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Email this citationCIAO DATE: 08/04
The Proliferation Security Initiative in Perspective
Andrew Prosser
Center for Defense Information
June 2004
Abstract
Participant countries of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), a U.S.–led effort to stem the illicit trafficking of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and delivery systems, met on the first anniversary of the initiative, from May 31 to June 1 in Krakow, Poland. Russia announced on the first day of the meeting its decision to participate in the PSI, a move that U.S. officials had supported as an important step in augmenting the effectiveness of the initiative. However, Russia’s participation will only occur, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, as long as PSI activities do not violate national or international law.1 Russian officials have similarly expressed concerns that the PSI’s land, sea, and air–based WMD interdiction activities could endanger international commerce, and give unwarranted powers to the U.S. Navy to act as a global police force.2
Russia’s reservations are symptomatic of a much larger set of apprehensions and uncertainties that have rightfully stirred doubts that the PSI will indeed contribute to nonproliferation goals without undermining international peace and cooperation. Fundamental legal, operational, and budgetary questions remain unanswered regarding the PSI, damaging its prospects for international support and effectiveness. PSI states remain secretive about the methods being employed and the number of actual interdictions being carried out. Under such conditions, it has been difficult to evaluate the success of the endeavor.
The PSI will not help curtail the spread of WMD or related technologies and delivery systems if it is made the centerpiece of international strategy to counteract proliferation. As an informal “non–organization” acting upon partial intelligence with limited national resources, and with no independent budget or coordinating mechanism, the PSI’s capabilities are significantly constrained. U.S. Undersecretary of State John Bolton envisioned in Krakow on May 31 that the PSI would evolve to the point where it “will have shut down the ability of persons, companies, or other entities to engage in this deadly trade.”3 Such high expectations are unrealistic, and could undercut potential attention to other essential nonproliferation measures.
The PSI could promote international security if its members recognize its limits, and emphasize its most promising elements, which include international intelligence sharing and building capacity where other nonproliferation structures have been unsuccessful. At the same time, careful agreement must be reached on a variety of questions that, if left unanswered, could lead to a PSI which destabilizes more than it helps curb weapons proliferation.
Sources
1. Oleg Shchedrov, “Russia Teams Up With Bush on WMDs,” The Moscow Times, June 1, 2004, p. 2; “Russia joins alliance against banned arms,” The Straits Times (online edition), June 2, 2004, at: http://straitstimes.asia1.com.sg/world/story/0,4386,254038,00.html.
2. “Russia joins WMD alliance,” Taipei Times, June 2, 2004, p. 6; Oleg Shchedrov, “Russia Teams Up With Bush on WMDs”; “Russia joins alliance against banned arms,” The Straits Times (online edition).
3. John Bolton, “Remarks to the First Anniversary Meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative,” Krakow, Poland, May 31 2004, at: http://www.state.gov/t/us/rm/33046.htm.
