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The Japan–America Security Alliance: Prospects for the Twenty–First Century
January 1998
The Japan–America Security Alliance in Historical Perspective
By almost any criterion of success—be it cost–effectiveness, risk–reward ratio, multiplier effects, or sheer longevity, the Japan America Security Alliance (JASA) stands out as one of the most successful alliances in twentieth century history. 1 For the United States, chief architect of a global network of military relationships, JASA is arguably the most important of its many bilateral alliances. In terms of historic impact, JASA is comparable to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a multilateral alliance that restructured the European security landscape in 1949. For nearly a half–century, JASA and NATO have functioned as the bedrock on which the Cold War security systems of Asia and Europe have been constructed.
JASA was signed in 1951, as the Cold War began casting long shadows over Asia. 2 Together with KASA, the Korea America Security Alliance, JASA has served as the main Asian pillar for America’s global alliance network. Both JASA and KASA have lasted for nearly a half–century despite far–reaching changes in the political economies of these nations as well as the external environment. Never before in the chronicles of Asian history has there been an alliance of comparable staying power and effectiveness. JASA’s longevity is especially noteworthy given the absence of other enduring alliances in the region’s history.
In contrast to Europe, where nation–states fought endlessly over territory and engaged in balance–of–power diplomacy, 3 Asia as a region has seen comparatively few alliances develop over the past five hundred years. For whatever reasons, the big powers in Northeast Asia—China, Japan, Russia—have refrained from building alliance structures. In those infrequent instances in which Asian states have established formal military ties, the alliances have proven to be unsatisfactory. Security alliances appear to be institutions primarily of Western origin. 4 They have not played much of a role in Asia.
Stark as it is, the contrast between Europe and Asia is easy enough to understand. Asia stretches across a much broader and more diverse geographic landscape than the European continent. Instead of sharing contiguous borders, key countries, like Japan and Korea, are separated by ocean straits or by vast stretches of the Pacific. Asia’s biggest continental power, China, has never conquered Asia nor ruled over a sprawling empire as Rome once did. 5 And Asian countries have not undergone the same formative experience of nation–building that European nations experienced from the mid–fifteenth century to the early nineteenth century. 6 East Asia’s incorporation into a colonial world dominated by the Western powers also took place comparatively late—later than that of Africa, North and South America, South Asia (the Indian subcontinent), and even Southeast Asia. It is not surprising, therefore, that East Asian states have not had to be as preoccupied with power balances and alliance diplomacy. Owing to basic differences in geography and regional dynamics, the Asia Pacific region has not witnessed the bewildering array of shifting military alliances that Europe has.
Of the handful of alliances that have been forged in Asia, most have appeared in the twentieth century. Nearly all have been short–lived. The Axis alliance (Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan) (1939–45) and the Sino–Soviet Alliance (1950–80) were two abortive attempts by Asian nations to band together against rival powers in the West. In 1954, Taiwan signed a security treaty with the United States; but that treaty was allowed to lapse after the United States opened formal diplomatic ties with China. In 1961, both the Soviet Union and China signed Treaties of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with North Korea; but both treaties have become moribund since the end of the Cold War, and they no longer constitute binding alliance commitments. Similarly, America’s security ties with New Zealand under ANZUS (Australia–New Zealand–United States treaty) have been terminated; and although the Philippine American Security Alliance is still legally alive, the closing of U.S. military bases, especially at Subic Bay, has negated its operational usefulness.
In 1954, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), NATO’s counterpart in Asia, was inaugurated, consisting of the United States, France, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan, and the Philippines. The eight nations agreed to consult with each other to contain the spread of communism and to cooperate in the defense of Indochina, which was beset at the time by guerrilla insurgencies. But SEATO was unable to develop a joint strategy for intervention in Indochina and, not surprisingly, failed to stem the tide of communism in Vietnam. SEATO thus failed to survive. No NATO–like organization has been able to sink roots in Asia; nor is one likely to.
In 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was set up, comprised of five local states, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines. ASEAN was not established as a military organization to mobilize for collective security or to promote military cooperation. Rather, ASEAN set out to facilitate economic development and encourage social and cultural contact, and in so doing to improve interstate relations and preserve the peace. For the past three decades, ASEAN has not only survived, it has doubled in size and has flourished as no other multilateral organization has ever flourished in Asia. It has created a forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), where security issues are discussed. But neither ASEAN nor ARF can be defined as security alliances.
Perhaps the only significant example of an alliance in Asia (besides those created by the United States during the Cold War) was the Anglo–Japanese Alliance (1902–1924). 7 This alliance, the first formal collaboration of its kind between an Asian nation and a Western power, was a minimalist agreement aimed at insulating British territories in Asia from possible Japanese expansion and at containing Russian expansion into Korea and other parts of Asia. While counteracting Russian advances, the Anglo–Japanese Alliance did nothing to constrain Japan’s own expansion into Korea. Indeed, by neutralizing the threat of Western intervention, the alliance facilitated Japan’s colonization of Korea, providing the Japanese military with a pivotal foothold on the Asian continent from which to sweep down into Manchuria and subsequently into the heartland of China. 8 The Anglo–Japanese Alliance, based on the “lowest common denominator,” failed to survive the shift to a multilateral arms control regime following the conclusion of the Washington Conference (1921). 9
For a variety of reasons, including historical relationships, geostrategic factors, and perhaps cultural considerations, China has eschewed security alliances over the course of its four thousand year history. The two alliances that China has entered, with the Soviet Union and North Korea, have failed to work smoothly or to hold together over time. In striking contrast to the United States, China has shown no propensity to enter into, or successfully manage, bilateral alliances, much less preside over a global network of security treaties. Thus, JASA, KASA, and AASA (Australia American Security Alliance)—handiworks of America’s Cold War strategy—constitute rare exceptions to the historic pattern of non–alignment in East Asia.
JASA: Indirect Benefits
JASA’s effectiveness is evident in what it has accomplished since its inception. In 1951, one of JASA’s prime goals was to foster Japan’s recovery from wartime devastation. From 1945 to 1948, the United States channeled $750 million in direct economic assistance to Japan. By 1952, the year the Occupation ended, the cumulative total is estimated to have reached $2 billion, a whopping sum but substantially less than the package of aid sent to Europe by way of the Marshall Plan. 10 The United States also used military procurements and other forms of security assistance to help Japan get back on its feet.
And if that was not enough, the United States interceded on Japan’s behalf to persuade Asian states, victims of Japanese aggression, to scale back their war reparation demands. Japan wound up paying a total of $1.15 billion, far less than the amount originally demanded. The bulk of the reparations consisted of grants of capital goods manufactured in Japan and low–interest loans tied to the purchase of Japanese goods (both of which stimulated Japan’s struggling economy). Most importantly, the United States opened its own huge market, giving Japan the opportunity to carve out sizable market shares in key sectors, such as steel, automobiles, and consumer electronics.
Owing to JASA, Japan has not had to spend much taxpayer money on national defense. Japan has been spared the need to divert scarce resources for military purposes. This was especially beneficial when capital and resources were tight, as they were during the first decade of JASA’s existence (the 1950s). The “JASA dividend"—the amount saved in Japan’s defense budget as a result of JASA’s security umbrella—could be invested in productive civilian areas such as electrical power generation, social overhead infrastructure, and heavy plant equipment. Patrick and Rosovsky estimate that a heavier defense burden—6 percent of GNP rather than 1 percent—would have slowed Japanese annual growth rates by 2 percent per year between 1952 and 1974. Yearly rates would have fallen from 9 percent to 7 percent. Compounded over a period of two decades, a slowdown of that magnitude would have shrunk the aggregate size of Japan’s economy by 30 percent. Higher defense expenditures would not have halted Japan’s industrial development; but it would have stunted its growth rate. 11
Owing in part to its light defense burden, Japan grew from 7 percent the size of America’s economy to 35 percent in 1970, and expanded all the way to 68 percent by 1994. Japan became the world’s second largest economy. Bear in mind that during this time, the U.S. economy was not standing still. Japan had to be moving a lot faster than the United States to close the gap as quickly as it did. Sustained economic development, in turn, had the unanticipated benefit of reducing domestic opposition to JASA. So the two variables—JASA and economic recovery and vigorous growth—worked well together.
There was another multiplier–effect benefit generated indirectly and only partially by JASA: Japan’s high–speed growth served as a catalyst for Northeast Asia’s industrial development and Southeast Asia’s economic takeoff. Today, Asia is well on its way to joining the select circle of the industrialized states. It is the only region outside the West to escape the curse of chronic underdevelopment. Not only has Japan led the way, Japan has contributed substantially to Asia’s “economic miracle” by making large–scale investments, extending official development assistance, constructing offshore production facilities, transferring technology, procuring goods and services, engaging extensively in trade, and serving as the “lead goose” in Asia’s “flying geese” pattern of industrial development. 12
Economic development has also led directly to postwar Japan’s political stabilization, another prime JASA goal. Until Japan recovered completely from the ravages of war (which did not happen until 1962), Japanese and American policymakers had feared that the country would be a fertile breeding ground for political extremism. Consider the ripple effects if Japan had been unstable and had turned communist in the 1940s. This would have dealt a severe, perhaps even fatal, blow to America’s position in Asia. The United States would have lost its bases in Japan and without these bases, it would have had a much harder time fighting in the Korean War. South Korea might have been conquered by the North. The balance of power would have shifted dramatically against American interests.
Instead, Japan became a bastion of anti–communist conservatism. The Liberal–Democratic Party (LDP) assumed the reins of government and held on to its hegemonic power for three consecutive decades, a record among the world’s industrial democracies. JASA has afforded the LDP the luxury of relegating controversial foreign and security policy issues largely to the back burner. In contrast to the United States, postwar Japan has managed to avoid the deep divisions and paralyzing polarization caused by controversial security policies. Japan has been able to concentrate its energies and attention on the achievement of its economic goals. Thus, JASA has had a hand in stabilizing postwar Japanese politics.
Thanks in no small measure to the assurance of security provided by JASA’s defense umbrella, therefore, Japan has become a large and robust industrial economy, a stable democracy, and a benign, non–threatening actor in postwar Asia. This is precisely what Occupation authorities had in mind in setting forth to transform the military regime that had plunged the country and region into the Pacific War. Japan’s postwar volte–face neutralized the danger that there might be a reversion to the military past. Since JASA permitted Japan to delink economic and military power, Japan’s neighbors in Asia, who had suffered grievously from Japanese aggression, could accept Japan’s rapid economic growth without trepidation. Of JASA’s various accomplishments, Japan’s metamorphosis from military to merchant state is certainly the most consequential. Asia is more stable today than it has been at any time since the onset of Western colonialism. 13
Questions
As Asia moves into the twenty–first century and emerges out of the shadows of the Cold War, questions about JASA’s future abound. Will JASA last for another half–century, contributing as much to regional peace, stability, and prosperity? Will JASA adapt to the epoch–making changes that have taken place and that continue to transform the landscape of the Asia Pacific region? As an institutional response to the Cold War in Asia, can JASA survive the disappearance of the communist threat?
Is there domestic political support to sustain bilateral alliances? Will American and Japanese governments continue to allocate funds that will allow the United States to maintain credible forward force deployments in Asia? Will fiscal constraints undercut the domestic base of support? Might a military crisis on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, or some other wholly unanticipated event cause JASA to collapse suddenly? Or will the fabric of the alliance unravel more gradually? If KASA is terminated following some sort of resolution of the bipolar confrontation on the Korean peninsula, how will this affect JASA?
These questions are, by their very nature, hard to answer, because they require that forecasts be made about a future full of uncertainties; but in trying to look ahead, social scientists can draw upon the insights offered by international relations theory. Relevant aspects of IR theory can provide a basis for making reasonably informed inferences about the future. Analysts can also assess the probability of certain regional contingencies and explore the range of policy options available to cope with these real–world contingencies. The remainder of this paper will seek to cull insights from IR theory and from policy–relevant, empirical analysis.
Argument
This paper argues that if JASA is to maintain its effectiveness going into the next century, it must be adapted to deal with the ongoing changes in the international system and domestic environment. China’s emergence as a major power suggests that Asia is on the cusp of a significant, long–term shift in the balance of power. Historically, periods of power transition have tended to be tense times—when international conflicts have flared up and large–scale wars have broken out. 14 Extant powers have not acted flexibly to accommodate the interests of rising nation–states. 15 For JASA to endure as an effective framework for security, it will have to make allowances for China’s legitimate security concerns. It is essential that China be able to live within a security environment that features JASA as a central institution. This means that China will have to feel that JASA is not inimical to its core national interests. This may also require that effective multilateral institutions be created to supplement the JASA–based framework, giving China a meaningful voice in the region’s security dialogue.
Since its inception in 1951, JASA has evolved in significant ways. Most of these changes have been gradual, anticipated, and scarcely noticed; they can be characterized as fine–tuning. But some changes have been sudden, unexpected, and far–reaching, forcing bigger adjustments on JASA. There is no question that the end of the Cold War is the biggest external change to have occurred over the past half–century. In response, JASA arrangements have had to be tightened; but whether the tightening is adequate to keep JASA healthy remains to be seen.
JASA is capable of surviving well into the next century. But its existence today is more precarious than in the past and the constellation of factors keeping JASA afloat may weaken as time passes. In the short term, JASA is vulnerable to such crises as a shoot–out on the Korean peninsula or fighting in the Taiwan Strait (depending on the circumstances and outcome). Even if there is no regional conflagration, JASA—the core of America’s alliance network in Asia—still faces the long–run challenge of dealing with the prospective rise of China, Japan’s imposing neighbor to the East, and the possible revival of Russian power across the Sea of Japan.
America’s Global Alliance Network
This paper also argues that America’s global alliance network—of which JASA is the main pillar in Asia—is a mode of institutional domination, designed to deal with the dynamics of interstate relations in the second half of the twentieth century. It is looser, less direct, less oppressive, and more reliant on voluntarism and mutuality of interests than the old system of European colonialism, the preceding paradigm of global domination.
Colonialism was once the only model of direct, Western domination, and its durability is seen in the fact that it persisted for nearly four centuries. Whether America’s global alliance network can last as long is doubtful, given the global diffusion of power and the greatly accelerated pace of change in economics, science and technology, politics, and globalization. Still, the fact that JASA has weathered the test of time already for a half–century—fifty years of fast–paced, unprecedented change—is testimony to its resilience.
Western hegemony in an age of global interdependence, rapid Asian development, accelerating change, and global power diffusion is infinitely more complicated, challenging, and difficult than it was in the heyday of colonialism and classical empire. Longevity requires constant fine–tuning, upkeep and maintenance, and periodically, major adjustments. The speed of economic, political, and social change, especially following the end of the Cold War, is making it harder for the United States to influence the course of world events. Whether or not America’s global alliance network is able to make the transition to the twenty–first century remains to be seen. But America’s global alliance network is organized in ways that give it a chance—whereas colonialism and the Soviet bloc were poorly organized to survive in the twenty–first century. America’s global alliance network can be differentiated from European colonialism, which lasted from 1571, when Spain captured Manila, until the end of the Pacific War in 1945, in terms of the contrasting characteristics listed below. (For a longer version of the contrasting characteristics, see the appendix.) Bear in mind that the list is a composite of Weberian ideal–types, distilled from over three centuries of historical experience. There are bound to be variations and exceptions in specific cases of European colonialism (e.g., Dutch, British, French, and Spanish). 16 But the comparative list of ideal–types draws attention to the central, underlying differences. In essence, what sets the American alliance network apart from European colonialism are the basic principles of voluntarism, reciprocity, negotiated agreements, and complex interdependence.
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Pre–World War II |
Post–World War II |
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Involuntary Incorporation Territorial Conquest Unilateral Domination Direct Control Decree/Compliance Coercion No Exit Assymetric Rewards Primacy of Economic Interests No Basis for Collective Action Weak International Regimes |
Voluntary Participation No Territorial Imperative Bilateral Coordination; Joint Veto External Pressures Negotiations/Compromise Persuasion Exit Option Assymetric Costs Primacy of Security Interests Common Security Threat Multilateral Support Structure |
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No Treaty Supremacy of European Interests Divergent National Interests Different Values & Norms European Laws (at the core) Direct Power Levers Unilateral Exploitation Political Subjugation Anti–Imperialism/Colonialism Hard Power |
Security Treaty Primacy of American Interests Overlapping National Interests Shared Values and Norms National Laws Instruments of Indirect Influence Substantial Reciprocity Self–Governance Anti–Americanism Hard and Soft Power |
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Self–Paying Few Subsidies or Sidepayments Raw Materials and Markets Government Driven Mercantilism Gold Standard Economic Enclaves High Trade Barriers Few International Organizations Ad Hoc Rules and Procedures Bilateral Relationship Abject Dependence |
Economic Assistance Large Subsidies and Sidepayments International Division of Labor Private Sector Driven Market Competition Flexible Exchange Rates Integrated, Global Economy Lower Trade Barriers International Regimes (e.g., GATT) Clear Rules and Procedures Bilateral + Multilateral Relationships Complex Interdependence |
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Imposition of European Culture Christian Proselytization Sparse Contacts Little Information |
Appeal of American Culture Secular Values/Materialism Dense Interactions Heavy Information Flow |
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Spheres of Influence Occupying Forces Extraterritoriality No Supranational Legitimacy Colonial Troops Military Action Duration: Open–ended |
Global Power Superiority U.S. Bases and Contingency Access Status of Forces Agreements UN Resolutions Mobilization of Allied Forces Economic Embargoes/Sanctions Specified Duration: Extendable |
America’s global alliance network represents a late twentieth–century paradigm of power domination, one that operates on an altogether different set of organizing principles relative to those that underpinned European colonialism for three and a half centuries. It is the latest, and perhaps last, paradigm of Western hegemony. 17 Its defining features include common national interests, commitments voluntarily entered into, and policy coordination. The USSR, America’s Cold War enemy, failed to develop an enduring, alternative paradigm. In bringing Eastern Europe into the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union operated on organizational principles closer to European colonialism than to America’s global alliance network. No wonder the Soviet model collapsed in less than forty years.
What makes America’s global alliance network distinctive in world history is that it is based on a structure of complex interdependence, encompassing not only bilateral military treaties but also a broad and constantly expanding web of economic, political, legal, informational, and socio–cultural linkages. This network of bilateral interdependence is strongly reinforced by the overarching support structure of multilateral organizations (like the United Nations) and of international regimes (like the International Atomic Energy Agency), setting forth a clear set of rules, norms, and expectations for friends and foes as well as concrete mechanisms for conflict resolution (like the UN Security Council).
It should also be noted that the separate bilateral alliances are linked by geographic proximity, operational complementarity, and a common connection to the United States. In the Asia Pacific region, JASA is reinforced by the existence of KASA and AASA as well as by NATO, though much less directly. Indeed, as pointed out later, the fates of JASA and KASA have become more closely intertwined since the end of the Cold War. What happens to KASA will have a direct bearing on the future of JASA, and vice–versa.
America’s global network, in short, is made up of bilateral alliances and multilateral organizations tied together in a crisscrossing, mutually reinforcing structure of interdependence. The bilateral alliances are multidimensional in scope, involving military, economic, diplomatic, political, informational, and socio–cultural ties. The breadth and diversity of such linkages function as a source of stability. When economic conflicts flare up, for example, the security commitment prevents them from overturning the alliance. In most cases, and certainly for JASA, security interdependence is the main source of stability, the anchor of the bilateral relationship.
Where is JASA headed? What factors will determine its future? What historical factors have shaped JASA to this point? To answer these questions, I shall draw upon the insights that IR theory and policy analysis have to offer. This paper will examine JASA through the theoretical lenses of realism, game theory, institutional interdependence, and cultural norms. It will also evaluate the real–world situation in Asia and explore the range of policy options available to deal with various contingencies. Each analytical lens will shed light on different dimensions of this complex and evolving institution called JASA.
Realism
For decades, realist views of national security have dominated the study of international relations. However, realism cannot be viewed as a single, coherent school of thought. 18 There are variations in approach and emphasis, subtle but significant differences among realist thinkers. For purposes of this analysis, the differences in realist thought are grouped into three schools:
1. Classical realism (e.g., Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan), which emphasizes the importance of national power, the regional and global balance of power, and military alliances as vital enhancements of national power;
2. Hegemonic stability (e.g., Robert Gilpin, Stephen Krasner), which focuses on a hegemonic state that dominates the world system, supplies collective goods, and provides stability for the global order;
3. Neo–realism (e.g., Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer), which calls attention to the anarchic nature of the world, to changes in the distribution of power caused by ongoing shifts in relative national economic and military capabilities, and to changing coalitions designed to bring about a stable balance of power.
The three schools of realism—classical realism, hegemonic stability, and neo–realism—share several underlying assumptions. All three view the world as essentially Hobbesian, use the nation–state as the basic unit of analysis, and examine the interaction between nation–states through the prism of power politics. They all stress the importance of national power capabilities, the destabilizing impact of relative changes in national power, the pursuit of national interests, and the achievement of stability through a preponderance or balance of power. 19 This paper draws on all three schools of realism, but it utilizes especially the insights offered by neo–realism.
How would realists assess the future of JASA? What is the near–term outlook? As bilateral alliances can enhance national power and counteract the threat of rival states, most realists would predict that both the United States and Japan will seek to extend JASA’s life as far into the future as possible. JASA is needed, even in a post–Cold War era where there is no clearly identifiable “enemy” against which the alliance is targeted. Why? Because JASA sustains a status quo very favorable to American and Japanese interests and is a hedge against unforeseen circumstances and events, including the future rise of a clear–cut enemy. Why dispense with an alliance that has yielded bountiful benefits, especially when there is nothing in sight to replace it? Abrogating JASA would destroy a security structure that has institutionalized America’s dominance in Asia—a cardinal sin in the orthodoxy of realist doctrine.
JASA gives the United States a cluster of strategically located bases in Asia, which deters aggression and gives U.S. forces the capacity to participate in combat missions as far away as the Persian Gulf. JASA also bolsters America’s prestige and enhances its political, diplomatic, and economic clout in Asia. If JASA is ended, and the United States significantly reduces or pulls back its forces, the United States will lose a lot of the leverage that it currently possesses in Asia. America’s military presence in Asia gives the United States a stronger, more credible voice on such matters as bilateral trade negotiations, multilateral organizations (such as APEC), and big–power summits. To borrow a metaphor from international finance, military power is a convertible currency functioning under a floating exchange rate regime; it can be converted into substantial influence in other issue areas.
The “hard” and “soft” sides of power are connected; if one side ("hard power") suffers a setback, there is inevitably some erosion on the other side ("soft power"), leading to a net loss of national power. 20 As U.S. power recedes, that of other nations rises, at least in relative terms. Thus, according to realist theory, the United States should have compelling incentives to hold onto JASA, because JASA is essential for America’s global alliance network, the primary instrument of promoting America’s vital national interests and preserving its superiority of power.
So much for the short run. What are the long–run prospects, looking over the horizon and taking Japanese national interests into account? Here near–term predictions diverge from long–run forecasts. Neo–realists argue that over long periods of time nation–states will respond to big–power domination in one of three ways: (1) neutralize the threat of a dominant power by entering into or extending an alliance with it (bandwagon); (2) counteract the dominant power by forming rival alliances (counterbalance); or (3) take security matters into one’s own hands by becoming an autonomous power, aspiring to gain superpower status (challenge). 21
There is a tendency over the long run for nation–states to pursue the second and third options, especially if the dominant power is not able to maintain its edge in power. Long–term shifts have taken place in response to hegemonic power. It is almost as if a structure of unipolarity is inherently unstable, because it automatically sets off a scramble that leads over time to bipolarity, multipolarity, or a new power balance. Power preponderance never lasts long. In its glory years of absolutism under Louis XIV, France emerged in 1660 as the dominant power in Europe; but by 1714, England, Habsburg Austria, and Russia had risen to counterbalance France. Similarly, two centuries later, Great Britain became the dominant power in 1860; but here again, unipolarity faded fairly quickly, as Germany rose to challenge British supremacy by 1910. In both cases, unipolarity begat bipolarity or multipolarity. Unipolarity lasted for only about a half–century.
Christopher Layne attributes this historical pattern to the neo–realist assumption that nation–states will always seek to achieve balance against hegemons. They cannot stand idly by and let a structure of hegemony persist. Nor is power preponderance likely to persist, given the differential rates of economic growth generated by nation–states. Hence, from the perspective of the neo–realists, postwar American hegemony is going to end. It is but a brief interlude in modern history, beginning in 1945 and probably ending sometime in the early decades of the next century. Like the French and British examples before it, American hegemony is apt to survive for only about a half–century. Other powers will rise to counterbalance or challenge the United States. Perhaps it will be China; perhaps a resurgent Russia, or maybe even a nationalist Japan.
It seems odd to think about the possibility that Japan, America’s loyal ally, would move from option one (bandwagon) to options two (counterbalance) or three (challenge). However, from a neo–realist’s perspective, a switch would not be at all surprising, given the dynamics of power balances at work. Japan may decide to jettison JASA over the long haul, either because JASA no longer serves Japanese national interests, or because the United States is no longer a credible partner, or because JASA is a drag on the development of Japan’s own power potential. Any one of the three factors could prompt Japan to cast JASA aside.
From a realist’s point of view, the decisive variable is whether a fundamental shift in relative power capabilities occurs involving the United States vis–à–vis China and Russia, and Japan vis–à–vis China, Russia, and a unified Korea. 22 If U.S. power erodes relative to China and Russia, and the credibility of U.S. military guarantees is called into question, Japan might decide to exit the alliance. Or if Japan feels that it is steadily losing ground to China and Korea and this adverse trend places its security at risk, Japan might feel compelled to cast off the shackles of JASA and embark on a crash course to upgrade its military power.
If, from a realist’s vantage point, the key issue is one of relative (not absolute) changes in national power, how likely is it that relative shifts in national power will occur? As far as the United States is concerned, the likelihood is that there will be some decline in power; but because the absolute disparity in power is so great, a gradual decline in relative power is probably tolerable, at least for another decade or so. The U.S. lead in military hardware is so commanding that a comfortable cushion appears likely to exist into the first decades of the next century. If China is the fastest rising power, its ascent begins from a base of backwardness. Even if Chinese development can be sustained at breakneck speed—a questionable assumption—China will still have a long distance to cover before it gets to where the United States is now.
Are rosy growth projections, based on linear extrapolations, warranted? Or will bottlenecks slow the pace? China may not be able to sustain breakneck growth rates over the next ten or twenty years, given the likelihood of environmental, energy, trade, and political externalities. If the pessimists are wrong and China continues growing at the robust rate of 8 or 9 percent per annum and that growth is converted directly into military firepower, China would still not be in a position in the foreseeable future to displace the United States as the hegemon in terms of air, naval, and nuclear power.
It is necessary to draw a distinction here between aggregate arsenals and usable military power for specific contingencies. While China will continue to lag behind the United States in terms of sheer firepower, it will acquire power projection capabilities that would substantially raise the costs of an American intervention in such contingencies as a China–Taiwan conflict. Perhaps China will develop the ability to keep U.S. vessels out of the seas surrounding Chinese ports and coastlines. With more firepower and greater capacity to project it, China will also be able to deter armed attack along its border. Thus, while the United States will continue to possess the world’s most destructive arsenal of weapons, China will be in a better position to defend its interests in conflict situations, especially those of low to medium intensity. In other words, the United States will suffer a relative decline in its usable power for specific contingencies in Asia while it continues to hold an edge in aggregate firepower.
In The Coming Conflict with China Bernstein and Munro (among others) sound the alarm about China’s rise to big–power status and its ambition to supplant the United States as the next century’s hegemon. Their analysis is plausible within the framework of neo–realist theory. China is seeking to exercise the third option: namely, displacing the United States as the hegemon. China’s ambition is perfectly in keeping with neo–realist assumptions. However, the question is not about power ambition; it is about national capacity. Can China fulfill its ambition? Can it become the next hegemon?
The answer is not clear. A case can be made against Chinese hegemony. Not only does China lag far behind the United States in overall military power, as already pointed out; it has also shown itself to be reluctant to forge military alliances with other states and has been inept at managing the few alliances that it has entered into (such as the Sino–Soviet and the PRC–DPRK alliances). If, for whatever reason, it cannot enhance its national power through alliance networks and influence over international organizations, China may lack the capacity to step into a hegemon’s role. From a realist perspective, security alliances are valuable assets—necessary enhancements to convert national capabilities into a global power base. If China cannot ally with Japan, Russia, the United States, or Europe, if it cannot weave global networks à la America’s global alliance network, its chances of being able to exercise hegemonic power are slim. True, the British and French acquired and wielded hegemonic power without relying heavily on a network of alliances; but that took place in the distant past—during the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries—before the advent of nuclear weapons, the third wave of democratization, worldwide news coverage, global interdependence, and the global diffusion of power. It is far harder today for any individual nation–state, be it the United States or China, to wield preponderant power without the support structure of bilateral and multilateral alliances and without the capacity to wield substantial influence within international organizations and regimes.
On top of these limitations, Chinese security policies have tended to be reactive and ad hoc. While the Chinese have been characterized as shrewd, rational strategists, going back to the Ming dynasty, and indeed all the way back to the classical writings of Sun Zi’s The Art of War, 23 the Chinese communists have failed to demonstrate that they are notably more astute or more rational than leaders from other states; indeed, a cursory glance at the postwar history of Chinese foreign and defense policies suggests a mixed record of victories and defeats, advances and setbacks, achievements and failures. China’s security posture can be characterized as reactive, nationalistic, and ad hoc. Is this the profile of a future hegemon? A counterbalancer, yes. But a global colossus, no.
As for Russia, the outlook appears to be relatively benign. A dramatic inversion of power vis–à–vis the United States is unlikely. Russia begins from a stronger base of military power than China. It currently possesses sophisticated naval, air, and missile weaponry. There is still a huge stockpile of nuclear weapons; and it is capable of delivering its formidable firepower to nearby and distant targets. But even if Russian capabilities are formidable, America’s lead over Russia is so substantial that it is almost too large to close, at least over the short run. In order to neutralize America’s military advantage, Russia would have to get its own economy to function more efficiently. This would be no small task. Hence, the United States will probably retain its military superiority over China, Russia, and any potential foe for the foreseeable future.
America’s commanding lead today, however, does not mean that the half–century of domination can be extended for another half–century. As neo–realists point out, there is an inescapable pull toward power realignment. Unipolarity cannot be maintained without generating countervailing power coalitions. Indeed, it is possible that unanticipated events, like a failure of will to utilize military force in a major crisis or a military debacle somewhere in the world, like the Middle East, might seriously damage America’s credibility. It is also possible that the U.S. Congress will slash defense budgets so deeply that America’s technological lead in weapons systems will be squandered. There may also be contingencies in Asia for which American firepower—no matter how awesome—cannot be projected effectively: for example, a protracted land war in China or Southeast Asia, or widespread terrorism, ethnic conflict, mass refugee movements, famine, and civilian rebellion. When crises of low–medium intensity have occurred, as they have in Africa and Europe, the limits of America’s firepower have been brought painfully to light.
The disappearance of the Soviet menace is also likely to undermine the cohesiveness of America’s global alliance network. Local factors will loom larger as the global threat recedes. This means that America’s global alliance network will have to give regional institutions (like JASA and KASA) sufficient leeway to adapt to distinctive and ever–changing local circumstances. What works in East Europe may not be applicable in Northeast Asia. America’s global alliance network may have to develop decentralized security structures that can be customized to fit the peculiarities of regional conditions. It will not be easy.
As nations in Asia grow richer, stronger, and more prosperous, they are apt to develop a greater sense of confidence, more nationalistic pride, and more resentment against what some believe is Western hegemonism. The United States may find it progressively more difficult to exercise preponderant influence. The climate in Asia is becoming less hospitable to Western manipulation—to say nothing of domination. Even if the United States remains the world’s preeminent military power, therefore, its capacity to convert that power into everyday political, economic, and diplomatic leverage may be diminishing. The regional outlook is thus complex. Although the United States will remain the dominant power, its usable power and ability to influence outcomes may be on the decline.
What about Japan, the other variable in the realist theory of power shifts? Strategic analysts from Henry Kissinger to Herman Kahn and Pierre Gallois have predicted that Japan would develop its own arsenal of nuclear weapons. 24 History offers no example of an economic power eschewing the option of acquiring commensurate politico–military power. In Kissinger’s opinion, Japanese nationalism is so deeply ingrained that sooner or later, Japan will seek to take its place among the world’s powers. Kahn believed that Japan would be compelled to become a military power for the simple reason that it would have to protect its far–flung economic interests. Gallois felt that Japan would go nuclear because Japan would not be feel comfortable about sacrificing its sovereignty and entrusting its security to the U.S. nuclear umbrella. However, so far at least, these predictions have failed to materialize. Kissinger, Kahn, and Gallois may have overestimated Japan’s drive to bring economic and military power into symmetrical alignment while at the same time underestimating the benefits that accrue to Japan by remaining a merchant state.
This is not to say that the Kissinger–Kahn–Gallois prediction will never come true. The further the time horizon is extended, the greater the chances that their forecasts might materialize. What realist theory emphasizes is the potentially powerful impact on Japan of the rise of formidable rivals in the region like China, a unified Korea, or a revanchist Russia. Power shifts involving Japan and its Asian neighbors could turn out to be the most dangerous fault line in Asia. A power inversion, if one took place, could touch off large–scale tremors. Japan might move to acquire military power.
Whether such tremors lead to a system–shaking earthquake will depend on a number of factors, not the least of which is JASA’s viability. If JASA remains effective, Japan may choose to continue relying on the U.S. security umbrella. As long as Japan is comfortable about entrusting its security to JASA, the alliance ought to obviate the need to “go it alone.” If JASA is terminated, however, and Japan feels threatened by a powerful Asian neighbor, Japan is likely to embark on a crash program of rearmament. A lot will depend on the nature of the security threat. China’s acquisition of a power projection capability is by itself not necessarily a threat; but the combination of an enhanced military capability and uncertainties about Chinese intentions would be worrisome.
Japan’s freedom to rearm is circumscribed by the existence of JASA, by Article Nine of its “peace” Constitution, and by various policy precedents, such as the one percent GNP ceiling on defense expenditures. As long as these limitations remain in place, Japan will only be able to upgrade its weapons systems slowly. Should China, Russia, or a unified Korea acquire destructive weapons at a significantly faster pace, Japan may feel threatened by the shift in national power capabilities (even under America’s military umbrella). Such a power shift—more than a symmetrical alignment in economic and military power (Kahn) or a resurgence of nationalism (Kissinger) or a perceived leak in the U.S. military umbrella (Gallois)—might turn out to be the real catalyst for rearmament. Here again, Japan would assess whether its neighbors’ behavior and intentions make the power shift an unnerving security threat.
How likely are Asian states to expand their military power more rapidly than Japan? On the surface, a unified Korea might be the most immediate candidate, since unification could happen at any time, and it would bring together potent military forces on both sides of the 38th Parallel. A simple merger of forces, assuming no reductions are made, would include nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles capable of hitting targets in Japan. A half–century after the collapse of Japanese colonialism, the antipathy between Korea and Japan still runs high. It might not take much of a spark to rekindle age–old antagonisms.
On the other hand, the very processes of unification would create the expectation of a “peace dividend” on the Korean peninsula, one that would scale back the number of soldiers, cut defense spending, and abolish weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear warheads. Integrating the backward North Korean economy will also require massive amounts of capital for two or more decades. Marcus Noland estimates that the costs of Korean unification could be as high as $1 trillion. 25 As pointed out earlier, Russia’s future course is hard to predict, because its future is fraught with political and economic unknowns.
By a process of elimination, therefore, this leaves China as the only country in Asia capable of achieving a significant shift in power capabilities vis–à–vis Japan. It is thus the Sino–Japanese relationship that bears the closest watching. Not only does this bilateral interaction involve the two biggest and most important states in Asia; also at stake is the region’s most complicated and consequential relationship. 26 If Sino–Japanese interactions turn nasty, the fall–out effects would be far–reaching for all countries in the region. It would upset Asia’s equilibrium. The United States, for example, would have a much harder time managing relations with Taiwan and Southeast Asia. Thus, from the perspective of realist theory, the decisive bilateral relationship in Northeast Asia is that between Japan and China, particularly in terms of possible shifts in national power capabilities. The key question that will shape Asia’s security structure is whether Japan can stand idly by and watch China acquire and subsequently increase a clear edge in terms of national power. But Stephen Walt emphasizes that a relative power shift alone is not decisive unless it leads to a greater security threat. 27 It is only when nation–states feel threatened by relative power shifts that they scramble to form new alliances or to upgrade old ones.
To sum up: by focusing on such basic concepts as “hard” power, national interests, and relative shifts in national capabilities, realist theory offers a rich vocabulary to apply to an assessment of JASA’s future. Like other theories, realism does not yield a single, definitive answer to questions about JASA’s future. Instead, it draws attention to several key factors (like relative changes in national power) which, depending on how other variables unfold, can lead to a range of possible outcomes. One realist might predict the sudden collapse of JASA while another might forecast its long–run survival. The United States will continue to hold a military edge, but its capacity to influence outcomes in Asia may be on the decline.
The discussion of realism suggests that JASA is likely to survive in the short to medium term (unless disaster strikes on the Korean peninsula or in the Taiwan Strait); but future uncertainties loom too large to make credible forecasts. JASA could be dismantled if Japan feels threatened by China’s rapid acquisition of power and if Chinese intentions appear to be hostile. But the time horizon is so long that the accuracy of any forecast is bound to be suspect. Perhaps the most intriguing point that the neo–realists make is that unipolarity is historically unusual and inherently evanescent. The dynamics of power balancing are such that in those historical periods—the mid–to–late seventeenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries—when one colossus has sat astride the world unchallenged, the system of unipolarity has set off a frenetic scramble by other nation–states to ramp up their own economic and military power and to form countervailing alignments that would curb the hegemon’s ability to impose its will unilaterally on others. Unipolarity cannot last. It sows the seeds of its own demise.
Game Theory
The concepts discussed above, selectively derived from realism and applied to JASA, deal with macro–level forces at work within a global system. A micro–level perspective can be gained by turning to game theory, which examines rational calculations of relative gains and losses in strategic interactions between two players (or nation–states). 28 Game theory can be used by realists to assess strategic intent. Like realism, game theory assumes that unitary state actors will rely on instrumental rationality to make decisions deemed to be in the nation’s best interests. The virtue of game theory is that it lays out a clear “map” of the various trade–offs—the mix of risks, rewards, and punishments—associated with a range of strategic moves by two (or more) players seeking either to minimize their losses or to optimize joint gains. The exercise is a microcosm of the strategic calculations that nation–states face in real–life situations.
By using game theory, we can identify what strategic moves are apt to bring about a state of equilibrium and what moves lead to defections. As long as preferences can be clearly defined, the insights gained can be of substantial value as deductive principles. Compared to realism, game theory is more rigorous, parsimonious, replicable, and generalizable; however, the trade–off is that game theory suffers from a high level of abstraction, shallowness of empirical context, difficulties in specifying preference functions, neglect of non–rational variables (such as organizational operating procedures), and some deficiencies in causal inferences.
For an analysis of JASA, game theory offers keen insights into the issue of asymmetrical burden sharing between the United States and Japan. Specifically, it sheds light on the puzzling question: Why is the United States willing to accept the lion’s share of the risks and costs associated with JASA? Is this asymmetry sustainable? Or will the alliance come apart at the seams when the United States exerts pressure on Japan to assume a significantly larger share of the costs and risks?
The conundrum that needs addressing is why the bigger and stronger state, the United States, has been willing to shoulder a larger share of the costs and risks of JASA, when Japan, the smaller and weaker partner, seems to have captured the largest returns. If the senior partner is stronger, why has it not forced the junior ally to assume its fair share of costs and risks? Why is Japan given the slack to free ride? If, over time, the small state grows stronger, both in absolute GNP and relative to the senior partner, why has it managed to avoid assuming a bigger portion of alliance burdens?
Alternative Explanations
Realism offers some insights. One realist explanation is that the bigger partner has a much larger stake in upholding a balance of power favorable to its interests, especially if it is the global hegemon. In return, the principal (big state) receives a decisive voice in the management of the alliance; the agent (small state) has no choice but to accept a diminution of its sovereignty and independence. Thus, a workable bargain is struck: the principal pays a disproportionate share of costs and risks in exchange for the right to exercise controlling influence. Or, viewed from the other side, the agent accepts a high level of dependence and some loss of national autonomy in exchange for guarantees of its national security. 29
With the onset of the Cold War, the United States as the dominant power had a far higher stake than Japan in containing the spread of communism in Asia. It also happened to have a bigger economy, capable of underwriting the costs. Remember that from 1951 to 1962, Japan was a crippled economy, still struggling to recover from the devastation of the Pacific War. The United States wanted, and needed, Japan on its side in the Cold War. There were dangers of domestic instability arising from Japan’s economic fragility—especially, the possible rise to power of left–wing forces inimical to American interests. Consequently, the United States was willing to pay the lion’s share of JASA costs while facilitating Japan’s economic recovery and growth. Long–run, strategic goals took priority over near–term, economic interests.
From a realist perspective, there is no conundrum. The United States was willing to pick up the tab because it had a lot more at stake. Besides, Japan found itself in no position to pay. While asymmetry in the initial phase is perfectly understandable, however, there is still the question of why the United States has been unable to shift more of the burdens onto Japan’s shoulders as Japan has emerged as the world’s second largest economy and as Japan’s stake in the status quo has risen.
An economic theory of alliances, advanced by Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, supplies an answer. The larger state pays more because it places a higher value on the alliance and the smaller state knows that. 30 There is an asymmetry of valuation, need, and incentives. The small state is content to let the big state foot the bill, since any threat of non–payment or exit by the big state lacks credibility. As long as the big state needs the alliance more than the small state, the latter has an incentive to free ride.
National Preferences
Tanisha Fazal has written a cogent paper on JASA, drawing on game theory to explain the stability over time of asymmetric burden sharing. 31 Fazal argues that America’s willingness to absorb the lion’s share of costs over time—even as Japan’s capacity to pay has increased—makes perfectly good sense, given American and Japanese preference functions. Fazal derives national preferences from historical documents that set forth strategic concerns, priorities, and goals.
For the United States, locked in a cold war with the Soviet Union, Japan represented the pivotal state in Asia. As Japan went, U.S. policymakers thought, so would go the balance of power in Asia. George Kennan, whose famous “X” telegram gave rise to the Cold War doctrine of containment, listed Japan as one of the five centers of industrial and military power in the world. 32 It happened to be the only one located in Asia. If the United States made the strategic blunder of allowing Japan to fall into the Soviet orbit, Kennan feared, Moscow would come to possess the industrial and military might to mount a credible threat of attack against the North American continent. 33 Japan’s swing into the communist camp, in other words, would tilt the balance of power decisively against the United States. China had already been “lost” to the communist bloc. The United States could not afford to lose Japan, not even to a position of international neutrality, because a weak, vulnerable Japan would be exposed to Soviet intimidation and coercion.
America’s worst nightmare was to wake up one morning and find that Japan had defected to the communist camp or had declared neutrality. In the parlance of game theory, the worst possible outcome was non–alliance. Why? Because an economically devastated and political unstable Japan, largely disarmed and left to fend for itself, would be exceedingly vulnerable to Soviet influence and blackmail. Japan would succumb to the same sad fate that beset Finland, a small, weak neutral state located close to the borders of much bigger states—forced historically to kowtow to the blandishments of its powerful neighbors. Worse yet, a weak Japan, non–aligned and basically defenseless, might be a tempting target for Soviet invasion. Forming an alliance with Japan, therefore, constituted the highest strategic priority for the United States. Non–alliance was simply unacceptable.
Of course, the United States wanted to avoid paying the bulk of the costs associated with the creation of JASA. The text of the original treaty states explicitly that there is an “expectation ...that Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression." 34 In the best of all possible worlds, the United States would have wanted to split the burdens evenly. Japan stood to benefit more from JASA in terms of its national security, economic interests, and political development. But because paying half the bill was out of the question, given Japan’s crippled condition, the United States was prepared to pay a premium.
In a modified game of “chicken,” where the payoff matrix is asymmetric, 35 America’s preferences can be summarized as follows: to split the costs evenly with Japan would be optimal (R); forcing Japan to assume the lion’s share of the burden (S) would backfire, because Japan’s fragile economy would collapse under the onerous weight of the defense burden, leaving Japan prone to the spread of communism; hence, the United States would pay more than its share (T); refusing to pay and letting the alliance die stillborn (P) was out of the question. In coded language, the strategic calculus follows the following logical sequence: R > S > T > P.
Japan’s preferences can be summarized similarly. In theory, Japan had the option of aligning with the Soviet Union or with China after regaining its independence in 1952. In reality, however, such an option made no sense. Communism as an ideology or as a politico–economic system has never had widespread appeal in Japan, and dating back to the Russo–Japanese War, and especially after the Soviet Union violated its pledge of non–aggression by entering the Pacific War in August 1945, Japan had viewed the USSR warily as the biggest threat to Japanese security. Alliance with the USSR—bandwagoning—was out of the question, especially since the USSR was a lot weaker than the United States economically and militarily.
In 1949, the Chinese Communist Party succeeding in unifying China, bringing an end to a half–century of turbulence, colonialism, and civil warfare. An alliance with China would have brought Japan few benefits. Though physically imposing, China had little to offer in the way of export markets, technology, military assistance, economic aid, and politico–diplomatic clout. There was no assurance that the communist regime would even survive, much less transform itself into a powerhouse. Furthermore, if Japan joined forces with China, Japan would have turned the United States and the democratic powers of Western Europe into mortal enemies. It was clear that the Western alliance—not the USSR or China—possessed the power, prestige, know–how, markets, and resources that Japan sought. Clearly, the costs of alienating the West far outweighed the benefits of siding with the Soviet Union or China.
What about neutrality? In theory, it was possible. Japan could have exercised the option of non–alignment. That was what General Douglas MacArthur originally had in mind. He saw Japan as “the Switzerland of Asia,” a neutral nation, whose security would be entrusted to the goodwill of the comity of nations. 36 Japan would be a pioneer, the first nation in history to renounce military arms and the use of force. In the wake of the Pacific War, there was a groundswell of popular support for the principles of neutrality and pacifism in Japan. Unarmed neutrality became the guiding principle for the Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and the holy grail of its foreign policy until 1994, when it cast the idea aside and joined the LDP–led coalition.
But Japan’s location at the vortex of big–power struggles meant that if Japan chose to be neutral, it would have to rearm heavily; otherwise, it would not be able to maintain its neutrality or preserve its sovereignty. For a country that had just gone through the ordeal of world war, and that had just adopted a peace Constitution, the costs of armed neutrality would have been prohibitively high. Not only would rearmament have strained the war–torn economy; it would have also thrown politics into disarray. For Japan, therefore, neutrality—whether unarmed or heavily armed—was not a viable option.
Of all the options open to Japan, alliance with the United States made the most sense. The United States was the world’s preeminent power: the biggest and most productive economy, the most lucrative market, the repository of advanced technology, the mightiest military machine, a robust democracy, and a vibrant society and culture. Allying with the United States promised to pay big dividends. Japan would gain the windfalls of stability, security, and prosperity. And as ending the Occupation was Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru’s ultimate goal, his chance of securing a permanent place in history, the strategy of coupling a Peace Treaty with a companion Security Treaty seemed to be the surest and fastest way of reaching his goal. 37
Using the code language of the game of “chicken” again, Japan felt that the United States ought to pay the lion’s share of JASA costs (T). Failing in that, the next option would be to divide the costs into equal payments (R). And if paying a disproportionate share would be the only way of establishing an alliance—making the unrealistic leap of inference that the United States was less wedded to the alliance than Japan—then it would be the third best option (S). What Japan wanted to avoid, above all, was to be left completely out in the cold, becoming an “orphan” in the world (P). Japan’s priorities can be coded as follows: T > R > S > P.
Fit the two national preferences together. Both the United States and Japan placed the highest priority on concluding a security pact. For both, non–alliance represented the worst possible outcome, a scenario devoutly to be avoided. Where they differed was over the question of exactly how much each country would pay. Japan wanted the United States to foot the bill; the United States wanted Japan to contribute its fair share. In this modified game of “chicken,” equal payment (R) would not have been a sustainable point of equilibrium. Why? Because Japan knew that the United States had a much greater stake in the Cold War balance of power and that the United States had a far larger capacity to pay. Therefore, Japan knew that any attempt to force it to pay half the bill would lack credibility.
Dividing the costs equally would have required that joint military costs be accurately forecast. Such estimates are notoriously hard to make and even harder to implement. For all these reasons, therefore, game theory tells us that either the United States would have to shoulder more of the costs or Japan would have to. An asymmetric distribution (S, T; and T, S) of costs constituted the only points of Nash equilibrium. As it turned out, the United States wound up paying more (T).
The preferences of the United States and Japan can be illustrated in a two–by–two matrix: 
If game theory reveals that asymmetric burden sharing is the only point of equilibrium, how long can it last? The answer depends on what happens to national preferences. As long as the United States and Japan both want to keep JASA, one party or the other will be willing to underwrite the costs. But is it always going to be the United States? Isn’t Japan big enough now that it could give the United States some much–needed relief and accept the bulk of the costs? In theory, yes. In practice, no. Japan is paying a progressively larger share (though not in proportion to the growth of its economy). Figure 2 below plots the rise in Japan’s host nation support for U.S. military bases. 
To switch positions suddenly and thrust Japan into the role of major provider would be well–nigh impossible. For that to happen, Japan would have to hold a higher stake in JASA than the United States. If that were the case, the United States would be willing, presumably, to walk away from JASA, or to stand by and watch it collapse. In short, there would have to be a reversal in national preferences. A reversal is not entirely out of the question, given the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as the unifying threat, China’s ascent as a major power in Asia, and greater dangers to Japanese national interests. If China rattles its saber, as it did in the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, it is conceivable that Japan might become willing to foot the bill. Payment would be preferable to non–alliance, the only other option and a sure formula for international isolation.
However, moving from T, where the United States pays the lion’s share, to S, where Japan pays the premium, would engender strong resistance from bureaucrats at Japan’s Ministry of Finance, fastidious guardians of the budget, and from conservative politicians, who would prefer that Americans continue carrying the freight. The length of time the current equilibrium, T, has lasted means that expectations have been hardened, precedents set, procedures routinized, fiscal and political patterns embedded, and the institutional structure rigidified. Japan expects America to pay. Its institutions, practices, and policies—the Finance Ministry, Defense Agency, Constitution, research and development infrastructure, tacit ceiling on defense expenditures, inhibitions against arms exports, and the government’s stance on collective defense—are geared to resist a role reversal. A new equilibrium, S, in which Japan ramps up defense spending, is unlikely. There is an institutional lock–in effect standing in the way of a move from T to S.
Altered Preferences
Each of the two theories analyzed so far has cast light on crucial but different variables that will affect the future of JASA. Realism emphasizes power balances and relative shifts in national power. 38 By contrast, game theory identifies national preferences as the key. Looking at preferences in greater depth, what factors might alter them?
The most immediate factor is the impact of changes in the global and regional environment. The end of the Cold War has already transformed the global system in ways that will take years for the United States and Japan to sort out. The dismantlement of the Soviet empire has already called JASA’s raison d’être into question. Is China’s rise a new threat that will give rise to an anti–China coalition? If not, what is the threat? What are JASA’s specific missions? Can JASA continue to marshal domestic support if its only purpose is to function as a general hedge—an insurance policy—against unforeseen developments?
Although questions about China’s future are important, other variables might have an equally strong impact on national priorities. The reunification of the Korean peninsula, which is likely to happen sooner or later, might have a powerful impact on Japanese perceptions of its national security. A unified Korea would introduce a major new variable into Northeast Asia’s power equation. If KASA is terminated, and America is no longer around to play the role of fair–minded broker, Japan may come to feel that the time has come to cut the U.S. umbilical cord and to strike out on its own. Tensions between Japan and a unified Korea will rise. And without U.S. forces deployed in Japan or Korea, interstate relations in Northeast Asia might degenerate. n
To sum up: Although it is an exercise in abstract reasoning, not an empirically based test case or even a controlled laboratory experiment, game theory reveals a great deal about the strategic calculations of nation–states that are faced with the choice of alliance or non–alliance. Applied to JASA, game theory sheds light on the conundrum of why JASA has held together in spite of an asymmetric distribution of costs, risks, and rewards. Within a game theoretic framework, an asymmetric distribution of costs is not only not surprising but constitutes the only true points of equilibrium in the alliance. Owing to America’s willingness to bear the lion’s share of the costs, JASA has survived in a state of equilibrium for nearly a half–century.
To survive in the next century, JASA will have to adapt to the same operating principle of asymmetry. Either the United States or Japan will have to assume a disproportionate share of costs. Since turning the tables would be difficult, regardless of Japan’s economic capacity to pay, the United States appears to be the party that will continue to be stuck with the bill. Will the United States decide someday that JASA is no longer cost–effective or that it cannot afford the payments? The answer depends on America’s fiscal health and the value the United States attaches to JASA. Since JASA represents America’s strategic foothold in Asia, and that foothold is essential to preserve vital American interests, the United States will probably continue to be willing to put up with the asymmetry.
Institutions
In contrast to the realists, who emphasize the primacy of power balances, and game theorists, who focus on national preferences, other IR analysts—the “institutionalists” and the school of “international interdependence"—stress the crucial role played by international and domestic institutions, such as GATT, NATO, the UN, and other security organizations. 39 According to the theory of international interdependence, the establishment and expansion over time of such institutions as JASA have a stabilizing impact on global and regional systems. Institutions like JASA establish rules and norms, open up communication channels, create elite linkages, standardize roles and expectations, routinize procedures for conflict resolution, and lay the basis for reciprocity and mutual trust. Once such institutions are in place, they are likely to persist over time, because the marginal benefits of unilateral abrogation are substantially lower than the marginal costs of continued membership in the alliance.
JASA is also lodged in a broader structure of bilateral linkages, including ties of economic interdependence as well as diplomatic, cultural, and social transactions. The bilateral structure is extensive, the largest and most comprehensive ever established between two nations located on opposite sides of the Pacific. Bilateral trade in goods and services every year exceeds $200 billion; long–term capital movements amount to over $40 billion per year; and foreign direct investments exceed $200 billion as a cumulative total. More than 5 million Japanese visit the United States every year, representing nearly one–third of all Japanese traveling overseas and more than two percent of the national population. Add to that the immense traffic of communication crisscrossing the Pacific—the daily telephone calls, faxes, mail, electronic mail, television and radio broadcasts, the print media—and the sheer scope of interdependence can be called unprecedented.
While the U.S.–Japan structure of interdependence is vast, it has not led to the development of a transnational political community as in the case of Europe, where the European Community, NATO, and the European Parliament have created the structure of a political community, the first of its kind effectively established anywhere. 40 Nor is JASA likely to lead to a trans–Pacific political community in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, JASA is securely embedded in a structure of broad–based interdependence that appears strong enough to withstand the political tensions and economic conflicts that often flare up in the U.S.–Japan relationship.
What specific linkages hold JASA together as an institution of bilateral cooperation? The linkages are strong and have expanded over time:
Clear definition of roles, expectations, and national identities
Japan: Yoshida Doctrine
USA: JASA as cornerstone of Asian security architecture
An effective system of deterrence and defense:
U.S. bases in Japan
Base leasing, development, and maintenance
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
Service contracts
Weapons procurement
Joint defense planning
Intelligence gathering and sharing
Military–to–military exercises and training
JASA–related links extend far beyond the military domain. JASA has served as the foundation on which the broader Japanese–American alliance has functioned. As America’s most indispensable military treaty in Asia, JASA has served as the leading edge in America’s deepening structural engagement with Japan, and in turn with the rest of Asia.
Without JASA, the bilateral structure of interdependence would never have expanded to the scale that it has. Of course, the daily flow of trade, investments, and commercial transactions would still have been extensive, but not as dense as they have become. Economic relations would have developed more slowly and at greater arm’s length—somewhat like the development of U.S. economic ties with Hong Kong, Thailand, or Malaysia, countries with which there are no military treaties. With JASA in place, what has emerged is the most comprehensive network of linkages across the Asia Pacific in history. Indeed, in terms of sheer size, the U.S.–Japan alliance is by far the largest and most complex structure ever created in Asia; and from the alliance’s inception, JASA has served as the anchor.
In addition to the defense of Japan, the founding fathers of JASA sought explicitly to facilitate Japan’s economic recovery and growth and to promote democracy and stability in Japan. The Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, signed in 1954, makes explicit reference to the relationship between defense and economics: “...economic stability will be an essential element for consideration in the development of its (Japan’s) defense capacities... ." 41 JASA became the instrument by which the two allies struck a tacit bargain: Japan would enjoy access to the huge U.S. market; American backing for Japanese recovery, growth, and full integration into the world economic system; and a powerful defense guarantee in exchange for Japan’s membership in the anti–communist bloc and America’s use of strategic bases in Japan.
Japan, like South Korea and Taiwan, converted the externalities of the Cold War in Northeast Asia—U.S. economic assistance, procurement orders, R&R expenditures, and access to the U.S. market—into significant advances for its economy. The struggling Japanese economy received a vigorous kick–start from military spending associated with the Korean and Vietnam wars. And more than anything else, the U.S. defense guarantee meant that the Japanese economy could lift off without the risk of invasion or external attack. U.S. businessmen could go about business activities in Japan, knowing that there would be no military disruption. The stable, low–risk environment made possible by JASA constituted the ultimate “peace dividend.”
JASA has also functioned as an anchor during periods of political and economic turbulence in U.S.–Japan relations. When trade tensions have risen, as they did during the late 1980s and early 1990s, JASA’s strategic value has shielded the alliance from the slings and arrows of Japan–bashing. The State and Defense Departments, together with the National Security Council, have often weighed in to leaven the harshness of reprisals, sanctions, and penalties that the USTR, Commerce Department, and Congress have threatened to enforce. Without the intervention of Defense, State, the NSC, and the entire JASA support structure operating as an effective counterweight, the region might have witnessed a pernicious pattern of economic sanctions and retaliation, a beggar–thy–neighbor syndrome. Here again is evidence of the stability brought about by the JASA–based framework of security interdependence.
With the passage of time, JASA’s institutional linkages have proliferated, keeping the military relationship from losing credibility and effectiveness as environmental conditions have changed. Since 1951, JASA has made the following additions and modifications:
Clarifying and strengthening the U.S. defense commitment
Revising the Security Treaty
Extending a nuclear guarantee
Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty
KEDO agreement
A prior consultation clause concerning the use of U.S. bases in Japan for military activities outside the defense of Japan
A definite time duration for the Security Treaty, automatically extended on a year–to–year basis unless one side gives notification of withdrawal a year in advance
Regular consultations at multitiered levels—from the Secretary of Defense and Defense Minister down to Deputy Assistant and military officer levels
Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation
Major increases in Japan’s level of host nation support (amounting to $5 billion in 1997, or roughly 75 percent of the total costs of U.S. base operations in Japan, minus U.S. salaries)
Hardware and software interoperability: the establishment of common technical standards
Periodic issuance of defense guidelines
Hotline of communications connecting Washington and Tokyo
Regular summits of the two heads of state
Thanks to these and other enhancements, the structure of military cooperation has been upgraded substantially since 1960, the year of the U.S.–Japan Security Treaty’s revision. Japan has also stepped up its level of contributions, as it began feeling anxious about the consequences of U.S. force reductions in Asia following America’s pullout from Vietnam.
Take the 1997 Defense Guidelines Review (DGR) as an illustration of institutional adaptation. The DGR spells out the functional roles that U.S. forces and Japan’s Self–Defense Forces (SDF) would play in the event a crisis broke out. It specifies the responsibilities that the SDF would assume: intelligence gathering and sharing, rear area support, search and rescue operations, civilian evacuation, and so forth. The DGR also clears away a lot of the bureaucratic and legal underbrush, permitting U.S. forces to utilize civilian airports, railways, roads, ports, and other infrastructure to carry out their missions. Of course, the Diet will have to pass laws laying down the legal foundations for logistical operations, and the legislative processes will take years to complete. But thanks to the spadework done for the DGR, JASA is better prepared today to respond to a regional crisis than at any time in the past.
By doing the groundwork necessary to coordinate defense operations, the DGR has moved JASA a significant step forward. Until 1997, the missions, roles, and legal basis of responding to regional crises had been left vague. A conflict on the Korean peninsula would have put JASA to its first operational test, one that it was poorly prepared to pass. Now, thanks to the DGR, JASA is in a much better position to respond. The danger of flunking JASA’s first litmus test—a distinct possibility as recently as 1994—is no longer a nightmare that keeps American and Japanese policymakers awake at night. If JASA can continue demonstrating that it can be adapted to fit the changing security environment, the chances for long–term survival may be good.
From an institutional perspective, JASA is firmly established, and its staying power has been reinforced recently; but bear in mind a point that was made above: JASA has never been put to a critical operational test. In the absence of a critical test, it is hard to assess JASA’s resilience. Furthermore, the theory of institutional resilience may be undermined by the subversive force of such domestic political variables as tight budgets, adverse swings in public opinion, or turnovers in political leadership. If fiscal pressures require significant cuts in defense spending, or if U.S. public opinion demands the pullback of troops deployed in Japan, JASA may be hard to hold together. Institutional strength and structural interdependence, in other words, offer no guarantee that JASA can survive the pulling and hauling of domestic politics. Curiously, in an age of greater globalization, domestic politics remains as intrusive and potentially corrosive as ever.
There is also an aspect of structural theory that leads to a more pessimistic assessment of JASA’s future. It stems from the notion of path dependency, the impact of established institutions in shaping the range of options open and the direction of events taken. Institutions often fail to adjust to changes in the external environment and exert an inertia that impedes efforts at adaptation and change. Such dysfunctionalism can give rise to problems that ultimately lead to the liquidation of old institutions. The existence of Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution, for example, may make it difficult for Japan to assume roles and missions that keep JASA robust. Or if Japan expects to play a more active role in the region, it will probably have to overcome the inertia of conservative institutions like the Ministry of Education and the Association of Bereaved Veterans (izokukai) in order to demonstrate that it has owned up to its responsibilities in the Pacific War. Path dependency may impede public acknowledgment. Indeed, path dependency might prevent JASA from making a smooth transition to the post–Cold War era.
Cultural Norms
In Cultural Norms and National Security, Peter Katzenstein advances an intriguing theory about the role of cultural norms in formulating national security policy, using Japan as the empirical case and comparing Japan to the United States and Germany. 42 In Katzenstein’s opinion, the IR theories examined here—realism, game theory, and institutional interdependence—all suffer from shortcomings in explaining the postwar evolution of Japanese security policy. Not that these theories are wrong; they are simply incomplete. They look at variables that tell only part of the story. Realist theory is not able to account for the steadiness of Japan’s postwar security orientation, particularly in view of tectonic shifts in the structure of power (e.g., the implosion of the Soviet Union and the rise of China). Although game theory draws attention to domestic variables, the notion of national preferences is narrow, abstract, and cut asunder from the reality of institutions, norms, and political contestation.
To understand how Japanese security policy has evolved, and to predict what might happen in the future, Katzenstein argues that IR theory needs to focus on the formative role played by cultural norms—the configuration of ideas, experiences, values, goals, and national identity that give concrete shape to a country’s security policy. Cultural norms are not invisible particles floating formlessly somewhere out in space; nor are they a set of attitudes and beliefs that individuals have internalized (as set forth in past studies of political culture and modernization). 43 Rather, cultural norms are embedded in concrete institutions, like the constitution, laws, regulations, administrative guidance, policy precedents, ideology, and widely shared expectations. Having gone through the processes of contestation and compromise, cultural norms take form, gain legitimacy, and carry weight in the political arena. Once institutionalized, norms can resist sudden or radical change, exerting a powerful, inertial force over the directions of national security policy. At the same time, however, norms are never static; they are constantly being modified and reinterpreted, usually in incremental and subtle ways, as part of the ongoing ebb and flow of politics.
To understand the impact of institutionalized norms, consider the consistency of Japanese security policy. It has hardly deviated from the basic principles set forth in the early postwar era: namely, alignment with the capitalist bloc, a security treaty with the United States, military weaponry designed only for the defense of Japan, aversion to conflict, pursuit of harmonious relations with all nations, no dispatch of troops to engage in combat missions overseas, the primacy of economic interests, civilian control over the military, and “comprehensive” security. To reiterate: neither realism, nor game theory, nor institutional interdependence accounts for the striking continuity in Japanese security policy. Only the theory of cultural norms, which treats domestic factors as key independent variables, seems to offer a satisfactory explanation. Its explanatory power does not hinge on assumptions of rationality. What the theory of cultural norms sacrifices in parsimony (compared to game theory), it makes up for in accuracy and causal clarity.
Institutionalized norms can be divided into two categories: regulatory norms that set certain standards of behavior, lay down a body of rules and procedures, and coordinate interactions among political actors; and constitutive norms that define the sense of national identity and what that identity means with respect to national security. In Japan’s case, Katzenstein emphasizes the importance of the Japanese sense of identity as a non–threatening, peace–loving state. This national identity did not develop simply out of the trauma of the Pacific War. It emerged out of political struggles and became institutionalized over time.
Of the events and developments that have given rise to Japan’s norms and sense of national identity, those listed below are among the most seminal. 44 There has been evolutionary development through each of the five decades, as seen below.
Late 1940s: World War and Occupation Legacy
Hiroshima and Nagasaki
Japan’s unconditional surrender
Allied Occupation of Japan
Demilitarization and democratic reforms
Demythologization of Emperor; a symbol of state
Dismantlement of military–industrial complex
Adoption of so–called Peace Constitution, especially Article 9
“Reverse Course” of U.S. Occupation
China’s unification under communism
Division of Korean peninsula
Dodge Line: monetary and fiscal reforms
1950s: Basic Building Blocks of JASA
National Police Reserve Force
Japanese Defense Agency
Self–Defense Forces
JASA and Peace Treaty
Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
Breakdown of talks on Northern Territories with Soviet Union
No peace treaties with Soviet Union or China
Yoshida Legacy:
Concentration on economic recovery and growth
Political stabilization
Reliance on JASA
Defense–only orientation
Korean War
Bikini Island hydrogen bomb tests
Anti–nuclear weapons movement
National Defense Council
Basic Policies for National Defense and First Defense Buildup Plan
U.S.–Japan Security Council
Merger of Liberal and Democratic Parties (LDP)
Long–term conservative domination of parliament
Japan Socialist Party (JSP) and unarmed neutrality relegated to semi–permanent minority/opposition status
Legal suits challenging constitutionality of SDF and U.S. bases; Sunagawa case (Supreme Court overturns Tokyo District Court; stationing of U.S. troops in Japan ruled not unconstitutional)
1960s: Institutionalization of JASA System
Revision of Security Treaty
Anti–Security Treaty demonstrations
Continuing legal challenges to constitutionality of SDF
LDP: income–doubling plan
Primacy of economic goals
Security issues pushed to back burner
One percent of GNP ceiling on defense expenditures
Sino–Soviet split
Normalization of Japan–Korea relations (with U.S. mediation)
Admission to OECD
U.S. entanglement in Vietnam War
Anti–Vietnam War movement
Japanese refusal to participate in Vietnam War (contrast to South Korea)
Mitsuya (Three Arrow) contingency plans
Third Defense Buildup Plan
Chinese nuclear and missile tests
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Three non–nuclear principles
U.S.–Japan Atomic Energy Agreement
No arms exports
Steady contraction of U.S. bases and troops in Japan
Nixon Doctrine
1970s: Consolidation
Automatic extension of JASA on year–to–year basis
Nixon–Sato Joint Communiqué (reference to Korea as essential to Japanese security)
Okinawa Defense Agreement and Okinawa reversion
Sino–Japanese normalization
U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam; Paris Peace Accord
Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defense Cooperation
Japan’s increases in Host Nation Support
Sapporo District Court rules SDF unconstitutional (Naganuma verdict) (later overturned)
Post–oil crisis: slowdown to single–digit economic growth rates
Burgeoning bilateral trade imbalance with United States
Nuclear Non–Proliferation Treaty
1980s: Turbulence and Global Transformation
Ballooning of U.S.–Japan trade imbalance; severe trade tensions
Continuing increases in Japan’s Host Nation Support
First Japan–U.S. combined command posts exercises
Security Council of Japan
First transfer of Japanese military technology to the U.S.
Concept of “comprehensive security” (Prime Minister Ohira)
FSX controversy
Crumbling of Berlin Wall. End of Cold War.
Disintegration of Soviet empire
Persian Gulf War
Japan abstention from participation in Persian Gulf War; $13 billion contribution
Regional economic integration: EC, NAFTA, and APEC
Speculative financial bubble
Plaza Accord; steep yen revaluation
Heavy Japanese investments in U.S. and Asia
Offshore production
Japan bashing; America bashing
1990s: Adaptation
Bursting of speculative bubble; severe and prolonged recession
North Korea threatens withdrawal from NPT; Kuala Lumpur Agreement LDP loss of majority in Diet; coalition government
SP joins LDP–led coalition; “unarmed neutrality” policy dropped
Diet ratification of bill allowing Japan to dispatch forces overseas to participate in UN peacekeeping missions (but not combat)
Japanese troops dispatched to Cambodia for UN peacekeeping
Rape incident in Okinawa
Taiwan Strait crisis
Clinton–Hashimoto Communiqué (reaffirming commitment to JASA)
Defense Guidelines Review (DGR)
The list of developments cited above shows that the institutionalization of norms and emergence of a strong sense of national identity took hold gradually over several decades through a sequence of events. It did not happen suddenly in 1945 or sink permanent root in 1952. Nor was it foreordained that these particular norms would be institutionalized. There was opposition and struggle along the way. 45
Several seminal events, benchmarking critical points of passage, can be identified. The first is the traumatic end of the Pacific War; the adoption of the peace Constitution; and Occupation reforms. These developments laid down the foundation for Japan’s postwar policy of peace. A second turning point came in the early 1950s with the signing of the Peace and Security Treaties, bringing Japan into the Western camp and under the shelter of the U.S. military umbrella. By 1952, the essential framework for Japan’s security policy had been put in place.
The security structure was solidified in the early 1960s with the revision of the Security Treaty, mass protest demonstrations organized against it (and against Prime Minister Kishi’s “high–handed” tactic of Diet ratification), and Prime Minister Ikeda’s Income–Doubling Plan. Once Japan passed through the tumult of treaty revision and moved its economy ahead at full speed, there was a lock–in effect and Japan turned its full attention and energy to the goal of economic development. Left behind was the contentious controversy that had swirled around security issues. When the treaty came up for review in 1970, a clause allowed it to be extended automatically on a year–to–year basis.
The era of full–speed economic growth had a calming effect on the politics of national security. Japan’s preoccupation with economic development meant that military issues were relegated to the back burner. One of the fruits of economic affluence was that the JASA–based security system became securely rooted. The JSP’s call for unarmed neutrality steadily lost appeal, and even though the percentage of votes cast for the ruling conservative party steadily dwindled, the LDP managed to ensconce itself in power. JASA ceased being a political land mine. By the mid–1970s, the danger of Japanese abrogation of JASA had passed.
But high–speed economic growth had mixed consequences. While it reduced political opposition to JASA, it generated progressively serious trade tensions with the United States. As the bilateral trade imbalance swelled from $3 billion in 1976 to $50 billion in 1988, the chorus of complaints alleging unfair Japanese trade practices rose to high decibel levels. With the rise of the so–called revisionists in the mid–to–late 1980s, the image of Japan, and the assumptions made about its behavior, underwent a radical transformation. 46 From a benign image of partner and friend, the only successful model of capitalist democracy outside the West, Japan came to be viewed as a competitor and adversary, an incorrigible mercantilist state whose self–centered, pernicious behavior posed a threat to American interests and to the world’s system of free trade.
Revisionist views about Japan spread swiftly, becoming the orthodoxy for an influential segment of American policymakers in Congress, the Department of Commerce and USTR, and the mass media. The less flattering portrayal of Japan clashed with the standard strategic assessment of Japan as America’s most important ally. In this clash, revisionist ideas, though widely diffused in the economic domain, failed to alter the Cold War view of Japan’s prime importance in the strategic domain. Moreover, revisionism had relatively limited success in terms of becoming embedded in institutions that would have given it greater influence and permanence. U.S. policies did not deviate as far from old pathways as might have been expected, given the amplitude of the cognitive swing. Nor were new institutions created, or a raft of new laws passed. Except for the Semiconductor Agreement, a precedent–setting accord, and a flurry of voluntary export restraints (VERs), not a lot of revisionist rhetoric found expression in concrete laws, new interpretations of old laws, or bold policy departures. To date, revisionism has affected but failed to transform the policymaking institutions, processes, and norms of U.S. foreign policy.
During the 1990s, JASA has had to be adapted to deal with the dramatic changes in the global and regional systems brought about by the end of the Cold War. Not only has the level of military integration been upgraded; the nature of the alliance itself has changed. JASA’s orientation has made a subtle but fundamental shift from the defense of Japan and containment of communism in the Asia Pacific to the reduction of uncertainties and risks and the containment of age–old rivalries in Asia (between Japan and China, Russia and Japan, Korea and Japan). JASA has become a general insurance policy covering a future fraught with uncertainties and risks, a hedge against the revival of historic conflicts between the major powers of Asia.
Japan brings a lot more to the JASA table today than it has in the past. 47 It has developed greater military capabilities and has integrated its self–defense forces with U.S. force deployments. While Japan spends no more than 1 percent of its GNP on defense, and only 27 percent of that is earmarked for weapons acquisition, Japan has still managed to assemble a potent military arsenal. The air force has 800 modern aircraft, more than 300 of which are combat aircraft. The navy has more combat ships than Great Britain, including seventeen submarines. Its minesweeping capability is as good as any in the world. 48 Japan’s army of 150,000 is smaller than Thailand’s, but it is well–trained and well–equipped. Using its own R&D system, Japan has developed advanced missiles, such as the XSSM–1, SASM 2, and XAAM–4. It has purchased the Aegis anti–aircraft system and AWACS from the United States. Japan is also mulling over the possibility of installing a multilayered ballistic missile defense to protect against high–altitude, long–range missiles.
In 1995, Japan reached a milestone in the evolution of its security policy when the Diet passed legislation making it permissible for Japan to participate in non–combat UN peacekeeping missions. The Japanese government is hard at work clearing up the obstacles to JASA’s swift implementation in the event of an external crisis in the “neighboring areas of Japan.” Japan has stepped up the outlay of host nation support for U.S. bases to a level unmatched by any other allied state. Although JASA is still asymmetrical, the gap in power, voice, and role has narrowed. Thus, while retaining its basic features, JASA has undergone considerable changes since its creation in 1951. The theory of cultural norms provides an explanation for both the continuity and change.
If the theory is valid, Japan’s neighbors in Asia, especially Korea and China, ought to feel relieved, because it leads to a projection that Japan will not reverse its course suddenly or radically. The norms of military self–restraint and sense of national identity as a peace–loving state are so deeply embedded that it would take a major upheaval or a fatal JASA malfunction to derail Japan from its present track. While worst–case contingencies cannot be ruled out, the theory suggests that the causes of possible derailment would have to be sufficiently strong to overcome the weight of nearly a half–century of institutionalization. In short, of the theories considered here the theory of cultural norms forecasts the most optimistic future for JASA.
The four IR theories discussed here have drawn attention to a set of variables that have facilitated JASA’s adaptation to ever changing domestic and international conditions. On the whole, the independent variables examined—balance of power (realism); asymmetric equilibrium (game theory); institutional expansion and adaptation (institutional interdependence); and cultural norms—can be described as generally stabilizing. They bode well for JASA’s future. Only the theory of neo–realism offers a gloomier forecast for JASA’s future. Neo–realists believe that unipolarity or hegemonic power cannot last long because it inevitably gives rise to countervailing coalitions and the emergence of rival powers. When that might happen is not clear. Nor is it clear whether JASA might survive as part of a new power configuration—for example, a bilateral or multipolar balance, or within some form of a multilateral security architecture.
Looking at current conditions and policy options, what are the prospects for JASA? Is the road ahead smooth? Or are there dangerous potholes to watch out for? What contingencies might derail JASA? What policy options are available to deal with the contingencies? In what ways might JASA’s survival be ensured?
China and JASA
Probably the biggest policy issue facing JASA specifically and the current security system in Asia more generally is how to deal with China. 49 The question has both near–term and long–term ramifications. Is China a menace, the incarnation of evil in the post–Cold War world? Or is China a nation that can be won over to support the status quo, especially as its economy becomes more market driven and as its political system permits greater popular participation? What China policy lies in the best interests of America, Japan, and the region as a whole? 50
Since 1992, China’s strategic visibility in Asia has increased, owing to the confluence of several trends: the end of the Cold War; Japan’s deep recession; China’s vigorous economic growth; the prospect of long–run Chinese development; the rush to invest in, and trade with, China; the desirability of integrating China smoothly into the international system; and the severity of North Korea’s problems. Clearly, China is a big piece of the Asian puzzle. How to deal with it is perhaps the central question for American, Japanese, and Korean policymakers. Whether JASA and KASA remain reliable spokes in the America’s global alliance network wheel will hinge, crucially, on how China is handled.
Is China willing to live with the current security structure in Asia, which institutionalizes American dominance? Or is China out to subvert JASA and KASA? How should the United States and Japan relate to China? Engagement or containment? Answers to these questions are difficult to formulate in the abstract, because nation–states never act in a vacuum. Strategic behavior emerges dynamically out of the crucible of constant interaction. Whether China is a security threat depends, in large measure, on how the United States and Japan treat China. Thus, as game theory reminds us, the perception of threat depends on how nation–states choose to interact.
From the viewpoint of American and Japanese interests, perhaps the most sensible approach to China—the one likeliest to engender a positive response—would be to adopt a policy of constructive, deep engagement. The oft–used term engagement is usually vague and ought to be defined. It refers here to the adoption of the following types of policies: supporting China’s development of a market–based economy governed by commercial laws, expanding ties of economic interdependence (through trade, foreign direct investments, capital flows), integrating China into international organizations (assuming the acceptability of Chinese policies), encouraging transparency and accountability in China’s foreign policies, reestablishing regular, high–level dialogues between Chinese and American leaders, opening up a two–way flow of people and information, expanding peaceful, military–to–military activities, and freely exchanging opinions across a wide range of issues. Engagement would create a “win–win” game, with incentives for all parties to cooperate. There would be rewards to share, for example, in China’s economic development; and the rewards would not be solely commercial. If industrialization is the sine qua non for democratization, as Henry Rowen and S.M. Lipset assert, then engagement holds out the best hope for Chinese democracy. 51 Imagine the upside benefits of a democratic China.
If China, for whatever reasons, fails to respond to carrots, then the United States can fall back on the option of brandishing sticks. Engagement can give way to containment. The shift might prompt China to alter its behavior. Over time China might come to understand that what it says and does affects the attitude and behavior of other states. Certain actions lead to predictable reactions. If China wants to reap the fruits of economic growth, it cannot afford to engage in aggressive or obstructionist behavior; to do so would force the United States to respond by taking a hard–line stance. China would learn that to a significant extent, its own behavior is one of the prime determinants of relations with the United States and Japan.
Such is the idea of strategic interaction. Tit–for–tat. 52 Unfortunately, history rarely unfolds in neat, rational patterns. Special interest groups, single–issue lobbying, electoral imperatives, bureaucratic politics, historical legacies, path dependency, ideological biases, economic downturns, unemployment, nationalism, corruption, media distortions, and other forces find ways of getting into the picture. Since 1992, Sino–American and Sino–Japanese relations have been whipsawed by the force of such factors at work. As a result, China’s relations with the United States and its closest Asian ally, Japan, have been rocky—alternatively cordial and tense, cooperative and conflictual. There has been little consistency or steadiness of direction.
To deal with relationships of high uncertainty, where the amplitude of fluctuation is wide, finding and following a steady, middle–of–the–road path may be the optimal strategy for a nation to follow. It may require that elements of engagement and containment be combined. The combination would function as a hedge against unpredictable swings. On the economic front, there would be deep engagement combined with a firm position on China’s adherence to GATT–based rules. The United States and Japan would trade and invest freely with China; but they would be careful about transferring dual–purpose or state–of–the–art technology. On the security front, there would be an effort to cultivate cordial relations with China but also a parallel effort to cultivate ties with India, Vietnam, and Indonesia, nations capable of counteracting the expansion of Chinese influence. JASA would not designate China as the hypothetical enemy; but neither would it be caught off–guard by certain crisis contingencies. Nor would JASA abstain from certain security policies simply because China objects. Those policies that serve American or Japanese security needs would be pursued; they would not be subject to China’s veto.
This syncretic policy, combining elements of engagement and containment, is the pragmatic approach that the United States appears to be following. Under today’s circumstances, a suboptimal, satisfycing strategy may be the most that can be expected, realistically. China feels ambivalent about JASA. On the one hand, China realizes that JASA may be the “cork in the bottle,” an institution holding back Japanese rearmament. If JASA is removed, the odds of rearmament rise exponentially. When forced to choose between JASA and the likelihood of Japanese remilitarization, China has chosen to put up with JASA. It is the lesser of two evils.
But since the end of the Cold War, Chinese attitudes appear to have hardened. The disintegration of the Soviet empire and rockiness of Sino–American relations have had a profound impact. In addition, several benchmark events have occurred in rapid succession—the Clinton–Hashimoto joint communiqué reaffirming the commitment to JASA, the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1996, and the interim report of the DGR (Defense Guidelines Review) in 1997—causing China to reassess the implications of JASA for Chinese security in Asia’s post–Cold War environment.
China seems to believe that JASA is America’s main instrument of containment. By giving U.S. troops a strategic foothold in Asia, JASA enables the United States to exercise hegemonic influence over the region. If JASA were eliminated, American influence would be greatly diminished, allowing China more room to maneuver. China would have an easier time dealing with neighboring states like South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, which currently fall into the American orbit. Without JASA, the United States would have a harder time supporting Taiwan. There would be no effective counterweight to China in Asia (unless Japan decided to strike out on its own and pursue superpower status). China would not have to put up with as much U.S. meddling in its domestic affairs or U.S. pressures in multilateral organizations.
On the other hand, if JASA disappeared, it would dramatically increase the probability of Japanese military rearmament. Japan would feel exposed and vulnerable. A remilitarized Japan, cut adrift from JASA, would alter the dynamics of security in Asia, to say nothing of the balance of power. China and Japan would confront each other once again as major adversaries, locked in an escalating struggle for power. This Hobbesian scenario is one that no one wants to see happen. To ensure that it does not, China may be forced to refrain from actively undermining JASA. To be sure, China will continue to complain about JASA publicly, seek to have some say about its functions, and try to stop it from further expanding; but in the final analysis, China will have to live with the reality of JASA’s existence.
The Chinese fear that the United States is leading Japan down a slippery slope by expanding the role of JASA. Instead of functioning as the “cork in the bottle,” JASA seems to be accelerating the pace of Japan’s remilitarization. What worries Beijing most is the possibility that Japan might cooperate with the United States in crisis contingencies involving Taiwan. It would be alarming to China if Japan allowed U.S. fighter planes, aircraft carriers, submarines, and other vessels to utilize bases in Japan to carry out combat missions in the Taiwan Strait, not to mention providing rear area support and minesweeping. Of course, owing to domestic politics, Japan would be far more reluctant to cooperate with the United States in contingencies involving Taiwan and China than those involving North Korea. Still, the Chinese are concerned. China has asked for clarification as to whether the phrase “areas surrounding Japan” referred to in the DGR includes Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. Concerning this question, U.S. and Japanese government officials have given vague and evasive answers, lending credence in Chinese minds to China’s worst suspicions.
If Japan jettisons past military inhibitions, the Chinese would find it easier dealing with a rearmed Japan that is not part of America’s global alliance network. A Japan divorced from the U.S. military network—not integrated within the U.S. NAVISTAR system, for example—would pose far less of a threat. A small “force de frappe” would not give Japan a credible first–strike, offensive nuclear capability; at the most, it would serve as a minimalist deterrent, one of uncertain efficacy. From China’s perspective, the integration of a fully rearmed Japan into America’s global alliance network would be a worst–case scenario. China would be better able to cope with the United States and Japan separately than with the two forces combined.
From the standpoint of U.S. national interests and arguably those of the Asia Pacific region, it would be desirable for the United States and China to forge closer and more enduring ties. They should hold regular summits and high–level government meetings and pursue closer military–to–military cooperation. For JASA to function as a constructive, stabilizing institution in the next century, the United States and Japan ought to bring China into a regular security dialogue. Giving China a de facto veto on JASA and regional security–related issues, à la Russia and NATO, would not be necessary. Nor would the inclusion of China necessarily destroy America’s alliance structure. But engaging China in candid, ongoing discussions about its security concerns, particularly those related to JASA, would make a great deal of sense. Perhaps this can be accomplished through the creation of a multilateral security forum.
Would it possible to engage China in an ongoing multilateral security dialogue while at the same time holding fast to JASA? Not easily. Military alliances, by their nature, identify adversaries and draw dividing lines in the sand. 53 China feels that it is the target enemy— if not today, then sometime down the road. The best hope of having China accept JASA is to provide a clear explanation of what JASA is organized to do and what it is not out to do. Start with a disclaimer: JASA is not directed against China. Point out that the DGR is designed mainly to deal with crisis contingencies on the Korean peninsula. Say that the Taiwan issue is an internal matter to be peacefully resolved by the two parties concerned, not by the intercession of outside powers. While such clarification would be politically controversial in both Washington and Tokyo, the benefits of explication (i.e., reassuring China) would outweigh the costs (i.e., giving rise to possible miscalculations and acts of aggression). It would simply express what is already the American and Japanese position.
Clearing the air of wartime grudges would also be an important step to take to ensure JASA’s longevity. Memories of the Pacific War linger a half–century after Japan’s surrender. The Chinese feel that Japan has yet to accept responsibility for its wartime behavior. They are afraid that those who fail to learn the lessons of history are doomed to repeat it. To roll back the dark clouds of the past, therefore, China has asked Japan to acknowledge, and apologize for, the pain and suffering inflicted. The apology China seeks is an official one, coming from the prime minister, cabinet, and national Diet. It should take the form of a parliamentary resolution. A formal apology would help to extinguish long–smoldering resentments.
A parliamentary resolution might be less contentious if the Japanese draw a distinction between the causes of the Pacific War and the wartime atrocities committed. The two issues have been conflated and need to be differentiated. There is no doubt that the underlying causes of the Pacific War are multivariate and complicated. The war was not the by–product solely of Japanese military aggression. European colonialism, American isolationism, the world depression, and the disarray of the international order and regional system also contributed to the outbreak. Set aside the causes, which can be debated endlessly, and focus on the carnage, atrocities, death, and destruction wrought by the Japanese military. If, for those sins, Japan expresses remorse and repentance, it would greatly improve the atmosphere in Asia.
In passing an official Diet resolution, there should be no illusions: an official Japanese apology is no permanent panacea to the deep–seated sense of distrust. It will not wipe the slate clean. Chinese, Korean, and other Asian leaders will continue to attack Japan for its lack of contrition. And many Japanese will resent the onslaught of criticism and ask how much apology will ever be enough. All sides will continue to feel aggrieved. Still, an official Japanese policy would be a major step toward gradual, long–term reconciliation.
From the standpoint of American and Japanese foreign policy, the task of keeping JASA alive and well into the next century will be challenging. China will have to be persuaded that the alliance is not geared to contain its growth or to curtail its influence. China’s own behavior will largely determine whether JASA is geared toward engagement or containment, or both. The United States and Japan should also try to purge Asia of the demons of the wartime past. Above all, the two allies should encourage China to sit down at multilateral conference tables where Asian security is discussed. Engaging China in a searching, frank, ongoing dialogue is perhaps the best way of enhancing JASA’s chances of survival.
Japan and Korea
Until the military face–off on the Korean peninsula is resolved by unification or by changes in the DPRK regime, JASA’s raison d’être and operational role will depend largely on what happens across the Japan Sea. Indeed, even after a resolution on the Korean peninsula is reached, JASA’s future survival will hinge crucially on the question of whether America’s security alliance with Korea is maintained. If KASA falls by the wayside, JASA will be harder to sustain. Conversely, if KASA is maintained, the pressures on JASA will be easier to handle. In the post–Cold War era, JASA and KASA, the twin pillars of Asia’s security structure, have become ever more tightly intertwined.
Of course, the two alliances have been closely interconnected from the outset. The United States decided to intervene in the Korean War in 1950 not only because the Truman administration saw it as a litmus test of America’s containment doctrine but also because the loss of Korea would place Japan in a precarious position. In America’s arc of containment, stretching from Hokkaido to Melbourne, Japan was the linchpin both in terms of geostrategic location and potential industrial–economic power. In the early articulation of this arc of containment, Korea was excluded. But President Truman determined that Korea was worth fighting to protect not so much for its own sake as for Korea’s proximity to, and strategic significance for, Japan. In the chess match of Cold War strategy in Asia, Korea was a mere pawn. Japan was the prize possession, the queen.
JASA was signed in 1951 when the Korean War was raging, and the United States needed to have assurances that it could continue to stage combat missions and carry on logistical operations from nearby bases in Japan. In successfully conducting and concluding the Korean War, U.S. bases in Japan were indispensable. The same holds true today. If a war broke out tomorrow, JASA would be put into operation instantly to prosecute the war to a swift and decisive conclusion.
Changes in Strategic Assessment
Over the postwar period, major changes have taken place on the Korean peninsula, in South Korea, and in the relationship between KASA and JASA. These changes have altered the priority placed on Korea in the scheme of American strategy. South Korea is no longer the poor, unstable, and authoritarian state that it used to be. It has become an industrial economy, a democracy, a valued military partner, and a middle–sized power implementing a constructive foreign policy. It has risen to a place of prominence in the structure of American relationships in the Asia Pacific.
Consider the evolution in America’s assessment of Korea. Recall that Korea used to be deemed of derivative importance in the sense that Korea merely represented a buffer for Japan. That has changed. South Korea’s vigorous industrial development has made it a valuable economic partner for the United States and a medium–sized engine of growth for the rest of Asia. Politically, the ROK has come a long way from the dark days of military authoritarianism. Through a process of arduous struggle, Korea has finally turned itself into a democracy. Its value as a showcase of democratic development (under American tutelage) is substantial. Diplomatically, Korea has taken an active role in such regional organizations as APEC, ARF, and the Asian Development Bank. Korea’s contributions to the region are greater than its size would lead one to expect. And strategically, China’s growing power and Korea’s development of a world–class industrial infrastructure have had the effect of elevating the strategic position of the Korean peninsula. Clearly, America’s commitment to South Korea is now direct, formal, and strong—no longer indirect, derivative, and conditional.
The balance of power on the Korean peninsula has also tilted decisively in the ROK’s favor. The DPRK held a commanding edge in 1953, the year of the Armistice, thanks in part to the extant infrastructure left behind by Japanese colonial rule. If U.S. forces had not intervened in the Korean conflict, the DPRK would have routed the ROK and taken control of the entire peninsula. For decades, the only obstacle standing in the way of the DPRK’s domination of the peninsula was U.S. bases, American troops, and KASA.
For the United States, the costs of involvement in another Korean conflict would have been high, given the imbalance between the North and South that existed from 1953 to 1980. The United States would have had to compensate for a huge gap. But by 1980, the ROK had closed the gap. While the North Korean economy stumbled along, following the dead–end philosophy of juche (self–reliance), the South Korean economy grew by leaps and bounds. Since 1980, the ROK has gained a lead of such insurmountable dimensions over the DPRK that there is no doubt who will triumph eventually. From the perspective of realism, the shift in relative power has placed the current Kim Jong–Il regime in an untenable position. Either it must reform its dysfunctional economy and open to the outside world; or it might feel so backed into a corner that the only option is to lash out at the ROK, even at the risk of its own self–destruction.
JASA and KASA
Over the past four decades, JASA and KASA have evolved as interlinked, complementary institutions within the framework of America’s global alliance network. Although the two treaties serve a common goal, peace and stability in Northeast Asia, they operate in contrasting national security environments. Japan and Korea stand at opposite ends of the spectrum. JASA and KASA also utilize a different mix of forces designed to fulfill different missions. KASA is geared solely for the defense of Korea; its role in regional or global security is limited. JASA, on the other hand, is geared to maintain regional peace and stability. Of course, JASA is responsible for the defense of Japan; but there is, at the moment, no nation in possession of the military firepower necessary to mount a credible threat of invasion or occupation. The Soviet threat, which hovered over Japan during the Cold War, has vanished. Thus, in the post–Cold War period, JASA has shifted focus from the defense of Japan to regional peace and stability.
The essential difference between JASA and KASA is captured in the main service linkages with the United States. The U.S. Navy is the primary service link for JASA, but for KASA it is the U.S. Army. The U.S. Navy roams all over the Pacific Ocean and well beyond. It serves a regional and global mission. By contrast, the U.S. Army is land–bound in Korea; its sole purpose is to deter attack and repel invasion of the South. It is not trained as a mobile unit to be transported to fight in other Asian areas. By contrast, the U.S. Marines in Okinawa are a mobile fighting unit, trained to arrive quickly on the scene, whether it be in Korea or elsewhere in Asia. The U.S. Air Force is present in both countries; but U.S. bases in Kadena, Misawa, and Yokota are designed to conduct combat missions throughout the region.
There is thus a tacit division of labor between JASA and KASA, a crude division, to be sure. But the JASA–KASA connection is strongly reinforced by ties of strategic interdependence. Japan needs KASA, because stability and a friendly regime in Korea are essential to Japan’s sense of security. KASA needs JASA because U.S. bases in Japan are essential for the defense of Korea and because JASA functions as “cork in the Japanese bottle.” From both strategic and operational points of view, therefore, JASA and KASA have become tightly interlinked within America’s regional and global military network. The nature of interdependence is such that if one leg is broken (e.g., KASA), the other leg (e.g., JASA) will require immediate medical attention.
Assume eventual unification of the Korean peninsula, or at least a major easing of military tensions. Because KASA’s raison d’être is the defense of the ROK, eventual unification or conflict reduction would undercut the rationale for KASA’s existence. For the moment, the military threat from the North and the fact that the Korean War technically has not ended (with only an armistice, not a peace treaty, in place), supplies the justification needed to station U.S. troops in Korea. Once that threat is removed, and a peace treaty is concluded, however, what rationale will be given? Would KASA’s historic mission be over? Public opinion polls in South Korea indicate that KASA will not be needed, once the military stare–down is over.
Peace and stability on the Korean peninsula would remove the main military contingency for which the Defense Guidelines Review was recently undertaken. In Japan, as in Korea, the same question would be posed: Is JASA still needed? If Japan is the only nation in Asia hosting U.S. bases, the prime minister will be hard pressed to maintain JASA. There would be probing questions raised about fiscal expenditures, the inconveniences suffered by the physical presence of U.S. bases, and Japanese sovereignty. The Okinawa problem would be hard to handle. The Okinawa Prefecture Government can be expected to voice strong objections to the unfairness of Okinawa’s shouldering of a lopsided share—upwards of 75 percent of the total square mileage—of U.S. bases in Japan. If there is another incident—say, a rape or a serious accident, such as a plane crash in a residential area—the hue and cry would be tremendous. Nationalism would well up. American bases would become the target of nationalist discontent. They would be seen as remnants of the U.S. Occupation and as humiliating symbols of Japan’s continuing subordination to the United States. Tensions between the Okinawa Prefectural Government and the central government would flare up.
To say that the political atmosphere would be hostile would be to state the obvious. The mass media would roil public opinion by giving the issue headline attention. JASA would become, once again, a source of raging controversy, contestation, division, and possible polarization. The LDP, which has only recently regrouped after being bumped from power, would have a hard time establishing a common ground on which its members could take a united stand. The controversy would drive a wedge between rival groups within the LDP and among the small opposition parties. A schism would open up, perhaps leading to another major realignment of political parties. Would the LDP hold together in the face of a realignment? Would politics in Japan, which has grown accustomed to the luxury of being removed from security controversies, fall into a pattern of fractious conflict and paralyzing polarization? In an atmosphere rife with tension, it would be hard to exercise effective leadership. Unless future Japanese prime ministers prove to be a lot stronger and more courageous than past heads of state, JASA could collapse under the cumulative weight of political conflict and opposition.
Korean Contingencies
The domino effect—KASA’s demise followed by JASA’s—might materialize in the wake of certain unfavorable developments on the Korean peninsula. North–South tensions are at a critical crossroads. 54 The Kim Jong–Il regime is caught in a bind. North Korea is suffering from famine, mass malnutrition, negative economic growth, and international isolation. Its only hope of escape is to follow the path of economic reform; but economic reform would require that market forces be unleashed and that the country be opened to commercial contact with the outside world. The dilemma is that liberalization, necessary to overcome the economic crisis, would undermine the Kim Jong–Il regime. To remain in power, the Kim regime has had to rely on coercion, ideological control, patronage, and corruption. So far at least, the Kim regime has eschewed the Chinese road to reform. Instead, it has kept North Korea in a constant state of information blackout while refusing to abandon the abortive juche line. In consequence, the crisis continues. Anything can happen. There could be a devastating all–out war, or isolated skirmishes and terrorist attacks, or the DPRK’s slow disintegration. The situation is fraught with the potential for disaster.
Probably the central reason for the volatility, and the prospect of the ROK’s eventual victory, is the steady erosion of the foundations of the DPRK regime. The end of the Cold War dealt the DPRK a fatal blow, one from which full recovery appears to be out of reach (at least under the current Kim Jong–Il regime). As a result of the implosion of the Soviet Union and follow–on changes, the DPRK has found itself cut off from hard currency, financial credit, energy, food, and other vital resources. In the agricultural sector, the DPRK has suffered from several years of abysmal crop yields; this is the result of an untenable economic system, poor productivity, and egregious mistakes made in the past (such as excessive rice cultivation and subsequent flooding problems). According to International Red Cross estimates, five million North Koreans are suffering from severe malnutrition. Unless more food is imported, it is estimated that as many as two million may die of starvation.
To stave off the catastrophe, the DPRK has asked the international community for massive food aid. But as it is unwilling to allow international agencies to distribute that aid or to monitor its distribution (so as to ensure that it does not wind up filling the bins of the political and military privileged), the quantity of food aid actually being delivered is somewhere in the range of one to one and a half million tons of rice, which, together with the low yields of domestically produced rice, brings the DPRK’s total to a level of bare subsistence. The ROK has promised to provide more aid if the DPRK agrees to participate in the Four–Party Talks (FPT).
The FPT is organized to discuss ways of resolving tensions on the Korean peninsula. The fact that the DPRK has consented to sit down at the bargaining table with the ROK (together with the United States and China) is in itself a major diplomatic breakthrough for the ROK, because the FPT is the first direct negotiation between the North and South, the DPRK’s first acknowledgment of the ROK’s existence as a nation–state. The Four–Party Talks also hold out the possibility of engaging China in a meaningful, long–term dialogue about security issues in Asia.
But if the talks go nowhere, tensions on the Korean peninsula could flare into violence. Backed into a corner, the Kim Jong–Il regime has the option of launching an all–out, sudden attack, à la Pearl Harbor, raining death and destruction on Seoul and other vulnerable cities. Of course, such an attack would prompt U.S.–Korean forces under unified UN command to launch a swift, withering retaliation. Military targets in North Korea, including Pyongyang, would be hit by firepower potentially more destructive than that directed at Iraq during the Persian Gulf War. It would demolish the DPRK’s military infrastructure and combat capabilities. Out of the rubble, the ROK would emerge the victor. It would unify the peninsula on victor terms.
Although military victory would clear the way for unification, the destructive effects of war would cast a pall over any postwar settlement, placing the future of KASA at risk. What if the DPRK drops chemical and biological weapons on Seoul and other dense population centers? What if U.S. forces, in retaliation, use tactical nuclear weapons? Imagine the legacy of long–term resentment and anti–Americanism that nuclear overkill would engender. The political radioactivity would hang like a dark cloud over the entire Korean peninsula and throughout Asia. Could a unified Korea, under such a cloud, marshal the mass support necessary to continue KASA? Probably not, if nuclear weapons are used. Perhaps not, even if the war is fought with conventional weapons and casualties are high.
This suggests that KASA’s future hinges not simply on the outcome of military confrontation but also on the manner in which the conflict on the Korean peninsula is managed. It matters whether or not chemical and nuclear weapons are used. It matters whether the casualty toll is high or low. It matters how well American and Korean forces work together. It matters how smoothly JASA functions in the crucible of war. It matters whether ROK actions trigger a shoot–out. It matters what kind of role China plays, whether it be constructive or obstructionist. It matters how U.S. public opinion reacts to America’s involvement in the war. If U.S. troops suffer high casualty rates, American public opinion may demand that all U.S. forces in Korea—and conceivably even Japan—be brought home. Depending on how these and other unknowns turn out, the fate of KASA will hang in the balance.
Even assuming the best outcome—limited violence, low casualty rates, cooperation from China, and swift conflict resolution—KASA’s fate is by no means assured. At the very least, a new raison d’être would have to be found and modifications made in basing arrangements. Maintaining the Second Infantry Division intact after confrontation would be unrealistic. Most U.S. ground forces would have to be removed. Only a symbolic presence would be possible—if that. Keeping the air base at Ulsan, however desirable, might be difficult. However, since air power can be projected to any point in the region from U.S. bases located elsewhere in the Pacific, such as Alaska, Guam, and Hawaii, withdrawal from Ulsan may not be that costly. And even if no permanent ground or air bases can be kept, perhaps KASA can still be retained by giving the U.S. Navy and Marines access to ports and land facilities for regular but temporary visits.
More costly perhaps in terms of power projection would be the withdrawal of U.S. Marines from Okinawa. If North Korea ceases to pose a threat, political pressures to remove U.S. Marines from Okinawa will mount in Japan as well as in the United States, because the rationale for their overseas deployment—namely, early engagement in a war—will have disappeared. Outside of the Korean peninsula, it is hard to identify a place where U.S. amphibious forces might get involved. Not Taiwan. Not the Spratley Islands. A land battle in Japan? Far–fetched.
To maintain Marines in Okinawa, a new rationale would have to be found. 55 Perhaps that rationale might be to deal with low–intensity conflicts. 56 In the post–Cold War world, a variety of low–level contingencies will arise, such as disaster relief, civilian rescue operations, citizen evacuation in ethnic wars, and anti–terrorist activities. Such contingencies cannot be handled easily by traditional forms of naval and air power. Low–intensity conflicts are more likely to happen than high intensity wars. Indeed, the lower the intensity of conflict, the higher the likelihood of occurrence.
U.S. Marines also have the capacity to play a key role in military–to–military training and joint exercises with counterpart services throughout Asia. The benefits of such interaction are substantial. They go beyond operational readiness. What military–to–military contacts provide is an effective means of strengthening bilateral ties with states outside America’s global alliance network (such as the Philippines, Indonesia, and Thailand). If the idea of serving new missions is accepted, the U.S. marines might be able to stay in Okinawa, but probably in smaller numbers and with a contraction in base facilities.
Looking at KASA from a balance of power perspective, the Koreans probably would have incentives to maintain an alliance with the United States, even after unification. KASA would serve the following functions: (1) as a general insurance policy against future unknowns; (2) as a secure link to America’s global alliance network; and (3) for the multiplier effects of close alignment with the world’s leading capitalist economy. A unified Korea would require large–scale capital investments, access to U.S. markets, and U.S. technology. 57 KASA would also help to keep JASA alive. This, in turn, would diminish the likelihood of Japanese remilitarization. KASA would make it possible for the United States to continue serving as a go–between for Korea and Japan. Most importantly, KASA would give Korea optimal leeway to manage relations with the big powers—the United States, China, and Japan.
JASA and KASA have become ever more tightly intertwined as part of America’s global alliance network—not only in terms of the strategic division of labor and operational coordination but also in terms of the interlocked nature of their fates. If KASA folds, JASA is in trouble. At the height of the Cold War, this was less true. Even if KASA had collapsed, JASA would have been maintained; indeed, it might have been expanded. The United States needed JASA to counteract the Soviet threat and to maintain a preponderance of power in Asia. But with the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet threat, the overriding need to keep KASA and JASA at all costs has diminished. Now, if KASA is terminated, it will be harder to keep JASA robust.
This is not to say that without KASA, JASA will surely collapse. It is possible for JASA to continue—but probably in modified form. JASA could not bear the full security load for Asia. It would need help at all levels and in all areas. The United States would have to strengthen the Australia–America Security Alliance or perhaps forge a trilateral U.S.–Japan–Australia security alliance and forge closer ties with ASEAN. This would take some of the pressure off Japan as the only state hosting U.S. forces in Asia. It would also be a step in the right direction if Japan broke out of its psychology of dependence on the United States and began taking significant foreign policy initiatives on its own. If Japan shed its cautiousness, its risk aversion, its reluctance to step out in front on controversial foreign policy issues, such behavioral modification would help to extend JASA’s life.
To some extent, Japan’s reactive stance on foreign policy has been the by–product of its dependence on JASA. It is also a reflection of the primacy of purely economic interests, the free–rider mentality, ossified domestic institutions and practices, and the asymmetry of power within JASA. 58 Although it will not be easy for Japan to shift gears, given the embeddedness of domestic institutions, it may be possible to alter past policies if the incentives and rewards of doing so are powerful enough and if early attempts turn out to be successful. The United States can do a lot to help. It can encourage, support, coordinate, and assist. It can give Japan more of a voice in JASA. It can give Japan more of a voice in multilateral organizations like the IMF, World Bank, and UN. It can support Japan’s efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.
Most importantly, the United States and Japan should work together to establish or upgrade a variety of multilateral institutions, both formal and informal, for security dialogues. The Four–Party Talks is an example of a nascent entity that might be turned into a permanent organization and perhaps expanded to include Russia, if it succeeds in resolving the conflict on the Korean peninsula. Former secretary of defense William Perry’s proposal to hold annual meetings of defense ministers in the Asia Pacific should not be abandoned, even though China has opted to stay out; perhaps it can be convened on an informal basis by private organizations. The idea of holding annual meetings of military chiefs of staff, of national security advisors, or of former high–ranking government officials also ought to be pursued. Having multiple forums for serious dialogue would reinforce, not replace, JASA, KASA, AASA, and other bilateral security alliances. 59 For the larger framework of America’s global alliance network to remain effective, the core bilateral alliances will have to be supplemented by a support structure of multilateral institutions, including economic, political, environmental, social, and intellectual organizations. The days are over when regional security can rest solely on bilateral alliances.
JASA is the longest lived and most successful alliance that Asia has ever known. It is a watershed institution in a region historically inhospitable to the creation and maintenance of alliances. In organizing JASA, American and Japanese policymakers had no idea that the alliance would last as long or play as seminal a role as it has. Consider the profound, systemic significance of the following postwar developments that can be attributed largely, or in part, to JASA’s existence:
Japan
- Unwavering membership in the non–communist camp
Metamorphosis from prewar military to postwar merchant state
A half–century of healing from the trauma of the Pacific War
Democratization
Development of institutions, norms, and policies embodying a new sense of identity as peace–loving, non–threatening nation
Vigorous economic recovery and growth
Unprecedented peace, prosperity, stability, and security
United States
- Clear commitment to advance its national interests in Asia
Forward deployment of troops; strategic location of U.S. bases in Japan
Effective network of alliances in Asia: JASA, KASA, AASA
Asian alliances as a mainstay of America’s global alliance network
Emergence of Japan as strong economic competitor and politico–military ally
Special partnership with Japan, the prewar enemy
Dynamic economic growth throughout Asia
Of the bountiful benefits listed above, JASA’s impact on the development of Japan’s political economy is particularly noteworthy, because the significance of the JASA factor is inadequately understood. JASA has had a major hand in shaping the following institutions, policies, and practices in Japan:
National consensus as normative basis for policymaking
Yoshida Doctrine
Primacy of economic interests
LDP monopoly of power; conservative rule
Weakness, fragmentation of political opposition
Reactive diplomacy; failure to take foreign policy initiatives
Risk aversion; cautiousness; a pattern of muddling along
Superficiality of mass media coverage of national security
Absence of genuine national debate over security policy
Insulation from divisiveness of security and foreign policy issues
Psychology of dependence and insularity; free–rider mentality
Reliance on gaiatsu (foreign pressures) to push through reforms and other difficult measures
As the list above reveals, JASA is a major reason for the distinctiveness of Japan’s political economy. Without JASA, Japan’s postwar development would probably have produced a different set of policies, practices, norms, and institutions. Although the JASA legacy has yielded many positive outcomes (such as a national consensus in support of the Yoshida Doctrine), it has also given rise to some notably negative consequences as well (such as the superficiality of the national debate on national security). Whether positive or negative, the JASA factor has loomed large.
Similarly, KASA has had a profound impact on the development of Korea’s political economy. Indeed, KASA’s role in the evolution of Korean institutions, norms, and policies has been considerably larger than JASA’s role in Japan, because the Korean War, the tense truce that followed, and the immediacy of the Cold War have brought greater pressures to bear on the Korean polity. The ROK, far more than Japan, has found itself trapped in the Cold War in Asia. The state has had to deal every minute of every day with the threat posed across the DMZ. KASA has made the ROK more dependent on the United States than the DPRK is on China or on the former Soviet Union.
Thus, it can be said that the United States, skillfully utilizing its military alliances, has succeeded in pulling Japan and Korea into its sphere of influence. It has molded the two states in America’s own likeness. JASA and KASA have functioned as extensions of U.S. power and influence in Asia. Both Japan and Korea have developed into subordinate partners, compliant allies, democratic states, and big–time economic clients and competitors. It is doubtful that European colonialism ever penetrated as widely or deeply into the soul of indigenous countries or left so large and lasting an imprint. Even if JASA and KASA were to disappear overnight, their legacies would persist.
The irony of the JASA legacy is that it may stand in the way of JASA’s adaptation to changes in the post–Cold War environment. The problem of path dependency—the inertia of extant institutions, norms, practices, and policies largely put in place by JASA—is that Japan might be paralyzed when confronted by an international crisis. Path dependency may prove to be a serious stumbling block if external crises are sudden and dramatic rather than gradual and moderate. Japan’s freedom to respond, maneuver, and adapt will be restricted by the rigidities of current system.
Whither JASA and America’s Global Alliance Network?
This paper has analyzed the future of JASA, using the prism of IR theory and that of future contingencies and policy options. Looking through the light of these prisms, how do the prospects for JASA look? What inferences can be drawn?
The four IR theories utilized here—realism, game theory, structural interdependence, and cultural norms—offer broad, abstract concepts with which to evaluate JASA. Each theory is sufficiently malleable that a range of interpretations can be drawn, including those at opposite ends of the spectrum. There is no single, clear–cut, definitive conclusion. The first three theories draw attention to international, macro–level variables at work; the fourth focuses on domestic factors. Realist theory offers perhaps the most pessimistic perspective on JASA’s future, since the region is changing so rapidly, the power balance in Asia is in flux, and the disappearance of the Soviet threat has had the effect of reducing the stakes that the United States and Japan hold in JASA. But realist analysis also suggests that JASA will hold up as long as the balance of power does not shift, and as long as no new security threat emerges.
Probably the strongest case for JASA’s resilience comes from the theory of cultural norms. It advances the hypothesis that the configuration of norms, expectations, practices, procedures, and policies, once institutionalized, is hard to transcend or transform. Structural interdependence and game theory also lend themselves to the projection that JASA will last for a while. Game theory stresses that there are established points of Nash equilibrium.
While the application of IR theory leads to fairly optimistic projections, an analysis of real–world contingencies suggests that the future is fraught with so many uncertainties that predictions about JASA’s future are risky and unwarranted. Look at the next five years. The crisis facing the Kim Jong–Il regime is deep–seated and structural. It cannot be overcome by relying on superficial, ad hoc solutions. The regime will either have to initiate a program of structural reform or it will face the progressively corrosive consequences of its miscalculations, malign neglect, and costly sacrifices (at the altar of regime survival). Or look at Taiwan, another volatile situation. If a conflict erupts in Taiwan, Japan would have a much harder time cooperating with the United States in operationalizing JASA than it would on the Korean peninsula.
These and other real–time contingencies suggest that the future is clouded by big unknowns. JASA could be affected by nearby crises. Indeed, the whole Cold War structure of regional security, based on JASA, KASA, and AASA, might be in danger of cracking and giving way under the weight of crises on the Korean peninsula and Taiwan. America’s alliance network in Asia is at a turning point. The region is susceptible to being pushed down a slippery slope by provocations or catalytic developments in the DPRK or Taiwan.
JASA also confronts several internal problems: (1) There is the possibility that the area of overlap between Japanese and American interests may be shrinking; (2) The two countries may be pursuing divergent national goals; (3) A big gap in power, voice, and burden–sharing still exists; (4) There are uncertainties about the impact of domestic politics on JASA; (5) Nationalism may undercut support for JASA in both the United States and Japan; (6) The cohesion of the alliance may be tested by nettlesome differences on how to deal with China and Korea; and (7) To adapt to changes in the external environment, JASA will have to overcome the shackles of path dependency.
Because the fates of JASA and KASA have become more tightly intertwined, the termination of KASA would shift a great deal of pressure onto JASA. For JASA to survive under the scenario of KASA’s demise, several important adjustments would have to be made. The United States would have to revamp the security system in Asia, compensating for the loss of KASA by establishing closer ties with ASEAN or key states within ASEAN (such as the Philippines, Singapore, and Indonesia), organizing perhaps a trilateral security alliance involving the United States, Japan, and Australia, and perhaps down the road establishing informal ties with India. It would have to look at ways of making more effective use of bases in Guam, Alaska, and Hawaii as well as in Japan and Australia. JASA would have to be reorganized. Without KASA, Japan will have an incentive to upgrade its military capabilities. Japan would also seek to play a more active role in Asia.
Whether or not KASA is eliminated, the United States and Japan want to engage China in an ongoing security dialogue, listening to China’s security concerns and explaining American and Japanese policies. By engaging China in a substantive dialogue, the region might be spared the creation of a deep fissure between the United States and Japan, on one side, and China, on the other. It would be in no one’s interests to see Asia polarized, à la the Cold War. Polarization might prolong the life of JASA, but the costs would be unacceptably high in terms of the power struggles and the possibility of nasty confrontations. For JASA and KASA to function at optimal levels, China would have to understand and accept the nature and limitations of the roles played by JASA and KASA. China would have to buy into the notion that JASA and KASA are not aimed at bottling up China. The intention is, rather, to serve as:
A framework to sustain economic growth and prosperity in Asia
A hedge against unanticipated events and adverse developments
A means of responding to a range of contingencies, from high–intensity wars (as on the Korean peninsula) to low–intensity conflicts (like terrorism)
A foundation on which to conduct multilateral security dialogues
An instrument for preventing age–old rivalries from upsetting peace and stability in Asia and boiling over into violent conflicts
A way of minimizing the incentives for Japan to sever ties with the United States and build a military force capable of projecting a full range of offensive power
Whether this new raison d’être is compelling enough to persuade China to accept JASA’s existence remains to be seen. China may see JASA as nothing more than the institutionalization of American hegemony in Asia. If so, China will oppose JASA and a deep fissure will open up in Asia. Whether the new raison d’être is persuasive enough to keep political support in Washington and Tokyo also bears watching.
If, for whatever reasons, JASA fails to survive, then America’s global alliance network will be dealt a severe blow. Built as a new paradigm of indirect influence (in contrast to the colonial paradigm of direct control), America’s global alliance network has served to preserve and protect American interests over the four decades of the Cold War. Colonialism, the old paradigm, was wholly unable to make the transition to the new dynamics of the postwar world. Colonialism’s many fatal flaws sowed the seeds of its demise. Nationalism, anti–colonialism, and economic development destroyed colonial empires in most places around the world by 1965. Indeed, as early as 1956, the world’s reaction to the Suez Canal crisis graphically illustrated the obsolescence of colonialism.
The end of the Cold War has forced America’s global alliance network to confront the issue of what kind of adjustments should be made. In the years ahead, America’s global alliance network faces a number of challenges:
Finding a compelling rationale and clear statement of mission that will ensure political support at home.
Coping with security problems of low–medium level intensity
Customizing regional security arrangements to deal with the distinctive needs and circumstances of each region
Dealing with the reality that Asian states are gaining greater relative power and no longer seem to be as compliant and cooperative as before
Learning how to give allied states a greater voice
Dealing with anti–Americanism and anti–Westernism
Providing for the collective good
Coming up with adequate budgetary allocations
Integrating economic and politico–military aspects of security
The expansion of NATO represents a major adjustment in Europe. Whether it proves to be effective remains to be seen. The Middle East is another region where significant adjustments may be needed. Can U.S. commitments to Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey—and its cooperative relations with Egypt, Jordan, and other Arab states—be maintained in the face of Islamic fundamentalism, intensifying Arab–Israeli conflict, and terrorism? Will it be possible to bury the hatchet and normalize relations with Iran? Syria? Libya? Iraq? The challenge is daunting—more so than in Asia. And adjustments in all three regions—Asia, Europe, and the Middle East—are essential if America’s global alliance network is to retain its effectiveness.
Although the challenge of making adjustments may be less daunting in Asia than in the Middle East, the long–term stakes in Asia are no less high. The world’s economic center of gravity shifted from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic and now to the Pacific. Adjustments in Asia will not be easy, as this paper has pointed out. For the future of Asia, JASA is the key, just as it has been the key over the past half–century. What happens to JASA will determine, to a large extent, whether the unprecedented peace and prosperity that Asia has enjoyed over the second half of the twentieth century will be carried over into the next century. IR theory says JASA is in relatively good shape to make the transition. The current situation in Northeast Asia draws attention to many road hazards along the way.
Appendix
|
Pre–World War II |
Post–World War II |
|
Involuntary Incorporation Territoriality; Outward Expansion Unilateral Domination Direct Control Decree/Compliance Coercion No Exit High Transaction Costs Opportunism Asymmetric Rewards Rent Expropriation Primacy of Economic Interests No Basis for Collective Action Undifferentiated No Multilateral Support Structure |
Voluntary Participation No Territorial Imperative Bilateral Coordination External Pressures Negotiations/Compromise Persuasion Exit Option Low Transaction Costs Voice and Loyalty Asymmetric Costs Collective/Public Good Primacy of Security Interests Common Security Threat Multidimensionality Strong Multilateral Support Structure |
|
Supremacy of European Goals Divergent National Interests Direct Power Levers Exploitation Different Values and Norms Political Subjugation Anti–Imperialism/Colonialism Local Elites Rigid Structure Hard power Limited Accountability European Law (at the center) No Autonomy/Sovereignty |
Primacy of American Interests Overlapping National Interests Instruments of Indirect Influence Reciprocity Shared Values and Norms Self–Governance Anti–Americanism Pluralistic Competition Flexible System Soft Power Accountability National Law Autonomy/Sovereignty |
|
Self–Paying No Subsidies or Sidepayments Raw Materials and Markets Mercantilism Market Competition Gold Standard Separate Monetary Policies Economic Exploitation Economic Blocs High Trade Barriers Few International Organizations Ad Hoc Rules and Procedures One–Layered Structure Complementary Economies Abject Dependence |
Economic Aid Subsidies and Sidepayments International Division of Labor Flexible Exchange Rates Coordinated Monetary Policies Joint Prosperity Global Economy Lower Trade Barriers International Regimes (e.g., GATT) Clear–cut Rules and Procedures Multilayered: Bilateral Interactions within Multilateral Framework Integrated Economies Complex Interdependence |
|
Power Source: Land and Resources Restricted Information Flows Limited Feedback Imposition of European Culture Christian Proselytism Sparse Interactions Hierarchy Ascriptive Elites Community/Collectivity Racist Discrimination |
Power Source: Information/Knowledge Heavy Information Flows Abundant Feedback Appeal of American Culture Secular Values/Materialism Dense Interactions: Media, Travel, Study Abroad Egalitarian Norms Meritocratic Elites Individualism Tolerance for Racial Diversity |
|
Europe: Regional Power Superiority Colonial Empires Maintenance of Internal Order Conventional Weapons Local Presence and Prestige Extraterritoriality Status of Forces Agreements Permanent Presence Local Fighting Capability No International Resolutions Colonial Forces Only Military Blockades Ruler/Ruled Geographic Spheres of Influence Economy as Leading Edge |
U.S.: Global Power Preponderance Global Alliance Network External Deterrence and Defense Conventional and Nuclear Weapons Commitment and Credibility Status of Forces Agreements Military Bases and Contingency Access Power Projection Capability UN Resolutions: Justification Mobilization of Allied Forces Economic Embargoes/Sanctions Principal/Agent Relationship Global Networks and Linkages Military as Leading Edge |
Endnotes
Note 1: Daniel I.Okimoto, Theoretical Approaches to the Japan AmericaSecurity Alliance (Sydney: Centre for Japanese Economic Studies, MacquarieUniversity, Working Paper Series, No. 96–2, 1996). Back.
Note 2: Frederick S. Dunn, Peacemaking and the Settlement withJapan (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). Back.
Note 3: Michael Sheehan, The Balance of Power: History and Theory(London & New York: Routledge, 1996), 97–144. Back.
Note 4: Sheehan, The Balance of Power, 24–52. J. David Singer andMelvin Small, “Formal Alliances, 1815–1939,” Journal of Peace Research 1(1966), 1–32; Bruce M. Russett, “An Empirical Typology of InternationalMilitary Alliances,” Midwest Journal of Political Science, 15 (1971). Back.
Note 5: John K. Fairbank, “China’s Foreign Policy in HistoricalPerspective,” in Foreign Affairs, 47, 1969, pp. 449–63. “Maritime andContinental in China’s History,” in Cambridge History of China, 12(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 1–17. Back.
Note 6: Richard Rosecrance, The Rise of the Trading State (NewYork: Basic Books, 1986), 67–85; Reinhard Bendix, Kings or People(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), 247–430. Back.
Note 7: Sydney Giffard, Japan Among the Powers: 1890–1990 (NewHaven and London: Yale University Press, 1994). Back.
Note 8: James B. Crowley, Japan’s Quest for Autonomy (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1966). Back.
Note 9: Ian Nish, Alliance in Decline: A Study in Anglo–Japan Relations1908–23 (London: Athlone Press, 1972). Back.
Note 10: Dunn, Peacemaking and the Settlement with Japan, 123. Back.
Note 11: Daniel I. Okimoto, “The Economics of National Defense,” in D.I.Okimoto, ed., Japan’s Economy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1982),250–52. Back.
Note 12: The World Bank, The East Asian Miracle (Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press, 1993). Back.
Note 13: Daniel I. Okimoto, “The Asian Perimeter, Moving Front andCenter,” in Aspen Strategy Group Report, Facing the Future, 143–204. Back.
Note 14: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Back.
Note 15: E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis, 1919–1939 (London:Macmillan, 1951). Back.
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Note 17: Samuel Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remakingof World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 81–101. Back.
Note 18: Sheehan, The Balance of Power. Back.
Note 19: Among the thoughtful and stimulating examples of realistanalysis, see Paul Dibb, Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia (Oxford:Adelphi Paper, No. 295, IISS/Oxford University Press, 1995), Gerald Segal,Rethinking the Pacific (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), and Aaron L.Friedberg, “Recipe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia,” inMichael I. Brown, Sean M. Lynn–Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds., East AsianSecurity (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996). Back.
Note 20: For a discussion of “hard” and “soft” power, see Joseph S. Nye,Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York:Basic Books, Inc., 1990), 174–201. Back.
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Note 29: Okimoto, Theoretical Approaches to the Japan–America SecurityAlliance, 3. Back.
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Note 31: Tanisha Fazal, “Rethinking JASA” (Unpublished paper, June1997). Back.
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Note 40: William James Adams, ed., Singular Europe: Economy and Polityof the European Community after 1992 (Ann Arbor: University of MichiganPress, 1992). Back.
Note 41: Japan Center for International Exchange, A Handbook onJapanese Foreign Policy and Security (Tokyo: Japan Center for InternationalExchange, March 1978), 38. Back.
Note 42: Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1996). Back.
Note 43: Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); Lucian Pye and Sidney Verba,eds., Political Culture and Political Development (Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press, 1965). Back.
Note 44: Walter Lafeber, The Clash: U.S.–Japanese Relations ThroughoutHistory (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997); Nestor, op. cit.; John Welfield,An Empire in Eclipse (London: Athlone Press, 1988); Roger Buckley,U.S.–Japan Alliance Diplomacy: 1945–90 (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress, 1992). Back.
Note 45: Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan’s NationalSecurity (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993). Back.
Note 46: Daniel I. Okimoto and James H. Raphael, “Ambivalence, Continuity,and Change: American Attitudes Toward Japan and U.S.–Japan Relations,” in AspenStrategy Group Report Harness the Rising Sun (Aspen: Aspen StrategyGroup, 1993), 117–63 Back.
Note 47: Michael H. Armacost, Friends or Rivals? (New York:Columbia University Press, 1996), 77–171. Back.
Note 48: Andrew K. Hanami, The Military Might of Modern Japan(Dubuque: Kendall/Hunt Publishing Co., 1995), 67. Back.
Note 49: Denny Roy, “Hegemon on the Horizon? China’s Threat to East AsianSecurity,” in M. Brown et al., eds., 112–32. Richard Bernstein and Ross H.Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Knopf, 1997). Back.
Note 50: Daniel I. Okimoto, et al., A United States Policy for theChanging Realities of East Asia (Stanford: Asia/Pacific Research Center,1996). Back.
Note 51: Henry S. Rowen, “The Short March: China’s Road to Democracy,"The National Interest (Fall 1996). S.M. Lipset, Political Man (GardenCity, NY: Doubleday, 1963). Back.
Note 52: Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation. Back.
Note 53: Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca andLondon: Cornell University Press, 1987). Back.
Note 54: Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas (Reading, MA:Addison–Wesley, 1997), 393–408. Back.
Note 55: Paul Giarra, “U.S.–Japan Defense Guidelines” (Stanford:Asia/Pacific Research Center, 1997). Back.
Note 56: Institute for National Strategic Studies and National DefenseUniversity, 1997: Strategic Assessment (Washington, D.C.: Institute forNational Strategic Studies and National Defense University, 1997), 185–230. Back.
Note 57: Lee Jay Cho and Yoon Hyung Kim, Economic Systems in South andNorth Korea (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1995). Back.
Note 58: Armacost, Friends or Rivals? Back.
Note 59: Daniel I. Okimoto, “Multilateralism in Asia,” in Richard J.Ellings, ed., Americans Speak to APEC: Building a New Order with Asia(Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 1993), 18–20.
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