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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 08/04
U.S. Arms Transfers to America’s Newest “Major Non–NATO Ally”
Andrew Prosser
Center for Defense Information
May 2004
U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell announced on March 18, 2004, that Pakistan would be named a “major non–NATO ally” (MNNA) of the United States, a designation whose formal benefits encompass closer military–to–military ties with the United States as well as access to certain American defense equipment. Observers have correctly characterized MNNA status as a generally symbolic and placatory gesture, rather than indicating any substantial policy shift toward the designee country. As Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi note, “U.S. State Department officials, congressional analysts and other experts in Washington see MNNA status high in symbolism and low in substance.” 1 Powell’s own comments support such an understanding of the declaration for Pakistan, as he told reporters on his flight from Pakistan after making the announcement: “(i)n some instances, (MNNA status) is more symbolic than practical. . . I don’t know if Pakistan (will) be able to take great advantage of it.” 2
The MNNA designation represents a tool to recognize, formalize, and encourage the continuation of a cooperative relationship with a U.S. military partner; it does not typically embody a qualitatively new relationship, nor is it an indication that the U.S. will automatically arm a country with significantly more advanced technology than it already has in its arsenal. 3 With regard to Pakistan, the United States has already been supplying the government of President Pervez Musharraf with modern military hardware since the terrorist attacks in the United States Sept. 11, 2001.
In autumn of that year, a dramatic shift in U.S. Pakistan policy brought about the waiving of sanctions, 4 previously imposed on the Musharraf government due to Pakistan’s development and testing of nuclear weapons and the military coup that brought Musharraf to power in 1999. The removal of the sanctions cleared the way for the administration of U.S. President George W. Bush to secure Pakistan’s cooperation in fighting international terrorism and to equip its military with the technology and training viewed as essential by the U.S. administration for Pakistan to carry out counterterrorism operations, particularly near the Afghan border. Since late 2001, this U.S. position has endorsed multiple billions of dollars in military and economic assistance packages to the Musharraf regime, and has supported the delivery of modern U.S.–made weaponry to Pakistan’s military forces. 5
At the same time, the declaration of MNNA status for Pakistan does present the prospect of a variety of potential unintended consequences, owing to the unique combination of Pakistan’s relations with its Indian neighbor, Pakistan’s internal political situation, and the potential for undesired use of any advanced weapons sent to the country. Furthermore, the United States is not the only provider of military hardware to South Asia, and the MNNA status can only serve to encourage other suppliers to reduce their own export restraint to a region that has a dangerous history of escalatory confrontations and conflict.
Background: Major Non–NATO Ally Status
Two different types of “major non–NATO ally” status exist under U.S. law. The Bush administration is currently formalizing both types of MNNA status for Pakistan. 6 One definition of the term is found in Title 10 of the U.S. Code (10 U.S.C. 2350a), which outlines a process whereby the secretary of defense may designate a country as an MNNA, entitling the country to various benefits:
| Countries designated by the secretary of defense as “Major Non–NATO Allies” under Title 10 (10 U.S.C. 2350a) of the U.S. Code are eligible for these benefits: |
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Early recipients of Title 10 MNNA status, in the late 1980s, included Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (ROK), while Jordan (1996), Argentina (1998), New Zealand and Bahrain (2002), the Philippines and Thailand (2003), and Kuwait (2004) were later included under this provision.
The other definition of “major non–NATO ally” is delineated in Title 22 of the U.S. Code (22 U.S.C. 2321k), which encompasses the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (“FAA”; 22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.), as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act (“AECA”; 22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.). Under Title 22, the president must notify Congress 30 days in advance that a country will be designated a major non–NATO ally for purposes of the FAA and the AECA, granting eligibility for the following benefits:
| Countries designated as “Major Non–NATO Allies” under 22 U.S.C. 2321k, for purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act, are eligible for these benefits: |
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Australia, Egypt, Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand were the original recipients of Title 22 MNNA status in 1996, while Jordan (1996), Argentina (1998), Bahrain (2002), the Philippines and Thailand (2003), and Kuwait (2004) were later added to the list. The U.S. government has recently tended to seek simultaneous approval for both types of MNNA status for a given country.
Pakistan’s Arsenal and the Implications of MNNA Status
Since September 2001, the Bush administration has supported significant military assistance to Pakistan, justified and established according to the requirements for fighting terrorism. Since that time, the U.S. Congress has authorized administration requests for transfers to the Pakistan government that have included modern weapons platforms and equipment, such as 40 AH–1F “modernized Cobra” attack helicopters and 40 UH–1H “Huey” helicopters. Six C–130E “Hercules” transport aircraft, T–37B trainer aircraft, and night vision equipment have been sent to Pakistan. Congress has been advised of potential transfers of six AN/TPS–77 air surveillance radars, multi–band radios, as well as funds for P–3C airborne surveillance aircraft. 7 The list of proposed transfers also includes naval weapons and surveillance equipment, intended, according to the State Department, “for the tracking and interdiction of maritime drug smuggling and al Qaeda operatives.” 8
MNNA status may act to facilitate or expedite certain transfers that would take place regardless – for example, deliveries through the war reserve provision under Title 22, or transfers through the use of Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to commercially lease defense items, a practice legalized for MNNAs under Title 22. Joint U.S.–Pakistan counterterrorism research may also be a possibility (22 U.S.C. 2349aa–10). But administration officials have reiterated the minimal import of Pakistan’s MNNA status for the types of weapons transferred to Pakistan. 9
The administration currently prioritizes for Pakistan the delivery of spare parts to return previously purchased American weapons to operational status. Such weapons in Pakistan’s inventory include older model F–16 fighter aircraft, M113 armored personnel carriers, F–100 and T–56 jet aircraft, and radar systems. U.S. policy has concentrated since 2001 on providing equipment, service and training to augment Pakistani troop performance and mobility in difficult–to–access regions; troop transport vehicles, including helicopters, fixed–wing aircraft, ground vehicles, and parts and maintenance, have topped the list. As for depleted uranium munitions, for which MNNAs may receive U.S. foreign assistance to help cover the costs, the administration has expressed uncertainty whether such shells would be needed by Pakistani forces to carry out counterterrorist and border security missions. 10 Further, the provision of new model F–16 aircraft, or substantial component upgrades to Pakistan’s older F–16 inventory, may represent a politically sensitive issue that the Bush administration would prefer to avoid, at least in an election year.
Pakistan has asked for U.S. missile technology; however, any contribution to Pakistan’s missile programs would be a controversial violation of U.S. commitments under the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and could have serious effects on regional security and stability, as well as political implications in light of U.S. nonproliferation policies and Pakistan’s status as a nuclear state outside of the nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty (NPT). U.S.–Pakistan cooperation on nuclear safety and security would also be contentious under the NPT; if it were to occur, it would not be carried out overtly.
To some extent, administration officials recognize the severe political and strategic risks of sending Pakistan advanced weapons technology, and are likely to downplay or refrain from transferring certain weapons. The prospect of congressional oversight typically helps shape the range of arms transfer proposals that the executive judges feasible. 11 Concerns that should be taken into account in sending arms to Pakistan include regional security considerations vis–à–vis India, concerns about Pakistan’s internal situation, and the potential that the end–use of U.S. military equipment exported to Pakistan will not be in line with U.S. security interests, particularly considering the view, held by many experts, that the Musharraf government was complicit in, and has not convincingly demonstrated that it has either adequately reprimanded or fully dismantled, an extensive illicit nuclear proliferation network formerly operated by Khan Research Laboratories (KRL).
At the same time, it is not clear to what extent the U.S. administration will exercise restraint in future transfers: the State Department recently notified Congress of a potential transfer of a range of new military equipment to Pakistan, including 26 Bell Textron 412 helicopters. 12
The strongest motivations behind the Bush administration’s declaration of Pakistan as a major non–NATO ally are connected to Pakistan’s status as an “indispensable” partner in the fight against terrorism. This underscores the role of MNNA status as a continuation of a Pakistan policy that was initiated soon after Sept. 11, 2001. 13 The Bush administration requires Pakistan’s favorability to conducting counterterrorist operations on its soil, and desires military–to–military contacts with Pakistan’s Armed Forces to ensure U.S. military influence among their ranks. 14 As a senior Defense Department official summarized in a 2002 briefing:
. . . I think this administration feels that particularly training, things like IMET, are enormously valuable to us as well as the recipient. They give us professional contacts and personal contacts with people who. . . become the leaders of friendly military establishments. And so we — we paid some price by being cut off for a number of years from. . . a generation of military leaders. So this is something we are. . . resuming. . .
. . .We. . . think our influence with foreign militaries is, as a rule, a constructive thing. The kind of skills we impart are not only military skills but, you know, things that we impart in our own military — civil–military relations, views of how. . . military service conducts itself in a democracy, this sort of thing. So I think that's something we're pleased about in the last six months or more and that we're doing this with Pakistan again. . . 15
The high–level ceremonial nature of MNNA status fits well and reinforces the overwhelmingly positive public discourse that has characterized U.S. Pakistan policy since late 2001. The official ceremony conferring MNNA status is typically a full honor celebration, a symbolic gesture that may be interpreted by the people to represent a more substantial relationship with the United States than may be the case. The effects within Pakistan may have been correctly calculated by the Bush administration, as the MNNA announcement seems to have been portrayed as a great success for a government viewed as politically unstable in the face of significant opposition from fundamentalist militants and segments of Pakistan’s Armed Forces and its general population. 16
However, while MNNA status itself may not necessarily mean changes in the level of advanced weaponry that will be delivered to Pakistan, the net effect on regional stability and U.S. security interests can only range from negligible to detrimental.
News reports from India have already identified Indian misgivings over the MNNA status, which could ultimately have the unfortunate consequence of contributing to a South Asian arms race, long viewed by U.S. administrations as a nightmarish scenario. 17
In addition, the declaration of MNNA status may be misunderstood within Pakistan, and contribute to future disappointment when the limits of the U.S.–Pakistan relationship are tested; for example, expectations may develop for receipt of certain weapons systems, or concrete security guarantees, while the United States may not be willing to offer them. Such let–downs of raised expectations have historically stirred anti–U.S. opinion among Pakistan’s population.
Equally likely is the prospect that some of the lower–technology military equipment that the United States has or will provide may be used internally by Pakistani forces for purposes of civil repression. The United States in 2002 transferred to Pakistan riot control gear consisting of 400 grenade launchers, 3,300 CS gas grenades, and 5,000 rounds of .32 caliber ammunition. 18 The United States is also sending surveillance equipment, as mentioned above. The nature of this equipment makes it much more useful to repress civil demonstrations and monitor Pakistani civilians than it would be to fight terrorists. “The major non–NATO ally declaration may serve to embolden the Pakistan government, and reinforce the notion that it may continue along its current path without undertaking democratic reforms,” according to Husain Haqqani, a South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 19
A further effect of the MNNA status may be encouragement of the undesired use of advanced weapons sent to Pakistan. The extent of Pakistan’s current and future control over its own weapons technologies, including conventional and unconventional weapons, is neither clear nor predictable, as a result of political instability and the clandestine nature of nuclear activities within the country. The recent uncovering of Khan’s black market nuclear proliferation network, which supplied the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran and Libya with nuclear technology and know–how, makes the risk of undesired use of weaponry even more extraordinary in Pakistan’s case. And Pakistan’s export control system is deeply ineffective, and contains exceptions for the military and government institutions. 20 The MNNA status may be interpreted as a confirmation that the United States will not press Pakistan too firmly to fulfill its export and proliferation responsibilities.
Finally, Pakistan’s MNNA status could alter other suppliers’ inclinations to supply even more advanced weapons to Pakistan, as well as to India. U.S. military cooperation with Pakistan may lessen any Israeli hesitations to supply India with more advanced weapons, which may destabilize the region. Israel has already shown interest in providing India with the Arrow missile defense system, which contains advanced American missile and targeting technology that could significantly enhance Indian missile capabilities. U.S. demands for Russia and China to exercise greater export restraint towards the region may appear less credible, and be more easily ignored. The U.S. designation of Pakistan as a major non–NATO ally would make it appear contradictory to tell China to refrain from exporting missile technology to Pakistan, as the U.S. simultaneously augments its own military relationship with the Musharraf government. While the United States may decide to draw the line at exports of certain levels of advanced weapons technology, it risks losing influence over the types of weapons that other suppliers may send to the South Asian region.
Sources
Note 1: Gopal Ratnam and Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Subcontinental Tightrope,” Defense News, online version, March 29, 2004. Back.
Note 2: Colin Powell, “Remarks En Route to Kuwait,” March 18, 2004, at: http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/30562.htm. Back.
Note 3: As former Defense Secretary William Cohen stated when Argentina was named an MNNA in 1998, “ the establishment of this major. . . non–NATO ally status. . . really was a reward in a sense. A recognition rather than a reward. A recognition that Argentina has been very helpful in its peacekeeping efforts. . . This was just. . . really a gesture on the part of the United States that we recognize that and wanted to establish it on that basis. It does not convey any major status and should not be construed as such.” Department of Defense News Briefing, May 22, 1998, at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/1998/t05271998_t522enrt.html. A telephone conversation between the author and a State Department official in the Pakistan Office on April 28, 2004 corroborated this understanding of the MNNA status for Pakistan. Back.
Note 4: On Sept. 22, 2001, the Bush administration waived sanctions that had been levied on Pakistan under the Glenn, Pressler, and Symington amendments, and later waived additional sanctions, including those imposed under Section 508 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended. See Alex Wagner, “Bush Waives Nuclear–Related Sanctions on India, Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, online version, October 2001, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_10/sanctionsoct01.asp; see also, Alex Wagner, “Bush Authorized to Lift Sanctions on Pakistan,” Arms Control Today, online version, November 2001, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_11/paksancnov01.asp. Back.
Note 5: See Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations (see Reports for Fiscal Years 2002 and 2003); see also, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations (see Fiscal Years 2003, 2004, and 2005), at: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/aid/aidindex.htm; also, “U.S. Military Package for Pakistan Set,” Arms Control Today, News Briefs, online version, December 2001, at: http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2001_12/briefsdec01.asp; also, Rose Gordon, “Bush Okays $3 Billion Aid Package to Pakistan, But No F–16s,” Arms Control Today 33: 6 (July/August 2003). Back.
Note 6: Telephone conversation between the author and a State Department official in the Political–Military Affairs Bureau, April 21, 2004. Back.
Note 7: Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) web site, at: http://www.dsca.osd.mil/programs/eda/search.asp (search for “Pakistan,” “FY 2003”), as accessed on April 22, 2004; see also, “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Arms Sales Monitoring Project web site, at: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/world.html (search for “Pakistan,” “2001–2003”). It should be noted that congressional notification or authorization does not guarantee that defense items have been delivered. See also, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2003, pp. 82–83; also, Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, p. 457, at: http://www.fas.org/asmp. Back.
Note 8: Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 2005, p. 457, at: http://www.fas.org/asmp. Back.
Note 9: Telephone conversation with a State Department official in the Political–Military Affairs Bureau, April 20, 2004; also, telephone conversation with a State Department official in the Pakistan Office, April 28, 2004. The administration has highlighted the prospect of meaningful effects on the U.S.–Pakistan military–to–military relationship arising from MNNA status primarily when speaking to a Pakistani audience, as well as at the time of the MNNA announcement on March 18. Back.
Note 10: Telephone conversation between the author and a State Department official, April 28, 2004. Back.
Note 11: However, traditionally, Congress supports the executive branch in cases where “national security” interests are invoked. Back.
Note 12: Sharon Weinberger, “U.S. To Provide 26 Utility Helicopters To Pakistan,” Defense Daily, April 21, 2004, p. 4. Back.
Note 13: In attempting to understand the nature of the MNNA status, it is helpful to consider the list of the most recent designees, including Bahrain, the Philippines, Thailand and Kuwait: all of which are in a strategic position to help the United States disrupt terrorist activities. Back.
Note 14: According to Stephen Cohen, Brookings senior fellow and expert on South Asia, there has been a significant increase recently in the number of Pakistani military officers receiving military training in the United States. Interview, Washington, April 22, 2004. Back.
Note 15: Defense Department Briefing Transcript, June 3, 2002, at: http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/nato/02060312.htm Back.
Note 16: See Ejaz Haider’s comments in Ratnam and Raghuvanshi, “Subcontinental Tightrope,” Defense News, online version, March 29, 2004. Back.
Note 17: Ratnam and Raghuvanshi, March 29, 2004; also, C. Raja Mohan, “India and the U.S.–Pakistan alliance,” The Hindu, online edition, March 26, 2004, at: http://www.thehindu.com/2004/03/26/stories/2004032601151000.htm. Back.
Note 18: “Notifications to Congress of Pending U.S. Arms Transfers,” Federation of American Scientists’ (FAS) Arms Sales Monitoring Project web site, at: http://www.fas.org/asmp/profiles/world.html (search for “Pakistan,” “2002”); also, Report by the Department of State Pursuant to Section 655 of the Foreign Assistance Act, Direct Commercial Sales Authorizations for Fiscal Year 2003, pp. 82–83. Back.
Note 19: Interview, Washington, April 28, 2004. Interestingly, Haqqani also noted that, immediately after the MNNA declaration, the Musharraf government’s position on India shifted toward a more hard–line stance. Back.
Note 20: Anupam Srivastava and Seema Gahlaut, “Curbing Proliferation from Emerging Suppliers: Export Controls in India and Pakistan,” Arms Control Today 33: 7 (September 2003). Back.
