003 Back.
Note 8: ibid. Back.
Note 9: Julian Borger, “US to lock Africa in military embrace,” Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 16, 2003 Back.
