Terrorism in the Name of Religion _*

Introduction:

On February 25, 1994, the day of the second Muslim sabbath during Islam's holy month of Ramadan, a zionist settler from the orthodox settlement of Qiryat Arba entered the crowded Ibrahim (Abraham's) Mosque, located in the biblical town of Hebron on the West Bank. He emptied three 30-shot magazines with his automatic Glilon assualt-rifle into the congregation of 800 Palestinian Muslim worshippers, killing 29 and wounding 150, before being beaten to death. A longstanding follower of the radical Jewish fundamentalist group, the Kach movement , ₂ Baruch Goldstein were motivated by a complex mixture of seemingly inseparable political and religious desiderata, fuelled by zealotry and a grave sense of betrayal as his Prime Minister was "leading the Jewish state out of its God-given patrimony and into mortal danger." ₃ Both the location and the timing of the Hebron massacre were heavily infused with religious symbolism. Hebron was the site of the massacre of 69 Jews in 1929. Also the fact that it occured during the Jewish festival of Purim symbolically cast Goldstein in the role of Mordechai in the Purim story meting out awesome revenge against the enemies of the Jews. ₄ Israeli Prime Minister Yithzak Rabin, speaking for the great mass of Israelis, expressed revulsion and profound sadness over the act committed by a "deranged fanatic". However, a large segment of militant and orthodox Jewish settlers in West Bank and Gaza settlements portrayed Goldstein as a righteous man and hailed him as a martyr. ₅ During his funeral, these orthodox settlers also voiced religious fervor in uncompromising and militant terms directed not only against the Arabs but also against the Israeli government, which they believed had betrayed the Jewish People and the Jewish state.

Israeli leaders and the Jewish community tried to deny or ignore the danger of Jewish extremism by dismissing Goldstein as belonging, at most, to "the fringe of a fringe" ₆ within Israeli society. Sadly, any doubts of the mortal dangers of religious zealotry from within were abruptly silenced with the assassination of the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a young Jewish student, Yigal Amir, who claimed he had acted on orders of God. He had been influenced by militant rabbis and their halalic  rulings, which he interpreted to mean that the "pursuer's decree" was to be applied against Israel's leader. ₇ Most Israelis may be astonished by the notion of a Jew killing another Jew, but Prime Minister Rabin was ultimately the victim of a broader force which has become one of the most vibrant, dangerous and pervasive trends in the post-Cold War world: religiously motivated terrorism.

Far afield from the traditionally violent Middle East, where religion and terrorism share a long history ₈ , a surge of religious fanaticism have manifested itself in spectacular acts of terrorism across the globe. This wave of violence is unprecedented, not only in its scope and the selection of targets, but also in its lethality and indiscriminate character. Examples of these incidents abound: in an effort to hasten in the new millenium, the Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyuo , released sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo underground in June last year ₉ ; the followers of Sheikh 'Abd al-Rahman's al-Jama'ah al-Islamiyya, ₁₀ caused mayhem and destruction with the bombing of Manhattan's World Trade Center and had further plans to blow up major landmarks in the New York City area; and two American white supremacists carried out the bombing of a U.S. Government building in Oklahoma City. ₁₁ All are united in the belief by the perpetrators that their actions were divinely sanctioned, even mandated, by God. Despite having vastly different origins, doctrines, institutions, and practises, these religious extremists are unified in their justification for employing sacred violence either in efforts to defend, extend or revenge their own communities or for millenarian or messianic reasons. ₁₂ This article seeks to explore these reasons for the contemporary rise in terrorism for religious motives and to identify the triggering mechanisms that bring about violence out of religious belief in both established and newly formed terrorist groups.

The Wider Trend of Religious Terrorism

Between the mid-1960s and the mid-1990s, the number of fundamentalists movements of all religious affiliations tripled worldwide. Simultaneously, as observed by Bruce Hoffman, there has been a virtual explosion of identifiable religious terrorist groups from none in 1968 to today's level, where nearly a quarter of all terrorist groups active throughout the world are predominantly motivated by religious concerns. ₁₃ Unlike their secular counterparts, religious terrorists are, by their very nature, largely motivated by religion, but they are also driven by day-to-day practical political considerations within their context-specific environment. This makes it difficult for the general observer to separate and distinguish between the political and the religious sphere of these terrorist groups.

Nowhere is this more clear than in Muslim terrorist groups, as religion and politics cannot be seperated in Islam. For example, Hizb'allah or Hamas operate within the framework of religious ideology, which they combine with practical and precise political action in Lebanon and Palestine. As such, these groups embrace simultaneously short-term objectives, such as the release of imprisoned members, and long-term objectives, such as continuing to resist Israeli occupation of their homelands and liberating all "believers". This is further complicated with the issue of state-sponsorship of terrorism: Religious terrorist groups become cheap and effective tools for specific states in the advancement of their foreign policy political agendas. They may also contain a nationalist-seperatist agenda, in which the religious component is often entangled with complex mixture of cultural, political, and linguistic factors. The proliferation of religious extremist movements has also been accompanied by a sharp increase in the total number of acts of terrorism since 1988, accounting for over half of the 64,319 recorded incidents between 1970 and July 1995. ₁₄ This escalation by the religious terrorists is hardly surprising given the fact that most of today's active groups worldwide came into existence very recently. They appeared with a distinct and full-fledged organisational apparatus. They range from the Sikh Dal Khalsa and the Dashmesh organisations, formed in 1978 and 1982 respectively; ₁₅ the foundation of the Shi'ite Hizb'allah movement in Lebanon in 1982; to the initial emergence of the militant Sunni organisations, known as Hamas and Islamic Jihad, in conjunction with the 1987 outbreak of the Palestinian Intifada as well as the establishment of the Aum Shinrykou in the same year.

The growth of religious terrorism is also indicative of the fact that the transformation of contemporary terrorism into a method of warfare and the evolution of the tactics and techniques used by various groups, as a reaction vast changes within the local, regional and global environment over the last three decades. These changes can be seen in numerous incidents, from the spate of hijackings by secular Palestinian terrorists and the mayhem of destruction caused by left- and rightwing throughout Europe, to today's unprecedented global scope and level of religious extremism.

The evolution of today's religious terrorism has neither occured in a vacuum nor represent a particularly new phenomenon. It has, however, been propelled to the forefront in the post-Cold war world, as it has been exacerbated by the explosion of ethnic-religious conflicts and the rapidly approaching new millenium. ₁₆ The accelerated dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural cohesion within and between societies with the current globalization process, combined with the historical legacy and current conditions of political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval common among disparate religious extremist movements, have all lead to an increased sense of fragility, instability and unpredicatability for the present and the future. ₁₇ The current scale and scope of religious terrorism, unprecedented in militancy and activism, is indicative of this perception that their respective faiths and communities stand at a critical historical juncture: Not only do the terrorists feel the need to preserve their religious identity, they also see this time as an opportunity to fundamentally shape the future. ₁₈ There are a number of overlapping factors that have contributed to the revival of religious terrorism in its modern and lethal form at the end of the millenium. At the same time, it is also possible to discern a number of patterns and features which are found in all religious terrorist groups across different regions and faiths. These features serve not only to define the cause and the enemy but also fundamentally shapes the means, methods, as well as the timing of the use of the violence itself.

The Causes and the Enemies of Religious Terrorists

A survey of the major religious terrorist groups in existence worldwide in the 1990's would reveal that almost all experience a serious sense of crisis in their environment, which has either led to an increase in the number of groups recently formed and caused an escalation in their activities. This crisis mentality in the religious terrorist's milieau is multifaceted, at once in the social, political, economic, cultural, psychological and spiritual sphere. At the same time, it has been greatly exacerbated by the political, economic, and social tumult, resulting in a sense of spiritual fragmentation and radicalization of society experienced worldwide in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the extremist's "fear of the forced march toward 'one worldism'." ₁₉ Yet, this sense of crisis, as a perceived threat to their identity and survival, has been present to varying degrees throughout history. It has led to recurring phases of resurgence in most faiths. In these revivals, the believers use the religion in a variety of ways: they take refuge in the religion, which provides century-old preserved ideals by which to determine goals; they find physical or psychological sanctuary against repression; or they may use it as a major instrument for activism or political action. Thus, religious terrorists perceive their actions as defensive and reactive in character and justify them in this way. ₂₀ Islam's jihad , for example, is essentially a defensive doctrine, religiously sanctioned by leading Muslim theologians and fought against perceived aggressors, tyrants, and "wayward Muslims". In its most violent form, it is justified as a means of last resort to prevent the extinction of the distinctive identity of the Islamic community against the forces of secularism and modernism. As outlined by Sheikh Fadlallah, chief ideologue of Hizb'allah: "When Islam fights a war, it fights like any other power in the world, defending itself in order to preserve its existence and its liberty, forced to undertake preventive operations when it is in danger." ₂₁ This is echoed by Sikh extremists, who advocate that, whilst violence is not condoned, when all peaceful means are exhausted, "you should put your hand on the sword." ₂₂ The defensive character of protecting one's faith through religious violence is also evident in the Sikh's fear of losing their distinct identity in the sea of Hindus and Muslims. ₂₃ In the United States, the paranoid outlook of white supremacist movements is driven by a mixture of racism, anti-Semitism, as well as mistrust of government and all central authority. ₂₄ This sense of persecution is also visible among the Shi'ites as an historically dominant theme for 13 centuries, manifest in the annual Ashura processions by the Lebanese Hizb'allah, commemorating the martyrdom of Imam Husayn. This event and mourning period have been used as justification and as a driving force behind its own practise of martyrdom through suicide attacks. ₂₅

Other than a few strictly millenarian or messianic groups (such as Aum Shinrikyuo or some Christian white supremacist movements), almost all the contemporary terrorist groups with a distinct religious imperative are either offshots or on the fringe of broader movements. As such, militant extremists' decision to organize, breakaway or remain on the fringe are, to a large extent, conditioned by the political context within which they operate. Their decisions are shaped by doctrinal differences, tactical and local issues, and the degree of threat they perceive secularization pose to either their cause. This threat of secularization may come either from within the movements themselves and the environment within which they come into contact, or from outside influences. If the threat is external, it may amplify their sense of marginality within, and acute alienation from, society. It may also fuel the need to compensate for personal sufferings through the radical transformation of the ruling order. ₂₆ The internal threat of secularization is often manifest in an vociferous and virulent rejection of the corrupt political parties, the legitimacy of the regime, and also the lackluster and inhibited character of the exisiting religious establishment. Thus, religious terrorism serves as the only effective vechicle for violent political opposition. ₂₇ As explained by Kach's leader, Baruch Marzel, "(w)e feel God gave us in the six-day war, with a miracle, this country. We are taking this present from God and tossing it away. They are breaking every holy thing in this country, the Government, in a very brutal way." ₂₈ Similarily, as voiced by the late Palestinian Islamic Jihad's leader, Fathi al-Shaqaqi, with reference to the Gaza-Jericho agreement between the PLO and Israel: "Arafat has sold his soul for the sake of his body and is trying to sell the Palestinian people's soul in return for their remaining alive politically." ₂₉ The religious terrorist groups' perception of a threat of secularisation from within the same society is also manifest in the symbolism used in the selection of their names, indicating that they have an absolute monopoly of the revealed thruth by God. It is, therefore, not surprising that some of the most violent terrorist groups over the last decade have also adopted names accordingly: Hizb'allah (Party of God), Aum Shinrykuo (The Supreme Truth) and Jund al-Haqq (Soldiers of Truth). These names also endow them with religious legitimacy, historical authenticity, and justification for their actions in the eyes of their followers and potential new recruits. They also provide valuable insight into their unity of purpose, direction and degree of militancy, with names like Jundallah (Soldiers of God), Hamas (Zeal), to Eyal (Jewish Fighting Organization) and Groupe Islamique du Arme (Armed Islamic Group) which promises unabated struggle and sacrifice.

The threat of secularization from foreign sources is also the catalyst for springing religious terrorists into action. Intrusion of secular values into the extremist's own environment and the visible presence of secular foreign interference provoke self-defensive aggressiveness and hostility against the sources of these evils. This is especially true against colonalism and neo-colonialism by Western civilizations or against other militant religious faiths. These defensive sentiments are often combined with the visible emergence and presence of militant clerical leaders. Such leaders have a more activist and militant ideologies than the mainstream movement from which they have emerged as either clandestine instruments or breakaway groups. It is often the case that these clerical ideologues and personalities acts as a centrifugal force in attracting support, strengthening the organisational mechanisms and in redefining the methods and means through terrorism. At the same time, they provide theological justification, which enables their followers to pursue the sacred causes more effectively and rapidly. The so-called spiritual guides, who ultimately overlook most political and military activities while blessing acts of terrorism, can be found in almost all religious terrorist groups: Examples include: Hizb'allah's Sheikh Fadlallah and Hamas' Sheikh Yassin, the militant Sikh leader Sant Bhindranwale and Aum Shinrikyo's leader, Shoko Ashara.

Most active terrorist groups with a religious imperative were actually propelled into existence in reaction to key events. These events either served as a catalyst or inspirational model for the organisation or gravely escalated the perception of the threat of foreign secularization, or for messianic or millinerian groups, a heightened sense that time was running out. The latter is evident in the growth and increased activism of doomsday cults, awaiting the imminent apocalypse, whose self-prophetic visions about the future have triggered them to hasten the new millenium. ₃₀ This messianic anticipation, for example, was clearly evident in the attack on the Grand Mosque of Mecca in 1979 (the Islamic year 1400) by armed Muslim militants from al-Ikhwan, who expected the return of their Madhi. ₃₁ The formation of Lebanese Hizb'allah can be attributed to the context of the civil war environment and the inspiring example of Ayatollah Khomeini's Islamic revolution in Iran. However, it was Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and the subsequent foreign intrusion in the form of the western-led Multinational Forces (MNF) that served as a catalyst for Hizb'allah's actual organizational formation and which to this day has continued to fuel its militancy and religious ideology. Similarly, the 1984 desecration by the Indian army of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, Sikhism's holiest shrine, lead not only to the assassination of prime minister Indira Gandhi in revenge, but also to a cycle of endless violence between the warring faiths, which hitherto has claimed over 20,000 lives. ₃₂

In many ways, religious terrorists embrace a total ideological vision of an all-out struggle to resist secularization from within as well as from without. They pursue this vision in totally uncompromising holy terms in literal battles between good and evil. Ironically, for example, there is a great degree of similarity between the stands of the Jewish Kach and Islamic Hamas organisation: Both share a vision of a religious state between the Jordan River and the Mediterrenean Sea; a xenophobia against everything alien or secular which must be removed from the entire land and a vehement rejection of western culture. This distinction between the faithful and those standing outside the group is reinforced in the daily discourse of the clerics of these terrorist groups. The clerics' language and phraseology shapes the followers' reality, reinforcing the loyalty and social obligation of the members to the group and reminding them of the sacrifices already made, as well as the direction of the struggle. ₃₃ In this task, many religious terrorist groups draw heavily upon religious symbolism and rituals to reinforce the sense of collectiveness. Examples of this emphasis on collectivity include the local street reputation of fighters of the underground military wing of Hamas, famous for never surrendering to arrest, ₃₄ the growth of Hamas martyrology, which lionizes martyrs with songs, poems and shrines, ₃₅ and the frequent symbolic burning and desecration of Israeli and American flags by several Islamic groups across the Middle East. This collectiveness is also reinforced by the fact that any deviation or compromise amounts to treachery and a surrender of the principles of the religious faith is often punishable by death.

The sense of totality of the struggle for these religious warriors is one purely defined in dialectic and cosmic terms as believers against unbelievers, order against chaos, and justice against injustice, which is mirrored in the totality and uncompromising nature of their cause whether that cause entails the establishment of Eretz Israel, an Islamic state based on shari'a  law or an independent Khalistan ("Land of the Pure"). As such, the religious terrorist perceive their struggle as all-out war against their enemies. This perception, in turn, is often used to justify the level and intensity of the violence. For example, this theme of war is continously detectable in the writings and statements by the terrorists, as exemplified by Yigal Amir's justification for assassinating Rabin ₃₆ ; or by Article 8 of Hamas' manifesto justifying that jihad  is its path and that "[d]eath for the sake of Allah is its most sublime belief."

This totality of the struggle naturally appeals to its acutely disenfranchized, oppressed, and alienated communities with the promises of change and the provision of constructive alternatives. Unlike their recent historical predecessors, like the fringe al-Jihad organisation which assassinated the Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1981, ₃₇ many of the existing religious terrorist cells are different in that they can often complement their violence with realistic alternatives to secular submission. This is especially true at grassroots level, due to the penchant for organisation inherent in religion and the backing of a vast network of resources and facilities. ₃₈ This has meant that some religious terrorist groups are not solely relying on violence, but also have gradually built an impressive constitutency through a strategy of "re-Islamization or re-Judaization from below" ₃₉ The political dimension is complemented with terrorism in confrontation with the enemy or in defense of the sacred cause. This is a process which began in the early 1970s and culminated in the 1990s with a visible shift in strategy among groups, from relying on terrorism while re-Islamizing their environment to complementing terrorism with the use of the electoral process to advance their sacred causes.

Religious terrorism also offers its increasingly suffering and impatient constituents more hope and a greater chance of vengance against the sources of their historical grievances than they would otherwise have. This is most effectively illustrated by the 1985 Sikh inflight bombing of an Air India airliner, causing 328 deaths, as well as by Hizb'allah's twin suicide-bombings of the U.S. Marine barracks and the French MNF headquarters in Beirut in 1983, killing 241 and 56 soldiers respectively. Violent acts give these groups a sense of power that is disproportionate to their size. The basis for this feeling of power is enhanced by a strategy of anonymity by the religious terrorist which confuses the enemy. In other words, the covernames are used according to where the religious terrorists have come from and where they are heading. Terrorists of the Muslim faith, particularly Shi'ite groups, employ a wide variety of covernames (in the Shi'ite case rooted in history with the notion of taqiyyah, or dissimulation) in efforts to protect their communities against repression or retaliation by the enemy after terrorist acts. ₄₀ Yet, these covernames reveal significantly the currents or directions within movements in alignment with their struggles. ₄₁ As such, the religious terrorist tend "execute their terrorist acts for no audience but themselves." ₄₂ Although the act of violence in and of itself is executed primarily for the terrorists own community as a sign of strength, it naturally embodies wider elements of fear in their actual or potential enemy targets. The perpetrators adeptly exploit this fear by invoking religious symbolism, such as the release of videotaped images of an endless pool of suicide bombers, ready to be dispatched against new targets.

While the religious extremists uniformly strick at the symbols of tyranny, they are relatively unconstrained in the lethality and the indiscriminate nature of violence used, as it is conducted and justified in defence of the faith and the community. Reflecting the dialectic nature of the struggle itself, various religious terrorist groups also refer to their alien or secular enemies in de-humanizing terms which may loosen the moral constraints for them in their employment of particularly destructive acts of terrorism. ₄₃ As explained by an extremist rabbi in conjunction with the funeral of Baruch Goldstein: "there is a great difference in the punishment becoming a person who hurts a Jew and a person who hurts a gentile...the life of a Jew is worth much more than the lives of many gentiles." This moral self-purification points to the belief that the perpetrators view themselves as divinely "chosen people", who not only possess religious legitimacy and justification for their propensity for violence, but also often act out of the belief that the violence occurs in a divinely sanctioned juncture in history. For example, the Japanese cultleader Shoko Ashara and his followers believed the world would end in 1997 and launched a sarin nervgas attack on Tokyo's subway system to hasten the new millenium. ₄₄

In fact, the lack of any moral constraints in the use of violence cannot only be attributed to the totality of the struggle itself but also to the preponderance of recruits of young, educated and newly-urbanized men (often with very radical, dogmatic, and intolerant worldviews), in contemporary religious terrorist organizations. ₄₅ This increased militancy of a younger generation of religious terrorists can be explained by both the fragmentation of groups into rival splinter factions and also the killing or imprisonment of key founding leaders and ideologues. ₄₆ Apart from removing the older generation of terrorist leadership, the experience of persecution and imprisonment has lead to the radicalization of younger recruits into the organisations. ₄₇ Also there seems to be an inverse relationship between size and militancy. ₄₈ The Shi'ite terrorist groups are more prone to martyrdom than their Sunni counterparts, due to their different historical legacies and to the more powerful role of Shi'ite clergymen in directly interceeding between man and God. However, some Sunni groups have recently broken the mold, as evident in the unprecedented series of 13 Hamas suicide-attacks inside Israel (which killed 136 people between 6 April 1994 and 4 March 1996) after the Hebron massacre and, to a lesser extent, the foiled plan by the GIA to explode its hijacked Air France plane over metropolitan Paris in December 1994. However, as explained by Sheikh Fadlallah: "[t]here is no difference between dying with a gun in your hand or exploding yourself. In a situation of struggle or holy war you have to find the best means to achieve your goals". ₄₉ While the resort to martyrdom by certain groups can be explained by the heightened sense of threat to the groups and their causes within their own environment, it can also be explained by an increasing level of internationalisation between groups both in terms of contact, similarity of causes and as examples of strategies. This is particularly evident among Muslim terrorist groups. For example, many foreign Algerian, Egyptian and Palestinian Muslim extremists have participated alongside the Mujahedeen fighters in the Afghanistan conflict. They trained with these Afghan fighters and supported them both physically and ideologically in a war "as much about the forging of a new and revolutionary social order as about national liberation." ₅₀ As a significant example of a revolutionary cause within a Sunni context, as opposed to the more narrow Shi'ite example of the Iranian revolution, the Afghan conflict served as a training ground for their own struggles during the 1980s: Following the collapse of communism, these fighters returned to their respective countries to radicalize the Islamic struggle at home, resorting to increasing violence in the process, either within existing movements or as splinter groups. Yet, the mechanisms of unleashing acts of religious terrorism, in terms of intensity, methods and timing, are tightly controlled by the apex of the clerical hierarchy and most often dependent on their blessing. This was clearly demonstrated in the 1984 Gush Emunim plot to blow up the Temple Mount (or Dome of the Rock), Islam's third holiest site, in part for messianic reasons (to cause a cataclysmic war between Jews and Muslims to hasten the coming of the Messiah) and in part to foil the return of Jewish sacred land to Arabs in return for peace under the Camp David accord. This act of terrorism never materialized due to the lack of rabbinical backing. ₅₁ Similarly, the role of the spiritual leaders within Islamic terrorist organisations is equally pivotal, as displayed by the central role of Sheikh Omar 'Abd al-Rahman of the Egyptian Jama'at al-Islamiyya in issuing the directive, or fatwa , for both the 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat and the 1993 bombing of New York's World Trade Center. ₅₂ As such, in most cases the strictly hierarchical nature of religious terrorist groups with a highly disciplined structure and obedient cadres means not only that the main clerical leaders command full control over the political as well as military activities of the organisation but also that the strategies of terrorism are unleashed in accordance with general political directives and agendas. ₅₃

Yet, the use and sanctioning of religious violence requires clearly defined enemies. The newly-formed religious terrorist groups today do not appear in a vacuum nor are their members naturally born into extremism. The identity of the enemy and the decision to use religious violence against them are dependent on, and shaped by, the heightened degree of the sense of crisis threatening their faiths and communities. This, in turn, is influenced by the historical legacy of political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval, and may be exacerbated by ethnic and military disputes. This sense of grievance is uniquely experienced between the faiths and the individual groups, as well as in alignment with the political strategies and tactics adopted to confront them according to local, regional and international contexts. Internally, this militancy may be directed against the corruption or injustices of the polictical system, or against other religious communities; externally, it may be focused against foreign influences, which represent a cultural, economic, or political threat to the respective religious communities. The West, particularly the United States as well as Israel, tends to be the favourite target of this militancy, especially by terrorists of the Muslim faith. ₅₄

Anti-Western sentiments and intense hostility towards Israel for the Muslim terrorist is the result of the historical legacy of political oppression and socio-economic marginalization within the Arab world. These hostilities are combined with the discrediting of secular ideologies and the illegitimacy of current political and economic elites, especially after the 1967 defeat of the Arabs by Israel. ₅₅ This sense of crisis has been exacerbated by the Arab-Israeli conflict which served to reinforce a Muslim inferiority complex due to the inability of either Arab regimes or secular Palestinians to defeat Israel. Simultaneously, the West is perceived to practising neocolonialism through its Israeli surrogate and its unqualified support for existing "un-Islamic" and "illegitimate" regimes across the Arab world. As such, the Islamist movements and their respective armed "terrorist" wings have gradually propelled themselves to the forefront of politics as the true defender of the oppressed and dispossessed and as the only effective spearhead against Israel's continued existence in the heart of Muslim territory and against the West's presence and interference in the region. Apart from the obvious religious dimensions of the loss of Palestine to Zionism, Muslim militants draw heavily on the symbolism of the historical legacy of the Crusades, pitting Christendom against Islam, to explain their current condition of oppression and disinheritance, and to provide workable solutions and defences against the threat of western encirclement and secularization. ₅₆ The Muslim terrorists rework these historic religious symbols to fit present-day conditions as a vechicle to inspire political action and revolutionary violence against its enemies.

While the identity of the enemy is deeply rooted in both distant and recent history, the turn towards, and the direction of, terrorism by militant Muslim movements against foreign enemies have been following distinct phases according to changes in the political and ideological context in the region. These phases are directly influenced by the Iranian revolution in 1979, the Muslim resistance struggle led by the Mujaheedin against the Soviets in Afghanistan, the electoral victory of the Front Islamique du Salut (FIS) in Algeria (1990 to 1991), and the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles in September 1993. The Iranian revolution provided a revolutionary model of Islam and inspired Islamic movements to seriously challenge existing regimes at home. Additionally, the internationalization of Muslim terrorist violence against the West and Israel during the 1980s supported Iran's efforts to export the revolution abroad and was a cost-effective instrument to change the foreign policies of Western states hostile towards the Islamic Republic. ₅₇ The Lebanese Hizb'allah movement in particular, was very useful to the Iranian regime in achieving these ends. It also provided Iran with the opportunity to participate, both indirectly and militarily, in the Arab-Israeli conflict. ₅₈ Additionally, Muslim fighters in Afghanistan during the 1980s forged important networks between various groups and individuals which accelerated the activism among Muslim groups on the homefront when these fighters returned home. The FIS electoral victory in Algeria demonstrated to Muslim terrorist groups that they could use the ballotbox rather than relying solely on bullets in efforts to come to power in various Arab states. The election's subsequent nullification by the Algerian military junta led to radicalization of the Islamists and their turn towards terrorism against the state itself and the French government for extending support.

Simultaneously, the gradual resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict threatens the pan-Islamic goals of militant Islamic movements of liberating Jerusalem. This threat has led to accelerated co-ordination between Islamic terrorist groups in efforts to sabotage the peace process, and an increased militancy and confrontation against the West, Israel, and supportive Arab regimes. At the same time, the political wings of these terrorist groups seek to continue and extend the process of re-Islamization of society from below. The confluence of these factors over the last two decades has accelerated the militancy of the Muslim terrorist while it clearly demonstrates that they are closely attuned to changes in the local, regional, and international environment, as well as very adept to reformulating their strategies for political and military action accordingly in efforts to protect, extend or revenge their religious communities.

The Means, Methods, and Timing of the Religious Terrorist

In comparison to their secular counterparts, the religious terrorists have not been particularly inventive when it comes to using new types of weaponry in their arsenals, instead relying on the traditional bombs and bullets. ₅₉ Yet the religious terrorists have demonstrated a great deal of ingenuity in terms of the tactics used in the selection of means, methods and timing of violence to cause maximum effect. They have utilized the notion of martyrdom and self-sacrifice through suicide-bombings as a means of last resort against their conventionally more powerful enemies. The first time this tactic was employed by the Hizb'allah was against the American, French and later Israeli military contingents present in Lebanon in 1983. It was emulating the actions of the shocktroops of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in their war with Iraq. While the Hizb'allah clerics gradually encountered theological dilemmas in continuing the sanctioning of this method, as suicide is generally forbidden in Islam except for under exceptional circumstances, the Hamas movement felt compelled to adopt suicide-bombings in 1994 as a means of last resort in order to sabotage the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. ₆₀ They believed that its actual implemention on the ground would severely threaten Hamas revolutionary existence. The tactic of suicide bombing was also to take revenge against its "Zionist enemy" for the Hebron attack. While few terrorist groups adopt large-scale campaigns of sucicde missions, the religious terrorist utilizes the traditional methods of assassination, kidnappings, hijackings, and bombings in a skillful combination in alignment with the current political context on the local, regional, and international level. Despite the growth and array of religious terrorist groups with diverse demands and grievances, they are all united not only in the level and intensity of violence used, but also in the role played by religious symbolism in selecting the targets and the timing of the violence itself.

Many of these terrorist groups are compelled to undertake operations with a distinct political agenda for organisational reasons to release imprisoned members or eliminating opponents. Nonetheless, the targets are almost always symbolic and carefully selected to cause maximum psychological trauma to the enemy and to boost the religious credentials of the terrorist group among their own followers. This is clearly evident from the selection by Muslim terrorists of Western embassies, airlines, diplomats and turists abroad as symbolically stricking in revenge at the heart of their oppressors. This was evident in the selection of major New York City landmarks by Sheikh Rahman's followers or the multiple attacks by the Hizb'allah against U.S. diplomatic and military facilities. ₆₁ In many instances, these groups have adopted a multi-pronged approach of using terrorism. For example, in Algeria the FIS has targeted foreign tourists, businessmen and diplomats, as well as Algerian officials and other Algerians who engage in un-Islamic behaviour (e.g unveiled women or any form of Western culture). At the same time, it engages in the re-Islamization of society from below and simultaneously wages a war of attrition on French soil against symbolic civilian and official targets. In other cases, religious terrorists have used powerful symbolism to provoke deliberate reactions by the enemy, such as Dal Khalsa's severing of cows' heads outside two Hindu temples in Amritsar, which provoked massive disturbances between the Sikhs and the Hindus in April 1982. ₆₂ This type of symbolism is also seen in the 1969 arson attack on the al-Aqsa mosque in East Jerusalem by a Jewish extremist and the 1982 plan by Jewish fanatics to blow up Temple Mount in order to spark a cataclysmic war between Muslims and Jews. ₆₃

Finally, the timing of the violence by the religious terrorist is carefully selected to coincide with their own theological requirements or in attempts to desecrate their enemies religious holidays and sacred moments. For example, the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma by white supremacists were reportedly scripted after The Turner Diaries  , but also timed to "commemorate the second anniversary of FBI's assault on the Branch Davidian's Waco, Texas compound; [and] to mark the date 220 years before when the American revolution began at Lexington and Concord." ₆₄ Similarly, the symbolism of the timing of religious violence was also evident in the Algerian GIA's decision to hijacking an Air France plane during Christmas after the killing of two Catholic priests, or the cycle of violence by Hamas' suicide-bombings against Israel, occuring in February 1996, on the second commemoration of the Hebron massacre.

Conclusions

This article has sought to demonstrate that, contrary to popular belief, the nature and scope of religious terrorism is anything but disorganised or random but rather driven by an inner logic common among diverse groups and faiths who use political violence to further their sacred causes. The resort to terrorism by religious imperative is also not a new phenomenon but rather deeply embedded in the history and evolution of the faiths, which have gradually served to define the causes, the enemies as well as the means, methods and timing of the violence itself. As such, the virtual explosion of religious terrorism in recent times is part and parcel of a gradual process of what can be likened to neo-colonial liberation struggles, which has trapped religious faiths within meaningless geographical and political boundaries and constraints, and which has been accelerated by grand shifts in the global political, economic, military and socio-cultural setting, compounded by difficult local indigenous conditions for the believers. The uncertainty and unpredictability in the present environment as the world searches for a new world order, amidst an increasingly complex global environment with ethnic and nationalist conflicts, provides many religious terrorist groups with the opportunity and the ammunition to shape history according to their divine duty, cause, and mandate while it indicates for others that the end of time itself is near. As such, it is imperative to move away from treating this new religious force in global politics as a monolithic entity but rather seek to understand the inner logic of these individual groups and the mechanisms that produce terrorism in order to undermine their breeding ground and strength as they are here to stay. At present it is doubtful that the U.S. or any Western government are adequately prepared to meet this challenge.

*: "Terrorism in the Name of Religion"
Journal of International Affairs,
Summer 1996, 50, no.1.: pp.41-62
Copyright by The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York Back.

**: Magnus Ranstorp is a lecturer at the Department of International Relations at the Univeristy of St. Andrew's in Scotland and a senior research associate at the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, specializing in the dynamics of militant Islamic movements and their use of terrorism in the Middle East. Dr. Ranstorp is the author of Hizb'allah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage Crisis and has contributed to such periodicals as Terrorism and Political Violence and Jane's Intelligence Review. Back.

Note 1: I would like to acknowledge the invaluable research assistance of Mr. Michael Sand and Mr. David Claridge, both assistant data-base managers at the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, and the advice as well as assistance extended to me by Dr. Bruce Hoffman, who in many ways pioneered the study of religious terrorism. Back.

Note 2: The Kach movement was founded in 1971 by the ultra-orthodox American Rabbi Meir Kahane as he emigrated to Israel. The group calls for the establishment of a theocratic state in Eretz (Greater) Israel and the forced expulsion of Arabs. For a useful overview, see: Raphael Cohen-Almagor, "Vigilant Jewish Fundamentalism: From the JDL to Kach (or 'Shalom Jews, Shalom Dogs'), Terrorism and Political Violence Vol.4, No.1 (Spring 1992): pp.44-66; and Ehud Sprintzak, The Ascendance of Israel's Radical Right (New York, NY.: Oxford University Press, 1991). Back.

Note 3: "The Impossible Decision", The Economist, November 11-17, 1995, p.25 Back.

Note 4: For a discussion of Goldstein's decision to carry out the attack during Purim, see: Sue Fiskhoff, "Gentle, kind and full of religious fervor", Jerusalem Post, February 27, 1994; and Chris Hedges and Joel Greenberg, "A Seething Hate, a Gun, and 40 Muslims Died", New York Times, February 28, 1994, p.1-A. Back.

Note 5: One of Goldstein's rabbinical mentors, Rabbi Dov Li'or, described him in compassionate terms as a man "who could no longer take the humiliation and the disgrace. Everything he did was in honor of Israel and for the glory of God", see: Yediot Aharanot, March 18, 1994. Also see: Richard Z. Chesnoff, "It is a struggle for survival", U.S. News & World Report, March 14, 1994. Back.

Note 6: Charles Krauthammer, "Deathly double standard", Jerusalem Post, March 6, 1994. Back.

Note 7: Prior to Rabin's assassination, Yigal Amir had tried two previous times. For a very useful biography of the assassin, see: John Kifner, "A Son of Israel: Rabin's Assassin", New York Times, November 19, 1995. idem, "Israelis Investigate Far Right; May Crack Down on Speech", New York Times, November 8, 1995. One of these traditional exemptions for killing is Din Rodef, or Law of the Pursuer. The rule was first set forth in the 12th century by the great Moses Maimonides, a Spanish Jewish scholar. Going beyond the principle of self-defense, it states that even a witness to the act of someone's trying to kill another is allowed to kill the potential assassin. For Yigal Amir's use of the principle as a defense for killing Rabin, see: Raine Marcus, "Amir: I Wanted to murder Rabin", Jerusalem Post, March 16, 1996. Back.

Note 8: As aptly observed by David C. Rapoport in his seminal work, the words "zealot", "assassin" and "thug" all derive from historic fanatic movements within, respectively, Judaism, Islam and Hinduism, see: Bruce Hoffman, "Holy Terror": The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative (Santa Monica, CA.: RAND, P-7834, 1993): pp.1-2; and David C. Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling: Terrorism in Three Religious Traditions", American Political Science Review, 78(3): pp.668-672. For a useful historical overview, see: David C. Rapoport, "Why Does Religious Messianism Produce Terror?", in Paul Wilkinson and A.M. Stewart, Contemporary Research on Terrorism (Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1987): pp.72-88. Back.

Note 9: The attack on the Tokyo subway was the first recorded instance of a terrorist group committing mass murder with a weapon of mass destruction. The Aum Shinrikyou religious cult was established in 1987 by Shoko Ashara, a near-blind acupuncturist and yoga master, and is composed of a synthesized mixture of Buddhist and Hindu theology. For a useful brief biographical sketch of Ashara, see: James Walsh, "Shoko Asahara: The Making of a Messiah", Time, April 3, 1995. The Sarin nerve gas attack on Tokyo's subway killed 8 and injured over 5,500. Also see: Martin Wollacott, "The Whiff of Terror", The Guardian, March 21, 1995. Back.

Note 10: For a useful overview of al-Gamma al-Islamiyya and its activities in Egypt, see: Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics (London: Macmillan 1990). Back.

Note 11: See: Stephen Robinson, "The American Fundamentalist", Daily Telegraph, April 24, 1995. Back.

Note 12: For a very comprehensive discussion, see: Mark Juergensmeyer (ed.) "Violence and the Sacred in the Modern World", Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol.3, No.3 (Autumn 1991). Back.

Note 13: Bruce Hoffman, (1993), op.cit.: p.2 The year 1968 is widely recognized as the point of origin for modern international terrorism. It was the beginning of an explosion of hijackings from Cuba to the United States, as well as attacks against Israeli and Western airlines by various Palestinian groups. Also see: Barry James, "Religious Fanaticism Fuels Terrorism", International Herald Tribune, October 31, 1995: p.3. Back.

Note 14: See: "Algerian Terrorism: Some National, Regional and Global Perspectives", Prepared Statement by Professor Yonah Alexander Before The House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Africa, Federal News Service, October 11, 1995. This figure should be compared with 8339 acts of international terrorism during the period 1970 to 1994 with 3105 incidents occuring after 1988, see: RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism, Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence, University of St. Andrews, March 1996. Back.

Note 15: The Dashmesh (meaning "10th") organization was named after the Sikhs' last guru, Gobind Singh, who, in the eighteenth century, transformed the Sikh community into a warrior class by justifying force when necessary. Both the Dashmesh and the Sikh Dal Khalsa advocate the establishment of an independent Khalistan. Back.

Note 16: The emergence of ethnic-religious conflict over conventional inter-state warfare was illuminated by a 1994 report by the UN Human Development Programme (UNDP) in which only three out of a total of 82 conflicts worldwide was between states. See: Roger Williamson, "The Contemporary Face of Conflict - Class, Colour, Culture and Confession", in Jane's Intelligence Review Yearbook - The World in Conflict 94/95 (London: Jane's Information Group, 1995): pp.8-10. Also see: Julia Preston, "Boutros Ghali: 'Ethnic Conflict' Imperils Security", Washington Post, November 9, 1993: p.13. Also see: Hans Binnendijk & Patrick Clawson (eds.), Strategic Assessment 1995: U.S. Security Challenges in Transition (Washington, DC.: National Defense University Press, 1995); and Martin Kramer, "Islam & the West (including Manhattan), Commentary (October 1993): pp.33-37. Back.

Note 17: For the wider debate of the religious resurgence, see Scott Thomas, "The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Study of World Politics", Millenium, 24, no.2 (Summer 1995) and Peter Beyer, Religion and Globalization ( London: Sage, 1994). Back.

Note 18: As observed: "[a]t a time when no one knows precisely what form the future may take, the strength of fundamentalism lies in its ability to promise radical change without having to specify its outlines - since God is claimed as its guarantor", see: Mahmoud Hussein, "Behind the veil of fundamentalism", UNESCO Courier, December 1994: p.25. Also as stated by an ideologue of Jewish extremist group, Kahane Chai: "[w]e are accountable only to our Creator, to He who chose us for our mission in history." See: Amir Taheri, "Commentary: The Ideology of Jewish extremism", Arab News, March 12, 1994. Back.

Note 19: See: Robin Wright, "Global Upheaval Seen as Engine for Radical Groups", Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1995. Back.

Note 20: See: "Fundamentalism unlimited", The Economist, March 27 1993: p.67; and Mahmoud Hussein, "Behind the veil of fundamentalism", UNESCO Courier, December 1994. Back.

Note 21: Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah, "To Avoid a World War of Terror", Washington Post, June 4, 1986. As reiterated by Sheikh Fadlallah: "[w]e are not preachers of violence. Jihad in Islam is a defensive movement against those who impose violence." Laura Marlowe, "A Fiery Cleric's Defense of Jihad", Time, January 15, 1996. For further elaboration on this by Sheikh Fadlallah, see: al-Majallah, October 1-7, 1986. Back.

Note 22: This is often seen in the Sikh slogan: "The Panth (religion) is in danger". See Paul Wallace, "The Sikhs as a 'Minority' in a Sikh Majority State in India", Asian Survey, 26, no.3 (March 1986): p.363. Back.

Note 23: Laurent Belsie, "At a Sik temple, opinions reflect conflicting religious traditions", Christian Science Monitor, November 11, 1984. For a detailed discussion of the use of violence, see: Sohan Singh Sahota, The Destiny of the Sikhs (Chandigarh: Modern Publishers, 1970). Back.

Note 24: Bruce Hoffman, "American Right-Wing Terrorism", Jane's Intelligence Review, 7, No.7 (July 1995): pp.329-30. Back.

Note 25: See: John Kifner, "Shiite Radicals: Rising Wrath Jars the Mideast", New York Times, March 22, 1987. Back.

Note 26: This theme is developed by David Rapoport, "Comparing Militant Fundamentalist Movements", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (eds.), Fundamentalism and the State (Chicago, IL.: The University of Chicago Press, 1993). Back.

Note 27: See: Maha Azzam, "Islamism, the Peace Process and Regional Security", RUSI Journal (October 1995): pp.13-16. Back.

Note 28: See: New York Times, November 19, 1995. Back.

Note 29: Al-Hayah, May 4, 1994. Similarly, according to Hamas' manifesto: "Palestine is a Holy Muslim asset to the end of time, so that no man has the right to negotiate about her or to relinquish [any part of] her", see: Amos Oz, "Israel's far Right 'collaborates with Hamas in thwarting peace', The Times, April 11, 1995. Back.

Note 30: For a useful insight into the dynamics of cults, see: Richardo Delgado, "Limits to Proselytizing", Society (March/April 1980): pp.25-33; Margaret Thaler Singer, "Coming of the Cults", Psychology Today (January 1979): pp.73-82. Back.

Note 31: See: Robin Wright, "U.S. Struggles to Deal With Global Islamic Resurgence", Los Angeles Times, January 26, 1992. Back.

Note 32: For a useful overview, see: Pranay Gupte, "The Punjab: Torn by Terror", New York Times, August 9, 1985; Vijah Singh, "Les sikhs, une secte traditionnelle saisie par le terrorisme", Liberation, November 1, 1984. Back.

Note 33: For example, this uncompromising position is clearly evident by Hamas' own charter in article 11: "the land of Palestine is an Islamic trust (waqf) to be maintained by succeeding generations of Muslims until the Day of Judgement. In this responsibility, or any part of it, no negligence will be tolerated, and no surrender." Mithaq Harakat al-Muqawamah al-Islamiyah (Hamas). (1988) Back.

Note 34: See: Michael Kelly, "In Gaza, Peace Meets Pathology", New York Times, November 27, 1994: p.56. Back.

Note 35: See: Michael Parks, "Ready to Kill, Ready to Die, Hamas Zealots Thwart Peace", Los Angeles Times, 25, October 1994: p.A10. For interesting insight into mentality of suicide-bomber, see: Joel Greenberg, "Palestinian 'Martyrs', All Too Willing", New York Times, January 25, 1995; and Ma'ariv, 30 December 1994: p.8. For an example of this martyrolog with an extensive list of Izzeldin al-Qassem martyrs since 1990, see: Filastin al-Muslimah, November 1994: p.14. Back.

Note 36: In a statement in Israeli court, Amir provided the justification: "[w]hen you kill in war, it is an act that is allowed", see: Russell Watson, "Blame Time", Newsweek, November 20, 1995. As explained by Amir: "I did not commit the act to stop the peace process because there is no concept as the peace process, it is a process of war", see: Mideast Mirror, November 6, 1995. Back.

Note 37: For a useful overview of the incident, see: Jihad B. Khazen, The Sadat Assassination: Background and Implications, Monograph (Washington, DC.: Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, November 1981); and Dilip Hiro, "Faces of Fundamentalism", The Middle East, May 1988: pp.11-12. Back.

Note 38: See: Robert Fisk, "'Party of God' develops its own political style", Irish Times, February 9, 1995. Back.

Note 39: For a very interesting discussion of this phenomenon, see: Gilles Keppel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity and Judaism in the Modern World (London: Polity Press, 1995). Back.

Note 40: For a useful exposition of concealment in Shi'ism, refer to lecture by Prof. Etan Kohlberg, Hebrew University, delivered at the Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel, May 23, 1993. Back.

Note 41: See: Maskit Burgin; Merari, A; and Kurz, A. (eds.) Foreign Hostages in Lebanon, JCSS Memorandum no.25 - August 1988 (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1988). Back.

Note 42: Bruce Hoffman, (1993), op.cit.: p.3. Back.

Note 43: See: Bruce Hoffman, "'Holy Terror': The Implications of Terrorism Motivated by a Religious Imperative", in A.Woodcock; & A. Christensson; et.al. (eds.) The First International Workshop on Low Intensity Conflict (ILIC '95) (Stockholm: Royal Society of Naval Sciences, 1995): p.43. Back.

Note 44: See: Andrew Pollack, "Cult's Prophesy of Disaster Draws Precautions in Tokyo", New York Times, April 15, 1995; and Andrew Brown, "Waiting for the End of the World", The Independent, March 24, 1995. Back.

Note 45: For example, a survey of imprisoned members of the Egyptian group al-Takfir wal-Hijra (Repentance and Holy Flight) revealed that the average member was in his 20s or early 30s, a university student or recent graduate; had better than average marks in school work; felt intensily about causes while intolerant of conflicting opinions; and a willingness to employ violence if necessary. See: Ray Vicker, "Islam on the March", Wall Street Journal, February 12, 1980. For a similar profile of Sikh terrorists, see: Carl H. Yaeger, "Sikh Terrorism in the Struggle for Khalistan", Terrorism, Vol.14 (1991): p.227. Also see: Hala Mustafa, "The Islamist Movements Under Mubarek", in Laura Guazzone (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamic Movements in the Contemporary Arab World (Reading: Ithaca Press, 1995): p.173. Back.

Note 46: For example, see: Paul Wilkinson, "Hamas - An Assessment", Jane's Intelligence Review (July 1993): pp.313-14; and Ziad Abu-Amr, Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza (Indiana, IN.: Indiana University Press, 1994). Back.

Note 47: As demonstrated in the case of Egypt, "Jihad and other movements were born in [former Presidents] Nasser's and Sadat's prisons", see: Robin Wright, "'Holy Wars': The Ominous Side of Religion in Politics", Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 1987: p.21. Also see: Halafa Mustafa ( 1995), op.cit.: p.174. Back.

Note 48: Richard Hrair Dekmeijan, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985): p.61-2. Back.

Note 49: Nader George, Middle East Insight, (June-July 1985). Back.

Note 50: See: Anthony Davis, "Foreign Combatants in Afghanistan", Jane's Intelligence Review, (July 1993): p.327. Also see: Raymond Whitaker, "Afghani veterans fan out to spread the word - and terror", The Independent, April 16, 1995. Back.

Note 51: For a detailed discussion of this plan, see: Ehud Sprinzak, "Three Models of Religious Violence: The Case of Jewish Fundamentalism in Israel", in Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (1993), op.cit.: pp.475-76. As stated by Sprinzak: "There has been no act by the Jewish underground which did not have a rabbinical backing." Yediot Aharanot, March 18, 1994. Back.

Note 52: See: Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Muslim Edicts Take on New Force", New York Times, February 12, 1995; and Philip Jacobson, "Muhammad's Ally", The Times Magazine, December 4, 1993.See: Youssef M. Ibrahim, "Muslim Edicts Take on New Force", New York Times, February 12, 1995; and Philip Jacobson, "Muhammad's Ally", The Times Magazine, December 4, 1993. Back.

Note 53: For example, see: Ma'ariv, February 28, 1996; Ze'ev Chafets, "Israel's Quiet Anger", New York Times, November 7, 1995. Back.

Note 54: As revealed by Hizb'allah's manifesto in 1985, "Imam Khomeini, the leader, has repeatedly stressed that America is the reason for all our catastrophes and the source of all malice. By fighting it, we are only exercising our legitimate right to defend our Islam and the dignity of our nation." See Hizb'allah's manifesto reprinted in Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Shi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987): pp.167-87. See also: Martin Kramer, "The Jihad Against the Jews", Commentary (October 1994): pp.38-42. Back.

Note 55: For example, see: David Wurmser, "The Rise and Fall of the Arab World", Strategic Review (Summer 1993): pp.33-46. Back.

Note 56: See: Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995). Back.

Note 57: For example see: Alvin H. Bernstein, "Iran's Low-Intensity War Against the United States", Orbis, Vol.30 (Spring 1986): pp.149-167; and Sean K. Anderson, "Iran: Terrorism and Islamic Fundamentalism", in Edwin G. Corr & Stephen Sloan (eds.) Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World (Oxford: Westview Press, 1992): pp.173-195. Back.

Note 58: See: Magnus Ranstorp, Hizballah in Lebanon: The Politics of the Western Hostage-Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1996). Back.

Note 59: See: Bruce Hoffman, (1993), op.cit. Back.

Note 60: See: Martin Kramer, "The Moral Logic of Hizbollah", in Walter Reich (ed.), Origins of Terrorism: Psychologies, Ideologies, Theologies, States of Mind (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990): pp.131-57. Back.

Note 61: See: Robert M. Jenkins, "The Islamic Connection", Security Management (July 1993): pp.25-30. Back.

Note 62: See: Revolutionary & Dissident Movements of the World (Harlow: Longman Group, 1991): p.141. Back.

Note 63: See: Mir Zohair Husain, Global Islamic Politics (New York, NY.: Harper Collins, 1995): pp.186-200. Back.

Note 64: Bruce Hoffman, "Intelligence and Terrorism: Emerging Threats and New Security Challenges in the Post-Cold War Era", Intelligence and National Security, Vol.11, No.3 (April 1996): p.214. For a broader discussion of millenarian terrorism, see Michael Barkun (ed.) Millenialism and Violence (London: Frank Cass, 1996). Back.