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Israel's New Government
The Royal Institution of International Affairs
At the end of May 1996, with a slender margin of only 30,000 (less than one percent of the Israeli vote but with a clear majority of 11 per cent of the Jewish votes cast), Binyamin (Bibi) Netanyahu defeated Shimon Peres, becoming Israel's first directly elected prime minister. Once again, and for the fifth time in his political career, Shimon Peres failed to receive the support of the Israeli public and the election results illustrated clearly the already well-known fact that Israeli society was deeply divided over the future of the peace process. Few would have predicted, though, that it was split so evenly down the middle.
Netanyahu's victory marks a remarkable political comeback and a dramatic reversal of personal fortunes. In the opinion polls at the turn of the year, Shimon Peres held what appeared to be an unassailable lead of 30 per cent over him. The assassination of Yitzhak Rabin at the beginning of November 1995 resulted in a spontaneous outpouring of national grief and in an unprecedented level of public support for his policies and peace accords with the Palestinians. Publicly castigated for helping foster the political atmosphere that had led to Rabin's death, Netanyahu's political standing plummeted and, for all his charismatic qualities, he appeared to be Likud's biggest electoral liability.
By the beginning of May, however, Netanyahu had begun to claw back his popularity, helped in no small part by the wave of Hamas suicide bombings in February-March which had shattered the confidence of many Israelis in the peace process. By the end of the election campaign the two prime ministerial candidates were running neck and neck, though most commentators, perhaps more on the basis of hope than fact, felt that Peres would just scrape home. Indeed, on the night of 29 May early indicators from exit polls and first returns pointed to a slim victory for Peres. One half of the country heaved a collective sigh of relief, a sentiment which echoed around the capitals of the world. Analysts hastened to put their finishing touches to Netanyahu's political obituaries which they had begun to pen six months earlier, while Labour politicians started to talk confidently about their plans for the next four years. However, as votes were counted throughout the night, victory slipped through the fingers of Shimon Peres and as morning broke, Israel awoke to a new prime minister and a new reality. Those who only hours earlier had looked on in dejection were now jubilant at this dramatic twist of events. The rest of Israeli society was left to contemplate its worst fears and the prospect of a new government dominated by hardliners and religious parties.
Netanyahu's victory
Netanyahu's victory was the result of a brilliantly orchestrated electoral strategy. The tactic was simple yet remarkably effective: to play on Israeli fears and insecurities about the peace process with the Palestinians, and to exploit the public's long-standing doubts and lack of confidence in Peres as leader of the nation. Netanyahu's campaign focused on the lack of security the Oslo accords had brought to Israel, promising that he would offer Ôpeace with security', the elixir that all Israelis crave, although he was less specific on how he would bring this about. He also portrayed Peres as a leader lacking in caution who was prepared to sacrifice everything, including Jerusalem, for the sake of peace. The message was hammered home repeatedly and consistently throughout the campaign. Accused of lacking policies of his own or of possessing a viable alternative to the peace process, Netanyahu simply hijacked the centre ground and campaign agenda.
But this was an election which Peres lost as much as Netanyahu won. Labour's campaign was unconvincing, sending out a set of confusing signals to the Israeli public. Its tactics fell between two stools, consisting of neither positive nor negative campaigning. Confident in the certitude of victory, its campaign team was poorly organized and suffering from a complacency which bordered, at times, on arrogance. At the same time, Peres and Labour appeared reluctant, if not frightened, of presenting their message and their vision of the future to the public. Seemingly scared of alienating the wavering voter, they chose to keep the election campaign as dull as possible. Prior to the campaign many believed that Labour would evoke the image and legacy of Yitzhak Rabin. Yet the party's most potent asset, even in death, was conspicuous only by its absence. At no point did Labour confront Netanyahu and Likud directly, forcing them to spell out their policies. The contrast between the two campaigns came most sharply into focus during the television debate between the two candidates, now seen as the final death-knell for Peres. Looking tired, apprehensive and clearly under-prepared, Peres cut a hesitant figure while Netanyahu exuded confidence and conviction.
Before the reality of defeat had time to be fully absorbed, a quick hunt for scapegoats was under way, with party leaders and activists hastening to exchange recriminations. This quick-fire swapping of accusations had little to do with any level-headed analysis of Labour's political demise, however, but marked rather the first shots in the impending battle between Ehud Barak, the popular former Chief of Staff, and Haim Ramon, who had headed Labour's campaign team, for the future leadership of the party. But neither a simple change of leader nor awaiting the failings of a Netanyahu government will suffice if Labour is to regain political power. Labour's downfall represents more than just a vote of no confidence in Shimon Peres's leadership. Nor can the blame be placed solely on a poor campaign strategy. Many sectors of Israeli society, most notably the religious communities - the traditional Sephardi as well as the ultra-Orthodox - remain alienated by Labour's socioeconomic policies and the elitist image conveyed by the party's leadership. Labour returned to power in 1992 on the coat tails of Yitzhak Rabin's popularity, papering over the need to deepen the process of internal party reforms and broaden the base of its public support. The redefining of the party's role in Israeli society, the building of a coherent social ideology and orientation and the forging of new coalitions, a process long overdue but assiduously avoided, are vital if Labour is not to be banished to the political wilderness. How, and whether, it will meet this challenge is uncertain. And, if past experience is any indicator, the party's energies are more likely to be consumed by personal rivalries to fill the political vacuum once Shimon Peres steps down.
While all Israeli elections are dubbed as being the most critical in the country's short history, the 1996 election was unique on two counts. For the first time Israelis cast two votes: one for the direct election of the prime minister; and the other for the party of their choice in the Knesset, the 120-seat parliament. This had an immense impact on the nature of the election campaign and on the voting patterns of the Israeli public. Second, the election was held in the midst of the peace process and, as such, the public would be trusting a leader to continue and bring to a successful completion the ongoing negotiations with the Palestinians and Syria. In this respect, the Israeli electorate was presented with a clear choice between two leaders with sharply differing views and conceptions of the outcome of these negotiations, and of Israel's future relations with its Arab neighbours.
One of the purported aims of the new electoral system was to reduce the political clout of the smaller parties and weaken their leverage over the political system. Paradoxically, it had the opposite effect. It has enhanced rather than diminished their size and influence. In order to become prime minister, both Netanyahu and Peres needed to cultivate the support of the various constituencies within Israeli society prior to the elections to be assured of their support on election day. It was here that Netanyahu prospered at Peres's expense. As an initial step, Netanyahu, with the considerable efforts of Ariel (Arik) Sharon - a debt that he has been slow to repay - persuaded David Levy (who had broken away from the Likud to form his own movement), and Rafael (Raful) Eitan, the leader of Tsomet, to drop out of the race for the premiership, thus allowing him to become the sole candidate of the Israeli right. Netanyahu paid a heavy price in return for their support, offering them a third of the secure seats on the Likud list and promises of senior cabinet portfolios. It was a deal that may yet come to haunt him.
With Peres assured of the Arab vote, though not of its size, Netanyahu was aware that he required the unreserved endorsement of the religious and Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) parties if he were to win the election. The National Religious Party immediately swung behind Netanyahu, although the ultra-Orthodox parties were more cautious in passing judgment. Throughout the campaign both Netanyahu and Peres zealously courted the spiritual leaders of the ultra-Orthodox communities in the hope of receiving their blessing. Eventually, only days before the election, Agudat Yisrael's Council of Torah Sages called on its followers to vote for the candidate Ôwhose party [would be] more likely to work in the spirit of religion and Jewish tradition'. The wording was ambiguous, but had only one interpretation - Netanyahu. This announcement came shortly after Rabbi Eliezer Schach, the nonagenarian spiritual mentor and erstwhile leader of the Lithuanian Haredi community, had put his full weight behind Netanyahu. Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, the spiritual leader of Shas, the ultra-Orthodox party which represents the Sephardi Jews of Asian and North African origin, refrained from endorsing either candidate. But the sympathies of the followers of Shas have always been with Likud. Netanyahu also received a priceless photo-opportunity and the blessing of Rabbi Yitzhak Kedourie, the ageing mystic and Kabbalist sage.
The total mobilization and blanket support of the ultra-Orthodox camp for a secular politician, let alone one thrice married and who had publicly confessed to the sin of adultery, was not only unprecedented in Israeli politics but also instrumental in bringing Netanyahu to power. One reason was their shared hardline views on the peace process. But equally important, if not more so, was the intense loathing by the Haredi community of Meretz, the overtly anti-religious and stridently secular, junior partner in the previous government, and their resentment of Labour's willingness to accommodate those positions.
The new Knesset
Although most opinion polls were remarkably accurate in forecasting the narrow margin in the prime ministerial contest, none came close in foreseeing the composition of the new Knesset. After the 1992 election, political analysts spoke confidently of the gradual demise of the smaller parties and the emergence of a quasi-two-party (or two-bloc) system. It was believed that the adoption of the new electoral system would hasten this process. Indeed, the decision by David Levy's Gesher movement and Tsomet to run under the umbrella of Likud rather than as separate lists reflected this widely held perception. To the surprise of everyone, the new electoral system produced the opposite effect, and it was the smaller parties, especially the religious ones which had most feared its introduction, that emerged as the principal victors in 1996.
Israelis quickly realized that they were getting two choices for the price of one: they could vote for their preferred candidate to lead the country while simultaneously choosing the party which best reflected their concerns and interests. The voters deserted the two main parties in droves. Labour, which entered the elections with 44 seats emerged as still the largest party, but now with only 34 members in the new Knesset. Similarly, the Likud-Gesher-Tsomet alliance fell from a combined total in 1992 of 40 seats to secure only 32, barely a quarter of the total vote. In contrast, the turnout for the religious parties rose dramatically, with the three parties securing just short of 600,000 votes, giving them a total of 23 members in the Knesset, an all-time high. Shas continued to confound its critics by increasing its representation from 6 to 10. The National Religious Party achieved an almost similar feat by winning 9 seats. Only the Yahdut Ha'Torah (United Torah Judaism) party failed to increase its power although it retained its 4 seats. Two other parties, making their first appearance on the Israeli political scene, also made their mark. Yisrael Ba'Aliya, the Russian immigrants' party headed by Natan Sharansky, the former Soviet dissident, won 7 seats, a performance way beyond all expectations. The Third Way, a party established by former Labour hawks who split from the party primarily over policy differences about the Golan Heights and negotiations with Syria, obtained 4 seats. The two Arab parties, Hadash and the United Arab List, performed far better than in previous years, winning 5 and 4 seats respectively. On the left, Meretz dropped from 12 to 9, a result slightly better than the polls had predicted, while on the far right, Moledet, which advocates a policy of transfer of the Arabs from the occupied territories, fell from 3 seats to 2.
It is convenient to apportion blame for the demise of Labour and Likud on the shortcomings of the new electoral system, as many have already done. True, the new system allows the electorate to split its vote between candidate and party, enabling voters to distribute their preferences more widely. But it does not explain why they chose to do so. Part of the explanation can be found in the electoral strategies adopted by the two main parties. Both campaigns focused on the same question - the peace process - and by doing so they became largely one-issue parties. In the battle to win over the centre ground of the political arena, the platforms of the two sides coalesced, with both adopting the same message of peace and security. Their campaigns focused more on personalities than policies. As a result, both Labour and Likud completely neglected economic and social issues, allowing the smaller parties, representing specific interests, to fill the void.
The results of the 1996 election underline a more long-term and ongoing crisis of confidence in the traditional functioning of the Israeli political system. 1 Elements of Israeli society (such as Oriental Jews, the ultra-Orthodox, the Russian immigrants and Israeli Arabs), frustrated at having failed to find expression for their goals and aspirations within the traditional arena of government, mobilized through extra- parliamentary groupings and through the creation of their own organizational frameworks. With such a base already, the new electoral system opened the way for them to give vent to their frustrations through the ballot box and in so doing highlight the communal, cultural, religious and economic cleavages prevalent in Israeli society.
These groups, apart from the Israeli Arabs, have now gained power and entered the political establishment, and they too will be expected to deliver to their own constituencies. Failure to do so may well lead to electoral punishment next time around. For their part, both Labour and Likud in the coming years must develop strategies and policies to bring these groupings back into their fold. The outcomes in these two areas will determine to a large degree whether the 1996 election was indeed a Ma'Hapach (Upheaval) 2 resulting in a fundamental redrawing of the Israeli political landscape or 'just another change in government'.
Forming the new government
The new electoral law did spare the Israeli public from the ugly spectacle of political horse-trading which has become the prime feature of Israeli coalition negotiations in recent times. Under the new electoral law, only the elected prime minister is empowered to form a government, thereby removing the possibility of parties manoeuvring between alternative candidates. Should the prime minister not succeed in forming a government, or should the Knesset at any point pass a vote of no confidence by a majority of at least 61, then new elections for both the prime minister and for the Knesset can be called. This effectively limits the options available to prospective coalition partners and lessens their leverage over the prime minister.
Netanyahu's coalition partners chose themselves - the three religious parties, (Shas, Yahdut Ha'Torah, the National Religious Party), Yisrael Ba'Aliya and the Third Way - giving him a clear majority of 66. The new electoral system weakens the bargaining power of the smaller parties but it does not eliminate it altogether. Netanyahu needed the support of all the smaller parties just as much as they were dependent on him. His only other option was to turn to the Labour Party and form a government of national unity. A channel of communication was opened up to Labour but Netanyahu had no desire to explore this avenue seriously. Furthermore, it was unlikely that Labour would respond positively to any overture without demanding a real say in the continuation of the peace process, an issue which Netanyahu would have been unwilling to concede.
The coalition negotiations and the drawing of the government guidelines proceeded relatively smoothly. Netanyahu's only real headache was in dividing up the spoils of government, many of which were coveted by more than one party. Restricted by the new law to only 18 ministers and 6 deputy ministers, Netanyahu discovered that he had made too many promises which he could not fulfil. In his haste to put together a government, he granted his partners what they wanted, leaving little for his own party. Senior members of Likud angrily discovered that they would have to settle for a few minor ministries, while there would be no place at all in government for Ariel Sharon. The claims of those who had loyally stood by Netanyahu, especially in the months after Rabin's death, were simply overlooked. During the weekend before the opening of the Knesset, senior party members began to flex their muscles, forcing Netanyahu to retract his offer of the Finance Ministry to Ya'acov Frenkel, the highly respected governor of the Bank of Israel, and give it to Dan Meridor instead. Moshe Katsav accepted the Ministry of Tourism after being offered the additional, albeit symbolic, position of deputy prime minister. The Likud members also displayed their displeasure with Netanyahu by refusing his request to postpone the election of the Knesset speaker in order to allow Ovadia Eli, his preferred candidate, to enter the Knesset and take up the post. 3
Then, in a cleverly calculated move only hours before Netanyahu was due to present his cabinet to the Knesset, David Levy informed him that he would not join the government unless a suitable post were found for Ariel Sharon. In a hastily conceived solution, a new custom-made Ministry of Infrastructure was created for Sharon. Even though all members of the cabinet believed that Sharon ought to be part of the government, they were less forthcoming in giving up part of their new portfolios on his behalf. Hoping that time would weaken Sharon's position, Netanyahu showed little interest and entrusted Ya'acov Ne'eman, his new justice minister, to mediate between Sharon and the ministers involved. Negotiations dragged on for over two weeks and it was not until David Levy again forced the issue, on the eve of Netanyahu's maiden trip to Washington as prime minister, by renewing his threat to resign that Netanyahu gave this matter his full attention and finally brought Sharon into the government.
Centralizing power
The new electoral law has created a unique Israeli mixture of presidential and parliamentary systems. In this hybrid system the relationship and balance of power between the prime minister, the cabinet and the Knesset is undetermined. Netanyahu's conception of his own role is based closely on the American presidential system and he has set about modelling the prime minister's office in the image of the White House. On taking office, he announced that his was the only voice empowered to speak on matters of defence and foreign policy. When David Levy declared that Israel would have to meet Syria 'half-way', Netanyahu quickly brought him into line. When Benny Begin dared to criticize the meeting between Dore Gold, Netanyahu's leading policy adviser, and Yasser Arafat, he was publicly rebuked. Netanyahu's original aim was to concentrate power in his own hands and centralize policy-making through transferring major sources of power from different ministries to his own office. Here he has been only partially successful. Although he has taken on responsibility for overseeing economic reform and privatization, Netanyahu was thwarted in his efforts to dislodge control of the Treasury's powerful budgetary division from the Finance Ministry. Similarly, he has been forced to relinquish control of the all-important Israel Lands Authority (which he had intended to move from the Housing Ministry to the prime minister's office) to the new Ministry of Infrastructure. Two new bodies in the prime minister's office have been established - a National Security Council (NSC) and a Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), to be headed respectively by David Ivri, the long-serving director-general of the Defence Ministry, and Ya'acov Frenkel, the governor of the Bank of Israel. Both men are held in high regard across the political spectrum and bring a high degree of professional expertise and personal authority to their posts. The idea of a National Security Council is not new but has always been opposed by the defence and intelligence establishments. It was first suggested following the Yom Kippur war and was actually mandated by law in the early 1990s, but never put into practice. The NSC will be responsible for overseeing strategic planning, an integral part of the Defence Ministry, and is intended to serve as a body which will oversee defence and foreign policy and be responsible for the peace process. However, it remains too early to judge whether this new body will possess any real authority or influence over policy-making.
The prime minister has always held sway in Israel, in practice if not in theory. The new electoral law now affords Netanyahu a greater degree of constitutional autonomy and freedom of action than before. All Israeli prime ministers in the past, however dominant, have been dependent on control over and the support of their own party. Netanyahu's experience so far indicates that this Ôlaw of Israeli politics' still remains in place and that he will not succeed in breaking the mould. Each time he has been at odds with his party, he has been forced to climb down. Twice he has been outwitted and publicly humiliated by David Levy. Netanyahu may well come to rue being so cavalier in overlooking the interests of Likud and alienating his own supporters within the party, and especially in openly snubbing Ariel Sharon. Netanyahu's early mistakes may be put down to political inexperience and, as he has amply demonstrated in the past, he can quickly learn from them. But many, even those within Likud are beginning openly to question his leadership skills and judgments. It has not been an auspicious start for Netanyahu. These events may set the tone for his tenure of office and impact critically on his conduct of domestic policy and his management of the peace process. It should not be forgotten that Netanyahu presides over a coalition of eight parties, within which his own party is a minority. Broad consensus surrounds a number of general areas of policy. At the same time, the new Israeli government consists of a coalition made up of parties with specific interests and a variety of competing agendas. Netanyahu may find himself being constantly pulled back and forth by his partners as they vie for resources and political patronage. With his freedom of manoeuvre severely curtailed, Netanyahu may well discover that his range of policy options, domestically and abroad, is limited. In such a situation, maintaining the status quo may be the simplest and safest course of action open to him.
Prospects for peace
Shimon Peres lost the election because ultimately he failed to win the trust of the Israeli people. Admired abroad, he was perceived by the wavering voter at home as a more risky prospect than Binyamin Netanyahu. Netanyahu's portrayal of the Middle East as an uncertain hostile environment wherein the Arab states have yet to reconcile themselves fully to living peacefully with Israel was more reflective of Israeli thinking than the vision offered by Peres. The Israeli public voted not against the continuation of the peace process but out of a desire for a more considered and balanced one. Netanyahu assured them that he would deliver peace without sacrificing Israel's security and would be more wary and hard-headed in his dealings with Israel's Arab neighbours. Negotiations would be conducted from a position of strength and further concessions to the Palestinians would be conditional on their fully honouring their obligations. Netanyahu's campaign speeches were high on generalities but short on details and at no point was he confronted by the Labour Party and compelled to translate his slogans into policies. Since his victory he has been biding his time. With the American presidential elections due in November, it is highly unlikely, over the next few months, that he will encounter any real pressure from Washington to be more forthcoming. But speeches cannot, in the long run, be a substitute for policies. Soon, Netanyahu will have to specify how he intends to move the peace process forward, and show, through deeds and not words, that he is truly committed to the Oslo process and to negotiations with the Palestinians.
Netanyahu's election marks more than just a change in style; it represents a fundamental shift in Israel's strategic calculations and its policies towards its Arab neighbours. Absent is talk of a new Middle East, and of Israel's integration, politically and economically, within the region. In its place, Netanyahu has focused on the dangers of terrorism in the Middle East and of the need to develop strategies to counter this threat. Whereas Peres and Rabin saw the threat of terrorism as an obstacle to be overcome in the pursuit of peace, Netanyahu has made its curtailment his point of departure, with the adoption of effective measures to control terrorism seen as a prerequisite for progress in future negotiations. This has become evident not just in his approach to the continuation of negotiations with the Palestinians but also in the line he has publicly adopted towards Syria.
For Shimon Peres, the signing of a peace treaty with Syria was a critical element of his regional strategy. Peace with Syria would bring to an end the cycle of violence between Israel and its Arab neighbours and lead to a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It would enable Israel to extricate itself from Lebanon, bringing peace to its northern border, and to pave the way for the normalization of relations with the rest of the Arab world. Withdrawal from the Golan Heights was the price that Labour was prepared to pay and the incentive on offer for President Hafez al-Assad to arrive at an agreement with Israel. Assad, however, was unwilling to accommodate himself to Peres's regional ambitions.
Syria is also a critical element in Netanyahu's diplomatic strategy. Unlike Peres, however, Netanyahu sees President Assad as the obstacle and not the key to peace in the region. Whereas Labour had been prepared to withdraw from the Golan Heights, Likud and its partners, especially the Third Way, see Israel's continuing presence on the Golan as vital to the country's security. For Netanyahu, President's Assad's interests are wide-ranging and extend beyond regaining the Golan Heights from Israel. They range from the maintenance of Syria's regional status and a continuing presence in Lebanon to the survival of the Alawite regime and the development of relations with the West. Unwilling to compromise over the Golan and convinced of President Assad's lack of interest in reaching an agreement with Israel, Netanyahu has adopted a more confrontational approach to Syria by highlighting its role in sponsoring international terrorism in the region, and by calling for the imposition of sanctions by the international community should it continue along this path. Faced by the prospect of diplomatic isolation and the weakening of his regime, Assad would eventually be compelled to reach an accommodation with Israel, and to seriously address its security concerns, especially along its northern border with Lebanon. Raising the stakes with Syria in such a way, however, is a strategy that is fraught with risks and uncertainties for the region.
The party platforms of both Labour and Likud took the continuation of the Oslo process with the Palestinian Authority as their starting points. Likud accepted the Oslo Accords as an irreversible fait accompli, but with little enthusiasm. Its platform stated that it would abide by international agreements but that it reserved the right to Ôact to reduce the dangers to the future and security of Israel resulting from these agreements'. Having effectively foreclosed for the time being any possibility of progress on the Syrian track, Netanyahu is unlikely to adopt in the short run any measures that might severely undermine negotiations with the Palestinians. He is fully aware that the collapse of the Oslo process would seriously jeopardize relations with Egypt and Jordan, as well as the remainder of the Arab world, and place Israel on the defensive on the international stage. Although he has not initially been forthcoming on a date for the redeployment of Israeli troops from Hebron, arguing that he is still studying the security implications involved, Netanyahu's commitment to taking this step, albeit on terms modified from those agreed by the previous government, cannot be doubted. Netanyahu is also likely to resist calls within his own party to shut down Orient House, preferring instead to impose tighter restrictions upon the activities of the Palestinians within Jerusalem. Netanyahu will also explore ways of easing the closure of the territories and of advancing the economic well-being of the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank. Although he is committed to increasing Jewish settlement in the West Bank, this policy will be conducted quietly and not ostentatiously.
But the real meaning of the Oslo process lies beyond the redeployment of Israeli forces in Gaza and the West Bank and the transfer of authority to the Palestinians, important as those achievements have been. Israel's decision to enter into negotiations with the PLO was seen by many observers, including supporters of the Oslo accords, as a tactical choice born of necessity, and one driven by pragmatic considerations. Yitzhak Rabin's reluctance to grasp Yasser Arafat's outstretched hand underlined this perception. The signing of the Declaration of Principles signalled a transformation in the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians from one of an Israeli concern about finding a solution for the Palestinian problem, to a search for a resolution to the conflict with the Palestinian people. Since September 1993 and the handshake on the White House lawn, Israel and Arafat have gradually emerged as partners bound together in their pursuit of peace. Negotiations have developed over the past three years from being a tactical decision into a strategic imperative for both sides. The inability of the Labour Party during the election campaign to grasp that reality fully and convey its importance to the Israeli people was one of its greatest failings.
Netanyahu and the Likud are seeking to redefine the relationship between Israel and the Palestinians. Netanyahu may have accepted the implementation of the Oslo accords but he has yet to embrace the Palestinian Authority as his true partners at the negotiating table. So far, he has been biding his time and has steadfastly refused to commit himself to meeting Yasser Arafat. But time is not an elastic commodity for Arafat and the Palestinians, nor is it a commodity of which Netanyahu has sole possession. If he is intent on forwarding the peace process with the Palestinians, then Netanyahu will have to confront the reality of the Oslo process and open up direct communication between himself and Arafat, and between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. His continued reluctance to take this step raises doubts about his commitment to this process and serves only to discredit Arafat's authority and the legitimacy of the Oslo process. Netanyahu, the candidate, won the Israeli election on the promise of peace with security. It remains to be seen whether Netanyahu, the prime minister, will be able to translate his campaign slogans into policies. Much depends on how he meets this challenge.
Appendix 1: The Israeli elections - final results
Prime minister
Binyamin Netanyahu 1,501,023 (50.4%)
Shimon Peres 1,471,566 (49.5%)
Number of valid votes: 2,972,589
Number of invalid votes (mostly blank slips): 148,681
Total number of votes cast: 3,121,270
Knesset:
| Party | No. of seats | % vote | No. votes |
| Labour | 34 (44) | 26.8 | 818,570 |
| Likud-Gesher-Tsomet | 32 (40) | 25.1 | 767,178 |
| Shas | 10 (6) | 8.5 | 259,759 |
| National Religious Party | 9 (6) | 7.8 | 240,224 |
| Meretz | 9 (12) | 7.4 | 226,257 |
| Yisrael Ba'Aliya | 7 (-) | 5.7 | 174,928 |
| Hadash | 5 (3) | 4.2 | 129,455 |
| United Torah Judaism | 4 (4) | 3.2 | 98,655 |
| The Third Way | 4 (-) | 3.1 | 96,457 |
| United Arab List | 4 (2) | 2.9 | 89,513 |
| Moledet | 2 (3) | 2.3 | 71,982 |
(Seats won in 1992 election in parentheses)
The remaining lists obtained less than the minimum 1.5% of votes required for election.
Total number of votes cast: 3,119,195
Number of valid votes for the Knesset: 3,051,592
Number of invalid votes: 67,601
Voter turnout: 79.3%
Source: Information Division, Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jerusalem.
Appendix 2
|
Government and coalition: |
The Opposition: |
|
|
|
Party |
Seats |
Party |
Seats |
| Likud-Gesher-Tsomet | 32 | Labour | 3 4 |
| Shas | 10 | Meretz | 9 |
| National Religious Party | 9 | Hadash | 5 |
| Israel Ba'Aliya | 7 | United Arab List | 4 |
| The Third Way | 4 | ||
| United Torah Judaism | 4 | ||
|
Total |
66 |
Total |
52 |
| In addition to the parties above the coalition is assured the support of the Moledet Party (2 seats), although it is not included in the government or in the coalition agreements. | |||
The government
The government of Israel, as approved by the Knesset, initially includes 18 ministers. There are four Deputy Prime Ministers. David Levy is the first in line to act in place of the Prime Minister when he is abroad.
The Ministry of Religion will be held in rotation by the Shas and NRP parties. It has not yet been decided in which order the parties will fill the position and the Prime Minister is holding the portfolio.
The Housing Ministry will also be held by the Prime Minister, with the United Torah Judaism having the status of Deputy Minister with extended authority. According to the coalition agreement there will be no full-time Housing Minister appointed over the Deputy Minister.
Cabinet ministers
Likud-Gesher-Tsomet
Binyamin Netanyahu Prime Minister, Minister of Housing and Minister of Religious Affairs
David Levy (Gesher) Vice Prime Minister, and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Ze'ev Binyamin Begin Minister of Science
Yitzhak Mordechai Minister of Defence
Rafael Eitan (Tsomet) Minister of Agriculture and the Environment, and Deputy Prime Minister
Tzachi Hanegbi Minister of Health
Limor Livnat Minister of Communications
Dan Meridor Minister of Finance
Moshe Katsav Minister of Tourism, and Deputy Prime Minister
Ariel Sharon Minister of Infrastructure
Shas
Eli Suissa Minister of the Interior
Eliyahu Yishai Minister of Labour and Social Affairs
National Religious Party
Rabbi Yitzhak Levy Minister of Transport
Zevulun Hammer Minister of Education and Culture, and Deputy Prime Minister
Yisrael Ba'Aliya
Natan Sharansky Minister of Industry and Trade
Yuli Edelstein Minister of Immigrant Absorption
The Third Way
Avigdor Kahalani Minister of Internal Security
From outside the political arena (professional appointment)
Prof. Ya'acov Neeman Minister of Justice
According to law, six deputy ministers will be appointed: two from Shas, one from the National Religious Party, one from
United Torah Judaism (Deputy Minister in Housing Ministry, Meir Porush), and two from Likud-Gesher-Tsomet.
Footnotes
Note 1: See Keith Kyle and Joel Peters (eds), Whither Israel?: The Domestic Challenges (London: I.B. Tauris/RIIA, 1994). Back.
Note 2: This phrase is associated in political terms with Likud's capture of power in 1977. Back.
Note 3: Ovadia Eli was placed number 38 on the Likud list and therefore was not elected to the Knesset. He would only have become a member, and thereby an eligible candidate for the post of Speaker, had the so-called Norwegian Law been adopted immediately. This law requires all cabinet members to resign from the Knesset and be replaced by candidates next in line on their respective party lists. Back.
