Conversion at Stepnogorsk: What the Future Holds for Former Bioweapons Facilities

Executive Summary

This study examines the ongoing efforts to convert a former biological weapons (BW) facility in Stepnogorsk, Kazakhstan. The facility, known in the Soviet period as the Stepnogorsk Scientific and Experimental Production Base (SNOPB), was the USSR’s largest mobilization facility dedicated to the production and weaponization of anthrax bacteria. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Kazakh government has demonstrated its commitment to nonproliferation and international security by opening and providing full transparency into the facility. The Kazakh government has issued mandates for a number of restructuring changes and conversion efforts at the facility. Subsequent U.S. and international assistance have played key roles in dismantling the facility and redirecting its personnel to peaceful purposes. Yet, the continuing economic and political instability in Kazakhstan maintains concerns regarding the threat of proliferation involving former BW personnel from the facility.

Because biotechnology is inherently dual-use, many have touted the conversion of former Soviet BW facilities as more simple and straightforward than converting other Soviet defense facilities. This study shows the contrary. Because of the unique characteristics present within BW facilities, as well as the peculiar political, economic, and social environment in the former Soviet Union, conversion of BW facilities like Stepnogorsk will likely be as difficult, if not more difficult, than their nuclear or chemical counterparts. These factors, as well as a general lack of understanding about what is needed for conversion of Soviet defense facilities, can help explain why all conversion efforts at Stepnogorsk have failed thus far.

Today, perhaps the most serious proliferation threat from this facility comes from the knowledge possessed by the forty bioweaponeers that remain. Several of these individuals have 20 or more years working on all stages of BW development, production, and weaponization. Although this “brain drain” problem is poorly understood, addressing this threat should remain a U.S. and international security priority. One of the most important instruments to deal with this threat involves converting these personnel to peaceful, economically sustainable activities. Although this fact is well recognized by the U.S. and Kazakh governments, all conversion efforts to date have failed.

In spite of these previously failed efforts, this study will propose specific recommendations to address these difficulties and recommend new approaches and strategies to re-start conversion efforts at Stepnogorsk. The Stepnogorsk case does not imply that U.S. and international assistance must fund long-term economically sound conversion at every former Soviet BW facility. Instead, each BW facility will have different characteristics influencing their proliferation potential and ability to convert. These characteristics must be identified and analyzed to design appropriate, effective, and cost-efficient nonproliferation policies for each facility.

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