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Ethnic Identity, Historical Memory, and Nationalism in Post-Soviet States
Center for Studies of Social Change
March, 1995
GENERAL APPROACH
ETHNIC IDENTITY reflects the awareness of the difference between 'us' and 'them'. It can serve as the basis for the formation of nationalist ideology and provide a sufficient level of group solidarity for the outbreak of short-term ethnic violence, which is often misinterpreted as some type of nationalist upsurge or "ethnic explosion". In present conditions, under the impact of mass media, modern communications and demonstration effects, ethnic identity, having provided the initial push for the emergence of nationalist ideology, is being increasingly shaped by the latter. Ethnic nationalism changes ethnic identity, and the modified identity provides for the further development of nationalist ideology, which supplies rationalization and provides guidance for organized nationalist movements. As a result, ethnic mobilization and counter-mobilization often produce a snowball effect, leading in many cases to ethnic confrontation, large-scale violence and even ethnic wars, i.e. a new type of war, different from both civil and interstate wars. These developments go a long way toward overthrowing the wishful conclusions of liberal social scientists that "where ideologies are in conflict, the appeal to the imagined community [i.e. nation] appears to have defeated all challengers" and that nationalism "is no longer a major vector of historical development". 1 For better or for worse, developments in many regions during the last few years have proved the opposite to be true.
In a modern context the origins of nations, as traced by many scholars, particularly by Anthony D. Smith 2 are relevant for the purposes of studying specific features of particular identities and nationalisms. E.J. Hobsbawm has pointed out that the nation "is a social entity only insofar as it relates to a certain kind of modern territorial state, the nation state. With Gellner, I would stress the element of artefact, invention and social engineering which enters into the making of nations.." 3 , while Benedict Anderson used the term "imagined communities" as a title of his book on nations. 4 In Slovenia or the Baltic states similar statements are likely to be flatly rejected by everybody, while among armed militias in Chechnya, Abkhazia or hill regions of Burma it might be simply dangerous to say something of the kind.
In the modern world, ethnic identity is far from being a universal phenomenon. Not to mention the textbook cases of the Hindi belt in India or of immigrants (usually those of the second or third generation) undergoing assimilation in their new homelands, ethnic identity tends to be diluted or at least irrelevant in several situations. In ethnically homogeneous areas, ethnicity is in a dormant state until awakened by direct or indirect (e.g. news reports) contact with members of other ethnic groups. A Russian farmer in central parts of his country does not see any non-Russians around and generally is not reminded of his ethnic affinities, until he watches the evening news on his TV and, observing the scenes of ethnic wars in such remote places like Bosnia, former Soviet Georgia, or the North Caucasian periphery of Russia, says to himself, "Thank God, we Russians are not like them". Ethnic identity can be irrelevant in a multiethnic milieu, especially in large cities, provided that the diverse ethnic groups are not racially different and there is a lingua franca accepted by everybody. A few years ago, everybody in Minsk and Kharkov spoke Russian, the children went to Russian-medium schools, and very few thought of themselves as Russians, Byelorussians and Ukrainians. Moreover, under normal conditions, there is an obvious trend towards cultural integration and the emergence of supraethnic communities in multiethnic countries. In the U.S.S.R. until the late 80s, millions of persons, particularly those of mixed ethnic origins, identified themselves as members of the "Soviet people", in Yugoslavia during the census of 1981 as many as 1,250,000 persons, or 5.5 per cent of the total population, indicated their ethnic affinity as Yugoslavs, and in the case of Switzerland all the original inhabitants of the Confederation identify themselves as Swiss irrespective of their Germanic and Romanic ethnic origins. Finally, the relevance of ethnic identity even for members of a particular ethnic group may vary widely, swinging between the "melting pot" and "ethnic paradox" extremes. Thus, in the Soviet Union of the late 8Os there was an upsurge of ethnic solidarity, which is still going on in many republics of the Russian Federation and minority areas of other republics, while after the emergence of the independent states, non-ethnic cleavages have become more relevant in other cases such as Lithuania and Turkinenistan.
All these fluctuations of ethnic awareness are not only possible but also inevitable because ethnic identity is only one among the elements of the identity structure of personality. People identify themselves as members of groups they belong to either by achievement or by ascription. In traditional society, the most relevant among these were kinship, peer, gender, socio-economic and, in settled (non-nomadic) communities, territorial groups, the latter coinciding generally with the village. In regions where several religions or denominations came into contact, confessional group often gained primary importance, as during the Reconquista in Spain, the religious wars in Europe, or Christian and Muslim rivalries in many regions.
None of these groups and respective elements of identity structure have disappeared completely in the modern world. Rather, they have been modified and became more diversified. Thus, the sense of territorial identity, which traditionally was limited to certain small areas, expanded vastly to include district, region, state, continent (Europeans, Asians, and Mricans appeared), and even the whole planet. Some other elements of identity, e.g. class, professional, age group, followed the same pattern. Maybe the professional group of taxi-drivers falls short of global identity, but many artists, businessmen, and social scientists in a number of countries seem to be inclined, at least in certain situations to identify themselves as members of specific global, or transnational, communities.
However, ethnic awareness is not exactly like any other element in the identity structure of personality. Non-ethnic components generally are liable to change during the lifetime of the individual. With the growth of social and territorial mobility, the corresponding elements of identity structure vary, and so do those determined by membership in such ascribed status groups as peer and gender groups. Ethnicity is much more rigidly ascribed and can be changed in a limited number of cases only - generally through assimilation, provided there is no racial barrier. Thus, Ukrainians and Byelorussians assimilated easily with Russians, while small Mongoloid groups like Mansi, Nanayans, Shors, Eskimoes in Siberia, although assimilated culturally and linguistically, due to their physical difference preserve their separate identity, especially as Russians, albeit generally not racialist, for the same reason cannot them accept as "us". There is also a psychological reason which hinders assimilation, especially in compact ethnic areas. To adopt the culture and language of some other - usually dominant - group and merge with it means to admit that one's own group is inferior.
The process of assimilation, except the cases of persons with high achievement and status, at the early stage is thus accompanied by ethnic inferiority complexes and marginal status. In many cases a segment in the process of assimilation is simultaneously rejected by its own group and not yet accepted by the assimilating group. Therefore, assimilation is not pursued readily unless there is strong motivation, generally in the form of social rewards and benefits at least for the next generation.
Ethnic identity as the expression of group membership is supported by specific features which make the particular group different from its immediate neighbours. Language, some specific cultural traits and religion in most cases serve to create and reinforce the group boundary and identity. However, it is territory, regarded as homeland, and the belief in common descent and history that constitute the universal basis of ethnic identity. A territorial dimension of ethnic identity is particularly characteristic of farming communities, while among semi-nomadic cattle-breeding groups and many hill tribes the idea of common descent, in many cases from a mythological ancestor, is considered much more important.
ETHNIC NATIONALISM. In the modern world, "pure" forms of ethnocentrism can hardly be found except in some inaccessible areas removed from the centers of civilization. Under the combined impact of educated individuals and mass media (transistor radios having penetrated the remotest corners of the globe), the world-view of all communities has undergone a dramatic change. In the post-Soviet republics even among the smallest and isolated groups there is a fairly high proportion of intellectuals, virtually all members of such communities are literate (generally in Russian), and all have access to mass media. The net result is that groups view themselves and other groups not only on the basis of their past and present experience but project their particular cases against much wider background. In the context of the widening social horizon, an intellectual who has an intimate knowledge of the grievances and expectations of his people, is able, after some reading and thinking, to produce a statement which will look like a very coherent and sound nationalist ideology. With access to mass media being generally available, the nationalist program is likely to become widely-known in a matter of few days and, in the way the population of the former Soviet Union was awakened to the freedom of expression by several 'bold' articles in the press and televised discussions, an ethnic group that seemed to be totally unaware of its specific interests, may suddenly turn highly nationalistic, to the consternation of its presumptuous neighbors or dominant groups.
As the (post) Soviet and numerous other cases show, the noteworthy feature of the process is that nationalist appeal can either find ready response or fall on deaf ears. The nationalist popular fronts in the Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) from the very inception in October 1988 emerged as powerful mass movements, while in adjacent Byelorussia, which for many centuries had shared the same state with Lithuania, had a similar history, except for the period between the world wars, and a relatively high level of socio-economic and cultural development, the majority of the population was (and remains) generally unresponsive to the nationalist appeal of the Byelorussian Popular Front.
The fact that the careers of nationalism are so different in particular ethnic regions with comparable levels of modernization, can be explained by the specific features and contents of ethnic identity of the groups concerned. Directly or indirectly religion as cultural tradition, the type of political culture, internal intraethnic sociocultural and subregional cleavages in different ways affect the potential for ethnopolitical mobilization. However, the most important among these factors is collective historical memory.
HISTORICAL MEMORY of an ethnic community comprises a set of ideas about the past history of the group, its historical relations with other groups, ethnic images and self-images. In case of dominating groups it is largely shaped by the textbook version of the national history, i.e. the popular interpretation of history, which is by itself a fascinating subject. 5 Historical memory of minorities, especially in countries with authoritarian regimes, often is a very obscure subject. In the case of the former Soviet Union, a single and obligatory textbook version of history, which was highly Russocentric, was taught in all schools. In the non-Russian republics the local history textbooks, permitted since the early 60s, were strictly censored by Moscow and followed the same line. Schoolchildren and students were taught that their countries since the beginning of history were surrounded by enemies and their only hope was Russia. After becoming parts of the Russian empire they were saved from extermination, came under the influence of progressive Russian culture and later had an opportunity to join the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat under the leadership of Bolshevik (Communist) party. These ideological cliches were reproduced in films, fiction, painting, songs and even operas, reinforced by numberless monuments, the names of collective farms, streets, towns, etc. However, even this sustained effort, which lasted for three generations, generally failed to shape the historical memory of diverse groups, including Russians themselves.
One reason for this failure has been noted by many observers and Sovietologists: as the decay of the regime - and the senile top leaders - progressed, the population, especially the post-World War II generation, grew increasingly immune to official propaganda. However, a no less important reason was that collective memory has a certain inertia and rejects interpretation which is totally incompatible with existing ideas about the group's past history. Armenians, who were permanently threatened by the Ottoman empire, accepted the idea that it was Russia who saved them from extermination, but Latvians and Estonians could not be persuaded that Russian rule was so much better than the German domination. In a specific case of Byelorussia which for the last seven centuries was under Lithuanian, Polish and Russian rule, patriots from the Byelorussian Popular Front similarly could not during a short period persuade the majority of the population that the medieval Grand Duchy of Lithuania was actually a Byelorussian national state and, consequently, modern independent Belarus was the successor of the state which during several centuries was the principal rival of Russia in Eastern Europe. 6
THE POST-SOVIET SITUATION
The breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 independent states radically changed the ethnopolitical situation in the post-Soviet era. Consequences differed widely for particular nations and ethnic groups; they defy sweeping generalizations and conclusions. For nationalist movements in the Baltic states, Moldova, the Ukraine and Georgia, whose principal aim was secession and independence, the task was fulfilled and, inevitably, the contents of nationalism had to be revised in a number of ways. In Central Asia, where political liberalization and nationalism had a slow start, some kind of nation-state ideology remained to be invented in order to rationalize both the legitimacy of the regimes and their opponents' bid for power. Ethnic minorities in Russia and the newly-independent states faced difficult dilemmas after the Union center, upon whose support they relied in their effort to assert their autonomy and to raise their status, disappeared following the Yeltsin-Kravchuk-Shushkevich pact of December 1991 on the dissolution of the U.S.S.R. Ethnic Russians, until recently the integrating core of what was called the "Soviet people", became minorities in the newly-independent states, and even the Russian majority in the Russian Federation is feeling uncertain about the future of their country. All these changes, although often overshadowed by the unprecedented economic crisis, affect the nationalist ideology and ethnic identity of virtually all post-Soviet nations and ethnic groups. In the present situation, more or less unstable in most republics and regions, it is hardly possible to generalize about the attitudes and identity changes of diverse groups. Nevertheless, certain observations concerning the main preoccupations of the nationalist ideology and conjectures about their impact on the ethnic identity of particular nations and groups seem to be fairly safe.
All kinds of nationalisms, present on the post-Soviet scene, contain some or all items from the universal set of issues characteristic of any nationalism, viz. group status, territorial security, ethnodemographic situation, historical memory, normative status of the language and culture. The ranking of the issues along the priority scale may be different and some specific issues can be added in particular cases but most of these basic elements are always present. Generally, the most significant dividing line falls between the nationalism of the dominating majorities and that of the minorities. In the post-Soviet era this distinction is particularly relevant. Although the dominating majorities in the newlyAndependent states have not yet overcome the survival syndrome which formed the core of their nationalism during the Soviet period, the aim of consolidating the nation-state has become the central problem for the Ukrainians, Estonians, Turkrnens and other nations. It includes, in different sequence, most of the issues listed above, e.g. the problem of territorial integrity is the top priority for Georgia, AzerbaUan, Moldova, Kazakhstan, the Ukraine and even for Russia (at least as long as General Dudayev acts as the president of an independent country), ethnodemographic issue, i.e. the presence of huge minorities, is very conspicuous in Estonian, Latvian and Kazakh nationalism, the problem of normative language and culture is anything but solved in many post-Soviet states, particularly in the Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan.
Nationalism of the ethnic minorities is generally dominated by the survival syndrome as virtually everywhere these groups are apprehensive of losing everything they have as ethnic communities: their historic homelands, language, culture, status and, finally, their own identity. These fears have become so pervasive that elites of the minorities tend to regard democracy as meaningless if it means the majority rule: to quote a Tatar scholar, "human rights have no meaning outside the context of the nationalities' rights" 7 . Another important difference between the nationalism of majorities and minorities is that leaders and ideologists of the latter are much more preoccupied with the problem of promoting and maintaining solidarity and unity among the group members and with maintaining group boundaries as marked as possible. This is especially the case in conflict situations.
NATIONALISM OF THE MAJORITIES has undergone several changes during the three years after the disintegration of the U.S.S.R. The first stage of the renascent nationalism for a short while was remarkably "green" since at the early stage of political liberalization (1987-88) environmental grievances were the safest means of ethnopolitical mobilization. Preoccupation with environmental issues made the people ecology-conscious and had obvious nationalist overtones since all the damage to the environment was interpreted as a consequence of the Kremlin policies in non-Russian republics. After the breakup of the Soviet Union and in the context of the deepening economic crisis environmental issues and green movements became relegated to the background in the newly-independent states, except parts of Belarus, badly hit by the Chernobyl nuclear power station disaster in 1986, and areas around what was once the Aral Sea. The subject of the repressive, assimilationist and humiliating policies of the Soviet regime also lost its top position in the nationalist ideology, and has been replaced by argumentation in support of the legitimacy of the existing nation-states within their present borders. 8
Similarly, the theme of total domination by "Moscow" has given way to the pride and satisfaction, albeit shortAived, over the expanding international relations and the fact that the new states have been recognized as legitimate members of the international community of nations. Combined with such attributes of independent statehood as national currency, postage stamps, foreign embassies, etc., these changes in nationalist ideology undermine the minority complex and the uncomfortable awareness of being a periphery of a huge state ruled from faroff and often hostile Moscow. Although it may take a decade or more before independent status is taken for granted by a majority of the population, the survival syndrome vanishes alongside with the complexes characteristic of subjugated groups.
Failure to reach consensus on national interests is caused by different reasons. In Russia it is the identity crisis of the "imperial" nation (or rather the integrating core of the "Soviet people"), the age-old dispute between Russophiles and westernizers and the rising challenge of indigenous minorities, who at least in theory can lay claims to just over half of Russian territory, or an area almost equal to that of the United States. In the Ukraine and especially in Belarus, a large part of the urban population has adopted Russian as its mother tongue and the Russian version of European culture, and stays aloof from the nationalist movement spearheaded by the Rukh movement and the Byclorussian Popular Front. In Central Asia nationalists of a modern type are a small minority, divided among themselves on attitudes towards Islam and secularism and by subregional loyalties, while the rural majorities with their parochial ethnocentrism, form an amalgam of local and tribal groups and have not constituted themselves as modern nations. Moreover, the post-Soviet period has witnessed revival of subethnic identities and ethnic consciousness which for several generations have not been recognized by official Soviet statistics and were considered as assimilated by larger groups.
Reappearance of Mingrealians in the western part of Georgia, Talyshes in Azerbaijan, Kipchaks in Central Asia, several regional communities in Tajikistan and other states, shows that a number of nationalities have not much of sociocultural cohesion and "national" identity, and can hardly be regarded as modern nations. As different groups often pursue incompatible goals, "intranational" conflicts develop, causing the further growth of subnational identities. The power-struggle among various subethnic groups can easily lead to strife and even civil war (as in Tajikistan and Georgia) in case the regimes relax, or lose, existing ideological and political constraints. In the absence of consensus over national aims and interests, existing regimes seem to be the only instruments capable of containing latent conflicts and pursuing consistent nation-building strategies.
Due to these changes, political parties and groups professing aggressive and militant nationalism lose much of their following and move to the periphery of the political scene. The nationalist popular fronts that emerged initially as protest movements and were a formidable force in the Baltic states, Moldova, the Ukraine and some other Soviet republics in 1989-91 fragmented into a number of small parties and organizations.
One more reason why nationalism of the majorities became less militant is the fact that what was called 'national revival', unlike similar movements of the past, did not grow into a consistent cultural movement. After a brief phase when it was preoccupied with the issues of language and re-interpretation of history, it became a political movement pure and simple. After the dissolution of the USSR, de-Sovietization of culture, which meant in practice renouncing much of what has been created during the preceding 70 years (50 in the case of the Baltic states and Moldova), economic crisis and the large expenditure on creating and maintaining state infrastructure, particularly the armed forces and external relations, relegated the needs of cultural development and education to the background. The 'national' culture in most of the newly-independent states simply proved unable to withstand the stream of mass culture from the West - generally in its Russian transcription (soap operas and detective films from Moscow TV) - or neighboring Asian countries, while the impact of the 'national' culture is reduced to the growth of vernacular schools, replacing those with the Russian medium, and to acquiring some traditional artifacts (carvings, musical instruments, etc.)
All these shifts in nationalist ideology have produced a marked impact on ethnic identity of the majorities. The number of the people who tended to identify as Soviet, especially high among Russians, has declined dramatically. Opinion polls show that the peoples of the former Soviet Union attach more importance to their ethnic affinity than ever before, and in the case of Azerbaijanians the protracted conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region actually completed the emergence of national identity. Similarly, expansion of external relations and conflicts with local minorities have made the members of all titular nationalities more aware of national interests. Another important shift is the growing identification with the newly-independent states: the former Soviet republics, symbolically ruled by the governments obedient to Moscow, were regarded as illegitimate by significant sections of the population, especially in the Baltic republics and the Ukraine, while the present states evoke more loyalty. These changes in ethnic identity make the majorities responsive to the ideas of nationalism as a dominant ideology and provide support for efforts of the regimes to transform the ex-Soviet republics into nation-states.
All in all, the prevailing trend of nationalism has become much more moderate than it was several years ago, and this trend is likely to continue unless a genuine threat to independence and territorial integrity of the newly-independent states is posed by minorities or by some foreign power.
NATIONALISM OF MINORITIES needs closer examination at least for two reasons. First, nationalism of the larger nations of the U.S.S.R., not to mention the Russian nationalism, has been studied for a long time, and during the last few years a number of new studies has been published in the United States and Europe. The ideology of minorities' nationalist movements only of late started attracting attention of social scientists, and so far its study remains seriously handicapped by the scarcity of source materials and reliable information. Second, nationalism of small minorities often appears irrational and parochial to an outside observer, 9 especially in the cases when a small minority challenges a relatively large majority (like Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia, Gagauzes in Moldova) or enclave groups, like Tatars in Russia, strive for independence.
Like any nationalist ideology, nationalism of minorities in the post-Soviet states reflects primary interests and concerns, as interpreted by their dominating groups. As the trend - and policies - of consolidation of nation-states intensifies in all post-Soviet republics, the minorities become increasingly apprehensive about their present and future status and survival syndrome is emerging as the central issue of the minorities' nationalism. To a large extent, minority nationalism is a reaction to the nationalism of the dominating majorities, although in some cases (Azerbaijan, Georgia) the process of ethnopolitical mobilization and polarization was started by the minorities.
Obviously, nationalism of the RUSSIAN MINORITY in the newly-independent states deserves special attention as the Russian diaspora forms the largest minority in all but few republics and collectively comprises nearly 25 million persons of Russian origin. 10 The challenges faced by Russians in such states like Estonia, the Ukraine, Uzbekistan or Tajikistan being widely different, the main issues of Russian nationalism in particular states are also diverse. However, it has several features common to the Russian minority in all republics.
The loss of the former special status and the very necessity to adapt themselves to the conditions of independent nation-states (first of all, to learn the official language) is interpreted by militant factions of Russian nationalists and a fairly large section of Russian communities in the new states as humiliating and affecting their "honor" and "dignity". Psychologically, many of them are not ready to accept the new realities, especially as the "elder brother" syndrome, inculcated during generations, developed superior attitudes towards non-Russian indigenous population, particularly in the southern republics. The basic assumption, sincerely accepted by most Russians in Russia and other post-Soviet states is that Russians saved the peripheral peoples from subjugation by powerful neighbors (Turkey, Persia, China, Germany), introduced modern culture and technology, set up and developed industries, and actually "fed" the natives. Some of these assumptions are not totally false (although the grievances of the indigenous nationalists are also anything but baseless), besides, ethnic Russians remain the most advanced (after the smaller and diminishing Jewish communities), urban section of the population and constitute the majority of skilled labor and technical personnel.
Therefore, they have enough reasons to regard this positive self-image as absolutely true and to expect the "natives" to be grateful enough to preserve the special position Russians enjoyed in the former Soviet state. These expectations are supported not only by militant Russian nationalists but also by the top-ranking officials of Russia who have on numerous occasions reiterated they would "use every means to safeguard the interests, honor and dignity of the compatriots" and insist that ethnic Russians should be granted not only all political and social rights, but also the right to acquire the citizenship of both the country of residence and of Russia.
All these factors reinforce uncertainty among Russian diasporas in the newly-independent states about their status and rights, cause many of them to reject allegiance to the country of residence, or produce conflict of incompatible loyalties. Unlike Russian immigrants in Western countries, Russian diasporas in the post-Soviet states tend to preserve their quasi-imperial nationalism and are unwilling to accept sociocultural integration. Probably the only compromise solution of this dilemma is the development of particular identity of, for example, "Russian Estonians", "Russian Ukrainians", etc., differentiating them politically and psychologically from the main body of the Russian nation and socioculturally from the majority in the country of residence. Some sections of Russians, who have lived for several generations in Lithuania, Latvia and some other states, have developed this type of identity and have been accepted by the local majorities as "our Russians", or the "Russians of Latvia (Lithuania, etc.)".
However, in Russia even very few social scientists, not to mention politicians, seem to be aware of such subdivisions among their "compatriots", and the very term sounds odd in Russian. Besides, it is hard to visualize similar process of integration among the Russian industrial workers in Islamic cultural surrounding of the Central Asian states, where ethnic cleavages overlap with socioeconomic differences and both the pattern and tradition of interethnic relations are not analogous with those in the Ukraine and the Baltic states. This is one of the principal reasons why thousands of ethnic Russians are leaving not only the Central Asian states, but also the North Caucasian republics of the Russian Federation, while repatriation from the Baltic states, despite the much-publicized complaints about discrimination against Russians, is very insignificant.
To sum up, semi-spontaneous ethnic cleansing is one of the major consequences of the formation of nation-states in the post Soviet area and of the growth of nationalism among both Russians and the indigenous majorities. This trend is opposite to the process of global integration, but is inevitable in the post-Soviet area, which has a number of features characteristic of a post-colonial situation. 11 It can be safely predicted that the "Russian problem" in the post-Soviet republics will remain as a vital issue in domestic policies and international relations in this part of the world for at least a decade more. Obviously, the majority of Russians will emigrate from Central Asian republics except Kazakhstan (which can only safely exist as binational state) and the Transcaucasian states, while in the western republics of the former Union significant sections (a large majority in the cases of the Ukraine and Belarus) of ethnic Russians are likely to adapt themselves to the conditions of the independent nation-states.
NON-RUSSIAN MINORITIES generally face a similar set of issues: the prospect of cultural and linguistic assimilation, territorial disputes with neighboring groups, the problem of collective status. However, unlike the Russian diasporas who have at least several alternatives (appealing to the homeland power, repatriation, industrial action, accommodation), non-Russian indigenous minorities in the post-Soviet states have few options to choose from in their efforts to safeguard and promote their interests. In most cases they can rely only upon their ability for collective action and group solidarity. For this reason, nationalist ideology and education are considered by minority leaders as the principal means of survival.
For most ethnic minorities, except the least numerous groups in Siberia and the Extreme North of Russia (discussed in the last section of this paper), the core of the nationalist ideology is historical memory or, rather, history reinterpreted to suit the needs of national revival and ethnopolitical mobilization. Subject to the requirements of the particular nationalist movements, the main topics of history-writing are the past glories of the group, annexation of its territory by the dominant majority, and the effects of the nationalities policy of the state.
It is quite natural that Tatars, Abkhazians, Kabardinians and other groups who had states of their own before they were annexed, interpret the 'independence' period as the golden age of their history. What is more striking is the fact that ideologues of some groups who never formed separate states in the past also tend to regard the pre-annexation period as a source of pride and inspiration. The Chechens, who were not familiar with'statehood until the neighboring Kabardinian chieftains imposed their rule, claim to be the only nation in the world history that was always free and never had princes, masters and slaves, and did not surrender themselves even to such great conquerors as Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan and Tamerlane. 12 The Bashkirs, whose ethnic area for several centuries prior to annexation by Russia was divided between the Kazan, Astrakhan, Nogay and Siberian khanates, find a certain pride in having contributed to the cultural achievements and military glory of those late medieval states.
It is, however, modern Ossetian history-writing that provides probably the most interesting case of historical interpretation. Ossetians, the only ethnic group of Iranian stock in the Caucasus, trace their origin to the ancient Scythians, Sarmatians and Alans, the medieval state of the latter being crushed by Genghis Khan in the 13th century. The Alans took refuge in the mountains and never reappeared again in history as a polity. They forgot their own common name, and the modern Ossetians call themselves in different localities as Iron, Digor, or Twal. It was the medieval Georgian chroniclers who baptized them as Ovs, or Oss, and this designation became their ethnic name. The modern historians of Ossetia stress that they are descendants of the people who left a visible trace in the history of nations from China to North Africa. 13 In 451 the Alans allegedly played a decisive part in the battle at Chalons where the joint Roman-Visigoth-Alan force defeated the Huns, while another group of Alans ruled over Spain jointly with Vandals.
A modern Ossetian historian concludes the subject: "The presence of Alans in Western Europe and North Africa, their political and military activity in those far-off lands constitute one of the glorious, amazing and beautiful pages in our history. At the sunset of the Roman Empire the Alans played a significant part in its destiny, proved themselves as brave warriors... While in France, the Alans contributed to the progress of martial arts of Western Europe, especially in the tactics of cavalry battle..." 14 It hardly needs to be added, that those Alans who moved West, never came back to their homeland in the Caucasus, and the modern Ossetians can hardly claim to be the descendants of those warriors. Nevertheless, the present Ossetian republic has already been renamed as Alania.
The stress on past achievements and glories is characteristic of all post-Soviet history writing. In the case of minority interpreters of history it is caused by several common factors: the Soviet negation of their past history, modern Russian history-writing which stresses the greatness of the former Russian Empire, in numerous cases also by conflicting territorial claims. So far the present history-writing of the non-Russian groups follows basically the same pattern. However, the minority historians divide themselves into two opposite camps on the issue of incorporation of their homelands into Russia. The differences are caused rather by current political exigencies than by available historical facts. Thus, Abkhazian and Ossetian scholars, whose communities in the present context of hostile relations with Georgians and Ingushes have to look towards Moscow for support, assert that their ancestors joined the Russian Empire of their own and free will, independently of Georgia and any other neighboring state.
Chechen, Daghestanian, Tatar, Bashkir and other nationalist writers, striving to achieve "sovereignty" for their republics, on the contrary, stress that their ancient homelands have been annexed by force of arms. Thus, for Tatar nationalists, the capture and destruction of Kazan by Ivan the Terrible after a prolonged siege and fierce battle in 1552, is a national tragedy, and since November 1991 a donations campaign is going on to erect a monument in memory of the national heroes who fell while defending Kazan from the Russian enemies. Modern Bashkir historians reject the idea of volunta1~ accession of Bashkir tribes to Russia and try to rationalize their peaceful surrender and humiliation. 15
Similarly, nationalist writers of Chechnya, Daghestan, and, less so, of Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachayevo-Cherkessiya, Ingushetia and several other regions of the North Caucasus, stress resistance to Russian expansion in the Caucasus. A Daghestanian author sums it in the following way: One can say that from the second half of the 16th century to the last quarter of the 19th century Caucasus was the object of consistent military expansion of Russia, which pursued the traditional aim of the Eurasian conquerors - the capture of the geopolitical gate from Europe into Asia..." 16 The Caucasian war of 1816-59 and numerous later uprisings are regarded now as the heroic period in the history of the region, and Shamil, the leader of the anti-Russian uprising in the 19th century, has re-emerged as the greatest national hero of Chechnya and Daghestan, while the later Field-Marshall Suvorov, General Yermolov, and even the poet Lermontov, all of whom occupy a prominent place in Russian history, are labeled as arch-enemies of the North Caucasian hillmen. It hardly needs to be added that all argumentation and anniversary celebrations of "voluntary accession" to Russia, so popular in the recent past, nowadays have become inconceivable in most republics of the Russian Federation.
Several generations of non-Russians have been taught that thanks to the "unselfish assistance of the great Russian people" they had been saved from subjugation by enemies, acquired modern culture and advanced rapidly in all spheres of life. During the last few years the assessment of the consequences incorporation has, with few exceptions mentioned above, changed dramatically.
Chechens, Ingushes, Daghestanian ethnic groups, Tatars, Bashkirs, Tuvians and others, mobilized on the platform of ethnonationalism, regard the Russian and Soviet period as the darkest pages of their history. Thus, Tatar historians and nationalist politicians stress the fact that after annexation much of their lands was taken away and distributed among Russian colonists, m9sques were destroyed, the Tatars were not admitted into universities, and the negative image of Tatars as wild and cruel natives was consistently reproduced in Russian literature and school textbooks. In their writings, the Tatar scholars and analysts quote ample evidence to prove that Tatarophobia was and remains integral part of the Russian mentality, despite the fact that since the end of the 19th century the Tatar nation could boast one of the highest literacy rates in the Empire, a numerous class of modern entrepreneurs and intellectuals, and intensive cultural life despite all the constraints imposed by the Russian administration. 17 The theme of expropriation and oppression is also very popular in the press of North Caucasus.
Even the Ossetians, who remain unconditionally loyal to Russia (because of their conflicts with Georgia and Ingushetia), have started voicing numerous grievances. Ideologues of the nationalist movement and politicians complain that the Ossetians fought bravely during all the wars of Russia since the early 19th century but instead of gratitude on the part of Russia have been betrayed each time their ferocious Ingush neighbors harassed Ossetia with their raids. 18 Another popular complaint is that during the Soviet period intensive Russification has been going on, and the Ossetian language has been totally replaced by Russian in offices, mass media and schools of all levels. Similar views are shared by intellectuals of those numerous groups who so far have not been able to launch popular nationalist movements and to start some kind of 'national revival'.
There is something like a conceptual version of minority nationalism emerging, mostly in the writings of Tatar authors, representing the largest and fairly advanced non-Russian minority in the post-Soviet area. Ideologues of the Tatar nationalist movement consider the right to self-determination, i.e. independence as self-evident and concentrate on proving that disintegration of Russia (otherwise the independence of Tatarstan does not make much sense) is imminent and inevitable. Russia, according to their view, like the Soviet Union, is a conglomeration of mutually alien nations, an empire, created by conquest, and can survive only by suppressing the freedom and rights of the non-Russian groups, i.e. pursuing policies, incompatible with democracy and human rights. 19 According to a Tatar newspaper,"... there is nothing like a a positive idea in the Russian society, which could become the driving force of progress. Such idea is not possible as long as huge area is ruled on the principle of empire; there will be no freedom in this state as long as inequality of peoples exists". 20 Ideologues of the minorities maintain that several of the present states, particularly Russia and Georgia, are empires, doomed to disappear. 21
Another prominent idea is that the existing international system is obsolete and undemocratic, especially as some 200 member-states of the United Nations and other international organizations constitute a kind of elitist club, while several thousand nations and ethnic groups are deprived of their natural right to take part in international affairs and are relegated to a second-rate status. According to the view of some Tatar nationalists, this unjust system, increasingly questioned by many ethnocultural and linguistic minorities in the developed countries (Basques, Flemish, Walloons, Quebecois and others) has to be replaced by a new world-order, ensuring equality and freedom for each group. 22
It hardly needs to be explained that against this background, sovereignty aspirations of the Tatar nation reflect the allegedly global trend towards a better and more perfect world. Hence, if the Tatars succeed, their victory will inspire several thousand other groups to stand up for their natural rights. Official efforts to coordinate activities and expand political, economic and even military cooperation between the unrecognized "independent states" (Abkhazia, Chechnya, Transnistria Moldovan republic, the Crimea) also contribute to the emergence of minority nationalisms.
This vision reflects the positive view of nationalism as a movement towards democracy and freedom. However, in most cases nationalist ideology and ethnic identity contain negative images of other ethnic groups and tend to promote enmity between interacting ethnic communities. Despite protestations to the contrary, the aspiration of nationalist movements to self-determination and, less so, for national revival", in the context of such multiethnic states as Russia, Georgia or Moldova in all cases had a certain anti-majority slant and contained some elements of majority-phobia. Similarly, Russian nationalism, especially that of the Russian settlers in non-Russian regions, invariably contains negative attitudes towards the indigenous groups.
Negative stereotypes become particularly strong in cases of protracted violent conflicts: the writings of the Abkhazians, Ossets, Ingushes, Georgians about the opponent-group evoke Manichean images of eternal struggle of "Good" vs. "Evil', "Light" vs. "Darkness", etc. 23 This being so, many political and public opinion leaders of the conflicting groups declare that coexistence is not possible any more in the same area. 24
Unlike the nations of the Volga-Urals region and North Caucasus, who are reasserting themselves as groups with glorious past histories, the small and semi-assimilated ethnic groups in Siberia and Extreme North are on the verge of disappearing. They have no age-old history to appeal to, their languages are not developed enough to function in all spheres of modern life, and their traditional way of life, based on hunting, fishing and deer-breeding cannot be modernized and is vanishing rapidly. Basically, it is only the racial difference from the Russians which prevents the indigenous groups of Siberia from total assimilation.
It is not a simple problem for intellectuals from these groups to find specific ethnic values in order to rationalize the survival motive of the ethnic communities which in the modern world look much like relics from prehistoric period. Fortunately, they are not alone in this world to face similar problem. The Indians of North America, the indigenous population of Greenland and the northern part of Scandinavia, and especially the Eskimos, Aleutians and other groups in Alaska and Canada, belonging to the same stock as the aborigines of Siberia (except the Turkic-speaking Yakuts) have similar experience in dealing with survival problems, the crucial difference being that in democratic systems they could voice their grievances and claims and have produced a fairly coherent ideology. The other sources of inspiration are the ideas of Western liberalism, the cultural relativism approach, nationalism of other minorities, the ideas of green movements and finally, the romantic tradition of Western literature, especially James Fenimore Cooper who remains among the most-read writers by schoolchildren in the post-Soviet republics. Therefore, indigenous intellectuals in Siberia have been able to produce their own version of nationalist ideology and to find references to authoritative opinion to support their claims.
The emerging indigenous "philosophy" falls within the broad category of ethnic nationalism, because in both cases the driving force is the Lebenswillen, the will-for-survival df ethnic communities, and the principal argument lays its stress on the uniqueness of the group. According to this line of reasoning, the culture of mankind is rich because it is varied and diverse, with each group contributing some unique feature. Accordingly, the world becomes poorer with the disappearance of each, however small and 'backward' group with its unique culture, language and mentality. If the world community is concerned about the vanishing species of flora and fauna, and registers certain populations of animals, birds, and plants in the red books of the environment, there is much more reason to care about the weakest human groups. On many occasions ideologues of the indigenous groups have stated this view straightforwardly: "We also should be in the red book!".
Indigenous groups of the Arctic regions of Russia draw a special pride of being more unique than any other nation or ethnic group, because they, alongside with the aborigines of other Arctic regions belong to the small fraction of mankind which had managed to adapt itself to, and survive in, the most extreme conditions. Elaborating on this subject, they reasonably argue that even at the present age of technology very few people are ready to settle permanently in Arctic regions, which remain sparsely populated not only in Russia, but also in the more advanced Scandinavian countries and North America. The "white man" despite all his drive and energy is not quite equal to the task, and in the survival test is inferior to the Eskimo or Chukcha.
This argument need not be understood literally - it serves, rather to stress the point that modern indigenous groups, despite the fact that their ancestors did not reach the stage of becoming "historical" communities, need not feel inferior, because they had produced a unique culture and way of life which enabled them to survive for centuries in forbidding conditions. Finally, in the context of extensive damage caused to the environment by the exploitation of natural resources, the indigenous intellectuals stress that the traditional way of life, in harmony with nature, contrasted favorably with modern industrial activities that cause pollution of waters and devastation of landscape.
These ideological postulates find a ready response from the members of ethnic groups in northern parts of Siberia. After losing their way of life, traditions and language and having experienced for several generations the attitudes of superiority, ranging from paternalism to indifference and ethnic jokes, for the first time they see a chance to restore their own self-esteem and not to feel themselves inferior to any other group. As total assimilation is out of question due to racial differences, and the wave of ethnic nationalism continues in different parts of Russia, the northern indigenous population has no choice but to reiterate its identity, enriched by outside influences and its own experience.
CONCLUSION
The phenomenon of nationalism has been regarded as evil by both Marxist and liberal scholarly tradition. The post-Soviet experience seems to lend some support to this opinion. Militant and extreme nationalism of both majorities and minorities has proved to be the ideology of conflict up to its extreme and violent forms (Nagorno-Karabakh, South and North Ossetia, Abkhazia in the Caucasus, Transnistria in Moldova). However, the absence of nationalism in the sense of broad consensus on ethnoregional interests and aims, in newly-independent states can become one of the major causes of sociopolitical fragmentation and intraethnic conflict either among the political elites (as in Russia, Belarus and, less so, in the Ukraine) or both on the political scene and at the mass level (Tajikistan, Georgia), in each case undermining stability of the new polities. The obvious conclusion seems to be that moderate nationalism, pursuing the consolidation of the nation-state, under the post-Soviet conditions may be the lesser evil compared to both militant nationalism and liberal-technocratic platform in providing political stability and consolidation of democracy.
Preoccupation with the survival issue, reinterpretation of history, particularly its ethnopolitical aspects, efforts to reintroduce vernaculars in public life and schools, the adoption of acts promoting the rights and interests of the indigenous groups, combine to produce a wide-ranging impact on the ethnic identity of minorities in Russia and other post-Soviet states. More and more people identify themselves in the first place as members of particular ethnic groups and assess the political realities in terms of the groups rights and status.
This trend raises several issues. First, a very complicated problem of the relationship between individual human rights and group rights arises, especially as the human rights phraseology is often used to uphold group interests and privileges. Second, the ongoing ethnic awakening, in its turn, enhances the confidence of nationalist leaders, who become increasingly assertive. The success of the nationalist movements in the Baltic states, regarded as initiators of the process which finally lead to the break-up of the U.S.S.R., and the example of the Abkhazians, who managed - albeit with external assistance - to evict the Georgians from Abkhazia and to establish a virtually independent (although not recognized internationally) state, is interpreted as a proof that even a small minority, provided it is mobilized and determined, can achieve its goals. If the Balts and Abkhazians did it, why not us? - this question seems to haunt the minds of many nationalists in the post-Soviet states and leads to positive conclusions.
The present economic crisis, which has grown worse since the disintegration of the USSR, has affected the well-being of the majority of the population, irrespective of ethnic group, in all newly-independent states, and nationalist movements today, unlike those of the late 80s, cannot offer visions of a welfare state as the immediate result of independence or 'sovereignty' and expected foreign assistance. "National revival" programs also became illusory due to the shortage of resources for the development of culture, education and social sciences and the multiple increase of prices of books and periodicals. All things considered, nationalism at the moment does not dispose of the minimal material base to engineer the proclaimed "national revival" in the area of culture. This holds true not only of the smaller post-Soviet republics, but also of Russia, which also has neither means nor adequate resources to withstand the 'invasion' of Western mass culture.
However, the psychological climate has undergone a significant and, in mid-term perspective, an irreversible change. Ethnic cleavages, especially those between the minorities and dominating majorities, have become the crucial factor, shaping group solidarity and the framework of political mobilization. Reinterpretation of history has played a major part in shaping the identity structure of large sections of the population. The views and opinions quoted in this paper, have been selected from the papers and journals, widely read in the republics of the Russian Federation. Mter decades - or even centuries - of press censorship, for the population of the post-Soviet states a written word preserves some kind of quasi-magic meaning in the sense that a written text is regarded as something between a law and official, or at least permitted, position.
Among ethnic minorities particularly anti-majority attitudes are actually becoming something like a norm, or at least as equivalent of patriotism, and the present will inevitably have a lasting effect, especially among the younger generation. The dominant majorities, on the basis of their past negative experience and the demonstrative effect of the developments in former Yugoslavia, Georgia or Moldova, in their turn view the minorities as a source of threat. However indifferent a person might be to nationalist ideas, he (or she) is reminded daily of his ethnic affinity and is under permanent pressure from various quarters to define his position in within the increasingly strained system of ethnic relations.
Since ethnic differences have been recognized as basic sociopolitical cleavages, there is no way of escaping ethnopolitical polarization. The ethnic identities grow stronger, and the group boundaries more rigid in ethnically heterogeneous become regions. 25 In extreme cases of protracted and violent conflicts between particular groups, e.g. Armenians and Azerbaijanians in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazians and Georgians, Ossetians and Ingushes, ethnic cleavages lead to total ethnopolitical mobilization and acquire inertia which cannot be overcome during several generations. It can be safely concluded that the assertion of ethnic identities and ethnopolitical contradictions will stay as the main axis of political development in many regions of the defunct Union.
Footnotes
Note 1: Hobsbawm E.J. Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 163, 164 Back.
Note 2: The Ethnic Revival. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; The Ethnic Origins of Nations. Oxford, New York: Blackwell, 1986, and numerous other books by Anthony Smith. Back.
Note 3: Hobsbawm, op. cit., p. 10 Back.
Note 4: Anderson Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and spread of Nationalism. London: Verso Editions and New Left Books, 1983. Back.
Note 5: Probably, the best among the well-known works on historical memory is Marc Ferro's Comment on racconte l'histoire aux enfants a travers le monde entier (Paris: Payot, 1986), available also in numerous translations. Back.
Note 6: Still, the Communist-dominated Supreme Soviet of Belarus approved the symbols of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as the coat-of-arms and the flag of the present independent state. Thus, Lithuania and Belarus share the same coat of arms. Besides, the date ofa victory of the the troops of the Grand Duchy over the larger Russian force is being celebrated as the Day of Byelorussian army. Back.
Note 7: Khakim, Rafael, Twilight of the Empire (in Russian). - "Tatar ilefl'atarskiye kraya" (Kazan), # 12, 1993. Back.
Note 8: Except Latvia and Estonia whose governments officially insist on their pre-war borders, and some militant groups in Russia who regard large parts of Kazakhstan and the Ukraine as Russian territory. Back.
Note 9: Patrick Bahners noted in "Frankfurter AIlgemeine Zeitung" (July 24, 1991) that "to accept the irrational dimension of the nation means not mystification but rather the recognition of the contradictory contents of the reality". Back.
Note 10: However, over half of this number are concentrated in the Ukraine (11.4 million in 1989) and Belarus (1.3 million) where the problem of accomodation does not exist, and over 6 million more are settled in Kazakhstan - mostly in its northern industrial region and the capital Almaty. Back.
Note 11: Post-colonial features of the C.I.S. have been examined by me in "Nezavisimaya gazeta", Feb. 7,1992. Back.
Note 12: Khasamikov, Khamsa. Let's Talk, Johar.- "Impuls" (Grozny), # 23, May 21,1993. Back.
Note 13: Agnayev A. Ossetians or Alans? - "Severnaya Osetiya" (Vladikavkaz), August 12, 1992. Back.
Note 14: Bzayev K Alans in Western Europe during the Great Migration of Peoples. - " Severnaya Osetiya'1, April 10,1993. Back.
Note 15: Bashkir scholar comments the annexation in the following way: "Really, one should not make too much of the peaceful and voluntary accession to Russia not only by Bashkirs, but also by other eastern countries and peoples of Eurasia. The Tatars of Kazan after fierce resistance to the hordes of Ivan the Terrible where simply overwhelmed and literally dispersed in boundless territories around the Khanate... The Bashkirs were horror-stricken at the outcome of this unequal struggle of the Kazanians against Moscow. They became demoralised and even uncapable of offering active and even passive resistance to the terrible invasion. It has to be admitted that the tribal nobility of Bashkirs generally took a sensible view of the situation and of the balance of forces and decided to surrender - on certain terms - to the will of the "white Czar"... Under these conditions it was but natural that, according to a fragmentary echo of those events... they replied to the question concerning their readiness to become subjects of the Russian Czar with the words "Heartily agree and approve". The facts related to the annexation of Bashkiria by Russia remained vivid in the memory of generations and became integral part of the national history and national consciousness of the Bashkir people. During the worst times of the national-colonial yoke and the struggle against it, the Bashkirs never forgot how and when their ancestors became part of the Russian state." (Yuldashbayev B. Bashkiria as a Part of Russia. - "Sovetskaya Bashkiriya" 'Ufal, Feb. 25,1992. Back.
Note 16: Aliev A Cossack games.-" Zov predkov" (Makhachkala), Sept. 1991. Back.
Note 17: Badal, Umar. An Uninvited Guest Is... Better than a Tatar, or Tatarophobia at the Lessons in Russian Schools. - "Tatar ile[Fatarskiye kraya", #3, 1993. Back.
Note 18: Prof. Bliev M. in "Severnaya Osetiya", April 13,1993. Back.
Note 19: "Tatar ile~atarskiye kraya", # 4, 1993. Back.
Note 20: "Tatar ile[Fatarskiye kraya11, # 3, 1993. Back.
Note 21: A Chechen scholar writes: "Sovereignization of the republics [of the Russian Federation. - A.P.J is a perfectly natural protest of the peoples against thesavageries of the ancient world rehearsed by certain forces in Russia, a protest against genuine threat of uncovered revival of the ideology and practice of the eternal empire of the "third Rome". Even the Slav nations are in no hurry to establish allied relations with the "renascent" Russia... As for the Chechen people, God himself ordered us to keep a safe distance from the "renascent" empire (Dudayev A Philosophy of Chechen Sovereignty. Grozny: Kniga, 1992 un Russiani, p. 11). Similar views are often shared by the Ingush authors:"... the Russian empire is on the verge of collapse and no one knows what will be the fate of our people. In order to defend ourselves from any enemy, we have to remember that our force is in our unity only" (Yevloyev A We Are Not Defeated. Our Salvation is in Our Unity. - "Impuls", Feb. 5, 1992). Back.
Note 22: Khakimov, Rafael, advisor to the President, member of the State Council of the Republic of Tatarstan in the "Nezavisimaya gazeta" (Moscow), Sept. 30, 1992, writes: "The international community lives under illusion that the world consists of states, while actually it is the world of peoples... There are some 5,000 ethnic groups, but only 180 have the internationally recognized statehood. The peoples are accorded different grades, and that is not justice". As the first steps of the "second decolonization" the quoted author proposes to adopt a Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples to be followed by creation of the second chamber within the U.N., representing the groups which do not have states of their own. Back.
Note 23: In the "Address of the Writers to the Ossetian People" 37 intellectuals of the republic accused the Ingushes of having collaborated with the Nazis during the World War II ("Severnaya Osetiya", April 1, 1993). An Ossetian scholar asserts that during the Second Wordl War "not a single fact of Ingushes taking part in the defence of Vladikavkaz is known. On the contrary, at this most difficult for our country hour the Red Army was compulsed to assign a special Moscow division of the NKVD, a paratroops regiment and other units to fight the Ingush gangs... A Fascist newspaper Ghazavat under the motto "Allah is above us, Hitler is with us" was published in Ingushetia. The author of the quoted article explains the allleged expansionism of the Ingushes by arguing that their community, unlike Ossetians and other modern nations, is in the state of transition from tribal system to hierachical organization and preserves leftover features of the former, when war, raids, and robbery are as usual forms of activity, as agriculture, animal husbandry, commerce, etc (Severnaya Osetiya, Nov. 27, 1992). Back.
Note 24: "Severnaya Osetiya" Dec.1, 1992, Feb. 3, 1993 Back.
Note 25: For example, in Daghestan the common supraethnic Daghestanian identity is increasingly fragmented as diverse ethnic communities are drifting apart and have founded separate nationalist movements. The Lezghins, divided territorially between the Republic of Daghestan and Azerbaijan, have started an irredentist movement, and in September 1991 actually proclaimed the Republic of Lezghistan, comprising the Lezghin areas in the two states. An All-Lezghinian meeting in June 1992 appealed to the governments of Russia and Azerbaijan to recognize the self-proclaimed republic ("Lezginskiy vestnik": Moscow, # 4,1992). Back.
