CIAO DATE: 10/03

Final Report of the Sixth Annual Conference: Building a Strategic Community Through Education and Research

June 15-17, 2003
Berlin, Germany

Partnership for Peace Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes

Contents

Plenary Session 1

• Panel 1: Implications and Perspectives of EU/NATO Enlargement

• Panel 2: Reflections on Regional Stability in Europe and on its Periphery

Plenary Session 2

• Panel 1: PfP Consortium and the Way Ahead

Parallel Panel Meetings

• Panel 1: Regional Stability

• Panel 2: Education and Training

• Panel 3: Security Sector Reform (SSR)

• Panel 4: Asymmetric Threats

 

Plenary Session 1, Panel 1: Implications and Perspectives of EU/NATO Enlargement

Moderator: Dr. Jack Kangas, National Defense University, Washington D.C.

Speakers:
Mr. Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of Parliament; Vice-Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag, Berlin
Colonel-General Vladislav P. Sherstyuk, Acting Secretary of the National Security Council of the Russian Federation, Moscow
Mr. Anders C. Sjaastad, Former Minister of Defense of Norway; Director of European Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Hans-Ulrich Klose, Member of Parliament; Vice-Chairman Foreign Affairs Committee, Bundestag

Overview

Mr. Klose gave a summary of his views on EU/NATO enlargement and, in doing so, addressed some of the most important and pressing questions raised regarding the implications of the enlargement of both the European Union and NATO.

Key Insights

Germany has a vital interest in EU/NATO enlargement, since, for the first time since the formation of the European and Atlantic alliances, it will be surrounded by partner-member states. While Europe is in the process of unifying, it is far from being a "United States of Europe," because there is a tendency for European states to lean toward re-nationalization. New countries entering the EU must realize that membership provides opportunities and will not limit their sovereignty. Europe should resist trying to counterbalance the United States militarily, and realize that the influence of the U.S. in Europe is beneficial to both the U.S. and the EU.

NATO is both a political and a military alliance, and it is important to have a debate on the Alliance's dual role and relevance. Insights growing out of this debate are important. For example, plans for a military response force, given today's new security environment, are meaningful and should be implemented.

The disparity between the military capabilities of individual NATO member states is considerable, with the U.S. being the only state with the capability to act unilaterally. It is important for the U.S. and the EU to revitalize NATO. Serious debate must be held on the effects of the new security threat (WMD, terrorism, etc.) so that NATO can become an institution that plays an active part in world security, given this new security environment.

Europe must pool its resources to increase its military capabilities, but must do this in cooperation with the United States, not as a counterbalance to it. Transatlantic cooperation is vital for Europe and should not be renounced.

Summary of Presentation

Germany has its own vital, existential interest in EU/NATO enlargement and expansion, since NATO has already been enlarged through the addition of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, and will be enlarged further, incorporating even more members.

Germany has always promoted EU enlargement, and intends to continue to do so. The unification of Europe is a beneficial outcome for not only Germany, but for Europe as a whole. Although Europe is unifying, the European Union is a long way from becoming the "United States of Europe." European states have a tendency toward re-nationalization. At the end of the Cold War, the European order of states was created based on the order of nation states, and that legacy remains in place.

The Central and Eastern European countries that will join the EU in 2004 have all achieved their sovereignty in the past fourteen years. It is difficult for the politicians and citizens of these countries to dispense with the rights of sovereignty. The EU is linked with the concept of relinquishing sovereignty, and therefore unification is limited, and in some cases restricted.

These limitations can only change when all potential member countries realize that joining the EU will enrich their opportunities. In this "interim" phase, the EU is not standing still, but complete European unification will not come to fruition any time soon.

The influence of the United States within Europe through the enlargement of the EU and NATO will increase, and this can only yield positive results. The accession candidates from Central and Eastern Europe look first and foremost to the United States when the issue of security and stability arises. Furthermore, dissension among the various states in Europe over the recent conflict in Iraq has to a certain extent pulled Europe apart. For example, the Letter of Eight and the Villnas Declaration are not just expressions of solidarity with Washington, but also are responses to the German and French attempt to achieve leadership within the European Union.

Europe as a whole should be prepared to work together with the U.S., and should seek to do so in the same way it has been doing for the last 50 years. This does not mean that the European Union should not criticize American policy from time to time, but rather the EU must realize that the American presence in Europe has not damaged Europe, but has helped it.

NATO

What is NATO's relevance and purpose in today's world? NATO was founded as a military alliance under the circumstances of a specific conflict, a conflict (the Cold War) that no longer exists. The opponent that NATO was created to counter-the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact-is now gone. Today, the EU and the U.S. are working with Russia to ensure that it remains a permanent partner of each.

One might come to conflicting conclusions over U.S. perceptions of NATO. Several American political leaders (e.g. Colin Powell) have emphasized the political importance of NATO, but in the same breath have questioned NATO's military relevance.

The debate over NATO's role must be conducted openly. NATO is a political as well as a military alliance. For example, the possibility of a NATO response force is meaningful, and plans for such should be implemented. NATO can also no longer be simply a regional alliance; if NATO is to have a significant military capability, than it must be a global alliance, an organization that takes on responsibility far beyond the European periphery and needs to be ready for action wherever there is an impingement on the world order that may impact Europe.

NATO's capacity to accomplish these daunting tasks looms large. There is one country that is in the position to accomplish tasks unilaterally, and that is the United States of America. That the U.S. is the one state that has sufficient military power to have a global impact brings NATO's military relevance into question. Further, the distance in terms of military technology between the member states in NATO is considerable and with the enlargement of NATO, these differences will not decrease.

Some of the problems of the past months have resulted from the fact that NATO is no longer the central advisory and decision-making body in terms of security policy for its member states; rather, it is an institution that is briefed. It no longer offers advisory services.

The current global threat is weapons of mass destruction (WMD), terrorism, etc., but there has never been a discussion in the NATO council about the impact of these threats on all of Europe, and, although the military has discussed these threats, the politicians have not.

Europe must increase its military capabilities, and this might amount to pooling the resources of European states. The era of European national armies is over. Not even the larger European member states are in a position to have all military capabilities at their disposal and be able to cope with every eventuality. Europe must pool its capabilities, and should do so closely tied to the United States through NATO, and not as a counterbalance to the U.S.

Multi-Polar World?

Politically and economically, the world is multi-polar. However, militarily it is not. The EU must enhance its military capabilities, but should do so in cooperation with the United States. Europe must be in a position to defend itself, solve European problems and those on the European periphery, and must be able to do unilaterally. But it must also be a partner in addressing global problems, and have capabilities that are useful. An enlarged EU is good, and an enlarged NATO is good, but transatlantic cooperation is vital for Europe, and should not be renounced.

"Prospects and Implications of NATO Enlargement from the Russian Point of View"

Colonel-General Vladislav P. Sherstyuk, Acting Secretary of the National Security Council, Russian Federation

Overview

Col. Sherstyuk spoke on the prospects and implications of NATO enlargement from the Russian point of view.

Key Insights

Expansion of cooperation with NATO is one of Russia's top foreign policy priorities. NATO and Russia have assumed solidarity and joint responsibility for the fate of the European continent.

NATO's eastward enlargement, however, is a very topical issue. NATO must uphold its commitments as stated in the Madrid Meeting of the Council of the Level of Foreign Ministers. Russia will operate on the basis of what it perceives to be the real situation rather than on the political statements made by those countries joining the Alliance. Nevertheless, Russia regards the enlargement of the EU as part and parcel of the natural integration process that is bringing European states together.

One of the most acute problems in the context of the expansion of the European Union has to do with the issue of the free movement of citizens. The EU is Russia's major trade and economic partner. Therefore, it is important to clearly develop the concept of European economic space. There are a number of outstanding issues, and it is time to move to the pragmatic level to solve them. One of the potential areas of cooperation in this regard is the establishment of a system of national information security.

Russia has never been as strong as it would like to be; but it has never been as weak as some may have believed. Russia is open to equal cooperation with NATO/EU in the interest of sharing in the security, stability, and prosperity of a European continent that will be united by common values, where there will be no room for hatred or mutual distrust.

Summary of Presentation

The expansion of cooperation with NATO is one of Russia's top foreign policy priorities. Since Russia's Cold War confrontation with Europe is over, it is the job of the European community to build a Europe without borders. Russia must be involved in the information integration process, and should take an active part in the new architecture of security that will take all parties into account. Proliferation of democratic values is in the interest of Russia, NATO, and the EU, thereby strengthening the stability of the European space. One of the key factors in this process is the upcoming enlargement of NATO and the EU. Furthermore, cooperation between NATO and Russia is part of the underlying architecture for European security, and is becoming one of the underlying structures for international relations as a whole.

The Roman declaration, signed in May 2002, opened a political dialogue between Brussels and Moscow. It qualitatively changed the tenor and direction of the relationship, and promoted a joint investment of trust that contributes to ensuring the security of the EU and Russia under new geopolitical conditions. NATO is called upon to reverse its many years of experience from the Cold War in dealing with real and imagined threats to Europe's security. Having become partners, Russia and the EU have assumed solidarity and joint responsibility for the fate of the European continent.

There are several areas of recent military cooperation between Russia and NATO, including: the improvement of relations between NATO and Russia in counter terrorist efforts, cooperation between intelligence communities, the signing of an agreement on submarines, conducting joint exercises in emergency circumstances, and developing peacemaking operations between Russia and NATO.

However, these measures of cooperation do not mean that Russia and NATO hold the same view of security. NATO's eastward enlargement is a prime example. NATO's eastern enlargement process will not add to the security of NATO or of the Eastern European countries that wish to become its members. There are no objective reasons for the expansion of NATO influence closer to Russia's borders. Similarly, Russia does not claim veto rights with regard to decisions made by the Alliance.

Russia respects the sovereign right of any country to independently choose ways of assuring its own security. However, NATO's enlargement should not lead to the interruption of security and stability or the weakening of any arms control regime. The Treaty of Conventional Armed Forces in Europe is the cornerstone of regional security and is of the utmost importance in terms of guaranteeing regional security between Russia and NATO. Russia is concerned about the slowdown in implementing the agreement and the lack of restraint over military forces in those states that are not yet participants of this treaty such as Slovenia, Latvia, and Estonia. During the Madrid Meeting of the Council of the level of Foreign Ministers, NATO stated that all member states would uphold their obligations toward Russia, as follows:

1. There will be no nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of NATO countries. There will be no storing such weapons, and no such structures will be set up.

2. The Alliance countries shall not deploy on a permanent basis on the territories of members with military capabilities. NATO will support only those military capabilities that are commensurate with its need for security, and will uphold their responsibilities in accordance with international law.

3. Newly invited states must also show military restraint.

In Madrid, the alliance countries showed their willingness to abide by treaties of conventional arms. Russia will act according to what it perceives the real situation to be rather than on the political statements made by those countries joining the alliance.

In Spring 2004, seven more countries will join NATO. As such, Russia expects its partners to take steps to ratify the agreement with regard to the conventional arms treaty. Russia has complied with the legal steps necessary to complete this process. If, by May 2004, NATO fails to fulfill its end of the bargain, there may emerge a gap between the geopolitical and military realities on the one hand and the existing system of arms control measures on the other.

Russia attaches great importance to the development of NATO. NATO is Russia's strategic partner, and Russia intends to improve its relations with NATO on a long-term basis. This relationship has been characterized by the development of increasing co-operation on political and security matters. Russia and NATO's position on a number of political and security issues are close or identical.

The Enlargement of the EU

Russia regards the enlargement of the EU as part and parcel of the natural process of integration that is bringing European states together. Russia hopes to improve relations with those countries. This will improve the level of stability and security that can be achieved through the structure and processes of the EU. The enlargement of the EU should not result in dividing lines that will harm Russia's economic position in its trade with the countries that are about to enter the EU. Both partners should make joint efforts to find solutions that will make it possible to improve the ties between Europe and Russia and introduce new elements into this cooperation that will elevate both to a new level that is in line with the new realities.

Free Movement of Citizens

One of the most acute problems in the context of the expansion of the European Union has to do with the free movement of citizens. Expansion of the Shangan Zone-the area along the borders of Russia-erects additional barriers to the free movement of people and goods. In Brussels, Russia reached a mutually acceptable compromise with respect to Kaliningrad, Russia's enclave in European territory. Yet the problem still exists that the visa barriers between Russia and the EU need to be removed. Mutual trade, business exchanges, scientific contacts, and growing tourism on both sides call for finding a speedier solution to these problems.

Russia must spend much time and effort in solving the problem of illegal immigration. Several legal and organizational issues warrant focused and intensified control over Russian borders and legal space. Organized crime, drug traffic, and other illegal manifestations are problematic. Russia is alarmed and concerned by continued ethnic conflicts as well.

Russia and the EU should unify international legislation regarding international terrorism and also develop international and legal codes to fight terrorism. Russia will not relinquish its responsibility to fight terrorism in its own territories throughout the entire process.

The EU is Russia's major trade and economic partner. It is extremely important to clearly develop the concept of European economic space. Yet there are still a number of outstanding issues, such as:

1. Rules against dumping exports.

2. Restrictions on supplies of certain Russian goods to European markets.

3. Higher import duties on certain types of commodities in East European countries after they become part of the EU.

The challenge is how quickly and effectively Russia and the EU will be able to realistically deal with the problems they face. It is time to translate dialogue to a pragmatic level. Cooperation between academies and institutes studying European security problems under the framework of PfP will also lead to stronger security ties between the two.

Establishment of a National Information Security System

One of the main areas of cooperation is the establishment of a system of national information security. Progress in information technology will create the potential for removing any threats to world peace and security, will help prevent interference in a nation's internal affairs, and will ensure respect for individual freedoms and rights.

However, the threat of informational structures being used for criminal or terrorist purposes may have catastrophic consequences. Several reasons exist to focus on national information security; among which are the increased opportunities for terrorists to do harm to the information infrastructure and the importance of securing the information that is passed through international channels.

Terrorists see no other way to happiness except through extremism. They have slowed down the global movement toward a civilized future by clinging to antiquated moral values that are different than those of contemporary civilized world. Terrorists and extremists impose their own values by using the achievements and progress of mankind in terms of telecommunication and information technology in the service of atavistic goals.

The fight against terrorism means not only destroying its military and financial bases, but also addressing the ideological confrontation between the civilized world and those who would destroy it by non-civilized means, as well as by creating other methods of solving political contradictions. This fight has a start with the active involvement of all states in the working groups of the consortium.

Winston Churchill once stated, "Russia has never been so strong as it would like to be; but it has never been so weak as some may have believed." Russia has been in a state of confrontation with the world and with Europe, but this state of confrontation benefited no one. Today, Russia is coming back to the family of European nations, and wants its voice to be heard and its interests to be taken into account. Russia is open to equal cooperation with NATO/EU in the interest of sharing in the security, stability, and prosperity of a European continent that will be united by common values, where there will be no room for hatred or mutual distrust.

Mr. Anders C. Sjaastad, Former Norwegian Minister of Defense; Director of European Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs

Overview

Mr. Sjaastad spoke on the different implications of both EU and NATO enlargement, and explained that, while both remained relevant, NATO enlargement needed to be analyzed and defended. The relationship between both organizations is not a zero-sum game, but a value added proposition for all states involved.

Key Insights

EU enlargement and NATO enlargement are two different animals. There are a variety of reasons for EU enlargement, and these are, for the most part, self-explanatory. But the implications of the expansion of the NATO alliance need to be analyzed, explained, and defended.

There are four avenues of analysis for NATO expansion, and these are: European peace and stability, the credibility of the Washington Treaty, consequences for non-NATO members, and looking at NATO as an alliance and collective defense organization.

In the aftermath of September 11 and the war with Iraq, pessimists say that the Alliance is losing its relevance. But this is not necessarily the case, provided the U.S. and Europe "get their acts together."

NATO no longer has any treaty-based geographic limits to its area of responsibility or area of engagement, and therefore many officers will a priori expect increased competition between an enlarged EU and an enlarged NATO

An enlarged EU will, as has always been the case before in its development, have its ups and downs. Whether it can grow to rival NATO in the latest domain remains to be seen. Regardless, an enlarged EU is the least likely to disappear from the international scene. There is no need to regard the EU/NATO relationship as a zero-sum game.

Summary of Presentation

EU enlargement and NATO enlargement are two different animals. The EU is a multi-purpose organization that holds many attractions for potential members. Regardless of whether the EU succeeds or fails with its common defense policy, there are still plenty of reasons politically and economically for other countries to seek membership in the EU.

But the EU is not first and foremost an "altruistic members' club." There is a variety of reasons why it should want to enlarge, and the implications vary from one policy sector to another.

NATO is a former collective defense alliance. In the post-Cold War era it transformed itself into a collective security organization. It is primarily a single-purpose alliance. That single purpose is of overriding importance for any single independent country. While the virtues of EU enlargement are self-explanatory, the implications of expanding the NATO alliance need to be analyzed, explained, and defended.

Many of the countries that joined during the last NATO enlargement in 1999 (Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic) did so for the wrong reasons: hoping to become a member of the old NATO-a potent collective defense alliance that could protect them from a former adversary if Russia ever wanted to regain parts of its former empire. The concept of territorial defense is still relevant for them. There is no doubt that those countries were most qualified for membership.

Paradoxically, countries that needed membership most were not invited either because they were not qualified or conditions were too delicate for them to be allowed entrance. The decision of the Prague Summit in the fall of 2002 took the opposite approach compared with 1999. Now, almost every applicant is invited to join or is qualified to join NATO. In May 2004, seven new members will join. In Prague, the only countries that got a "thumbs down" were latecomers who were clearly unqualified, but no one got a more negative reply, than a temporary "No."

NATO after Prague

The four areas of analysis most useful for a discussion of NATO after Prague are: European peace and stability, the credibility of the Washington Treaty, consequences for non-NATO members, and NATO as an alliance and collective defense organization.

European Peace and Stability

After the Cold War, European peace and stability is no longer a zero-sum game. In today's Europe, peace and stability are value added propositions for all states; everyone should benefit by increased stability in the Euro-Atlantic Region. Further, enlargement of the Alliance is not directed against any country or alliance of states.

The process of qualifying to become a NATO member has contributed significantly to eliminating interstate conflict (i.e., it has minimized ethnic problems or border disputes). NATO has promoted peace and stability in Europe beyond deterring the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

For example, the Alliance has prevented conflicts between member states (e.g., Greece and Turkey would have fought wars during the past several decades). The bottom line is that NATO enlargement brings peace and stability to an ever-greater part of the Euro-Atlantic area.

Credibility of the Washington Treaty

NATO was structured to have an open-ended membership. No candidates were considered if they were not otherwise qualified by meeting the basic membership criteria, but it was also assumed that there was no automatic trigger for membership. At the same time, old members can now invite new members.

The founding members took upon themselves a moral commitment to welcome new members to the Alliance. This was to the benefit of the existing organization. It used to be that old member states would say, "Sorry guys, you lost your chance of joining NATO by ending up on the wrong side of the Iron Curtain." But now, NATO is treaty-bound to open itself up for further enlargement without threats knocking on the Alliance door. Finally, the opportunity and screening process are inducements for aspiring candidates to strive to qualify.

Consequences for Non-members

There are more aspiring NATO members than were invited to join at the Prague Summit. NATO can never pronounce this expansion as the last. The Washington Treaty assured that membership must remain open to future members.

Some countries may never be invited, or may never be interested in joining NATO. For example, Russia is already a quasi- or part-time member. The challenge for both parties (NATO and Russia) is to develop co-operation within the current limits.

The Ukraine is a more difficult case. It cannot, at this time, hope to win Russian approval, nor does it come anywhere near to fulfilling the basic criteria for membership. The size of its population and geographic location makes it impossible to ignore the Ukraine, however. At the same time, inaction could throw Ukraine back into the arms of Russia, and no one wants this regardless of good relations with Russia. The overriding challenge for Ukraine in the time to come is to get its house in order.

NATO as an Alliance and Collective Defense Organization

NATO must remain a functioning defense alliance. There is no traditional military threat visible today, but NATO's indispensable ability lies in its capacity to conduct peace operations. NATO has a military capability that no other organization possesses. There is no sense of turning NATO into another OSC, since there is no use in having two of these organizations.

NATO will remain the only effective military organization whether it operates on its own, or whether it participates in an ad hoc "coalition of the willing." Any new member should make elective contributions to the alliance capabilities. But their contribution should not be judged by a Cold-War yardstick.

NATO after September 11 and Iraq

Countries in the process of joining NATO today are joining a different alliance than the one they originally applied for. In the aftermath of September 11 and the war with Iraq, pessimists say that the Alliance is losing its relevance. But this is not necessarily the case, provided that the U.S. and Europe "get their acts together."

If, in future international actions, missions define the coalition, NATO's status as a potent collective defense alliance is worth promoting and protecting. What makes NATO a unique organization is that comprehensive, integrated, military cooperation is a peacetime, around-the-clock endeavor. Any new member will have to integrate its armed forces with those of the rest of the Alliance through changes and adjustments. Among other things, they will have to change their military doctrine and procedures.

A functioning alliance is necessary to provide any backbone to ad hoc coalitions that are facing a high-risk mission. The one exception to this is if the U.S. wants to go it alone, which the U.S. has the military capability to accomplish. However, the recent examples in Afghanistan and Iraq illustrate how difficult it is to maintain peace and security once the fighting has ended. In the long term, U.S. unilateral action may not suffice, even if the determination is prevailing in Washington, D.C.

It is doubtful that NATO can be sustained as an effective military alliance if international terrorism is its only adversary, and if fighting terrorism will be the only science and art required of the Alliance. Even a reformed and transformed NATO may not be the right tool for fighting terrorism unless the host is a so-called "rogue state."

The following questions should be asked with respect to future NATO enlargement: (1) If we look toward another round of NATO enlargement after the Prague interests have been accommodated, can we foresee any acute international conflict between the various enlargement criteria? (2) Can NATO enlarge forever, without losing its trademark as an integrated military alliance capable of fighting successfully in major military conflicts? (3) Or is NATO enlargement increasingly irrelevant for promoting peace and stability because current U.S. policies will render NATO impotent if not obsolete?

Some time ago, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar proclaimed his famous dictum about the alternatives for NATO after the end of the Cold War. The Alliance must be "going out of area, or out of business." NATO has no longer any treaty-based geographic limits to its area of responsibility or area of engagement.

Given that the Treaty's defined southern border, the Tropic of Cancer, is by unanimous consent no longer limiting the Alliance's area of operations, does this imply that there are no geographic limits to NATO membership, when apparently there is none to "out of area" operations? Today it is difficult to point to any European country that is commonly defined as unsuitable for NATO membership.

Similarly, should former Soviet Republics apart from the Baltic states be denied membership? The Caucasus Republics would cause havoc in NATO capitals and headquarters, but they can hardly be written off forever. And if there is no European country a priori disqualified from becoming a future NATO member, this will nullify the widely used argument against the first post-Cold War round of NATO enlargement, namely that it would create new dividing lines in Europe (i.e., restoring some reminiscence of the Iron Curtain).

The Central Asian republics may represent and provide an interesting and potentially divisive test case for NATO. Already today in connection with NATO's engagement in Afghanistan, Central Asian bases and territory constitute an important staging bridge between NATO proper and the mission areas. We might someday envision a formalized relationship between the Central Asian republics and NATO instead of bilateral agreements with individual Alliance countries, with some kind of development clause aimed at NATO membership.

Until now, NATO was not solely a military and political alliance; it also professed itself to be a community of values. And with the current Alliance lineup, it is hard to dismiss the claim. Can such an alliance community be maintained regardless of NATO's size, membership, and types of mission? Or will NATO degenerate into an alliance of global mercenaries?

A Few Words on the Competition and Conflict Between an Enlarged EU and an Enlarged NATO

Many officers will automatically expect increased competition between an enlarged EU and an enlarged NATO. Such fears have probably been fueled by Secretary Rumsfeld's division of Europe into the Old and the New. However, support for the American policy in Iraq split both the existing NATO and the old EU right down the middle. The newcomers that will constitute the enlarged NATO after Prague and the enlarged EU after Copenhagen are, of course, many of the same countries, and would not by their shared entrance increase the already existing transatlantic conflict. In fact, many of the new members will be more eager than some of the older ones to assist in bridging the gap between the Old and the New world. Most likely, the old communist countries are more inclined to trust the U.S. when it comes to facing security threats than relying on a Europe separated from North America.

An enlarged EU will, as always before in its development, have its ups and downs. Whether it can grow to rival NATO in this latest domain remains to be seen. But until now, EU's ambitious defense plans have been more characterized by paperwork than by realistic funding of sophisticated military hardware.

In a recent newspaper interview, Helmut Schmidt voiced his skepticism regarding the likelihood of an enlarged EU of twenty-five members being able to develop a truly common security and defense policy. However, of the two organizations, the enlarged EU is the least likely to disappear from the international scene. But NATO will only have to leave the arena if one of two things happens:

1. The EU becomes so successful in the security and defense field that NATO becomes superfluous; leaving us with a more or less harmonious bilateral relationship between the U.S. and the EU.

2. Continued recourse by the U.S. administration to unilateralism and ad hoc coalitions. If such an attitude to NATO cooperation prevails in Washington, D.C., and is also supported by successive American administrations, an alliance like NATO, with basically a single-purpose agenda, is left with no option but to go out of business.

There is no need to regard the EU/NATO relationship as a zero-sum game. For the foreseeable future, there are enough conflicts, challenges, and human misery to keep both the EU and NATO busy.

 

Plenary Session 1, Panel 2: Reflections on Regional Stability in Europe and on its Periphery

Moderator: Major-General (ret.) (French Army) Alain Faupin, Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, Geneva

Speakers:
Dr. Arnold Rüütel, President of the Republic of Estonia
Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Georg Wagner, Ministry of Defense, Germany

Dr. Arnold Rüütel, President of the Republic of Estonia

Whether thinking at the global, regional, national, or family level, security, stability, and safety are key words that matter most to people. But we often only pay attention to these issues during times of war. We want security for the future, and security in a broader sense, so that we can live in an environment fit for humans. Modern science and technology need to serve sustainable development. Because of globalization, no nation, regardless of size or location, can really feel safe.

Al-Qaeda's recent threat to Norway shows that terrorism is a problem to all, not just a few countries. The Baltic Sea region is renowned for economic and social development and strong growth, but we are exposed to many threats due to our location at Northern Europe's crossroads and our openness to the sea. Our historical experience allows us to view the present world through a unique prism. Changes are taking place in our regions: Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia will hopefully soon join the European Union, and the three Baltic states are poised to join NATO. Of the ten member states of the Council of Baltic Sea States, only three-Russia, Iceland, and Norway-will remain outside the European Union, and Finland, Sweden and Russia will be the only ones outside of NATO.

The capability of the Baltic Sea states to combat terrorism and organized crime needs to be bolstered. We need to step up close co-operation between these countries. The Baltic Sea region is inseparable from Europe in this effort. Terrorism shows that the security chain is only as strong as its weakest link: security is indivisible. Therefore, cooperation amongst countries is critical. NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea region is very important to foster stability and the development of democracy and for co-operation in economics, culture, the environment, and security. As a small country, Estonia is aware of the need for collective and cooperative security. We do not want to distinguish between partners; we want to foster parallel links in Europe and in the Baltic Sea region. One example is the close co-operation between Finnish, Estonian, and Russian border guards who train together on a regular basis on such missions as rescue at sea and various other activities. Such coordination is needed to enhance their efficiency. Within the framework of the Vienna Document, we are implementing military inspections with Russia. The transatlantic alliance is the backbone of NATO, and the strength of this alliance comes from the awareness that we are the best possible allies for one another. But this alliance would be strengthened if we in Europe approached the threats we face more decisively. We must see the need to tackle these threats more clearly and be willing to contribute our own resources more effectively than we have in the past. In Estonia, a number of governments in recent years have kept the promise of spending two percent of our GDP on defense. Estonian citizens see the importance of sustaining this level of defense spending. Seventy percent of our citizens think that defense spending should stay at the present level or even be increased. These are some of the reasons why I believe fostering European security and defense policy is critical. It is important that cooperation among the countries that share the values of liberal democracy should be strengthened and become more equal. The European security and defense policy should be shaped to avoid commitments it cannot meet with its existing capabilities, lest we make empty commitments and promises.

Perhaps we should ask why Central and Eastern European countries believe the transatlantic alliance is so important. There are not many in Western Europe who have personal memories of the Marshall Plan, and there are not many in Germany who remember Kennedy's speech here in Berlin in 1963 when he said, "Ich bin ein Berliner." For many people in the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, however, Ronald Reagan's "evil empire" speech was one of the most decisive moments of their early years. Of course, most EU and NATO member states are small and have only limited resources at their disposal, so we welcome developments that help to lessen tensions. I am speaking specifically about developments in Afghanistan, Iraq, Cyprus, and the Balkans. Peace is more than a truce or cease-fire. It means a society where everyone feels safe and where there is no place for crime or drug trafficking. It means mutual respect and acceptance of the languages, cultures, and religions of others.

Sustainable security in Europe can only be achieved on the continent as a whole if we see the continent as a whole. Security and stability are not God's gift to humanity; they are a challenge for humanity that must be engaged with constantly. They cannot be created overnight, but they can be lost through imprudence and inaction. It is my hope that co-operation in our region will continue in an atmosphere of mutual trust and assistance and an exchange of ideas.

Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

I read in yesterday's paper that the president of the German republic was recently asked what he thought would be the greatest miracle for Germany's future. He replied, "That this country would have another 50 years in which it would be surrounded by friends." Our task is to try to make that miracle come true not just for Germany, but for the rest of Europe as well. The president's response gives us an indication that this outcome is not a foregone conclusion; it will be no easy task, and the work will not just be about terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. So far there is no solid evidence of a link between terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, but there is no doubt that there are many countries that are not happy with what we regard to be a stable status quo. We know that proliferators are normally states, not terrorists. We are entering an inflection point in which the current stability we enjoy, which is not God-given, will be assailed by many disparate challenges. To achieve sustainable stability will require hard work.

Reflection on Europe's periphery is a challenging task for two reasons. First, insecurity has been globalized. Security and periphery can no longer be defined geographically. What implications does this have for our security? Should we be everywhere? What choices must we make, what priorities must we set? Consider for example the current situation in the Congo. Is the Congo on Europe's periphery? Should we be engaged? Does it affect our security? Of course, not everything that happens out there in world is dangerous to us, but a lot of things are, and those are the areas we must concentrate on.

There is a second aspect to this issue of periphery that we are addressing today, and that is that we are pushing the periphery forward. We are pushing borders forward through EU and NATO expansion. European governments and publics have discussed enlargement as if it is only relevant to the internal operations of the European Union. But we are pushing into parts of the world that can be quite troubled. Enlargement demands that we recognize not just the obvious issues such as the fact that this is a bigger Union that is more difficult to manage, or who is going to get what share of the Union's limited resources. Enlargement also demands that we ask ourselves the question, "What does Europe want to do in the regions in which it is expanding?" With the admission of Cyprus, these areas include the Middle East; with Malta, Spain and Portugal it is North Africa; with Finland, it is the long border with Russia. With the advent of other countries, the EU is bordering Russia and the Ukraine, but our concerns don't stop on the border. They begin on the borders. We must start thinking about what it is we want to do and what our policies should be. There is very little awareness in European publics and European governments about the world beyond Europe into which we are enlarging. There is no real strategy or policy. We are increasingly willing to dispatch forces abroad, but rarely is the dispatch of forces accompanied by a strategy that reflects a wider concept of security. We send forces, but do we have a real policy as far as South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Southwest Asia are concerned? We should be concerned about the lack of a policy and strategy. As the Balkans have illustrated, an understanding of the security challenges of the region and policy and strategy should precede forces being dispatched. Dispatching forces is not the catalyst for policy; it should be the other way around.

What Europe really lacks, among other things, is an understanding of its strategic challenges. For so many years during the Cold War, we focused exclusively on the security challenges existing in Europe, and we left the rest of the world to United States. It is time for us to realize that we have new strategic challenges on and beyond the European periphery. Dispatching forces cannot replace strategic thinking. In Germany we discuss defense spending in terms of whether it pleases Americans, not in terms of what we want to accomplish and what resources we need to accomplish it.

Finally, we need to ask, "What is the 'we'?" The Estonian president has said, "The security of Europe must be seen as a whole. If one country suffers all suffer." While this is an important message that we need our leaders to convey, we know that it is not literally true. Is Liberia relevant to Finland? It is doubtful. We will need coalitions of the willing. There are crises in which only some will want to act. This is true of NATO and the EU. But there the problem begins. How does one ensure that the wider group supports the actions of the smaller affected group? We have seen this in Iraq; Europe was easily split over Iraq, revealing the weakness of the EU and NATO. If we only operate as coalitions of the willing, it will be impossible to avoid fractures. The real challenge of NATO is to achieve this support from the many of action by the few. Otherwise, the EU and NATO will unravel. The need to take others along, both big and small, is essential to coalitions of the willing. Power includes the responsibility to take others along. The periphery of Europe is fluid, and we are missing the recognition that our security is challenged by the fact that we are moving into other parts of the world. The need to hold together EU and NATO for the stability of the continent as they expand means that a much greater effort will be needed in order to bring others along.

Parliamentary State Secretary Hans Georg Wagner, Ministry of Defense, Germany

Transatlantic relations and the close ties that exist with America are crucial for Europe. We need to develop and expand these relations. We Germans must not forget that it was primarily the Americans who liberated us from dictatorship decades ago and helped us along the way in creating democracy. Thus, transatlantic relations are critical for German foreign and domestic policy and for security policy within the enlarging European Union. I think it is not particularly good that we Europeans have not formulated our policies in the world as community policies because we Europeans must also have an interest in seeing that events in the Caucasus and central Asia or the Middle East develop in a way that we like. We need to engage with these issues along with America because it is only in the framework of international cooperation that we can really combat terrorism. Terrorism is not confined to what we saw on September 11, 2001. It includes trafficking in human beings, drug trafficking, and money laundering. We must join forces to combat all of these together.

The Framework of the Stability of Europe and its Periphery

The most important factors in European security are the geo-strategic situation in Europe and the increasing diversity of the many players, states, and NGOs and government organizations. We need to increase our involvement in the EU, NATO, and the OSCE without internal competition, ensuring that we work together to develop a more modern and comprehensive security concept, because the multi-dimensional aspect of conflicts has to be taken into account. We need preventative security policies in place to prevent civilian crises. We need early warning of disasters and conflicts through a multilateral security policy. This will require a German understanding that we need multilateral commitments in international organizations such as the United Nations, the European Union, NATO, and the OSCE.

We should say that the geo-strategic situation is the same as it was, but the security situation has changed and the security policy situation is much more complex that it was a few decades ago. It is no longer only the strong states we must engage, but the weak ones as well, along with non-state actors and asymmetrical threats resulting from weapons of mass destruction, electronic networking of terrorist threats, and weapons of mass confusion. Security must be understood globally, since there are so many ways to attack: information warfare, international terrorism, and biological and chemical weapons that can be put into containers on freight ships or trains. These threats blur competencies in terms of domestic and foreign security. Deterrence and prevention have become even more important. National borders start to disappear in this fight against terrorism. This is a war with no front, one which simultaneously takes place with soldiers fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan while law enforcement roots out terrorist sleeper cells in Hamburg and terrorists launch new information attacks operating through computers in a virtual world. These examples show that there are no borders in this war.

The links between organized crime and terrorism mean that we face new challenges as we combat terrorism: cyber terrorism, money laundering, human trafficking, and child labor, to name a few. These can only be combated internationally. As an example, this year in Afghanistan, farmers will cultivate enough poppies to create 4,000 tons of heroin-the highest level of drug production from Afghanistan since the war began. This shows that we have not yet coped with the developments there: we must give people another option for their future so they do not have to resort to poppy cultivation in order to survive.

Today I see three regional areas of action: the Baltic Sea region, the Mediterranean Sea region, and the Balkans. After the Cold War, multinational cooperation was seen as an area that needed to be expanded in international policy. On a military level the following projects need to be emphasized:

• In the Baltic region, we need to emphasize the BALSEAN international support for the Baltic states, which is coordinated by seventeen countries; the success of this project depends on NATO membership for these states. The Kiel Initiative since 2000 has been a forum for improving cooperation in the Baltic Sea area. The initiative has done more than achieve its goal. This good cooperation of the U.S. Navy and other states in Baltic Sea region should continue.

• NATO's Multi-National Corps, Northeast is a very good example of international cooperation between Germany, Denmark, and Poland in the Baltic Sea region. In the future, the military contributions of the Baltic Sea states-once they have been incorporated into NATO-will result in a Balti-Corps. In the long term we will be able to increase cooperation with non-NATO states, such as Russia, through this forum. So the Baltic State forum presents a positive picture; however, experience shows us that we need to come up with cooperation models that might apply to the Mediterranean or the Balkans, and I think we can copy the model from the Baltic Sea states.

• The Mediterranean is quite a bit more complicated. The EU and NATO have engaged in forging an institution to create Mediterranean cooperation. We need to help get rid of prejudices and to increase stability through dialogue with the South Eastern European states, particularly when it comes to combating international terrorism. The states in the Mediterranean littoral hope for economic and social improvements. The Barcelona process, with its holistic concept of various different types of policies, is most attractive to these states. The Barcelona Declaration of 1995 deals with security in the region, as well as other economic, cultural, and social aspects. Association treaties enhance closer ties between the various Mediterranean countries and the EU. In the light of 9/11, it is clear that association does not come free of any costs. The terrorism clause, which ensures that the partners are committed to combat international terrorism, must be taken into account.

• Finally, the Balkans. South Eastern European policy deals with the prevention of new conflicts and the stabilization of the area, building up democratic structures, coping with refugee problems, re-appropriation of property, cooperation between the armed forces and security forces, and strengthening regional dialogue and cooperation. In order to ease and defuse conflicts there we have to deal with the problem of multi-ethnic nation-states. Clan structures are a breeding ground for criminality, often pseudo-politically organized criminality. The situation in Kosovo and Macedonia is distinguished by a risk of escalation. The exacerbation of the situation in any one of these regions, although it looks unlikely now, could have an enormous impact on the region as a whole. Despite a positive development on the whole, we see a factor of insecurity in the ambivalent situation of the Albanian population in Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, and Macedonia. Bosnia-Herzegovina's understanding of the state as such is not yet well defined. Serbia and Montenegro could well stick to the reform path it has begun. This would ensure stability for southeast Europe.

The prospects of integration in the European-Atlantic area will hopefully be an impetus for these regions, and it is our objective to ensure that Europe as a whole and its periphery be integrated into the structures of the EU and NATO and that we expand the EU security zone. Germany wishes to do its part in the EU, and we want to coordinate military and civilian operations here. Reducing the German contingent in the Balkans was only possible in early 2000. We need to concentrate on local authorities or international organizations there. In the Balkans, the EU will play a greater role in the future since the Europeans have taken on Operation Concordia in Macedonia.

As a result of these increased responsibilities, we must ensure that the actions of the EU are coordinated. In the wake of this, the military pillars of the European security and defense policy together with its civilian pillar, the EU police mission (EUPM), could come into play. Then we will have a comprehensive strategy. Our understanding of security and defense policy are based on the same values. We are assuming a comprehensive concept of security. The complex multi-polar dimensions of security mean that the military is only one tool. There are many civilian conflict prevention and conflict management tools in this set as well. We should always prefer prevention to any military intervention. We must be sure that we have tried all the negotiation possibilities at our disposal before committing troops. Our policy is embedded multinationally, and we accept our commitments within the framework of the UN, EU, NATO, OSCE, and other international organizations. Therefore Germany will never act unilaterally, as this is not in our own interests. Only through multinational cooperation can we engage in proper risk prevention. If we manage to follow these principles successfully then we will be able to truly contribute to regional stability in Europe and its periphery.

 

Plenary Session 2, Panel 1: PfP Consortium and the Way Ahead

Moderator: Dr. Peter Foot, Deputy Dean of Academic Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College, United Kingdom; PfP Consortium Editorial Board Convenor; Member of the PfP Consortium Secretariat Working Group

Topics/Speakers:
"The Role of the PfP Consortium in the Context of the Partnership," Major-General Federico Yaniz (Spanish Army), NATO-HQ/IMS
"Considerations on the Way Ahead," Major-General Friedrich Wilhelm Ploeger, ACOS Politico-Military Affairs and Arms Control, Armed Forces Staff, Ministry of Defense, Germany

"The Role of the PfP Consortium in the Context of Partnership," Major-General Federico Yaniz, NATO-HQ/IMS

As head of the Cooperation Division of the International Military Staff, MG Yaniz related the NATO perspective on the Consortium's contribution to NATO enlargement and transformation. He emphasized that the Consortium's work had significantly outpaced the expectations and objectives of NATO, and that NATO would like to see the Consortium's work continue in specific areas supporting both the Partnership for Peace and NATO at large.

The Consortium's first substantial contribution to NATO is the consortium's ability to attract participation across a wide spectrum of think tanks, militaries, civilian defense ministries, and others. This great variety of people and expertise brings many benefits. The tremendous participation emphasizes the consortium's unique position, independent from international structures and national agendas. This freedom of thinking by the Consortium offers unique opportunities.

Flexibility and independence link individuals and organizations across the traditional boundaries of the Atlantic area and far beyond to the Russian region. The Consortium therefore relays both NATO's strategies and democratic values to many influential circles. As one fine example, educational tools developed by the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group have enhanced the PfP's work. NATO has capitalized on these developments to enhance its own capabilities in many areas. These include bringing tools to help NATO's own transformation efforts for the 21st century.

In the area of experimentation and training, the Consortium's education developments lead NATO's transformation efforts. NATO is currently adapting the Consortium's advanced distributed learning systems, in direct cooperation between the NATO staff and the PfP's Education and Distributed Learning Working Group. This working group is clearly the European focal point of international learning development, not only through its doctrinal expertise, but also through a number of very successful projects including both software and class development. All these achievements speak for themselves. There is no doubt that, through these initiatives, the Consortium efficiently contributes to the Partnership for Peace meeting its objectives.

Consortium work promotes transparency, fosters democracy, and enhances the capability for common actions to support the security and stability of NATO and beyond. It is doubtful that any other organization in the world has such a wide audience and capacity.

The endgame for NATO is to establish a high-quality educational approach at the upper levels of military service, and establish interoperable training centers, characterized by high-quality training environments linking modern technologies. These centers will be the focal point for NATO to develop interoperability, leveraging NATO and national capabilities. These centers will focus their efforts on military, politico-military and civil-military issues. The transformation of NATO and the new NATO command structure should allow better coordination and harmonization for military location and training within NATO.

Many new member nations will join NATO in the next year. NATO will welcome seven new nations, significantly changing the balance between partners and members. The Consortium will lose partners who have contributed significantly to its activities, particularly in the area of common standards in interoperability. As these nations join the Alliance, PfP should be able to meet the remaining requirements of new these NATO members. But the Consortium's work is not complete. We need more efficient ways to meet specific requirements from partners in Southeast Asia and the Caucasus. This organization should be prepared to bring new partners closer to the Alliance, and to reconsider its original mission while educating new partners. The Partnership for Peace is not only for educating new members; it is one of the elements of the transformation of NATO.

NATO's transformation aims at adapting to the evolving strategic situation of our times. While its underlying strategic doctrine remains unchanged, it is refocused on asymmetric threats such as terrorism and weapons of mass destruction, which require a more global and comprehensive approach to security. NATO needs to increase the scope of the Partnership for Peace to include interrelated issues such as border security and intelligence sharing. These issues are clearly outside NATO's area of responsibility, but should be considered an element of cooperation with other organizations.

Two primary objectives of the Partnership for Peace remain enhancing interoperability, and creating training and education programs. The five tracks proposed as a framework for present and future work in the Consortium-namely European security, interoperability, regional stability, asymmetric threats, and training and education enhancements-are perfectly suited to NATO's strategic and cooperation objectives. The high level of capability and the world-wide audience of the Consortium could substantially contribute to the success of NATO's transformation agenda.

In support of the continuation of the Alliance, NATO's command structure is being reorganized to realize transformation efforts with the announcement on 9 June 2003 of the creation of the Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT). The new SACT will be responsible for the conceptual and factual initiatives of NATO. In this context, it will be the focal point for training and education, including developing close relationships with the NATO Defense College.

We can anticipate that the SACT will be highly interested in the work of the Consortium. Therefore, it will have to consider what the specific roles and relationships will be. The Consortium has a significant capability to support the transformation of NATO (and particularly PfP) by fostering multinational perspectives and by developing new capabilities for education and training in emerging areas of Atlantic security cooperation. In addition, the Consortium offers additional opportunities for the improvement of regional cooperation, because it can reach out where NATO cannot. The Consortium has the potential to catalyze the establishment and maintenance of democratic nations' relations and to facilitate the emergence of cooperative attitudes.

However, like NATO, the Consortium needs to adapt to meet new challenges. The following ideas are offered for consideration on fashioning the relationship between NATO and the Consortium.

First, the Consortium should actively continue its training and education initiatives in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace. It has been the understanding that the participant countries define the scope and operating structures of the Consortium. NATO has neither the mandate nor the authority to decide or even to provide guidance on the future of the Consortium. All such decisions lie exclusively with the Consortium participants and stakeholders. In this context NATO is prepared to support the Consortium's efforts, and to contribute to the reform process.

The NATO Defense College has the mandate to represent NATO in the Consortium. That representative will monitor and contribute to proceedings according to the commandant's judgment. The Defense College will help when asked and where appropriate.

Future Consortium governance should continue to encourage freedom of discussion and proposal, and needs to be independent. NATO will support and encourage partners to take up opportunities. This Consortium is one of the best post-Cold War institutions. This institution supports NATO transformation, and contributes to NATO at large.

MG Yaniz expressed his belief that this institution has a role to play, and it has to work in cooperation with all involved in this endeavor. MG Yaniz expressed his gratitude to the stakeholders and contributors to the Consortium, including the Marshall Center.

"Considerations on the Way Ahead," Major-General Wilhelm Ploeger, ACOS Politico-Military Affairs and Arms Control, Armed Forces Staff, Ministry of Defense, Germany

MG Wilhelm Ploeger offered his perspective on the future of the Consortium, its unique value, its changing membership, and potential changes to its structure. He did so from the perspective of what it means to be "in the spirit of the Partnership for Peace" from the German and American perspective.

The PfP Consortium is a valuable tool that helps all of us to accomplish our common work and to network among stakeholders and partners, all of whom are united to make this consortium a tool for professional growth and assistance for the partners.

Seen as an important forum of 1500 experts from several institutions, the Consortium is an integrated element of PfP training and education. E-learning tools, simulation tools, distance learning, and experimentation highlight the Consortium's efforts in this area.

The Consortium fosters multinational perspectives in emerging areas of NATO security cooperation. Democratic control of a nation's armed forces is important.

The Consortium is at a development crossroads. Its size and complexity have grown unwieldy. Stakeholders are preparing changes to its structure, including a new coordinating organization and clearly defined end-state objectives. The annual conference is the right forum to consider discussions of changing structures.

In the area of planning conduct and oversight, Germany as host nation, and the U.S. as a significant contributor, will continue their support, and want to continue housing the Consortium at the Marshall Center. Reassessing the relationship with the Marshall Center will include discussions of budget control through the Consortium's secretariat, with daily operations delegated to the Marshall Center.

Working and study groups play a central role in this organization's focused and output-oriented approach. The Secretariat is well aware that there are more proposals for organizing the Consortium's work. Initiatives regarding reorganization are welcome.

The Secretariat will address reorganizing the Consortium's governance in September. One should expect a roadmap to be developed, as well as terms of reference. Proposed measures will likely include budget oversight and standards for efficient and economic ways of spending scarce resources. The September meeting will also consider alternatives for improving the governing structure. The Consortium will decide that structure at the next annual conference. The Secretariat will present its plan to EAPC Defense Ministers in December. Until that time, the Partnership for Peace continues as it does today.

"PfP Consortium's Philosophy and Thoughts on the Way Ahead," Dr. Peter Foot, PfP Consortium Editorial Board Convenor

Dr. Peter Foot added his ideas about the Consortium's role and its future. He placed emphasis on the Consortium as a structurally and philosophically unique institution that contributes to multilateral communications and fosters both understanding and concrete opportunities to professionalize armed forces associated with the PfP and NATO.

The Consortium means nothing if does not add value. Without value-added, it would be simply another security studies institute with a logo, a phone number, and an e-mail address. This PfP Consortium represents several points of added value, which is why this is a precious, unique, and important organization with a substantial future.

The Partnership for Peace and this Consortium are about a revolution in strategic education. We have an obligation to support research organizations and military personnel in all phases of their careers, and regardless of their placement. NATO can't do it. Universities can't do it.

First, the Consortium offers a mix of official and unofficial representation across the EAPC community. In its annual meetings, and in small working and study groups, persons from the uniformed militaries, government, academic institutions, and the security community discuss issues in a context of freedom that doesn't exist in policy communities. The bottom-up organizational structure and thinking gives potential and originality to the Consortium. No one else actively recruits security research scholars from Eastern Europe. New scholars are welcomed and become completely equal participants in any group. This fact highlights the bottom-up approach and emphasizes that there is neither a political hierarchy nor a hierarchy of ideas.

This organization combines old methods of scholarship with new technologies in a multi-national framework. We are not frightened of technological advances. Likewise we welcome historians, political scientists, and technicians. There is absolutely no compartmentalizing of disciplines, with innovation and quality being the result. This is the only place where military educators come together with researchers in security studies. Searching for the way forward cannot be divorced from the profession of arms, nor from military education.

This Consortium offers unique opportunities to professionalize the armed forces throughout the Alliance and beyond; all militaries are constantly dealing with issues of professionalization, politico-military relations, and change. Military staff education at high levels, training in tactical level interoperability, and simulation exercises support the professionalization of the Alliance.

There are several areas in which we can continue to improve the ability of the Consortium to add value. First is to publish our work more aggressively. The current work is not made public to the community it is meant to serve. Second, the governance of this organization needs attention. NATO is looking for an intellectual engine to drive command transformation. It needs to get stimulated by this organization.

We need to be careful about government structures. There is no profit or loss account here. The issue at hand is the security of the Alliance and all of Europe. We want effectiveness, not economics. Money will follow if we are effective.

The Consortium needs certainties soon, if the next conference in Romania is the last one. By next year we'll be able to generate the confidence that the Partnership for Peace is valuable as a forum of professional intellectual exchange. How we structure our working group and study group organization and the subjects we address are all up for reconsideration. We should take this opportunity to appreciate what our membership does in the working groups, and consider what gaps in our collective work need to be addressed.

The organization of the Consortium and this conference is good. Collective work of the working groups is on display upstairs for our collective consideration. It is a wonderful showcase of interdisciplinary activity, and represents the core capacities of this organization. Please take some time to visit the tables upstairs and consider participating in one of these working groups.

 

Parallel Panel 1: Regional Stability

Topic: Organized Crime Endangering Regional Stability
(Responsible Organization: National Defense Academy, Austria)

Introductory Speech and Moderation: Ambassador. Dr. Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator for the Stability Pact for South East Europe, Brussels

Topics/Speakers:
"Links between Terrorism and Organized Crime-Perspectives from Georgia and the Southern Caucasus," H. E. Irakli Alasania, Deputy Minister for State Security of Georgia, Tbilisi
"The Three-Block War: Challenges of Command in Afghanistan in 2002," Brigadier-General Roger Lane, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Swindon, UK; Former Commander of 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines in Afghanistan, 2002
"The Current Security Situation in Serbia and the Aftermath of the Assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic," Ivan Djordjevic, Chief of Staff, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro (MUP), Belgrade
"International Terrorism and Migration," Claus Folden, Technical Cooperation Centre for Europe and Central Asia, International Organization for Migration, Vienna"
Causes and Consequences of the Terrorist Acts at the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002," Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia, Author and Correspondent in Chechnya for Novaya Gazeta, Moscow

Overview of Panel on Regional Stability

This panel looked at how organized crime affects regional stability from central Asia, through the Caucasus, and on to South Eastern Europe. The panel speakers presented the particular cases of Afghanistan, the Pankisi Gorge in Georgia, Serbia and Montenegro, and the Russian-Chechnya war.

Brigadier Roger Lane discussed his experiences in Afghanistan as part of Operation Enduring Freedom. From his experience we learned that, after the fighting ended, organized crime very quickly became a problem.

Deputy Minister Irakli Alasania from Georgia discussed the links between terrorism and organized crime. The perspectives from Georgia and the central Caucasus demonstrate that law enforcement, intelligence, and effective police activity are critical tools in establishing security.

Mr. Ivan Djordjevic from Serbia and Montenegro presented a case study of the assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic. This was a watershed for their society, much as 9/11 was a watershed for the U.S. We see a picture of a society and a people who are determined to do what is best for their own security and for regional security.

Mr. Claus Folden from the International Organization for Migration discussed the link between international terrorism and migration. Terrorists use several important loopholes to assist migration: border control, holes in the information and identification system, designation of terrorist and extremist organizations, internal centralization of immigration structures, and anti-terrorist legislation. Effective counter-terrorism activity will address these issues.

Finally, Ms. Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia addressed the causes and consequences of the terrorist attack on a Moscow theater in October 2002. She underlined the role of motivations for those who took hostages. These terrorists were driven by years of disappearances, missing relatives, and death squads, which led to extreme hatreds and an unquenchable desire for revenge. Behind the emotional picture of these motivations we see the organizational roots behind Chechen terrorists. In her estimation, only two to three percent of them are the true extremists that should be the focus of Russian policy. The remainder are reacting to the brutality of Russian intervention. This does not excuse their actions, but an understanding of their motivations is important to developing an effective response.

Overall, the issue of stability in the South Eastern European region is critical, since the international business community will take it into account when it evaluates whether it is worth going into a region. They view the region as a single market and will not differentiate between a stable country and its unstable neighbor. Before significant investment flows into this region, there must be a greater level of regional stability. This investment is critical to alleviating the economic conditions that often lead people to resort to organized crime.

In fighting organized crime, it is very important to improve the activity and cooperation of both local and European law enforcement agencies. There are several obstacles to this: lack of communication, lack of cooperation between South Eastern European countries, lack of commitment from the international community, and a lack of organization and motivation among the region's population for fighting organized crime and terrorism.

Introduction by Ambassador Dr. Erhard Busek, Special Coordinator of the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, Brussels

Dr. Busek outlined the history of the Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI), of which he is the coordinator, and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe, of which he is the Special Coordinator.

The Southeast Europe Cooperative Initiative was begun by the Americans based on an agreement with the European Union after the Bosnian War and the Dayton Agreement. The original focus was on the special obligations required to stabilize the region to prepare the way for the business community. SECI started with programs aimed at managing border security, because there were long waiting lines at various border crossings, and the changed map of South Eastern Europe resulted in longer borders and more border stations. The initiative was funded largely by World Bank loans, and it began with a training program for customs and police officials. The initiative gradually developed in different directions. Initially, no one considered that organized crime would become the hot issue it is today. As it became more evident that something needed to be done about organized crime, they began to look at various instruments for fighting it, which is where the Stability Pact came into being.

The Stability Pact was formed after Kosovo War as an instrument of crisis intervention and crisis prevention. Although the Stability Pact initially mirrored the work of the Southeast European Cooperation Initiative, it eventually grew to encompass much larger responsibilities. It now encompasses three broad areas: Democracy and Human Rights, Infrastructure and Business, and Security, both military and civilian. The Stability Pact involves all the member states of the European Union, in addition to Switzerland, Norway, the United States, Canada, Japan, and the incoming states of the European Union. The Pact's area of responsibility includes Romania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Macedonia, and Albania.

SECI was originally founded to create cross-border coordination because the only hope for a real battle against organized crime lies in inter-state collaboration. There is a flawed perception that organized crime is "at home" in South Eastern Europe. While it may be true that much of the supply side of organized crime originates in this region, we have to ask where the demand comes from. Who are the consumers of the drug trade or the sex trade? There is an obligation on the demand side to fight organized crime, and it is a serious mistake to blame a particular region for organized crime. Organized crime is becoming increasingly sophisticated, and is organized at the global level. Part of the problem is that we are fighting this global criminality from the perspective of national governments and national administrations. We also know that organized crime money is partly funding terrorism, so we cannot draw clear borders in the fight against organized crime. Its existence in one part of the world is potentially a threat to security and stability in all parts of the world.

Conflicts of today are borderless; there are no clear borderlines between terrorism, human trafficking, drugs, corruption, etc. There is not even a line between military security and civil security. The military situation in South Eastern Europe has developed well. Military security itself is not the problem, but as conflicts have ended the region is left with too many weapons floating around. This includes many small arms, but it also includes large quantities of heavy weapons. Here there is a connection to military security, since many of these weapons are coming from sectors of the military that are not getting paid, so soldiers sell their weapons in some areas close to the region. One simple solution has been to give money to those villages that collect arms, but of course this creates an incentive for them to acquire more arms. Therefore we have seen some success, but no one really knows how many weapons are still out there. This is a big challenge in attempts to create regional stability.

On the economic development front, the presence of organized crime is one of the strong arguments of the international business community not to go into a region. Problems in one country impact others, since businesses take a regional view. Businesses do not consider countries in isolation; they look at a regional market. Without business investment, instability will continue. The assassination of Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic signaled the end of a period of instability rather than the beginning of a new period of instability. He believes that it is critical to convince the international business community that this is the case, in order to increase their investment in the region so as to foster economic development and higher wages. This will be the best way to fight corruption outside of the courts, since so much corruption is the result of low wages. This connection shows that it is easy to speak about fighting organized crime, but it is extremely difficult to eliminate it on the ground.

Finally, there are three expected obstacles in the fight against organized crime and discussed current steps toward overcoming these obstacles:

1. Communication and efficient engagement within countries involved: Close cooperation between customs and police and the court system is crucial. Court systems in the region do not work well. It is not as simple as firing corrupt judges. This presents the problems of where to find new judges and how to ensure their impartiality. Identifying problems from the outside is quite simple, but implementing the necessary reforms from the inside is a much more difficult matter.

2. Cooperation between South Eastern European countries: At the most basic level, language barriers pose a challenge to cooperation between countries. Customs agencies are able to communicate, since English is a common language, but police forces are much more limited in their knowledge of foreign languages. Also, by their very nature, police forces tend to be focused within the country. They have very few connections with the outside. Starting from the Ministries of Interior on down, they tend to look only inside their borders. This is a serious challenge in a time when there is such great mobility across borders, both physically and electronically.

3. Commitment from the international community: The international community has demonstrated an unwillingness to provide the sustained and focused support that is necessary to establish security in the region. For example, countries are very ready to give advice and even military troops, but it is much more difficult to get judges or policemen for assistance programs. The military forces that intervene in troubled areas wind up doing a lot of civilian jobs for which they are poorly prepared. There are a variety of reasons why this lack of commitment exists. One reason is that the fight against organized crime lacks efficient international systems and structures. Without established structures, there is a chronic lack of information sharing. Simple lack of funding is another problem. Local needs may fall into a funding gap because they do not fall clearly under the purview of an established organization. There is also an issue with donor fatigue for South Eastern Europe after so many years of problems.

As a beginning to a cure for these problems, Dr. Busek and the SECI Regional Center for Combating Trans-border Crime in Bucharest are bringing together representatives from the law enforcement community, the legal community, the academic world, regional experts, and the donor community to develop a task force to address these issues. There will be three required activities to tackle organized crime: improvement of legislative systems, setting the right technical conditions to allow enforcement, and winning public support for the fight against organized crime. The task force is currently focusing on legal harmonization across the region, effective enforcement, and partnerships with civil society.

"Links between Terrorism and Organized Crime-Perspectives from Georgia and the Southern Caucasus," H. E. Irakli Alasania, Deputy Minister for State Security of Georgia, Tbilisi

The fights against terrorism and organized crime are core national security interests for Georgia. The Georgian administration believes that the enlargement of NATO and the transformation of the Euro-Atlantic region are vitally important. Although Georgia aspires to join NATO, they acknowledge the hard work needed to get there. Georgia believes that NATO's active role in leading joint efforts in the fight against terrorism is a timely and necessary measure for the prevention of future acts and for the fight against the forces that foster terrorism such as religious extremism and separatist movements. So-called "white spots" created by the separatist movement in the Caucasus often turn into a safe haven for terrorist organizations. As an active member of the Partnership for Peace, Georgia stands ready to co-operate fully with the Alliance to address this problem in this region.

Many of the pieces needed for this effort are already in place. Georgia has a government with the political will to carry out this fight and numerous UN resolutions and multinational declarations establish the framework for international cooperation. However, we are currently missing the practical steps for coordinating international efforts. In accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1373, and despite the existing difficult social and economic climate in Georgia, large-scale anti-terrorist and anti-criminal activities have been started. Georgia is very grateful to its Western partners for their assistance in these efforts. Of special note is an initiative from the United States to train and equip Georgian forces to develop a more robust response capability for Georgia and the entire south Caucasus region. The program has helped the region transform itself into a less attractive place for terrorists and organized criminals. The aim of the program was to assist Georgian military forces to develop rapid reaction capabilities. This capability has helped Georgia better secure its borders and contributed to the international fight against terrorism. The presence of U.S. military forces in Georgia is also decisive in speeding up reform of the Georgian military forces and will contribute to raising the Georgian defense system up to Western standards in order to meet the criteria required for integrating with Euro-Atlantic security structures.

By virtue of their unique experiences over the last decade in fighting regional conflicts, along with crime and terrorism in the south Caucasus region, Georgia's law enforcement and special services have developed expertise in these areas. Mr. Alasania shared these lessons and some observations on the challenges faced by Georgia in the new global environment. For the last year Georgia has been engaged in a struggle against organized crime and terrorist networks of national and regional reach in the Pankisi Gorge. This has been a truly unconventional fight that cannot be fought by any single law enforcement service. The Georgian government has always been concerned with the problem of international terrorism. Their geopolitical location, foreign policies, and implementation of large-scale regional energy projects have caused a number of terrorist attacks. Assassination attempts on President Shevardnadze were a direct manifestation of politically motivated, foreign sponsored terrorist attacks. Planning, selection, and training of terrorists were conducted in Russian territory. The mastermind of the 1995 attack escaped arrest by fleeing with a Russian military airplane for an air force base near Tblisi. In addition, Georgia has experienced violations of its territorial integrity followed by ethnic cleansing and acts of mass terror against the Georgian population. Having experienced all of this, Georgia joined the anti-terror coalition at its very beginning.

While these remarks will be confined to Georgia's efforts to restore law and order in Pankisi Gorge, it is important to remember that, during the second Russian-Chechen war, a huge number of Chechen refugees were forced into Georgian territory, some of whom were terrorists or members of armed criminal gangs. Carrying out a large-scale military solution without preliminary intelligence gathered via special covert operations would have brought grave results, including ethnic war. Georgia believes that in strategy it is imperative not to take first steps without considering the last. Preparatory steps including limiting access to Georgian territory from states that had been used as staging areas of foreign fighters moving into Georgia. The intention was to stop the usage of Georgian territory for transit, or for bringing in groups of fighters, arms, and equipment, and creating training bases on Georgian soil. Special steps have been taken to cut off the channels of financing and arming of such groups. This was the critical time for Georgia to take counter-terrorist actions in Pankisi Gorge. President Shervardnadze made clear to the international community and Georgian citizens his determination to remove foreign fighters and individuals having suspected links to foreign terrorist organizations from mountainous regions bordering Chechnya and to neutralize the threats they posed to Georgian national security interests.

Chechen refugees living in Georgia and Chechens in general are not a threat to Georgian interests, but the number of Islamic extremists and their sympathizers clearly continued to be a threat to Georgian national security. The current conflict between Russia and Chechnya has been raging for almost three years, and the situation has been deteriorating. The violence has hardened the public's position on both sides. Although many Russians say they believe that ultimately the conflict can only be solved through negotiations, the absence of any meaningful dialogue between Russia and Chechen extremist forces and the escalation and uncontrolled activities of extremists make any progress extremely difficult. This environment created opportunities for international extremists and linkages to terrorist organizations, resulting in escalating violence in the entire Caucasus region. Increased efforts to neutralize the threats from foreign fighters and their associated networks have been underway for the better part of the last year. There have been some successes. Since the summer of 2002, a significant number of individuals with suspected links to terrorist organizations have been neutralized. Unfortunately, these groups are still operating in Russia. As a result, it became possible to limit the activity of military groups, formations, and criminals in Pankisi Gorge and to change the environment to from which they had chosen to operate.

The next step took Georgia to full-scale counter-insurgency operations in Pankisi Gorge and surrounding areas. As of June 2003, the active phase of the operation, which used active measures for the destruction of the infrastructure for training, organization, and recruiting efforts; confiscation of weapons and equipment; and preventive arrests was successfully completed. Operations across the border were conducted. More than forty suspects and wanted persons-citizens of different countries-were detained, and several caches of arms and munitions were discovered and destroyed. The Georgian forces managed to disrupt and destroy groups that had links to international terrorist organizations. They attacked leadership, command and control, and sophisticated communications centers, and disrupted sources of material support and finances. The main goal of the operation was to disable terrorists' abilities to plan and operate. Commanders tried to ensure that all special forces of Georgian law enforcement operated in an integrated manner with coherent responses to the specific transnational threats in the Caucasus. These efforts yielded some results. These operations are still underway, and they will be continued until the entire area is cleansed of criminal elements and further insurgence of armed groups from other regions have been effectively ended. In Pankisi Gorge, they ensured that all special and law enforcement agencies had better connections with their counterparts in neighboring regions. At this point Georgia has the military, law enforcement, and political tools necessary to finish the task. The operational environment is still challenging, and the possibility of new incursions, of foreign fighters from Russian territory, and of new follow-up bombardments of Georgian territory by the Russian air force may still be high. Yet Georgians take comfort from the fact that they are not alone in the fight.

In their analysis of operations in Pankisi Gorge, the Georgian government has come to several important findings. The terrorist groups working there raise their funds in a variety of ways, including through NGOs, their own commercial enterprises, drug smuggling, and kidnappings. Several groups use NGOs for cover purposes and to facilitate the movement of funds and personnel, while others use personal contacts.

Most detainees had links with groups and individuals in neighboring countries. Mainly they came from training camps in Russian territory in the north Caucasus, where they received training in conventional military tactics as well as the use of poisons. The conflict in Chechnya has produced a generation of trained and radicalized fighters and has formed personal bonds between participants from different countries. Many of them had good relations with corrupt local officials and bought their support. They took advantage of poor social and economic conditions in rural areas to establish themselves and to recruit new followers. Only after establishing constructive cooperation with their partner services and exchanging operational information were the Georgians able to put all the pieces together.

The most vulnerable spots in the state apparatus that were most easily infiltrated by foreign operatives appear to be loose border control and underpaid police and security officials. Terrorists and criminals established strong organized crime ties with officials of law enforcement services to facilitate couriers, drug traffickers, and illegal combatants through the border. Facilitators made extensive use of the state governmental apparatus to protect and promote their illegal activities. They were operating under the protection of the police or security officials employed outside their official capacities for this purpose. In some cases, officials were active participants in transferring military equipment, ammunition, and arms from Russian military bases in Georgia to Chechen fighters.

Finally, operations in Pankisi Gorge have resulted in a number of lessons. There is a need to develop systems that will consolidate efforts in intelligence and law enforcement. Countries should have the capability to assess threats to regional security and to protect the region from terrorists and criminal threats. Sharing of intelligence data is critical to success. We have to acknowledge that in fighting terrorists, we must get beyond the perception that one man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter. Countries in the region have to build functional systems that will allow networked intelligence agencies to share real-time information on the groups and individuals that have links to domestic or international terrorist networks or crime organizations. Information sharing covers a broad spectrum of activities, from people to intelligence. Intelligence and security experts from countries in the region already have close working relationships. There has been great constructive cooperation with Russian services established in 2002, specifically specialized in combating their common terrorist threats. This kind of cooperation will continue and will expand and deepen. Armed with knowledge and information, these forces will be able to assess evolving threats, terrorists' targeting strategies, their training strategies, their doctrines, and be able to build a regional system of protection for the strategic interest of the countries in the area and to provide long-term deterrence.

In closing, Mr. Alasania cautioned the audience that failure will result from being too late to face the challenges.

"The Three-Block War: Challenges of Command in Afghanistan in 2002," Brigadier-General Roger Lane, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Swindon, UK; Former Commander of 3rd Commando Brigade, Royal Marines in Afghanistan, 2002

Brigadier Lane's purpose was to provide insights into command challenges in contemporary conflicts. His brigade was part of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan in 2002, which was primarily a war-fighting operation. This was a separate operation from the current mission in Kabul with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which has as its mission facilitating the establishment of a legitimate government. Despite these very divergent missions, the distinctions on the ground between war-fighting and nation-building have become quite blurred. Brigadier Lane's mission in Afghanistan was offensive in nature, but the wider purpose was to contribute to the stabilization of the region and the stabilization of Afghanistan. An understanding of this wider purpose has a profound impact on the conduct of operations.

I will frame these comments in terms of a "Three-Block War," a term borrowed from American Marine General Charles Krulak. This term refers to the fact that a soldier in modern conflicts might be required to transition from humanitarian operations to peacekeeping to high intensity conflict just by moving a few city blocks. This development has tremendous implications across a broad array of military issues, including force structures, rules of engagement, and professional military education. Using this paradigm of a Three-Block War, I wish to discuss some of the challenges faced and the lessons learned from his experience in Afghanistan.

1. War-fighting: Forces in Afghanistan faced a bivalent, elusive, and disparate opposition composed of both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Driving a wedge between Taliban and al-Qaeda became a priority. It was considered a strategic imperative that Taliban fighters not be alienated to the extent that they would cross over and join al-Qaeda. This meant that at times President Karzai wanted Taliban targets attacked by indigenous forces; however, he did not possess any indigenous forces of his own that were capable of routing the Taliban. After their significant defeat in Operation Anaconda, al-Qaeda forces clearly understood that they should not attempt a force-on-force engagement with coalition forces. The technological disparity was too great. This changed the nature of the operation and will change the wars al-Qaeda fights in the future. This evolution of the conflict meant that different skills became more important, particularly human intelligence and linguistics.

2. Peace support operations: As al-Qaeda dispersed, forces had to transition to peace support operations. This required very different operating methods; excellent training and mental flexibility were required to cope with this transition. Establishing an indigenous government was a key strategic goal during this phase of the operation. This required regional meetings leading up to the national Loya Jurga in Kabul. While this process was under the purview of ISAF, not Operation Enduring Freedom, providing security for the regional meetings leading up to the Loya Jurga became an important mission for the forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. As the military tried to establish stability and to encourage the establishment of democracy, they needed to establish relationships with local leaders. But local leaders were simultaneously trying to establish their own power bases. In some cases their power brokering activities may have included bribery, corruption, and other criminal activities, since they needed funding to remain in power. It was difficult for coalition military leaders to determine who had legitimate authority and upon what basis. Furthermore, there were few mechanisms available to eject those who remained in power without a legitimate mandate.

3. Humanitarian operations: The purpose of the force was to create a stable and secure environment in which the peaceful development of Afghanistan could begin. However, the ability of the military to achieve these conditions often outstrips the capacity of the UN and other humanitarian relief agencies to respond at the same speed. They also have different priorities from the military, according to their mandates, and they will want to preserve their independence. This makes coordination with the military much more difficult, and becomes a huge challenge for both parties. The military needs to create space for these NGOs to fulfill their humanitarian mandates while trying to ensure that no power vacuum emerges. Without close cooperation between the military and NGOs, it is very difficult for the population to make a direct connection between the military's presence and an improvement in their quality of life. The military is not able to directly provide for the needs of the population, but they can provide a more stable and secure environment in which NGOs can work.

There are two critical issues in conflict intervention. First, the nations involved must have the correct strategy from the outset. In Afghanistan there was a debate on the virtues of establishing a strong central government in contrast to the traditional model of empowering local warlords. This debate was not concluded with a unanimous view prior to the commencement of military operations. Moreover, the responsibilities for war-fighting operations and the restoration of government were mandated through different organizations, making coordination more difficult. The result was that coalition forces used regional warlords to conduct coalition operations during the war-fighting phase of operations, but the coalition backed the formation of a strong central government, implicitly suggesting the need to disenfranchise the regional warlords in a subsequent phase. The warlords' reluctance to work on behalf of a national government to collect money, and the central government's lack of control over the warlords due to a lack of means, resulted in a collective failure to generate national income for reconstruction. This example illustrates the requirement to focus much more clearly on conflict termination and not just resolution. It is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you desire. It is critical to think about the strategy that takes you through all aspects of the conflict to termination rather than a short-term focus on resolution.

As a direct consequence of the coalition's mixed signals about the power structure in Afghanistan, there were intense power struggles after the conclusion of the fighting. Since this was primarily an Afghan issue, they were reluctant to use foreign military forces to remove erstwhile Taliban or other power brokers who might be regarded as opposition members. The existence of an international police force throughout the country to enhance stability and build capacity was not achieved, partly because there was no overarching strategy on security sector reform. Such forces can rarely deploy with the same speed as the military or in sufficient numbers. Although we have recognized the requirement for the early deployment of security forces, this needs to be followed by the quick deployment of officials and others who can establish a regulatory framework, whether it be in the financial, legal, constitutional or any other arena. It is insufficient to just send a police force unless you have judges, courts, prisons, appeals procedures, a constitution, and a penal code. These elements should be thought of as a complete system. The failure to do so results in a window of opportunity for corruption and organized crime to flourish. We know from experience elsewhere that corruption, criminal activity, and the absence of proper regulatory frameworks are key deterrents to attracting foreign investment, and therefore to economic development.

My experience in Afghanistan mirrors the UK's experience in Sierra Leone and the Balkans upon the cessation of hostilities. Initially, there is a sharp reduction in conflict following the domination achieved by coalition forces as they work to create a stable environment. This is followed by a sharp but relatively short increase in revenge crimes, such as murder and arson, as factions and individuals settle old scores. As coalition forces extend their influence and agencies begin to provide aid and the process of conflict resolution begins, the level of civil unrest begins to diminish. However, if the population's expectations are not matched by action, then there will be periodic waves of unrest. With a more secure environment, trading increases and the entrepreneurial members of society begin to open new businesses at a faster rate than the development of the regulatory framework. The pursuit of democracy and a market economy creates the very environment where organized crime can develop, and the less regulated the country is, the greater is the potential for such a development. This model of criminal trends is really quite common, and being aware of this phenomenon should help in the development of strategy, force structure, media relations, and security sector reform priorities.

In conclusion, it is likely that military interventions will become more complex and will place greater demands on military commanders. Although defining the correct strategy at the outset is the ideal, the availability and timeliness of agencies to arrive in-theater and to be willing to work towards a common objective is even more elusive. We need to be more alert to criminal trends and how they develop on the ground and deploy the necessary force structure and civil servants to establish the proper conditions after conflict to prevent the development of such criminal activity.

"The Current Security Situation in Serbia and the Aftermath of the Assassination of Prime Minister Zoran Djindjic," Ivan Djordjevic, Chief of Staff, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia and Montenegro (MUP), Belgrade

The assassination of Prime Minister Dr. Zoran Djindjic was an attempt to kill the nascent democracy in Serbia. It was organized and perpetrated by a criminal organization-the so-called "Zamun Band"-that represents the residue of the criminal heritage of the Milosevic period and which worked in the past for the leadership of the former State Security Service and former commander of the Special Operations Unit of that Service. The goal of their conspiracy was to use the assassination of the prime minister to provoke chaos in the country. They thought that such an act would prevent the election of the Council of Ministers in the common state of Serbia and Montenegro. The assassination was performed at the time when the country was without the minister of defense and without other federal ministers. They also hoped to disrupt the election of the new Serbian Government. All this was supposed to trigger the fall of the administration and return them to their status under Milosevic.

The political background and platform of this conspiracy was a gathering of the so-called "healthy patriotic forces," while in reality it was a joint attempt of all those who rose to protect their criminal heritage. The real effect of their activities was in a certain way a kind of boomerang to their intentions. They got clear answers. First of all, the citizens of Serbia-with their magnificent farewell to Dr. Djindjic during his funeral, which was attended by more than half a million citizens-clearly demonstrated that all the plans of these criminals had failed and that there were no chances of a return to the past. The ruling coalition of over fifteen different parties had not fallen apart. On the contrary, this tragedy united them. The coalition was also aware of the responsibility it had towards the citizens and its own state. Elections of the Council of Ministers for the joint state of Serbia and Montenegro and for the government of Serbia went on without a hitch. The terrorists were counting on disunity between the republican and federal authorities on the issue of war atrocities, which used to be the main problem in the fight against organized crime. However, they discovered that the government of Serbia and the Council of Ministers of the State Community were completely unified.

On the proposal of the government of Serbia, the acting president of Serbia, Mrs. Natasa Micic, declared a state of emergency. The Supreme Defense Council passed a decision to integrate the efforts of the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian police in the investigation and arrest of the perpetrators of this assassination and in the removal of all the conditions that caused the introduction of the state of emergency. So, for the first time the army, the police, and security agencies found themselves working together toward the same goal. The state of emergency was introduced in order to facilitate the rapid arrest of the perpetuators, the organizers, the financial supporters, and those who inspired the assassination on the Prime Minister Djindjic. This state of emergency was also used to fight organized crime throughout the country, as well as to apprehend individuals who had been, for various reasons, immune to justice and who already had extensive criminal records. This state of emergency was not imposed against the citizens, trampling on their freedoms and rights. This was confirmed by the delegation of the OSCE Mission in Serbia and Montenegro that visited detained persons. During the whole action, the government enjoyed the full understanding of the citizens and had very good cooperation with them. The public's cooperation was crucial in obtaining information that led to the detention of some members of this criminal organization and other data relevant for the investigation.

Organized crime gains its power from the ability to respond flexibly to every challenge in the environment in which it operates, as well as the ability to adapt to all the repressive measures that societies use against it. The existence of the Zamun clan is just another proof of this. This clan was the biggest narcotics cartel in Serbia and had exclusive rights for the distribution of cocaine in the country and, along with its international partners, was a major supplier of heroin in the Serbian market. These activities transcend national boundaries, so it is impossible to imagine a fight against them being fought within exclusively national jurisdictions. The organized crime that is today affecting both developed and developing countries became international long ago, and its actors from different countries and regions have been uniting and now act on a global scale. Arms dealers, drug traffickers, mercenaries, and organized pirates launder their profits through well-known and established channels of financial crime.

After coming into power, the new government realized quickly how big and how serious the criminal heritage of the Milosevic regime was. That criminal pyramid, at whose tip were the individuals from the state administration, had two faces. One face was war atrocities and the other one was organized crime. They saw that terrorism is just a political aspect of organized crime and that it is financed with the revenues of criminal activities. These revenues are also used to finance security details of some war criminals. Also, during the times of conflict and war in the former Yugoslavia, while the politicians and statesmen were dividing themselves and were trying to erect barriers between new small Balkan states, the criminals were behaving like real globalists as they established a real Balkan criminal brotherhood. But after these wars, the Balkans is again becoming a transit area, not only for the majority of heroin that reaches the European Union's narcotics market, but also all the other kinds of organized crime like trafficking in human beings, weapons, illegal migration, and others. That is the reason why the countries of the European Union, if they want less drugs on the streets of their cities, if they want less false asylum seekers and less uncontrolled migrations, have to aid police, customs, tax and judiciary systems in the countries of South Eastern Europe. Such an orientation is also cheaper for the taxpayers of the countries of the European Union than the costs of the elimination of all these drugs and migrants from the streets of European capitals.

The high level of violence under the previous regime represented the main weapon of organized crime. Partners of organized crime were not protected from this violence, even if they had high positions in the legal world. However, the consequences of this violence were not felt exclusively by the partners of organized crime; they were also felt by all citizens, who were somehow victims of the feeling of personal insecurity and endangerment of life and property. The Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia has undertaken very clear and concrete measures in fighting organized crime. The first step was the public recognition that organized crime does exist in Serbia, followed by the establishment two years ago of the Directorate for the Fight Against Organized Crime as a specialized organizational unit in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. They also changed the law on organized crime and instituted the necessary legal structures, such as witness protection, so that they can reach the very core of the problem and secure evidence on the activities of these organizations. Until these developments, police information did not have value in the courts. As a result, the general state of security has improved, and the number of crimes was significantly reduced compared with the same period last year. So, for the first time in recent history, there were days in Belgrade when more cars were recovered than were stolen.

Simultaneously with the seizure of illegal weapons and explosive devices from the criminals, the voluntary surrender of weapons and legalization is underway. Up to today, significant quantities of weapons were seized from criminals, as well as great quantities of explosives. The authorities in Serbia are not living under the illusion that organized crime can be completely eradicated, but they do think that they can reduce it to a tolerable level, at which it will not represent a danger to the institutions of society and for the values that citizens cherish. They achieved these goals through the complete reform of the Ministry of Interior, and the conclusions of the London conference, as well as the readiness of the European Union and its member states to help not only the Republic of Serbia but also the whole region in fighting this global evil. The tragedy of March 12 that eliminated the leader of these reforms, Dr. Zoran Djindjic, has its security, its political, and its historical dimension.

From the security point of view, the event of March 12 has the same significance for Serbia as the events of September 11 have for the United States. In the political sense, March 12 is for them similar to October 6, as it gave them a chance for a successful completion of the political changes that were late due to the impermissible divisions within the political forces that overturned the Milosevic regime on October 5, 2000. But even these divisions are now finished. From the historical angle, this horrible tragedy is a unique chance for a historical change in our the way of thinking, and Mr. Djordjevic believes that this is the last attempt, in a long string of events, to change power violently in Serbia.

The European Union and the United States offered support to Serbia and Montenegro, which was manifested in pledging assistance for the elimination of the budget deficit, by admitting them in the Council of Europe, and by a chance to define, on the occasion of the forthcoming Thessaloniki Summit, their process of stabilization and association.

The Government of Serbia today has the support of two thirds of its citizens, who are full of optimism that they will enjoy better lives. By finishing the tasks already undertaken toward implementing the necessary reforms, they will provide their citizens with a better standard of living, and they are moving forward in their quest to become full members of the family of European peoples and states.

"International Terrorism and Migrations," Claus Folden, Technological Cooperation Centre for Europe and Central Asia, International Organization for Migration, Vienna

The linkages between international terrorism and migration arise because terrorism touches on a range of matters directly affecting migration policy, including immigration document fraud, ethnic and multicultural affairs, and transnational financial transactions. The International Organization for Migration is committed to developing international standards for border security, document protection, etc. Migration policy is a central component in the fight against terrorism and organized crime. Actions after 9/11 have focused on improved intelligence gathering and intelligence sharing among countries and tightening immigration controls. There has been perhaps too much emphasis on control. Where punitive measures are involved, there is often a thin line between them and the denial of individual rights and freedoms. There are five areas in which states around the world have increased their immigration control measures in a bid to close the loopholes that can be exploited by terrorist networks:

1. Increased border and entry control. Many countries have focused their efforts on strengthening their pre-frontier control measures. The idea here is to shift the "border" out so that all immigration control measures take place long before potential perpetrators reach the actual border. As an example, countries are moving their immigration control and customs control to foreign airports. Another example is advanced passenger processing, so that passenger manifests are pre-cleared even prior to boarding aircraft. Another dimension of increased entry control has been the imposition of carrier sanctions, which place heavy fines on air carriers that fail to identify passengers who meet certain listed pre-conditions.

2. Improved information and identification systems. A key component of this is transnational data gathering and data sharing. Countries are also taking steps to increase the security features in identification and travel documents, making them more difficult to counterfeit. We have also seen an increased use of biometric technologies such as facial recognition, fingerprinting, etc.

3. Increased data collection and data exchange. The security structures are collecting and sharing data on individuals through greater regional and inter-country cooperation. This is especially critical in areas without internal borders. One way to improve cooperation between national security agencies is to conduct joint training with neighboring countries.

4. Tighter internal migration controls. This includes using language analysis to determine the national origin, and other means of profiling potential suspects. Governments have also granted security forces greater authority to hold persons for longer periods if they are suspected of terrorist activities. Some countries have begun to issue identification cards to immigrants to make it easier to track their internal movements. Another trend has been the centralization of security and immigration structures such as that seen in the United States under the U.S.A. Patriot Act.

5. Antiterrorism legislation. Countries are beginning to recognize that they need specialized legal structures to deal with terrorist threats. Normal criminal law is insufficient to cope with the threat adequately. This has included a movement towards military law in dealing with threats to the state, rather than traditional criminal law.

These policies all focus on control, which will certainly be a part of any successful migrant control program. But we also need a climate that allows a focus on multi-cultural policies in increasingly diverse societies. There is an urgent need to protect migrants against growing community backlash, in order to keep them from becoming prey to terrorism recruitment. We also need to create opportunities for migrants to promote their assimilation into society. Canada has several positive programs designed with this in mind, including loans and transportation to assist newly arrived immigrants.

If countries pursue control systems to the exclusion of migrant integration activities, they run the risk of fostering organized crime, hostility, and further terrorist acts. They key is to achieve a balance of control and integration of migrants.

"Causes and Consequences of the Terrorist Acts at the Moscow Dubrovka Theatre in October 2002," Anna Stepanovna Politkovskaia, Author and Correspondent in Chechnya for Novaya Gazeta, Moscow

In October 2002, a terrorist group made up of about fifty Chechen men and women seized a theater complex in Moscow while a popular show went on. There were more than 800 people in the audience. While Russians were aware that there had been a radicalization of Chechen society, this bold move still came as quite a shock to the Russian people.

Ms. Politkovskaia gained a unique perspective on this tragedy because she was able to enter the theater and talk to the terrorists just before they died. Thus she knows first-hand what their motivations were for this heinous act. The attack was in large part a response to harsh Russian anti-terrorist actions in Chechnya. These methods include mass disappearances of Chechen detainees in so-called "clean-up" operations. Journalists working in Chechnya believe that the disappeared number between 2,000 and 3,000, although the official number of detainees is smaller. Families of detainees do little besides travel around Chechnya looking for their relatives. When you talk to young Chechens, they have no jobs other than attending funerals: there is no infrastructure, schools barely operate, there is no cultural life, and in many areas there is scant electricity.

The terrorists in the theater took no pity on innocent Russian civilians, since no one took pity on them. Their main sentiment was a deep thirst for revenge. A person who has seen relatives arrested, never to be seen again, has no one to turn to. There is no functioning court system. The prosecutors are afraid of the military, because so many prosecutors have died trying to investigate allegations of military abuse. The presence of NGOs and international monitors is episodic and tightly controlled by the military. People have nowhere to turn for refuge from these abuses.

The influence of international terrorist organizations in Chechnya is being deliberately exaggerated in order to hide the inability of politicians to provide security within their borders. The situation in Chechnya has degraded because non-state terrorism is being confronted with state-sponsored terrorism. In the early days of the second war, Chechens expected their situation to improve in time, but it has only gotten worse.

Those in power during the anti-terrorism campaign assured both the Russian public and the international community that the situation was improving and that adequate action was being taken. In reality, the situation was worsening. In the days leading up to the terrorist attack on the Moscow theater, the activities of so-called death squads in Chechnya had been stepped up. These squads are mainly GIU units and certain FSB units who behave as forest guards. These squads believe it is their state-given right to destroy Chechen combatants in the absence of any legal procedures. They don't rely on legal systems; they kill, often people who have nothing to do with the war. People in Chechnya feel very real despair. Despite extensive investigations, we have been able to bring only a very small group of GIU officers to answer for their activities. In one investigation, in conjunction with other journalists and the prosecutor's office, we proved that six innocent people were killed and their bodies burned. Despite proof of this crime, no action has been taken against the GIU officers who ordered the murders.

One can not justify people who place themselves outside the law or morality. There has been a debate among journalists over the use of the term "terrorists" in describing those who carry out these attacks in order to end the war, but they are clearly terrorists.

The results of this attack and the government's response to it were catastrophic: 129 hostages and all the terrorists were killed in a gas attack on the theater. Many hostages are still disabled, and the nature of the gas is a cosmic secret. In the aftermath of this incident, people began to speak out in Russian society, saying that perhaps things were going wrong in Chechnya and that our army was making mistakes. But these voices quickly died down. The Russian government promised the people that it was approaching a peaceful settlement in Chechnya through a referendum there and the establishment of a constitution. People in Chechnya took the government's promises at face value. These promises offered them hope that they would be able to attain security. Unfortunately, the referendum was without result. The checkpoints were reduced by a very small number. Army officers do not care about the new Chechen constitution. Against this very cynical backdrop, the terrorists have been made into heroes, especially the women terrorists. There is more cynicism toward the federal center: the army pledged to stop "cleanups," but instead they have increased, and there is still a complete lack of protection for individuals. The OSCE has recalled its mission to Chechnya under the false belief that things were improving. These conditions have led to new attacks by suicide bombers, which just make more heroes and continue the hero worship, especially of females. Chechens are now forming special female suicide bomber brigades.

The result of the constitution was to place in power Akhmad Kadyrov, one of the chief promulgators of ethnic conflict in Chechnya. He has created an enormous personal army, which he funds using federal money. His group is now engaged in internal civil war in Chechnya. The situation is currently very grim. There is no sign on the horizon of any peaceful negotiations between the warring parties. These armed groups are structured such that only two or three percent are Islamists. The Islamists do not enjoy wide support amongst the population; most of the people engaged in hostilities are trying to effect revenge for the killing of their family members.

In conclusion, the only way to end the hostilities in Chechnya will be through international support and mediation. The Russian federal center is loath to enter into any such mediation, so it will only occur through international intervention.

 

Parallel Panel 2: Education and Training

Topics:
Challenges to Military Education
Education on National/International Strategic Level
Application and Integration of New Technologies
Knowledge Management

Moderators:
Mr. Ulrich Gysel, IT-Attaché and Co-Chair of the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group
Mr. Patrick Lehmann, Project Coordinator, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Coordinator WGCD, Geneva

Topics/Speakers:
"Challenges to Security and Defense Related Education and Training," Dr. Peter Foot, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Swindon, UK
"Education on an International/National Strategic Level," Ambassador Gérard Stoudmann, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy
"Military Training and Education on National Level Will More and More Be Dependent on International Joint Strategies and Interoperability," Colonel Valery Ratchev, Deputy Commandant, Rakovsky National Defense College, Sofia, Bulgaria
"Multinational Partnerships in Co-Development and Co-Production of Education and Technology Will Assist Professional Military Education and Training in Support of the Transformation of Security Cooperation," Dr. William Bader, Vice President & Director, Office of Education Technology & Outreach, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
"Application and Integration of New Technologies: E-Learning, Simulation and Gaming," Dr. Jim Barret, Director of Learning Management, Canadian Defense Academy, Kingston, Ontario
"Aspects of ADL," Lieutenant Colonel Lars Lundberg, Swedish Defense Wargaming Center, Stockholm
"Knowledge Management," Dr. Donald Clark, CEO, Epic Thinking, Brighton, UK

Panel Summary

The Education and Training plenary session was essentially divided into three parts. The first three speakers focused on military education and training in various civilian and military institutes. The second set of speakers focused on the needs and challenges facing the international community and on national applications of new technology. Finally, the last group of speakers focused on the presentation and use of new technologies, and on how they affect learning.

The panel discussed several different elements dealing with a variety of topics, including: the increasing complexity that educational institutions must deal with; the decrease in importance of traditional methods of education; new developments in education that pop up quickly; the importance for administrators to anticipate change and grasp and observe emerging issues; and sophistication of interference among systems.

Some of the challenges facing civil-military education include: the fading line between civilians and the military; the mix of civilian and military cultures; mobility among different sectors in society; the flattening of military hierarchies; the increasing repercussions on the lower and higher ranks (e.g., if a captain in Northern Ireland makes a mistake, he is likely to be talking directly to the "top brass"). Likewise, lower ranking officers will increasingly be given more responsibility, making a greater demand for new lines of communications, especially given the need to be informed of new developments and the growing complexity of information.

There is a similar increase of complexity on the side of the educational system. There must be cooperation between defense and civilian universities where new tools are available. Many professors try to ignore the new technology, but complexity arises when a new generation of students moves up to the university level. You as a teacher must make information available in IT terms. Professors must try to utilize networking among students, IM and parallel streams, peer-to-peer based E-Learning, and feel free to tap into Internet sources.

We must be prepared to increase the level of complexity in the classroom using simulations. The new generation has grown up in homes with simulations, and has extensive gaming experience. This experience will be widespread among the generation that will enter the university in just a few years. This new generation will be accustomed to "flattened hierarchies." They will want to be in charge of their own learning. Their education must be learner-driven.

In many cases the faculty cannot adapt, and in many cases tools are not available because of a lack of funds. Faculty development is therefore extremely important. Tomorrow's students will be competent in new technologies; the faculty must be prepared to tap into existing resources, they must tap into new work processes, and build laboratories in line with how the new generation works. The United States Army uses these new technologies. For example, in Iraq, it used Microsoft Chat on stable laptops in HMMWVs, and therefore had constant communication.

Only when we are able to prepare faculty to accept the new mode of learning among students will we be able to have the material available in time and then be able to make changes in priorities. One of these priorities must be mobility. Military education must be on par with civilian education in order to be able to attract people from the private sector into the military.

"Challenges to Security and Defense Related Education and Training," Dr. Peter Foot, Deputy Dean of Academic Studies, Joint Services Command and Staff College, Swindon, UK

Huntington: "The great professions of law, of the church, of medicine, of the military have a number of things in common. Those professions are responsible for their own training and education, career structure and advancement. They're responsible for their own ethos and professionalism. They're responsible to society for the standards of what it is that they do, and most particularly they're all united by a common sense that what they do is done selflessly for society as a whole."

A doctor may not withhold his skills on grounds of race or color or creed or nationality. Military personnel may not avoid ultimate personal liability if they are to retain credibility in their colleagues' eyes or indeed continue to enjoy the privileges of society. But the military profession is special, even within that group of professions. For medicine and the law, much of which is done for preparing for the career is training. It is a process of learning procedures, and wisdom is acquired as the doctor or the lawyer grows in the profession. The church and the military, on the other hand, require wisdom almost from the first moment of going out as a part of that new profession, which places an enormous premium on education being correct and being in the right balance with training. This is especially important today for the profession of arms, because no longer can we divide the work of the profession into those characteristic levels of command, strategic, operational, and tactical. If a soldier on the streets of Northern Ireland makes a mistake, the British Prime Minister, if not Her Majesty the Queen, immediately become involved. There has been a collapse, or narrowing of distance between the tactical level of war or military operations and the high political level of command and control. Therefore the people even at the lowest levels must have knowledge. They must have wisdom. Secondly, most armed forces today are operating in financially constrained circumstances in which command structures are flattening. That means that Admirals, Air Marshals, Generals, and Field Marshals are increasingly relying on fewer staff and more junior staff to give them advice. In the old days, advice would be filtered through any number of hands, and you could guarantee through that filtering process that mistakes would be eliminated, and the best advice would come forward. Now it may be that a chief of defense staff has his speech written for him by a major that has just graduated from the staff college. That places an enormous responsibility on those civilian academics, military academics, and other trainers who are responsible for staff education.

The final reason why I think education is so important in this era of rapid communications is that a soldier on the ground, a junior lieutenant in command of whatever units that lieutenants command, may well find himself on a satellite telephone to the head of state, who is asking, "What the hell are you doing?" I want you to do this, that, and the other." And junior lieutenants don't normally have the intellectual structures or the confidence to deal with a prime minister or a minister of defense directly on the telephone. That too is why one has a responsibility to protect that lieutenant to make sure that he does indeed have the military, professional, and intellectual capacity to deal with what can be a bewildering and very responsible position.

That is why those involved in military pedagogy are working very hard to determine what makes military pedagogy-the preparation for this particular profession-so distinctive, and what does military pedagogy have to do in order to make sure that the pedagogues understand the responsibility that they carry, however indirectly. If they get it wrong, they must bear some of the responsibility if the profession of arms or members of the military profession are ill-prepared for the conditions in which they find themselves.

Some time ago in the Psychology of Military Incompetence (an analysis, a benchmark by which to measure other contributions), Norman Dickson said the problem with the military profession is that it has a mindset that does all the right things, but which in certain contexts gets everything wrong. A classic example is the fall of Singapore, in 1941-42, when the English-speaking peoples suffered the most humiliating defeat in our history. And many would say this was the consequence of military people doing military things, and getting it completely wrong. From that perspective, military pedagogues operate to ensure that Singapores do not happen.

The profession of arms is odd in that it represents the greatest force for order in the world (the long periods of peace represented by the Roman and British Empires respectively), but also represents the greatest source of chaos in the world. But the profession operates in conditions where it alone has the legitimate use of violence in the international context. It needs to be educated as to what constitutes that legitimacy. Each generation must have that reinforced, in the context of civilian and democratic accountability.

The military profession must understand each generation as it goes through, since it needs to bear some aspects of the society that it represents-and ultimately, if necessary, defends-and yet, by virtue of its uniqueness as being the only branch of government that is allowed to request unlimited personal liability on behalf of the state, it has the requirement to remain somewhat special. And it must operate under the highest conditions of personal morality, and do so at a time of shrinking budgets, and in a changing international system in which all of the familiar landmarks of the last hundred years are disappearing behind the fog. In addition, all of this is happening-certainly in Western societies, at least-in which people no longer defer to authority. That is a tough agenda for military pedagogy. It is not just an agenda for today; it is what has to be done generation after generation to help that particular profession be ready for these conditions. In fact, it might be that the greatest challenge for military education is to educate society about what it is that the profession of arms has to offer on its behalf.

"Education on an International/Strategic Level," Ambassador Gerard Stoudmann, Director, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Switzerland

Imagine the end of the eighteenth century at a court in Europe-you have people discussing strategic issues. I don't think they had a security-related conference in those days, but let's imagine they had. What they would have been discussing was probably the result of the loss of the American colonies for the British Empire, whether the British defeat in America-by the way, with the help of the French Fleet and the French Army-would have long-standing consequences for the British Empire, but I don't think anybody would have been discussing the events of 1789, nine years later, which led to the French Revolution and the complete upheaval of Europe, which lasted well past the eighteenth century and into the nineteenth century. It illustrates pretty well the challenges of being in the security policy and training education business today.

We are witnessing tectonic changes in the security environment. Things are changing profoundly, and the world is becoming more complex. The post-Cold War order is starting to fall into place. The first decade was nothing but dealing with issues that had been popping up as the lid of the Soviet era was lifted off. Of course, these issues are not solved yet, from the Caucasus in particular, but also in the Balkans; as it has been said, they remain with us. But now we are in the second decade in a fundamentally different environment. So the world will be different ten years from now, with changing parameters, more interconnection on issues, and more complex issues, more global security. In all this, what are the consequences for education and training center?

The first consequence that we can already deduce and clarify is that we must think out of the box, because the order of importance of security issues has shifted. The traditional issues of arms control, disarmament, balance of forces, etc., have become less relevant. But with issues such as the dissemination of weapons of mass destruction and human security issues, we have a shift in the traditional order of importance. Also because of the asymmetrical character of threats, we have to consider today issues that were not considered as relevant to security policy ten years ago, or were considered only marginally. We have panel groups taking place dealing with organized crime. We now understand that such phenomena as organized crime, along with migration, other human security issues, good governance, corruption, or even the factor of SARS and its impact on stability, all have an impact on security studies.

Consequence number two is that security studies has to go where the threats are. This is not botanical studies, where if you study plants then you don't study fish, or you don't study minerals or animals. It is more than ever comprehensive and global, and cannot be approached as an exact science.

Thirdly, we should concentrate more than ever on emerging issues, without neglecting the past. Because many of the recipes for catastrophe can be found throughout history, even though history never repeats itself, we have to reach this delicate balance between lessons learned and identification of emerging issues. Identification of emerging issues is one of the biggest challenges we have in the education and training community.

Last, we must concentrate on perception, especially perception of the thinking of others. This is something that can be accomplished in an international training center. In an international training institute, we can offer the multi-cultural and multi-national setting that is precisely where you address the different perceptions.

The offer is not only the teaching, but also the cross-fertilization element. Training and education in the field of security must be an ongoing, permanent process, for the reasons that Peter Foot has said. We cannot have training at the beginning of your career, and then you're trained for the rest of your life: this must be an ongoing process for every level. And we must find ways to do it on the job. So, training as an ongoing process and on the job is one of the challenges we face at the international level, but certainly also in national training processes as well.

The following points encapsulate the response that we at our training center in Geneva are trying to achieve.

• Constant process.

• Incorporation of non-traditional factors.

• Constant process of curricular review.

• Adaptation to a new range of participants.

• Offering new products that are demand-driven.

• There is little difference between traditional security issues and non-traditional ones.

• Adjust teaching methodologies to audience and experience.

• Use new technologies such as E-learning.

• Work on visibility and outreach.

• Training is part of an overall undertaking.

• Having people from the field is important.

• Develop the network; because of the global aspects of security, you cannot be just one institute, you must have synergy.

• As security sector, we are working with GHO (Global Health Organization).

• Security needs to think out of the box.

"Military Training and Education on National Level Will Have to Focus on International Joint Strategies and Interoperability," Colonel Valery Ratchev, Deputy Commandant, G. S. Rakovsky National Defense and Staff College, Sofia, Bulgaria

I will look at the topic of our panel through the prism of the necessity of making a clear connection between national and international levels of contemporary military training and education. I will address the problem from the perspective of East European realities, and from a perspective of someone trying to find the right place for the Consortium in our efforts to provide the correct strategic education to our civilian and military personnel.

Yesterday, we heard several explanations of what the Consortium is for. It is my understanding that the Consortium was established under the paradigm of interoperability-an understanding of interoperability that includes most of all cultural, doctrinal, and intellectual aspects, not only technical ones. This is not the question of defending only common political, economic, and cultural values, but defending a common security space that could be joined by any country contributing to the prevention of threats of any kind. The enemy of this common security space is not territorially opposed, it is not conventionally mobilized, it does not form a front line, it has no uniformed appearance, but it is monstrous and fragmented. This enemy is extremely dispersed, metaphoric, and undermining, absolutely cruel, and constantly omnipresent. Irrespective of its strength or structure, terrorism is capable of unpredictably changing the dynamics of world relations. A single person with the help of a box cutter could cause such a severe effect that entire armies would respond to it. A single terrorist that blows himself up on a bus could convene the Security Council, bring a million people out on the streets, and move armies in combat. Every open country is facing the necessity to integrate its efforts as well as its foreign and interior institutions; furthermore, integration of efforts and institutions in its international aspect is becoming inevitable. This internationalization for security and stability extends far beyond NATO and the EU's borders, and this is a positive trend.

The state sovereignty for which, in fact, the armed forces have been created can now be defended primarily through international cooperation, engagement, and integration. This is easily explained, as the new enemy is not politically sovereign. What terrorism aims to threaten is the policy of governments, the political order of societies, and their style of life, and only secondarily state sovereignty.

The use of armed forces as a complementary instrument in the efforts to stabilize the situation and minimize the risks of multilateral threats is now based not on abstract notions, but on specific conditions self-awareness and the ability to react fast. With the appearance of the new enemy, the difference between external and internal disappears, because it digs itself into everything, and manifests itself everywhere in a different way. The new threat comes unexpectedly, and leaves no chance to politicians and militaries for planning and performing countermeasures.

The zero warning time is a reality, and proves once again that the internationalization of efforts-especially in the military sector, and in the supporting services of intelligence, communications, and military infrastructure for fast deployment-is inevitable. If this is the reality of contemporary life, what challenges do national military educational institutions face regarding this situation?

The military educational systems in our countries have been built around the levels of war generally accepted since the last several decades of the Cold War. The package of knowledge included in the curricula, in spite of the fact that it is changing continuously, has been determined by the requirements of national territorial defense, or maybe a major regional war. Generally this knowledge is still useful, but there is no doubt that the contemporary asymmetric threats and new multi-aspect roles of the military can not be met merely with this kind of knowledge. The new security environment has changed the relationship between the levels of war, the traditional requirements toward military professionalism, and the spectrum of knowledge and skills that officers should obtain. These changes are so significant that they should be considered when determining an effective way to educate officers for the future.

In the first place is the necessity to recognize that we come not only from different strategic cultures and military traditions, but generally the modern paradigm is considerably changed. The strategy of mass armies supported by total mobilization of the state and the strategic culture that derives from the "big war" paradigm are totally different from those of the revolution in military affairs and the army designed for preemptive, preventive, and crisis response operations mainly.

Because of the traditional definition of military strategy as an art and science of employing armed forces to secure the aims of national policy is correct, but only in a certain context, it does not explain completely what the Bulgarian contingent is doing in Afghanistan, and why Argentina wants to participate in PfP. If this is correct, then the senior civilian and military leadership of today must acquire a much more sophisticated understanding of the integration of all the elements of national power in the pursuit of national objectives, simultaneous with the pursuit of the same issues but viewed from the perspective of the international democratic community.

The systematic status of international relations, international organizations, and international law are a mandated part of this package. Changes in the status of the entire worldwide security problem in their stabilization, political, and operational context and cross-referenced impact are the key to understanding the contemporary puzzle of security.

Completely new practices in training on interagency cooperation on both the national and international level are increasingly important, because there is a new operational phenomenon that we call integrated operations.

Knowledge in the field of civil-military relations and democratic control should be received not only in terms of national but international projections as well. Decision-making in contemporary peace support operations in the war against terrorism is the best course in civil-military relations.

It is extremely important to achieve a multinational approach to the three pillars of military professionalism: leadership, command and control, and management. In this way, common understanding, coordinated command, and effective management in the international and national context will be ensured. Only in this way can we compensate for the technological diversity that will obviously continue to exist in the future. Simultaneously, our officers must continue to be firmly grounded in the fundamentals of tactics, operational art, and technology, because they are the basis of success for all types of combat and non-combat operations. But only a very few countries can afford to train their officers for missions in real conditions. Obviously, a completely new approach toward the internationalization of training is strongly needed. The establishment of integrated national systems for modeling and simulations based on internationally compatible platforms will guarantee higher integration on the national interagency level and between regional networks systems, as well as opportunities for international computer assisted exercises as Viking and Cooperative Associate.

The newly changing conditions require a level of advanced knowledge in international relations, security policy, and strategy to be present in the middle and even lower officers and civilian ranks, because they are the main participants in multinational missions and to a large extent, they determine the military political and public outcome of the mission performance.

Internationalization of strategy and doctrine is not an easy job, especially for a coalition of states such as we here in this quorum represent. For the United States, for instance, the strategy of containment has been replaced by a strategy of engagement internationally, which has been coupled with increasing demands for the military to become involved with domestic emergencies. The West Europeans place the emphasis on soft power-they believe in the power of the peacekeeping process as well as the organizations and international law that soften contradictions between parties. In Eastern Europe we share the tradition of guaranteeing sovereignty of territory and a strong sense about defense, offense, and prevention.

The new alliance strategic concept of NATO reflects the existence of threats to the entire organization, but does not provide enough detailed instruction in how the concept is to be further operationalized in order to overcome such differences.

The very idea of mutual defense capabilities consists of four principal areas that should provide an international platform for action, and these are:

• The mutual political and military will.

• The joint conceptual and strategic framework.

• Organization for performance.

• Military hardware.

The adequate knowledge and skills for both military and civilian staff are those that will make operational all that was mentioned above. Only military-sensitive politicians and politically-sensitive soldiers prepared for national and international operations working together can be effective in the modern complicated security environment. Without that, operations from Washington to Prague and further from Operation Desert Storm to Enduring Freedom will keep repeating that there is a gap in everything without having any practical result.

In this complicated security environment, our defense academies can adapt their equipment and educational programs in the light of the new demands placed on the twenty-first century soldier. The defense academies are facing a package of extraordinary challenges. We will have conceptual, organizational, and pedagogical problems. Operational concepts are too general, and it is difficult to make them operational. Doctrines are still focused on the classical level of military operations. Jointness is not completely dominant yet over services and branches. The field manuals do not correspond to contemporary realities. Having in mind that these issues are gaining national and international context, the question, "What are we supposed to teach our officers?" remains open.

Our colleges are in the process of organizational restructuring together with our armies. The problem of change in terms of generations, lack of motivation, and reproduction of the faculty staff is a serious one. A new problem has emerged. More and more civilian colleges offer expert programs in the field of military knowledge. Competition is at our doorstep, and our former self-isolation is not going to save us. The necessity of simultaneous training of military and civilians is a challenge that not everyone between both the top brass and the scholars is ready to accept. From the point of view of the ideology of military education, a transition from the principles of learning and reproduction towards critical thinking and creative interpretation is needed. The knowledge and lessons learned are so dynamic that, without such an approach, it would be a danger to train officers based on events in a war that happened the previous day. It is a fact that the knowledge and lessons learned are predominantly internationally based, and the access to worldwide information is an inseparable element of any level and type of education. Because of this, the benchmarking and mutual validation between the educational programs of our colleges is not an academic fancy, but a vital requirement coming from real life.

Never before has military knowledge and practice been internationalized to the extent that it is today. Removing ideological differences-in particular in the rise of the new common threat perception-is opening a process of a scope and dimension previously unknown to us. None of our countries is able to deal independently with that problem. Internationalizing our efforts in education is not modernism, but is a vital necessity coming from the realities of the time we live in. Mutual opening of the military educational system means commonality of strategic cultures. In this process, everyone can be a beneficial contributor. Here there are not small and big, because there is not a monopoly on the knowledge. The Consortium of Defense Academies and Security Studies Institutes is one of the few brilliant ideas in this aspect. It is worth investing in it. It should be further developed as a model for relationships because it erases unnecessary borders between national and international, between military and civilian, between cultures and policies. Certainly the Consortium itself will hardly be sufficient. Multi and bi-national, NATO and EU understanding and support are required too. Everyone who knows the Consortium from the inside knows that one thing is obvious: the people participating in the working groups are closer together in terms of culture, mentality, ambitions and capacity than the others, and there have been enough significant results that this is the answer to those asking, "What is the Consortium working for?"

"Multinational Partnerships in Co-Development and Co-Production of Education and Technology Will Assist Professional Military Education and Training in Support of the Transformation of Security Cooperation," Mr. Scott Swafford, filling in for Dr. William Bader, Vice President & Director, Office of Education Technology & Outreach, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.

Security cooperation is a rather large field: there are equipment programs, there are training programs, there are education programs. From our purview at the National Defense University (NDU), we are interested in the educational programs. Some of the Department of Defense (DOD) constructs of regional centers are associated with NDU and some are not. But from the point of view of transformation at large as a concept, as well as transformation of some existing project and processes currently occurring throughout our Department of Defense, conceptually, what are some new paradigms we can bring to enhancing or transforming education as a bolster to security cooperation? And by that, it is obviously implicit that it is international education, whether it is a national basis developed jointly, or whether it is something developed in a consortium of different partners with a much larger perspective. So, basically, how can we bring some new paradigms to the existing process of security cooperation in education?

A few ideas:

• Capacity Building. Taking a page from an economics model, we can apply an end-result outcome as a different filter and gauge for what we want to do. Using the term "capacity building" in many ways is very typical of much of the approach of Consortium activities, but it is fundamentally different from the normal traditional approaches of some schoolhouse activities. By capacity building, it could be typified by something from the 1990's; the World Bank and several other institutions were very careful in putting a definite emphasis on strengthening and creating programs in education of economics and economics research in former Soviet countries. As opposed to taking larger number of people and providing education for them in other locations, this involved strengthening the institution and the curricula locally, to build capacity to put more people through programs, to have people locally trained to do regional approaches, to take macroeconomics and apply them locally as a concern. But can we take the gauge of capacity building and apply it to education in a security cooperation sense? In many ways, many of our activities already do so, but we need to consciously take that as a gauge of how we evaluate what we're doing, by building local, indigenous, capability within institutions in terms of curricula and programs.

• The co-development of curricula. Co-development and co-production of the wellsprings, the concepts, the syllabi, but in true partnerships as we build jointly managed and jointly developed programs that can then be sustained locally in institutions.

• Applying different types of funds. Use research and development funding to do curriculum development as opposed to a standard operations and maintenance process.

• Apply IT where appropriate. NDU has been applying IT, not in the context of ADL (their terminology is "electronic enhanced education"), but first and foremost in a progression where what comes first is the curricula, what comes next is the students, and the blend between the students and the curricula, and then how IT can assist that. But injecting technology where necessary could be done in a number of ways. It could be facilitating the exchange of curricula back and forth, or facilitating instructors' revision for multiple countries of curricula that is jointly developed.

• Focus all of these areas on policy and security relevant goals. From the U.S. perspective, this would mean taking goals from our defense planning guidance from the national security structure, looking at the far end of what we want to focus on. From an international perspective, this is looking at the common concerns so that we can prioritize what we'd like to do joint development. If we all agree that terrorism is a current area, what are the curricular implications of terrorism? There are curricular implications of the general conceptual wellsprings of terrorism, but there are also interesting spin-offs on border control, military support to law enforcement, on civil-military relations. Can we take policy-relevant and strategy-relevant areas as our focus point as initial curricular development themes?

This is part of what NDU and its office of education, technology, and outreach have in mind as we move to bring a new dimension to international, professional, military education. That dimension is the forging of multi-national partnerships in co-development and co-production of curricula and training materials to assist in the transformation of security cooperation via PME. These are the fundamental components of our approach that will bring a unique and critical dimension to how we think, plan, and then implement in a dangerous new world of security cooperation.

In March of this year, we held a meeting at NDU to bring together representatives from partner countries in Central Asia, South Eastern Europe, and the Caucasus to talk, exchange notes, and discuss needs and capabilities in professional military education in their respective countries. To my surprise and pleasure, there was a strong consensus from Central Asia to the Caucasus that there was an immediate need for course material for immediate practical use in the areas of civil-military emergency planning, military support to law enforcement, and energy environmental security. Each delegation took the opportunity to highlight their country's needs and capabilities in terms of professional military education. At the end of the discussion, there was general agreement on future planned actions, to work together on specific threat areas, uncover sources of curricula, and identify partnering opportunities for development and dissemination of new materials. We see this as a tandem effort to those in the Consortium, and note the progress made by the Consortium toward going beyond transfers to true exchanges in jointly developed and managed projects. Our office was formed to create an extended collaborative community with partner countries. Our long-term goal is to educate a core of people capable of formulating policies and practices tailored to the specific needs of each region and country, ultimately leading to the creation of public, private, and international partnerships that will design, plan and implement programs on a regional basis.

In closing, let me say that we are now in the process of soliciting comments and recommendations on this emerging program from interested organizations, agencies, the Congress, individuals, and institutions across the globe. In the concept of applying new paradigms to security cooperation via education, there is definitely an intellectual flow from applying the concept of transformation looking at the role of education in security cooperation and looking at the current processes that take place: from schoolhouse processes and schoolhouse approaches to measuring impact by throughput on one hand from an accounting point of view, and being forced to justify activities, and also from a larger impact of affecting long term sustainable reform. Bringing new mindsets-whether it is public/private teaming, looking at weighing and gauging your output by developing local capability, whether it is by applying different sources of funding-these, we think, are interesting ways to explore taking new paradigms from somewhere else, from outside the box and applying them to the current business of what we do.

"Application and Integration of New Technologies: E-Learning, Simulation and Gaming," Dr. James Barret, Director of Learning Management, Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston, Ontario

The new millennium is less than four years old and is already full of surprises. Most recently, I learned that old-fashioned pre-emptive warfare has once again entered the security toolbox of the West. For governments, alliances, for humanitarian agencies, and, most importantly, for armed forces, there are immediate and pressing questions about how you build, how you plan, and how you educate and train for a world that is constantly shifting under foot.

If there are answers, we need to seek those in our collective experience and wisdom. If there is hope for us to deal with the rapidly changing security agenda and environment, it lies in our ability to learn and adapt quickly.

In the learning sciences, the traditional pedagogical sciences, these sciences are being augmented by the revolution of computer and communications technologies, and they are having a most disturbing and rapid effect. By revolution, I mean a rapid change that goes well beyond the application of the computer and communications technologies into distance and distributed learning. Knowledge building, knowledge management, object-based learning environment, learning echo system, instructional engineering, cognitive engineering-there is no doubt that the use of these phrases heralds a brave new world of learning, and it is already having a profound effect, particularly for collaborative and network instruction.

The millennium students-the youth who have grown up comfortable with the use of computers-are multi-tasking and time-sharing. They are our future soldiers, and we find many of them already in our armed forces. For many people, the ability to process in parallel is essential to work survival. And thus it is that higher speeds, broader bandwidth, and greater data compression appear not only in the machinery, but also in the way that humans communicate. And in time the language of teaching and learning will become increasingly compressed as we learn how to separate the learning process from the maturing process-that is, as the art and science of learning pays increasing attention to learning for working adults. In a world that moves with increasing speed, there is little time to waste on habitual practices designed to shepherd adolescents.

One finds in the universities and the colleges and the schools a growing impatience with the old learning structures. This is coupled with an eagerness to try ever more adventurous models. In the schools and industry, as well as in the home, we find more and more examples of such experiments. We have not seen the end of it, and we may never see the end of it. There are calls for a pause or stop, but this is like telling Columbus that his first landfall is all he needs. In this new world, the explorers have found land, and see land looming on the horizon, and they will not be stopped. We will have no choice but to share in what they discover, and they will discover a lot.

Investment in tele-learning over the years in Canada has resulted in a number of networked centers of excellence, which only ten years ago would have been unlikely partnerships. Out of these centers have emerged consortia for the sharing of courses, the transfer of credit, the development of new learning support systems, and new methodologies. Some of these new systems are in active production, and they are bringing learning opportunities undreamed of to students in Canada's remote areas.

This revolution in defense education comes at a moment of great need and great opportunity. The problems of defense and security are among the world's most difficult problems, and we believe that they are also the most important. The opportunity comes from profound changes in learning that give us powerful new tools for international exchange and interaction. It arises from the characteristics of the defense and security community itself.

Over countless ages, soldiers have developed a remarkably common language and culture. That for me has been one of the richest learning experiences from the PfP Consortium. Defense education has a purpose. When one talks about strategic education, one thinks about large issues. Defense education is often for a deadly purpose, but it serves that purpose when it informs military action. Defense education systems today are among the most interoperable, and the most easily steered, of any education systems. Defense education will be transformed in at least three ways:

• The continued emergence of consortia of colleges and universities will give soldiers unprecedented access to learning. One example is the U.S. Military's experience with E Army U, which makes education available to the common soldier. This is an extraordinary experiment that has achieved remarkable popularity.

• The second transformation will occur when soldiers have increased choice and influence over what they will learn. This is a shift toward learner-centricity that one finds also in the civilian world, but it is the correct strategy to increase the sum, the breadth, and the depth of knowledge in the heads of our soldiers. Furthermore, there will be interesting spin-offs. Learner-centric models, if properly exploited, can pay huge dividends in economies and efficiencies of human resource management.

• The tools of the modern learning sciences, combined with object-based learning structures, can dramatically shorten the cycle from field experience to lessons learned, to learning object, to instructional package. Knowledge management tools will permit an expert or a student to search learning object repositories, and through aggregation, adaptation, and augmentation, to rapidly develop new learning courses or new learning activities. Add electronic distribution to this, and we can instruct entire armies in very short time.

To obtain maximum leverage, it suffices to find effective ways to link together our defense education systems. A defense education "super network" offers great potential, and-not least-extensive professional development opportunities in a rich collaborative environment. Imagine a staff course that has a mandated national portion, but with the remainder of the courses to be selected from a long list of accredited learning activities offered by other nations. With group learning, including joint and combined simulation gaming exercises, the potential for increased interoperability and the harmonization of vocabulary and standards is obvious.

The defense education network, or "super network," is assembling itself as we speak here today, and I believe this is an unstoppable progress. It will happen. We may or we may not construct virtual international defense universities, but through many local initiatives, driven by local needs, and supported by global communications capacity, all the essential characteristics are emerging. This is another example of globalization, this time applied to defense education. With modest support, and gentle guidance, growth will be rapid. The active agent we see here is the Advanced Distributed Learning Working Group, combined with the work of the Curriculum Working Group of this consortium. You've seen that the ADL Working Group is active in three areas: platform development, course development, and building a knowledge community. Of these three, the last is the essential piece. One does not construct a knowledge community without purpose, or without work for it to do. That work is the integration of platform and program, the integration of content and conduit, for the purpose of learning the business of security and defense: practical, theoretical, tactical, operational, strategic, and on all levels and time scales.

The ADL and Curriculum Working Groups typify the goals and the mandate of the PfP Consortium. It is central to all its activities, which, I believe, can be framed in this context of integration of content and conduit. It is important-it is beyond important. It is, as Peter Foot says, "precious."

"Integration of ADL in the Preparation of CAX Viking 03," Lieutenant Colonel Lars Lundberg, Swedish Defense Wargaming Center, Stockholm, Sweden

The thought of giving information through the Internet in Swedish military wargaming practices began during the preparation for Viking 01. With the corps planning team located in different places, we used a Web-based application named Quickbase. With about 500 participants, many of them not knowing anything about computer-assisted exercises and simulation, we needed to find a simulation to give them an opportunity to learn something about computer-assisted exercises.

We developed two courses together with U.S. Joint Forces Command: "What is CAX?" and "How to Conduct a CAX." The courses were given prior to the IPC, and prior to the final planning conference, and they were then accessible through the Internet.

The courses for Viking I consisted mostly of Power Point slides, combined with text that explained more about each subject. Each block was followed by questions. The questions were formulated only for those who had already been trained, and no registration was done.

With Viking 03, with about 850 participants, from roughly 25 different countries and 10 civilian organizations, there was no alternative or pre-training in the traditional way. When NATO, together with U.S.JFCOM SECLAND, suggested that they should support us with ADL as a tool, the answer was not difficult.

ADL as part of the training was the solution to bring everyone up to a minimal level of knowledge about peace support operations, the NATO decision-making process, and the basics for civil-military cooperation. U.S.JFCOM also converted the course from Viking 01, "How to Conduct a CAX," into ADL.

We developed a generic course with the help of the Swedish International Center—that is, it is not specific for Viking 03. Hopefully it will be used for some years all over the world.

This unit [pictured on slide] is an introduction for peace support operations.

This unit [pictured on slide] is about Brigade staff, how it works, and gives examples for responsibility for each position in the staff.

The great challenge for Viking 03 was to have the primary training audience not only in Sweden, but in seven different places. Having people involved from twenty-five countries, it was not possible to bring them to the same place and train them prior to the exercise. We do some kind of training just prior to the exercise, but everyone must be at the same level.

The other challenge for training was knowledge about the NATO decision-making process, and that is one of the main objectives for the training audience in Viking 03. So one unit was focused on that subject.

Another important issue that was to be handled was peace support operation and civil-military cooperation. This is also one of the main objectives for the training audience in Viking 03, and we had one block devoted to that objective.

At last, given the basics about peace support operations, NATO staff procedures, and relations with civilian staff organizations, it is time to learn how to use the tools. We have one block about these, where the war fighter must learn peace support operation tactics, how to negotiate, and also how to best cooperate with the media, which is something that simply must be understood.

The last block is a data library, with peace support operation manuals, handbooks, and NATO documentation about the subject. When Viking 03 entered into partnership with ADL, we didn't realize that we were one of the first within the PfP community to use it on a larger scale. But now that we have wired, webbed, and Windowed, now what? Where are we headed using these new tools?

What is the vision, not only for the Consortium, but the vision for the users? What is the optimum use for these new tools? Today, children fight battles on the Internet. The only limit we have is our imagination (and, in the short term, bandwidth). So if we can think it, we can do it-let's speed up a little bit. We are using the tools we have, but we need new tools for the next exercise, too.

"Knowledge Management," Dr. Donald Clark, CEO, Epic Thinking, Brighton, UK

The classroom is a short-term learning experience, not a long-term learning experience. One must take knowledge and apply it before it hardens.

[Video of "Ferris Bueller's Day Off"]

The movie clip may seem like a caricature or a joke, but that clip was voted as one of the most memorable movie clips among teenagers in the U.S. The clip is memorable because we've all been there. It happens in your institutions, in your schools, with your kids. Students cut lectures because they understand that lectures do not help students pass exams. They learn most of what they learn in the quiet of their own room or in the library. They cram in those few precious weeks prior to the exam, they get their degree, and then they forget most of it.

This is the way in which education has been built in the West. But this is no longer acceptable. The next generation coming along will not put up with it. Children know more about IT than their teachers; they laugh about the teachers when they come home. The generation gap is enormous now.

It is one thing to acquire knowledge, but what really matters is getting people to share knowledge. There has been a sea change in the knowledge management field over the last decade. Technology is not terribly important. What is important is information and the way people use that information. One must embed curiosity in the organization; if one does not give people autonomy in their learning, then they will not learn.

Intellectual Capital in Organizations. The true value in organizations-intellectual capital-hardly ever gets an actual value attributed to it. Knowledge in the organization is the real asset. If one wants to respond quickly or flexibly, then one must rely on the wits of the people, and not on technology.

Wonderful things are happening with technology. The Internet is the biggest learning resource on the planet. Why did China fear Google more than it feared Saddam Hussein? They know it is a subversive technology. This is where the next generation gets their learning and knowledge. All sorts of things are happening with technology: bandwidth is doubling every eighteen months; storage is halving in price every twelve months; and, according to the network law, once you get people networked, you have tremendous opportunities for sharing knowledge. You get a swarm effect.

As all of this technology hits the streets, it is wonderfully enabling. However, it is only five to ten percent of the solution. Organizations must become learning organizations. One must inculcate the new world set of values, one must execute at speed. No longer is it acceptable to take a year to develop a course. Most training teaches "stuff" that is out of date. The problem is that we want knowledge, but on the Internet we are literally drowning in knowledge. The trick is to make sure that the knowledge is filtered properly.

The abundance problem. The problem is the gathering, sharing, and dissemination of the knowledge. A knowledge management system will not suddenly accelerate the process of, say, putting together the journal. It will accelerate the dissemination, but the gathering and distillation of the knowledge is the hard bit.

That is because people do not like sharing knowledge. They hate it. They get on in organizations because they do not share knowledge. People are poor at capturing, sharing, and applying knowledge. And no matter how much knowledge one has, it does not solve the problem of getting knowledge there in the first place and getting people to use it.

Why do the transmitters of knowledge not share it with other people? The primary reason is the human trait called "hoarding." We hoard information, and we must overcome this trait in order to share knowledge. On the other hand, the recipients of knowledge have NIH syndrome (Not Invented Here). "My institution knows best." "My people know best." "The other institutions know nothing." This NIH principal is a very important psychological barrier, and it really does exist. Without overcoming this barrier, all the technology in the world will not solve the problem.

Another reason that transmitters will not share knowledge is that they like to boast about it. It is great knowing that others do not know as much. The next generation should be more learner-centric, much more willing to learn in a different way than previous generations going through the university system.

Procrastination is another obstacle to learning. Learning must be a much more even-keeled activity. One must spread the learning over time, rather than relying on the final exam system that education is so fond of.

Unblocking knowledge. One must make knowledge accessible, collaborative, attractive, easy to use, searchable, and scalable. Those are the six big goals. To what degree can technology help you solve this problem?

Material must be highly interactive, it must involve gaming techniques and simulations. It must be massively interactive. That is what sixteen-year-olds expect, and that is what soldiers in the future will expect.

Learning management systems (LMS) might not be the whole answer to the problem. It may be that fleetness of foot, and using the Internet, or using what nine-year-old kids use, may be part of the answer. Kids download stuff from other kids. They would not want to use LMSs. The danger is that, if one is not careful with the content, one will disappoint learners. These are highly sophisticated, media literate kids who know what they want. The levels of interaction they have are in real time, with magnificent graphics and fantastic feedback. Do not disappoint them, or you will turn them off learning. This must be high quality content.

There is some wonderful E-learning taking place in the U.S. based on private-public partnerships. It really does work. The private sector has been doing E-Learning for over twenty years. Harvard has a great course on negotiating skills. You learn by doing, not by doing a flip chart. Use templates, but make sure they are good and strong, with high levels of interactivity with the learner. One must look at the added value. The only added value one will gain is cognitively changing the minds of the learners. It is only the learning that matters. But it is not just the learning, it is the application of learning in the field, and technology is only a means to that end. It is the learning and the quality of the learning that matters.

You cannot have a revolution in strategic education if you deliver materials that disappoint. You must have early success and "grab people by the throat." If you want to change an organization, you must stun them at day one with an early success. That is what you must do with your E-learning content.

The younger generations are not like you at all. They are what are called digital natives. They have grown up with the Web coming out of the wall. It means nothing to them, it's not new technology: it was there when they were born. We are digital immigrants. We go into their world, and observe it from the outside. The Web is their world. People have accused kids of not having the same attention span as older generations, when in fact they have attention, they have patience, but what they do not have patience for is the old methods of learning. To "shove it down their throat and give them a spoon feeding" is a big mistake.

America's Army is an unbelievable experiment. This is a computer game funded by the DOD in the U.S. Kids really learn what it is like to join the Army. However, knowledge is slightly anarchic. Kids are hacking into the game, and there is a team of guys in DOD having to fight other kids to keep the games going. But the point is the anarchic nature of knowledge, and the power of the Internet as a knowledge tool. It is so powerful that no one will be able to tame it, but one must use it, know it, and one must understand it.

The Internet is where kids are learning their values. The video games Under Ash and Ethnic Cleansing are two examples that demonstrate the power of the Internet to subvert values. This is what leaders will be faced with in the future, and if you are not in the culture and do not understand it, the Web will cut your legs away. The Web is truly subversive.

A few points in conclusion:

• The human dimension is always weak.

• Human behavior will always win out.

• Think about collaborations and communities (e.g., e-Bay, Napster).

• New paradigms are emerging.

• Get the learning to the people (e.g., PDAs for learning).

• Games and simulations and learning are absolutely the future.

• Use the tools: they are cheap, easy to use, and they work.

 

Parallel Panel 3: Security Sector Reform (SSR)

Presented by the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF)

Moderator: Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler, Director, DCAF, Geneva

Topics/Speakers:
"Implications of Enlargement as Seen from the Balkans/Caucasus/Central Asia in the SSR Context," Ambassador Dr. Istvan Gyarmati, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary
Dr. Heiko Borchert, Consultant, Switzerland
"Implications of Enlargement for Structuring European Intelligence Cooperation," Mr. Bjorn Muller-Wille, Visiting Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Sweden
"Transformation/Coordination of Police in the SSR Context," Colonel Dr. Jozsef Boda, Director, Ministry of Interior, Hungary
"Lessons Learned, Practical Approaches, Standards in Border Guards," Mr. Andrus Oovel, Former Minister of Defense, Estonia
"Role of Parliamentarian Bodies in the SSR Framework," Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, Former Deputy Defense Minister, Bulgaria

Purpose

Reflecting the efforts of the Security Sector Reform Working Group, the panel sought to provide avenues of discussion to enhance democratic civil-military relations and security sector reform (SSR) through exchanges and cooperation in joint research, outreach, and expert-formation initiatives, and to encourage cooperation between international information networks in support of research outreach and expert formation related to SSR. The panel also provided a forum to enhance the exchange of ideas, insights, knowledge, expertise, and best practices on SSR processes between consolidating and consolidated democracies in the Euro-Atlantic area. With recent events, SSR as a whole has gained importance, encompassing not only armed forces, but also police, border guards, intelligence agencies, and other agencies dealing with security matters and civil-military relations, meaning ministries of defense, foreign affairs, interior, justice, and police.

Introduction, Ambassador Dr. Theodor Winkler, Director, DCAF, Switzerland

Welcome. This panel will have not only experts from military and defense academies and security studies institutes but also experts on police, border guards, parliamentary matters, and intelligence. Security Sector Reform (SSR) by definition involves broad expertise. The term is relatively recent, coined in last part of 1990s, and its meaning is still being established in international debate.

The term may be new, but the problem is an old and familiar one to most. First, it is obvious that young democracies cannot prosper without resolving the heritage left behind from dictatorships and totalitarian regimes in the form of uncontrolled, overblown, and inefficient security sectors. In many countries we have power ministries, states within the state not sharing information, overlapping competencies, and staffs that are too large. Obviously, in this environment, organized crime, armed gangs, and corruption thrive. The state monopoly on legitimate power is actually dispersed, and is therefore an unwieldy instrument at best.

There is no legitimate oversight, either at the governmental or parliamentary levels. Such systems imply that the security sector is seen not as the solution but part of the problem. It is wielding an undue influence and keeps things opaque. If one cannot cope with SSR and deal with oversight, the prospects for a country over time are rather dim.

The need for reform has been reinforced due to recent developments. Obviously, 9/11 highlights not only the need for the military but also for interaction between the police, border guards, intelligence agencies, and other aspects. Fundamentalism, terrorism, organized crime, and armed gangs are other phenomena that reinforce the importance of such interaction. Many states are gliding towards scenarios that we see in Columbia, West Africa, or Somalia.

Clearly what is needed is therefore a comprehensive view on this issue. Reform cannot be confined simply to defense or police or border guard reform alone. The entire security sector needs reform, and it must all be coordinated through a comprehensive and integrated approach. The following presentations are an effort in that direction.

"Implications of Enlargement as Seen from the Balkans/Caucasus/Central Asia in the SSR Context," Ambassador Dr. Istvan Gyarmati, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary

It is important when considering the reform of the security sector in various regions to elaborate on the issue of what is going to be enlarged and how-that is, to take a look at what the NATO and EU of the future look like. Questions remain, such as, why is there a need to enlarge, why do countries want to join, and do they know what they are joining?

One of the difficulties that we encounter in our institutions is that we are often in the paper-drafting rather than the solution-drafting mode. These institutions face serious challenges, and these challenges are not posed by enlargement. Enlargement is not the reason for but rather the consequence of the challenge. If there are to be problems, they will be due to organizations that were created in a different era and under different circumstances; the process has not yet reached a point where the organizations have adapted sufficiently to be able to respond to new tasks and challenges.

This is not necessarily a negative note, but is rather the norm in this time of tectonic changes. International organizations and states that were constructed to exist in the pre-9/11, Westphalian order are all dealing with changes. The problem is that we are not ready to deal with the challenges, or that we try to paper over or delay the answers to emerging questions.

What are the questions? All are familiar with the changes that came about in the early 1990s. Only now are we seeing debate emerging about fact that the changes that came about after September 11 were not caused by that event, but rather only became visible on September 11. These changes are more important than the ones that came about in the early 1990s. Therefore, it is not surprising that the international community is at a loss as to how to deal with the huge changes generated by these events, the likes of which had never occurred before.

The most important change that was made visible by September 11 is the collapse of the Westphalian international order. Created by and around the Treaty of Westphalia in the seventeenth century, this order originally had two very important features. First, it was states and only states that were players in international relations-nation-states, with some variations. The second principle was that the use of large-scale organized force was reserved to states. Prior to the Treaty, others played a role in deploying large armed forces, such as churches, warlords, and those who could hire mercenaries. All had the capability, and to some extent the right, to use large-scale force.

Accordingly, the international system, including international organizations and law, were built within that system. This meant that the subjects and the objects of international law were run by states. This basically came to an end at the end of the twentieth century. Many players other than states have emerged to play a role in international relations. Bill Gates, Christiane Amanpour, large corporations, and CNN play a role rivaling that of states.

What really undermined the order was the collapse of the second principle, the use of large-scale force being reserved to states. Non-state actors began appearing on the world scene that started to deploy large-scale force. The first were entities such as those in Nagorno-Karabakh and Kosovo, who tried to secede from states by behaving like states while not actually being states. They used force on a large scale, as if they were states. They behaved like states because they wanted to become states. They tried to abide by the international system, and were often handled like states. But others emerged who could use large-scale force but did not want to become states, who did not want to be integrated into the international order but wanted to destroy it. These include groups such as organized crime and global, hyper-international terrorist groups. They can use large-scale force of a kind previously reserved for states. These groups not only rival the military capabilities of many states but also display a willingness to use forms of extreme force, such as weapons of mass destruction. These groups can acquire these weapons, and are more than ready to use them. So the international order was fatally undermined by the emergence of these groups because it was not built to deal with these kinds of challenges and threats.

This is also true of international law. These groups do not normally operate within the norms of international law. It is also why the United States, beyond any doubt a state with the rule of law, violates international law from time to time simply because it cannot deal with these new threats within the bounds of international law.

The question raised concerns how international organizations should deal with these problems, and it is one that will face both the EU and NATO. Looking at transatlantic relations, the crisis is not caused by banana-republic wars or economic wars but by different understandings of security. Expansion is part of the response. Part of the goal is to maintain stability, because terrorists and organized crime can only survive in unstable environments.

Military force is only a short-term answer. It can defend against imminent threats, but cannot address the root causes of the problem. NATO and the EU are not yet ready to deal with these problems, but they are something that new states seeking to join both bodies are sure to face. There is confidence that these new countries, with different experiences with wealth, welfare, and stability, will be more ready to address these issues than will the richer nations of Western Europe. Enlargement of the EU and NATO will thus help the organizations be better prepared to meet these new challenges.

Reforming armed forces is the next key area. This reform is unlike anything that has been done before. Only two countries in Europe have embarked on significant reforms: the UK and Sweden. All of the others are lagging fatally behind. This is the problem responsible for the capability gap between the U.S. and Europe. The U.S. can afford to do two things at the same time-maintain the old structures and introduce new ones. The Europeans cannot afford to do this; radical decisions have to be made between old and new kinds of forces. European politicians and military officers are not thinking outside the box-they need to look at network-centric warfare, battlefield management using information technology, and soldiers developing capabilities previously reserved to company-sized units. All require totally new thinking in areas such as doctrine and training. Many European countries have not recognized and adapted to such changes, but there is much optimism about the capabilities of the new European member states. Former Warsaw Pact states have not radically changed their militaries to date. However, they can leap into the twenty-first century military without going through any intermediate changes. They do not have to fight the huge inertia and resistance to change imposed by maintaining huge tank forces or fighter aircraft, such as those in the U.S.

There is a chance to make the transition if the politicians and military will make and implement the decisions needed. NATO is currently giving old advice, trying to save money and political capital, and militaries want to maintain the status quo. The new states could generate new changes as well as meeting the needed reforms. It is hoped that, when the panel meets again in five years, we can all say, mission accomplished.

Dr. Heiko Borchert, Consultant, Switzerland

Advancing SSR needs to focus on three basic issues. First, the whole issue of network centricity in the broadest possible sense is crucial-that is, the need to systematically link all security sectors with each other. Secondly, the issue of joint capabilities is important, not only for the armed forces, but within the wider security sector as well. Third, there is a need to improve co-operability and inter-operability between all security sector forces.

The consequences for security policy are important to assess. It is clear that there needs to be a more comprehensive, holistic approach to security policy. Implementing security policy continues to be a critical issue. Two key areas are joint network-centric capabilities and seamless interaction among security sector actors. These must be more properly addressed in the future. Many reforms have been initiated, but most are still "stove-piped" within fixed organizational boundaries. There is a great need to find ways to cross over these borders.

Armed forces have embraced the need to transform. The security sector needs to do the same. There is a much more complex environment in the aftermath of 9/11 and the security sector needs to adapt.

Security sector transformation might include different areas. Democratic governance remains key, and the rule of law and the separation of powers are still critical principles. SSR needs to be geared to accomplish two additional tasks. First, it must be able to address joint and network-centric capabilities. The security sector as a whole needs to embrace change to adopt such capabilities in order to improve cooperation. Finally, co-operability among security sector actors, joint standards, and planning processes are all needed. These must cut across organizational boundaries. Joint training and exercises are key as well.

A potential roadmap would include something along the lines of what has already been accomplished with the PfP planning and review process, which is a good example of what can be done to advance the SSR process. Clear goals need to be established, with concrete assessment criteria. An SSR survey should be conducted to identify each state's strengths and weaknesses. Additionally, a proper review mechanism needs to be established. There needs to be a clear sense of both what has been accomplished and what needs to be done. Peer review and self-assessments are both important components. Finally, an action plan for SSR is important.

Improving inter-institutional cooperation, such as between European security organizations, is important as well. SSR should not be conducted within individual states or institutions, but should work in concert with others. It is critical to have interconnected reviews conducted in concert with others rather than having them be independently accomplished.

"Implications of Enlargement for Structuring European Intelligence Cooperation," Mr. Bjorn Muller-Wille, Visiting Fellow, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Sweden

It is important to identify what challenges recent changes in the global security environment pose to the security sector and to outline core elements of a proposal on intelligence sector changes. Almost two years after September 11, new reforms are now on (or about to be put on) the agenda. The recent changes in the security environment are well known, so there is no need to dwell on them. There are new actors, a qualitative change to the threat they pose, and a fusion of threats. Borders between internal and external threats are blurred, as are borders between militaries, terrorists, proliferators, criminal enterprises, and even humanitarian threats.

The main impact of the enlargement of NATO and the EU on the intelligence sector will be that it offers new perspectives for cooperation. These new threats pose new challenges to the intelligence sector that require increased cross-border and cross-agency cooperation.

The four challenges of note include: improving detectability, making accurate assessments, allowing for a collective European response, and ensuring democratic oversight. The new threats are more difficult to detect than the more traditional ones. Terrorism is one example; it may not become visible until it materializes. However, this is also valid in other areas, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery. Those who want to import and those that want to deliver WMD are normally well known. The difficulty of detectability increases when criminal organizations are involved, and when the deliveries are no longer made exclusively to other governments or states, but to non-state actors. This can severely undermine non-proliferation agreements.

Improving detectability will require the development of new data collection methods and capabilities. This will necessitate cooperation and sharing of experiences among intelligence agencies. In some cases, the division of responsibilities among intelligence agencies must be reformed.

Cooperating and sharing intelligence is often necessary in making accurate and complete threat assessments. It can be impossible for a single intelligence agency to map out the activities of an actor and the magnitude of threat if the organization limits itself to a specific geographic or functional area. Without sharing information, different organizations are liable to have different and incomplete threat assessments.

A collective European response is important. Decision makers need to link together the various security policy responses at their disposal. At the same time, the efforts of different countries and international organizations have to be synchronized. In this context, cross-border and cross-agency intelligence cooperation is vital. Without a common threat perception and common sense of alarm, various authorities, countries, and organizations will neither be willing or able to coordinate their efforts and to effectively ensure security.

Not only is there a need to promote intelligence cooperation in order to harmonize and support the views of national authorities. International organizations may also have to establish their own intelligence support structures.

The final challenge is democratic oversight. When developing European agencies, one must determine the legal framework within which they will operate. The purpose is to hinder these agencies from bypassing restrictions placed on national intelligence agencies by national law. Data protection is one example. There must be some form of scrutiny. Oversight is important not only at the national but also at the European level.

Some of the results of the study we conducted were as follows. The dynamics of cross-agency and cross-border cooperation should be located in the EU. The reason is that the EU is the only organization that disposes of its own agencies for the exchange and production of military, imagery, criminal, and security as well as external intelligence. Admittedly, these agencies have limited capabilities, are largely dependent on national contributions, and cannot deliver the intelligence support needed. However, institutional adaptations are taking place.

Addressing the four challenges is important. Democratic oversight of the EU agencies should be located in a committee composed of European parliamentary representatives and individuals from the bodies that scrutinize national agencies. Modifications need to be made that will allow organizations to properly provide intelligence support to the EU. No new agencies at the European level are needed.

There are shortfalls in technical intelligence collection. There is also a lack of sufficient and adequate support for external intelligence. This affects general situational assessments in support of diplomatic efforts, the ability to make assessments of threats to EU field staff, and the development of a verification capability that will allow the EU to negotiate credible treaties and implement a non-proliferation policy. In order to remedy this, it is recommended that there be a considerable expansion of the fledgling Joint Situation Center, which can be described as the EU's external intelligence agency.

The next proposal is tied to networking. It advocates the establishment of an EU intelligence communications network. Such a network would facilitate cross-border and cross-agency cooperation within the EU and the national areas of responsibility. This would allow for the development of a common sense of alarm and facilitate the production of accurate assessments at the national and European levels. This could interconnect the EU's four intelligence agencies: the EU Military Staff's Intelligence Division, the Situation Center, the Satellite Center, and EUROPOL. It would also connect the Commission's digital nodes and national points of contact in each country. It could also be used nationally, and in cooperation with third parties, and would aid in the development of improved detection methods.

Detectability is the most pressing issue, and further studies should be launched immediately to further explore it. Perhaps this is a good suggestion for this working group to look into in the future as part of the Consortium.

"Transformation/Coordination of Police in the SSR Context," Colonel Dr. Jozsef Boda, Director, Ministry of Interior, Hungary

It is important to provide an overview of the transformation of the Hungarian national police, to explain the problems and to describe some of the successes. In socialist countries, the main tasks of the police forces were similar to those of other law enforcement agencies: to protect the political system and safeguard its functioning. In Hungary, the police and the state security agencies were under the control of the same ministry. Regular police work, such as the prevention of crime and maintaining public order, was secondary to the task of ensuring the security of the state.

During the transitional period, in response to criticism from the new political parties, the ruling party in Hungary developed the concept of a non-political police force. The police were no longer to receive orders from the ruling party, but instead laws were formulated to define their responsibilities and powers and the means of their supervision. Political interest was replaced by the principles of professionalism, organizational independence, and decentralization of the law enforcement agencies. All these steps were directly opposed to party control.

As soon as the preparations for free and fair elections were under way, it became evident that the coming democratic and constitutional state would not only abolish the state security network that oversaw society, but also limit the excessive powers that had been given to law enforcement agencies.

There is no doubt that following the political transition the number of crimes increased significantly in all former socialist states. Although the crime rate per 100,000 inhabitants was close to Western European averages (and still is), the citizens perceived a dramatic rise in crime. Many people lost their jobs. The secure, modest lifestyle became fraught with uncertainty.

Before the 1990 elections, the democratic parties in Hungary all agreed on the need to decentralize the police. The aim was that those police forces responsible for local public safety would work under local government supervision, while the police responsible for criminal investigation would remain under central control. There was much discussion, but the Hungarian National Police remained a centralized police force.

Transformation was designed to change the structure of the police force. Following the political changes, the reform of law enforcement agencies was high on the agenda of the new political leadership. Carrying out police reform is a difficult task, and in many cases these reforms were more superficial than fundamental. Prior to the political transition, the police system of Hungary incorporated administrative and political responsibilities, had a centralized secret police service, and a centralized, militarized uniformed police. These police forces were tasked to protect the interest of the Socialist Party. This system provided minimal civilian accountability. The secret police was accountable to the Socialist Party and the Ministry of the Interior, not to the parliament; they were under direct political control. During the mid 1980s, the law enforcement agencies were used to protect and sustain the socialist regime.

The new democratic states of Central and Eastern Europe placed a high priority on changing the police. In the early days of these new regimes, changes to both the police and penal systems were considered crucial. In Hungary, the police became the prime target of those forces advocating democratic change. The most radical changes happened in East Germany. Following reunification, all ex-GDR police officers were vetted; many of them were not reappointed, and others were demoted. Those who were reappointed were retrained, subject to a probationary period. In other former socialist countries, the changes were less radical. In Hungary, all police officers were required to swear an oath to the new republic, and those who refused were fired.

In 1991, a Swiss company, Team Consult, completed a survey on the Hungarian National Police. It determined that the Hungarian police's strong points were its relatively high crime resolution rate, high safety, and its unity. Additionally noted were the police organization's willingness to change and the presence of a reliable criminal statistical system capable of monitoring events over time. However, today it can be seen that some elements in the police at the time did not support reform, but tried to maintain existing conditions. Presenting a unified police force as an advantage obstructed all efforts to decentralize, which meant that over-centralization became a problem. Highly qualified leaders often had no interest in sweeping reforms and used their position to rein in reformers, not only to protect their own positions but because the status quo did not require new knowledge.

Among opportunities for improving the police, the Team Consult report described a number of positive social changes that could drive reorganization: the opening of borders, which made it possible to obtain knowledge about Western experiences; increased international support; the transfer of advanced techniques; the improvement of the relationship between the police and the community; and the fact that the atmosphere was right for enforcing preventive strategies. Today, we know that, in addition to its advantages, there were significant disadvantages to the opening of borders, which had helped preserve old formations.

The weak points noted were the lack of a comprehensive strategic program, unclear chains of responsibility in the police leadership, underdeveloped human resource policies, low salaries, management problems, low motivation in the ranks, poor communication, and outdated equipment and technologies. These difficulties still exist, but have shown some improvement.

Among the disadvantages facing the police, the report mentioned the increasing crime rate, worsening public security, budgetary restrictions, the lack of coordinated action, and the departure of some of the force's best officers. The foreign experts expected coordinated action from the government's public safety strategy, but even today this is lacking. As regards the brain drain, the dangers signaled in 1991 in the meantime have become a sad reality. The average age of police officers is thirty-four, and middle-aged officers with substantial experience are almost entirely absent from the force. In addition, no progress has been made concerning the most serious manifestations of organized crime: assassinations, bombings, and murders. The police have yet to develop effective crime prevention schemes involving the general public with respect to petty and medium crimes. There is no regular polling of victims of crime, which could help provide information on the number of unreported crimes.

The successes in reform highlight that the police has at its disposal all legal means necessary to pursue its activities effectively in a democratic country under the rule of law. Regulations concerning covert information-gathering comply with European norms. A law on suppressing organized crime has been passed, which provides a legal basis for witness protection, the use of covert investigators, and surveillance of vehicles. The police has retained its operational capabilities and has been able to keep crime under control. Social differences and pressure have not increased, the delicate balance in society has been successfully maintained, and a sense of public safety has made further political, social, and economic development possible.

International partnerships are constantly developing, and Hungary is a reliable partner for police forces in neighboring countries. Organizational and technical developments required by EU norms are being implemented on an ongoing basis. Additionally, Hungary is a participant in the Police and Human Rights 2000 Program and the European Police College within the framework of the Council of Europe. Hungary is also part of an initiative to create a universal code of ethics for European police forces and has initiated the Total Quality Management system in ten county police units.

The future of Hungarian law enforcement agencies can be forecast with greater certainty than has been the case in the past ten to twelve years. The perceived failures of the present-i.e. corruption scandals and outright manifestations of police brutality-have been dealt with by carrying out some personnel changes in the police leadership. Furthermore, external control institutions have been reinforced, and there are likely to be other adjustments such as "profile cleansing," demilitarization, and regionalization. In order to counterbalance inefficiency, there will be a further enlargement of the force itself, technical conditions will improve, the rigidity of legal procedures will be loosened, and there will be a controlled flow of information related to police activity. Changes that have been clearly and definitely declared have not yet achieved major levels of success. It is important to note that all efforts made by the police or the Ministry of Interior failed as soon as it turned out that the transformations involved would hurt important organizational or related professional interests.

"Lessons Learned, Practical Approaches, Standards in Border Guards," Mr. Andrus Oovel, Former Minister of Defense, Estonia

The main goal to be achieved with a modern border security system is to establish a cooperative network that enhances the national capabilities of states, improving public security in a way that ensures effective and citizen-oriented protection of borders and preserves and strengthens safety. It is important to encourage all to work hard on border security, because the current global security environment is supportive to that end.

There are four points that need to be highlighted. The first two are changes in the political and security environment. Third, there are some universal principles that should be taken into account in the creation of the development process of modern border security systems. Finally, it is important to highlight why the regional approach matters.

The political environment for border security has changed. Rather than having individual countries each looking after their own systems, and having international organizations running their own programs, we are seeing the beginning of a willingness to cooperate and work together in the field of border security. The European Commission, NATO, and OSCE have all agreed on both short-term and long-term goals in the field of border security for the western Balkans. This signaled a willingness to coordinate border activities that was previously unseen. If great powers are willing to make such an agreement for one region, there are opportunities to go further.

A common platform that acknowledges a comprehensive need for security policy and demands a clear vision leading to proper aims as well as the proper tools and means is important. All elements of border security must be taken into account, considered equally, and resources should be allocated according to real threats. Hopefully, we are seeing a new environment of international cooperation.

The security environment has changed as well. We should not speak in terms of territorial defense at present, primarily because we are confronted with new challenges. One is internal stability, caused by the marginalization of certain religious or cultural groups, the increase in relative poverty, and the weakening of the state structure, which often lead to uncontrolled movements of people and a destabilizing growth in transnational crimes. Terrorists, the traffic in humans and drugs, and weapons smuggling are only a few of these areas that need to be addressed.

One feature shared by each of these threats is that they cross borders. Ensuring the security of states and their citizens requires an effective and efficient border management system. On the one hand, increasing globalization and international integration have challenged the autonomy of states. On the other hand, states are expected to ensure the security of their citizens, because their legitimacy and integrity still depend on it. Thus, it should be the preeminent interest of states to provide an effective border security service.

At the same time, border security is increasingly an international matter, as it plays an important role in managing new security threats and fulfilling international agreements. Border security is an important means of confidence building. We can conclude that the effectiveness and smooth functioning of economic and security alliances can depend on it.

Third, based on my experience of working with countries in the western Balkans to develop their own border security systems, there is a need to take into account the issues of cultural diversity, historical traditions, and nation-specific needs. It is clear that a number of universal principles exist in border security that must be applied if an organization is to be successful.

For border security authorities in the European Union, and in states with the aim of becoming a member of this family, the challenge is to preserve cultural diversity while at the same time ensuring security. It needs to done in a way so that the dividing lines that have separated us in the past do not exist anymore. Meeting such a challenge will require clever managers who will be able to transition units patrolling the line into units capable of monitoring the situation and carrying out intelligence and investigation activities.

This makes it necessary to develop a comprehensive approach to border security that incorporates all aspects of it and treats them with equal importance. It means thinking about border security on four levels: the organization itself, its duties and control, cooperation with other national authorities, and cooperation with embassies and consulates of countries in the region.

There are four important principles for any border security apparatus: unity, independence (which also implies interdependence), professionalism, and civilian control, often under the Ministry of Justice or Interior. Unity means that all crucial elements, checkpoints, patrols, means of surveillance, vocational and specialized training, criminal investigation, and intelligence capacities are all part of a single system.

Independence means that border security is distinct from the policing system but is able to react independently by using adequate means and concentrating forces according to their needs. Independence should be accompanied by interdependence at both the international and national levels. At the international level, there should be cooperation between different national authorities working in the area, and at the national level cooperation should take place between the various agencies responsible for law and order. In order to be effective, this should all be centrally coordinated.

Due to the scale and scope of border guard activities and the need to be able to operate from countries of concern to target countries, success can only be achieved if the force is highly professional. Border guarding should be seen as a specialized area of the security sector and a distinct profession that needs specialized skills and qualifications, due to the complexity of its activities and areas of cooperation.

Finally, under the civilian authority of the Ministry of Justice or Interior, all national agencies need to come together to form the pillar of law and order. This is crucial for enabling close cooperation with partner agencies, both internally and externally.

If organizations follow these principles, the two keystones of a successful border security system-coordination and cooperation-will predominate and guarantee a degree of success.

It is important to emphasize the importance of the regional approach to border security as an addition to bilateral assistance programs. Having organized just such an approach in the western Balkan area, it is apparent that there are three crucial advantages to a regional approach. First, by bringing practitioners of border security together and encouraging a frank and open exchange of experiences, it is possible for clear ideas to emerge, to the extent that certain principles can be seen as cornerstones for success.

Second, the regional approach encourages transparency and self-development. On the one hand, each participant is expected to share information while, on the other hand, knowledge about what one's neighbors are doing has a motivating effect and encourages healthy competition. Bringing practitioners together forges close working relationships characterized by trust and build international cooperation.

We should keep in mind that development is never complete. There needs to be a continuous evaluation and assessment of the chosen path so as to be able to accommodate new situations. Flexibility is a key component to success. In this regard, comprehensive fundamental ideas and independent initiatives are crucial factors in any creation and transformation process. Similarly important is the need to gain support from partners both inside and outside of countries.

Third, the regional approach lets us dream about a possible future model of common European border guards, providing security for citizens, openly and honestly. This model should contain elements such as a border security service that provides for the security of citizens, mutual acceptance characterizing teamwork, and the promotion of accountability at all levels where information is properly analyzed and distributed. Within the model, training for and on the job is seen as an investment, while engagement and performance gain further acknowledgment and support on the job.

"Role of Parliamentarian Bodies in the SSR Framework," Dr. Velizar Shalamanov, Former Deputy Defense Minister, Bulgaria
(Report written by Mrs. Nadezhda Mihaylova, Chairperson of UDF; Bulgarian Leader of the UDF Parliamentary Group, former Minister of Foreign Affairs)

There are challenges and responses in the project of security sector reform that are central to the parliamentary role. First, there is a priority-driven revamping of parliamentary commissions dealing with security and defense and foreign affairs aimed at developing an integrated approach to changes in the security environment and its response. The security sector needs to be able to deal with these issues.

Because this is a very large area, we believe there will be a step-by-step process dealing with key elements of security sector reform connected with modernization, professionalization, resource management, and oversight of security services. The second challenge is building a capable expert community of staffers to support the parliamentary commissions, especially in new democracies. The stability of the parliaments is dependent on the expertise of the staffers. Next is the introduction of regular cooperation mechanisms and links between relevant parliamentary commissions and the academic and NGO community. This is another source of stability and long-term experience in parliamentary oversight. We believe that the development of internal expertise in political parties, especially those represented in the parliament, is a key issue that should put SSR high on the priority list.

A long-term challenge is the development of a culture of transparency, accountability, and responsibility, as well as developing ways to ensure the greater role of civil society in the development of the security sector.

There are three elements that are not so easy to resolve in the current environment. The first concerns the development of relations with the business community in the area of security, touching on the involvement of the defense industry in SSR and involving both national and international companies and organizations. The second serious challenge is to find the best measures to reduce the presence and influence within the reformed security sector of the members of the former communist security services and old-guard representatives of the defense and security establishment, and to do so in the most democratic and transparent way while not repeating earlier mistakes, such as those made after the Second World War.

Lastly, there is a need to develop a new vision of an integrated security sector that provides integral security to all citizens and develops a new perception of security and justice in the country and the region. Integrating the Ministries of Defense, Interior, Justice, the security services, civil protection agencies, and other bodies in order to operate better is important.

An effort was made to analyze the phases and timing of this process of transformation in Bulgaria, along with the role of the decisions and other steps taken by the parliament to effect this transformation, and the main mechanisms of interaction with the executive and judiciary branches of power, civil society, and the media. Issues connected with cooperation, especially with civil society, business, and foreign international institutions, are important to identify what has already been done by the parliament to restructure the security sector.

There have been six periods in this process in Bulgaria since 1990. The earliest period was one of subtle reformism, which was highlighted by a lack of vision, will, and implementation capacity in the areas of defense, secret service, and police reform. There was a short period when democratic forces were in power, but only the first steps toward reform were taken by introducing civilian ministers of defense and interior, as well as initial steps to control these institutions through the budget.

The second period was 1997-1998, when steps were taken to have more parliamentarian involvement in SSR. During this period, Bulgaria officially applied for NATO membership. A special interagency committee was established under the control of the parliament to implement the decision. The first national security council was developed and approved by the parliament. Practically, this was the real beginning of the SSR process that would help Bulgaria to become a member of NATO and the European Union. The third period came in 1999, when an initial effort at profound defense reform took place with approval by the parliament, after great public discussion and the development of a national military doctrine.

First-phase implementation of these plans for reform, including a membership action plan, took place in 2002 and, as a result, Bulgaria received an invitation to join NATO. In 2003-2004, the most important task will be to complete these reforms. During 2004-2008, we expect to have full integration into NATO as well as the EU.

There are some shortcomings that must still be addressed by parliament. First, a comprehensive legislative framework must be developed. Some necessary laws are still missing. For example, a law on special services and emergency crisis management is incomplete. Practically, special services are distributed; national intelligence and protection services are under the authority of the president, and out of parliamentary control. National security services and national counterintelligence are in the Ministry of Interior with many other special services, while military intelligence and counterintelligence reside in the Ministry of Defense. There is no legislatively mandated coordination among these bodies.

Next, we believe that existing laws are too complex, with too many amendments. Practically speaking, it is very difficult to implement laws with so many amendments, and there are many contradictions within the laws relating to defense and the interior. The Ministry of Interior is no longer considered as part of the armed forces, as it was previously in 1991.

At the next level, amendments were made to laws for purely political and personal reasons. There is a need to rethink the framework and to have a comprehensive legislative framework to properly structure security sector management and civilian and parliamentary oversight of the security sector.

A short list exists of the main laws that were developed during the transition that set up SSR in Bulgaria. We must start with the constitutional special national security consultative council. There are multiple laws related to the interior, defense, and security that have since been passed. Many are not public but remain classified, which makes it harder to gain public support.

Another dimension is connected with conceptual political documents. We are proud that, in 1998, the national security concept was approved, as was a new military doctrine in 1999. This gave Bulgaria the opportunity to react properly in the early stages of the Kosovo crisis, as well as subsequently in Serbia, Macedonia, and Iraq. Because such a system was established, coordination among the various security sector elements was much improved. This was also established under the security concept of annual reports. Debate in parliament and society was based on actual achievements, and problems in the national security field were handled on an annual basis.

Another dimension important for parliamentary involvement is the ratification of international agreements. For Bulgaria, agreements related to Eastern European brigades were debated in the parliament, debates that proved important to understanding and enlarging regional cooperation in the military and security area. Another important agreement was that with NATO to use Bulgarian airspace and territory during the Kosovo operation. Debate around this agreement was a key turning point in Bulgarian practical support for membership in NATO. We now have a well-established practice of ratifying international agreements.

The most challenging issue will be the ratification of the NATO accession treaty, and in the Bulgarian parliament this occasion will be used to debate Bulgarian responsibilities and contributions to the Alliance in the areas of collective defense, out of area operations, and military presence on Bulgarian territory (i.e., the use of Bulgarian bases for NATO or U.S. troops, training ranges, etc.). It is important for this debate to take place, not only among the nineteen NATO countries' parliaments, but in the Bulgarian parliament as well. This will be used as a boost to improving parliamentary oversight, because many decisions will be made in this compressed period of time.

A very important dimension of the parliamentary role is relations with other elements of the political environment, particularly those with the business community. The Business Leaders for National Security organization was established in order to organize communications with the business community. When it comes to civil society, a security sector reform coalition has been established in Bulgaria containing more than ten NGOs and academic institutions. They developed a charter for relations with parliament in areas relating to the security sector; the coalition reports every four months about the problems of SSR, publishes a monthly newsletter of SSR progress, and has initiated a NATO integration program.

The special role of center-right parliamentarians is also apparent. We want to stress the measures for dignified NATO membership that were developed in the beginning of January 2003, which is the political framework for the security sector reform action plan.

In conclusion, there are some important elements that need to be mentioned. First, Bulgaria has started a strategic defense review that will be completed next year and is designed in part to include an SSR action plan. Parliament will be a very important player in this review.

The Union of Democratic Forces is working very seriously to build this community on strategic matters in the country and in the larger PfP space. Of course, in order to do this with NGOs and academic institutions, intensive work must be undertaken, as well as efforts to tie it into the larger regional framework.

The SSR coalition is a knowledge-based and network-centric approach that can make a difference in the security sector. Having the strategic partnership between civil society and parliament is important because the latter is central to ensuring deep involvement of the political leadership in SSR.

Finally, after a successful period of reform, now is the time for Bulgaria to contribute to the efforts of other countries that are pursuing SSR. This is why we believe the movement of the headquarters to Constance will increase its utility as a regional center for SSR training and effective use of modern information technologies, and as a field agency to extend these efforts to the countries in the Black Sea area. It can be used as a tool to integrate regional efforts in security sector reform.

 

Parallel Panel 4: Asymmetric Threats

Moderator: Colonel Russell D. Howard, United States Military Academy, West Point

Topics/Speakers:
"Al-Qaeda Changes Shape Again," Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore
"Russian Peacekeeping Operations and International Terrorism," Dr. Anatoly Sudoplatov, Department of Economics, Moscow State University
"New Terrorism—The British Police Response," Mr. Keith Weston, Detective Superintendent, New Scotland Yard; Director, Police International Counterterrorism Unit, UK
Mr. Graham Ashton, Chief Investigator, Bali Bombing; Assistant Commissioner, Australian Federal Police

Introduction

Colonel Russell Howard introduced the topic and each member of the panel. The panel on asymmetric threats was sponsored by the Combating Terrorism Working Group of the PfP to examine those methods and policies that combat terrorism, extremism, and organized crime.

"Al-Qaeda Changes Shape Again," Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Associate Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Singapore

Dr. Gunaratna outlined the international, networked structure of al-Qaeda and how recent efforts in the war on terrorism have forced al-Qaeda to change its operations. He then focused on three areas of the changing face of the al-Qaeda organization. First was the group's changing organizational structure, second was its changing geographic scope, and, third, the changing operational methods of al-Qaeda.

Al-Qaeda was created in March 1988. The U.S. government did not pay attention until August 1998. For ten years, al-Qaeda grew in size, strength, and influence. Al-Qaeda was initially located in Pakistan, then in Afghanistan, moving in December 1991 to Khartoum, Sudan, and then back in Afghanistan in 1996. Since U.S. military action began in Afghanistan in October 2001, al-Qaeda has been decentralizing very rapidly.

Al-Qaeda has four components. First is the core leadership. Second is its nature as a global terrorist network; in the past eighteen months, 3100 members of al-Qaeda have been arrested in 102 countries, demonstrating that it is truly a global, multinational group with diverse capabilities. The third component is the strategic reserve, called the 055 Brigade. This structure was destroyed by the American-led coalition in Afghanistan. This organization primarily fought against the Northern Alliance, and al-Qaeda recruited among the membership of the 055 Brigade to strengthen its global terrorist network. The fourth component is still very much intact, and is the center of gravity of al-Qaeda-the associated groups. These are groups from the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Europe that al-Qaeda trained throughout the 1990s, largely in Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a terrorist Disneyland. It was a place where the international community looked the other way while al-Qaeda trained these groups in terrorism and guerilla warfare from 1989 to October 2001. These associated groups include: the Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines; the Jemaah-Islamiya in South Asia; the Abyan Islamic Army in Yemen; the Islamic Group of Egypt; the Egyptian Islamic Jihad; the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, or GSPC, in Algeria, Europe, the U.S. and UK; and the Chechen group called al-Ansar Mujahideen.

Moving away from the structure of al-Qaeda, the modus operandi of al-Qaeda is to conduct terrorist attacks in waves. We have witnessed about a dozen wave attacks. These are illustrated by recent operations mounted on May 12, 14, and 16 of 2003: May 12 in Chechnya and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia; on May 14 in Chechnya; and on May 16 in Casablanca. The attacks in Chechnya were conducted by al-Ansar Mujahideen, in Riyadh by al-Qaeda proper, and the attack in Casablanca by an associated group, called al-Sirat al-Mustaqeem. These attacks indicated that al-Qaeda has seriously suffered, but that it is still able to reorganize itself and coordinate operations with its associate organizations. A second spate of wave attacks occurred in October 2002. Osama bin Laden appeared on audio broadcast on Al-Jazeera on October 8. We then witnessed attacks on October 8, 10, and 12, including an attack on the French oil supertanker Lindbergh off the coast of Yemen, the killing of two U.S. service personnel in Kuwait, and the Bali bombing on October 12, where 202 Indonesians and foreigners (mostly Australians) were killed.

For maximum effect, al-Qaeda coordinates its operations. The specialty of these worldwide operations is suicide bombings, learned from Hezbollah, which was the strongest terrorist group before the emergence of al-Qaeda on the international stage. It was Hezbollah that pioneered the concept of coordinated suicide attacks. For instance, in 1983, Hezbollah attacked the French paratrooper headquarters and the U.S. Marine barracks in Lebanon. The Italian headquarters were also targeted, but because the Italians were living in tents, it was not possible to attack them using suicide bombers. Al-Qaeda copied the idea of coordinated suicide attacks after a meeting in Sudan between Osama bin Laden and the Special Security Apparatus of Hezbollah that masterminded the 1983 attacks. There were other instances of cooperation between Hezbollah and al-Qaeda while al-Qaeda was based in Khartoum, and that cooperation reemerged after U.S. intervention in Iraq, making a U.S.-supported regime the immediate neighbor of Iran (the government that has provided assistance to Hezbollah).

Turning to the structure of al-Qaeda and how it is responding to the new threat to its existence, al-Qaeda has lost about fifty percent of its leadership since October 2001, and significant losses have occurred in Pakistan. As a result, today al-Qaeda cannot mount spectacular operations on the scale of 9/11, especially in Western Europe and North America. Their ability to conduct long-term planning, to rely on a stable environment, and to have a constant resource flow has been disrupted.

There are three reasons why al-Qaeda cannot mount a large-scale attack in the U.S., Canada, Western Europe, Australia, or New Zealand. The first factor is heightened public awareness or vigilance. Second is an unprecedented level of law enforcement and intelligence cooperation, including cooperation among law enforcement agencies, intelligence communities, and cooperation between these types of groups. Due to the fact that al-Qaeda has been aggressively hunted, and continues to be hunted, it has become very difficult for this group to mount operations in Western countries.

This group still retains the capability to mount attacks in the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, the horn of Africa, and Southeast Asia. In these regions, we see areas of lawlessness and instances where al-Qaeda is cooperating with regional organizations. These are the principal reasons why al-Qaeda remains a strong and significant force.

In conclusion, it is important to understand why al-Qaeda attacked the United States. The United States was attacked because al-Qaeda takes credit for having sparked the devolution of the Soviet Union and its loss of superpower status. Al-Qaeda wishes to do the same to the United States, showing the Islamist movements that the United States can also be attacked and destroyed. That is why al-Qaeda attacked American landmarks, because behind every al-Qaeda attack there is an important message of instigation and inspiration to the other Islamist movements al-Qaeda presents itself as spearheading. Al-Qaeda places greater value on attacking symbolic, high prestige, or strategically significant targets rather than conducting large numbers of smaller attacks. That is how al-Qaeda sees itself moving the Islamist revolution forward.

"Russian Peacekeeping Operations and International Terrorism," Dr. Anatoly Sudoplotov, Moscow State University

Dr. Sudoplotov discussed the Russian experience in fighting extremism, drawing conclusions about the changing nature of war over the last several decades and the need for international efforts to build stable, law-abiding states in the effort to fight extremism at its root. He highlighted several of the lessons of the Russian experience in fighting extremists and conducting peacekeeping.

The nature of contemporary wars has changed significantly in that the vast majority of casualties are civilians, especially compared to wars of the 1960s through the 1980s. Additionally, these low-intensity conflicts tend to continue for longer periods, with an eight-year average for wars in the 1990s. In the wars of the last ten years, extremists have deliberately targeted civilians in actions such as hostage taking, choosing mass casualty targets, and arousing civilian sympathizers who may not necessarily adhere to the terrorist group's core ideology. Some of this unrest can be traced to areas of the world suffering from political upheaval, areas of extreme poverty, and areas characterized by the reproduction of archaic social relations. These regions create a long-term basis for extremism and an environment conducive to intra-political conflicts. This means that the community that would fight terrorism needs to realize that this undertaking will necessarily be done over the long haul to be effective.

Russia has found itself involved in peacekeeping actions by virtue of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Not only has Russia been presented with many new, occasionally unstable states on its borders, but Russia has also assumed a role in conducting peacekeeping operations on the exterior borders of these newly formed nations. Russian armed forces are now stationed around the periphery of the former Soviet Union and they have assumed the role of peacekeeping operations. Initially, the Russian authorities did not set specific assignments for those who were in charge of military commands. Therefore there was a spontaneous reaction in some situations, where we witnessed the evolution of informal relations between the leaders of the Russian military command and the leaders of national or ethnic groups. It was only in 1994 that Russia reached agreements with some of the governments of the former Soviet republics who became independent states for procedures for conducting peacekeeping operations.

Peacekeeping operations have met with some success, but certain problems also exist. It is quite obvious that, for instance, in the Caucasus, situations have arisen where events were not under the control of either the authorities in Moscow or national authorities at a more local level. The result of this has been a breeding ground of criminal and political extremism. The most extreme example is Chechnya, which has become a hotbed for international terrorism. In this connection, the following two substantial factors come into play. First, the existence of a power vacuum creates a number of contributing factors including rapidly decreasing standards of living, the inability to maintain basic services, and the growth of extremist nationalist sentiment that ultimately leads to armed confrontation.

These armed conflicts have been typically commando, or guerilla, warfare. This shifted the center of gravity toward involving civilian sympathizers. Using this example, we can say that the asymmetric threat is rooted in the fact that in contemporary wars ninety percent of the casualties are civilians. This is a significant shift from wars of the 1960s and 1970s.

That is why there is a question as to how to assess various forms of asymmetric war. The challenges of fighting al-Qaeda, and how it has changed in form and content, are especially important in this regard. It is in the territories of Afghanistan and Chechnya where it is important to gain the attention of the international community.

In acknowledging the truth regarding the end of the Cold War, the result has been that the superpowers have done little to make sure that terrorist forces do not have the capability to mount a dangerous, extremist military wing. Terrorists in these regions will take innocent people hostage and conduct military operations outside the territory that is under their control.

A recent publication concerning the history of secret forces in the USSR and the U.S. revealed that those countries prepared for the Cold War by setting up specialized forces for guerilla warfare in particular areas, including Latin America and Africa. Of course, both the Soviet and American sides have played a major role in special operations to liquidate hotbeds of guerilla warfare in Latin America and Africa. Task forces were developed for the training and conduct of warfare in the territory of the enemy, but the concept of specialized peacekeeping forces was never considered by either side until the breakup of the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, when the Caucasus conflicts started, as well as conflict in Central Asia, Russian internal military forces were used simply to keep public order.

The events in Afghanistan forced the USSR to set up a special task force in 1991 to deal with extremist groups there, mainly conducting an anti-guerilla operation. The lessons of that tragedy for today are relevant given the huge task of disbanding the Taliban. First, there are a number of zones that are still under the total control of illegal military structures. Then there are zones that are partially under such control, and finally those zones that are under the control of legal military forces, with sporadic terrorist activity in those areas. This is a very important thing, because the military phase is complete in Afghanistan, and the international community needs to focus on building civil structures and conducting military peacekeeping missions.

These methods of operation are outlined in great specificity in documents from the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, captured in coalition actions there since winter 2001. Given that those documents are very detailed, they are worth mentioning here.

The main structural components of the military units are similar to those of terrorist groups. There are nine units broken down here by type:

• Reconnaissance

• Rapid reaction force (also in charge of taking hostages)

• Diversion

• Military training

• Procurement

• Headquarters

• Medical

• Propaganda

• Financing/fundraising

Social transformation is the best means to stop the spread and appeal of terrorist groups, but in the meantime immediate tasks must be faced. These include isolating terrorist groups from the local population and conducting reconnaissance of military groups still in existence to make sure they do not constantly disrupt order. The international community needs to ensure it has the means to constantly monitor all terrorist movements, it needs to foster cooperation among special services to properly disrupt terrorists from the inside, and it must ensure that it has the necessary legal structures to conduct surveillance. Two major tasks exist: to develop a social democratic government to disrupt activities of extremist groups and to focus on international cooperation. Where those two lines intersect is not very clear at the time being. A hotline for information exchange may be necessary; such a hotline will help ensure a common effort to counteract terrorist actions.

We have only just started on this endeavor, while the terrorists have been formulating their methods for some time. This shows the continued need for international cooperation in four major areas. First is to use the enemy's mistakes, and, secondly, to understand how they operate. We need to analyze our own vulnerability to terrorist attacks. We need to pool scientific groups to implement an internationally unified methodology in our fight against terrorism. Also it is necessary to focus more on current peacekeeping missions under the UN mandate, in harmony with the need to fight terrorism.

"New Terrorism—The British Police Response," Mr. Keith Weston, New Scotland Yard, Police Counterterrorism Unit

Mr. Weston discussed international and domestic efforts in the United Kingdom to fight the new breed of global terrorism, including intelligence sharing, law enforcement activities, consequence management preparation, and community outreach. He outlined a number of areas in which the United Kingdom has directed its efforts, as well as successes and challenges for the UK in both the international and domestic arenas in the current global war on terrorism.

Based largely on London's experiences fighting the Irish Republican Army, the UK realizes that the current global terrorist threat must be dealt with in a different manner. IRA attackers who would call the London police before a bomb exploded and then issue a public apology for any unintended civilian casualties were gentleman terrorists when compared to today's threat. Nowadays, with terrorists' changed methods and their specific targeting of civilians, comes the realization that terrorism can no longer be treated simply as a criminal matter.

The UK's efforts focus on preventative measures, preparation for attack and consequence management, broadening intelligence and police information sharing, and community efforts. While Britain remains open to receiving immigrants and those seeking a safe haven from persecution, the UK does not want to be viewed as harboring terrorists. To this end, the UK has enacted new laws and strengthened others. Most significant is a detention policy that allows law enforcement to hold persons suspected of terrorist activity in prison until a nation willing to take responsibility for a person comes forward. The UK now has persons in detention, and no states coming forward on behalf of those persons.

A series of laws strengthening police activities now allows law enforcement to target specific individuals, neighborhoods, or sectors, as intelligence dictates. This intrusion is balanced by efforts to reach out to communities in meaningful ways. Such efforts have included partnering with moderate leaders in Islamic communities and increased explanation of government activities. The constant message is that the terrorists are the enemy, not Islam.

Likewise, Britain has been able to coordinate with international intelligence agencies in ways that are helpful to all those fighting terrorism. This is the most open Britain has ever been regarding its intelligence assets. However, there are still real issues to overcome.

Domestically, Britain still struggles to coordinate among agencies. Information does not flow across agencies very well. There are other areas that need attention as well. Gaps, or areas where we lack knowledge or expertise, are the first thing to be identified. First is the need for greater understanding of the enduring nature of the threat. Second is the need for understanding the scale of possible harm, for example the incident in Bali. There is a gap in the breadth of the debate, and a question whether all necessary agencies are involved in preparedness exercises regarding consequence management. Understanding the scale and type of incident many include agencies other than the more obvious police, fire, and medical responses. Examining other incidents is helpful, especially in planning for WMD incidents (e.g., the sarin gas attack in Tokyo in 1995, which was a relatively small incident). Finally, there is a need to examine suicide terrorism and the transport of hazardous materials.

Opportunities to address these gaps include continued cooperation among many participants, such as developing and exercising consequence management agencies to test preparedness, from tabletop to exercises out in the street, or harnessing the energies of business, commerce, and security organizations in a coordinated endeavor in support of the national security strategy. The new work includes forging deeper partnerships with unlikely counterterrorist actors, working toward a better public-private alliance, and understanding that the scale of the threat means that no one actor has all the answers.

Britain's current concerns include the management of complacency (from members of the public to members of Parliament), engendering greater public understanding of the range of dangers, and sustaining inclusive teamwork between everyone involved.

Successful prevention and preparation measures, including domestic legislation allowing law enforcement to detain suspected individuals, community programs to increase police visibility, and a menu of choices to increase domestic security and intelligence operations in national, local, or specific geographic areas as deemed necessary, are all important tasks in this regard. Finally, advisory groups help emphasize to local communities that the war on terrorism is not a religious war, but a fight against the most radical elements in our community.

Challenges the UK continues to face include the trend toward continued complacency in both the public and the government, the need to continue to prepare and train for chemical, radiological, biological, or nuclear attacks, and continued compartmentalization of both intelligence and planning. This is not just a military or law enforcement issue, but one that affects all areas of government and society, both domestically and at the international level.

Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, for Mr. Graham Ashton

Dr. Gunaratna presented the findings of the Bali bombing investigation, providing a detailed analysis of how the bombings were executed, and the role of al-Qaeda in the incident. He presented the findings of the investigation on behalf of Mr. Ashton, the incident's chief investigator.

The Bali nightclub bombing on 12 October 2002 was the single worst act of terrorism since 9/11, killing 202 people. It was conducted by an associated group of al-Qaeda called Jemaah-Islamiya. It is currently a very active terrorist group, with about 400 members. Many of its members were trained in Afghanistan by al-Qaeda, or in the Philippines in camps called Mindenau. This organization staged an attack in the tourist area of Bali. It was a coordinated attack on two soft-target locations, after several other planned attacks in Southeast Asia were disrupted. Jemaah-Islamiya originally planned on attacking the U.S. and Israeli embassies in Manila, and later U.S., Australian, British, and Israeli diplomatic targets in Singapore. When those operations failed, they decided to attack soft targets in Bali.

British, American, and Australian investigators assisted the Indonesian authorities in the investigation. One of their first actions was to cordon the site, as the Indonesian authorities did not do much to protect the area or the important evidence that was contained there.

The Bali bombing was actually two nearly simultaneous attacks on a pair of bars in Bali, located almost directly across the street from each other. The first attack, on the Sari Club, was the detonation of a car bomb packed with potassium chlorate, purchased by the terrorist group in a port city, Surabia.

The van that transported the device that destroyed the Sari Club was completely destroyed-only the burned-out metal hulk of the vehicle remained, parked directly in front of the building. Between the extremely hot fire and the explosion itself, the building was almost completely flattened.

The second attack was on Paddy's Pub, approximately opposite the Sari Club. It was carried out by a suicide bomber wearing a backpack full of explosives and small shards of metal designed to become shrapnel when the bomb detonated. The ensuing explosion damaged or destroyed the majority of the building, leaving portions of two walls of the external structure intact.

While the two attacks in Bali were carried out by a local organization, it was part of a larger wave of attacks carried out over several days in mid-October 2002. Al-Qaeda proper carried out only one of the attacks, but financed the Bali bombings with US$ 70,000, which included payment for the locally purchased potassium nitrate.

In this case, as in previous incidents, Osama bin Laden signaled the pending attacks with a communiqué to his followers on October 8. He addressed the American people, saying that the U.S. had an impoverished culture and must embrace Islam. In a tape broadcast on the Al-Jazeera network, bin Laden issued veiled threats and rallied listeners to continue to fight the infidels. Such communications have usually preceded a major attack. Bin Laden continues to speak publicly before such attacks; in doing so he links himself to the Prophet Muhammad, who issued rallying pronouncements prior to attacking his enemies. This warning to the enemy provides Koranic justifications for the attacks. This intent was verified by members of al-Qaeda currently in custody. Al-Qaeda continues to misinterpret and misrepresent Islam's holy texts for its own purposes.

Before the attacks in Bali, the Indonesian government was reluctant to admit that Jemaah-Islamiya and al-Qaeda had a presence in Indonesia. Singapore and Malaysia targeted these organizations in their countries, but the Indonesians remained in denial until 202 lives were lost. The most important lesson we must learn is that, when there is a problem, we must deal with the problem very effectively. If we do not, we will suffer. Preparation is the best form of defense. If the Indonesians had taken to heart the warnings given by Singapore, Malaysia, and the Philippines that there was a strong terrorist network in the region, this attack would not have happened. Today, the Jemaah-Islamiya cells connected to the bombings have been disrupted, but the leadership of these attacks is still alive. Dr. Azahari manufactured the device. In Southeast Asia, we are likely to face additional attacks. Fortunately, Thailand has started taking steps to deal with the terrorist network, and in cooperation with U.S. Customs was able to arrest a Jemaah-Islamiya member who was trying to procure radiological material (CCM137). Even Jemaah-Islamiya is making progress toward obtaining WMD, a significant threat in the West and Southeast Asia.

The Bali bombing case illustrates al-Qaeda's continued ability to launch terrorist attacks, even if it is through subsidiary Islamist terrorist organizations. Regional and territorial groups are becoming a greater threat in the short run as they partner with al-Qaeda. A classic example is the Bali attack. It is the network of networks we will have to fight in the next few years.

Panel Summary

Overall, the panel presentations and discussion enlightened listeners and continued to emphasize the importance of both understanding the threat and sharing the best means to fight global terrorism. Each presenter's remarks focused on particular aspects of the fight, from understanding the terrorists' organizational structure and methods of operation to efforts to defend against future attacks wherever they may occur. The working group will continue to study the problem of asymmetric threats and share tactics and techniques for both offensive and defensive efforts against extremist organizations throughout the world. Members of the audience were encouraged to consider contributing to the working group on a continuing basis.