The Korean Peninsula: Preserve the Past or Move Toward Reconciliation  

THE KOREAN PENINSULA – TOWARD RECONCILIATION

The Cold War and the Soviet Union are history, Germany and Vietnam are united, NATO has expanded into Eastern Europe, and the United States and Russia have achieved reconciliation. One would think that by now we could have found a peaceful solution to the problems on the Korean peninsula. Obviously, we have not. Instead, it has taken two years just to bring North Korea into the Four Party Talks process. Why does the Cold War continue on the Korean peninsula?

Alas, we never seem to move beyond history when it comes to dealing with the future of the Korean peninsula. A possible explanation is that all the disputing parties feel compelled to cling to the past when arguing their present positions each time they gather to attempt a reconciliation of their differences. Then too, all sides have been stuck in the rut of trying to understand each others' previous positions and consequently work to formulate solutions wedded to the past. Not surprisingly, this process yields little progress toward a better future. Common sense suggests that cherishing past positions and practices will most likely only repeat their earlier consequences.

Old Wine – New Bottle

For almost two years, North and South Korea and the United States have put aside tinkering with their respective positions on areas of common disagreement and instead sought to establish a new forum for addressing their differences. South Koreans, uncomfortable with the US–DPRK bilateral negotiations over the nuclear issue because they felt left out, came up with the idea of four party talks. Pyongyang responded hesitantly until the inducements to attend outweighed other considerations. Two years of intense effort and considerable inducements finally brought Pyongyang to the Four Party meeting in Geneva in December. Discussion of the substantive issues, however, has yet to begin, but already the main participants have reiterated their long cherished positions on security issues. The first plenary session of the Four Party Talks apparently resembled sipping old wine from a new bottle.

In the case of the Korean peninsula, a new recipe would appear to be in order, certainly more so than trying to construct a new process, or simply tinkering with the mix of carrots and sticks. But before suggesting a new recipe, we would do well to untangle a few things from the past.

The problem of the Korea peninsula is not solely a "regional" issue, a perspective oft stated in Washington. We would do well to recognize that the situation on the peninsula is more complex and has the potential to adversely affect nations far beyond Northeast Asia. The geopolitical reality of the Korean peninsula, its location at the nexus of superpower interests, plus the peninsula's political division into contending northern and southern halves, creates three concentric circles of issues which are of varying degrees of concern to different nations. Ultimately, however, the concerns caused by these issues resonate far beyond the Korean peninsula and in some cases take on global dimensions.

Korea's Reunification – A Matter of Self Determination

First, Korea's reunification is obviously the priority concern of Koreans north and south, and they share the primary responsibility for achieving national unification. This is not to say that they should be left alone as they wrestle with this problem, but the issue of reunification is of greater immediacy to Koreans than to Americans, Chinese, Japanese and Russians. These world powers should recognize this, and tacitly agree to only advise Koreans about the issues of reconciliation and reunification, and not to assert to Koreans a particular formula for resolution of their differences. Ultimately, Korea's reunification will prove possible only when the Koreans have achieved reconciliation between themselves in their own fashion.

Korea's reunification, in other words, is a matter of self determination for Koreans. Seoul and Pyongyang since their first joint statement of July 4, 1972, in the Basic Agreements both signed in Pyongyang in September 1992, and as recently as the first plenary session of the Four Party Talks in December 1997 have repeatedly asserted that the issue of their national reunification is a matter of self determination. The foreign powers external to the Korean peninsula therefore need to recognize and respect this principle, and strain any impulses they may harbor to become directly involved in the process of Korea's reunification.

Koreans both north and south, on the other hand, should admit that thus far they have achieved mixed results and would do well to seek the advice of their allies and neighbors. The two Korean governments also would do well to reflect on their past dialogue and strive to develop a new blend of previously successful and as yet untried practices. ROK President–elect Kim Dae–jung's offer to resume North/South dialogue is a constructive step that North Korea should respond to positively if it is sincere about pursuing reconciliation.

Security – A Regional Concern

Koreans would also do well to recognize that preservation of peace on the Korean peninsula is, at a minimum, a regional matter with potentially global ramifications. The possibility of hostilities there poses a threat to peace and stability throughout Northeast Asia, possibly even beyond since each Korea has aligned itself with a different military power – Seoul with the US. and Pyongyang with China. Japan is also concerned because it hosts a significant portion of US forces forward deployed in the western Pacific. The recently expanded US–Japan Defense Guidelines intensify Japan's interest in seeing peace preserved on the Korean peninsula, primarily because US bases in Japan might become the target of North Korean ballistic missiles if war were to erupt on the peninsula. Then too, the United States projected the Korean security problem onto the global geo–political stage by taking it to the United Nations Security Council in 1950. The move was understandable in the context of the era, but it now appears dated since the Cold War has become history, and Seoul has normalized diplomatic relations with Moscow and Beijing. Yet Washington perpetuates the linkage between the issue of Korean security and Cold War geo–politics by preserving the UN Command (UNC) in Seoul, and by continuing to claim the role of UN Commander–in–Chief (CINCUNC) for the US Army.

Proliferation's Global Significance

The Korean Peninsula's global significance to the superpowers as a stage upon which to prove the superiority of their respective political and economic systems has waned since the Cold War's end, but the two Koreas have yet to escape from this divisive legacy. This legacy, at least in part, helps explain North Korea's pursuit of an ability to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. Urged on and assisted by their respective superpower champions, Seoul and Pyongyang competed to establish one another's' lack of legitimacy and morality, as well as the superiority of their respective political and economic systems. Eventually Seoul excelled in the development of representative government, but only after decades of authoritarian rule, and succeeded first in integrating its economy into the international market. Seoul acquired skill in utilizing support from the United States and various international organizations as well as access to international markets to develop diplomatic leverage in its competition with North Korea. Subsequently, Seoul was better able than Pyongyang to project itself as a diplomatically and commercially sophisticated member of the international community.

North Korea, isolated by U. S. sponsored diplomatic and economic boycotts, channeled its resources into building an impressive military–industrial complex. The DPRK, perceived as a renegade by most nations in the UN, excelled in the use of coercion to assert its interests. Pyongyang between 1968 and 1988 routinely threatened, and frequently used brut force against the South and even the US. The list of such occasions is impressive: the infiltration of a commando unit into Seoul in an attempt to assassinate President Park in 1968 and the Pueblo Incident in which the North Korean navy captured a US intelligence gathering ship, the assassination of President Park's wife in 1974 by a North Korean sympathizer, the so–called "ax murders" of US military personnel at Panmunjom in 1976, Rangoon in 1983 and the bombing of Korean Air flight 858 in 1987. Here it is important to note that in the 1980's North Korea began to project its use force against South Koreans beyond the Korean peninsula and in the process earned for itself the label of international terrorist.

Even more dangerous to world peace has been North Korea's development of a ballistic missile capability and possible effort to acquire a nuclear weapons capability during the 1980's. By 1990, Pyongyang had the ability to de stabilize peace not only in Northeast Asia, but globally by exporting ballistic missiles and technology to the Middle East, and by threatening to withdraw from the international nuclear non–proliferation protocol while developing the ability to manufacture the essential ingredients for nuclear weapons.

Our Primary Goal – The DPRK's Conversion or Its Elimination?

Accurately assessing the scope and magnitude of the problems on the Korean peninsula can help us prioritize our goals. Everyone agrees to the oft repeated goals, "peace and stability " on the Korean peninsula and "reunification". Unfortunately, these goals have taken on an increasingly hollow resonance because they have been to often recited without concrete explanation of how we intend to achieve them. Again this ritualization of our goals would appear to be a remnant of the Cold War which would best be replaced with precise delineation of the steps we intend to take toward attaining peace and stability on the Korean peninsula. In the process, we would also do well to recognize that the process should be multilateral, both in terms of defining the intermediate and longer term steps and the negotiating process.

Firstly, Washington and Seoul need to determine their priorities. Broadly speaking, what are they: to end North Korea's threat to world and regional peace through the proliferation of ballistic missiles, preserve the status quo created by the Armistice in 1953 and its affiliated institutions like the UN Command, or to nudge North Korea away from its present dependence on coercive diplomacy and integrate it gradually into the international community while formulating a new security arrangement for the Korean peninsula? What is the future of the Agreed Framework?

Washington seems to vacillate between the old and new. Some in Washington, particularly at the Department of State, emphasize the new, i.e. North Korea's conversion into a responsible member of the international community. After the Agreed Framework of October 1994, State moved away from inducing the DPRK'S cooperation and toward linkage and reciprocity. The results were disappointing; progress toward the opening of liaison offices ground to a halt, as did negotiations about the missile and terrorism issues. Since 1997, State has returned to emphasizing inducements , commonly referred to as "carrots". Inducements of food aid did bring North Korea into the Four Party Talks process, but whether they can convince North Korea to relinquish its ability to undermine peace remains to be seen. Possibly most important when dealing with North Korea is the credibility of the offer to deliver the inducement in a timely manner, not merely their apparent appeal. This is particularly important now given the uneven pace of the lifting of economic sanctions, and the problems of funding the heavy fuel oil and reactor construction program so central to the Agreed Framework.

The Pentagon does not publicly oppose State's current preference for "carrots", but key policy officials at the Department of Defense seem fairly confident that North Korea will inevitably self destruct by imploding or exploding. Either way, these officials seem to be suggesting that negotiating now with North Korea and giving it food and fuel only prolongs its inevitable demise. This collapse scenario may be more a delayed reaction to what happened in Eastern Europe a decade ago than current developments on the Korean peninsula.

Likewise, key components in the Pentagon seem preoccupied with clinging to the past rather than pursuing ways to create a durable peace in Northeast Asia. Thus the Pentagon's priorities center on preserving the UN Command (UNC), the Military Armistice Commission (MAC) and the presence of US forces in Korea. All of this is done in the name of peace through deterrence. Not mentioned is the contradiction that an apparently collapsing North Korea is an increasingly dangerous military opponent. Another bed rock assumption is that North Korea is incapable of being converted from its old ways. Paradoxically, this view is at odds with contemporary developments in Eastern Europe where in the unchangeable East Germans have become capitalist loving Germans and the ruthless Soviets are becoming the democracy respecting Russians.

Overseeing the verbal dueling between the State and Defense Departments is a National Security Council (NSC) which seems to treat foreign policy more like an academic debate than a dynamic process. Rather than pursuing initiatives and policy goals, the NSC appears satisfied with "going with the flow" of daily world events. In the new world of a single superpower, this may be acceptable since there is no need for a global strategy to deal with a contending superpower. On the other hand, it does not take a superpower to wreck havoc in either the Middle East or on the Korean peninsula. Peace, and US national interests, especially on the Korean peninsula, would seem to be better served by having an NSC that resolves the differing view points between State and Defense, and establishes clear policy priorities and strategies for moving toward a more durable peace in Northeast Asia.

If anything, Seoul has vacillated far more than Washington in terms of its policy toward North Korea. Kim Young Sam's preferences have closely resembled those of the Pentagon, but the key characteristic has been inconsistency. Seoul claimed the initiative with its formulation of the Four Party Talks proposal but then balked when Washington advocated inducing Pyongyang to the negotiating table. Instead, Seoul became preoccupied in 1997 with North Korea's perceived collapse. Seoul now champions the Armistice, although it refused to sign it in 1953. As for the Armistice, Seoul has been more concerned with procedural rather than substantive issues and with accusing North Korea of ignoring the 1992 Basic Agreements than with fulfilling its commitments under those agreements. All the while, Seoul opposes direct military to military talks between the US and DPRK unless they are concluded within the Military Armistice Commission.

We need not dwell on Seoul's past policies because president–elect Kim Dae Jung seems willing to pursue policies very different from those of his predecessor. He has already seized the initiative by offering to resume North/South dialogue. Removing the National Security Planning Agency (NSP) from this process could improve prospects for its resumption since the NSP's central role in North/South dialogue is a Cold War antique that has proven in recent years to be more an obstacle to rather than a facilitator of progress in the dialogue.

South Korea's economic woes probably will also hamper efforts to induce Pyongyang to the negotiating table, especially if Seoul proves unable in 1998 to follow through on promises made in 1997 aimed at inducing the DPRK to join the Four Party Talks process. On the other hand, quite possibly Seoul has over emphasized the significance of economic inducements to Pyongyang and under rated the importance of security related "carrots"

But before Washington and Seoul re–engage Pyongyang, they would do well to first get their act together. That is, they need to jointly prioritize their policy objectives, determine who has the lead on which issues, and come up with a common strategy to attain their goals.

A good starting point for the two allied capitals would seem to be whether they in fact want to first reduce the scope of North Korea's threat to peace, both globally and regionally, or move first on the Korean peninsula away from the Armistice and toward a new peace arrangement?

As for the Armistice, it was after all intended to be a temporary arrangement established under the auspices of the United Nations. Clearly, several key elements of the Armistice have become dysfunctional. For example, both sides openly import weapons from abroad, particularly South Korea. Seoul, which is not a party to the Armistice, heads the Military Armistice Commission. The UN Command is a misnomer since the commander reports to the US president, not to the UN Secretary General and because the UN has not authorized the command to do anything for nearly half a century.

Seoul signaled by its signing of the 1992 Basic Agreement with Pyongyang a readiness to negotiate a new peace arrangement (the wording both sides agreed upon), and Washington commended the move. At issue therefore is not just the terms of the new peace arrangement, but the future of US forces now stationed in South Korea. Logically speaking, the implementation of a new peace arrangement between the two Koreas must determine whether US forces are to remain, depart, or be posted in both Koreas. Ruling out discussion of this issue will only prolong the current uncertainly about US intentions regarding the Korean peninsula and the earnestness of its avowed goal of converting the present state of hostility into a more durable peace.

In short, can Washington and Seoul realistically expect Pyongyang to forego its ability to de stabilize peace, both globally and regionally, without themselves committing to at least a gradual phasing out of US troops on the Korean peninsula?

North Korea' Objectives

North Korea's goals remain a subject of debate in Washington and Seoul, and possibly also in Pyongyang. Some would argue that North Korea's priority is the forceful reunification of the Korean peninsula. Others would claim its foremost objective at present is the survival of the incumbent regime and its ideology, as well as restoration of the DPRK's economic vitality. Given Pyongyang's current economic weakness, inability to feed its population, dependence on China for crude oil, and lack of resolute support from Russia, North Korea would seem ill prepared to risk war now or in the foreseeable future. Instead, the wiser course for the DPRK would appear to be one of remaining focused on striving to survive. Most long term American, Korean and Chinese observers of Korean affairs seem to agree that regime survival and economic recovery are North Korea's primary objectives.

North Korea seems to have been most willing to move away from hostility and toward more civil conduct when the US and ROK worked to lessen its isolation and to draw Pyongyang into the world community. Quite possibly North/South dialogue began in 1971 as a consequence of Washington's initial steps to end the policy of containment in East Asia when Henry Kissinger visited Beijing. The impressive progress made in North/South dialogue in 1991 came after ROK President Noh Tae–woo offered to engage North Korea on a broad range of issues and after the US launched its "modest initiative", which established the first formal diplomatic channel between Washington and Pyongyang and slightly relaxed US economic sanctions. A crucial step was the admission of both Koreas into the United Nations in 1991. Eventually, the package of inducements in the US–DPRK Agreed Framework of 1994 convinced North Korea to freeze its nuclear program and to cooperate with the International Atomic Energy Agency. Likewise, the inducement of food aid brought North Korea into the Four Party talks process.

Moving Beyong History

Our interest in peace on the Korean peninsula, and effort to reduce North Korea's threat to global and regional peace, would appear to be best served by recognizing and accepting Pyongyang's determination to survive. As noted earlier, the question of reunification is the responsibility of the Korean people. It therefore follows that the Korean people should determine themselves through peaceful dialogue whether the two Koreas should merge or continue to coexist.

Consequently, the United States would do well to forego further discussion about the pros and cons of North Korea's survival, and publicly clarify its primary goals through high level public statements. If in fact the US priority is to convince North Korea through negotiations that it should relinquish its potential to threaten world peace through weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, we then need to consistently pursue a strategy that gradually shifts from perpetuating North Korea's diplomatic and economic isolation to a policy of drawing Pyongyang into the international community. The pace of this integration, of course, would be determined in accordance with the pace and magnitude of the DPRK relinquishment of its ability to threaten global and regional peace. Once such a determination has been firmly resolved in Washington and Seoul, we will be able to assure North Korea that our aim is its integration into he international community, not its elimination from it.

Only then can we expect North Korea to facilitate progress toward our goals. All too quickly we have forgotten that the crucial ingredients in "suspending" North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non–proliferation Treaty (NPT) in June 1993 were US assurances "against the threat and use of force, including nuclear weapons" against North Korea and the promise of "mutual respect for each other's sovereignty." (US–DPRK Joint Statement of June 11, 1993). This painfully learned lesson best not be forgotten if future negotiations are to move us closer to our goals.

A New Recipe

Given the continuing impasse between Seoul and Pyongyang, and Washington and Pyongyang, a new approach would seem to be in order. Seoul and Washington, however, despite their repeated urging of North Korea to reform its political and economic systems, persist in championing the diplomatic and security status quo. Paradoxically, Pyongyang appears more willing than either Seoul or Washington, to pursue a new course regarding the security arrangement and international relationships surrounding the peninsula.

Maybe it is time for Washington and Seoul to formulate a new recipe for addressing the security issues on the Korean peninsula that might:

0. Take into account the fact that the problems of the Korean peninsula have global, regional and bilateral North/South ramifications. The highest levels of the Clinton Administration therefore need to become far more visibly concerned with and involved in the process of resolving these problems. It also needs to define realms of responsibility for resolving the issues, i.e. reunification is for the Koreans to resolve, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is an issue for the US to play the leading role; but in close, substantive consultation with the numerous other nations whose national interests are directly affected by this issue. Where appropriate, trilateral (Washington, Seoul and Tokyo), multilateral (MTCR and NPT member nations) might be drawn into the negotiating process and called upon to contribute to the basket of inducements to be offer to North Korea. These inducements could encompass the full range of diplomatic and commercial normalization between the concerned nations and North Korea.

1. The negotiations could occur in tandem, with Washington focusing on negotiations with Pyongyang over global issues while Seoul engages Pyongyang on issues of primarily bilateral concern such as implementation of the Basic Agreements of 1992. Four party talks could focus on security issues in Northeast Asia, but with the possible modification that eventually Tokyo and Moscow would be included in this process. The aim here would be to minimize the global and regional dimensions of the Korean problem while also working to replace the military, political and economic rivalry between North and South Korea with economic cooperation and the reunion of separated families, among other things. Ultimately the complications of the problems would be reduced to the bilateral process of Seoul and Pyongyang working toward reconciliation.

2. The proposed solutions to each category of issues should be presented as a package deal — an all or nothing agreement — with a comprehensive plan of action in which each primary participant contributes something of equivalent value toward both resolution of the issue and toward implementation of the solution.

A Level Playing Field

Early on some procedural rules need to be spelled out to ensure a level playing field for the two Koreas. History has shown that when one Korea feels inferior to or perceives a threat from the other, negotiations falter. The foremost priority must be the resolution of problems, not a contest to establish one Korea's ascendancy, legal or otherwise, over the other. Nor is the question of legitimacy of one government relative to the other to be a concern. On the contrary, both Koreas should be accorded the same status as sovereign nations. This should not be difficult since the admission of both Koreas into the United Nations in 1991 essentially bestowed sovereignty and equality of legitimacy on Seoul and Pyongyang. The North/South Basic Agreements, furthermore, provide for mutual respect of one another's systems of government.

South and North Korea should recognize that their survival is best served by working together toward the common goal of unification, not toward asserting their ascendancy over one or the other with the help of an ally. Each capital needs to begin communicating this reality to their citizens. And governments concerned about peace in the region need to impress this need upon the two Koreas while ceasing to facilitate rivalry between Seoul and Pyongyang.

Just as the two Koreas must recognize the limits of their sovereignty over only half of the Korean peninsula, so too must the United States recognize that there are times and issues in which a multilateral approach is more appropriate than a unilateral or bilateral one. The United States did so during the nuclear negotiations with North Korea by consistently and closely consulting with the UN Security Council, leadership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and the governments in Seoul and Tokyo. Success in those negotiations would appear to be, to a significant degree, the consequence of such a willingness on the part of the US. Of at least equal value was the US recognition that its long standing policy of unilateral containment in East Asia needed to be converted into broadly based international consortium concerned with preservation of the global nuclear non–proliferation regime. Eventually this realization produced the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO).

A similar approach might prove appropriate regarding North Korea's proliferation of ballistic missiles and other weapons of mass destruction. Thus far, however, the US has defined this matter as a bilateral, US–DPRK issue. Two years of on again, off again talks have yet to yield any results. A multilateral approach to the missile issue could have the added advantage of increasing the number of nations that could contribute a broader range of inducements for concessions of equivalent value by North Korea.

Also early on it would seem appropriate to affirm what is to be discarded or carried forward from the past. A solid beginning would be reaffirmation of the Agreed Framework as part of the multilateral process to minimize the scope of North Korea's potential to undermine world peace. The US would do well in 1998 to convene talks in Washington at the vice minister/under secretary level to review progress on implementation of the Agreed Framework. The US would do well to recognize North Korea's cooperation with the nuclear spent fuel storage project cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency by relaxing selected sanctions, possibly by allowing US firms to join their ROK partners in joint ventures in the DPRK. Then too, North/South dialogue could resume with reaffirmation of the Basic Agreements of 1992.

New Recipe for Global Issues

Issues of global magnitude could be addressed first to reduce the scope of the threat posed by North Korea's ability to threaten peace, but would not have to be resolved before other issues could be addressed. Beginning with issues like Pyongyang's production of weapons of mass destruction could greatly reduce the magnitude of the North Korean threat, while at the same time diminish security problems in the Middle East and South Asia currently intensified by Pyongyang's export of missiles to these regions. In Washington, the concerns of the US Congress and of the American public about North Korea's future military intentions will also have been significantly assuaged. Hopefully, this would reduce Congressional reservations about the Administration's efforts and allow the NSC greater flexibility in formulating its plan of action and mix of inducements. Likewise, Pyongyang's priority concern, survival, will have also been addressed because in the process of convincing it to forego weapons of mass destruction, inducements involving resources vital to its survival can be provided.

Actually, this process began in 1993 when the UN Security Council invited member nations to assist with the resolution of the nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula. The United States, with the full support of Seoul and Tokyo, stepped forward and successfully engaged North Korea over the question of nuclear proliferation. A similar process could be extended to ending North Korea's production and export of ballistic missiles, and possible production of chemical and biological weapons. As with the nuclear issue, the United States would take the lead in negotiations with Pyongyang, possibly at the behest of signatories to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to convey to the DPRK that the US position is backed by a broad international consensus. Selected MTCR members could form inspection teams to ensure compliance with the MTCR on both sides of the DMZ.

Subsequently, each major step the DPRK eventually takes to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction and ability to produce them would be matched with inducements not just from the US, but also from all the other concerned nations such as Israel, Japan, South Korea and eventually even the European Union.

As a first step, Seoul could commit itself to discontinuing its own missile development program and, simultaneously with North Korea, follow the same steps expected of North Korea which means the dismantling of its own missile facilities, periodic inspections and signing of the MTCR. Additionally, the United States would commit itself to the removal of its missiles and launch facilities from the Korean peninsula. Furthermore, a bilateral ROK–DPRK freeze on the importation and exportation of any and all weapons would be implemented, and the US, China, Japan, and Russia would pledge to respect and to enforce the freeze.

To replace North Korea's lost earnings from its missile exports, the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, Israel and the European Union would relax barriers to their nationals' investment in North Korea's mining industry, provide North Korea modern mining technology and machinery at concessional rates, and fund training programs for engineers and technicians in North Korea's mining and minerals. These nations, together with South Korea and China, would also support North Korea's admission to international financial organizations like the International Monetary Fund and the Asian Development Bank.

A similar approach could be taken regarding the issue of terrorism, except here Japan instead of the United States would take the lead in the negotiations. Again, a multilateral negotiating team including Japan, the United States, possibly South Korea, and a member of ASEAN would present North Korea with a package proposal. In addition to reiterating its public pledge to forego terrorism to promote its national policies, North Korea would cease encouraging and condoning its nationals' distribution of counterfeit currencies, drugs and other international contraband. North Korea would be called upon to release to Japanese authorities members of the Japanese Red Army still resident in North Korea and respond concretely to Japanese government inquiries concerning the possible kidnapping of Japanese citizens by North Korean nations.

In recognition of North Korea's agreement to these stipulations, Japan, the United States and South Korea would discontinue all economic sanctions imposed because of past terrorist activities by the DPRK, make grant and loans available to North Korea to improve its agricultural production and public health programs both through training programs and the acquisition of new technology and equipment in both areas. China could be called upon to provide funding to upgrade North Korea's irrigation and sanitary water systems.

The accumulative affect of this multilateral diplomacy could be a win–win situation for all involved. The problems of the Korean peninsula would be significantly reduced in scope and their potential to disrupt international peace. The MTCR would be strengthen by the inclusion of both Koreas. The security of Israel, Japan and South Korea would be further assured. At the same time, the steps taken by the international community in recognition of Pyongyang's concessions would assure North Korea that the aim of multilateral diplomacy is not the end of North Korea but its conversion from a renegade outlaw state to a fully integrated and respected member of the international community.

Addressing Regional Security Issues

At issue here is more than a shared desire for peace. Clearly, Beijing, Washington, Seoul and Pyongyang would prefer peace over war. The problem, obviously, is how to reach this mutual goal. The current Four Party Talks forum would appear to be an appropriate forum for resolving regional security issues in that it brings the primary antagonists together. Unfortunately, however, each party seems equally resolute in clinging to the past. For example, the US objectives appear aimed more at preserving the unstable status quo rather than working to achieve a more stable new order on the Korean peninsula. Apparently the US position is to: maintain the Armistice, preserve the UN Command and the Military Armistice Commission, yet at the same time improve relations among the participants. Forty years of working through the MAC has yet to improve relations among the participants.

As the party with the least to lose, the United States would appear best positioned to move first with an innovative proposal. Rather than contest North Korea's demand that US troops leave the Korean peninsula, the US could announce its willingness to remove its forces from the peninsula once North Korea had created the appropriate conditions there for a phased withdrawal. The US should also offer to dismantle the UN Command and the Military Armistice Commission (MAC), once the appropriate conditions exist. All that would be required of the US would be to reiterate the original temporary intent of both the UNC and the MAC and to call on North Korea to take concrete steps toward reducing the threat to peace on the peninsula. On North Korea's part, it would have to conclude a peace arrangement with South Korea before the US would even consider the phased withdrawal of its troops.

Frankly, nothing is gained by insisting on the preservation of the UNC and the MAC. These are remnants of the Korean and Cold Wars. Progress toward peace dictates the need for innovative diplomacy, not preservation of the past. Seoul may feel quite uncomfortable with such an initiative, but a careful reading of President–elect Kim Dae–jung's writings on these issues strongly indicates his willingness to support such initiatives.

Again, we should not allow our perceptions of the future to be held captive by the past policies of either Washington or Seoul. For Washington, the time is ripe to forego Cold War policies like containment and the preservation of the UNC and the MAC. All too quickly we have forgotten that the end of Team Spirit did not, as many in the Pentagon argued, unravel our ability to deter war on the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, it reduced the potential threat of nuclear proliferation and war, conventional and otherwise.

Once again, our concessions should be presented as part of a package deal that could include:

• the ROK and DPRK reaffirmation of the Basic Agreements of 1992; followed by trilateral reaffirmation by the US, ROK and DPRK of the Agreed Framework;

• North/South reactivation of the Joint Military Commission provided for in their Basic Agreement for the purpose of negotiating a new bilateral peace arrangement (Chinese and US observers would attend all negotiating sessions);

• the initiation of trilateral US/ROK/DPRK military to military talks aimed at replacing the Armistice with a new, temporary peace mechanism pending the conclusion of a permanent, bilateral North/South peace arrangement. The peace arrangement would be consistent with the practices and precedents of Armistice, and aimed solely at preserving peace along the Demilitarized Zone;

• DPRK military teams would begin observing US and ROK field exercises, and US–ROK teams would start to observe DPRK military exercises;

• the US would dismantle the MAC once a new peace mechanism has been put into effect;

• the US would pledge the phased withdrawal of all combat personnel from the ROK as soon as a North/South peace arrangement has been concluded, and would assume responsibility for organizing an international peace keeping force that would assume responsibility for policing the DMZ as US ground forces are withdrawn from the peninsula.

• North and South Korea would phase out their air forces and initiate a simultaneous reduction of their ground forces until each side has no more than 100,000 military personnel.

• the US, China, Russia and Japan would agree among themselves to work together to ensure North and South Korean compliance with all pertinent international agreements such as the NPT and MTCR, among other appropriate agreements, and not to intervene militarily on the Korean Peninsula once North and South Korea have concluded a permanent, bilateral peace arrangement.

Conclusion

Creating durable peace on the Korean peninsula requires a phasing out of the old and its replacement with a new arrangement. The old order was born of war, both the Cold War and the Korean War. The superpower and nuclear rivalry between Washington and Moscow; military, diplomatic and commercial rivalry between Seoul and Pyongyang; the policies of containment and deterrence; and the Armistice with its MAC and UNC are all remnants of war. Peace requires that they be discarded and replaced with innovative solutions and institutions.

But first we need to recognize the significance of the endeavor, otherwise it will linger in the shadows of our minds till a crisis of potentially global proportions brings painful memories of what might be. Korea is not merely a regional problem involving a divided nation. Korea is the only place on earth where the concerns of all the leading powers come together in tense, tentative balance. We need to address the problems there with the appropriate sense of urgency, commitment, resources and clarity of goals and methods.

There needs to be a clear definition of realms of responsibility for resolving the problems there. The United States is best equipped to address the issues of global magnitude such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Koreans should assume responsibility for their own reconciliation and reunification. Clearly, regional security is the primary responsibility of the major powers in the region, the US and China, but one shared by the two Koreas and of keen concern to Japan and Russia.

Our goals could easily become one of converting North Korea from a renegade nation dependent on coercion to assert its interests to a nation that is an increasingly responsible member of the international community. This would require that we phase out our prior goals of containing and isolating it diplomatically and commercially while deterring it from armed invasion and terrorism.

We need to recognize that Pyongyang's determination to survive is our best negotiating card. In extending to it the means to survive, we should insist on it relinquishing its means to threaten peace. Our best inducements, therefore, are not necessarily economic ones as long assumed. Actually, addressing North Korea's security concerns could prove more fruitful over the long term. Rather than clinging to the remnants of the Cold War, such as the Armistice and its supporting institutions, we could offer to phase them out as North Korea does similarly with its weapons of mass destruction capability.

Placing the initial emphasis on shrinking North Korea's ability to de stabilize the world far beyond the Korean peninsula has several potential benefits. It would address the concerns of many nations, allowing the US to tap these nations' for diplomatic and commercial inducements, in the process enlarging and making more appealing the basket of inducements Washington can offer Pyongyang. Reducing the magnitude of the problem to first regional and eventually peninsular proportions would very likely strengthen Congressional and public support, both in Washington and Seoul, for a process that relies on inducements rather than coercion to gain North Korea's cooperation in integrating itself into the international community. Ultimately, the Koreans will have to achieve their own reconciliation on a peninsula that is no longer a stage for Cold War superpower rivalry.

Our other option is a rather bleak one: persist with the old policies of containment and deterrence. They served us well during the Cold War, but they cannot produce a durable peace on the Korean peninsula. Their perpetuation more than likely will also perpetuate North Korea's ability to threatening peace, not just on the Korean peninsula but globally.

This is our choice. We need to make a decision on which way we want to go. Only then should be expect others to follow us.