The Cost of International Justice

Introduction

The issue of the financing of international justice has been generally neglected by international research. Legal scholars have rarely ventured beyond generic calls for the widening of the jurisdiction of international courts or for the creation of new courts. The financing of international justice has usually been conceived as an essentially political and technical issue and, therefore, as outside of the scope of legal discourse. Economists, on their side, have never taken a hard look at the way international law works, aside from decisions that effect the functioning of the international economic system per se. It is not surprising, therefore, that there does not exist any serious study on how much international rule of law costs, how and if efficiency could be enhanced, and where and if additional resources could be tapped to enhance the functioning of the courts themselves and allow a greater use of existing means. Hopefully, the data presented in this paper, together with some general observations proposed in the conclusions, will elicit constructive criticism and new thoughts on these much neglected aspects of this particular area of international cooperation.

The scope of this paper is modest. First, it intends to provide a broad picture of the major existing international courts and dispute settlement bodies ₂ , stressing those elements useful to understand the structure of their costs. Second, it will highlight some raw data on these costs which are usually lacking in legal literature. References to jurisdiction, powers, constitution, etc. of these bodies are therefore extremely brief, except when they are directly affected by budgetary or planning issues. Thirdly, this paper is just the prologue to a wider research effort. Indeed, this study has been presented as background paper for discussion at a meeting on the use and financing of international courts and dispute settlement bodies held in London, on January 31st-February 1st, 1997, co-sponsored by the Foundation on International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) and the Center on International Cooperation (the Center), New York, University. On the basis of the conclusions reached by that meeting, FIELD and the Center have decided to launch the “Project on International Courts and Tribunals” (the Project) ₃ .

The Project has been established to address legal, institutional and financial issues arising from the proliferation of international courts, tribunals and other dispute settlement bodies as well as from the increased willingness of members of the international community to have recourse to these bodies. It comprises two main components: The first one is research on the financial, access and procedural issues of the work of international courts and tribunals. The second is a capacity-building effort aimed at strengthening the awareness and knowledge of the functioning of international courts and tribunals among various international actors, developing countries and economies in transition foremost. Finally, the Project intends to create a permanent forum for communication and discussion among existing international courts and tribunals ion order to share experience and diffuse knowledge on best-practices.

This paper, therefore, is just the first step of an on-going research effort. More articulated findings will be available once the research component of the Project has reached its conclusion. They will be made available to the public as soon as possible, perhaps on this very same publication.

Methodological Issues

The most difficult aspect of this exercise has been to bring into the same picture widely different international bodies. Their commonalties are rather few. Broadly speaking, they are all the fruit of the efforts of international society to enhance the international rule of law. The great majority of existing dispute settlement bodies have been established during the second half of this century ₄ . The past few years, moreover, have seen a significant increase in the number of cases being brought to well-established bodies such as the International Court of Justice. The recent modification of other systems, as the new WTO dispute settlement system, and the creation of entirely new bodies, as the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea and the World Bank Inspection Panel, provide additional fora for the resolution of international disputes. What is more, private parties are increasingly playing a role in international dispute settlement mechanisms, particularly in the field of commercial disputes. For this reason the second half of the twentieth century will probably be remembered as the century where humanity has started a painstaking march toward an international order based on justice rather than on might. Much is still left to be done, however.

Differences, conversely, are numerous and important. First of all, the legal nature of the entities having a locus standi before these organs is widely different from case to case. Certain bodies like the ICJ or the WTO Dispute Settlement Body allow only States to bring cases; some others, like the ECJ, ECHR, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the World Bank Inspection Panel, allow natural persons, as well as States and/or International Governmental Organizations, to stand either as plaintiffs or as defendants. Finally some bodies are competent to receive cases between legal and/or natural persons. This is the case of the ICSID and of the ECJ. Some of the bodies considered in this paper, like the ICJ, the ECJ, the ICTY, the ICTR offer judicial remedies for violations of law. Some others like the PCA and the ICSID provide facilities for the settlement of disputes through arbitration. Some others, again like the PCA, the ICSID, but also the World Bank Inspection Panel and to a certain extent the WTO, offer “quasi-judicial remedies” like mediation, conciliation, inquiry.

Again, each of these international bodies are different in the geographical scope of their jurisdiction. Both regional courts like the ECJ, the ICTY, the ICTR, the ECHR and the IACHR, and those courts without geographical limits like the ICJ, the PCA and the UNTLOS, are included in this survey. Finally, a distinction can be drawn between those bodies which settle disputes arising out of contractual obligations, either treaties (like the ICJ, the PCA, the WTO Dispute Settlement body) or contracts (like the PCA, the ICSID), and bodies which decide cases arising out of violations of customary international law (like the ICJ, the ICTY, the ICTR, the PCA).

Even if it is admitted that these diverse international entities can be examined within the same work, it is quite difficult to find a single name suitable to identify all of the international bodies which this paper examines. International legal scholars use the broad designation of "dispute settlement bodies". Since 1994, however, this term has become increasingly inadequate to describe the efforts to promote the international rule of law. In particular the international criminal courts for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda and the future permanent criminal court cannot be regarded as “dispute settlement bodies”. They do not “settle a dispute” on a point of law or fact between two subjects (States, international organizations or individuals); rather, they apply international humanitarian law, or international criminal law (provided that such a body of law can be identified), to individuals. They do not exercise, therefore, a contentious or an advisory jurisdiction but rather an implementation function. They do not provide an alternative to the use of force, like all dispute settlement bodies, but rather are the tragic consequence of its use.

Prima facie a common ground could be found in the fact that all these international bodies have the aim of implementing international law and are, by and large, established by inter-state agreements and, therefore, subject to (and dependent on) state support. Upon closer scrutiny, however, such a statement is not wholly correct either. While the implementation of international law, either customary or conventional, is the main function of many of them, there are a few, like the World Bank Panel of Inspection, the International Chamber of Commerce and the ICSID, which do not necessarily implement international law. They seek to find a solution to a dispute, and such a settlement will not necessarily constitute the implementation of international law. In many cases it will recall a sort of transactional justice or political adjustment.

Another main methodological difficulty of this paper is represented by the need to use figures. Figures in this paper are introduced solely with the purpose of providing the reader with a general sense of the cost of the rule of law and of the relative magnitude of the costs of each body. They should not be regarded as authoritative. As far as we are able to determine, this paper represents probably the first systematic attempt to compile the cost of international rule of law. The data come from a variety of sources, always referenced in a footnote, with varying degrees of reliability. They are a composite of precise expenditure figures, as well as annual averages of multi-year figures and estimates. In some cases data were inconsistent; in others, they were simply non available. Finally budgets expressed in currencies other than the US dollar have been converted on the basis of the January 14th, 1997 exchange rate provided by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York ₅ .

Furthermore, the reader should be aware that when we talk throughout this paper of the cost of international justice we refer only to the cost emerging from the various organs’ budgets. While these costs constitute a large share of the total amount, they are not, however, the whole story. They do not tell, namely, how much it costs a state to appear before one of these organs either as plaintiff or as defendant. This figure is particularly volatile because it depends upon several unpredictable factors, just to cite the most obvious, like the complexity of the case, the number of lawyers and experts a party chooses to use, and the location and length of the hearings. None of the bodies from whom we requested the information used to compile this review has been able to provide this data. However, knowing how much it actually costs a state to appear before these bodies might be crucial to determine the need for special trust and/or legal aid funds and the scale required if such need were to be determined. Further research in this direction might be warranted.

Finally, throughout this paper the reader should keep in mind the key difference between fixed costs (constituted by the costs incurred for the maintenance of the court room, registrar, secretarial services etc.) and variable costs (such as the arbitrators and legal counsels fees, evidence gathering, etc.). First, while fixed costs are borne collectively by those states which are parties to the relevant treaties (i.e. UN Charter, ICJ Statute, Hague Conventions, etc.), variable costs are sometimes (i.e. PCA, ICSID, etc.) borne only by the parties to the case submitted.

Second, while fixed costs by definition do not vary with the caseload, variable costs are determined by the number of cases filed. This truism leads to two observations. First, the demand driven nature of the work of the international bodies surveyed in this paper might suggest a flexible budgetary strategy to ensure that sufficient resources are available to process all requests received. Second, a further distinction might be made between “light bodies” and “heavy bodies”. Light bodies, like the PCA, the International Chamber of Commerce, the ICSID and, in part, the WTO, are endowed only with a seat and a registrar and provide potential claimants with a panel of experts to settle the dispute. They usually have low fixed costs. To a certain extent this is also the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. Conversely, heavy bodies have not only a seat and a registrar but also judges who sit permanently. This is the case of the ICJ, ECJ, UNTLOS, ECHR, IACHR, etc. Fixed costs of these courts are typically greater.

The difference between light and heavy bodies is due not only to the existence or absence of permanent organs but also to the fact that while light bodies allocate most variable costs to parties, which usually pay arbitrators’ fees, etc., heavy bodies limit parties’ costs to the fees of their own attorneys, experts and evidence gathering.

In the following pages eleven different bodies will be surveyed. For each of them a short description of their function, jurisdiction and structure will introduce to their respective caseload and budget.

The International Court of Justice

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) is “…the principal judicial organ of the United Nations” ₆ . Its seat is at the Peace Palace in The Hague. It began work in 1946, when it replaced the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) which had functioned in the Peace Palace since 1922. Its Statute, very similar to that of its predecessor, is an integral part of the Charter of the United Nations.

The Court is composed of 15 independent judges elected to nine-year terms of office by the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council, voting independently of each other. It may not include more than one judge of any nationality. When the Court does not include a judge of the nationality of a State party to a case, that State may appoint a judge ad hoc for the purpose of the case. The Court discharges its duties as a full Court but, at the request of the parties, it may also establish a special chamber ₇ .

The Court’s function is twofold: to settle in accordance with international law the legal disputes submitted to it by States, and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by duly authorized international organs and agencies.

Concerning its contentious jurisdiction, only States may apply to and appear before the Court ₈ . Moreover, the Court is competent to hear a case only if the States concerned have accepted its jurisdiction. Such an acceptance can take the form of the conclusion of an ad hoc agreement to submit the dispute to the Court. Alternatively, it can be included in a “jurisdictional clause” of a treaty (e.g. when disputants are parties to a treaty which contains a provision whereby, in the event of a disagreement over its interpretation or application, one of them may refer the dispute to the Court) ₉ . Finally, the jurisdiction of the ICJ can derive from the reciprocal effect of “optional declarations”, whereby each disputing State has accepted the jurisdiction of the Court as compulsory in the event of a dispute with another State having made a similar declaration ₁₀ . In cases of doubt as to whether the Court has jurisdiction, it is the Court itself which decides. The Court’s judgment is final and without appeal. Should one of the States involved fail to comply with it, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations.

Concerning the advisory jurisdiction, only UN organs and UN specialized agencies can requests opinions of the Court ₁₁ . On receiving a request for an opinion, the Court decides which States and organizations might provide useful information and gives them an opportunity to present written or oral statements. The Court's advisory procedure is otherwise modeled on that of contentious proceedings, and the sources of applicable law are the same. In principle the Court's advisory opinions are consultative in character and are therefore not binding as such on the requesting bodies. Certain instruments or regulations can, however, provide in advance that the advisory opinion shall be binding.

Caseload

Since 1946 the Court has dealt with forty-seven contentious cases, delivering sixty-one judgments, and rendering twenty-three advisory opinions ₁₂ . However, the caseload of the Court has suffered remarkable fluctuations all through its existence. The Court received its first thirty-three cases between 1947 and 1960, with an average of slightly more than two cases per year. During the 1960s the average fell to less than one per year. From July 1962 to January 1967 (again between February 1967 and August 1971), no new cases were brought before the Court. From 1972 the number of new cases increased again, raising the annual average between 1972 and 1985 from one to three each year. During the last ten years, the Court has been asked to deal with nineteen contentious cases and four requests of advisory opinion. Nine contentious cases are at present pending ₁₃ .

Costs

The Court’s budget is drafted biennially by the Registrar, approved by the Court and forwarded, through the UN Secretary-General, to the UN General Assembly for approval. Fixed costs are borne by the United Nations members, according to the scale of assessment determined by the UNGA ₁₄ . The budget of the Court for the biennium 1994-1995 was $ 19,316,000, of which $ 7,103,300 is for the Judges of the Court, $ 8,660,200 is for the Registry, and $ 2,820,100 is for common services ₁₅ .

The financial crisis faced by the United Nations during last years had negative repercussions on the work of the ICJ ₁₆ . The Courts’ 1996-1997 budgetary proposals were reduced by the General Assembly ₁₇ . This has lead to the elimination of four of the total sixty-one positions which the Registrar had had during the previous biennium ₁₈ . Personnel and material resources reduction coupled with and increase in the caseload has ultimately put the Court under strain. In particular during 1995-1996 the Court has been forced to deliberate on three cases simultaneously ₁₉ , in contrast with its traditional practice of taking one case, or one phase of a case, at a time ₂₀ .

For what concerns the cost of the proceedings before the Court, in principle each party bears its own costs. However, the Court has the power to make an order in favor of one of the parties for the payment of costs. The expenses of the Court, including amounts payable to witnesses or experts appearing at the request of the Court are paid out of the United Nations Budget, as described above. However, if a party to a case does not contribute to the UN Budget, the Court itself fixes the amount payable by that party as a contribution towards the expenses of the Court for the case.

In 1989, acknowledging that “… there are occasions where the parties concerned … cannot proceed because of the lack of legal expertise or funds” ₂₁ , the UN General Assembly created the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice ₂₂ . The Fund is designed to encourage States to settle their disputes peacefully by submitting them to the Court, and eventually to help them finance the costs associated with the execution of a judgment of the Court. To be eligible for funding, a state must be entitled to appear before the Court and demonstrate a need for financial assistance. In addition, the dispute must be submitted to the Court by an ad hoc agreement.

States, intergovernmental organizations, national institutions, and NGOs, as well as natural and juridical persons, can make voluntary contributions to the Fund. In 1992 the UN Secretary-General reported that 34 States had contributed a total of $ 583,705 ₂₃ .

The requests for financial assistance are reviewed by a three-person Panel of Experts, which makes a recommendation to the Secretary-General for a final decision. To date the UN Secretary-General has received two applications. The first was in March 1991, from a developing country seeking to resolve a territorial dispute with its neighbor through the ICJ. An award was made to defray the expenses partly incurred in reproduction(including maps), printing and translation of documents submitted to the Court ₂₄ . In September 1991 a second application was filed by another developing country regarding a boundary dispute pending before the Court ₂₅ . Again, a limited amount of assistance was provided to the applicant to defray the expenses in cartography, transport and per diem incurred in connection with its submission of the case to the ICJ.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities

The great innovation introduced by the European Communities, in contrast to previous failed attempts at European unification, is the complete reliance on the rule of law to achieve that end. The European Communities have been established by treaties ₂₆ and pursue their aims exclusively through a new body of law, the EC Law. EC Law is independent, uniform in all fifteen Member States, and separate from, yet superior to, national law. Finally, many of its provisions are directly applicable in all Member States.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ), as the judicial institution of the Community, is the guardian of EC Law. Its essential task is to ensure that EC Law is not interpreted and applied differently in each Member State. In order to fulfill this role, the ECJ has jurisdiction to hear disputes to which Member States, the EC institutions, and natural and legal persons may be parties.

The ECJ comprises 15 judges and nine Advocates General, appointed by common accord of the governments of the Member States and holding office for a renewable term of six years. The Advocates General assist the Court in its task. They deliver, in open court and with complete impartiality and independence, opinions on the cases brought before the Court. Their duties, however, should not be confused with those of a prosecutor or similar official ₂₇ . That role is filled by the EC Commission, as guardian of the Community’s interests. Moreover, in 1989, in order to cope with a constantly growing caseload the EC Council set up the Court of First Instance, composed of 15 Judges and appointed by common accord of the governments of Member States. Its aim is to strengthen the judicial safeguards available to individuals by introducing a second tier of judicial authority and to enable the ECJ to concentrate on the uniform interpretation of EC Law.

The Court of Justice of the European Communities has a Registrar, appointed by the Court, who, in addition to fulfilling duties similar to those of a registrar or clerk of a national court, also acts as secretary-general of the institution. There are currently some 950 staff working for the Court at its seat in Luxembourg. The Court of Justice, as an independent and autonomous institution of the European Communities, possesses, in addition to the registry, its own administrative infrastructure, which includes a large translation and interpreting service ₂₈ . The Court of First Instance appoints its own Registrar, while for its administrative needs it relies on the services of the Court of Justice.

Caseload

The ECJ has jurisdiction to hear cases on failure to fulfill Treaty obligations; to review the legality of Community acts; to review the legality of a failure to act by a Community institution; to rule on the liability of the Community for damages caused by its institutions or servants in the performance of their duties; to give national courts preliminary rulings on the interpretation or validity of EC Law, and to hear appeals against judgments of the Court of First Instance. The Court of First Instance can hear cases for annulment, for failure to act and for damages brought by natural and legal persons against the Community; competition proceedings; cases relating to the European Community of Steel and Coal; and disputes between the community and its officials and other servants.

Proceedings before the European jurisdictions can take the form of either a direct action or a reference for a preliminary ruling. While in the former case it is the plaintiff which brings directly its case before the European jurisdictions, in the latter is a national judge who submits a case pending before her/him to the ECJ to have a ruling on the interpretation or validity of EC Law.

Given its wide basis of jurisdiction, it is unsurprising that the case load of the ECJ is impressive. Since its establishment in 1952, as the Court of Justice of the Coal and Steel Community, more than 8600 cases have been brought before the Court. In 1995, 415 new cases were brought before the ECJ. On December 31, 1995 a total of 620 cases were still pending. The work load of the Court of First Instance is equally remarkable with a total of 235 new cases brought in 1995 and 616 cases still pending as of December 31, 1995. The overall case load of the European Communities’ justice system is, therefore, of 650 new cases and 1236 cases pending.

Costs

The budget of the ECJ is part of the annual budget of the European Communities and is adopted by the EC budgetary authorities: the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers, acting jointly. The 1996 total estimated expenditures are ECU 169,692,540 ($137,180,630). It should be noted, however, that this figure includes an exceptional item of ECU 60,000,000 ($48,504,420) for the purchase of the Court’s buildings.

The ECJ budget alone exceeds the sum of the costs incurred by all other bodies considered in this survey. Such tremendous costs can be accounted for, however, by the centrality of the ECJ in the construction of the European Union, which also explains its extremely busy docket.

The rules governing both costs and legal aid in European jurisdictions vary according to whether the proceedings concerned take the form of a direct action or a reference for a preliminary ruling ₂₉ . Neither type of proceeding requires the payment of any court fees or registry charges. However, if a party causes the Court to incur avoidable costs or if copying or translation work is carried out at the request of a party and the registrar considers it excessive, the cost shall be paid by that party ₃₀ . The ECJ Rules of Procedure, however, do not provide a definition of what constitutes “avoidable costs” or excessive amounts of translation or copying, and neither the Court nor the Registrar have so far been called upon to exercise their powers in this sense ₃₁ .

In the case of direct proceedings, the basic rule is that the unsuccessful party bears the costs of the proceedings ₃₂ , provided that costs reimbursement have been requested in the successful party’s pleadings ₃₃ . However, the ECJ may order even a successful party to pay costs which the court considers that party to have unreasonably caused the opposite party to incur (e.g. by using dilatory tactics in providing relevant information or documents) ₃₄ .

Finally, ever since the Court was established, its rules of procedure have provided for financial assistance to be made available to a party who was wholly or partially unable to finance the cost of the proceedings ₃₅ . The grant of such legal aid, however, is rarely an open-ended undertaking to meet the legally aided party’s costs, but generally takes the form of a fixed sum and may be restricted to covering only certain aspects of the procedure ₃₆ . Moreover, only a relatively small number of applications of such assistance are filed each year, perhaps because the availability of legal aid to bring cases before European jurisdictions is not widely known ₃₇ .

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) is an independent international organization which has been established pursuant to the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The UNCLOS entered into force on November 16, 1994 and the judges of the ITLOS, elected on August 1, 1996, sworn in on October 18, 1996. The Tribunal, therefore, is still in its organizational phase and, to date, no case has been submitted to it ₃₈ . The data relative to its organization, caseload and costs, therefore, are extremely scarce and merely indicative of a future trend.

The UNCLOS is probably one of the most comprehensive and complex treaties ever negotiated. It regulates the exercise of States’ sovereignty over the seas, by establishing clear outer limits to coastal States’ jurisdiction, as well as other prominent issues like the exploitation of sea resources, navigation and environmental protection. The UNCLOS, moreover, has declared that the seabed beyond states’ jurisdiction is the “common heritage of mankind”, and has set up the International Seabed Authority to regulate the exploitation of its resources. To date 112 States, with the main exceptions being the USA and United Kingdom, are party to the Convention ₃₉ .

The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ₄₀ , located in Hamburg, Germany, is one of the possible fora to which States can bring disputes arising out of the UNCLOS interpretation and implementation ₄₁ . It is composed of twenty-one independent judges, elected by States Parties to the Convention, which are permanently at the disposal of the Tribunal. Not all members would necessarily be present in every adjudication: the tribunal’s quorum is eleven and it is also empowered to operate through special chambers of three or five members or through the eleven-member Seabed Disputes Chamber (which may itself operate through three member ad hoc chambers).

The UNCLOS gives the Tribunal jurisdiction to resolve a variety of disputes. First, the Tribunal can hear cases concerning disputes between States over, inter alia, the delimitation of maritime zones, fisheries, navigation and ocean pollution. Second the Tribunal has compulsory jurisdiction over the prompt release, upon deposit of a bond, of arrested vessels and their crews. Third, the Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction over disputes between States, the International Seabed Authority, companies and private individuals, arising out of the exploitation of the international seabed Area. Moreover, the Tribunal has special jurisdiction in matters calling for provisional measures. Failing agreement between parties to a dispute within two weeks of the request by either party for provisional measures, the Tribunal (or with respect to activities in the Area, the Seabed Disputes Chamber) may prescribe, modify or revoke provisional measures. Finally, the International Seabed Authority may request advisory opinions from the Tribunal’s Seabed Disputes Chamber.

Decisions of the Tribunal are final and shall require the compliance of all the parties to the dispute. However, decisions will not have a binding force except between the parties in respect of the particular dispute.

Costs

The international regime of the law of the sea, as conceived in the UNCLOS, should be financially self-sustained. The exploitation of mineral resources in the Area, through the International Seabed Authority, is expected to generate a regular flow of income to finance all activities related to the international management of the high sea. However, fixed costs of the ITLOS (e.g. judges salaries, travel, staff costs, meetings, communications, supplies and materials) are not to be met by this source of income but are rather divided among States Parties to the UNCLOS applying the United Nations scale of assessment. The 1996 budget of the ITLOS, approved by the meeting of the States Parties to the UNCLOS, was $ 1,950,147, while the 1997 budget is $ 4,220,752.

At present time the staff of the ITLOS, excluding the judges, is eighteen people ₄₂ . They are temporarily hosted in a building in the center of Hamburg, while a new seat, donated by the German Government, is under construction.

Variable costs will be apportioned between the parties. Unless otherwise decided by the Tribunal, each party shall bear its own costs. Finally, no provision for legal aid has been made.

The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

In May 1993 and in November 1994 respectively, the UN Security Council determined that the situations in former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda constituted threats to international peace and security. Accordingly, the Security Council established the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) ₄₃ and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) ₄₄ under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The establishment of these two criminal tribunals, the first since the Tokyo and Nuremberg trials in 1945-46, represents a significant step by the international community to assure the enforcement of international law in general and of international humanitarian law in particular, through criminal prosecutions.

Both the ICTY and the ICTR are subsidiary organs of the Security Council within the meaning of Article 29 of the UN Charter. As such they are dependent in administrative and financial matters on various United Nations organs; but, as judicial institutions, they are independent of any one State or group of States, including their parent body, the Security Council. The pre-existence of the ICTY has much influenced the establishment of the ICTR. Because there are a number of similarities between the two tribunals, particularly concerning organizational and institutional aspects, therefore, they can be considered together ₄₅ .

First of all it should be stressed that both tribunals are ad hoc in nature. As an enforcement measure under Chapter VII, the life span of each is linked to the restoration and maintenance of international peace and security in the territories of former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Once the Security Council decides that peace and security have been re-established, they will be dissolved.

Second, the Statutes of the ICTY and of the ICTR recognize individual criminal responsibility and have jurisdiction over natural persons only, not over organizations or States, for crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity. Moreover, their jurisdiction is not exclusive but concurrent with the jurisdiction of national courts. However, both the ICTY and the ICTR have primacy over national courts. At any stage of the procedure, the International Tribunal may formally request the national courts to defer to the competence of the tribunal.

Third, both the Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTY and of the ICTR provide protective measures for victims and witnesses, especially in cases of rape or sexual assault.

Finally, unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, both the ICTY and ICTR are civilian, not military. Neither possesses a means of its own to bring an accused before the court. Therefore, the resolutions establishing the ICTY and the ICTR require States, beyond what is already contained in Article 2.5 of the UN Charter, to cooperate with the Tribunal in the investigation and prosecution of persons accused of committing serious violations of international humanitarian law.

From an organizational point of view it should be stressed that both tribunals have the same Chief Prosecutor and share the same Appeal Chamber, composed of five judges and based in the ICTY’s facility.

The location of the ICTY and of the ICTR are respectively at the Hague, The Netherlands and in Arusha, Tanzania. The ICTR Office of the Prosecutor is in Kigali, Rwanda. Moreover, both tribunals have a special Detention Unit located at the Hague and Arusha, respectively. The staff, including judges, of the ICTY is 316 people ₄₆ . That of the ICTR is 403 ₄₇ .

While the ICTY expenses are borne by the United Nations, the ICTR expenses are borne by a special account in accordance with Article 17.3 of the UN Charter ₄₈ .

Caseload

The ICTR has to date issued 14 indictments concerning 21 individuals and 13 of them are presently in custody (seven in Arusha, four in Cameroon, one in Switzerland and one in the USA). The ICTY has issued 18 indictments ₄₉ against 75 indictees, and 7 of them are presently in custody in The Hague ₅₀ .

The activity of the ICTR is still in an organizational phase. Its full operational phase is expected to start in 1997, during which it is expected that 12 trials will be initiated ₅₁ . The first trial before the ICTR, that of Mr. Jean-Paul Akayesu, is scheduled to start in January 1997. The trial of Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, who are on the same indictment, is due to start on 20 February and the trial of Georges Rutaganda, postponed on the ground of illness, is due to start on March 6, 1997.

The ICTY has already moved from the organizational stage to full operation. Its Trial Chambers have become increasingly active and since May 1996 sit continuously. This extra workload reflects the fact that the Tribunal has become a functioning judicial organ, having commenced its first trial (and with two other cases before it in the pre-trial case). In a fourth case the Tribunal has sentenced Mr. Erdemovic who entered a guilty plea.

During 1995 the Appeals Chamber sat for the first time, rendering a judgment on an interlocutory appeal in which defense counsel argued before the Chamber that the Tribunal was unlawfully established; did not have primacy over competent domestic courts and lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter. The Appeals Chamber dismissed these grounds of appeal.

Costs

The ICTY 1996 budget, approved by the UNGA, amounts to $35,430,622 ₅₂ which is slightly less than the ICTY’s total expenditures for the biennium 1994-95 ($35,800,000) ₅₃ . Resources are distributed as follows: $2,059,300 to the Chambers; $13,482,700 to the Registry; $12,177,600 to the Office of the Prosecutor and $7,711,022 for the general program support (operating expenses, furniture and equipment, materials, etc.).

As of 31 December 1995, contributions and pledges totaling $6,696,611 had been received by the Voluntary Fund to support the activities of the ICTY ₅₄ . Furthermore, contributions in kind valued at approximately $2,500,000 were also provided to the Tribunal in 1994-95 ₅₅ . In addition, contributions in the form of the loan of personnel (55) have been received from a number of Member States ₅₆ .

Two items deserve to be singled out from the ICTY budget. First, the Tribunal has a “legal aid” program ₅₇ . This program, which began only recently as more cases are coming before the Tribunal, provides legal counsel free of charge to indigent indictees. To date 66 lawyers from 13 countries have been assigned under the program ₅₈ . The second is the ICTY Victims and Witnesses Unit, whose aim is to provide care, support and protection to witnesses testifying before the Tribunal. So far dozens of witnesses from many countries have been brought to the Hague by the Unit to appear in four hearings, as well as in the Tribunal’s first trial against Mr. Tadic, involving some 100 witnesses alone. In addition to administrative staff, the Unit consists of a Protection Officer, experienced in witness protection, and a Support Officer, who has a background in dealing with cases of sexual assault.

The total appropriation of the ICTR for 1996 amounts to $36,494,700, while the amount of resources estimated for 1997 is of $46,732,700. To date voluntary contributions to the ICTR amount to $6,431,500. These resources have not been fully used due to the delays experienced by the ICTR in attaining a fully operational phase until early 1996. They have been mainly used to lease an aircraft to secure transport from Kigali to Arusha and to set up, on the blue print of the ICTY, a Victims and Witnesses Unit to assist impartially both prosecution and defense witnesses, to ensure the safety and confidentiality of the victims and witnesses, and to provide them with both physical and psychological protection. In addition a number of states and organizations have made contributions in kind to the Tribunal ₅₉ . Contributions in the form of the loan of personnel (38) have been received by the ICTR also ₆₀ .

The International Criminal Court

The idea of the establishment of a permanent international criminal court emerged for the first time in the aftermath of World War II and the Tokyo and Nuremberg Tribunals. Shortly after the UN was founded, the International Law Commission was mandated to codify the legal principles that emerged during those trials, but progress on this initiative was largely paralyzed during the cold war years. In 1989, the idea was re-launched at the UN on the initiative of Trinidad and Tobago, and since then the idea of the establishment of a permanent criminal court has progressed quickly.

The end of the cold war, the establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR and the concern about their ad hoc nature, together with the continuing stalemate over the trial of two Libyan citizens accused of the Lockerbie bombing, have given impetus to the work of the International Law Commission, leading in 1994 to a draft Statute for an International Criminal Court ₆₁ . Since 1994, the Draft Statute has been debated in the UN Sixth Committee, drawing general support for a decision to convene a diplomatic conference in the near future.

In discussions in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly, concerning the financing of this international criminal court three main approaches have emerged. According to one approach, the costs of the court should be financed from the regular budget of the United Nations ₆₂ ; according to another, they should be borne by those States that will be parties to the statute ₆₃ ; and under a third, it is still premature to discuss budgetary matters in detail until the nature of the court and the degree of its general acceptability has been clarified ₆₄ .

The proponents of the first approach have emphasized the need to ensure the universal character of the court by making it part of the United Nations System. They feel it necessary, given the nature of the crimes over which the court would exercise jurisdiction, to make it possible for all States to initiate proceedings without financial burdens. This objective could not be achieved if only the States parties to the statute were to contribute to the financing of the institution. It was also observed that on a practical level it had been difficult to finance other institutions in this area by any voluntary method alone ₆₅ .

Those States favoring funding by States parties to the court’s Statute pointed out that a wide interest in the court on the part of States would translate itself into wide participation in its statute and, therefore, in a large number of contributing parties. Mention was made of the possibility of resorting to a formula similar to that applicable in the framework of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ₆₆ .

Beyond these three main approaches on the way the future international criminal court should be financed, a number of other suggestions have been advanced. First, it was suggested that consideration should be given to making a state which initiated a procedure share the costs with the court, with due regard to the special position of developing countries ₆₇ . Second, a view was expressed that costs of judicial assistance at the request of the courts could be considered costs of the court itself. Third, in response to the argument that a State might be precluded from seeking justice for lack of means, the opinion was expressed that very few states were so lacking in resources that they could not make some contribution, bearing in mind, in particular, that in the absence of an international criminal court, they themselves would have to bear the relevant costs. Fourth, the remark was made that the UN should bear the financial responsibility in relation to cases referred by the Security Council ₆₈ .

Finally, in order to reduce costs, however funded, it was suggested that, whenever possible, the court should move to the location where a particular crime had been committed. It was also suggested that a State which had lodged a frivolous complaint should be made to pay some of the costs. Mention was further made of the possibility of establishing an auditing mechanism to monitor the expenditures of the court, as well as a supervisory mechanism to oversee the administration of the court ₆₉ .

The European Court of Human Rights

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is an autonomous judicial institution, created in 1959 under the aegis of the Council of Europe, with the purpose of ensuring the observance of the engagements undertaken by member States under the 1950 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter the Convention) and its protocols ₇₀ . To date forty European countries have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Of these, thirty-five have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court ₇₁ .

The Procedure prescribed by the Convention is relatively complex. For reasons noted below, a far-reaching set of institutional and procedural reforms was adopted, in 1994, by member States, which is unlikely to enter into force before 1998 ₇₂ . In this Chapter the complexities of the existing arrangements are not examined in detail, partly because of the pending changes pursuant to Protocol No. 11, and partly because our primary concern is with the functioning of the ECHR, rather than the European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter the Commission) or Committee of Ministers.

Under the terms of the Convention, cases submitted to the Court must have originated in an application lodged with the Commission. This application can be lodged by a member State ₇₃ or by an individual, group or NGO ₇₄ . As of March 1995 only eleven applications (concerning six different situations), out of tens of thousands applications, have been lodged by States ₇₅ .

To be declared admissible, a petition must not be anonymous, manifestly ill-founded or constitute an abuse of right of petition. Moreover, domestic remedies must have been exhausted and it must be presented within six months of the final decision in a domestic court. Once the application is declared admissible, the Commission’s task is to establish the facts and encourage efforts to reach friendly settlement. Where a friendly settlement based upon “respect of human rights as defined in the Convention” ₇₆ is reached, the Commission reports on this to the Committee of Ministers, which consists of the Foreign Ministers of the member States of the Council of Europe. It is the responsibility of this political organ to take the measures to which it has agreed.

Where no friendly settlement is reached, the Commissions determines prima facie, and in a way that it is not legally binding per se on the member States, whether there has been a breach of the Convention. Within three months of the Commission’s report the case can be referred to the Court either by the Commission or by a State concerned, or, since October 1, 1994, by an individual, group of individuals or an NGO ₇₇ .

Where a case has been submitted to the Court, by an individual, group of individuals or an NGO, a panel of three judges may decide unanimously that the case should not be examined by the Court ₇₈ . In such an instance, the Committee of Ministers will determine the case. Conversely, the Court cannot turn down a case submitted by the Commission or a member State.

The Court consists of a number of judges equal to that of member states of the Council of Europe (currently forty), and no two judges may be nationals of the same State ₇₉ . The Judges sit part-time, for about sixteen weeks a year.

For the consideration of each case brought before it, the Court sits as a Chamber of nine judges including, as ex officio members, the President, Vice-President and a judge who is national of any State party concerned. Since 1994, the Chamber may, under certain conditions, relinquish jurisdiction in favor of a Grand Chamber of twenty-one judges; the Grand Chamber itself may in turn, in exceptional cases, relinquish jurisdiction in favor of the plenary Court ₈₀ .

Although the Commission is not party to cases before the Court, one of its members participates in the proceedings to assist the Court as “defender of the public interest”. Moreover, since 1983, an individual applicant may be represented before the Court by a lawyer, but she/he is not formally a party to the case.

The Courts’ judgments are final and binding, but they are declaratory in nature. If the Court finds a violation of the Convention, it has no power to overrule the decision of the national authorities or to order consequential measures. The Court may, however, award “just satisfaction” in the form of financial compensation. Judgments are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, which supervises their execution.

Caseload

During the period 1953 - 1994, a total of 78,583 letters, of which 26,041 were registered as applications, have been received by the Commission. Of those 2,027 have been declared admissible. Two-hundred twenty-three cases ended in friendly settlement, 506 were referred to the Court (of which 290 resulted in a finding of violations, 103 in a finding of no violations, 62 were pending and 51 were settled or struck off the list), and 551 cases were referred to the Council of Ministers (of which 121 were considered to involve violations, 64 no violations, 332 pending and 34 settled or leading to other findings) ₈₁ .

In recent years the Commission has received between 5,000 and 10,000 complaints each year. The number of applications registered by the Commission has increased ten times during last 15 years ₈₂ . In the years prior to 1990 the Commission built up a large backlog which began to be reduced only when it was permitted by Protocol No. 8 to meet in Committees of Three and Chambers. As an example of the caseload of the Commission, in a five-month period between August 1993 and January 1994 the Commission was able to deal with 2,378 individual complaints. Of these, the Commission declared 396 admissible and 974 inadmissible, it struck 48 applications off its list of cases pending, and it communicated 489 applications to governments. In examining applications which had already been admitted, the Commission referred 36 cases to the Court, adopted 19 reports based on friendly settlements and adopted 203 reports on the merits ₈₃ .

The Court, while until the early 1980s it dealt with an average of only five to six cases annually, between 1989 and 1992 this figure rose to 63 cases between 1993 and 1996. The Court heard its first 100 cases between 1959 and 1985, its second hundred between 1985 and 1989 and between 1990 and 1996 almost 600 cases ₈₄ .

Since 1994 the workload has sharply increased. This increase has resulted from several factors. First, the expansion of the Council of Europe’s membership to Eastern Europe has doubled in five years the number of members States. Second, the introduction of Protocol No. 9 extended to individuals the right of petition to the Court once the Commission has decided on the admissibility of the case. Finally, the Convention system’s perceived effectiveness, has probably encouraged additional cases. As a result, the European system of protection of human rights has become clearly overburdened and, therefore, more time consuming ₈₅ .

Costs

Such an overburdened docket is currently handled by fifty-five ECHR permanent staff members ₈₆ . According to Article 58 of the Convention, the Court’s expenses are to be borne by the Council of Europe. The Court’ s budget is therefore part of the overall Council of Europe’ Budget, funded by contributions from the member States and approved by the Committee of Ministers.

The appropriation specifically allocated to the Court in the Council of Europe’s 1997 Budget is approximately FRF 60,900,000 ($ 11,340,798) ₈₇ . The main items of the Court’s expenditure which have to be met from this sum are judges’ retainers and allowances; staff costs; reproductions, translations and dispatch of documents; publications; and legal aid. Much of the Court’s infrastructure, including computer and telecommunication services, is provided by and/or shared with the Council of Europe. Since 1994, the Court has been housed in the new Human Rights Building in Strasbourg, built with contributions from member States and owned by the Council of Europe ₈₈ .

While, the general costs of the Court proceedings are borne by the Court itself and/or the Council of Europe, in principle the State concerned and the applicant bear their own costs associated with the procedure (legal counsels, evidence gathering, etc.). However, where the Court finds a violation of the Convention it may award a sum against the respondent Government for costs and expenses (in addition to any award that it may make in respect of compensation) in so far as such costs and expenses were incurred by the applicant in seeking to prevent the violation or to obtain redress therefor ₈₉ . The costs and expenses may relate to both domestic and Court proceedings if they satisfy this criterion, provided that the applicant shows that they were necessarily incurred and reasonable. No costs may be awarded against applicants who lose their case before the Court, and no Court fees are payable by the participants to the proceedings.

Legal aid may be granted to applicants, provided that the President of the Court or of the Chamber is satisfied that the applicant lacks sufficient means to meet all or part of the costs involved. Legal aid may be granted to cover not only representation fees, but also traveling and subsistence expenses and other necessary out-of-pocket expenses incurred by the applicants or their representatives. Fees shall be payable only to the advocates appointed by the applicant, or to other persons so appointed and duly approved by the President as the applicant’s representative.

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights ₉₀

The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) is an autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application of the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights ₉₁ (hereafter the Convention) and its protocols ₉₂ . It was established by the Convention and its main purpose is to judge cases of alleged violations of the human rights protected thereunder ₉₃ . To date, twenty-five American countries have ratified or acceded to the Convention. Of these, seventeen have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.

The Convention vested the authority to supervise its observance in two organs, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (which pre-existed the Convention, having been founded in 1959) and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (which was created by the Convention), and endowed them with the jurisdiction necessary to hear cases of human rights violations. The Inter-American Commission is composed of seven members elected in a non-governmental capacity by the OAS General Assembly and represents all the member States of the OAS. The Inter-American Court consists of seven judges irrespective of the number of States that have recognized the jurisdiction of the Court. Although the Court is formally an organ of the convention and not of the OAS, its judges may be nationals of any Member State of the OAS whether or not they are parties to the Convention.

Caseload

The Court is not a permanent organ. It carries out its work in regular and special sessions held at its seat in San José de Costa Rica. The IACHR held its first meeting on June 29 and 30, 1979 and, since then, it has held 34 regular and 20 special sessions, meeting on average three times a year.

The IACHR has both contentious and advisory functions. Advisory opinions may be requested by either state Members of the OAS, regardless of whether or not they have ratified the American Convention, and by those OAS organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the OAS ₉₄ . To date the IACHR has rendered 14 advisory opinions. In an advisory proceeding, the Court generally invites all of the States and qualified Organs to present their written observations regarding the matter pending before the Court. This faculty has been widely used. Twenty-one States and a number of OAS organs ₉₅ and organisms ₉₆ have submitted memoranda on matters under consultation by request of another State or by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ₉₇ .

The IACHR can exercise its contentious jurisdiction only on cases which are brought before it either by the Commission or by a State party to the Convention ₉₈ . For the Commission to refer a case to the Court, the case must have been admitted for investigation and the Commission’s draft report sent to the State concerned. In addition, the State must recognize the Court’s general contentious jurisdiction or a limited jurisdiction specified by a time period or case. For a State party to be able to place a case before the Court, the only requirement is that both States must have recognized the Court’s contentious jurisdiction. To date the IACHR has heard or is hearing 22 contentious cases, and more than half of those have been submitted during the triennium 1994-1996. On these cases the Court has passed 28 judgments corresponding to Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Interpretation of Judgments.

Costs

Both the IACHR and the Commission’s budgets are extremely limited. The 1997 budget of the IACHR is $ 1,035,700 ₉₉ , while the 1995 budget of the Commission was set to $ 1,734,000 ₁₀₀ . These reduced budgets explain the personnel scarcity that affects these organs. To support its activities the IACHR has currently only seven judges and four permanent functionaries in the Secretariat. The rest of the personnel is employed by means of short-term contracts. The Commission similarly is endowed with seven lawyers, including the Executive Secretary, four secretaries and one administrative official.

Personnel scarcity might have severe repercussions on the Court and Commission’s capacity to discharge rapidly their duties. An important aspect of their work, indeed, is the hearing of witnesses and experts. A total of 157 testimonies of witnesses and experts are currently pending in nine cases before the Court ₁₀₁ . However, on average the Court hears only four testimonies during one full day of hearings. It would, thus, take the IACHR approximately forty days to hear all of them. This situation is problematic because in 1997 the Court will be in session for a total of 49 days, only a few of which might be scheduled for testimony hearings.

This fact, coupled with increases in the caseload and in the number of witnesses appearing before the Court, is making the expeditious handling of cases by the Court increasingly difficult. In an effort to solve this problem, at least temporarily, the OAS has approved the necessary funds to hold four annual sessions beginning in 1997. Other long-term solutions under consideration include the establishment of a permanent presidency in the seat of the Court which would allow the IACHR President to decide on interlocutory resolutions, receive testimonies of witnesses and experts and expedite proceedings; an increase in the number of members of the Court, which would allow the Court to sit in chambers, thus doubling the capacity of the Court to hear cases. Both of these solutions would require an increase in the Court allowances. However, the only long-term solution to the overcrowded agenda of the IACHR would be the creation of a permanently functioning tribunal. This, however, would greatly increase the IACHR fixed costs, requiring the creation of permanent positions and the payment of the salaries of the permanent judges.

The Commission is affected by the same problems. It usually receives about 500 complaints a year, with each complaint frequently involving more than one victim. At times the number is much higher: in 1980, when members of the Commission visited Argentina, 5,000 complaints were received. Furthermore, in any one year, the Commission carries out two or three on-site visits and monitors the general situation of human rights in at least six or seven countries. To perform all these functions the Commission holds only two ten-days sessions a year.

The Permanent Court of Arbitration

The Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) is the oldest of the existing dispute settlement bodies. It was established by the 1899 Hague Convention on the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes ₁₀₂ , subsequently revised in 1907 ₁₀₃ , to facilitate immediate settlement of international disputes which the parties have agreed to refer to it. The PCA began operating in 1902 and in 1913 took up residence at the Hague, in the Peace Palace, built courtesy of a gift from Andrew Carnegie. In 1995 eighty-two States were members.

The point has been well made that the name “Permanent Court of Arbitration” is not a wholly accurate description of the machinery set up by the Hague conventions. Indeed the PCA is neither a “court” nor “permanent”. It is rather an institutional framework open to parties to a dispute to avail themselves of at their choice, consisting in essence of a panel of jurists designated by each country acceding to the 1899 and 1907 conventions (each such country being entitled to designate up to four) from among whom the members of each ad hoc arbitral tribunal might be chosen ₁₀₄ . The 1899 Convention further created a permanent bureau (the International Bureau), located at the Hague, with functions corresponding to those of a court registry and secretariat, and it laid down a set of rules of procedure to govern the conduct of arbitrations. Besides arbitration, the Hague Treaties of 1899 and 1907 provided for the constitution of an International Commission of Inquiry to facilitate the solution of disputes by elucidating facts through an impartial and conscientious investigation. Finally, since May 1937 the International Bureau has put its offices and organization at the disposal of conciliation commissions.

On the whole the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s function is to provide member states, and non-member States which have agreed to have recourse to the PCA, with all administrative and secretarial services necessary to have an effective settlement of the dispute by peaceful means. These services include providing an updated list of leading scholars and practitioners to be appointed as arbitrators or conciliators, acting as a channel of communication between the parties, holding and disbursing deposits for costs, ensuring safe custody of documents, arranging for efficient secretarial, language and communications services, and providing a courtroom and office space.

Caseload

The caseload of the PCA is more limited than that of other bodies considered in this survey ₁₀₅ . After a promising beginning in which a number of major disputes were heard and settled, recourse to the Hague Court of Permanent Arbitration became infrequent in the extreme. Of the twenty-seven cases submitted to arbitration before the PCA, during almost a century of life, twenty-one were disposed within its first three decades (1902-1932), one in 1935, and only five of them have been filed since 1938 (in 1938, 1954, 1969, 1989 and 1994) ₁₀₆ . The International Commission of Inquiry had an even less busy docket. Four cases were submitted, the last of which in 1962 ₁₀₇ . Finally the International Conciliation Commission, since 1937, has settled a mere three cases, the last of which was in 1956 ₁₀₈ .

With such a reduced caseload during last fifty years, there has been ample opportunity for an inquest into the reasons why a promising beginning did not long survive WW I. It is certainly the case that the unwillingness of the large and small powers at the 1907 Hague Peace Conference to accept proposals to strengthen the 1899 scheme may have played some role. And perhaps the relative success first of the PCIJ and later of the ICJ in attracting cases, albeit also experiencing periods of recession, has diverted work away from the PCA. Finally the cold war doubtless affected this means of peaceful settlement as did others. Yet, these reasons cannot be the entire story, especially when considering the proliferation of dispute settlement bodies which has taken place during last decades. In particular one might wonder if and how the weak caseload of the PCA, during last half century, has perhaps damaged its credibility as an effective and cost-efficient dispute settlement mechanism.

Several attempts have been made during last half century to bring back the PCA to its original stature. First, under Article 47 of the 1907 Convention, the International Bureau is authorized to place its offices and staff at the disposal of the Contracting Powers for the use of any special board or arbitration. This has been construed generously in recent years to include a variety of possible situations. In particular under the Rules regarding the Court, the International Bureau has placed its organization and premises at the disposal of contracting powers even if one of the parties to a dispute is not a state ₁₀₉ . In October 1994 the Court has even stretched the legal notion of State by admitting a dispute between an Asian company and an Asian State-owned. At present the case is pending before a sole arbitrator.

Second, in 1994 the Administrative Council ₁₁₀ has authorized the Secretary General to appoint a Steering Committee, composed of thirty experts in international law and dispute resolution, with the mandate “… to analyze the historical development and practical application of methods of dispute settlement, to make recommendations whether to revise the Conventions and whether to improve the dispute settlement procedures under the aegis of the PCA…” ₁₁₁ . Most likely the final outcome of the Steering Committee’s work will be a high level diplomatic conference in 1999, which is both the end of the UN Decade of International Law and the centennial of the PCA, aimed at adoption of a broad commitment to utilize the facilities of the PCA to the greatest extent possible ₁₁₂ .

Costs

Because of its limited caseload and permanent staff (6 including the Secretary General), the PCA fixed costs are relatively modest. The 1996 budget amounts to DFL 557,260 ($316,822) ₁₁₃ . Pursuant to Article 50 of the 1907 Hague Convention, “The expenses of the Bureau shall be borne by the Contracting Powers in the proportion fixed for the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union” ₁₁₄ . In conformity with the General Rules of the Union, which were approved at Washington in 1989, and effective since 1991, member sates are divided into 11 categories contributing respectively 50, 40, 30, 25, 20, 15, 10, 5, 3, 1 and 0.5 units (for fiscal year 1996 50 units corresponded to DFL 37,250 ($21,178) and 0.5 to DFL 372.50 (217$)) ₁₁₅ .

Costs of arbitration, conciliation or inquiry are borne by the parties. These costs include, inter alia, the arbitrators’ fees; the use of the PCA facilities (courtroom, office space, library), which are made available by the International Bureau by an arrangement with the Carnegie Foundation at a low rate in accordance with an established schedule ₁₁₆ ; the expenses of implementing an award or other decision or recommendation of such a body; payments to agents, counsels, experts and witnesses, and operational or administrative expenses connected with oral or written proceedings. In order to help developing states to meet these costs and to be able to bring cases before the PCA, in 1994 the Administrative Council established, on the blueprint of the ICJ Trust Fund, a Financial Assistance Fund ₁₁₇ . Contributions to this Fund are made on a voluntary basis by States, intergovernmental organizations and national institutions, as well as by natural and legal persons. To date, three States have made pledges to the Fund, which have been sufficient to cover two requests of assistance ₁₁₈ . States can have access to the Fund, by submitting a written request to the PCA General Secretary and after review by a separated Board of Trustees, if they are States Parties to the 1899 and 1907 Conventions; have concluded an agreement for the purpose of submitting one or more disputes, whether existing or future, for settlement by any of the means administered by the PCA; and are listed on the “DAC List of Aid Recipients” prepared by the OECD ₁₁₉ .

Moreover, in 1995, in order to clarify the scope of the Fund, the Administrative Council approved an amendment to paragraph 5 of the Terms of Reference and Guidelines, expressly providing that financial assistance may also be granted to an institution or enterprise owned and controlled by a State that meets the above mentioned qualifications ₁₂₀ . In December 1995 an Asian State-owned enterprise involved in arbitration proceedings under the auspices of the PCA received financial assistance from the Fund ₁₂₁ . This event is notable because it is the first instance of an entity, which is not strictly speaking a State, receiving financial assistance from an international fund to meet the costs of international litigation.

The World Trade Organization

The Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has completely revolutionized the discipline of world trade. Its main achievement has been the creation of a formal international trade organization, the World Trade Organization (WTO). To date 127 States are members of the WTO, representing the great majority of international trade, with the main exception of the Peoples Republic of China.

To a large extent the dispute settlement mechanism of the World Trade Organization is based on its GATT heritage ₁₂₂ . Its structure and procedures, contained in the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) ₁₂₃ , have been designed to provide security and predictability in the multilateral trading system ₁₂₄ . As compared with the former GATT dispute settlement procedure, the DSU has created a strengthened, swifter, more coherent and more predictable dispute settlement system. First, the DSU has consolidated all dispute settlement processes under the various WTO multilateral trade agreements into one central dispute settlement system. Second, as compared with the former GATT system, the DSU is an integral part of the agreement establishing the WTO. Thus, the establishment of dispute settlement panels and the subsequent process is not an ad hoc exercise, as it was under the GATT, but rather the exercise of functions mandated by the WTO Agreement. Third, strict time limits are fixed for the whole dispute settlement procedure and for each distinct phase of it ₁₂₅ . Finally, while under the GATT a decision of a panel could not be implemented without a consensus to do so, under the WTO system a consensus is necessary to prevent the decision of a panel or Appellate Body from being adopted.

Caseload

The wide difference in effectiveness between the former GATT and the present WTO dispute settlement system is shown by the fact that in the 45 years of GATT’s existence a total of 196 disputes were referred to it, resulting in 81 decisions being adopted by the GATT Contracting Parties ₁₂₆ , while in the two years of existence of the WTO, there have been, as of 1 December 1996, a total of 62 disputes referred to the WTO dispute settlement system, involving not less than 43 distinct matters ₁₂₇ . Of these disputes two have so far completed the entire process up to the appellate stage ₁₂₈ , and there have been two further panel reports issued ₁₂₉ , with one already the subject of appeal ₁₃₀ .

Costs

The overall WTO budget for 1997 is CHF 115,692,850 ($85,187,306), of which CHF 114,200,000 ($84,088,086) is from member States’ contributions, calculated on the base of their share of world trade, and CHF 1,492,000 ($1,098,593) is from miscellaneous sources.

The WTO dispute settlement system is sustained by the support of staff from the WTO Secretariat. Article 27.1 of the DSU requires the Secretariat to assist on the legal, procedural and historical aspects of the matters before the dispute settlement panels. The WTO Legal Affairs Division will usually provide legal services to the panels and will sometimes provide secretarial services as well. Where the issue of the dispute corresponds to a particular operational division of the Secretariat, then that operational division is also involved in assisting the panel with sectoral advice on the matters in the dispute. If and when a case reaches the appellate stage, the Appellate Body has its own Secretariat which supports the entire appellate process, excluding, therefore, the action of the Legal Affairs Division.

The operation of the dispute settlement process is financed by various allocations from the overall WTO budget to those divisions involved in the process. Indeed, there is no specific allocation for the dispute settlement process as a whole. It is, therefore, hard to provide exact figures on the cost of the dispute settlement system. However, considering that, as we said above, one of the duties of the WTO Legal Affairs Division is to provide legal and secretarial services to the panels, its budget might shed some light on the actual cost of the whole dispute settlement system. Its budget, which includes panelists and experts fees, per diem and travels expenses, but not translation and interpretation costs, has been set by the Committee on Budget, Finance and Administration, for 1997 at CHF 1,800,000 ($1,325,381). This figure, however, should be regarded as an overestimation of actual costs. Supporting the DSB functioning, indeed, is not the only activity of the Division of Legal Affairs. It spends probably 60% of its time, and therefore of its resources, on panel matters ₁₃₁ .

The Appellate Body, because it is a distinct body with the exclusive function of hearing appeals, has a different allocation of CHF 3,800,000 ($2,798,027), under the overall 1997 WTO budget. The difference between the Legal Affairs Division’s budget and the Appellate Body Budget can be attributed to the fact that while the panelists of the Dispute Settlement Body are appointed ad hoc when a case is submitted for settlement, Appellate Body members are permanent sitting members with a fixed remuneration and a daily fee. Moreover, the WTO also covers the costs of their travel to Geneva for the purposes of a hearing as well as their per diem expenses. To summarize, it can be concluded that the overall costs for the WTO member States of the dispute settlement procedure in 1997 is about CHF 5,000,000 ($3,681,615), which represents less than 5% of the overall WTO budget.

Costs to States to submit a case to or be summoned before the WTO dispute settlement organs are rather limited. The WTO Secretariat does not charge filing fees and costs for States are limited to the payment of the consultants and lawyers and to the gathering of its own evidence. While highly industrialized countries, like the US, the EU, Canada and Japan, are the most frequent users of the system, developing countries have resorted to the WTO dispute settlement mechanisms in a number of instances. Seventeen cases have involved consultation requests by developing countries, and in eight of these cases the complaints have been against other developing countries.

Despite the limited costs for states to participate in a case before the WTO dispute settlement procedure, technical aid might still play a role. This concern has been incorporated in the DSU. Article 24 states that “…at all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special situation of least-developed country Members”. First of all, disputes involving least-developed countries should be avoided all together. To this end the WTO Director-General or the Chairman of the DSB shall, upon request by a least-developed country Member, offer their good-offices, conciliation or mediation, before a request for a panel is made ₁₃₂ . If a panel is established and “ …a nullification or impairment of WTO benefits is found as a result of a measure taken by a least-developed country member, then the complaining party shall exercise due restraint in asking for compensation or seeking authorization to suspend the application of concessions or other obligations pursuant to these procedures.” ₁₃₃

Second, the DSU does provide for the provision of technical assistance to a developing country that is party to a dispute. The Secretariat is mandated to provide the services of a legal expert from the Technical Cooperation Services if so requested ₁₃₄ . At present, there are two full time legal officers in the Technical Cooperation Division of the Secretariat, as well as two legal consultants, both of whom are former legal officers of the Legal Affairs Division, who can share their practical experience of the panel process with the developing country seeking the assistance. Finally, the Secretariat is required by the DSU to carry out special training courses for interested Members concerning the dispute settlement procedure and practice ₁₃₅ .

The Inspection Panel

The Inspection Panel is one of the most recent bodies created by the international community. It was established by the Executive Directors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and development (IBRD) and the International Development Association (IDA) (together referred to as “the Bank”) on September 22, 1993 ₁₃₆ . The Panel opened its offices one year later in Washington DC on September 7, 1994, after the formal adoption of its Operating Procedures.

Its aims are to provide people affected or merely potentially affected by projects financed, in whole or in part, by the Bank with a formal mechanism to voice their concerns, particularly in the social and environmental areas; to provide the Bank Management and the Board with the results of an independent review of controversial Bank projects; and to enhance public confidence in the Bank’s commitment to help development and to promote greater transparency and accountability. The scope of the Panel's mandate extends to IBRD loans and IDA credits, but not to projects financed by other member institutions of the World Bank Group ₁₃₇ .

The Panel is an investigative rather than a judicial body. Its function is to investigate complaints by affected parties, or by the Bank's Executive Directors, for actual or threatened adverse material effects resulting from the Bank's failure to follow its policies and procedures in the design, appraisal or implementation of a project. It may make recommendation on whether investigation is needed and, if the Executive Directors so decide, it may investigate the complaints found and make its independent findings accordingly. Yet the Panel does not have the power of decision, and its function does not include making recommendations on the adequacy or suitability of existing policies and procedures ₁₃₈ .

The Bank is the first global organization to have set up an independent body like the Panel. It implicitly acknowledges that international organizations have a legally significant, non-contractual relationship with private parties that is independent of either the organization's or the private party's relationship with the State. It also establishes the first international forum ₁₃₉ , though merely quasi-judicial, in which private actors can hold an international organization directly accountable for the consequences of its actions. Such a remarkable step has been prompted by the need to increase the accountability and transparency of the Bank’s operations, particularly in the wake of the issues raised, in the early 1990s, by two projects on the Narmada River in India. On the whole, it is reasonable to expect that the establishment and operation of the panel will contribute to a widening of the role of private parties in international relations.

The Panel consists of three members, who are nominated by the Bank's President and appointed by the Executive Directors. The paramount consideration is their independence. The terms of the first appointees (Mr. Ernst-Günter Bröder, Mr. Alvaro Umaña Quesada and Mr. Richard Bissel, have been staggered respectively for five, four and three years, while future members will each serve one five-year term. Only the Chairperson serves on a full-time basis. The Chairperson may call the two part-time Panel members on a case-by-case basis as required by the Panel’ s workload. During its first two years of activity the Panel has worked by consensus with the two part-time members fully involved in all activities related to requests and informational, institutional and administrative matters. The Resolution provides that should the Panel’s workload increase further the Board may appoint one or both part-time members on a full-time basis.

The Panel has a Secretariat headed by an Executive Secretary, which provides administrative support to the Chairman and Panel members; helps in the processing of requests filed and coordinates other activities such as information dissemination, requests of information, Panel consultation inside and outside the Bank and disclosure processes. The Secretariat is composed of an Executive Secretary, an Assistant Executive Secretary and two office staff. Furthermore, in order to assure full transparency with requests, the Panel introduced a registrar, where all actions taken in connection with the processing of a request are filed. The register is open to the public and is freely accessible through the Internet.

Caseload

As of January 1, 1997 the Inspection Panel had received seven requests of inspection ₁₄₀ . Three of them have been dismissed on the basis of various legal grounds ₁₄₁ . Two of them have elicited the Bank’s action. In the case of the Arun III Hydroelectric Project in Nepal the Bank Senior Management decided to discontinue the project because of its inconsistency with the IDA's policies and procedures relating to environmental impact assessment, involuntary resettlement and indigenous peoples. In the case of the Rondonia Project, in Brazil, the Executive Directors concluded, in light of an agreed project review plan to be carried out with the federal and local governments, that proceeding with a formal investigation would not be advisable. Besides these five requests, two more cases have been subject to a preliminary evaluation by the Inspection Panel ₁₄₂ . As January 2, 1997, an Executive Director’s decision on these two cases was pending ₁₄₃ .

Costs

The Resolution establishing the Inspection Panel provides that the “…Panel shall be given such budgetary resources as shall be sufficient to carry out its activities”. The Panel’s annual funding level was tentatively set at about $1.5 million for each of the first two years. Quite remarkably the Panel’s expenditures for fiscal year 1995 and 1996 were about one third under budget amounting to slightly more than $1 million. Indeed, the Panel, during its first two years of activity, has used in-house resources, with the major exception of the Rondonia Inspection, reducing to a minimum the use of external consultants. This cost-effective approach resulted in substantial savings in budgeted resources.

While plaintiffs do not bear any of the costs associated with the procedure or any filing fee, the Inspection Panel has no aid scheme for potential plaintiffs to cover the costs of evidence gathering. Proving the existence of potential or actual damage resulting from the Bank’s failure to comply with “its operational policies and procedures” can be rather expensive. It implies extensive data gathering and analytical work. Specific legal knowledge, moreover, is required to file a request of Inspection which would have a reasonable chance of succeeding. “Affected individuals” almost invariably reside in depressed or under-developed regions. They might, therefore, lack the financial resources to meet all costs associated with filing a request. So far NGOs have provided advice and funding. However, if the role of the Inspection Panel is to be widened, financial aid from the Bank should be considered.

Conclusions

The foregoing data suggest a number of points, each of which are interrelated, which might be usefully addressed by future research. The overall cost of international justice is small, relative to other areas of international cooperation. Approximately $ 250 million are spent each year to finance the existing bodies surveyed in this paper ₁₄₄ . The ECJ alone constitutes more than 50% of the overall costs ₁₄₅ . However, there are good reasons for considering the Court of Justice of the European Communities as a quasi-federal jurisdiction and, therefore, to exclude it from the list of strict international bodies. This scales down the total amount of resources allocated by the international community to the bodies considered in this survey to $ 114,204,270 ₁₄₆ . Whether this figure is considered small or large, an investment or a mere cost, depends on the value that is attributed to the services that these bodies provide to the international community. And this determination has become a quintessentially political issue.

These scarce resources are unequally distributed among existing bodies. More than 80% of these resources are allocated to three organs: the ICTR, the ICTY and the ECJ. If the ECJ is excluded from the picture, on the above mentioned grounds, the two criminal courts alone take 63 % of the remaining funds ₁₄₇ . Finally, if the picture is examined on the basis of the situation pre 1994 (before the establishment of the two criminal courts,) the total gets to a mere $ 42,278,970, with the ICJ (45.7%) and the ECHR (26.8%) as the two main beneficiaries ₁₄₈ . These data raise questions about the priorities in the allocation of resources as well as variations from organ to organ in the cost per judgment rendered or settlement reached.

International justice is a public good, albeit rather peculiar; and as for any kind of public good, there is a demand for it. All international bodies considered in this paper produce a service, which is the settlement of international disputes and/or the implementation of international law, subject to a demand occasioned by the filing of cases by those entities which have a locus standi before that particular organ. The main economic feature of the bodies considered in this paper is that they are demand-driven: it is the amount of requests filed that will determine their caseload and therefore their financial needs, and not vice versa.

Generally international bodies like those considered in this survey cannot run budget deficits. The allocation of funds to them is tightly monitored. Every year their budgets are approved by their respective “controlling organs”, which determine the amount of resources allocated to that body during a given fiscal year.

The funding histories suggests that, every time the caseload of a body has increased, the amount of resources allocated to that body has usually also been increased. It would appear, then, that to the extent that these bodies are actually used, they will be eventually allocated resources, albeit often the minimum necessary, to handle all cases submitted to them. Conversely, if resources are cut, it would suggest that this is the consequence rather than the cause of the State’s reduced willingness to utilize to their services.

The increase in the amount of resources allocated to dispute settlement bodies and international courts, as a response to an increase in their caseload, rarely matches the underling increase in the caseload.

Moreover such an increase sometimes takes place the following fiscal year. This is the case of the international criminal tribunals and can, to a great extent, be attributed to the mass media attention to their work. However, in the case of bodies which deal with less spectacular cases or even work under the duty of confidentiality, resources are quite frequently allocated with a certain delay or, at worst, left unchanged.

These few remarks raise a number of questions regarding the consequences of both short term and chronic budgets shortages on the capacity of these bodies to properly discharge their functions.

Do limited budgets hinder the capacity of these bodies to deal swiftly with the cases submitted? The case of the limited number of sessions held, each year, by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is just but one example (and quite ironically just when the IACHR is facing these difficulties, it also has been called upon to adjudicate the first cases in which delay in the application of justice is alleged ₁₄₉ ). Delays in settlement and justice administration undermine confidence in dispute settlement bodies and international courts. Fixing strict timetables within which the Dispute Settlement Body and the Appellate Body of the WTO must deliver a judgment has been one of the key issues in the restructuring of the old GATT dispute settlement system. In 1989 the EC States were compelled to create the Court of First Instance to speed up the dramatically increased workload of the ECJ and in order to allow it to concentrate on the uniform interpretation of EC Law ₁₅₀ . Finally, when indictees are kept in jail (e.g. in the case of the international criminal courts) or goods have been seized (e.g. in the case of vessels for what concerns the work of the ITLOS), a rapid and fair trial is simply imperative.

Do limited budgets reduce the capacity of the various registrars and secretariats to plan their activities strategically? For example, does it permit them to establish and act on dockets in an orderly way? Does it permit case selection? Are staffing needs adequately met, in terms of recruitment and training? What are the specific problems faced by those bodies which rely heavily on the work of interns or seconded personnel?

Are the secondary activities performed by these bodies, such as information to the public, and their promotion and cooperation with other bodies curtailed? Having a public aware of the existence of reliable avenues for the peaceful settlement of disputes beyond domestic courts is essential if their role is to be enhanced.

Do, limited budgets, or the allocation of resources within budgets, affect the capacity of international criminal courts and human rights courts to gather information and evidence necessary to carry out their functions?

While there are no known instances of bodies which have dismissed an application because of budgetary constraints, it might be legitimately asked: How much do budget constraints influence the final outcome? Inevitably an increased caseload coupled with a stagnant resource allocation will lead to fewer resources allocated for the handling of each case. Does this lead to flawed settlements? In a word, do poor courts provide poor judgments?

Affirmative responses to these questions would seem to lead to the conclusion that increasing the resources allocated to international courts and dispute settlement bodies would be crucial to the promotion of the international rule of law. However, a mere increase in their resource endowment not coupled by a parallel increase in their work might eventually have wide negative consequences.

First, it could reinforce the arguments of the international justice skeptics who would be able to point to the scarce use of judicial and quasi-judicial means as proof that the international rule of law is still aspirational and only power matters in international relations.

Second, considered that nowadays industrialized States are coping with large budget deficits, investing additional resources in these bodies without seeing an increase in their caseload will be either initially rejected or could lead over time, because of public delusion, to downsizing, reductions and eventually dissolution.

Improved performance of existing dispute settlement bodies and international courts, as a result of an increase in their resource endowments, should be coupled therefore with wider access to their services. This could be achieved by enlarging their jurisdiction rationae personae. While maintaining the present statutes and, therefore, the present locus standi before courts, the number of potential “clients” could be increased by promoting a wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of these bodies. (e.g. promoting the ratification of the relevant instruments, such as the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions, and promoting a wider acceptance of the jurisdiction of the ICJ by optional declarations, etc.). This, however, can only be achieved if existing bodies, as it was said above, are able to provide a swift, fair, just and satisfactory settlement.

Alternatively, the relevant conventions, statutes or rules of procedure, could be amended to enlarge the categories of entities which can file claims or requests before these organs (e.g. granting to international organizations the possibility to sue and be sued before the ICJ). Again, the credibility of these international institutions is a prerequisite to and not a consequence of their wider use.

Conversely, the enlargement of their rationae materiae does not seem to be a viable alternative because many of the existing bodies are rather technical and therefore are the only organs able to reach a settlement or emit a verdict with due consideration to the technical aspects of the case submitted. However, attempts to modify the statutes of existing bodies might be a politically awkward exercise.

The question of cost of appearing before any of the organs surveyed in this paper is invariably in the forefront of the minds of litigants and those advising them. Furthermore, where the arguments to the merits of a particular case are narrowly balanced, the nature and scale of the costs will often be crucial to the decision of whether or not to proceed. Apprehensions as to the costs of proceedings might explain the relative small number of references made to international dispute settlement bodies and courts. When the potential applicants are, moreover, less well financially endowed, costs represent a significant barrier to access to justice.

With this consideration in mind, during last decade some bodies, like the International Court of Justice and the Permanent Court of Arbitration have been endowed with special programs of financial aid to help parties to meet the financial burdens associated with international litigation. The ECJ and both international criminal courts are similarly endowed with particular legal aid funds. The issue of legal aid in an international context, however, has not yet been fully explored and some additional study should be dedicated to it.

Tables:

- Table 1
- Table 2
- Table 3
- Table 4
- Table 5

Notes:

Note 1: Cesare Romano is a graduate of the Universite degli Studi di Milano, Italy; a Diplome d'Études supérieures (D.E.S.) and Ph.D. candidate in International Law at the Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva, Switzerland; and a LL.M. at the New York University, School of Law. The author wishes to express his gratitude for the support and suggestions provided Shepard Forman and Philippe Sands; for the information provided by (in alphabetic order) Laurence Boissons de Chazournes, Valerie Brion, Jamie Campbell, Willie Chatsika, Vladimir Golitsyn, Ambassador P.H.J. Jonkman, Tom Kennedy, Beatrice Lacoste, Rodrick Liddell, Victor Madrigal Borloz, Margrete Stevens, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina and Manuel E. Ventura-Robles; for the assistance of Elise Baudot; and for the help and suggestions of Rita Parhad. Any error or omission, however, are the responsibility of the author. Back.

Note 2: This survey does not include, because of space and time constraints, the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce, the UN Commission on Human Rights, the European Commission of Human Rights, the ILO system of supervision, the United Nations Claims Commission, the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal, and the Non-Compliance Procedure of the Montreal Protocol to the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer. Back.

Note 3: The author is the manager of the project for the Center on International Cooperation. Queries about the project can be addressed to: Cesare P.R. Romano, Center on International Cooperation, New York University, 418 Lafayette Street, suite 543, New York, NY, 10003. Tel: **1/212/998.3680; Fax: **1/212/995.4706; E-mail: cpr200@is4.nyu.edu. Back.

Note 4: The major exception are the Permanent Court of Arbitration and the Permanent Court of International Justice. While the former is still existing the latter has been terminated with the dissolution of the League of Nations in 1945. The International Court of Justice took over its mission. Back.

Note 5: See http://www.ny.frb.org Back.

Note 6: Article 92 of the UN Charter; Article 1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Back.

Note 7: The Court constituted such a chamber in 1982 for the first time, formed a second one in 1985 and constituted two more in 1987. A Chamber of Summary Procedure is elected every year by the Court in accordance with its Statute. In July 1993 the Court has also established a seven-member Chamber to deal with any environmental cases falling within its jurisdiction. Back.

Note 8: In particular only the States members of the United Nations (at present numbering 185), and two States not members (Nauru and Switzerland) which have become parties to the Court's Statute, are so entitled. Back.

Note 9: Several hundred treaties contain a “jurisdictional clause” conferring the ICJ jurisdiction to hear disputes over their interpretation and/or implementation. Back.

Note 10: The declarations of fifty-nine States are at present in force, a number of them having been made subject to the exclusion of certain categories of dispute. Back.

Note 11: The only bodies at present authorized to request advisory opinions of the Court are six organs (General Assembly, Security Council, Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, Interim Committee of the General Assembly, Committee on Applications for Review of Administrative Tribunal Judgments) and sixteen specialized agencies of the United Nations (ILO, FAO, WHO, IBRD, IFC, IDA, IMF, ICAO, ITU, IFAD, WMO, IMO, WIPO, UNIDO, IAEA). Back.

Note 12: Disputes concerned, inter alia, land frontiers and maritime boundaries, territorial sovereignty, the non-use of force, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, diplomatic relations, hostage-taking, the right of asylum, nationality, guardianship, rights of passage and economic rights. Advisory opinions were requested, inter alia, on admission to United Nations membership, reparation for injuries suffered in the service of the United Nations, territorial status of South-West Africa (Namibia) and Western Sahara, judgments rendered by international administrative tribunals, expenses of certain United Nations operations, and applicability of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement. The last two Opinions were rendered in July 1996 in response to a request made by the World Health Organization (WHO) on the Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict; and a request made by the United Nations General Assembly on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. Back.

Note 13: Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United Kingdom); Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. United States of America); Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America); Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro); Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia); Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria); Fisheries Jurisdiction (Spain v. Canada); Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia). Back.

Note 14: Article 33 of the Statute. States which are not members of the UN but which are parties to the Statute of the Court pay in accordance with the undertaki9ng into which they entered when they became parties to the Statute. By Resolution 46/221 of December 20, 1991 the UNGA decided that these States should contribute for fiscal years 1992-1994 as follows: Nauru 0.01%; Switzerland 1.16%. Back.

Note 15: The Court occupies, in the Peace Palace at the Hague, the premises formerly occupied by the PCIJ as well as new wing built at the expense of the Netherlands Government in 1978. The Peace Palace was built as a courtesy of Andrew Carnegie for the PCA. An agreement between the UN and the Carnegie Foundation determines the conditions under which the court uses these premises, providing for the payment to the Foundation of an annual contribution. The Agreement was approved by the UNGA in Resolution 84(I) of December, 11, 1946. Back.

Note 16: See UN, Report of the International Court of Justice, 1 August 1995 - 31 July 1996, New York, 1996, (UN Doc. A/51/4.), par 184-199. Back.

Note 17: UNGA Res. 50/215 A of 23 December 1995. Back.

Note 18: The result is that, in a period of months, the Court’s staff has sustained an effective reduction of 11.5 %, and Professional staff has been cut by 16.7%. Back.

Note 19: While the Court was working on the advisory opinions on the legality of the use and threat of nuclear weapons, it was required to deal with a request for the indication of provisional measures in the case concerning the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, and it held the hearings on the jurisdiction and admissibility on the Genocide Convention case. Back.

Note 20: See Report of the International Court of Justice, supra note 14, par. 185. Back.

Note 21: Terms of Reference, Guidelines and Rules of the Secretary-General’s Trust Fund to Assist States in the Settlement of Disputes through the International Court of Justice, par. 3. Back.

Note 22: UN Doc. A/44/PV.43 (1989). Back.

Note 23: To date the Secretary-General has submitted to the UNGA only one report, in view of the fact that no additional applications have been submitted since 1991. See UN Doc. A/47/444, 7 October 1992 Back.

Note 24: Ibid., par. 7. Back.

Note 25: Ibid., par.8. Back.

Note 26: These are the Treaty which established, in 1951, the European Community of Coal and Steel, 261 UNTS 140; the Treaty which established, in 1957, the Economic European Community, 298 UNTS 3; and the Treaty which established, in 1957, the European Community of Atomic Energy, 298 UNTS 167. Back.

Note 27: There are no permanent Advocates General in the Court of First Instance. The duties of Advocate General are performed, in a limited number of cases, by one of the judges. Back.

Note 28: The Court has to use all thirteen the official languages of the Community in the course of its work. Back.

Note 29: The Rules of Procedure of the Court of First Instance contain provisions which are grosso modo the same as those of the Court of Justice. Back.

Note 30: See Rules of Procedure of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, Rule 72. The Rules of Procedure, the Protocol on the Statute of the Court and a number of other measures contained in the treaties and Community secondary legislation are reported in EC, Selected Instruments relating to the Organization, Jurisdiction and Procedure of the Court, Brussels, Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1990. Back.

Note 31: See KENNEDY, T., “Proceedings before the European Court of Justice: Costs and Legal Aid”, Journal of the Law Society of Scotland, April 1991, pp. 139-143. Back.

Note 32: Rule 69, see supra note 28. Back.

Note 33: See e.g. Case 138/79, Roquette v Council [1980] ECR 3333, and Case 298/83, Les Verts v European Parliament [1986] ECR 1339. Back.

Note 34: Rule 69(3), see supra note 28. Back.

Note 35: Rule 76(1), ibid. Back.

Note 36: Legal aid, for instance, will not be granted for the purposes of investigating an issue, except in the context of a measure of inquiry decided upon by the court, or of gathering evidence prior to proceedings, nor will it extend to a request for legal advice with a view to establishing whether proceedings may be appropriate. See Kennedy, supra note 29, at 142. Back.

Note 37: Ibid., at 143. Back.

Note 38: On November 13th, 1997 St. Vincent and the Grenadines filed in the Registry of the Tribunal an Application under article 292 of the UNCLOS instituting proceedings against Guinea in respect of a dispute concerning the prompt release of the M/V “Saiga” and its crew. On December 4th, 1997 the Tribunal rendered its first judgment ordering Guinea to release the vessel and the crew against the posting by St. Vincent and the Grenadines of a bond of $400,000. See The M/V “Saiga”, (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of December 4th, 1997. Text in (site visited on February 28th, 1998). However, at the end of December 1997 the vessel had not yet been released. On January 13th, 1998 St. Vincent and the Grenadines asked the Tribunal to prescribe interim measures. Hearings were held before the Court on February 23rd and 24th, 1998. Judgment on Interim Measures is expected by March 10th, 1998. At the eleventh hour before the hearings on the Request of Interim Measures started, the parties agreed to transfer the competence to hear on the merits of the case from an ad hoc arbitral tribunal to the ITLOS itself. It seems that considerations of cost and expediency played a fundamental role in this decision. Unless a settlement is reached before, the Tribunal should renders its judgment on the merits of the case by the beginning of 1999. Back.

Note 39: See: gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/LOS/WHATSNEW.LOS Back.

Note 40: The Statute of the ITLOS is contained in Annex VI of the UNCLOS. Back.

Note 41: Part XV of the UNCLOS requires that States Parties to the Convention settle any dispute between them concerning the interpretation or application of the Convention by peaceful means. Where, however, no settlement has been reached, article 286 of the Convention stipulates that the dispute be submitted at the request of any party to the dispute to a court or tribunal having jurisdiction in this regard. Article 287 provides that:

1. When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time thereafter, a State shall be free to choose, by means of a written declaration, one or more of the following means for the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application of this Convention:

(a) the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea […];

(b) the International Court of Justice;

(c) an arbitral tribunal […];

(d) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex VIII for one or more of the categories of disputes specified therein.

2. A declaration made under paragraph 1 shall not affect or be affected by the obligation of a State Party to accept the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea […].

3. A State Party, which is a party to a dispute not covered by a declaration in force, shall be deemed to have accepted arbitration in accordance with Annex VII.” Back.

To date seventeen States have made a choice on the applicable dispute settlement means: Nine States have selected the ITLOS, either exclusively or as an alternative to the ICJ; nine States have selected the ICJ, either exclusively or as an alternative to the ITLOS; two have rejected the jurisdiction of the ICJ for any kind of disputes; one has selected the Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VII; three have selected the special Arbitral Tribunal under Annex VIII as an alternative to the ITLOS or the ICJ. Fax communication received on January 17, 1997 from DOALOS/OLA. Back.

Note 42: The Tribunal itself appoints its Registrar and other officers of the Registry as may be necessary. See Doc. LOS/PCN/SCN.4/WP.16/Add.6 contained in LOS/PCN/152, Vol. I, pp. 150-183. Back.

Note 43: To be precise the ICTY was formally established in a two-stage process, with two Security Council resolutions: UNSC Res. 808 and UNSC Res. 827. Back.

Note 44: UNSC Res. 955 Back.

Note 45: The major difference between the two tribunals are jurisdictional. Namely they differ for their competence ratione temporis, loci and materiae. First the ICTY has the mandate to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed since 1 January 1991, while the temporary jurisdiction of the ICTR is limited to one year, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994. Second, the ICTY has jurisdiction over persons responsible for war crimes committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. The territorial jurisdiction of the ICTR, conversely, extends beyond the territory of Rwanda to that of neighboring States, in respect of serious violations of international humanitarian law committed by Rwandese citizens beyond their State’s boundaries. Finally, while the ICTY strictly applies the principle nullum crimen sine lege, in the sense that it applies only those rules of international humanitarian law which are beyond doubt part of customary law, the Statute of the ICTR takes a more progressive approach. It includes within its subject matter jurisdiction, international instruments regardless of whether they are considered part of customary international law or whether they have customarily entailed individual criminal responsibility. Article 4 of the ICTR Statute, accordingly, includes violations of the 1977 Second Geneva Protocol (Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions), which is not yet been regarded by states as part of customary international law. Moreover, it includes violations of Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions, which applies to non-international conflicts. Back.

Note 46: ICTY Bulletin, n. 9/10, at 6. Back.

Note 47: UN Doc. A/c.5/51/29, p.5. Back.

Note 48: “The General Assembly shall consider and approve any financial and budgetary arrangements with specialized agencies referred to in Article 57 and shall examine the administrative budgets of such specialized agencies with a view to making recommendations to the agencies concerned.” Back.

Note 49: To these 18 indictments must be added one which remains subject to an order for non-disclosure, giving a total of 19 indictments. “Report of the International tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991”, UN Doc. A/51/292, 16 August 1996. Back.

Note 50: ICTY, ICTY Bulletin, n.13, 1996, at 3. Back.

Note 51: See UN Doc. A/C.5/51/29/Corr.1, par 1. Back.

Note 52: The 1996 draft budget was of 40,780,000. UN Doc. A/51/292, par. 132. Back.

Note 53: UN Doc. A/51/292, par. 128. Back.

Note 54: UN Doc. A/C.5/51/30, p. 33. Back.

Note 55: UN Doc. A/51/262, par. 229. These contributions included the donation of computer equipment by the US government, donations of equipment by the UK, France, the Open Society Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation. The judicial department of the Registry is staffed almost entirely by the legal assistants seconded by the European Union. Back.

Note 56: UN Doc. A/51/292, par. 130. Back.

Note 57: See “Directive on Assignment of Defense Counsel (Directive n. 1/94) (as amended June 1996)”, IT/73/Rev.3. Back.

Note 58: UN Doc. A/51/292, par. 107. Back.

Note 59: US, UK, The Open Society Institute and the Rockefeller Foundation. See supra note 52. Back.

Note 60: These personnel continue to assist with investigations and serve as legal and expert advisers. UN Doc. A/C.5/50/54. Back.

Note 61: See UNGAOR, 49th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 29-40, UN Doc. A/CN.4/458 & Adds. 1-7 (1994). Back.

Note 62: This is the position, inter alia, of Argentina, Canada, India, Germany, the Netherlands, Egypt, Norway, Trinidad and Tobago, Greece. See Press Release GA/8876, L/2721, 7 April 1995. Back.

Note 63: This is the position of the USA, China. See Press Release GA/8876, L/2721, 7 April 1995. Back.

Note 64: This is the position of UK, Mexico, Croatia, Tunisia. See UN Doc. A/50/22, par. 244. Back.

Note 65: Ibid., par. 245. Back.

Note 66: Ibid., par. 246. On the PCA formula see infra “The Permanent Court of Arbitration”. Back.

Note 67: This was suggested by China, US, Japan, India. See Press Release GA/8876, L/2721, 7 April 1995. Back.

Note 68: Ibid., par. 247. Back.

Note 69: Ibid., par. 248. Back.

Note 70: A protocol to the Convention, which entered into force on September 21, 1970 has conferred on the Court also an advisory jurisdiction. This protocol, however, has not yet been applied. Back.

Note 71: The five signatories who have not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are: Latvia, Moldova, Russia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Ukraine. Back.

Note 72: Protocol 11 to the Convention, which has been opened for signature on May 11, 1994, provides for the constitution of a single permanent Court to replace the present related functions of the Commission and Court and the present role of the Committee of Ministers. Back.

Note 73: Article 24 of the Convention. Back.

Note 74: Article 25 of the Convention. Back.

Note 75: See STEINER, H.J./ALSTON, Ph., International Human Rights in Context, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996, at 594. Back.

Note 76: Article 28.1.b of the Convention. Back.

Note 77: Protocol No. 9 to the Convention has extended to individuals the right of petition to the Court. This Protocol has been ratified as of December 31, 1996 by twenty-three member states. Back.

Note 78: The Rules of Procedure of the Court were adopted in 1959 and have been subject, over the years, to several amendments. After the entry into force of Protocol No. 9 to the Convention, on October 1, 1994, its Rules have been divided into Rules of the Court A and the new Rules of the Court B, which apply only to the cases brought against States that have ratified this Protocol. Back.

Note 79: The judges are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, for a renewable term of nine years, from a list of persons nominated by member States. Back.

Note 80: Prior to October 1994, when the system of Grand Chamber was first instituted, eighty-eight cases had come before the plenary court. As at 31 December 1996, twenty cases have been referred to a Grand Chamber. Back.

Note 81: Steiner/Alston, supra note 72, at 590. Back.

Note 82: Ibid. Back.

Note 83: Ibid. Back.

Note 84: Fax communication received by the registrar of the ECHR on January 14th, 1997. Appendix I. Back.

Note 85: In 1993 it took on average five years and eight months for a case to be settled (four years and four months before the Commission and one year and three months before the Court . See Steiner/Alston, supra note 72, at 590. Back.

Note 86: This figure breaks down as follows: in addition to the registrar and Deputy Registrars, there are 20 legal officers, whose role is to assist the Court in preparing draft judgments. There are 8 legal translators, 9 administrative assistants and 16 secretaries. There are currently five temporary members of staff, 1 translator, 1 computer expert and 3 secretaries. Additional temporary staff are employed during court sessions (interpreters, typists, ushers and messengers). Back.

Note 87: Fax communication, supra note 81, at 4. Back.

Note 88: Ibid. Back.

Note 89: Article 50 of the Convention. Back.

Note 90: This survey has been based on an ad hoc report, entitled “The Inter-American Court and the Inter-American System of Human Rights”, compiled and submitted in December 1996 by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to the Center on International Cooperation of the New York University. Back.

Note 91: See American Convention on Human Rights, adopted in San José, Costa Rica in November 1969, entered into force on July 18, 1978 upon deposit of the eleventh instrument of ratification by a member state of the OAS. Back.

Note 92: There are currently two additional protocols to the American Convention on Human. The first, the “Protocol of San Salvador, signed in San Salvador (El Salvador) on November 17, 1988, concerns economic, social and cultural rights. This first Protocol will enter into force when eleven States have deposited their respective instruments of ratification or accession. The second is the Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights to Abolish Death Penalty, signed in Asuncion (Paraguay) on June 9, 1990. This Protocol enters into force for each State that ratifies or accedes to it upon ratification or accession. Panama, Uruguay and Venezuela are the only States that have ratified it to date. Back.

Note 93: These include, among many other, the Right to Life, the Right to Humane Treatment, the Right to Personal Liberty, the Right to a Fair Trial, the Right to Equal Protection and the Right to Judicial Protection. Back.

Note 94: The only one that has requested an advisory opinion from the IACHR to date has been the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which has done so on five occasions. Back.

Note 95: The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the Permanent Council, the Secretary General and the Inter-American Judicial Committee. Back.

Note 96: The Pan-American Institute of Geography and History has presented its observations in an advisory proceeding. Back.

Note 97: Ten of these on one occasion, six on two and three on three occasions. Uruguay and Costa Rica have presented to the Court their points of view in four and eight advisory proceedings respectively. Back.

Note 98: See American Convention on Human Rights, Article 61. The fact that only States or the Commission can bring cases before the IACHR might explain the lack of a program to provide financial assistance to the parties to a dispute. Back.

Note 99: IACHR, supra note 1, at 20. Back.

Note 100: MEDINA, C., “The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture”, Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 12, 1990, at 440. Quoted in Steiner/Alston, supra note 72, at 644. Back.

Note 101: In various cases the evidence has not been directly submitted to the Tribunal or presented to it during a public hearing. Exceptional cases, for example, have required the naming of experts to receive testimony in the territory of the respondent state or that the Court commission one of the functionaries of its Secretariat to gather additional information. Back.

Note 102: For the text of the Convention of 29 July 1899 [hereafter referred to as the 1899 Convention], see BEVANS, C.I., (ed.), Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776-1949, (1968), vol. I, at 230-246. Back.

Note 103: For the text of the Convention of 18 October 1907 [hereafter referred to as the 1907 Convention], Ibid., at 577-606. Back.

Note 104: Moreover, according to Article 4.1 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the members of the PCA appointed from each state Party constitute “national groups” which are entitled to nominate candidates for election, by the General Assembly and the Security Council of the UN, to the International Court of Justice. Back.

Note 105: Beyond arbitration, conciliation and inquiry, another relevant item in the list of functions carried out by the PCA, through its Secretary General, is the appointment of arbitrators when parties cannot reach an agreement on their choice. Back.

Note 106: From this figure we have excluded the activities of the Iran-USA Claims Tribunal, constituted with the Algiers agreement on January 19, 1981. The PCA provided the Tribunal with office space and secretarial support before the latter moved to its own premises in 1982. The Iran-USA Claims Tribunal has to date rendered 648 awards. Back.

Note 107: Denmark-Great Britain on the “Red Crusader” Incident. Back.

Note 108: Greece-Italy on the Destruction of the Greek Ship “Roula”. Back.

Note 109: The Court has in view especially disputes between states and private companies or persons . See 1993 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes between Two Parties of which only one is a State. Back.

Note 110: By Article 49 of the 1907 Convention (Article 28 of the 1899 Convention), the “Administrative Council is composed of the diplomatic representatives of the Contracting powers accredited to the Hague, and the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs who acts as President”. The Administrative Council is charged with the direction and control of the International Bureau. Back.

Note 111: Permanent Court of Arbitration, 95th Annual Report, par. 20. Back.

Note 112: Id., par. 22. Back.

Note 113: Id., Annex 9. Back.

Note 114: Id., par. 58. Back.

Note 115: Id., at 72-73. Back.

Note 116: Id., par. 13. Back.

Note 117: Id., Annex 5, Financial Assistance Fund for Settlement of International Disputes. Terms of Reference and Guidelines. Back.

Note 118: Personal communication by Ambassador P.J.H. Jonkman, Secretary General of the PCA, on January 13,1997. The exact amount of the funds and the identity of the States making contributions to it, however, are kept confidential. Back.

Note 119: Cfr. Terms of Reference and Guidelines, par.5. Back.

Note 120: 95th Report, par. 19. Back.

Note 121: Id., par. 18. Back.

Note 122: Article XVI.1 of the Final Provisions of the Agreement establishing the WTO states that “…the WTO shall respect the rules, decisions and customary practice of the GATT” and Article 3 of the 1994 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes provides that “The Members affirm their adherence to the principles for the management of disputes heretofore applied under Articles XXII and XXIII of the GATT 1947, and the procedures further elaborated and modified herein”. Back.

Note 123: The text of the DSU has been reproduced in WTO, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, Geneva, WTO, 1994, Supp. Back.

Note 124: DSU, article 3.2. Back.

Note 125: Nine months and, in the case of appeal, twelve months. Back.

Note 126: GATT, Analytical Index, Sixth revised edition, 1995, pp. 772-787. Back.

Note 127: See http://www.wto.org/wto/dispute/bulletin.htm. Back.

Note 128: US Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline (compliant by Venezuela and Brazil) and Japan Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (compliant by Canada and the US with the EC as a third party). Back.

Note 129: Brazil Measures Affecting Desiccated Coconut (compliant by the Philippines) and US Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and Man-made Fiber Underwear (complaint by Costa Rica) Back.

Note 130: US Restrictions on Imports of Cotton and man-made Fiber Underwear. Back.

Note 131: Written communication of December 5, 1996 from Mr. Willie Chatsika, Legal Affairs Division. Back.

Note 132: Article 24.2. Back.

Note 133: Article 24.1. Back.

Note 134: Article 27.2. Back.

Note 135: Article 27.3. Back.

Note 136: IBRD Resolution No. 93-10 and the identical IDA Resolution No. 93-6. (Hereafter referred to as “the Resolution”). Back.

Note 137: The World Bank Group comprises the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), the International Development Association (IDA), the International Finance Corporation (IFC), and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). Back.

Note 138: The Panel has the power to issue (a) a decision on procedural matters, (b) recommendations to the Executive Directors, who will decide whether to proceed with an investigation and (c) reports to the Executive Directors embodying the Panel's findings on the investigation. The findings of the Panel are discussed in the Staff Appraisal Report, which is a technical document, circulated to the Executive Directors which assesses the intrinsic quality of a project and evaluates the critical risks to which the project is exposed. Back.

Note 139: The major exception being the European Union. Back.

Note 140: Nepal: Proposed Arun III Hydroelectric Project; Ethiopia: Compensation for Expropriated Foreign Assets; Tanzania: Emergency Power Project; Brazil: Rondonia Natural Resources Management Project; Chile: Pangue/Ralco Hydroelectric Complex; Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project; Bangladesh: Jute Sector Adjustment Credit. Back.

Note 141: Ethiopia: Compensation for Expropriated Foreign Assets; Tanzania: Emergency Power Project; Chile: Pangue/Ralco Hydroelectric Complex. Back.

Note 142: Argentina/Paraguay: Yacyretá Hydroelectric Project; Bangladesh: Jute Sector Adjustment Credit. Back.

Note 143: Telephone call with Mr. Blissel, Inspection Panel’s current Chairman. Back.

Note 144: This figure roughly equals the total 1992 criminal justice expenditure, both State and local, excluded police protection and corrective measures, of the state of North Carolina. The total US criminal justice expenditure, both Federal, State and local, excluded police protection and corrective measures, during the same fiscal year amounted to almost $ twenty-one billion. See US Department of Justice, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics 1995, Washington DC, US Department of Justice, at table 1.2 and 1.6. To make a comparison with another area of international cooperation, just the 1994 UNESCO budget amounted to $ 278,000,000. That of the WHO, during the same fiscal year, reached $641,000,000. See United Nations General Assembly, Budgetary and Financial Situation of the Organizations of the United Nations System, (UN Doc. A/49/588), 1994, pp. 7, 76-77. Back.

Note 145: See Charter 1. Back.

Note 146: See Charter 2. Back.

Note 147: Ibid. Back.

Note 148: See Charter 3. Back.

Note 149: E.g. the Genie Lacayo, Blake, Suarez Rosero and Benavides Cevallos cases. Back.

Note 150: Despite this the average duration of proceedings before European jurisdictions was, in 1994, twenty months. See Court of Justice of the European Communities, Report of Proceedings 1992-1994, Luxembourg, ECJ, 1995, at 242. Back.