Domestic Structures and Democratic Foreign Policy: Peacemaking After World War II

Norrin M. Ripsman

Browne Center for International Politics

July, 1997

Unlike the comparative political economy literature, the literature on foreign security policy treats democracies as a coherent category of states, focusing on their commonalities rather than their differences. Both classical and contemporary theorists of foreign security policy have emphasized that all democratic states--states that are characterized by popular sovereignty, where the ultimate source of authority resides within the people as a whole ₁ --share certain constitutional, procedural and normative features which affect the nature and content of their foreign security policies in similar ways. Using this logic, traditional Realists have argued that public involvement in the policy process makes democracies slow to react to international threats, reluctant to spend on defense, incapable of secrecy and war-averse; consequently, they conclude that democracies are at a disadvantage in international politics, where balance-of-power policies are necessary. Liberals, on the other hand, argue that democracies enjoy certain advantages at international bargaining, devote more aggregate resources to implementing their foreign and security policies, and are less likely than non-democratic states to have their policies subverted to serve the particular interests of their leaders, private interest groups or foreign countries. Moreover, as democratic peace theorists have recently argued, shared political norms and common political procedures prevent democracies from waging war against other democracies.

This emphasis on the common features of democratic states has obscured important institutional, procedural and normative differences between them, and has led to the mischaracterization of all democracies as essentially weak states that cannot conduct foreign security policy autonomously from public opinion. In fact, different domestic decision making environments provide democratic states with widely varying degrees of foreign security policy autonomy, rendering the traditional category of democratic states both inappropriate and misleading. ₂ It is therefore necessary to unpack this category in order to generate a richer understanding of the complex range of democratic foreign security policy. ₃ This paper examines the institutional, procedural, and normative determinants of autonomy in the foreign security policy issue area and constructs a model to explain their impact on decision-making in different democracies. To test this model, the paper presents an in-depth, primary source analysis of the construction and evolution of British, French, and American peacemaking policies toward Germany after World War II. It pays particular attention to their leaders' abilities to pursue conciliatory policies toward the former enemy--something realists assert democracies are unable to do--and their ability to use domestic political opposition as a means of securing concessions in international negotiations--an advantage that liberals claim democracies enjoy.

I have chosen the peacemaking policies of these states as the empirical base for this study for a variety of reasons. First, it allows me to study the impact of public opinion in three different democracies with considerably different decision-making structures and political traditions. Second, the Second World War was a "total war" which mobilized for war the entire domestic economies of the belligerents, bringing their respective populations into the most destructive, all-consuming conflicts ever fought. Consequently, the animosity that developed between the combatants was high and we can expect that public opinion was less than conciliatory. Yet the rapid emergence of a Soviet threat after the war made it apparent to leaders in all three countries that German rehabilitation was necessary to contain the Soviet Union. This provides the perfect conditions to test what happens when public preferences differ from leader preferences in the national security issue area. Third, since the post-war settlement with the Federal Republic of Germany was negotiated by these three democratic states, it gives us the opportunity to assess whether differences in their abilities to influence each other by highlighting domestic political difficulties corresponds to differences in their domestic decision making environments. Finally, while there is a relative dearth of secondary source literature on the post-WWII settlement process, there are ample memoir and documentary sources available to permit a detailed decision making study of these cases.

The analysis reveals that domestic political institutions, legislative practices and prevailing legislative norms in the three countries did indeed yield different levels of autonomy to their foreign policymakers. American leaders enjoyed a tremendous degree of foreign security policy decision making autonomy. British leaders were only slightly more constrained by public opinion. The Cabinet of the highly unstable French Fourth Republic, however, possessed little independence from the Assemblé e Nationale and the public at large. The policy choices of the three countries varied accordingly. The Anglo-Saxons were better able than the French to pursue unpopular policies of post-war German reconstruction and rehabilitation, and, in particular, German rearmament when it was deemed necessary. At the same time, French foreign ministers were uniquely able to use their domestic constraints in trilateral negotiations as a means of inducing important concessions from the British and Americans.

I. Traditional Characterizations of Democracies in the Foreign Security Policy Literature: ₄

The pioneers of the "realist" school of international politics were decidedly pessimistic about the fate of democracies in a hostile international arena. ₅ They concluded that public input into the policy process would necessarily undermine the national interest--the rational basis of all policy. Indeed, Morgenthau charges "...a foreign policy carried out under democratic control must fall short of the rational requirements for good foreign policy; for it must satisfy emotional preferences whose satisfaction is incompatible with meeting those requirements." ₆ As a result, democratic states tailor their security policies to meet public whims, rather than international requirements, which is folly in a hostile international environment. In general, traditional realists have argued that public control over policy and time-consuming democratic processes cause democracies to be war averse even when a hostile state threatens the balance of power; to underinvest in military capability; to be inflexible and incapable of secrecy; and to have difficulty making peace with former enemies, since public passions, which were necessarily aroused to inspire entrance into the war, stand in the way of reconciliation. ₇

Liberal international relations scholars agree that public opinion and democratic processes necessarily constrain foreign policy decisionmakers, but they see in this constraint an important advantage. While non-democratic states can be led into war by their leaders for their own interests and glory, democratic states will be reluctant to wage war for trivial reasons, since the people who bear the costs of war have a hand in decision making. ₈ Therefore, democracies are less likely to wage war--at least with other democratic states, who are perceived as legitimate and non-threatening. ₉ Furthermore, public input into the policy process actually improves the policies chosen, by bringing all available information to policymakers' attention and granting legitimacy to the policies they adopt, which they carry out with great resources and single-minded purpose. ₁₀ Of particular significance is the ability of democratic leaders to manipulate domestic opposition to their advantage in the two-level game of international negotiation as a means of forestalling compromise and inducing concessions from other states. Democratic leaders can portray themselves as willing to compromise, but unable to do so because of domestic opposition. ₁₁ For these reasons, liberals conclude that democratic decisionmakers lack autonomy, but are not necessarily disadvantaged in international politics.

Although they differ in their evaluation of the consequences, then, traditional realists and liberals, agree in their characterization of democratic foreign policy executives as weak and constrained. ₁₂ Such a characterization is remarkably unsophisticated and ignores a central insight of the comparative political economy literature: even democratic states can be autonomous if their domestic political institutions shield them from public opinion and interest groups. ₁₃ The next section, will consider how democracies differ and how these differences should affect their ability to construct foreign security policy independently of public and legislative preferences.

II. Democratic Institutions and Decision Making Autonomy

The conventional wisdom on democratic foreign policy outlined above is incorrect because traditional realists and liberals fail to take into account the distinctive political arrangements or domestic decision making environments of different democratic states. It seems implausible, for example, that the executive of a parliamentary democracy like Canada or Great Britain, whose Cabinets necessarily command a majority of support from the legislature, should be constrained to the same extent as a presidential executive that faces a legislature dominated by a rival party, like the Clinton Administration after the 1994 congressional elections. Similarly, it is unreasonable to assume that a Westphalian parliamentary democracy, such as Great Britain, with strong, well-disciplined single party majorities should face the same obstacles in foreign affairs as a multiparty parliamentary system with undisciplined parties and fragile multiparty coalitions, like Fourth Republic France or Israel. Furthermore, differences in national attitudes toward foreign policy and the proper role for the public and the legislature in its formation should also affect the conduct of foreign relations across states. In this section I argue that the degree to which the leadership of a democratic state is affected either positively or negatively by parliamentary oversight and mass public input into the foreign policy process depends upon the degree of decision making autonomy accorded to the foreign policy executive by the political institutions and decision making procedures of that state. Furthermore, I explain which institutional structures, decision making procedures and prevailing norms contribute to or detract from policy making autonomy in the realm of foreign security policy and construct a model to illustrate their operation.

a) Foreign Policy Autonomy

Theda Skocpol has defined state autonomy as the ability of a state to formulate preferences independently of social forces. Her definition is unsatisfying in that it does not include what she labels state capacity--the ability of states to act on their preferences in the face of social opposition. ₁₄ Without such a capacity, the ability to formulate preferences is politically insignificant. A more meaningful definition of autonomy would be: the ability of an entity to act upon its own preferences. States are autonomous to the extent that they can construct and pursue policies independently of social forces and public opinion. ₁₅ Foreign policy decision making autonomy refers to the capacity of the foreign policy executive--comprising the Prime Minister or President, as well as the Cabinet officials and political appointees charged with foreign policy decision making--to pursue policies when faced with public or legislative opposition.

States can enhance their autonomy by delegating decision making authority to a bureaucracy and insulating this apparatus, by both formal and informal means, from the public and the legislature, which is the main instrument of public control in a representative democracy. ₁₆ Formally, they can create new institutions and place them outside public scrutiny, dissolve existing institutions, or undertake constitutional change which shields existing institutions from public and legislative oversight. They can also alter decision making procedures to shield elected officials from public pressures. ₁₇ With regard to foreign policy decision making, therefore, autonomy can be gauged in terms of the institutional structures and prevailing decision making procedures or conventions which set the boundaries of the decision making environment.

Institutional structures are defined in terms of not only constitutional provisions, which delimit procedures and responsibilities, but also in terms of the patterns of institutional growth over time. ₁₈ We can identify two broad categories of structures which can affect foreign policy making. First, there are structural features which determine the way in which democracy is practiced in a particular state. These include, inter alia, the nature of democratic governance (presidential, parliamentary, or mixed), the extent of concentration or separation of executive power, the electoral procedure (e.g. single member constituencies, proportional representation, etc.), the number of political parties which participate meaningfully in the electoral and policy processes, and the frequency of elections. ₁₉ Second, there are structural features which pertain exclusively to the foreign policy apparatus, including the number of institutions and actors which contribute meaningfully to policy determination, the extent and frequency to which these institutions and actors must report to a democratic body, and the body responsible for appointing the foreign minister and other key officials. All things being equal, then:

• the more concentrated executive power is, the more autonomous the state is;

• a two-party system yields greater decision making autonomy then a multi-party system, since in the former the executive usually commands the support of the majority party;

• an electoral system based upon single-member constituencies will afford greater autonomy than one which employs proportional representation, since the latter favors a multiplicity of parties and a less stable, coalition government. Coalition governments require the executive to consult more parties and avoid unpopular policies that might split the government;

• the longer the interval between elections--the main instrument of direct popular policy evaluation--the greater the insulation of the government;

• at any given point in time, the further away an election is, the more freedom to maneuver a government should possess;

• presidential executives which cannot be dissolved by the legislature under normal circumstances enjoy an advantage over parliamentary cabinets supported by a coalition of parties or even one governing party with a small majority of seats. Small majorities can whittle away due to defections and bi-elections;

• the degree to which the constitution favors the executive over the legislative branch in matters of defense and foreign affairs directly affects the government's autonomy;

• to the extent that foreign policy is conducted by appointed rather than elected officials, the public impact on foreign affairs will be minimized;

• if appointed diplomatic and military officials are responsible to the executive rather than the legislature, autonomy is enhanced.

Decision making procedures or conventions refer to routinized patterns of behavior and informal rules which govern actors' conduct, but do not necessarily stem from the structure of the institutions within which they act. When procedures are routinely adhered to, they can constrain or enable policymakers just like formal institutional structures. More precisely, they modify the scope of action which institutional structures allow leaders. Some, such as the tradition of party discipline in Great Britain (requiring the majority party to support Cabinet policy) enable decisionmakers to surpass the boundaries imposed upon them by formal structures. Others, such as the recent American practice of executive consultation with Congress before dispatching troops, can constrain leaders and prevent them from exercising the full degree of their institutional authority. Many of these procedures are based merely on custom and political actors adhere to them only because they simplify political interaction. Consequently, these procedures may be altered by political actors if they are willing to accept the costs of change.

Many procedures, however, are inspired by prevailing procedural norms--widely accepted standards which provide a broad consensus on the way politics ought to be conducted in terms of the rights and obligations of political actors and institutions. ₂₀ Such conventions are likely to remain more or less constant until the underlying norms change or lose force. For our purposes, the most important procedural norms are legislative norms which affect the legislature's usage of whatever structural rights it has to scrutinize the foreign policy process. Bipartisanship, or nonpartisanship, and Congressional restraint in the conduct of American foreign relations, practices which endured for some time after the Second World War, for example, were inspired by a norm that required both parties to curtail bickering over the direction of foreign policy. Based on a belief that "politics stops at the water's edge" due the importance of foreign policy in a hostile international environment and the need to present clear signals to foreign governments, ₂₁ this norm compelled the executive to consult privately with senior members of both parties in the construction of policy. In return, both parties were obliged to refrain from open criticism of governmental policy. Since bipartisanship and Congressional restraint elevated foreign policy decision making above politicking and removed much policy debate from public purview, they gave the executive considerable autonomy. In general, then:

• conventions, such as party discipline, which routinize support for the government grant it greater autonomy;

• decision making procedures which require the executive to consult the legislature prior to implementing policy curtail state strength;

• legislative norms which view the conduct of foreign relations as of utmost importance and which, therefore, stifle public dissent on matters of foreign affairs grant the executive a freer hand;

• legislative norms which require representatives to scrutinize decisions closely in order to prevent excesses serve to constrain leaders;

Taken together, institutional structures, conventional practices, and procedural norms determine the level of decision making autonomy a foreign policy executive possesses. It is instructive to represent this decision making environment graphically. Figure 1 represents the traditional view of the domestic decision making environment in democratic states. Both realists and liberals assume that public preferences intervene between state (i.e., decisionmaker) preferences and policy choices. Realists believe the electorate interferes with policy making; in other words, they expect public opinion to reduce the nexus between rational national interests and policy selection. Liberals believe that the governed can simultaneously filter out the influence of unwholesome, particularistic state interests and enable rational state interests to shape policy.

Figure 2 illustrates the richer picture generated when the role of decision making autonomy is considered. Autonomy enables decisionmakers to filter out public pressures, thereby allowing them to formulate policy that more closely approximates their own preferences. Whilst policy making in less autonomous states tends to approximate the traditional model, in highly autonomous states the public role is severely curtailed.

The sources of autonomy are represented in Figure 3. It is determined primarily by the scope of action allowed by institutional structures. What policymakers are able to do within this scope, however, is either amplified or diminished by decision making procedures, which are themselves influenced in part by prevailing procedural norms. The complete domestic decision making environment described above is presented in Figure 4. It reflects the possibility that decisionmakers can use skillful leadership to manipulate the public and attempt to bring their preferences in line with elite preferences, as well as the public's ability to use public debate to reshape leader preferences.

Since procedures and norms affect state autonomy, three important implications follow. First, a state's level of autonomy should vary over time, as decision making procedures and the norms that inspire them change. Thus the practice of bipartisan foreign policy eroded after the Vietnam War and, consequently, so did the power of the President over foreign affairs. ₂₂ Second, autonomy does not lend itself to quantitative measurement. This does not mean that it is not worth studying, though. Much can be learned about policy outcomes by estimating the relative autonomy of two or more states, or the same state at different times. ₂₃ Third, autonomy is issue specific. A state can at the same time be circumscribed in its ability to redistribute wealth and independent in its ability to negotiate international treaties, since different institutions, procedures, and norms affect each issue. Indeed, as we will see in the next section, the post-war French state, which has been characterized by Peter Katzenstein as possessing a high degree of autonomy in economic policy, was simultaneously fragmented and weak in the conduct of foreign affairs. Similarly, the American executive, constrained in the economic arena, enjoyed considerable foreign security policy autonomy in the first two decades of the Cold War.

The concept of autonomy, of course, has been employed as a conceptual tool in explaining foreign economic policy, particularly by Katzenstein, who uses domestic institutional structures as a lens through which to study commercial and monetary policy making in advanced economies. ₂₄ Others, meanwhile, have examined the impact of state autonomy on national strategic raw materials policies. ₂₅ Surprisingly, though, state autonomy has been almost completely ignored in studies of "high politics." In the 1990s, analysis of institutional structures has begun to creep into the broader foreign security policy literature, as scholars have started to realize that state structures affect the policy process. ₂₆ Very recently, some theorists have even criticized the democratic peace theory for failing to distinguish between presidential and parliamentary democracies. ₂₇ Nonetheless, researchers have, as yet, neglected to account for the normative and procedural bases of autonomy or to address its other important structural determinants. Consequently, these recent studies have tended to oversimplify the domestic decision making environment.

Since the national security institutions of democratic states vary in the level of decision making autonomy they enjoy, it is unwise of realists to dismiss all democracies as deficient in the conduct of foreign affairs. Consequently, the realist critique of democracy should not apply to all democratic states. By the same token, liberals are incorrect in assuming that all democracies are safe from foreign policy abuse by governmental officials. Instead, we can predict more about the nature of a state's foreign policy by studying the nature of its institutions and the manner in which it conducts policy than we can by observing its political regime. In order to test this proposition, the balance of this paper will analyze empirically how decision making autonomy can explain differences in the nature and content of the peacemaking policies of Great Britain, France, and the United States toward Germany after the Second World War.

III. The Relative Autonomy of Great Britain, France and the United states after WWII

Before we can study the impact of foreign policy decision making autonomy on policy, we must make a priori assessments of the relative autonomy of the states under investigation. ₂₈ The analysis that follows, therefore, seeks to determine the degree of autonomy afforded by the domestic decision making environments of England, France and the United States from 1945-1954. In each case, I evaluate the formal division of powers between the executive and legislative branches of government, particularly as they relate to foreign affairs, as well as the informal procedures that impact on executive authority, in order to answer the following questions. Does the constitution, favor the executive or the legislative branch in foreign affairs? Do prevailing executive practices in foreign affairs facilitate executive independence? Do prevailing legislative practices in foreign affairs facilitate executive independence? Do prevailing legislative norms in foreign affairs facilitate executive independence? In addition, when considering parliamentary systems, I address two supplemental questions. Is the government a one-party majority government? Does the government command a strong majority of support in the legislature? Finally, for presidential systems, I consider whether the legislature is controlled by the same party that controls the executive. The answers to these questions are presented in table form after the richer contextual analyses of the three states' decision making environments.

a) Great Britain:

In the absence of a formal constitution, the English political system is governed by various parliamentary laws and constitutional conventions. The frequency of parliamentary elections, the legislative power of the House of Lords, civil liberties, and various other matters are all regulated by written laws. Nonetheless, these laws may be altered or repealed by Parliament at any time. Many other central aspects of British politics, such as the functions and operation of the Cabinet and the diminished power of the monarch, are not provided for or regulated by law, but are governed by long-standing conventions of the constitution.

Technically, English sovereignty resides in the Crown. The King opened and dissolved Parliament, commanded the armed forces, declared war, concluded peace, and possessed a veto power over all bills. Tradition, however, has transferred monarchical power to the Cabinet, which is responsible to Parliament. Ostensibly acting as advisors to the Crown, they actually make the decisions and issue orders in the name of the monarch. The diminished capacity of the Crown is so firmly entrenched that "it would be regarded as 'unconstitutional' for the king to attempt to reassert some power, such as that of veto." ₂₉ With monarchical authority existing in name only, true political power resides in the Parliament, a bicameral legislature consisting of the popularly elected House of Commons and the House of Lords, whose members either inherit their titles or are appointed by the monarch on the advice of the Cabinet. In the twentieth century, the House of Lords has become largely devoid of power, leaving the Commons as the predominant parliamentary body. Executive power is exercised by the Prime Minister--typically the leader of the party with the most seats in the House of Commons--and the ministers he/she appoints to the Cabinet. Since convention dictates that the Cabinet must resign if it does not command the confidence of the Commons, minister's are usually chosen from the majority party, except in rare instances when no party controls a majority of seats or when political crises require a coalition Government in order to preserve national unity. The Cabinet, referred to as His/Her Majesty's Government (HMG), takes the initiative in proposing legislation for the Commons to debate and approve.

By long-standing convention, the conduct of foreign affairs is a royal prerogative, exercised by the monarch and his/her ministers of the Cabinet. ₃₀ As a result, the British foreign policy process, more than any other policy area is dominated by the executive. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary play the leading roles in policy formation and direction of the Foreign Office (FO) administration. The Prime Minister lays out general programmatic guidelines for all ministers and, at least potentially, has final say on all policy matters. Moreover, he/she must have a sufficient command of and involvement in British foreign policy to guide him/her through the international conferences, ambassadorial meetings and meetings with heads of state that it is his/her duty to attend. ₃₁ The specific degree of control he/she has over the direction of foreign policy within the Cabinet depends primarily on his personality and his/her relationship with the Foreign Secretary. Since prime ministers have the sole authority to appoint and dismiss Cabinet ministers, if they wish to retain an active hand in foreign affairs, they can appoint foreign secretaries who either agree with them on general policy guidelines or who will, due to their personality, defer to the Prime Minister in matters of importance. On the other hand, prime ministers who choose to be less directly involved in foreign policy may select senior parliamentarians experienced in foreign affairs and allow them considerable independence in policy construction. ₃₂

For his part, the Foreign Secretary enjoys one of the most prestigious portfolios in the Cabinet. The position itself commands respect and the individuals who have been selected to fill it are typically held in high esteem due to their own experience and accomplishments. As a result of this prestige, foreign secretaries who were granted a free hand by the Prime Minister were typically also given substantial leeway by their Cabinet colleagues, Parliament and the nation. The Foreign Minister's power was enhanced by his placement at the helm of the FO bureaucracy and diplomatic corps. The FO reported to the Cabinet and the Prime Minister through the Foreign Minister, placing him in a uniquely advantageous position. His monopoly on expert knowledge insulated him further from his Cabinet colleagues, if not the Prime Minister, on foreign policy matters. Certainly, other Cabinet ministers, most notably the Chancellor, the Minister of Defense and the Colonial Secretary, were frequently involved in the foreign policy process, but they did not normally approach the influence of the Foreign Secretary.

The British Parliament plays a comparatively minor role in foreign affairs. To be sure, the House of Commons does involve itself in foreign policy making in several ways. First, there are parliamentary debates, of which at least one per session is devoted to foreign policy. Second, question time in the House of Commons addresses matters of foreign policy on the third Wednesday of each month. Third, Members can pass motions which indicate the state of opinion in Parliament. Fourth, there are committees in both the House of Commons and Lords which deliberate on foreign affairs. Fifth, under the so-called Ponsonby rule of 1924, Parliament had the right to review treaties at least twenty-one days prior to ratification. ₃₃ Finally, Parliament retains the power of the purse and can refuse to fund overseas activities of which it disapproves.

Nevertheless, there are three important considerations--two structural and one normative--which prevent Parliament from using these mechanisms to achieve a major role in foreign policy making. First, since the British system is adversarial in nature, Parliament is rigidly divided into Government and Opposition. The role of the Government, which of necessity commands a majority of seats, is to support the programs of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet; the role of the loyal Opposition is to oppose. These roles are amplified by the tradition of party discipline, which ensures that the first duty of MPs is to their party, rather than to their constituents or themselves. Consequently, debates tend to be routine and ritualistic, reflecting the current state of Government-Opposition relations, rather than earnest expressions of popular concerns; question time is frequently used by the Opposition as an opportunity to embarrass the Government; and parliamentary committees, with a majority of members from the Government side of the bench, are unwilling or unable to generate serious criticism of Government policy.

The second structural impediment to a strong parliamentary voice in foreign affairs is the Cabinet's ability to keep vital information confidential. Since the Cabinet and the various Cabinet committees meet privately and since the Whitehall administrative staffs are responsible to the Cabinet, rather than to the legislature, Parliament is dependent on the Cabinet for most of the information on foreign policy it receives. As a result, parliamentary input lacks power at the stage of policy formation, since it is frequently unaware of both the minutiae of the political and military matters which occupy the Government's attention, as well as the options under consideration by the Cabinet. Often matters are not brought before Parliament's and the public's attention at the early stages of policy construction except by way of Government leaks and the foreign press. Thus Parliament is more commonly relegated to the less important position of criticizing policymakers after the fact, or debating the implementation of policies already chosen.

The role of Parliament in foreign affairs is further constricted by the prevailing norm that foreign security policy ought to be left to the Cabinet. In Great Britain, "(m)ore than any other policy area, foreign policy is identified as that which must be conducted by the executive; it is concerned with the exercise of sovereignty in relations with the outside world." ₃₄ Although MPs still try to involve themselves in England's international relations, and although they can still censure the Government for foreign policies which they oppose on moral or political grounds, they typically allow the Prime Minister and the Foreign and Defense secretaries substantially more leeway than in domestic matters.

Following the post-war elections of July 1945, two important phases characterize the British Government during the period under investigation: the phase of substantial majority government and the phase of bare majority government. The Labour Government which held power from July 1945 to the February 1950 election was a strong majority Government. Out of 640 possible seats, the Labour party won a commanding 392. It therefore possessed a clear and powerful mandate to govern and could make controversial policy choices without the fear of losing a vote of confidence in the Commons.

The two Governments which succeeded it were substantially more vulnerable. In February 1950, Clement Attlee was re-elected by the barest of majorities; his Labour party won 319 out of 633 seats, yielding an overall majority of only 5 seats. This placed him in an extremely unenviable position. Unless his political agenda satisfied the leadership of the Opposition, he could not be assured of the necessary parliamentary support for it to pass. If any of his aged and ill Cabinet members were to become indisposed, if any of his MPs were not able to report for votes, or if any Labour Members defected, his Government's policies could be defeated in the Commons. Worse still, the Government itself could fall in a vote of confidence if it could not consistently muster a nearly perfect voting turnout. The Conservative Government elected in October 1951 was only marginally stronger, controlling an overall majority of 17 seats. Prime Minister Winston Churchill did possess a larger margin for error and, consequently, greater freedom of action. Nonetheless, with a slim majority, some accommodation of Labour concerns would have been the surest way to ensure success in Parliament.

Based upon the above, we can distill the picture of the English domestic decision making environment summarized in Table 1. Clearly, the constitution favors the executive in foreign affairs, as do prevailing legislative norms and procedures. During the period under study, all governments were formed by a single party, although the size of the majority varied.

b) France:

The French Constitution of October 1946 which established the Fourth Republic provided for a bicameral legislature, consisting of an upper house--le Conseil de la République (the Council)--and a lower house--l'Assemblée Nationale (the Assembly). The bulk of legislative power was clearly vested in the Assembly, which was presided over by the Premier Ministre (Premier) and his Cabinet. The Council possessed little real power, except that it could veto decisions of the Assembly. The two houses jointly elected the Président de la République (President), a figurehead whose main political function was the appointment of the Premier, subject to confirmation by the Assembly and his ability to form a government. ₃₅

The Premier, who together with his Cabinet comprised the executive of the Fourth Republic, was considerably constrained in the exercise of his power. He was not allowed to appoint Cabinet ministers before securing Assembly approval of his political program, and he was required by a procedure of double investiture to secure the votes of an absolute majority of Assembly delegates both before and after naming his ministers. Thus, he frequently had to make significant domestic and foreign policy compromises to the legislature in order to proceed with the task of government. Furthermore, the multiplicity of political parties in France required the Premier to form a coalition with several other parties and invite prominent members of these parties into his Cabinet. Consequently, policy making was frequently a partisan struggle not only in the Assembly, but within the Cabinet too.

By far the most powerful political institution in the Fourth Republic was the "omnipotent, divided, and irresponsible" Assembly, which could frustrate any Cabinet endeavor in both domestic and foreign affairs. ₃₆ The Assembly set its own agenda. Although the legislature was required to listen to the Cabinet's request for a particular schedule of priorities, the Cabinet lacked the power to impose its preferred agenda. Furthermore, the government's program could be rejected, in whole or in part, by powerful parliamentary committees or delayed in endless polemical debates.

Overcoming the parliamentary committees was perhaps the most serious hurdle for the executive. No policy or program could be discussed by the Assembly as a whole until it had been considered by the appropriate committees, which had the authority to reject it outright or make revisions. Membership in these committees, which proportionally represented the distribution of parties in the Assembly, was frequently used either to curry favor with the leaders of one's own party, or to garner national attention. The easiest way to get noticed, of course, was to obstruct. This problem was compounded by the fragility of the government, which meant that legislative obstruction could bring down the government and enhance the power of prominent committee members in the next government. Indeed, the only procedural norms of any consequence in the Third Republic were obstruction and interference. Criticizing and derailing the Premier's program was the preferred way for politicians to achieve national recognition, to rise in their party organizations, and to bring about governments in which they could play a greater part. Hence the Premier was given little leeway from the Assembly.

Whilst the Premier's power was constrained and his tenure brief, Cabinet Ministers enjoyed greater staying power, since successive coalitions typically included the same political parties and, consequently, the same senior politicians. This was especially true of the Foreign Minister. From 1945 through 1954, despite some twenty government changes, there were only four different Foreign Ministers: Georges Bidault, Léon Blum, Robert Schuman, and Pierre Mendes-France. This contributed to some degree of stability of interactions with foreign nations and also allowed the foreign minister to build up his personal influence in Quai D'Orsay through the strategic distribution of appointments and recruitment after the post-war bureaucratic purges. Moreover, since Bidault and Schuman, both of the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP), together held the office for over nine years with only a two-month interregnum, their party consistently exerted more influence on foreign policy than any other party. Nonetheless, the Foreign Minister still had to win the approval of a bitterly divided Cabinet and push his program through the Assembly. As a consequence, policy compromise and strategic retreat were frequently the only options available to the Foreign Minister in an always fragmented an often hostile domestic decision making environment. For Bidault and Schuman this became increasingly the case in the early 1950s as the centrist MRP became progressively marginalized within right-wing governing coalitions. Although Mendes-France had the advantage of serving simultaneously as Foreign Minister and Premier, his tenure was brief and his freedom of action was limited by intense public and parliamentary scrutiny coupled with a divided Cabinet that included both radical Gaullists and moderate MRP Ministers. In addition, his control over the implementation of policy was also quite limited, due to the heavy involvement of the military and other ministries in post-war defense matters. Indeed, there was reason to believe that during Schuman's tenure, the foreign minister had little control over the Quai D'Orsay and that officials in that ministry who disagreed with the Government's policy could obstruct the Foreign Minister's orders. ₃₇

Despite the relative security of the foreign minister's position within the Cabinet, then, he possessed little real autonomy in the construction of French foreign policy. The Premier, himself, was dependent on both his coalition partners and the Assembly, whilst the Cabinet was typically too divided to overcome the obstruction of the lower house. Hence, at least in the field of foreign affairs, the Fourth Republic's executive was extremely weak.

We can distill from this analysis the picture of foreign policy authority presented in Table 2. The legislature was clearly the dominant actor in foreign affairs. Although the executive (particularly the foreign minister) tried to preserve some autonomy, legislative norms and practices coupled with fragmentary coalitions shackled the Cabinet. Cells 5 and 6 of the table indicate that even though the Government, by virtue of the parties included in governing coalitions, was comprised of a significant majority of the electorate, the fragility of these large coalitions as well as the lack of party coherence and unity frequently served to undermine this support.

c) United States:

In the United States, there is at once the potential for extensive executive autonomy in foreign affairs as well as strong prospects for effective popular and legislative control of foreign policy. On the one hand, the President is granted a four-year mandate to govern and cannot under normal circumstances be impeached or dismissed by the legislature. Unlike in parliamentary democracies, his Administration officials--most notably, for our purposes, the Secretaries of State and Defense--are not themselves elected politicians; they are appointed by the President and, after initial confirmation by the Senate, cannot personally be removed either by direct election or by the Congress. Nonetheless, several factors combine to restrain presidential authority over foreign affairs. Notwithstanding the facade of the electoral college, it is fair to say that the President is directly elected by the American people and he must satisfy them if he wishes to be re-elected. Moreover, the split ticket ballot implies that the President and his Administration do not necessarily reflect the composition of the Congress and, therefore, cannot be assured of the support of the majority of the legislature. Congress and the White House are frequently controlled by rival parties, a situation which can be problematic, given the constitutional allocation of authority over foreign relations.

Whereas in England the executive is clearly granted a preponderance of institutional control over foreign policy, and in France the legislature was endowed with ultimate say over peace treaties, the United States Constitution explicitly divided power over foreign relations between the President and the Congress. The President is empowered to negotiate treaties with foreign nations with the advice and consent of the Senate, provided that two-thirds of the Senate approves; the President may appoint ambassadors and consular staff, provided a majority of senators concur; the President is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, but Congress has the power to declare war; the President has the power to receive ambassadors, and as a corollary, to recognize foreign governments; Congress has the power of the purse, which affects all troop deployments and foreign programs. The resulting constitutional stalemate amounts to what one prominent commentator has labeled "an invitation to struggle for the privilege of directing American foreign policy." ₃₈ This struggle is ongoing and dynamic. Over time, the balance of foreign policy power between Congress and the President has fluctuated due to a variety of factors, most notably: Supreme Court rulings, the mood of the Congress and the public, and the personal style of the President. It would be fruitful to consider each of these factors in turn.

While the national and state legislatures together can change the Constitution, the Supreme Court is its ultimate interpreter. The Court has frequently declined to rule on the distribution of foreign relations power between the executive and legislative branches, arguing that it was not its role to settle political questions. Nevertheless, by the time the second World War ended, the Court had carved out a broad authority for the President over foreign affairs in several landmark cases. In The Prize Cases (1863), the Court expanded the Commander-in-Chief power to allow the President to respond to an attack without waiting for a congressional declaration of war, and to determine the degree of force that is necessary. ₃₉ Moreover, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936), the Court asserted that "the President is the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations." ₄₀ Consequently, in order to avoid serious embarrassment of the United States internationally, the Court concluded that Congress should grant the President much wider latitude in external relations than in internal matters. Furthermore, it maintained that secrecy on the part of the President and his information-gathering agents was acceptable in foreign affairs and should be tolerated by the legislature due to the harmful international consequences that could result if information were to be disclosed prematurely. ₄₁ The breadth of the Curtiss-Wright decision helped pave the way for a dramatic post-war expansion of executive authority over national security policy.

Prevailing public and legislative sentiments following the war also favored executive independence and the expansion of executive control over external affairs, primarily because of a heightened threat perception in the post-war international system. After World War II, changes in the nature of military technology and shifts in the international balance of power brought a traditionally isolationist American political culture to favor active international engagement. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 had painfully ushered in a new era for Americans. No longer were they invulnerable from foreign invasion. The advent of aircraft carriers and long-range aircraft significantly downgraded the defensive buffer provided by the two oceans and allowed potential enemies to carry out offensive operations against US soil. ₄₂ Advances in long distance rocketry--while still not able to traverse the oceans--represented a graver threat in the near future, especially if other states were to develop nuclear weapons. The potential damage that a future adversary could wreak upon the United States compelled American decisionmakers and, indeed, the American public to abandon the cavalier detachment with which they viewed international affairs. ₄₃

American fears were accentuated by the international balance of power which emerged from the Second World War. Aside from the United States, the greatest international power was the Soviet Union. Wedded as it was to Marxist-Leninism, Soviet power represented both an ideological and military challenge to the American leadership. The ideological threat was strong enough, with the growth in popularity of Moscow-directed Communist parties throughout the ravaged countries of Europe; the military challenge, though, was staggering. Not only did the Soviet Union boast the world's largest army, but it also possessed its own share of captured German scientists and engineers who had participated in Hitler's nuclear program. It would only be a matter of time before the Russian leadership would possess the capability to inflict immense devastation upon the American homeland. The changed American threat perception which resulted required a more active American role in international affairs, since the United States could not count on the weakened Europeans to hold Russia in check. The only problem was: if the United States was to act decisively in foreign affairs, the executive needed unfettered authority over foreign security policy. Consequently, the Truman Administration with the help of Congress proceeded to construct the foreign policy institutions that comprise what some have termed "the National Security state". ₄₄

The passing of the National Security Act of 1947 marked the institutional turning point in executive authority over foreign affairs, accomplishing three important objectives. First, it created the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to gather information on the adversary and other nations. This new intelligence arm of the executive was to act secretly so as not to compromise the intelligence it received; therefore, it was to report directly to the President with only limited congressional oversight. ₄₅ Second, the three independent armed services (the Army, the Navy and the Air Force) were reorganized within a Joint Chiefs of Staff System and placed under the authority of the Secretary of Defense. Finally, the Act established the National Security Council (NSC), a foreign policy Cabinet with a permanent professional staff to provide policy-relevant information to the President and facilitate coordinated action among the various foreign security policy institutions. On the grounds of national security, the deliberations at these meetings were classified, thereby shielding the executive from congressional and public scrutiny.

The President was also assisted in his conduct of international relations by changed congressional attitudes, inspired by the heightened perception of the communist threat. As the United States faced increased danger abroad, congressional leaders recognized the need for the executive to take decisive and resolute action when necessary. Since domestic political bickering could undermine resolution, they recognized that, within reason, politics must stop "at the water's edge". Thus the norm of non-partisanship allowed the President a free hand to react as he saw fit internationally, provided he could justify his policies to the leaders of both parties in terms of the Cold War as attempts to contain communism. ₄₆ Under these conditions, even an embattled President Truman and his advisers were able to direct American foreign policy despite facing a Republican Congress in 19 ₄₇ - ₄₈ . Although the Republicans staged the occasional revolt against Secretary of State Acheson, they were unable to alter the course of the Administration's policy.47 President Eisenhower had the added advantages of national respect for his leadership experience in the national security sector and the Republican Congress which was elected with him in 1953. Both men enjoyed a degree of foreign policy autonomy which was unprecedented in American history and which would undoubtedly have been coveted by many non-democratic leaders.

Table 3 illustrates the scope of the American president's autonomy over foreign affairs. As indicated in cell 1, the Constitution clearly does not favor either branch in the construction of foreign policy; nonetheless, judicial interpretation of that document provided for a wide range of executive authority. Moreover, legislative norms and practices served to enhance the President's autonomy over foreign policy, even during the period of divided government between 1948 and 1950.

Table 3: The Determinants of Executive Autonomy in The United States, 1945-54

d) Relative Autonomy

As expected, the countries in this study conduct foreign relations in strikingly different manners with different levels of decision making autonomy for their foreign policy executives. Figure 5 graphically represents the relative autonomy in the field of foreign affairs of the three states in our study.

As Figure 5 indicates, the United States after the Second World War was granted a high degree of foreign policy autonomy by its domestic decision making environment. The American president dominated the foreign policy process in the United States after the Second World War because of the powerful security institutions created in the 1940s and the considerable leeway granted to him by Congress because of the Soviet threat. The autonomy of the British executive was only marginally weaker during the period of Attlee's large majority Government, although the second Attlee administration and Churchill's 1951 Government were further constrained by their small majorities. Finally, the executive of the French Fourth Republic had considerably less control over foreign policy than the other governments under investigation thanks to a Constitution which enshrined parliamentary authority and favored extremely unstable multiparty coalitions. Under these conditions, legislative norms that encouraged interference and obstruction made autonomous action by the Cabinet exceedingly difficult.

These findings are interesting in and of themselves. Comparative studies of the domestic allocational and foreign economic policies of Western democracies have concluded that the post-war American state is marginally weaker than its British counterpart which, in turn, is significantly less autonomous than the French state.48 Consequently, the relative autonomy of states in one issue area is not a good indicator of state power over other types of policy.

IV. Peacemaking with Germany after World War II

Having estimated the relative foreign policy decision making autonomy of the states in this study, we shall now turn our attention to the peacemaking strategies pursued by these states after the second World War to determine the impact of autonomy on policy choices and international bargaining outcomes.

Study Design:

The design of the study is as follows. I have selected a traditional realist hypothesis and a liberal hypothesis regarding the conduct of security policy by democratic states that are germane to the study of peacemaking. These hypotheses are as follows:

Realist Hypothesis--Policy-makers in all democratic states will choose to pursue punitive post-war settlements, even if they believe that is contrary to national interests.

Liberal Hypothesis--When democratic negotiators portray themselves as having their hands tied domestically, they should have some success in forestalling compromises and inducing their partners to make concessions.

Assuming that regime-type is the most important variable in determining foreign security policy outcomes, we should expect both of those assumptions to valid. Consequently, we should expect to see all three governments pursuing punitive policies toward the former enemy and all three democracies enjoying similar success when they use domestic constraints as a lever in international negotiations.

Alternatively, if our model of domestic decision making autonomy is correct, we should expect the following hypotheses to provide a better fit than the traditional hypotheses outlined above:

Alternative Hypothesis 1--In states where the domestic decision-making environment grants more autonomy to the foreign policy executive, decision-makers will frequently resist public pressures for a punitive peace when they believe that a more conciliatory settlement can serve the national interest by promoting international stability. In states where the foreign policy executive is granted little autonomy, they will pursue more punitive policies even if believe a more conciliatory policy would be wiser.

Alternative Hypothesis 2--The lower the degree of autonomy allowed by a state's domestic decision-making environment, the more likely its representatives will be successful at forestalling compromise and inducing concessions from their bargaining partners when they portray themselves as having their hands tied domestically.

We can choose between the traditional realist hypothesis and Alternative Hypothesis 1 by examining who wins out at times when leaders prefer conciliatory policies and public opinion prefers sternness. If we find that public opinion tends to win policy disagreements in all three states, then the realist hypothesis will have been vindicated. On the other hand, if leaders tend to win out in the states that we have determined a priori to be more autonomous, than the alternative hypothesis will be confirmed. We can choose between the liberal hypothesis and Alternative Hypothesis 2 in two ways. First, if we find that the states that we have identified as less autonomous tend to be more successful at wrangling concessions by projecting domestic opposition than the more-autonomous states, that will support our alternative hypothesis over the liberal hypothesis. Similarly, if the less-autonomous states employ this negotiating tactic more frequently than the more-autonomous states--presumably because they expect that they will be successful, while the more autonomous states do not--that will, to a lesser degree, confirm the alternative hypothesis. On the other hand, if these states resort to these tactics with comparable frequency and if they meet a comparable degree of success, then the liberal hypothesis will appear more powerful.

To make credible judgments, I employ a detailed decision making analysis, employing primary sources wherever possible, to answer the following questions: 1) what were the policy preferences of the key foreign policy elites of each country? 2) to what degree were these consistent with public preferences? ₄₉ 3) when public and decisionmaker preferences diverged, to what extent do decision-makers perceive themselves to be constrained by public opinion? 4) to what extent did policy correspond to decisionmaker rather than public preferences? 5) to what extent did policymakers portray themselves to their foreign counterparts as unable to compromise because of domestic opposition? 6) when this occurred, were they successful?

The following are the results of my analysis of the impact of public opinion on the two most important aspects of the post-World War II settlement with Germany: the political and territorial settlement that unfolded from 1945-1952 and the controversy over German rearmament from 1950-1954.

A. THE POLITICAL AND TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENT, 1945-52

Under the terms of the Yalta Agreement, Germany was divided into three zones of Occupation, to be administered individually by the Soviets, the Americans and the British until the three allies could agree to a final settlement with their former enemy. From the American and British zones, an occupation zone was to be created for the French. ₅₀ Initially the Three Powers exerted complete control over their own zones of occupation, while they undertook programs of denazification, demilitarization and industrial dismantling. Gradually, all three western zones allowed for greater German participation in zonal administration.

Despite similar anti-German trends in the public opinion of all three Western countries in the immediate post-war era, their policies regarding the political and territorial disposition of occupied Germany diverged sharply from the outset. While the Americans decided early on that the rapid economic and political rehabilitation of Germany was necessary both to promote general European recovery and to resist Soviet influence in Western Europe, the French fought bitterly for territorial amputations and rigid, indefinite Allied control of the former enemy. The British political leadership was more attuned than the Americans to French demands for caution, but proved willing to follow the American lead in the interests of British recovery and maintenance of the balance of power. Even after the French reluctantly acquiesced in the 1949 creation of the Federal Republic of Germany, they continued to drag their feet, impose conditions and delay Anglo-American progress toward a contractual settlement with the West German state.

The mere fact that American and British public opinion was hostile to Germany but their leaders were able to assist German recovery casts doubt on the realist hypothesis about democratic peacemaking. In order to confirm our alternative hypothesis, though, we must examine the policy processes carefully, though, to verify that this was, indeed, the case and to determine whether French leaders obstructed German recovery because of public opposition or for other reasons. To test our other hypothesis against the liberal hypothesis, we must also examine whether or not France was more successful in trilateral negotiation over the status of Germany because of its domestic opposition.

a) Initial Attitudes

Great Britain:
Following the war there was strong anti-German sentiment throughout the United Kingdom. Having fought two bitter and draining wars against the Germans in thirty years, the British people harbored an intense dislike and distrust for the German people, whom they regarded as overly militaristic. This image was compounded by the hardships endured by the British during the Battle of Britain and mounting evidence of the atrocities committed by the German Army during the war. ₅₁ While there is little systematic polling information on British attitudes toward Germany during this period, such evidence as does exist confirms this impression. For example, in August 1945, 53% of Britons surveyed by Gallup reported negative feelings toward the German people. ₅₂ Even in 1947, when hatred of the Germans began to abate slightly--54% of British respondents with opinions claimed to be friendly toward the German people as opposed to 46% who were unfriendly--, an overwhelming majority were skeptical that Germany could become a "peace-loving, democratic nation" and expected that it would once again threaten world peace. ₅₃ Consequently, there was heavy support in the United Kingdom for a long occupation and a peace settlement which imposed strict political, economic and military controls on Germany in order to prevent it from plunging the world into war yet again. ₅₄

The political leadership, however, had different priorities. The Labour Government which came to power shortly after the war could hardly be labeled "pro-German." Leading Cabinet ministers, including Prime Minister Attlee and Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin had served in Churchill's War Cabinet and had supported the war effort fully. They and other prominent Labourites were only too aware of the dangers posed by German militarism and the tremendous toll Europe paid for its lack of vigilance toward Germany in the past. ₅₅ Foreign Minister Bevin privately professed outright hatred of the Germans, telling British Military Governor in Germany Brian Robertson, "I tries 'ard, Brian, but I 'ates them." ₅₆ Nonetheless, the Labour leadership realized immediately that a German recovery was essential in order to serve the twin objectives of British and European recovery and the reconstruction of a stable balance of power in Europe. ₅₇ Consequently, they desired to enforce the provisions of the Potsdam agreement, including denazification, industrial dismantling and demilitarization, without placing burdens on Germany which were too onerous, with an eye toward a rapid German political and economic recovery. They rejected the French plan to revise the western frontiers of Germany because of the detrimental effect it would have on the German economy. And when it became clear to the Foreign Office that the Soviet Union would always be a threat to British interests in Germany, the Labour leadership quickly agreed on the necessity of a Western strategy premised on the economic recovery, political rehabilitation and association of western Germany with the West. ₅₈ Thus, the Labour leadership did not allow public animosity to determine their post-war German policy.

France:
In the aftermath of the war, French political leaders and the French public were initially in agreement on the way to treat their defeated enemy. Both believed that French security could be guaranteed only by imposing a severe settlement that denied the Germans the economic and military resources to overturn the balance of power. ₅₉ To meet this challenge, General de Gaulle's "thesis" on Germany, which remained the core of French policy until well into 1948, had five essential elements. First, a centralized German government should be rejected in favor of a loose confederation of German states. Second, the industrial Ruhr was to be separated from Germany and treated as a separate political entity. This region was to be occupied by an international force and the mines of the Ruhr to be internationalized. Third, the Rhenanie region (the left bank of the Rhine) was also to be separated from Germany and divided into separate states. The French were to occupy this region permanently, with the help of the Benelux countries and possibly Great Britain. Fourth, the Saar was also to be separated from Germany administered, both politically and economically, by France. Sarrois mines were to become French property. Finally, Germany would be required to make high reparations payments in order to weaken German industry and fuel the French recovery. ₆₀

In the first year after the Allied victory, Foreign Minister Bidault and French Military Governor in Germany Pierre Koenig pushed this punitive plan aggressively, frustrating Allied efforts to create central administrations for all of occupied Germany. ₆₁ In coming years, however, the breakdown of Four Power co-operation would force French leaders to rethink their German policy and soften their position to the extent that public opinion allowed.

The United States:
Toward the end of the war, it appeared as if American leaders also favored a harsh policy toward Germany. Spurred on by Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau, President Roosevelt concurred that "[w]e have to be tough with Germany, and I mean not just the Nazis. We either have to castrate the German people or you have got to treat them in such a manner so they can't just go on reproducing people who want to continue the way they have in the past." ₆₂ Secretary of War Henry Stimson managed to prevail on the President to abandon the harsh Morgenthau Plan in favor of a more measured occupation blueprint, JCS 1067, which represented a compromise between Morgenthau's desire for punishment and the War Department's belief that political and economic stability should be restored to Germany as soon as possible after its defeat. ₆₃ The document stated sternly that "Germany will not be occupied for the purpose of liberation but as a defeated enemy nation." The principle aim of the occupation was "...to prevent Germany from ever again becoming a threat to the peace of the world." Moreover, JCS 1067 ordered that until the Big Three decided on the future disposition of Germany, "...(the Military Government) will take no steps looking toward the economic rehabilitation of Germany nor designed to maintain or strengthen the German economy." Nonetheless, the document clearly left open the political, economic, and territorial future of Germany, thereby distancing the United States Government from the harshest provisions of the Morgenthau Plan. ₆₄

In the immediate aftermath of the war, though, American public opinion toward Germany was much more severe than the JCS 1067 policy and every bit as negative as the British and French publics. Throughout 1945 and 1946, the White House was flooded with letters from the public either supporting the Morgenthau Plan, advocating the division of Germany and harsh treatment of Germans, or decrying the reduction of US Army rations in Europe to feed starving Germans. Considerably fewer letters asked for leniency. ₆₅ At the same time, public opinion polls confirmed that most Americans did not trust the German people and were skeptical that they could become democratic and peace-loving. ₆₆ Consequently, the vast majority of Americans desired the territorial dismemberment of Germany ₆₇ and most favored severe treatment of and rigid controls on the Germans. ₆₈

The American Deputy Military Governor in Germany, General Lucius Clay, however, refused to let public hostility toward Germany in the United States and Western Europe derail his efforts to reconstruct a semblance of order in the chaos of post-war Germany. Clay "believed that his first responsibility was to get Germany 'on its feet,'" in order to reduce the cost to taxpayers and mitigate the suffering he saw all around him in post-war Germany. He was convinced that German recovery and political rehabilitation as a democracy was an essential prerequisite for peace in Europe. Moreover, he considered that "his primary mission was the establishment of a democratic German government at the earliest possible moment." ₆₉ As a result, he used the "disease and unrest" provision in JCS 1067 together with the Potsdam decisions on central administrations and economic unity to rebuild Germany economically and politically, while conducting rigorous campaigns of denazification and demilitarization. In the process, as a result of his considerable and influence and the growing Soviet-American rift, other leading American officials also became aware of the need to restore a modicum of political and economic stability to the former enemy.

The first political expressions of this softer official attitude toward Germany came in the form of intense US pressure to establish the central German administrations envisioned at Potsdam and in initial American coolness to the French proposal to separate the Ruhr and Rhineland from Germany. Indeed, American leaders demonstrated their reluctance to acquiesce in any policies that threatened to render Germany economically unviable or to force the Germans to embrace the Soviet Union and communism. ₇₀ Hence, almost from the outset, American policymakers predicated their policy toward Germany on economic and strategic concerns rather than an effort to punish German aggression, in spite of a punitive public sentiment.

b) The Paris CFM, Summer 1946: Minimal French Gains

In early 1946, then, when the Three Powers and the Soviet Union met in Paris for quadrilateral talks on Germany, British and American policy toward Germany was considerably softer toward Germany than de Gaulle's thesis. The Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM) convened in Paris from April through July 1946 quickly revealed an unbridgeable chasm between Soviet and Anglo-Saxon views on reparations and central administrations. This left the French, who desperately wanted a Four Power settlement neutralizing all of Germany, out in the cold.

Worse still for the French, none of the other powers were willing to entertain the territorial amputations that were the cornerstone of French German. The British Cabinet was reluctant to cut away the economically viable regions from Germany, as the French demanded, because it would increase the staggering amounts of food and economic assistance the United Kingdom was pumping into their zone to feed the starving German masses. Bevin was also concerned that removing the Ruhr would leave the rump of Germany vulnerable to Soviet influence; therefore, he advocated the return the Ruhr to the future German state, but agreed that ownership of the industries in this province should be allocated to an international authority. ₇₁ The Americans, likewise, did not want to take any overly-punitive measures that would subvert the economic recovery of Germany or drive the German people into Soviet arms. This latter concern took on a special urgency for Byrnes after Molotov opened the bidding for German allegiances at the conference. ₇₂

Bidault was able to get some concessions from his English-speaking counterparts by impressing upon them the magnitude of French public hostility toward Germany and the danger that his Government could be defeated and the Communists--who were the single largest party in the Assembly--could seize power if he came out of the conference empty-handed. ₇₃ Byrnes was reluctant to sabotage a workable plan for Western Germany to satisfy the French desire for revenge, but he agreed "that a system of controls and small security forces should be remain for a long time in order to ensure observance of conditions imposed on Germany." In addition, to allow the embattled French Government at least a small victory in its territorial security policy, he was prepared to exclude the Saar from the jurisdiction of central German administrations and allow the French to administer it at least until the final boundaries of Germany were fixed. Bidault convinced Bevin too that public dissatisfaction could topple the French Government and bring the Communists to power if the French security proposals for their Eastern frontier were to be completely defeated. Therefore, the Foreign Secretary persuaded the Cabinet to endorse the French position on the Saar, provided that France did not annex any German territory west of the Rhine. ₇₄

c) 1947: A Beleaguered France Drifts Toward the West

1947 was a pivotal year for the German policies of the Western Powers. While Great Britain and the United States consolidated the bizone, they began to contemplate and debate the future political status of Western Germany; inevitably, they clashed with France in this endeavor. Meanwhile, faced with growing evidence of Soviet antipathy toward their security aims in Germany, French leaders began to reconcile themselves to a western strategy, the compromises this strategy would entail and the monumental struggle with domestic instability that would ensue.

Leon Blum and the Saar:
As already noted, French public opinion took a hard line on Germany and wholly endorsed de Gaulle's thesis, which underlay the Government's political and economic security policy. It was, therefore, not until 1947 that the views of key French foreign policy officials began to diverge from public attitudes. The average Frenchman continued to harbor deep resentment against the Germans and remained skeptical that they could be made democratic and peaceloving. ₇₅ Hence, they continued to demand a punitive settlement and disapproved of American efforts to curry favor with the Germans. ₇₆ French foreign policymakers, however, were beginning to reconsider their German policies, which could not succeed without support from Washington and London.

The first confrontation occurred over the Saar during Léon Blum's brief tenure as both Premier and Foreign Minister from December 1946 to January 1947. Blum, who believed that Germany must ultimately be rehabilitated both economically and politically, did not approve of the plan set in motion by his predecessor to establish a French border crossing between the Saar and the rest of Germany. He felt it was unwise to take unilateral action in Germany when quadripartite agreements precluded any territorial changes without the Allied Control Commission's approval. Despite his control of the two most powerful foreign policy posts, however, he felt powerless to prevent this popular action in the Saar. ₇₇ A more serious clash between France and her foreign minister over German policy was about to develop under the next government following the Moscow CFM of March 1947.

The Moscow CFM and after ₇₈ :
The Moscow CFM of March 1947 was a turning point for Bidault (who succeeded Blum as Foreign Minister at the end of January) and the Quai D'Orsay. At this important conference, it became clear to Bidault that France could not rely on the Soviet Union to advance French interests in Germany. The Soviets proved unwilling to enter into a long-term treaty on German demilitarization, which the French desperately wanted. Of equal significance, Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov refused to endorse the French position on the Saar. ₇₉ The Western Powers, though, were much more accommodating to Bidault in order to entice France into the western camp. Not only were Bevin and the new American Secretary of State, General George Marshall, amenable to the French position on the Saar, they were the only ones with the ability to relieve the severe French coal shortage which was paralyzing the French economy and threatening its political stability.

Co-operation with the United States and Great Britain had its costs, as Bidault was well aware. The Anglo-Saxons were quite anxious to increase the industrial output of their occupation zones, to associate the French zone (ZOF) with their bizone, and to establish political institutions for all of western Germany. Indeed, the initiation of the Marshall Plan in the second half of 1947 served to reinforce these goals for American policymakers. After the Soviet rebuff at Moscow, Bidault became convinced that it was necessary to go along with many of the western plans, provided that he could slow down the pace and ensure that the future German state would have a decentralized political structure with appropriate industrial and military restrictions. ₈₀ As part of this change of policy, Bidault dropped the demand for an independent Ruhr--despite its immense popularity in France--in exchange for an insistence on firm international control of the area's rich industrial base. ₈₁

Unfortunately for Bidault, domestic political events in France conspired to make this course of action most difficult. To begin with, French Communists bitterly opposed German rehabilitation and were hostile to a policy that favored the West over Moscow. This was no small problem for Bidault, since the PCF was the largest party in both the coalition government and the Assembly. ₈₂ After Socialist Premier Ramadier expelled the Communists from his Cabinet on May 5, 1947, matters became even worse. Out of the Government and directed by the Cominform's new Zhdanov line to oppose the 'bourgeois' Government and its policy of German revival more vigorously, the Communists took advantage of political and economic instability in France to instigate a wave of debilitating strikes. ₈₃ These staggering pressures compelled Bidault to slow down the pace of German recovery to which he was now committed.

In the midst of this internal chaos, Bidault made it clear to his Anglo-Saxon counterparts that he was inclined to pursue a Western policy, but that he needed both time and concessions from them in order to overcome domestic opposition. On April 20, Bidault assured Marshall, "I think that no-one can doubt the choice that France will make if it becomes necessary, but it is imperative that this choice is not imposed on her." ₈₄ He stressed that "France simply needed support and time in order 'to avoid civil war." ₈₅ Later, on July 17, the Foreign Minister told the American and British Ambassadors in frustration, "I know full well that our zone must join yours, but I cannot do it at the mouth of a gun." ₈₆ In particular, he insisted that no major decision be taken on German economic or political arrangements until after the next CFM, so that the French public would agree that no alternative was possible. Reluctantly, the Americans and British complied with his wishes, although many officials, most notably Clay, were growing visibly impatient. ₈₇

d) The London Accords of 1948

The Three Powers met in London during the first half of 1948 to co-ordinate political affairs in Western Germany. By the time these meetings concluded in June, the three foreign ministers struck a political bargain that paved the way for the establishment of a West German state, although Bidault would pay a heavy political price for his role in this bargain.

Negotiations at London:
The protracted discussions at London were exceedingly difficult for Bidault as he was forced to walk a fine line between the demands of his Western allies on the one hand and those of his Cabinet colleagues and French public opinion on the other. He continued to press for decentralization and Anglo-American security guarantees as a precondition for trizonal fusion. At the insistence of the Schuman Cabinet, the French delegation in London could only allow the election of a West German Constituent Assembly to draft a constitution if it would not be elected on the basis of universal suffrage. Universal suffrage would allow the more populous regions to dominate like Prussia had in the past and would foster strong national, rather than regional, political parties (in fact, the French wanted the Assembly's members to be appointed by the Länder, rather than popularly elected). ₈₈

Nevertheless, Bidault went to London prepared to compromise in order to prevent the Anglo-Saxons from proceeding without the French, provided that his bargain could be sold at home. As he implored Ambassador Caffery, "Far from wanting to break with you we want the success of the London, but don't make it too hard for me. I'll have to face the Assembly and given the attitude of the Communists, the Gaullists, and the Socialists, I don't know how we will come out." He pleaded with the Ambassador, "Tell your government I am on your side and in the long run I am sure we will work something satisfactory out, but at the same time, I must think about public opinion." ₈₉ Bidault's concessions, though, were quite dear. Under stiff pressure, primarily from the Americans, the Foreign Minister acceded to a popular election and virtually universal suffrage, and forwent a meaningful US security guarantee for the time being. More importantly, he conceded substantial central authority for the West German legislature, giving up a central plank of French policy since 1945. In return, the Americans reluctantly agreed to establish some form of International Authority for the Ruhr and a Military Security Board (MSB) to ensure that the future West German state remained demilitarized. ₉₀

That the Americans made these compromises is telling. It is not surprising that the French had to make concessions to the Americans, who--at least on the surface--possessed all the leverage. Only the Americans commanded the military might to guarantee French security from future German and Russian threats. Only the United States controlled the financial resources to rebuild the shattered French economy. In the final analysis, if Marshall was not satisfied with the French position, the United States could have acted together with the British, and excluded the comparatively insignificant French zone from the Western Germany it was creating. Yet the United States also made noteworthy concessions to the French position. They did so because the French ironically did possess some bargaining power. The magnitude of French domestic political opposition to the Anglo-American line on Germany made it impossible for Bidault to capitulate to their views in London; he needed to demonstrate that his surrenders were hard fought and were matched by concessions by the Anglo-Saxons, or else he would jeopardize his own position and the future of his government, while running the risk that extremists on either the right or the left would seize control of France. Ultimately, the compromise reached was not enough to save Bidault.

Bidault tried to sell the resulting London Accords to the Cabinet by stressing the concessions made to the French point of view and the consequences of rejecting what was, in effect, the final Anglo-American offer. The Cabinet, however, was bitterly divided over the issue and even the normally pro-German Premier Schuman joined forces with the decidedly anti-German President Auriol to chastise the Foreign Minister for giving in too easily on a decentralized state. With remarkable irresolution, they decided to send the London agreement to the Assembly without making it a vote of confidence. ₉₁

Debate on the London Accords in the Assembly was heated and the hostility toward Bidault for delivering "the funeral oration to a policy" of French security through firm controls on Germany was palpable. The legislature finally approved the Accords on June 17 by the slimmest of margins (297-289), but they attached a number of reservations which called for the Foreign Minister to negotiate more vigorously for French interests in Germany as previously defined. ₉₂ Thus Bidault was able to force the London agreement through a reticent legislature, but only with conditions and at a very high price; attacked from the Left, the Right, and even the parties of the Center for his capitulation at London, he was replaced as Foreign Minister by his MRP colleague, Robert Schuman, when the latter's government fell in the middle of July. ₉₃ The lesson--that it was costly to push through unpopular agreements, regardless of their necessity--was not lost on subsequent Foreign Ministers, particularly when they negotiated German rearmament in the early 1950s.

The Occupation Statute:

As Foreign Minister, Schuman continued the policy of limited German recovery and Franco-German rapprochement that Bidault had begun. The first big test for this policy came as the Three Powers negotiated the Occupation Statute that would govern the relations with the future West German state. Negotiations began in September 1948 at the level of the zonal commanders, but soon became deadlocked. The main political axis of disagreement was, predictably, between the French and the Anglo-Americans. In particular, the French refused to allow the Germans a right of appeal to a High Court in the event of disputes between the Allied Powers and the future German state; they insisted that the Länder governments, rather than the central government pay Occupation costs to the Allies; and, they demanded a unanimous voting procedure to ensure a French veto over decisions of the West German government over a wide range of subjects. ₉₄ It appeared that the new thinking at the Quai D'Orsay would not translate into a more benevolent stance on Germany.

The main reason for the discrepancy between Schuman's policy preferences and actual French toward Germany was the existence of a large group of Gaullist officials, like Koenig, both in the Military Government and in the Quai D'Orsay itself. These officials, knowing that public opinion favored a hard line and believing that de Gaulle could be swept into office at any moment, attempted to obstruct conciliatory policies whenever possible and frequently kept the Foreign Minister in the dark about German policy. ₉₅ As the British Foreign Office observed, "The bitter truth is that there is no unanimity among French officials in the Quai D'Orsay, no agreement between the Quai D'Orsay and General Koenig and his staff, and little or no desire on the part of the majority of French officials to carry out at present a policy which would really reconcile the Germans to the French and vice versa." ₉₆ Another British observer groused, "Experience has shown that in these matters the French are not really influenced by fears about security but almost always by considerations of internal politics." ₉₇

By early 1949, however, Schuman had begun to assert his ascendancy over German policy under intense Anglo-American pressure. He was assisted in this regard by progress toward a North Atlantic Treaty, which would provide security against a resurgent Germany and thereby reduce the risks involved in German rehabilitation. ₉₈ With the prospect of a security treaty to sell to the French public, Schuman took matters into his own hands and personally met with Clay for three and a half hours on March 20, 1949 to break the deadlock over the Occupation Statute. The French Foreign Minister proved willing to simplify the Occupation Statute by listing the rights and powers reserved to the Allies and leaving what remained to the central German government, to place only a few essential controls on German industry, to apply the rule of unanimity only to amendments of the federal constitution, and to enter into negotiations immediately after the statute would come into effect to revise to German advantage so that Allied control could be gradually withdrawn. ₉₉ This meeting paved the way for a Three Power meeting in Washington in April at which French compromises led to British and American concessions on matters directly affecting French security--such as unanimity in approving amendments to the federal constitution and the right of High Commissioner appeal to his Government in case of defeat in a vote over reserved security powers. ₁₀₀ As a result, the Occupation Statute and Tripartite Control Agreements were signed and the three western zones of Germany were transformed into an occupied state with limited governmental authority.

e) Between France and the Federal Republic: 1949-1950

When the Federal Republic of Germany was established in September 1949, Allied-German relations were officially governed by the Three Power Occupation Statute of April 1949. In practice, however, the statute was rather vague and potentially provided for a wide range of Allied authority over German affairs. ₁₀₁ Consequently, the character of its implementation depended in large measure on Three Power interpretations of the document and their attitudes toward the new West German state. Predictably, each of the three partners had different views on the proper relationship between High Commission and the federal Government. The American attitude was that "(t)he Statute defines the broadest limits within which the Allied High Commission will ordinarily operate." Consequently, American leaders were prepared to give the Germans as liberal an interpretation of the statute as possible, while maintaining their ability to protect Allied interests and actively foster democracy. ₁₀₂

The French, on the other hand, held a more restrictive view of the High Commission's role in German affairs, in no small part due to public pressure. The French public were by no means overjoyed by the new German state to their west and continued to express their profound dislike for the German people --a fact that Schuman had to bear in mind constantly and which led to continued caution in French policy. ₁₀₃ Schuman argued, therefore, that the High Commission should use the Occupation Statute to the fullest and play an active role in German affairs in order to prevent the development of attitudes and institutions in Germany that would endanger European integration and, by implication, French security. ₁₀₄

The British took a position between the liberal American stance and the more rigid attitude of the French. Bevin informed the Cabinet in November that the High Commissioners were empowered to negotiate with Adenauer to bring about a gradual and satisfactory evolution of the Allied-German relationship, "provided that they all three stand firm on the essential points and do not give Dr. Adenauer any encouragement to think that he may obtain more by playing one Allied Government off against another." In his view, the Allies should bide their time until the Occupation Statute was up for review and then bring about further changes in the respective authority of the AHC and the Federal Republic, while "binding the German Government and the German people more closely to the Western world and at the same time making adequate provision for security." ₁₀₅ The British approach was, therefore, a policy of cautious and gradual evolution.

Despite Three Power disagreement, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer was able to force the pace of Allied concessions by using the newly created power of the Federal Republic to press the Allies for greater authority and political equality. To avoid alienating the Germans, Acheson wanted to satisfy some of the Chancellor's aspirations and proceeded to garner British support for this endeavor. ₁₀₆ Consequently, at the May 1950 NATO conference in London, French representatives were outflanked by Anglo-American agreement to terminate the state of war with Germany and to revise the existing Occupation Statute, granting the Germans greater domestic authority and even limited control over foreign affairs. ₁₀₇ Under pressure, Schuman agreed to study these matters, provided the MSB and the IAR remained in place and the Germans fulfilled their commitment to enter the Council of Europe. ₁₀₈ Consequently, in September 1950, following the advice of the tripartite study groups set up at the May conference, the state of war was officially terminated and the Three Powers agreed to grant the Federal Republic greater flexibility in domestic affairs and even granted them a department of Foreign Affairs. ₁₀₉

By then, however, political events had overtaken the pace of Western concessions to German political rehabilitation. After the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 obliged the Americans and the British to seek a German contribution to Western defense, Adenauer's bargaining power vis-à-vis the Three Powers increased exponentially. ₁₁₀ The Chancellor used German opposition to rearmament as a lever to demand full sovereignty and the placement of Allied-German relations on a contractual basis. ₁₁₁

Acheson willing to enter into contractual arrangements with the Federal Government provided the Germans committed themselves to participate in both Western defense and the Schuman Plan, that they would join the institutions of the western liberal trading order, and that they would undertake various domestic commitments required by the Three Powers, including voluntarily limitations on their defense establishment and military production. ₁₁₂ On the other hand, the Chancellor's demands alarmed the French and unsettled the British, who were concerned about possible Soviet responses to what would amount to a violation of the Potsdam agreement. When the three foreign ministers addressed the German demands at the Brussels defense conference in mid-December, Schuman stated that he agreed with the principle of German equality, but "if equality means automatic and complete removal of restrictions and servitudes on the Germans, then we must be careful" for fear of both international and domestic political repercussions. He professed that he had no objections to contractual arrangements, if that meant subjecting most Three Power decisions on Germany to negotiations with the Federal Republic. Nonetheless, he "did not believe it was possible to put total relations with Germany, particularly matters relating to troops, on a contractual basis and supplant the occupation regime because the basis of relations with Germany is covered by four power agreements." Bevin similarly cautioned that, whilst relations with Germany could in general be premised on German equality, there would have to be exceptions to that rule. The three ministers agreed, though, to study the issue in the coming year. ₁₁₃

The Saar:

Another perpetual source of inter-Allied irritation--not to mention Franco-German antagonism--was French policy on the status of the Saar. Having failed to secure Allied agreement to separate the region permanently from Germany, in 1949 the French Cabinet proposed Sarrois entry into the Council of Europe. Bevin and Acheson both opposed the proposal on the grounds that it would unnecessarily provoke the Germans and might ultimately cause the Germans themselves to stay out of the Council of Europe. Schuman made it clear to his allies, however, that public and governmental attitudes made it impossible for the French Government to allow German entry before comparable Sarrois admission was allowed. ₁₁₄ Leading Cabinet members, such as Bidault--who had recently rejoined the Cabinet--and Jules Moch, were adamant that they would agree to allow the FRG to join the Council of Europe only if the Saar joined first. ₁₁₅ Moreover, because of French sensitivity on this matter, Schuman would have to discuss the matter with the National Assembly before he could officially endorse German entry. ₁₁₆ In light of French domestic vulnerability, Bevin agreed to endorse simultaneous German and Sarrois admission and the United States did not protest. ₁₁₇ For the same reason, the Anglo-Saxons did not react strongly when on March 3, 1950 the French concluded four conventions with the Saar Government on the autonomy of the Saar, economic relations between France and the Saar, the lease of Saar mines by France for a period of fifty years, and the control of Saar railroads. ₁₁₈ Adenauer protested strenuously, but the only support that Acheson or Bevin offered him was a statement by the High Commission that the status of the Saar could be reversed if the final peace treaty stipulated that the Saar was to be returned to Germany. With this less than satisfactory commitment, the Bundestag voted to enter the Council of Europe and the matter of the Saar was resolved for the time being.

f) Negotiating a Contractual Agreement, 1951-1952

By 1951, the Korean affair and Soviet covert actions in East Germany placed the French government in an unenviable position. Internationally, they faced powerful strategic incentives and formidable American pressure to meet the German demand for equality. Schuman, himself, was amenable to delegation of greater authority to the Germans, but he faced a French public that distrusted the Germans and was fearful of a revival of German nationalism. The linkage between German sovereignty and German rearmament was particularly troublesome, since the French people overwhelmingly opposed the latter, perceiving any German military capability as a serious threat to French security. ₁₁₉

Caught between these formidable international and domestic pressures, Schuman had little choice but to proceed slowly and secure adequate safeguards to assure the French public that Germany could not again threaten French security. He insisted, therefore, that the German rearmament question had to be settled satisfactorily before German sovereignty could be restored. In this manner, the Allies could bind the future German military establishment tightly within the Western European framework so that it could not be used as a national instrument by a newly independent German state. For if the Federal Republic were to be granted sovereignty before the conclusion of military arrangements, there could be no guarantees that the Germans would accept the principle of supranational control or, for that matter, that they would agree to participate in Western defense at all. ₁₂₀ Furthermore, although the Quai D'Orsay was willing to place some aspects of Allied-German relations on a contractual basis, it would not consider relinquishing the principle of Allied supreme authority. ₁₂₁

The Germans objected vociferously to the French scheme and Adenauer declared that the restoration of German sovereignty and equality must precede rearmament. ₁₂₂ In order to overcome the Franco-German stalemate, the US State Department concluded that sovereignty and rearmament had to be pursued jointly. ₁₂₃ Although the threat of a Soviet response and the demise of Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin dampened British enthusiasm for German rearmament, they agreed to the American strategy. ₁₂₄ Consequently, while talks in Bonn and Paris were underway on defense arrangements, the High Commission began talks with German representatives to draft contractual agreements with the Federal Republic that would replace the existing basis of relations between the Occupying Powers and West Germany.

The second plank of the French strategy was to pursue Four Power negotiations with the Soviet Union to attempt to settle the German question without resort to either rearmament or the restoration of German sovereignty without adequate safeguards. Schuman did not expect a new CFM to yield any tangible benefits. Prior to the June 17 French election, however, he was anxious to begin Four Power talks to satisfy French public opinion that all alternatives to West German rearmament would be fully explored before the French Government would countenance it. ₁₂₅ In the event, preliminary ministerial-level talks, which were prominently held in the palais Rose in Paris, quickly reached deadlock and were prolonged only until after the election, when they were permanently adjourned. ₁₂₆

In the Fall, Three Power negotiations made substantial progress. The new French Government, with the election securely behind them, made a number of important concessions to the Anglo-American position at the foreign ministers meeting in Washington in September 1951 and further concessions to the Germans in November. ₁₂₇ As French parliamentary agitation over the rapid pace of German rehabilitation began to grow in early 1952, however, Schuman's willingness to compromise abruptly ended. The Foreign Minister insisted upon explicit provisions as part of the contractual agreements which prohibited Germany from producing not only weapons of an unconventional character (atomic, biological and chemical--the so-called ABC weapons), missiles, military aircraft, and naval ships, but also civilian aircraft and all heavy military equipment, (e.g., gun barrels and propellants). ₁₂₈ Anxious to avoid any hint of second class status, Adenauer countered that these restrictions should be covered by the EDC Treaty rather than the contractuals or else the Bundestag would reject the agreements as an unwarranted restriction on German sovereignty. That was unsatisfactory for the French, who argued that restrictions on munitions manufacture had to be included in the contractuals, rather than merely in the EDC Treaty in order "to satisfy French, public opinion that German menace will be removed." ₁₂₉ At an AHC Meeting with the Chancellor on February 6, French High Commissioner Andre François-Poncet contended that Schuman's parliamentary difficulties were every bit as great as Adenauer's. "However one may try," he lamented, "it was impossible, particularly for [the] Fr[ench] public, to formulate policy without taking into account past experience with Ger[many]." ₁₃₀

The new Franco-German impasse was overcome by American economic inducements for France and Anglo-American pressure on Germany at the London and Lisbon conferences of February 1952. Under pressure from Acheson and Eden to accommodate the French and solve Schuman's domestic problem, Adenauer agreed to a wide range of voluntary restrictions on German military production which would be written into the EDC Treaty and would be the subject of an exchange of letters at the time of the signing of the contractuals. In the meantime, American promises of economic assistance persuaded Schuman to remove some items--particularly gun barrels, which were in short supply in NAT countries--from the restricted list. ₁₃₁

Still suffering from pre-agreement jitters, the French insisted on as many extra "voluntary" restrictions in April 1952 as they could convince the other powers to accept and tried to hold onto whatever control they could maintain on Germany. Then the Germans themselves became restive as details of the agreements were leaked to the German press. ₁₃₂ To overcome these obstacles, Acheson cabled his representatives in London, Paris and Bonn demanding that the pace of negotiations be accelerated. He threatened that if the agreements were not signed by May 9, it would be difficult for him to convince Congress and the American public to provide European security appropriations. ₁₃₃ This threat did not have quite the desired effect, as last-minute demands from Paris and Bonn required a flurry of negotiations in Bonn on May 24th and 25th.

At long last, on May 26, the Bonn Contractuals were signed, putting Three Power relations with Germany on a contractual basis, rather than an occupation footing. The High Commissioners were to become ambassadors once the treaty was ratified. The agreements did not immediately come into force since, at French insistence, they were made contingent upon the ratification of the European Defense Community (EDC) Treaty. The French delayed their ratification vote on the EDC until 1954, when it was defeated by a narrow margin in the Assembly. The contractual agreements (slightly modified in the Federal Republic's favor) did not enter into force until 1955, after a new European defense arrangement was concluded in the Autumn of 1954 and ratified the following Winter.

g) Preliminary Observations

We can make two rather obvious generalizations based on this study of Three Power policies toward the political and territorial disposition of Germany after the Second World War. First, French leaders clearly pursued a more punitive policy program than their British and American counterparts at every stage of negotiation. At first this took the form of calls for territorial amputation, a long occupation, and rigid security guarantees. Later on, the French called for considerably greater restrictions on the political authority of the Federal Republic than the Anglo-Americans wanted. Second, French leaders made many more appeals to the other two Western Powers that their hands were tied because of public opinion at home and that, as a result, they were unable to soften their stance toward Germany.

Neither of these observations should surprise us. After all, the French people had suffered at the hands of Germany to a far greater degree of magnitude than either Britain or the United States, and their geographic proximity to Germany made the security provisions of the settlement considerably more important for them than they were for the Anglo-Saxons. What is surprising, however, is that the British and, in particular, the Americans, who held all the political and economic trump cards, frequently made concessions to the French point of view. In addition, it is noteworthy that all three Governments faced situations where domestic public opinion advocated sterner policies than the foreign policy executives thought wise; yet, on these occasions, the Anglo-Saxon Governments exhibited greater independence from public preferences and their policies were affected by these preferences to a far lesser extent than were those of the French Government.

Table 4 lists the conflicts between public opinion and governmental preferences over the direction of policy toward Germany in the three countries during the period under study. We should observe from this table that even the Fourth Republic French government--identified as the least autonomous in this study--possessed some measure of independence which allowed Bidault to push through the unpopular London Accords and secured eventual, if reluctant, agreement to the Bonn contractuals. Although Bidault paid the political price for it, he still demonstrated that the Foreign Minister could get his way if he truly wanted to. Nonetheless, this observation should not obscure the larger point that the public impact on policy was infinitely greater in France than it was in Great Britain or the United States, where it played almost no role.

Table 5 demonstrates that the French attempted to use public opposition to its advantage in international negotiations far more frequently and more successfully than the United States and the United Kingdom. Two caveats should be made, though. First, reference to public opinion provided the French with only limited concessions in each case. Because of their weaker international political position, the French government had to concede most of de Gaulle's security proposals and substantial central political power for the Federal Republic. Even in the Saar conflict, where they achieved all that they asked for, we must acknowledge that the issue was comparatively unimportant to British and American leaders and, therefore, not a major concession. Nonetheless, the French did employ this tactic successfully, whereas the Americans were unsuccessful. Second, the post-war political and territorial settlement process with Germany does not provide many significant instances where British and American leaders appealed to their bargaining partners to make concessions to their public opinion. Thus we are unable to make judgments about the likelihood that such entreaties would have met with success, although it might indicate that the Anglo-Americans were less confident about their prospects for employing this tactic successfully.

B. GERMAN REARMAMENT, 1950-1954

Perhaps the most difficult decision undertaken by the Three Powers after the Second World War was to rearm the Federal Republic of Germany and allow their former enemy to contribute to the defense of Western Europe. Since German militarism had plunged the world into war twice in the first half of the century, it was widely agreed that post-war reconciliation must not include restoration of the German military. Indeed, the Allies agreed that world stability depended on keeping Germany permanently demilitarized. Even after Europe divided along Cold War lines, most in the West were unwilling to consider utilizing German the forces as a bulwark against the Soviet Union. The governments of the Three Powers, though, gave serious consideration to German rearmament starting in 1950, and after four years of arduous negotiations, reached agreement to include West German troops within NATO subject to voluntary restrictions.

As we shall see, the agreement was not easy to come by. From the outset, public opinion in each of the three democracies was hostile to German remilitarization and reacted negatively to early rumors that it was even being considered. Government policies, though, diverged sharply in the three countries beginning in 1950, when the issue claimed a prominent place on the Western political agenda. It is worthwhile to study these policy differences and the difficult international negotiations they engendered in order to examine the effect public opposition had on policy choices and bargaining outcomes in different domestic contexts.

More than any other aspect of the post-war settlement, the politics of the military settlement should shed light on the implications of democratic control over foreign security policy. Traditional realists would expect that when domestic public opinion opposed German rearmament, all three Governments would have been highly constrained and would have had difficulty pursuing such a policy even if they believed it to be essential for national security. Therefore, they would expect policy making in all three countries to have been a slow and tortuous affair until the public was converted to the Government's position. On the other hand, if my model of autonomy is correct, we should expect to see a great deal of independence by the governments--particularly in this most important of issues--of the United States and Great Britain, which we have identified a priori as having highly-autonomous foreign policy executives. We should also expect that in trilateral negotiations on Western defense, French leaders would be more successful at securing concessions to pacify its public and parliamentary attitudes than the Anglo-Americans.

Background:
At the Potsdam Conference, the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union agreed to demilitarize Germany and dismantle all industrial capability devoted to munitions production. The French, of course, having suffered three times in seventy years at the hands German militarism, were only too pleased to agree with these provisions. The Three Powers remained unequivocally committed to keeping Germany demilitarized until the 1948 Soviet challenge in Berlin drew the attention of Western military and political leaders to the uncomfortably large conventional force advantage that the Soviet Union enjoyed. Moreover, after the detonation of the first Russian atomic bomb in 1949, the West could no longer rely on American atomic weapons to deter a Soviet attack in Europe. Consequently, the military establishments of all three countries became convinced that Western European security might be impossible without, a German military contribution. ₁₃₄

In late 1949, amidst rampant press rumors that German rearmament was imminent, the three governments issued stiff denials. Nonetheless, spurred by Adenauer's demand of a security guarantee, his request for a federal police force and the onset of the Korean War, the issue burst onto the international agenda in 1950 and demanded the immediate attention of the three Western powers.

a) Before the Korean War: Initial Attitudes

Great Britain:
Beginning in 1948 and lasting throughout 1950, military circles--most not aably Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff--expressed their concerns to the Attlee Government that a continental defense effort could not succeed without a German defense contribution. ₁₃₅ The Soviet Union and its allies possessed an overwhelming numerical superiority, which the Allies could not counter with their token forces stationed throughout Germany. ₁₃₆ Moreover, due to a deteriorating financial situation, it was by no means clear that Great Britain would be able to maintain troop levels as they were. ₁₃₇ Opposition Leader Winston Churchill echoed this sentiment in a March 16, 1950 debate on the Government defense White Paper. The Conservative leader proposed a West German contribution toward the defense of Western Europe, arguing that the European front could not be defended without the active participation of the Federal Republic. In his opinion, such a move did not involve any serious risk, since if Britain and France were united, they were strong enough to keep Germany in check. ₁₃₈

The Labour Government responded with almost unanimous disapproval to Churchill's "irresponsible" speech. ₁₃₉ The Government maintained their opposition to any German defense contribution for two reasons. First, British public opinion overwhelmingly opposed German rearmament. In November 1949, for example, French Ambassador to London René Massigli observed that, in the popular press, only The Economist found favor with German rearmament and that the British public opposed this idea. ₁₄₀ Moreover, this public uneasiness was well-represented at the heart of the Labour party. ₁₄₁ Second, they did not want to alarm the French, who would not tolerate such a move. The Government feared that even considering the issue could interfere with Franco-German reconciliation and derail the process of associating Germany politically with the West. ₁₄₂

Nonetheless, key Labour leaders, particularly Bevin, personally viewed a German military contribution as both necessary and inevitable. As early as December 31, 1948, Bevin wrote to Sir Herbert Morrison, Lord President of the Privy Council and Bevin's eventual successor, that he favored a German contribution to Western defense once "the rearmament of the Western European Powers is so advanced that they can tolerate the prospect of a revival--even on a modest scale--of German defense forces." ₁₄₃ In May 1949, The British decided that they no longer favored a Four Power "Byrnes" Treaty to guarantee German demilitarization and disarmament for a period of 25 years, since it might "damage our prospects of incorporating Germany into the economic and political system we are constructing in Western Europe." ₁₄₄ Even at the March parliamentary defense debate, when the Government reiterated its opposition to German rearmament, Bevin choice of words indicated that he believed it was unfortunate that HMG could not initiate steps to associate the Federal Republic with Western European defense. ₁₄₅

At the May 8 Cabinet Meeting, the Foreign Secretary persuaded the Cabinet that the economic and political integration of Western Germany into Western Europe must ultimately lead to some measure of German rearmament within NATO. "This, however, was not a process which could be rushed; for it must not be forgotten that both France and Italy were genuinely apprehensive about a resurgence of German militarism." Bevin's recommendations carried the day as the Cabinet agreed that before long it would be necessary to consider how Germany could best contribute towards the defense of Western Europe..." ₁₄₆ The Labour Government's official opposition to German rearmament, then, was motivated by short-term political exigencies, rather than a long-term aversion to such a policy, which they actually believed to be desirable.

France:
Like their British counterparts, French military leaders realized before the French Government that Western defense would be difficult, if not impossible, without German participation. ₁₄₇ They believed that, even rearmed, "Germany no longer represented any danger, either immediately or in any foreseeable future." ₁₄₈ By the end of 1949, notable military figures such as Général Delattre de Tassigny began to express these views publicly. ₁₄₉ In 1950, they stepped up their pressure and conducted feasibility studies on their own initiative.

French foreign policymakers, however, refused even to consider the question. Even Foreign Minister Robert Schuman, the most "pro-German" of French politicians, drew the line at German rearmament. ₁₅₀ The official French position was that German armed forces would, as in the past, pose a serious threat to French security and were unnecessary as long as Allied troops continued to occupy Germany. The key to Western defense was, then, to persuade the United States to commit their troops to Europe on a permanent basis. Thus Aléxandre Parodi, Secretary-General of the Quai D'Orsay, insisted, "There cannot be a question of any solution of this sort for the French Government." To French policymakers, the whole problem could be avoided by building up Western forces in Germany and extending the Three Power security guarantee to the Federal Republic which Adenauer had requested. ₁₅₁

In 1949, French reluctance to discuss a German military contribution stemmed from two strategic concerns. First, they feared that the creation of German units would strengthen the hands of those in the United States and Great Britain who favored withdrawal from Europe due to the high costs of the Occupation. After all, if the Germans had their own armed forces, it would be more difficult to justify a continued presence on the Continent. The second worry was that German rearmament would lead to German independence from Allied control and perhaps reunification. An independent, reunified Germany would surely pose a greater threat to France than even the Soviet Union and might even align itself with the Russians; therefore, it had to be stopped at all costs. ₁₅₂

In 1950, as the Soviet menace became more alarming, the fear of Germany itself--at least among French leaders--took a back seat to the need to defend Europe from the USSR. Despite their residual distrust of Germany, some influential French diplomats, including Massigli, began to contemplate an eventual German military contribution to Western defense, albeit in the distant future, after the other European states had completely prepared their own defenses. ₁₅₃ Nonetheless, the French Government remained opposed to German rearmament because they feared that it would provoke the USSR ₁₅₄

Apart from these strategic considerations, the Government was troubled throughout by French public opinion, which was deadset against the idea of German rearmament and hostile toward Germany in general. ₁₅₅ Judging from the magnitude of the public outcry at early press reports that the Americans were considering a German military contribution, grassroots opposition was likely to be intense. Initial reactions in France caused such a stir that Henri Bonnet, the French Ambassador to Washington, lamented that some elements of the American Press were unaware that "even a partial rearmament of Germany would frighten the French people to the point of compromising the efforts at Franco-German collaboration currently being tried in other areas." ₁₅₆ In fact, the reports in November 1949 created a parliamentary crisis for the French Government, which, in a bid for survival, initiated a vote of confidence on November 26 categorically denying the possibility of German rearmament. Consequently, as Sir Ivone Kirkpatrick surmised, "(i)n the present climate of opinion in France no French Government can agree to any proposal involving the rearmament of Germany," since the magnitude of public opposition could easily threaten the survival of the fragile governing coalition. ₁₅₇

The United States:
After the Soviet Union successfully exploded their first atomic weapon in 1949, American political and military leaders scrambled to re-evaluate and redress Western security efforts. NSC-68, the definitive statement of the new strategic thinking by the NSC, concluded that, given the current state of Western unreadiness, if war were to occur in 1950, the Soviet Union would be able "to overrun Western Europe, with the possible exceptions of the Iberian and Scandinavian Peninsulas." Clearly, steps had to be taken for the United States and its allies to bolster Western European defense in order to resist a Soviet attack. ₁₅₈ The Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, therefore, "were firmly of the opinion that, from the military point of view, the appropriate and early rearming of Western Germany is of fundamental importance to the defense of Western Europe against the USSR." Their recommendation, presented to the President in NSC-71, was that the Administration put pressure on the Western Europeans, and in particular the French, to accept the urgent need for a German military contribution. ₁₅₉

The State Department, on the other hand, believed that German rearmament was premature and dangerous. In a June 16 memo to the President, Acheson advised that NSC-71 was "decidedly militaristic and in my opinion not realistic with present conditions." He believed that Germany was not well enough integrated into the Western political orbit yet and that Western opinion had not advanced to the point that it would accept a German military. Until the Korean War, Truman was inclined to agree, indicating in his hand-written comments that the DoD report was "wrong as can be." ₁₆₀ Consequently, American policy pronouncements prior to the Korean War steadfastly denied that German rearmament was even being considered. ₁₆₁

b) The Impact of Korea:

The invasion of South Korea by North Korean forces on June 25, 1950 dramatically altered the stakes in the German rearmament debate. It demonstrated to the West that the Soviet Union, its allies, and its proxies were not averse to using force to achieve their objectives and were liable to exploit Western weakness wherever it was manifest. Consequently, in the aftermath of the invasion, British and American advocates of rearming the Germans were able to sway government policy and bring the issue to the forefront of the Allied agenda.

The United States:
Events in Korea did not initially change Acheson's assessment of the European situation. In a June 30 Memorandum for the President, the Secretary of State contended that it was still "premature" to consider German rearmament. In the first place, such a move would have a dreadful effect on public opinion both at home and abroad. ₁₆₂ Indeed, public opinion polls conducted in the United States in May and June indicated that a majority of decided voters opposed rebuilding German military strength as protection against Russia, although a majority favored associating the Federal Republic with the North Atlantic Treaty. ₁₆₃ As well, Acheson thought it unwise to allow the Federal Republic a military program before democratic values and traditions were firmly entrenched there. Thus, he concluded, "(r)estoration of a German army. however small, would greatly discourage the democratic elements in Germany, would add little real strength to the West, would in fact divide the West, and would constitute a potential menace in the present incomplete state of the development of our policy of firmly attaching Germany to the West." ₁₆₄

The President, though, had changed his mind as a result of the North Korean attack. At the July 6th meeting of the NSC, despite his grave reservations, Truman acknowledged the need to begin serious consideration of German rearmament and authorized the State and Defense Departments to begin joint planning for this event. Because of the adverse effect this would have on public opinion both at home and abroad, he insisted that nothing be said publicly to this effect and NSC members should not admit that the subject was even under consideration. ₁₆₅ When the Council discussed the matter again at the end of August, Truman agreed "that some means should be found to utilize West German forces" provided that they avoided "anything which would permit a revival of German militarism." ₁₆₆

By this point, American decision-makers no longer had to concern themselves with American public opinion on the matter, since American voters had been converted to the cause of German rearmament by events in Korea, newspaper editorials and endorsements by respected public officials, such as General Bradley and McCloy. ₁₆₇ Whereas in June the majority of votes had opposed such a move, a National Opinion Research Center poll released in late July indicated that the tide had turned. ₁₆₈ By the middle of August, a Gallup poll revealed that 82% of Americans with opinions favored creating an army in the Federal Republic to match that established by the Soviet Union in East Germany. ₁₆₉ In fact, from the July poll on, the American public consistently favored a German contribution to Western defense throughout the period under study. ₁₇₀

Having resolved to redress the European military imbalance by rearming the Federal Republic of Germany, the Americans set for themselves the task of securing British and French support.

Great Britain:
The Korean War had an important but subtler impact on official British policy toward German rearmament. While HMG remained officially opposed to a German military force, ₁₇₁ it began to soften its position noticeably. To begin with, the British started to talk freely to their allies behind closed doors about German rearmament as a desirable goal, provided it was preceded by a build-up of French defenses. They simultaneously launched an initiative to establish a large federal German border police of 100,000 volunteers and an expanded Frontier Police Force to meet the threat posed by the Bereitschaften. In addition they followed the American lead and began organizing and arming a German labor police in their zone. ₁₇₂

By late August, amidst press reports that Bevin intended to raise the subject at the upcoming Three Foreign Ministers Meeting in New York, the British stepped up their pressure for a German military contribution. At an August 24th meeting of the AHC, Kirkpatrick argued that augmenting the Land police was not sufficient to repel an attack by the Volkpolizei. Instead, the Allied occupation forces would need to be reinforced by 100,000 German troops, armed by, and under the control of, an Allied command. ₁₇₃

France:
French policy also evolved after the outbreak of the Korean War, especially after the British and Americans applied intense pressure upon the French to accept German military units. To avoid a domestic political disaster, though, French policy statements were largely unaffected and continued to oppose German rearmament, which the Government maintained was unnecessary. ₁₇₄ Nevertheless, an important shift can be detected in the Quai D'Orsay's attitude which foreshadowed more significant policy changes in the months ahead. Rather than resisting German rearmament under any circumstance, as they had in the past, French public statements and private correspondence declared that it must not occur until France and other Western European countries were able to complete their own rearmament programs. ₁₇₅

The Anglo-American decision in early August to establish a Labour Police caused the Quai D'Orsay to fear that its allies would rearm Germany in an underhanded way and present France with a fait accompli. In order to prevent such a catastrophe, and because French leaders recognized that Russia represented a more immediate threat than defeated Germany, they altered their stance considerably. Instead of continuing to resist the very idea of a German defense contribution--which France was powerless to prevent and which would, in any event serve French interests if handled properly--Schuman would now agree to begin negotiations for German rearmament in order to control and delay the process. ₁₇₆ Therefore, the official French bargaining position was softened. The Foreign Ministry instructed their Ambassadors to argue that it was still too early to consider a German army--presumably because of the state of French forces and public opinion--but it was acceptable for the Germans to contribute to their own defense in the form of a reorganized and reinforced police, which should be equipped with defensive weapons and be permitted to exceed the 10,000 men initially envisaged. ₁₇₇

These modified goals were still at odds with the anti-German tide of French public opinion. ₁₇₈ In order to overcome this problem, French leaders needed to make it appear that any concessions they made to German rearmament were initiated by the Anglo-Saxons and forced on the French Government over its staunch objections. Thus, the Quai D'Orsay continued to oppose publicly any notion of German rearmament up until October, while secretly hinting to the Americans that the French position could change during negotiations. The State Department Weekly Review reported at the end of August:

The French Foreign Office has informed Embassy Paris that a recent French statement to the effect that the French remained opposed to German rearmament and to the abrogation of limitations on certain German industries was merely a 'routine' statement in response to press queries and was not intended to prejudice London Study Group consideration of the Prohibited and Limited Industries' Agreement. The Foreign Office spokesman added, however, that the French position on the subject at the Study Group meeting will be 'tough'. ₁₇₉

Thus, the French traveled to the September Foreign Ministers Meeting in New York much less reluctant to rearm Germany than they wanted their public to be aware.

c) The Fall 1950 Foreign Ministers Meeting, the Pleven Plan and the Spofford Compromise

The Americans hosted the September meetings in New York with the intention of securing Anglo-French acceptance of German participation in Western defense. Discussion of this issue opened with Acheson presenting the Pentagon's "one package" proposal, making American agreement to increment troop levels and provide a unified Allied Command contingent upon German rearmament. The Pentagon insisted on this linkage since they did not want to commit US troops to a mission that did not have reasonable prospects for success, and they believed European defense could not succeed without German divisions. To make the pill a little less bitter for the French to swallow, Acheson required only agreement in principle on the inclusion of German military units, which could take place after a sufficient delay to allow the French to build up their own forces first. ₁₈₀

The one package proposal caught the Europeans completely off guard. ₁₈₁ Bevin and Schuman were not made aware in advance that the American military commitments in Europe hinged on European acceptance of German units. Despite his surprise, Bevin was convinced by the logic of the American position and he persuaded his Government to endorse the plan, at least in principle, despite strong opposition within the Cabinet. ₁₈₂ This was a bold move for the Government, since British public opinion still opposed German rearmament. ₁₈₃

Schuman was also surprised, but he demonstrated that the French Government understood the necessity of a German defense contribution. His initial response was that he would be willing to agree in principle to German rearmament, provided that the whole affair be kept secret. ₁₈₄ Acheson, however, would not hear of a secret agreement on the matter. Schuman's subsequent strategy was to restate the tremendous risks involved in rearming the Germans, and then to suggest other ways in which the Germans could assist Western defense until the other Western Europeans had rebuilt their forces sufficiently to reduce the dangers of a German military contribution. France would countenance a limited federal German police force, increased industrial production--although not of munitions--to serve needs of Western defense, employment of German labor battalions to build a defensive line, and even utilization of German volunteers by the Allied Armies of Occupation. ₁₈₅ He eventually conceded the necessity of a German contribution, but argued that the French Government could not agree to a declaration accepting the principle of German rearmament because of public hostility to the idea. Moreover, he insisted on a delay until all Western European powers armed first and required integration of the smallest units possible, rather than at the divisional level. ₁₈₆ This "filibuster" effectively prevented Three Power agreement on the matter and bought time until the French Government countered the American proposal with the Pleven Plan at the end of October.

The Pleven Plan called for France, Italy and the Benelux countries to retain their own national armed forces, but place divisions under the control of a separate North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) force at the discretion of a European Defense Minister. A German contribution at the battalion level would also be placed under the command of the NAT force/European army, although the Germans would not be allowed to retain any national troops outside the European Army. ₁₈₇ This and the fact that the plan stipulated German acceptance of the Schuman Plan as a precondition made the plan unpopular with the Germans, the British and the Americans, since it relegated the Federal Republic to an obviously inferior status. The plan was a success in the French Assembly, however, where it helped the Government win a critical vote of confidence at the end of October. In effect, this was "a vote against the rearmament of Germany rather than for the European Army." ₁₈₈

The British received the Pleven Plan for a European Army under a European defense minister coolly because of the supranational character and the appearance of discrimination against Germany. ₁₈₉ The Americans also disapproved of the Pleven Plan because it discriminated too openly against Germany. ₁₉₀ Moreover, they viewed it as an attempt by the French to postpone the issue by deliberately advancing a plan that was militarily unviable and acceptable to no-one. They could not reject the plan outright, however, to prevent the French Government from collapsing; therefore, they applauded the French initiative and suggested the plan merited study.

In the meantime, the State Department authorized Charles Spofford to proceed to the Brussels Conference in December with a compromise plan. Given the urgent need to rearm Germany in a timely manner, Spofford proposed that the Three Powers agree immediately to allow German Regimental Combat Teams (RCTs) of 5,000 to 6,000 men fight alongside Allied divisions and under the authority of the Allied High Command while the Three Powers continued to study the Pleven plan. ₁₉₁ Acheson also persuaded the Pentagon to drop the "one package" position and grant a US military commander and a commitment of 6 divisions even before a definitive agreement on German participation was reached.

Events in Korea and Germany, however, conspired against the Spofford compromise. By December 1950, the war in Korea had started to go badly for the United States, the Russians warned against rearming Germany in violation of the Potsdam agreement, and the German public rejected a military program. As a result, the British began to lose their nerve, fearing that they were "in a very much weaker position to run such risks as might be involved in embarking upon the process of rearming Germany." ₁₉₂ Under these circumstances, HMG approved the Spofford compromise in principle, but cautioned that, since a Four Power meeting was ultimately necessary to determine the future of Germany, it was unwise to be too hasty about reaching a definitive settlement of the question of German defense. ₁₉₃

The French were able to accept the Spofford compromise, for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, the Germans themselves, under fire from Protestant leaders, rejected the idea of rearmament and Adenauer informed the French Government in advance that the Germans could never accept the plan since it would never allow the Federal Republic the equality of rights that it demanded; ₁₉₄ therefore, there was no danger that the Brussels agreement would lead to any German military units in the foreseeable future. ₁₉₅ Finally, the plan itself was less repugnant to the French than other American and British proposals since it accepted the principle of the European Army and envisioned the integration of German units at well below the divisional level. The compromise was doomed from the start by virtue of Adenauer's disapproval, however, leaving the German rearmament question very much in limbo as 1950 drew to a close.

d) The Road to the EDC Treaty, January 1951- May 1952

American strategists hoped that the Spofford compromise would pave the way for simultaneous progress on three fronts: the rapid incorporation of interim German troops; the establishment of a European Army plan that would both be practicable and satisfy German demands for equality; and the drafting of a contractual agreement with Germany. ₁₉₆ Their aspirations were stymied, however, as a variety of factors conspired to slow down the pace of events.

The first sign of trouble for the Americans was the deadlock in the Petersberg talks in Bonn on the mechanics of a German military contribution, where the Germans categorically rejected the Spofford compromise as unworkable and highly discriminatory. The primary German objections were that, from a military point of view, the RCT would be far less effective than the division, that German units should be entitled to heavy armor, and, above all, that the Spofford Plan did not place the Federal Republic on equal footing with the other participants. The French representatives did not have governmental authority to agree to a revised proposal. Consequently, no agreement was reached. ₁₉₇

Meanwhile, the European Army talks in Paris did not initially fare any better. Led by Hervé Alphand, the French delegation used these talks as a means to delay the incorporation of German forces until a political mechanism for European rearmament could be developed that would bind Germany completely within a supranational framework to safeguard against German militarism. To this end, the French proposed a two-phase plan for the construction of the European Army. The first phase--which would last approximately 18 months after agreement would be reached and ratified--was devoted to creating the political institutions, rules and regulations to govern the combined force that would be brought into being in the second phase. During the first phase, the sovereign states (i.e., all participants except the Federal Republic) would prepare the forces to be devoted to the European Army. In the second phase, the combined forces would be assembled and placed under the disposition of SHAPE (Supreme Headquarters, Allied Powers, Europe) and administered by a European Defense Commissioner. ₁₉₈ Needless to say, the Germans found the French plan unacceptable, since it would discriminate openly against them in the initial phase.

Despite a serious effort by Alphand to make progress in the Paris negotiations, French public opinion conspired against a rapid resolution of even the principles that would underlie a European defense force. Since an election was scheduled for June 17, 1951, the Government would not negotiate on the critical questions of the size of the European Army's basic unit and level of military integration until after that date--even though Schuman himself was "wholly receptive to a militarily workable unit rather than a politically palatable one" ₁₉₉ --lest they be compelled to compromise and face defeat at the polls. Moreover, the Government felt that they could not reach any final agreement on German rearmament until after a four power Conference of Foreign Ministers (CFM). They feared public outrage if the West proceeded with German rearmament while it was still possible to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union on a final settlement which would leave all of Germany demilitarized. At the same time, Paris rejected interim utilization of German contingents on the grounds that a provisional solution would impede the construction of a European Army with adequate safeguards. ₂₀₀

Frustrated by these developments, the Americans could not count on British support to help them overcome French and German intransigence. The Labour Government was frightened of provoking a Soviet response and, therefore, was content to let negotiations founder in Paris over what they believed was an unworkable plan for a European Army. To complicate matters further, Attlee's February 12, 1951 address to the House of Commons imposed conditions which had to be met before German armed forces could be raised, including priority for general Allied rearmament, German public approval of the rearmament plan and satisfactory safeguards against German militarism, which would take time to devise. ₂₀₁ In other words, his Government effectively wished to postpone any rearmament of Germany for a period of years. Delay would serve HMG well both internationally and domestically. Internationally, it reduced the short-term threat to the Soviet Union posed by German rearmament, while keeping the issue alive so it could be used as a bargaining chip in Four Power negotiations. Domestically, where the Government's eager support for the American initiative of the previous autumn had created "an unholy muddle," the new expression of caution would help to mollify the large and vocal opposition to German rearmament in the Cabinet, the Labour benches and the public at large. ₂₀₂ Indeed, at the February 8 Cabinet meeting that preceded Attlee's address, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Kenneth Younger reminded the Cabinet "that there were large sections of responsible public opinion in this country which had never favored the rearmament of Germany." Therefore, "there would be great political advantage in delaying the application of this principle as long as possible." ₂₀₃

The delays that resulted from French obstruction, German ambition and British apathy frustrated the Americans to no end. Nonetheless, Acheson resisted the temptation to pressure the French Government to proceed with an interim defense plan similar to those suggested by the Germans at Bonn, which he and American military officials felt were quite reasonable. ₂₀₄ By the same token, he was unwilling to coerce the Germans to accept French terms, since the Truman administration as a whole lacked confidence in the European Army formula. By the autumn of 1951, however, three notable American officials--McCloy, Ambassador to France David Bruce, and SACEUR Dwight Eisenhower were converted to the EDC idea and generated enthusiasm for it back in Washington. ₂₀₅ As a result, the US embarked upon an arm-twisting campaign that helped to overcome French and German obstruction to a workable EDC.

Two important events in June 1951 helped the US to overcome French intransigence: the French election of June 17 and the collapse of the palais Rose meeting of Four Power deputies without reconvening the CFM. After the French elections, Pleven formed a Government of the right, excluding Socialists--and, importantly, the anti-EDC Moch--from the Cabinet for the first time ever in the Fourth Republic. Without fear of immediate electoral reprisal, this new Government made several noteworthy concessions to the German position at the European Army conference. In particular, the new French Government agreed to let SHAPE recommend the size of the basic unit and subsequently accepted the armored groupement consisting of 12,000-13,000 men. ₂₀₆ Nonetheless, fear of German resurgence led the Pleven Government to hold firm on several points. First, it would not countenance German entry into NATO for fear that NATO membership would grant the Germans a truly national army within an alliance that could be dragged into offensive operations to regain its eastern provinces. ₂₀₇ Second, Great Britain had to associate itself with the EDC in order to guarantee that Germany could not escape the constraints of the European Army. Finally, the French Government required adequate safeguards against German militarism, including restrictions on German weapons production and a guarantee against German secession from the European Army. ₂₀₈

The British Government also became more committed to the European Army plan following the palais Rose debacle of June 1951. Since there was obviously little chance of reaching an accommodation with the Russians, the German rearmament issue would ultimately have to be tackled. Attlee and his new Foreign Secretary, Morrison, became convinced that a European Defense Community under NATO command offered several advantages. It could provide adequate safeguards against the German militarism and thereby pacify those in Britain and the Cabinet who feared a resurgent Germany. It was the only method by which France would countenance a German contribution to Western defense. Most importantly, it would take time to iron out the details of the organization. Consequently, the Federal Republic would continue to bear the costs of the British Occupation forces. ₂₀₉ The British would not, however, consider joining the EDC themselves, since the supranational character of the organization would jeopardize British independence, her ties to the Commonwealth, and, above all, her special relationship with the United States. In order to encourage progress toward a continental army, though, Morrison declared in September that "The Government of the United Kingdom desires to establish the closest possible association with the European continental community at all stages of its development." ₂₁₀

In this new atmosphere of Anglo-American support for the EDC, the French and Germans patched up most of their differences and agreed on the essential elements of the European Army and its relation to NATO. Still, two important areas of Franco-German disagreement remained. The first was over German entry into NATO, upon which Adenauer insisted. ₂₁₁ Schuman argued that the French public would not allow German entry in NATO since that would place German military forces on equal footing with the other NATO members and could allow them to withdraw from Western defense arrangements at a later date. He warned Acheson and Eden:

It is clear that if the entrance of Ger[many] into NATO were envisaged, the creation of the EDC and the sacrifices involved therein for several countries w[ou]ld be much less easily accepted by public opinion and by Parliamentary opinion. You are familiar with the feeling of the French Parliament as resolutely hostile to the accession of Germany to the NAT. There are no grounds for believing that this attitude may be changed in the foreseeable future. ₂₁₂

The two countries also disagreed on the nature of the safeguards against German militarism and the proper form for them to take. The French were adamant that the Federal Republic could not be permitted to produce propellants, large gun barrels and civil aircraft, in addition to the generally agreed list of ABC weapons, long-range and guided missiles, military aircraft and naval vessels aside from minor coastal defense craft. Moreover, Schuman insisted that these security controls could not be satisfied within the EDC framework; they had to be made the subject of an additional contractual agreement between the Three Powers and Germany. ₂₁₃ Anxious to avoid open appearances of discrimination against Germany, Adenauer preferred to maintain security restrictions informally by placing national production for all EDC members at the discretion of the EDC Commissioner. ₂₁₄ These disputes were resolved at the Foreign Ministers meetings in London in mid-February, when Acheson and Eden encouraged Adenauer to unilaterally restrict some categories of defense-related production to satisfy French public opinion. Consequently, Schuman agreed to accept a unilateral German declaration to the EDC powers, the United States and Great Britain, stating that the Government of the Federal Republic would not consider it discriminatory if the EDC Commissioners were to refrain from allocating production of these materials in Germany on the grounds of its "strategically forward" location. ₂₁₅

The crucial test for the French EDC policy came in mid-February 1952 when the National Assembly voted on the EDC plan. The vigorous, heated debate in the legislature illustrated the extent of opposition to the European Army and fear of German rearmament in any form. Alphand aptly characterized the debate as "horrible" and indicative of the magnitude of French bitterness and animosity toward their former enemy. ₂₁₆ The Assembly approved the plan by a majority of 40 votes (327 to 287), but they attached no fewer than 14 conditions which had to be met before the Government could proceed. Most notably, they required: an Anglo-American guarantee in case Germany violated the terms of the treaty; active British participation in the EDC; an agreement that no EDC member (especially not the Germans) could possess more armed forces in Europe than the French; Germany must never be allowed a German national army or general staff and must not be admitted into NATO. ₂₁₇

The very large minority who voted against the plan included many members of the Socialist Party and the Government "pro-EDC" parties (Radical, and MRP), reflecting the widespread feeling among the French public that one final attempt should be made to reach an accord with the Soviet Union on a neutralized, demilitarized Germany. That is not to imply that the French public and their representatives brooked illusions about Soviet intentions; they simply feared Germany more. ₂₁₈

In the event, the Government proceeded with EDC negotiations and secured many of the revisions requested by the Assembly, including a declaration by Eden that he would sign a mutual assistance treaty between the UK and the EDC. ₂₁₉ The only real concession the French had to make to the Germans on the military side was to convene joint NATO-EDC meetings so that the Federal Republic could attend NATO meetings and not suffer overt discrimination. The European Defense Community treaty of May 27, 1952, therefore, represented a victory for French policy.

e) The Treaty Unravels, May 1952-August 1954

The public and political response to the EDC treaty in France was strong and negative. Before the ink could dry on the treaty, attacks began from all ends of the political spectrum. Within weeks of its signature, General De Gaulle, President Auriol, Radical leader Edouard Herriot, and, paradoxically, a host of Gaullists and Communists condemned the treaty. ₂₂₀ To complicate matters further, French public opinion welcomed the Soviet note on Germany in the Spring of 1952 as an avenue to explore before committing irrevocably to German rearmament. ₂₂₁ In that inhospitable climate, Premier Pinay and Schuman sought to delay the ratification vote in the vain hope of extracting concessions, such as British association with the EDC and an American guarantee against German secession to make the deal more palatable for the French public. ₂₂₂

In January 1953, prospects for ratification took a decided turn for the worse as Antoine Pinay's short-lived Government was defeated by the Assembly and René Mayer formed a new Cabinet with the support of the Gaullists. Mayer was a staunch partisan of the treaty, but had to maneuver carefully within the constraints of his coalition. ₂₂₃ Disliking the EDC's supranational constraints, the Gaullists demanded that the treaty be loosened to allow France the right to withdraw whatever forces they wished to withdraw from the European forces without asking for permission from other signatories. Furthermore, Mayer insisted on modifications to the EDC Treaty that would confer the same status on French forces in Germany that the British and American forces enjoyed and ensure that the weighted voting EDC scheme would ensure Franco-German equality. ₂₂₄ He also tried to link support for the EDC to greater US support for the crumbling French position in Indochina and continued to request British association with the EDC. ₂₂₅ All of these amendments were justified on the grounds of making the treaty acceptable to French public and parliamentary opinion in order to secure National Assembly approval of the treaty. Even more damaging was the Gaullist requirement that the intractable Franco-German dispute over the Saar be resolved as a precondition of ratification. The Gaullists were effectively and self-consciously delaying both the EDC and the Bonn contractuals indefinitely. _{2 href="#note221">221} In that inhospitable climate, Premier26 When Joseph Laniel formed yet another French Cabinet in June 1953, he adhered to Mayer's conditions. ₂₂₇

Eisenhower, the new American President, and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles feared that accepting the French amendments would not hasten French ratification, but would only embolden the French to ask for more changes. They warned the French, therefore, that the "EDC [is] so important in American eyes that [the] American people would not support aid to France if they were given [the] impression that France [was] resorting to dilatory tactics in order to postpone ratification [of] this vital document." ₂₂₈ The threat went unheeded, however, as Mayer, Laniel and Foreign Minister de novo Bidault--who had personally suffered in 1948 for pushing an unpopular agreement through the Assembly due to American pressure--feared their own public response to an unpopular treaty more than American impatience. As a result, the United States reluctantly urged the other five EDC signatories to accept many of the French supplementary protocols. ₂₂₉

The French also succeeded in bringing Great Britain into a closer association with the EDC. In order to ease French parliamentary difficulties, the British expressed their willingness to consult with EDC members before altering their European forces and offered to propose a thirty year extension of the North Atlantic Treaty to make it coterminous with the EDC. ₂₃₀ In addition, the British Cabinet agreed to technical military collaboration between the British military establishment and the EDC powers and a limited British mission to the EDC Commissariat. ₂₃₁ Although these commitments still fell short of the full British commitment to the EDC treaty that the French desired, they represented a significant victory for French diplomacy. They were insufficient, however, to sway the tide of French parliamentary opinion and pave the way to the treaty's ratification.

Ironically, by the time the French became completely disenchanted with the EDC, the Americans had been so thoroughly converted to the European Army plan that they would not hear of a NATO solution. ₂₃₂ Instead, they used all the diplomatic leverage they could muster through a variety of channels to coerce the French and influence both the timing and the outcome of their ratification vote. In the Spring of 1954, this pressure took many forms. On one plane, the French were informed that the American people were dissatisfied with stalled progress toward a European Army and would not permit their leaders to delay much longer. If the EDC were not ratified in a timely manner, the United States would insist on enacting the equivalent of the Bonn Contractuals as soon as possible and would consider other arrangements for admitting Germany into the defense of Europe without French participation. ₂₃₃

On June 18, 1954, the Assembly made Pierre Mendès-France both Premier and Foreign Minister. Unlike his predecessors in both posts, Mendès-France did not commit himself unequivocally and publicly to the EDC. He informed the Americans that he favored European unity, but did not believe that EDC should be passed by a small majority over a large, embittered minority. Instead, he wished to ask all involved to make compromises in order to reach a satisfactory agreement. He pleaded with Dulles that he needed more than a small majority in the French parliament because the Council of the Republic would surely oppose EDC and he needed 314 votes in the Assembly to override the Council of the Republic. ₂₃₄ Every indication, however, was that the new Premier actually preferred a NATO solution over the EDC, since the former would include American and British power as a counterbalance to the Germans, whereas the latter framework left France alone with Germany. ₂₃₅

Faced with a more reticent French leader, American pressure became more intense. At the end of the month, Churchill and Eden visited Washington for a conference with Eisenhower to which the French were deliberately not invited so that they would conclude that their reticence was leading to isolation. At this meeting, Eisenhower convinced a reluctant Churchill to use all his diplomatic clout to influence Mendes-France to ratify the treaty. ₂₃₆ In Paris, Ambassador Dillon added to the American barrage by charging in Paris that the French had only one unpleasant alternative to the EDC. "Shall the inevitable rearmament of Germany be a controlled rearmament within a European Defense Community," he asked, "or shall there be recreated once again an independent German National Army?" ₂₃₇ At the end of July, Dulles engineered a Senate declaration calling upon Eisenhower to take direct action to grant the Federal Republic sovereignty unless France ratified EDC Treaty in a timely manner. ₂₃₈ The Senate had already cut off all aid to France and Italy until they ratified the EDC treaty under the terms of the Richards Amendment of July 1953. ₂₃₉

Dulles' trump card was his frequent intimation that a failure to carry the EDC through the French Assembly would lead US policymakers to engage in an "agonizing appraisal" of American foreign policy. ₂₄₀ By this, he implied that the Pentagon did not believe Western European defense was feasible without a German contribution. Therefore, if it could not be secured with French approval, two options remained: 1) German rearmament without French participation; and 2) a retreat to a peripheral strategy, effectively abandoning all of Europe, save Great Britain, as indefensible. ₂₄₁ The overt threat of strategic realignment had a negative effect in France on both opponents and partisans of the treaty and French leaders, themselves, were probably not gullible enough to accept so outrageous and unlikely a proposition as American abandonment of Europe to the USSR ₂₄₂

Despite this intense Anglo-American pressure, Mendès-France continued to bide his time. Like his predecessors, he wanted to delay a ratification vote because the French public never truly accepted that the dangers of German rearmament could be contained. ₂₄₃ In such a hostile and turbulent domestic environment, the prospects for ratification were slim. Seeing that the curtain was about to fall, Mendès-France attempted to secure eleventh hour concessions to sweeten the deal for France, including a shorter treaty duration, the right to rescind the treaty if the United States or Great Britain were to withdraw their troops from Europe, the requirement of a unanimous vote on all matters not explicitly decided by the text of the treaty, and integration of only those troops in the forward zone--thereby freeing all French troops outside of Germany. ₂₄₄ The other western leaders, however, had grown weary of French dickering and under intense Anglo-American pressure, the Premier could no longer delay the inevitable; the National Assembly defeated the EDC treaty by a sound margin (264 votes for, 319 against) in a ratification vote on August 30, 1954. The most powerful opponents of the treaty all expressed distrust of German power and deemed it irresponsible to rearm the nation that had "invaded us in 1792, in 1814, in 1815, in 1870, in 1914, and in 1940." ₂₄₅

f) The NATO Solution, September-October 1954

The French rejection of the EDC sparked a flurry of international negotiations as Dulles and Eden sought desperately to find a means of rearming the Germans to which the French could agree quickly. The British and Germans clearly preferred German entry into NATO. Dulles initially groused that Congress and the American public required a supranational framework, but he had to accept the fact that a revival of the EDC was not possible. ₂₄₆ In order to compel Mendès-France to find another acceptable formula for German rearmament, Dulles employed the same tactics he had earlier used to force a ratification vote, threatening American disengagement from Europe, cutting off all Mutual Defense Assistance Program aid to France, avoiding France on tour of European capitals, and publicly empathizing with German frustration. ₂₄₇ Eden, meanwhile, took the initiative in calling a Nine Power conference (the six EDC countries plus Great Britain, the United States and Canada) in London at the end of September to consider his own plan for German entry into NATO within the European framework of the Brussels Treaty Organization.

The agreement finally reached at the London conference brought Italy and the Federal Republic into the Western European Union (WEU) under the Brussels Treaty. This treaty was revised to include additional safeguards against a rebirth of German militarism. Adenauer issued a unilateral guarantee renouncing the Federal Republic's right to produce ABC weapons, guided missiles, heavy warships, long-range artillery and strategic bombers on German soil. In addition, the military forces of the WEU were put directly under the authority of SACEUR, whose powers were enhanced to control the integration, deployment, supply and inspection of the European contributions to NATO in order to "make it impossible for any single member nation to use its armed forces in Europe for nationalistic adventures." ₂₄₈ Finally, to allay French fears, Eden pledged not to remove British forces from the Continent without the approval of a majority of Brussels Treaty signatories, and Dulles promised to recommend that Eisenhower extend the same guarantees to Europe as he had under the EDC framework. ₂₄₉ It is ironic that after all the Anglo-American pressure on France to accept the EDC, the French realized all of their ambitions: meaningful British participation in the European defense institution, an American commitment to maintain its troops in Europe, national control of the French military, and adequate safeguards against German militarism. Rather than alienating their two more powerful allies, French leaders were able to exploit their domestic opposition masterfully to extract all the concessions they required from the Anglo-Saxons.

The agreements reached in London were signed in Paris in the middle of October, but faced another crisis when the French Assembly rejected German entry into the Brussels Treaty and NATO in a Christmas Eve ratification vote by a margin of 280 to 258. It required Anglo-American threats that there would be no renegotiation of these accords and a vote of confidence in the Assembly on December 29 to reverse the initial vote by a narrow margin (287 to 260) and put the matter of German rearmament to rest at long last. ₂₅₀ Despite the safeguards and the Anglo-American commitments under the new arrangements, the French public felt betrayed by the vote, which they interpreted as a sell-out to international pressure and German power. The final footnote to the whole affair was Mendès-France's dismissal in February 1955, in no small part for his sponsorship of the "new Wehrmacht". ₂₅₁

g) Preliminary Observations

The politics of German remilitarization after the Second World War reveals much about the impact of public opinion on policy in the Britain, France, and the United States. On this particularly sensitive issue, the political leadership in all three countries proceeded cautiously until the summer of 1950, despite the fact that their military establishments believed that Western defense would founder without a German military contribution and despite Bevin's and Acheson's clear preference for eventual German rearmament. They were cautious in deference to Western public opinion, which was understandably concerned about a renaissance of German militarism. We can conclude, therefore, even the most autonomous democratic executive must concern itself with public opinion and tread carefully rather than risk public outrage. Nonetheless, when the stakes of the German rearmament debate escalated as a result of the Korean War, Bevin and Acheson were able to adapt their policies rapidly in spite of public attitudes. French policy conversion, on the other hand, was a tortuously slow and uneven process because French leaders dared not provoke public opinion or upset their delicate parliamentary balance. Table 6 illustrates clearly the comparative ease with which British and American leaders ignored public opinion when they deemed it necessary to do so, as well as the immense difficulties had coping with French public opinion.

This case study confirms, therefore, that the French executive, which we had determined a priori to be considerably less autonomous than Great Britain and the United States in the realm of foreign security policy, was indeed more constrained by public opinion when it disagreed with Government policy. At the same time, this case teaches us important lessons about negotiations between democratic states. Many will no doubt find it surprising that bargaining outcomes were not primarily determined by the relative power of the states involved, even on such important security matters as German rearmament and Western defense. Indeed, overwhelming American power and pressure was insufficient to secure either an early French ratification vote or, ultimately, French parliamentary approval of the EDC. On the other hand, the French were effectively able to obtain a variety of concessions from the British, French and Germans, as well as the other EDC countries, because of their domestic difficulties. Table 7 illustrates this disjuncture between French success and American failure to induce concessions by highlighting domestic political difficulties.

V. Conclusion

Our examination of the post-war political/territorial settlement with Germany from 1945-1952 and the politics of German rearmament from 1950-1954, therefore, supports both of our alternate hypotheses about the impact of the domestic decision making environment on democratic foreign security policies. In each case, the French foreign policy executive, who were identified a priori to be less autonomous than their British and American counterparts, found it considerably more difficult than the Anglo-Americans to pursue a conciliatory policy when public opinion favored harsher policies. By the same token the French were much more successful than the Americans when they sought to win concessions from their bargaining partners by referring to their domestic constraints and they employed this tactic considerably more than either the American or British Governments. It follows, then, that the impact of public opinion on the foreign security policies of democratic states is not comparable across democracies, as traditional theorists assumed. Instead, it varies across democracies, depending on the degree of autonomy afforded by their domestic decision making environments.

Two potential objections should be considered. First, we might wonder whether French reluctance to reintegrate Germany into international affairs could be a function of French geographical proximity to Germany. Certainly, Germany posed a greater menace to France than it did to either Great Britain or France, both of which were geographically removed from German power. A geographical explanation is problematic, however, because of a post-war Soviet threat that was a more formidable and more immediate concern than German militarism. As French leaders were aware after 1947, the exposed French position on the continent made them more dependent on a stable Western Germany and, ultimately, a German military contribution than the Anglo-Saxons were. Therefore, proximity alone cannot explain French obstruction.

A second, more plausible alternative is that, due to the immense French suffering inflicted by Germany in three wars over seventy-five years, public hostility toward Germany might have been of a greater order of magnitude in France than it was in the United States or Great Britain. Therefore, our observed results could reflect the intensity of public emotions, rather than the relative autonomy of the three states. Such an explanation, though, would ignore an important fact. The Second World War was a bitter and protracted conflict with extraordinary deprivations and casualties on all sides. It would require a heroic leap of faith to assume that Americans and Britons who had been reluctantly galvanized to war because of the Germans and suffered immensely at German hands would bear any less hostility toward their former enemy than the French. Indeed, public opinion polls and other indicators in all three countries showed comparable levels of distrust of and hostility toward Germany in aftermath of the war. These are compelling reasons to conclude that differences in decision making autonomy, rather than emotional intensity, explain our observed outcomes. Nonetheless, to ensure that our observed results are not an artifact of the case selection, additional case studies would be fruitful.

Implications for Theory:

The case studies presented in this paper suggest that foreign security analysts must look beyond simplistic characterizations of democratic states as homogeneous and weak. They must consider the unique institutional, procedural and normative contexts of each democracy in order to distinguish between democracies and generate more accurate predictions about the foreign security policy choices of particular democratic states. In this paper, I have presented a framework for analyzing the domestic decision making environments of democratic states to assist scholars in this task.

Careful attention to relative foreign policy decision making autonomy may help to explain anomalous behavior by democratic states and surprising instances of democratic divergence. For example, it might help to explain why British leaders quickly liquidated their colonial possessions after World War II, but their French colleagues were unwilling or unable to follow suit. Moreover, it can help to refine existing theories, such as the democratic peace theory, by elucidating the conditions under which democracies are unlikely to go to war. ₂₅₂ Miriam Fendius Elman, for example, has argued that presidential and majoritarian democracies, which she terms "strong democracies," are less likely to be subject to the logic of the democratic peace theory than "weak" parliamentary states. ₂₅₃ The research in this paper suggests that it would be fruitful to consider other distinguishing factors beyond the presidential/parliamentary divide, since various procedural and normative factors can yield both autonomous and constrained forms of each type of democracy. ₂₅₄

Another avenue of inquiry would be to conduct empirical examinations of the relative autonomy of a samples of both democratic and non-democratic states. My research indicates that regime-type alone is a poor predictor of foreign security policy, since the United States behaved liked a prototypical "non-democracy" in the traditional sense. Nonetheless, it would be worthwhile investigating if, on average, there are any group differences on the autonomy scale between democratic and non-democratic states even if they are non-generalizable across the category.

This research also has important implications for the field of comparative politics. Contrary to the conventional wisdom in comparative politics and comparative political economy that post-war France was a highly centralized and autonomous state and the post-war United States was fragmented and weak, ₂₅₅ this study indicates that the autonomy of the French foreign policy executive during this period was low, while the American executive was extremely independent of public and legislative constraints. Therefore, autonomy must be examined on an issue-by-issue basis, taking into account not only institutional and procedural inputs, but also the normative predispositions that inform executive and legislative behavior in specific policy areas.

Policy Relevance:

This paper has policy-relevant implications for the termination of ethnic and international conflicts in the democratizing regions of the globe. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder have recently demonstrated that democratizing states are highly war-prone. ₂₅₆ This problem should be particularly salient in contemporary Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union--a region plagued by ethnic rivalries and nationalist conflict. My research implies, however, that the construction of domestic political institutions that generate foreign policy decision making autonomy could facilitate conflict resolution and help to mitigate instability as many of the newly-independent states in this region make the transition to democracy. At the same time, care must be taken to avoid granting similar autonomy to these executives in other less-essential issue areas in order to prevent these fledgling governments from trampling the rights of their electorates.

Institution-building is likely to be of only limited value, however, unless we also are able to foster procedural norms that will inspire patterns of decision making that allow for a broad range of executive power over foreign affairs within these institutions. That will not be an easy task. It will require an intensive and prolonged education program within these countries and will, consequently, require the active participation and assistance of the United States and the European Union. The effort and expense will undoubtedly be worthwhile if it helps to break the cycle of conflict in this important region.

Footnotes

Note 1: V. O. Key, Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 97; Daniel Deudney, "The Philadelphia System: Sovereignty, Arms Control, and Balance of Power in the American States-union, circa 1787-1861," International Organization, 49, 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 197-199. Back.

Note 2: For similar points, see Thomas Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies," World Politics, 43,4 (July 1991), 479-512; Norrin M. Ripsman, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy by Democracies: A Critical Review," paper presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, New York Hilton, September 1-4, 1994; Susan Peterson, "How Democracies Differ: Public Opinion, State Structure, and the Lessons of the Fashoda Crisis," Security Studies, 5,1 (Autumn 1995), 3-37; Miriam Fendius Elman, "Unpacking Democracy: Presidentialism, Parliamentarism and Foreign Security Policy," Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association, San Diego, April 1996. Back.

Note 3: I borrow the phrase "unpacking democracies" from Elman, "Unpacking Democracies." Back.

Note 4: For a fuller treatment of traditional thinking about democratic foreign policy, see Ripsman, "The Conduct of Foreign Policy by Democracies;" Norrin M. Ripsman, Democratic Institutions and the Governance of Foreign Security Policy: Peacemaking After Two World Wars, (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania, 1997.). Back.

Note 5: Hans J. Morgenthau, Dilemmas of Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958); Walter Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1955); Reinhold Niebuhr, The Structure of Nations and Empires (New York: Scribner, 1959); Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul E. Sigmund, The Democratic Experience: Past and Prospects (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); George F. Kennan, The Cloud of Danger (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1977); and, George F. Kennan, "Foreign Policy and the Professional Diplomat," in Louis J. Halle and Kenneth W. Thompson, eds., Foreign Policy and the Democratic Process: The Geneva Papers (Lanham: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 14-26. Back.

Note 6: Morgenthau, Dilemmas, p. 303. Quote from p. 326. Back.

Note 7: For related discussions, see Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 18,4 (Spring 1988), pp. 653-673; and Miroslav Nincic, Democracy and Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 6-11. On the problem of peacemaking, see Niebuhr, The Structure, p. 197; Lippmann, Essays in the Public Philosophy, p. 21. Back.

Note 8: Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay, M. Campbell Smith, trans. (New York: Garland, 1972); Montesquieu, The Political Theory; Baron de Montesquieu, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, Melvin Richter, ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Back.

Note 9: Recent empirical evidence has failed to confirm that democracies are more peaceful than other states. see Zeev Maoz and Nasrin Abdolai, "Regime Types and International Conflict," in Journal of Conflict Resolution, 33,1 (1989), pp. 3-35 and Stuart A. Bremer, "Democracy and Militarized Interstate Conflict, 1816-1965," in International Interactions, 18,3 (1993), pp. 231-250. It has frequently been observed, however, that democracies have not waged war against each other. See Michael Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 1", in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12,3 (1983), pp. 205-235; "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs, part 2", in Philosophy and Public Affairs, 12,4 (1983), pp. 323-353; "Liberalism and World Politics" in American Political Science Review, 80,4 (1986), pp. 1151-1161; Bruce M. Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993). Back.

Note 10: Montesquieu, The Political Theory of Montesquieu, Melvin Richter, ed. (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 285; David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," American Political Science Review, 86,1 (March 1992), pp. 24-37, esp. 30-31; Aaron Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" International Security 16,4 (Spring 1992), pp. 109-142. Back.

Note 11: James D. Fearon, "Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes," The American Political Science Review, 88:3 (September 1984), pp. 577-592. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization, 42,3 (Summer 1988). For similar observations, see Shibley Telhami, Power and Leadership in International Bargaining (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990); David A. Lake, "The State and American Trade Strategy in the Pre-Hegemonic Era," International Organization, 42,1 (Winter 1988); and, G. John Ikenberry, "The Irony of State Strength: Comparative Responses to the Oil Shocks in the 1970s," International Organization, 40,1 (Winter 1986). Back.

Note 12: Not all security theorists treat democratic states as institutionally weak and lacking in autonomy. Structural realists, such as Kenneth N. Waltz, maintain that foreign security policy is determined principally by the dictates of the international system and not the characteristics on individual states. International anarchy socializes all states--regardless of regime-type--to act rationally to safeguard their security by eliminating those which behave irrationally. Consequently, differences between regimes are largely irrelevant. Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics: The American and British Experience (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1967), especially pp. 306-311; Theory of International Politics (New York: McGraw Hill, 1979). Defensive structural realists, such as Jack Snyder, attribute more explanatory power to domestic politics, but they too are more sanguine than traditional realists about the ability of democracies to make rational policy choices. This school of thought concludes that domestic political explanations are required to elucidate irrational national security policy decisions that are inconsistent with systemic incentives; nonetheless, they typically identify regimes driven by imperialistic cartels and militaristic general staffs, rather than democratic governments, as the most likely to engender pathological behavior. Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1991); Snyder, Ideology of the Offensive (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1984); Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security 9:1 (Summer 1984), pp. 58-108; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1987). For a critical review of defensive realism, see Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics: a Review Essay," International Security, 17:1 (Summer 1992), pp. 177-198. Both of these perspectives are even less satisfying for the foreign security policy analyst than the traditional realist and liberal approaches, since they do not distinguish either between democratic states and other states or between democracies themselves. Back.

Note 13: See, for example, Eric A. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1981); Hugh Heclo, Social Policy in Britain and Sweden (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974). Back.

Note 14: Theda Skocpol, "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in Peter B. Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 3-37, especially pp. 9-20. Back.

Note 15: This definition is similar to Nordlinger's. On the Autonomy, p. 8. Back.

Note 16: Thomas M. Callaghy calls this process "engineering." If states are unable to insulate themselves completely from social forces, however, they must engage in "buffering", which amounts to bargaining and compromising policy for the sake of consensus. "Political Passions and Economic Interests: Economic Reform and Political Structure in Africa" in Thomas M. Callaghy and John Ravenhill, eds., Hemmed In: Responses to Africa's Economic Decline (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), pp. 463-511. Back.

Note 17: See Nordlinger, On the Autonomy, pp. 92-94, 131-132. It is, of course, difficult to engineer autonomy in the face of active political opposition. Back.

Note 18: An excellent study which explains US policy adaptation to the oil shocks of the 1970s in terms of the structure and growth of the American state is G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 19: For a discussion of how democratic governments in twenty-one countries vary along these dimensions, see Arend Lijphart, Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries (New Haven: Yale, 1984). See also, Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents and Assembles (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1992). Back.

Note 20: Stephen D. Krasner, "Structural causes and regime consequences: regimes as intervening variables," in Stephen D. Krasner, ed., International Regimes (Ithaca, NY.: Cornell, 1983), p. 2. For a discussion of how norms operate, see Friedrich V. Kratochwil, Rules, Norms and Decisions (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1989), chaps. 2 & 3. Back.

Note 21: Ellen C. Collier, ed., Bipartisanship and the Making of Foreign Policy (Boulder: Westview, 1991), pp. 50-51. Back.

Note 22: I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and Anthony Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1984), p. 61; and, Collier, ed., Bipartisanship, pp. 28-30. Back.

Note 23: This is the approach taken by Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," pp. 295-336 in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). See also Robert A. Dahl, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control (New Haven: Yale, 1982), pp. 21-22, 26. Back.

Note 24: See, for example, the contributions to Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty. Back.

Note 25: Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978); and Ikenberry, Reasons of State. Back.

Note 26: Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?"; Risse-Kappen, "Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies;" Matthew Evangelista, "The Paradox of State Strength: Transnational Relations, Domestic Structures, and Security Policy in Russia and The Soviet Union," International Organization, 49,1 (Winter 1995), pp. 1-38; Michael N. Barnett, Confronting the Costs of War; Barry Buzan, "Peoples, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in the Third World," in E. Azar and C. Moon eds., National Security in the Third World (Hants, U.K.: Edward Elger, 1988); Michael N. Barnett and Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Sources of Alliances and Alignments: The Case of Egypt, 1962-1973," in International Organization, 45,3 (Summer 1991), pp. 369-395. Back.

Note 27: Peterson, "How Democracies Differ"; Elman, "Unpacking Democracy." Back.

Note 28: A priori assessments that do not use information from the decision making study are essential if the integrity of autonomy as an independent variable is to be maintained. Back.

Note 29: Central Intelligence Agency, "United Kingdom," SR-25, December 7, 1949--Papers of Harry S Truman, HSTL, PSF, Intelligence File, box 261. Back.

Note 30: It is instructive to note that the Cabinet was initially known as "the committee for foreign affairs". Charles Carstairs and Richard Ware, "Introduction," pp. 1-7 in Charles Carstairs & Richard Ware, eds., Parliament and International Relations (Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 1991),p. 3. Back.

Note 31: David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1968), p. 54. Back.

Note 32: Michael Clarke, "The Policy-Making Process," pp. 71-95 in Michael Smith, Steve Smith, and Brian White, eds., British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 73-76. Back.

Note 33: Peter G. Richards, Parliament and Foreign Affairs (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1967), p. 29; and Richard Ware, "Parliament and Treaties," pp. 37-48 in Charles Carstairs & Richard Ware, eds., Parliament and International Relations (Buckingham, England: Open University Press, 1991), pp. 38-39. Back.

Note 34: Ibid., p. 72. Back.

Note 35: The ability to form a government after confirmation by the Assembly was not a foregone conclusion. In 1949, for example, Jules Moch and Réné Mayer were consecutively appointed by the President and confirmed by bare majorities in the Assembly, yet were unable to secure the participation of enough political parties to command a majority of support in the Assembly. Back.

Note 36: Edgar S. Furniss, Jr., Weaknesses in French Foreign Policy-making (Center for International Studies: Princeton University, 1954), p. 4. Back.

Note 37: See, Gilchrist to Dean, October 22, 1948, FO371/70530. Back.

Note 38: Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1957 (New York: University Press, 1957), p. 171. Back.

Note 39: The Prize Cases, 2 Bl. (67 U.S.) 635 (1863). Back.

Note 40: United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation (1936), 299 U.S. 304 (1936). Back.

Note 41: Ibid. The President's right to keep secret information pertaining to external affairs was upheld in Chicago and Southern Airlines v. Waterman Corp. 333 US 103 (1948). Back.

Note 42: H. Schuyler Foster, Activism Replaces Isolationism (Washington: Foxhall Press, 1983), pp. 19-20. Back.

Note 43: See, for example, Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton: Princeton, 1959), esp., pp. 390-409. Back.

Note 44: See, for example, Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977); and Marcus G. Raskin, Essays of a Citizen: From National Security State to Democracy (Armonk, NY: Sharpe, 1991). Back.

Note 45: Harry Howe Ransom, Central Intelligence and National Security (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard, 1965), pp. 81, 144-146. Back.

Note 46: Thomas G. Paterson, "Presidential Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Congress: The Truman Years," Diplomatic History (1983), pp. 14-17. Back.

Note 47: Acheson smugly observed that "congressional approval is pleasant but largely irrelevant to the outcome of international enterprises, unless they call in one way or another for congressional votes." Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969), p. 442. Back.

Note 48: Peter J. Katzenstein, "Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy," pp. 295-336 in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978), pp. 306-323. On the strength of the Fourth and Fifth Republic French states in international economic policy, see John Zysman, "The French State in the International Economy," pp. 255-293 in Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty. For discussions of American weakness in this policy area, see Stephen D. Krasner, "United States Commercial and Monetary Policy: Unravelling the Paradox of External Strength and Internal Weakness," pp. 51-87 in Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty; and G. John Ikenberry, Reasons of State: Oil Politics and the Capacities of American Government (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 49: This question poses a research problem, since leaders can often misperceive public opinion or not take the public at its word. See, for example, Friedberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State?" p. 127. Therefore, the researcher must study not only public opinion polls and other indicators of public opinion, but also leader perceptions of public opinion. In the cases presented below, there does not appear to have been any significant difference between what the public thought and what their leaders thought they thought. I am grateful to Deborah Avant for bringing this problem to my attention. Back.

Note 50: "Protocol of the Proceedings of the Crimea Conference," February 11, 1945, FRUS, Yalta, p. 978. Back.

Note 51: D. C. Watt, Britain Looks to Germany (London: Oswald Wolff, 1965), pp. 114-129. Back.

Note 52: When asked "What are your feelings at the present towards the German people?" 21% professed "hatred," 14% "dislike," 10% exhorted their political leaders to "keep them down/under strict control," and that "treatment should be harsher," 5% urged "caution," and 3% asserted that the poor conditions in occupied Germany "serve them right." Only 25% professed any "sympathy" for the Germans. George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 1937-1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), vol. I, p. 117. British antipathy toward Germans was confirmed in December 1946 when 95% responded that they would not send any of their rationed foods to the starving population of Germany (p. 145). Back.

Note 53: 65% of respondents with opinions expected future German aggression, while only 35% expected democracy to take hold. Of those who were skeptical of German democracy, many explicitly emphasized the need for strict controls to deny the Germans the opportunity to disrupt the peace again. Ibid., p. 148. Back.

Note 54: In the final days of the war and afterward, the British Government received an enormous amount of letters from British citizens recommending harsh peace plans, designed to prevent a future German resurgence. The various plans included: transfer of German territory to other European countries, terminating German control of the Kiel canal, heavy reparations, severe industrial restrictions, a controlled, lower standard of living for Germans, and complete disarmament. PRO, FO371/46865-46869. Back.

Note 55: See John W. Young, Britain, France and the Unity of Europe (Leicester: Leicester University, 1984), pp. 1-61; Trevor D. Burridge, British Labour and Hitler's War (London: Deutsch, 1976), pp. 159-160, 167-170. Back.

Note 56: Quoted in Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin, Foreign Secretary 1945-1951 (London: Heinemann, 1983), p. 90. Back.

Note 57: COS (46) 105 (O), April 5, 1946; CP (46) 139, April 15, 1946; CP (46) 156 (and attachments), April 15, 1946; CM (46) 36, April 17, 1946. Back.

Note 58: For a bold statement of this argument, see Anne Deighton, "Towards a 'Western' Strategy: The Making of British Policy Towards Germany, 1945-46," pp. 53-70 in Anne Deighton, ed., Britain and the First Cold War (New York: St. Martin's, 1990); The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany, and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990). Back.

Note 59: For his part, de Gaulle had concluded that "(t)o make France's recovery possible, the German collectivity must lose its capacity for aggression." Charles de Gaulle, War Memoirs (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), vol. III, p. 51. With regard to public opinion, an August 1945 Gallup poll reported that an overwhelming 89% of French respondents with opinions believed that a future war could be avoided "by keeping Germany weak and depriving her of the means of making war." George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France, 1939, 1944-1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), vol. I, p. 31. In September, L'Institut Français d'Opinion Publique (IFOP) published a poll indicating that the vast majority of Frenchmen (87% of respondents with opinions) wanted to dismember Germany. Sondages, 7ième Année, 1 septembre, 1945, p. 173. Back.

Note 60: de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. III, pp. 239-240. Mtg. between de Gaulle and British Ambassador Duff Cooper, April 16, 1945, de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. V, pp. 237-240; Mtg. between de Gaulle and Truman, August 22, 1945, de Gaulle, War Memoirs, vol. V, pp. 283-287; Memorandum by the French delegation to the CFM, September 13, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III, pp. 869-871. Back.

Note 61: General Koenig to the Allied Control Council, October 1, 1945, Documents français relatifs à l'Allemagne (henceforth DFRA) (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1947), p. 16; Young, France, pp. 82-83. Back.

Note 62: Quoted in Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University, 1995), p. 472. Back.

Note 63: The see-saw struggle between Morgenthau and Stimson over occupation policy is described in Warren F. Kimball, Swords or Ploughshares? The Morgenthau Plan for Defeated Nazi Germany, 1943-1946 (Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1976); Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt, pp. 472-479; and Manfred Jonas, The United States and Germany (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1984), pp. 268-274. Back.

Note 64: "Directive to SCAEF Regarding the Military Government of Germany in the Period Immediately Following the Cessation of Organized Resistance (Post-Defeat)," September 22, 1944, FRUS, Yalta, pp. 143-156. Back.

Note 65: Papers of Harry S. Truman, Official File, 198 Misc (1945-46), HSTL. Back.

Note 66: In a December 1945 poll conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC), 66% of respondents with opinions did not believe "that Germany will ever become a peace-loving nation," and almost 90% of respondents with opinions in a May 1946 NORC poll expected that "Germany would try to start another war in the next 25 years, if the allies don't watch her carefully." Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, Public Opinion On-Line (hereafter cited as POO), USNORC.450137, R03, December 1945 and USNORC.460142, R04, May 1946. See also USROPER.45-050, R08, October 1945, and USNORC.460241, R11A, May 1946. Back.

Note 67: An August poll by the NORC revealed that 67% of respondents with opinions thought that the United Nations should "break Germany up into smaller states." POO, USNORC.450132, R07, August 1945. Back.

Note 68: According to Gallup polls conducted in July and October 1945, for example, the majority of respondents with opinions believed that the occupation regime was treating civilians in Germany "too softly" or "not tough enough," while fewer than 3% felt the Germans were being treated "too harshly." POO, USGALLUP.45-351, QKT08, July 1945 and USGALLUP.111445, RT13, November 1945. See also USGALLUP.052745, RK01, May 1945 and USNORC.450133, R07A, August 1945. Back.

Note 69: John H. Backer, Winds of History: The German Years of Lucius DuBignon Clay (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1983), p. 14; Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 30. Back.

Note 70: See, for example, Byrnes to Caffery, November 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III, p. 908; Patterson to Byrnes, November 21, 1945, FRUS, 1945, III, pp. 908-909; Stimson to Truman, FRUS, 1945, Potsdam II, pp. 990-991; Memo by US Control Council for German Director of Political Affairs, Donald Heath, FRUS, 1945, Potsdam II, pp. 999-1000; Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1992), pp. 68-70; Young, France, p. 61.. Back.

Note 71: CP(46) 139, April 15, 1946; CP(46)156 April 15, 1946; CM (46) 36, April 17, 1946; CP (46) 218, June 4, 1946. See also the conversations between Bevin and Bidault reported in FO371/55400. Back.

Note 72: See "Discussion on Germany at the Council of Foreign Ministers," FO Minute by A. A. E. Franklin, July 11, 1946, assessing Molotov's position at CFM, PRO, FO371/55843; Speech by Molotov, July 10, 1946, Beate Ruhm von Oppen, ed., Documents on Germany under Occupation, 1945-54, hereinafter cited as DGO, (London: Oxford University, 1955), pp. 144-147. Byrnes responded to Molotov's ouvertures to Germany by inspiring Anglo-American bizonal fusion and declaring a softer line toward Germany in his "Stuttgart speech" in September. DGO, pp. 152-160. Back.

Note 73: MemCon between Byrnes and Bidault, September 24, 1946, FRUS, 1946, V, pp. 607-610; Bevin to FO, July 11, 1946--FO371/55844. Realizing that French domestic opposition was the only leverage he had over the Americans, Bidault frequently resorted to this sort of "blackmail". For this reason he was hated in Washington, even though American officials often accommodated him. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, chaps. 2 & 3, especially p. 57. Back.

Note 74: CFM meeting summaries, July 11, 1946, FO371/55844. Back.

Note 75: In public opinion polls published in February 1947, 56% of Frenchmen surveyed reported feelings of hostility toward the German people whilst only 3% professed sympathy. Moreover, 75% of respondents with opinions thought that Germany could become a truly democratic country and 86% of respondents with opinions believed the Germans would again become a warmongering nation. Sondages, 9ième Année, No. 4 (16 fevrier, 1947), p. 35. Back.

Note 76: A poll published in February showed that of Frenchmen who were familiar with Byrnes' Stuttgart speech advocating the return of the Ruhr and the Rhineland to a future German state, 84% of those with opinions disapproved of the Secretary's comments. Sondages, 9ième Année, No. 3 (16 Fevrier, 1947), p. 26. Back.

Note 77: Pierre-Olivier Lapie, De Léon Blum a de Gaulle (Paris: Fayard, 1971), pp. 36-38. Back.

Note 78: For proceedings of the conference, see FRUS, 1947, II, pp. 234-390. Back.

Note 79: François Seydoux, Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin (Paris: B. Grasset, 1975), pp. 108-110; Georgette Elgey, La République des Illusions: 1945-1951 (Paris: Fayard, 1993), p. 75, ff. Back.

Note 80: Dalloz, Georges Bidault, pp. 168-171. Back.

Note 81: Auriol, I, p. 738, n.2. A January opinion poll revealed no change in the attitude of the French public toward this question: 64% continued to advocate the political separation of the Ruhr, while only 15% were satisfied with allowing the territory to remain Germany subject to Allied control. Sondages, 9ième Année, No. 6 (1 avril, 1947), p. 68. To make matters worse, the first Assembly debate on foreign affairs after the Moscow CFM (July 25-26) was punctuated by angry invectives demanding co-operation with the Soviets and rigid controls on Germany. Journal Officiel: Débats, Assemblée, 25 juillet, 2542-2570, and 26 juillet, 3585-3612. Back.

Note 82: Young, France, p. 128. Back.

Note 83: Ibid., pp. 165-168. Back.

Note 84: Dalloz, Georges Bidault, p. 171. Back.

Note 85: Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, p. 66. Back.

Note 86: FRUS, 1947, II, p. 991, n. 19. Back.

Note 87: See, for example, Clay Papers, pp. 385-392. Back.

Note 88: Auriol, Journal, 1948, pp. 174-180. Back.

Note 89: Caffery to Marshall, May 25, 1948, FRUS, 1948, vol. II, p. 281. This worried Marshall who thought that involving the French legislature would kill the plan. Marshall to Caffery, May 26, 1948, FRUS, ibid., p. 283. Back.

Note 90: "France's German Policy," ORE 39-48, December 29, 1948, pp. 5-6--Papers of Harry S Truman, HSTL, PSF, Intelligence File, box 255. For the proceedings of the London conference on Germany, see FRUS, 1948, II, pp. 75-145, 191-317. Back.

Note 91: Auriol, 1948, pp. 265-266; Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman: homme d'Etat (Paris: Imprimerie nationale, 1986), pp. 186, 190; Elgey, République des Illusions, pp. 386-387; Dalloz, Georges Bidault, p. 192. Back.

Note 92: Young, France, pp. 196-197. Back.

Note 93: De Gaulle denounced Bidault's efforts as "a series of retreats leading to the final surrender." L'Anné e Politique, 1948, pp. 334-335. The PCF derided a policy to revive Germany that favored the West over the Soviet Union. In April, the Socialist Cabinet ministers wrote a letter of complaint against the Foreign Minister's conduct of negotiations in London to President Auriol. Young, France, pp. 196-197; Auriol, Journal, 1948, pp. 190-192. The French press accused him of "putting French security in jeopardy" and even his MRP colleagues were dissatisfied with the Foreign Minister brought home. His dismissal was clearly imminent. Dalloz, Georges Bidault, pp. 194-197. Back.

Note 94: See summary of Military Governors' points of disagreements in FRUS, 1948, II, pp. 615-617 & 650-63. In addition to these disputes, the French also pressed for international control over the German port of Kehl. See, for example, Douglas to Acheson, February 17, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 42-44. Back.

Note 95: See the report of a Schuman-Kirkpatrick conversation in Douglas to Acheson, February 7, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, p. 29. Back.

Note 96: FO Minute by Dean, January 26, 1949--FO371/76694. See also, Gilchrist to Dean, October 22, 1948--FO371/70530; and Murphy to Beam, FRUS, 1948, II, p. 434, note 1. Back.

Note 97: FO Minute by Dean, March 26, 1949--FO371/76694. Back.

Note 98: On the relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty and the German problem, see Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance: The Origins of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1981); Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, pp. 280-282. Back.

Note 99: Caffery to Secretary of State Acheson, March 22, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 115-118; CM (49) 26, April, 7, 1949. Back.

Note 100: See Acheson's memoranda of March 31-April 11, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 156-173; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: Norton, 1969); Auriol, Journal, 1949, pp. 206-208. Back.

Note 101: Schwartz, America's Germany, p. 44. For the text of the Occupation Statute, see DGO, pp. 375-377. Back.

Note 102: "Policy Directive for the United states High Commissioner for Germany," November 17, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 319-340. Back.

Note 103: Throughout the period under study, public opinion polls continued to register French distrust and, above all, dislike of the German people. In October 1950, for example, an IFOP poll indicated that out of nine prominent nations, the Germans were by far the people that the French disliked the most. See the public opinion polls reported in Jean Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," pp. 72-101 in Daniel Lerner and Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 73-74. Back.

Note 104: Poidevin, Robert Schuman, pp. 213-215. Schuman emphasized that, though "any idea of hatred or revenge had already disappeared from French policy," it was unrealistic for the Germans to expect immediate integration into Western Europe as an equal partner. It would take time until the Germans could fully regain the confidence of their former enemies. Ashley-Clarke to FO, January 12, 1949--FO371/76694. Back.

Note 105: CP (49) 237, November 16, 1949. Back.

Note 106: Summary of Foreign Ministers Meeting, May 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 1044-1051, esp. pp. 1046-1047. See also Acheson to Byroade, May 2, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 913-915. Back.

Note 107: US Del. to Marshall, May 4, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 923-926. Tripartite Mtg. Summary, May 10, 1950, DBPO, ser. II, vol. I, pp. 7-13, esp. pp. 10-13; CP (50) 80, April 26, 1950; CM (50) 29, May 8, 1950. Back.

Note 108: Acheson to Webb, May 9, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 1013-1018; USDel to Webb, May 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950, III, pp. 1044-1051. Back.

Note 109: Communiqué by Three Foreign Ministers, September 19, 1950, DGO, pp. 517-520. Back.

Note 110: See pp. 50 ff. Back.

Note 111: The text of Adenauer's aide-mé moire is included in McCloy to Acheson, November 17, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV, pp. 780-784; François-Poncet to MAE, November 17, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 189. Back.

Note 112: Acheson to McCloy, December 12, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV, pp. 797-799. Back.

Note 113: Parodi to French reps. Bonn, London, Washington, and New York, December 21, 1950, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 190; US Del. Meeting Minutes, December 19, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV, pp. 803-813. Back.

Note 114: Bruce to Acheson, October 29, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 491-492; Auriol, Journal, 1949, pp. 402, 612, n. 21 & n. 22; Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 203, 211-212; Douglas to Acheson, July 25, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 478-479; Acheson to Douglas, July 29, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 479-480. Back.

Note 115: Auriol, 1949, pp. 401-406. Back.

Note 116: Bruce to Acheson, October 29, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 491-492. Back.

Note 117: See Acheson to Douglas, October 31, 1949, FRUS, 1949, III, pp. 492-494. Back.

Note 118: The first three of these agreements are reproduced in DGO, pp. 469-482. Back.

Note 119: C (52) 31, February 8, 1952; Acheson Memo, July 6, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 813-819, esp. pp. 813-814. For French attitudes toward German rearmament see below p. 53. Back.

Note 120: Bruce to Acheson, February 19, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1463-1464. The British FO also feared that a newly-sovereign Federal Republic might forgo its defense obligations if they were not hammered out in advance. McCloy to Acheson, February 9, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1461-1463. Back.

Note 121: Parodi to French reps. Bonn, London, Washington, and New York, December 21, 1950, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 190; Bruce to Acheson, January 8, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1446-1449; Bruce to Acheson, February 19, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1463-1464. Back.

Note 122: CM (51) 12, February 8, 1951; Acheson to McCloy, February 14, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1014-1016. On Schumacher's agitation, see McCloy to Acheson, January 5, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1317-1321; Adenauer, Memoirs, pp. 322-323, 326-328. Back.

Note 123: Acheson to Paris Embassy, June 21, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 786-789; Acheson and Lovett to Truman, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 849-852. Back.

Note 124: Morrison to Acheson, August 17, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1174-1175. Back.

Note 125: Lapie, De Léon Blum à de Gaulle, pp. 362-363; Seydoux, Mémoires d'Outre-Rhin, pp. 166-167; Minutes of Tripartite Meeting, December 19, 1950, FRUS, 1950, IV, pp. 810-811; Policy Planning Staff Paper, December 28, 1950, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1048-1051. Back.

Note 126: For records of these Four Power meetings, see FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1086-1162. Back.

Note 127: For. Min. Mtg., September 13, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1272-1278. For the revised drafts of "Instructions from the Three Foreign Ministers to the Allied High Commission" and "the Agreement on General Relations with the Federal Republic," see FRUS, 1951, III. pp. 1197-1214. The November concessions are included in "Draft agreement on General Relations," November 17, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1592-1597. Back.

Note 128: Schuman to Acheson, January 29, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 7-11. Back.

Note 129: Bruce to Acheson, February 3, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, pp. 7-9. Back.

Note 130: McCloy to Dept. of State, February 6, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, pp. 9-12; C. (52) 31, February 8, 1952. Back.

Note 131: See Mtg. Summaries, February 18-19, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 66-77; Acheson to Truman, February 21, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 80-86; Mtg. Summary, February 26, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 163-167. Acheson observed that in spite of these compromises, Schuman was less conciliatory than ever before and more dependent on Cabinet instructions than at any time during his tenure as foreign minister. He attributed that to his diminishing influence within a new Government that favored a tougher line on German issues. Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 608-609, 615. Back.

Note 132: See, for example, McCloy to Dept. of State, May 2, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, pp. 45-47. Back.

Note 133: Acheson Memo., April 8, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, pp. 24-25; Acheson to McCloy, April 11, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, VII, pp. 25-28. Back.

Note 134: David Clay Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina, 1996), pp. 32-38; Robert McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois, 1971), pp. 16-17. Back.

Note 135: PRO, DEFE 4/10, JP (48) 16 (Final), January 27, 1948; Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein, The Memoirs of Field-Marshal the Viscount Montgomery of Alamein, K. G. (New York: Da Capo, 1958). Back.

Note 136: Saki Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, 1950-55 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991), p. 7. Montgomery made his concern about Western defense public while visiting the United States in November 1949. See New York Times, November 30, 1949, p. 16. Back.

Note 137: US Intelligence Assessments speculated that Britain might attempt to cut defense costs by, among other things, reducing its troop commitment to Germany. ORE 93-49, December 23, 1949, Papers of Harry S Truman, HSTL, PSF, Intelligence File, box 257. Back.

Note 138: Massigli to the MAE, March 17, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 78-79. Back.

Note 139: Ibid. Back.

Note 140: Massigli to the MAE, November 28, 1949, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 182, 58. There were also parliamentary references to "widespread public concern about various Press reports" claiming that the United States and Great Britain were considering some form of German rearmament. Parliamentary Question by Mr. Skeffington-Lodge, November 28, 1949, FO371/76650. Indeed, until December 1950, a majority of Britons resolutely opposed the idea of German rearmament. See footnote 191. Back.

Note 141: Prominent Labourite R. H. S. Crossman, and Cabinet Ministers Hugh Dalton and Aneurin Bevan were all outspoken critics of German rearmament. See Crossman, "Open Letter," The Times, April 10, 1950; and Hugh Dalton, The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, 1918-40, 1945-60, Ben Pimlott, ed. (London: Jonathan Cape, 1986), p. 425. Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevin (London: Davis-Poynter, 1973), Vol. II, pp. 305-307, 319. Back.

Note 142: Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth series, Volume 473, "House of Commons Official Report, session 1950," column 324, PRO, ZHC2/981; Massigli to Schuman, April 14, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 140. Back.

Note 143: Bevin to Morrison, December 31, 1948, FO371/76527. Back.

Note 144: FO Memo to the UK delegation to the CFM in Paris, May 20, 1949, FO371/76649. Back.

Note 145: Bevin contended: "Therefore, I must say to the right hon. Gentleman that we have set our face - the United States, France and ourselves - against the re-arming of Germany, and that, I am afraid, we must adhere to. " Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), Fifth series, Volume 473, "House of Commons Official Report, session 1950," column 324, PRO, ZHC2/981. Back.

Note 146: CM (50) 29, May 8, 1950; CP (50) 80, May 3, 1950. Back.

Note 147: Georges-Henri Soutou, "France and the German Rearmament Problem, 1945-1955," pp. 487-512 in R. Ahmann, A. M. Birke, and M. Howard, ed., The Quest for Stability: Problems of West European Security, 1918-1957 (London: Oxford, 1993), p. 497; Pierre Guillen, "Les Chefs militaires français, le réarmement de l'Allemagne et la CED, 1950-1954," Revue d'histoire de la deuxième guerre mondiale et des conflits contemporains, 33 (1983), pp. 3-33. Indeed, as early as Winter 1948, during the negotiations concerning the Brussels Treaty, Generals Ely and Stehlin issued a memorandum to Foreign Minister Schuman demanding German rearmament. Georgette Elgey, La République des contradictions, 1951-1954 (Paris: Fayard, 1968), p. 215. Back.

Note 148: McGeehan, The German Rearmament Question, p. 17. See also Peter Calvocoressi, Survey of International Affairs, 1949-1950 (London: Oxford University, 1953), p.155. Back.

Note 149: "Le Bulletin de l'Etranger," Le Monde, December 7, 1949; Jean de Hautecloque, French Ambassador to Belgium, to the MAE, December 8, 1949, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 182, 139. Back.

Note 150: Raymond Poidevin, Robert Schuman (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1986), pp. 306-309. Back.

Note 151: MAE Note, Direction d'Europe, April 21, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 161. Back.

Note 152: Note, Direction d'Europe, November 18, 1949, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 182, 24-25; Vincent Auriol, Journal de Septennat, 1947-1954 (Paris: Librarie Armand Colin, 1977), 1947, pp. 463-464. Back.

Note 153: See, for example, Massigli to Schuman, March 17, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 80. Back.

Note 154: MAE Note, Direction Europe, April 18, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 155; MAE note, Direction d'Europe, April 27, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 163. Back.

Note 155: A February 1950 Gallup poll asked Frenchmen if France should have "cordial relations" with Germany. 55% of all decided respondents responded negatively. George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: France, 1939, 1944-1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 141. Back.

Note 156: Bonnet to Schuman, November 30, 1949, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 182, 97; British Embassy in Washington to FO, November 17, 1949, FO371/76649; Harvey to FO, November 23, 1949, FO371/76650; MemCon between Acheson and Bonnet, December 1, 1949, HSTL, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversations. Back.

Note 157: Kirkpatrick Memo, December 15, 1949, FO371/76650. For the text of the vote of confidence, see Kirkpatrick Minute, November 29, 1949, FO371/76650. Back.

Note 158: NSC-68, April 14, 1950, Documents of the National Security Council, 1947-1977 (Maryland: a Microfilm Project of University Publications of America Inc., 1980) (hereafter cited as DNSC). Back.

Note 159: NSC-71, June 8, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. Back.

Note 160: Acheson to Truman, June 16, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. Back.

Note 161: Undated FO Brief, filed March 30, 1950, FO371/85087; Wahnerheide to FO (German Section), February 7, 1950, FO371/85087; Massigli to MAE, April 1, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 110; Letter from Bonnet to Schuman, April 13, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 138; Sir Oliver Franks, Washington, to FO, June 8, 1950, FO371/85088. Back.

Note 162: Acheson to Truman, June 30, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. Back.

Note 163: George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-71 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 914; Roper Center at the University of Connecticut, Public Opinion On-Line (hereafter POO), USNORC.500282, R02, June 1950. Back.

Note 164: Acheson to Truman, June 30, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. These views were set down for the National Security Council in NSC-71/1, July 3, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. Back.

Note 165: Mtg. Summary of the 60th Mtg. of the NSC, July 8, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 60, July 6, 1950. Back.

Note 166: Mtg. Summary of the 66th Mtg. of the NSC, August 25, 1950, HSTL, President's Secretary's Files, NSC Files, meetings, meeting 66, August 24, 1950. Back.

Note 167: General Bradley testified before House and Senate Foreign Relations committees and the Senate Armed Services Committee in June that from a strictly military point of view German rearmament would facilitate Western European security. The Washington Post, June 7, 1950, p. 1. In a July interview with the NBC, McCloy stated: "I am against the reconstruction of a German army, but in the event of an attack after the pattern of Korea, I think it would really be difficult to deny the Germans the right and the means to defend their country." Kirkpatrick to FO, July 24, 1950, FO371/85088. Back.

Note 168: POO, USNORC.500287, R13, July 1950. Back.

Note 169: The Gallup Poll, p. 932. Back.

Note 170: See for example, the Gallup polls of December 1950 and January 1951, and the NORC surveys of January and October 1951. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, pp. 951 & 962; and POO, USNORC.510298, R16, January 1951 and USNORC.510313, R15. Back.

Note 171: Massigli to Schuman, August 2, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 184, 122-123. Back.

Note 172: François-Poncet's report of Kirkpatrick's summary of his conversation with Adenauer. François-Poncet to MAE, July 13, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 38; Bevin to Harvey, September 5, 1950, DBPO, Ser. II, Vol. III, pp. 9-13.; Mtg. between Bevin and J. Holmes, US Chargé d'Affaires, September 4, 1950, DBPO, Ser. II, Vol. III, p. 5; Air Marshal Elliot to Bevin, September 8, 1950, DBPO, Ser. II, Vol. III, pp. 22-24; Bérard to the MAE, August 4, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 141-142.. Back.

Note 173: C.M. (50) 56, September 6, 1950; François-Poncet to MAE, August 24, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 185, 47-50. Back.

Note 174: See the public statement reported in MAE Circulaire 183 IP, July 26, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 183, 68-69. Back.

Note 175: Ibid.; MAE Note, August 5, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 184, 150-151. Back.

Note 176: MAE Note, Direction Europe, Sous-Direction d'Europe Centrale, August 10, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 184. Back.

Note 177: de Tournelle to the French embassies in London and Washington and the French High Commissioner in Bonn, August 23, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 185. Back.

Note 178: An October 1950 Gallup poll, for example, revealed than an overwhelming majority of Frenchmen wanted to exclude Germany from any European Army and those in France who believed that German rearmament would increase French security (24.7% of decided respondents) were outnumbered by more than two to one by those who feared it would decrease French security (55.6%). The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, France, p. 144. Back.

Note 179: State Department, Weekly Review, August 30, 1950, p. 16, HSTL, Papers of Harry S. Truman, WHCF, Confidential File, Box 59. Back.

Note 180: Papers of Dean Acheson, Princeton Seminars, October 10-11, 1953, Reel 6, track 1, p. 7, HSTL. Back.

Note 181: Papers of Dean Acheson, Princeton Seminars, October 10-11, 1953, Reel 6, track 1, pp. 8-9, HSTL. Back.

Note 182: C.M. (50) 58, September 14, 1950; C.M. (50) 59, September 15, 1950. Back.

Note 183: An October Gallup poll indicated that 54% of decided British respondents opposed rearming Western Germany. George H. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls: Great Britain, 1937-1975 (New York: Random House, 1976), p. 229. Back.

Note 184: Sir Gladwyne Jebb to Minister of State Kenneth Younger, September 16, 1950, DBPO, III, p. 63. The day before, Massigli told Prime Minister Attlee that "the French Government would not be able to accept any mention in a public communiqué of the principle of German rearmament. As to the principle itself, their attitude was not entirely negative, but they were trying to find a possible solution." p. 63, note 2. Back.

Note 185: Papers of Dean Acheson, HSTL, Princeton Seminars, October 10-11, 1953, Reel 6, track 2, p. 7; C.M. (50) 59, September 15, 1950; Jebb to Younger, September 17, 1950, DBPO, pp. 67-68. Back.

Note 186: Jebb to Younger, September 23, 1950, DBPO, ser. II, vol. III, pp. 89-97. Back.

Note 187: Declaration du Gouvernement français sur la création d'une armée européenne, October 24, 1950, AN, Les Papers de Réné Pleven, 560AP45, dossier 1. Back.

Note 188: Soutou, "France and the German Rearmament Problem," p. 499. Back.

Note 189: C.M. (50) 69, October 30, 1950. Back.

Note 190: HSTL, Papers of Dean Acheson, Princeton Seminars, December 11-13, 1953, Reel 1, track 1, p. 5. Back.

Note 191: Acheson to Spofford, November 16, 1950, FRUS, 1950, Vol. III, pp. 471-472; UK Deputy to the North Atlantic Council to Bevin, November 20, 1950, DBPO, Ser. II, Vol. III, pp. 274-277. Back.

Note 192: C.M. (50) 86, December 14, 1950. See also Compte Rendu, December 2, 1950, AN, Les Papers de Réné Pleven, 560AP45, dossier 1. Back.

Note 193: Parodi to French embassies in Atlantic Pact countries, December 21, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 190. Back.

Note 194: Kirkpatrick to Bevin, December 12, 1950, DBPO, Ser. II, Vol. III, pp. 354-356. On the Protestant leaders' objections, see Bérard to the MAE, October 17, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 187; François-Poncet to the MAE, November 1, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 188. Back.

Note 195: MAE Note, Direction d'Europe, December 5, 1950, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 189. Back.

Note 196: Washington continued to dislike the "unrealistic and undesirable" European Army plan, but countenanced negotiations to that end in Paris in order to make it possible for the French to allow an interim German contribution. Acheson to American diplomatic offices, January 29, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 760-762; Acheson to Bruce, March 17, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 781-782. Back.

Note 197: For the text of the AHC Report on the meetings, known as "the Petersberg proposals" or "the Bonn report", see AHC to the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, undated, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, pp. 1044-1047. Back.

Note 198: See Memorandum from French Foreign Ministry to the Department of State, February 16, 1951--State Department, Central Files, 740.00, NA; Paris Embassy Paper, "Analysis of the European Army Conference through June 22, 1951," undated, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, pp. 789-798. Back.

Note 199: Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 552. Back.

Note 200: Bruce to Acheson, April 18, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, p. 782; Acheson to Bruce, June 28, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 3, p. 803; Bruce to Acheson, July 3, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. 3, pp. 805-812. Back.

Note 201: Quoted in "Policy of the Labour Government Towards the Rearmament of Germany," FO Paper for Eden, December 19, 1951, FO371/97905. Back.

Note 202: Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, p. 57. Back.

Note 203: CM (51) 12, February 8, 1951. A Gallup poll taken in December 1950 indicated that only the barest minority of decided Britons (52%) favored building a West German as part of a European Army. Gallup, The Gallup International Public Opinion Polls, Great Britain, p. 235. Back.

Note 204: Acheson to Bruce, June 28, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 801-805. Back.

Note 205: Large, Germans to the Front, pp. 125-129; Schwartz, America's Germany, pp. 223-224; Bruce to Acheson, July 3, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 805-812; Stephen Ambrose, Eisenhower, 2 vols. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), I, pp. 506-508; Bruce to Acheson, July 18, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 838-839. Back.

Note 206: The French ultimately renegotiated and agreed to a revised groupement which was marginally smaller than a US division. Bonsal (American Chargé in France) to Acheson, September 3, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, pp. 878-879; Bruce to Acheson, October 3, 1951, FRUS, 1951, vol. III, pp. 883-885; Jacques Fauvet, "Birth and Death of a Treaty," pp. 128-164 in Daniel Lerner & Raymond Aron, eds., France Defeats EDC (New York: Praeger, 1957), pp. 128-129. Back.

Note 207: Memo of Mtg. between Acheson and Schuman, September 6, 1951, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversations, HSTL; Report au Gouvernement by Hervé Alphand, May 10, 1952, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 1067; Auriol, Journal, 1952, pp. 105-106. Back.

Note 208: Poidevin, Robert Schuman, pp. 320-326; Soutou, "France and the German Rearmament Problem," pp. 500-501; Acheson to Truman, November 30, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1730-1732. Back.

Note 209: CM (51) 56, July 30, 1951; CM (51) 58, September 4, 1951; CP (51) 233, July 24, 1951; CP (51) 240, September 1, 1951; Dockrill, Britain's Policy for West German Rearmament, pp. 76-78. Back.

Note 210: Declaration of the Foreign Ministers of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, September 14, 1951, DBPO, ser. 2, vol. I, pp. 723-724. Churchill reaffirmed this commitment after returning to office in the Fall. Government Communiqué of December 18, 1951, DBPO, ser. 2, vol. I, p. 796n; Sir Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London: Cassell, 1960), pp. 31-35. Back.

Note 211: See, for example, Gifford to Dept. of State, January 31, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 607-608; Bruce to Dept. of State, February 5, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 608-609. Back.

Note 212: Schuman to Acheson, January 29, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 7-11. Back.

Note 213: See, for example, Acheson to Truman. November 30, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1730-1732; Bruce to Acheson, December 14, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1737-1739. Back.

Note 214: McCloy to Webb, November 26, 1951, FRUS, 1951, III, pp. 1719-1721. Back.

Note 215: Acheson to Dept. of State, February 18, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 55-58; Mtg. between Acheson, Eden, Schuman and Adenauer, February 18, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 66-71; US Del. to London Mtgs. to Dept. of State, February 19, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 65-66. For the text of the letters to be sent by Adenauer, see FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 104-105; CC (52) 17, February 14, 1952; C (52) 41, February 17, 1952; CC (52) 18, February 18, 1952. Back.

Note 216: Hervé Alphand, L'Etonnement d'ê tre (Paris: Fayard, 1977), p. 227. Back.

Note 217: For a complete list of these conditions, see Alphand's Report, May 10, 1952, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 1067. Back.

Note 218: Harvey to Strang, April 8, 1952, FO371/97905; Fauvet, "Birth and Death of a Treaty," p. 131. Back.

Note 219: Eden, Full Circle, p. 44. In his May 10, 1952 Report to the Government, Alphand commented that all changes made to the treaty since the February vote brought the final treaty closer the Pleven's original plan, and that progress was made on all 14 of the Assembly's conditions. France, MAE, EU 1944-1960, Allemagne, 1067. Back.

Note 220: Poidevin, Robert Schuman, pp. 327-328; Soutou, "France and the German Rearmament Problem," pp. 504-505; Dunn to Acheson, October 20, 1952, NARA, Decimal File, 751.001/10-2052. Back.

Note 221: Memo of Ministerial Talks, June 27, 1952, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversations, HSTL; MemCon between Acheson and Schuman, June 28, 1952, Papers of Dean Acheson, Memoranda of Conversations, HSTL; Soutou, "La France et les notes soviétiques," pp. 261-273. Back.

Note 222: Poidevin, Robert Schuman, p. 329; MemCon between Acheson and Eden, November 12, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 696-698; Acheson to Dunn, September 6, 1952, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 690-692. Back.

Note 223: Fauvet, "Birth and Death of a Treaty," p. 137; MemCon between Eisenhower, Dulles and Belgian Foreign Minister Van Zeeland, March 16, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 773-775. Back.

Note 224: Dunn to Dept. of State, January 15, 1952, NARA, Decimal File, 740.5/1-553. Back.

Note 225: Bruce to State Department, March 12, 1953, European Defense Community, Box 14, Administration Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library. Back.

Note 226: Indeed, the Americans believed that the French preconditions were primarily delaying tactics rather than serious concerns. See, for example, Gruenther to Eisenhower, February 7, 1953, General Alfred Gruenther 1954 (4), Box 16, Administration Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library; and MemCon between Dulles and Eisenhower, March 24, 1954, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library Collection, White House Memoranda, Princeton. Back.

Note 227: Laniel to Eisenhower, October 8, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 820-821. Back.

Note 228: Dulles to Bruce, March 26, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 781-784. Back.

Note 229: FRUS, 1952-1954, V, p. 775; Dillon to Dulles, September 20, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 808-812, esp. p. 811. Back.

Note 230: C (53) 73, February 20, 1953; CC (53) 14, February 24, 1953; CC (53) 15, February 26, 1953. Back.

Note 231: C (53) 332, November 20, 1953; CC (53) 32, May 19, 1953; CC (53) 72, November 26, 1953. Back.

Note 232: NSC 160/1, August 13, 1953, DNSC. Back.

Note 233: Dulles to US Emb. in Paris, May 18, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 956-957; Deputy British High Commissioner to Germany Ward to FO, March 29, 1954, FO371/109576; MemCon between MacArthur and Laniel, April 14, 1954, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library Collection, White House Memoranda, Princeton; MemCon between Dulles, Hagerty and the President, April 19, 1954, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library Collection, White House Memoranda, Princeton. Back.

Note 234: Dillon to Dulles, June 21, 1954, John Foster Dulles June 1954 (2), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library. MemCon between Dulles, Mendes-France, and MacArthur, July 13, 1954, John Foster Dulles July 1954 (1), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library. Back.

Note 235: Churchill to Dulles, August 24, 1954, John Foster Dulles Aug. 1954 (1), Box 2, Dulles-Herter Series, Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower as President, 1953-61, Eisenhower Library. Back.

Note 236: Churchill to Dulles, August 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, p. 1077; Eden to Dulles, August 24, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 1078-1079. Back.

Note 237: Speech by US Ambassador to Paris, Douglas Dillon to the Anglo-American Press Association in Paris, June 29, 1954, p.7, J. F. Dulles Personal Papers, Correspondence, Douglas Dillon, 1954. Dulles wrote Dillon on July 6, 1954, saying his speech was "an excellent statement of our position." Back.

Note 238: MemCon for the President, July 21, 1954, Dulles Papers, Eisenhower Library Files, Subject Series, Princeton. Back.

Note 239: This amendment agreed to provide military assistance from fiscal year 1954 funds only to those EDC members who successfully ratified the document, thereby officially obtaining member status. For the text of this amendment, see Dulles to Bruce, July 13, 1953, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, p. 796. Back.

Note 240: John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University, Réné Mayer, p. 6; John Foster Dulles Oral History Collection, Princeton University, Ogden Reid, pp. 3-4; Press and Radio News Conference summary, June 15, 1954, p. 5, JFD Papers, Correspondence, European Defense Community, 1954, Princeton University; FRUS, 1952-1954, V, p. 868. Back.

Note 241: Bonnet to the MAE, March 29, 1954, MAE, Europe, 1944-1960, Généralités, CED, 27. Back.

Note 242: See, for example, René Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs (Paris: Plon, 1978), pp. 411-414; Irwin M. Wall, The United States and the Making of Postwar France, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1991, p. 272. Back.

Note 243: A July 1954 IFOP survey, for example, revealed that 66% of decided French respondents thought German rearmament was a danger under any form, while 28% believed that it required acceptable safeguards. Stoetzel, "The Evolution of French Opinion," p. 84. Back.

Note 244: Bonnet to the MAE, August 13, 1954, MAE, Europe, 1944-1960, Généralités, 76. Some in the United States, like New York Times writer Callender, thought that Mendès-France wanted the proposals to be rejected. Back.

Note 245: Alexander Werth, Lost statesman: The Strange Case of Pierre Mendès-France (Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1980), p. 183. Back.

Note 246: Eden, Full Circle, pp. 162-164. Back.

Note 247: Statement by Dulles, August 31, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 1120-1122. Back.

Note 248: Minutes of the 216th Meeting of the NSC, October 6, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 1378-1384; MemCon between Dulles and SACEUR Gruenther, September 27, 1954, FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 1281-1283. Back.

Note 249: For the agreements reached at the London conference, see FRUS, 1952-1954, V, pp. 1338-1366. Back.

Note 250: Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs, pp. 489-491; Eden, Cull Circle, pp. 170-171. Back.

Note 251: In fact, Mendès-France was defeated by an odd coalition of partisans of the EDC who resented him for killing the plan and opponents of German rearmament. See Large, Germans to the Front, p. 223; Massigli, Une comédie des erreurs, p. 495. Back.

Note 252: For a similar point, see Peterson, "How Democracies Differ." Back.

Note 253: Elman, "Unpacking Democracy." Back.

Note 254: Additional research I have conducted has demonstrated, for example, that the US presidential system, which yielded a very autonomous foreign policy executive after the Second World War, was considerably weaker than most parliamentary regimes after the First World War. Ripsman, Democratic Institutions. Back.

Note 255: Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies in Advanced Industrial States (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Back.

Note 256: Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the danger of war," International Security vol. 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38. Back.