CIAO DATE: 8/99

Regional Burden-Sharing for Humanitarian Action

David O’Brien

April 1999

New York University Center on International Cooperation

 

Table of Contents

Forward

Introduction

Section 1: Factors Undermining Humanitarian Action

1.1 Declining resources
1.2 Uneven coverage across crises
1.3 Imbalance among humanitarian contributors

Section 2: Regional Responses to Regional Problems

2.1 Organization of African Unity
2.2 Arab Maghreb Union
2.3 Economic Community of Central African States
2.4 Economic Community of West African States

(i) Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
2.5 Intergovernmental Authority on Development
2.6 Southern African Development Community
2.7 Partnership arrangements

(i) Peace and security operations
(ii) Relief operations

Section 3: Financing Regional Responses to Regional Problems

3.1 Non-African funds for humanitarian action
3.2 African financial resources
3.3 The capacity to contribute: some projections

Conclusion

Annexes

References

 

Acronyms

ACRI	African Crisis Response Initiative (US)
ADB	African Development Bank
AMU	Arab Maghreb Union
CAP	United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process
CDERA	Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency
CILSS	Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel
DAC	Development Assistance Committee
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ECOMOG	ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group
ECOSOG	Economic and Social Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
GHAI	Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (US)
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OAU SCFAR	SCFAR Special Contingency Fund for Assistance to African Refugee
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD	Organization for Economic Development and Cooperation
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SEADF	Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa
SRF	Special Relief Fund for African Countries Affected by Drought
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WFP	World Food Program

Forward ₁

The Center on International Cooperation is an independent institute that promotes policy research and international consultations on multilateral responses to transnational problems. Its project on “Resources for Humanitarian Assistance" examines an interrelated set of management, coordination, and financing issues in an effort to improve the quality of humanitarian aid.

In September 1997, the Center hosted a meeting that brought together representatives from intergovernmental and non-governmental humanitarian agencies, as well as donor representatives and other experts, to focus on issues of resource mobilization, standby capacity and coordination for humanitarian assistance. In advance of the meeting, the Center circulated a background paper, “Paying for Essentials: Resources for Humanitarian Assistance," which was based on input from the primary intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations and other experts. ₂ The paper, from which the meeting agenda was drawn, analyzed the overall financial situation facing the humanitarian enterprise; examined the ways in which patterns of funding, as well as gross amounts, affect the delivery of assistance; and identified several finance and readiness options that could strengthen the capacity and performance of the humanitarian system.

The meeting participants developed a set of recommendations for additional research and policy consultations. Three reports were subsequently commissioned. One examines alternative funding scenarios, specifically the role of “up-front" funds and their influence on the capacity of humanitarian agencies to secure their core competencies and to improve their ability for early response. The second report explores the potential for, and effect of, greater participation of local and regional professionals in the staffing of humanitarian operations. This, the third report, explores the concept of burden-sharing as a means to widen and increase the responsibility of regional and sub-regional organizations for humanitarian action.

This report focuses on the African continent. While there is some evidence of an ‘African renaissance’, a reference to the determination among African leaders to create the conditions for peace, security and development, Africa remains a continent of concern. The vulnerability to and frequency of humanitarian emergencies are rooted in an interrelated set of political, historical, socioeconomic and environmental factors.

As humanitarian emergencies rarely respect borders, intergovernmental cooperation is often needed and requested. In Africa, the most relevant intergovernmental organizations are those of the UN system, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and increasingly, Africa’s sub-regional organizations. Individual states, NGOs and the private sector are important actors but they rarely have the capacity to undertake, in a coherent and coordinated manner, the range of humanitarian actions this report examines at a national or regional level. Furthermore, most NGOs do not have an independent funding base. While the private and corporate sector make humanitarian contributions, their contributions are episodic and difficult to quantify. Consequently, the burden-sharing debate is most pertinent and pressing at the intergovernmental level. Governments and international organizations regularly negotiate over how best to respond to major humanitarian emergencies, and how to finance humanitarian action. In the final analysis, these actors, complemented by the efforts of NGOs, have to assume the primary responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs.

For present purposes, humanitarian action is understood to include both (1) peace and security operations ₃ and (2) relief operations ₄ in preparation of and response to natural catastrophes and conflict situations. This broad scope is warranted because humanitarian action in Africa frequently involves military and civilian actors ₅ . Military personnel are not confined to peace and security operations, and civilian actors are involved in peacemaking and peace-building initiatives. Moreover, within regional African organizations the distinctions between peace and security operations and relief operations are not so sharp. To focus solely on civilian relief delivery capacities would simplify artificially the range of humanitarian activities undertaken within the international humanitarian system.

 

Introduction

The emergence of an international humanitarian system, the codification of international humanitarian law and the corresponding creation of supportive organizations, is arguably one of the most welcomed forms of multilateralism in the 20^th century. At the close of this century, billions of dollars are raised annually by the UN system to alleviate the suffering caused by natural disasters and war but this financial support is declining and increasingly unable to meet humanitarian needs. This declining resource base, along with a search to diversify sources of funding and the recognition that some emergencies receive adequate attention while others do not, raises question for the need for new burden-sharing arrangements.

The burden-sharing concept has been advanced by various actors as a means to alter the existing division of resources and responsibility for humanitarian initiatives. For example, the European Union representative to the July 1998 ECOSOC session on humanitarian issues commented that the EU would like to see non-traditional donors increase their financial contributions to UN humanitarian initiatives. Likewise, the UNHCR annual Executive Committee meeting in 1998 examined burden-sharing as a means to strengthen its work. Meanwhile, OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim has urged member states to increase their efforts to prevent and respond to emergencies. Finally, the UN Secretary-Generals, Boutros Boutros-Ghali and his successor Kofi Annan have both called on regional organizations to assume greater political and operational responsibility for humanitarian action. ₆

How the burden for humanitarian action is shared can be either voluntarily or legally determined. Burden-sharing as a voluntary act is a form of international solidarity. From the Irish potato famine of the 1840s to hurricane Mitch in Central America in 1998, governments, religious and secular organizations have responded voluntarily to humanitarian emergencies. When encoded in international law, burden-sharing binds states to cooperative action to uphold shared goals. For example, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, obliges member states to cooperate on humanitarian issues, calling on them to “take appropriate measures [to] lighten the burden of the Member State granting asylum." ₇ Unlike the UN’s formula for assessing membership dues, however, there is no formula in the OAU refugee convention indicating how this burden should be shared. Potentially burden-sharing could take many forms, including both tangible resources such as financial resources and in-kind contributions, as well as non-quantifiable assets like leadership, good offices, and political support that institutions and leaders lend to humanitarian action.

Two agendas appear to be competing in discussions regarding burden-sharing. On the one hand, burden-sharing seeks a new division of labor for humanitarian action based on the principles of cooperation and complementarity. Burden-shifting, on the other hand, has the opposite intent. It seeks to transfer the primary responsibility for responding to humanitarian emergencies to countries or regions that are affected by crises without due concern for whether the organizational capacity exists to respond effectively. Transferring the burden of action to countries or regions affected by humanitarian emergencies is appealing to Western governments that are increasingly reluctant to commit military or civilian personnel to politically volatile and physically dangerous situations. ₈ On its own, however, this transfer will not result in effective humanitarian action.

To improve humanitarian action, burden-sharing must be founded on the principles of complementarity and cooperation, and it must be nurtured and sustained over time. This requires a commitment to humanitarian values and intergovernmental cooperation as a means to prevent and respond to emergencies ₉ . In addition, governments and intergovernmental organizations in the affected regions must have a capacity for humanitarian action. If absent or underdeveloped a domestic response will be inadequate and international assistance will not have a framework in which to complement domestic efforts. These capacities can be developed or strengthened through regional and international cooperation. ₁₀ Improving the international humanitarian response system will require the consideration of new and innovative institutional reforms, capacity-building projects, and resource mobilization mechanisms.

This report highlights the capacities of African intergovernmental organizations to respond to humanitarian needs and examines the possibility of greater financial contributions for humanitarian assistance from governments and intergovernmental organizations in the regions in which crises occur. The report describes the existing and evolving institutional mechanisms for humanitarian action as a basis for understanding what needs to be done to strengthen the humanitarian capacities within regional and sub-regional organizations.

The Organization of the Study

The first section examines the weaknesses of the international humanitarian system. The second evaluates the organizational structure, technical capacity and financial resources of Africa’s principal regional organizations, including partnership arrangements that seek to fortify regional organizations’ capacities. In the final section, regional organizations’ current financing arrangements for humanitarian action are discussed, followed by some quantitative projections to suggest how additional resources could be raised.

 

Section 1: Factors Undermining Humanitarian Action

Three weaknesses of the international humanitarian system are particularly troubling. First, the decline of resources for humanitarian action in recent years has raised serious concerns about the international community’s readiness and ability to respond to humanitarian emergencies. Second, there is an uneven distribution of resources across crises; some appeals receive adequate attention while others are neglected. Third, humanitarian action is predominately financed and designed by the OECD countries.

1.1. Declining resources

There is insufficient financial commitment to meet current and projected humanitarian needs. According to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), global needs decreased gradually from their peak in 1994 to 1997 but rebounded sharply in 1998 (see Chart 1). Meanwhile, funding has declined continually. As a result, resources for humanitarian action are increasingly insufficient to meet overall needs. According to the United Nations Inter-Agency Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) data, a primary source for monitoring resource trends for humanitarian action, appeals fell consistently short of their targets. ₁₁ In this regard, 1998 was the worst year to date. The percentage of global needs met through the CAP has declined steadily, from 75.8% in 1994, to 64% in 1997, and to just 32.9% mid way in 1998. ₁₂

The coverage of Africa’s humanitarian needs follow the global pattern of a growing resource gap. Chart 1 demonstrates graphically the resource chasm between the requirements and the funds committed through the Coordinated Appeals Process (CAP) for Africa (s ) and globally (l ). The solid lines represent estimated needs and the dotted lines represent the amount of needs actually met.

Global and Africa’ Humanitarian Resource Gap
CAP Required and Needs Covered (‘94-‘98)

Source: The Financial Tracking Database for Complex Emergencies at http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html
* Mid-year estimate

1.2 Uneven coverage across crises

Funding shortfalls are particularly acute in cases of so-called ‘forgotten emergencies’. Sudan, a country that has continually been the subject of appeals, receives the African average, with 32% of CAP projected needs covered mid-way through 1998. Countries such as Sierra Leone and Liberia fall below this 32% average with 28.9% and 27.5% of needs covered, respectively. The 1997 appeal for the Republic of Congo and the recent appeal for Guinea-Bissau received, respectively, only 7.9% and 9.9% of estimated requirements, whereas the Great Lakes appeal was 84.4% fulfilled. ₁₃

Related to this is the uneven funding for certain types of assistance. For example, food aid is usually forthcoming but there maybe little support for agricultural rehabilitation efforts. The impact of the unevenness of funding across sectors was underlined by Kofi Annan, who wrote:

when resources are inadequate for certain sectors or types of activities, the effectiveness of the overall humanitarian program is compromised. Failure to provide assistance for rehabilitation activities, such as agricultural recovery, risks the creation of a relief dependency syndrome among persons affected by crisis and may result in increased assistance requirements at a later date. ₁₄

1.3 Imbalance among humanitarian contributors

In 1995-1996, ten donors accounted for 92% of total funds committed to the CAP funding mechanism; ₁₅ the top twenty (all OECD countries, plus the European Commission) contributed 99%. Within the regions in which crises occur, on the other hand, only a few governments have responded to CAP appeals. In Africa, only Libya, South Africa, Tunisia, and Mauritius reported making financial contributions to the CAP in 1995 and 1996; their contributions totaled 0.02% of aggregate funding for humanitarian assistance in those years (see Annex 2). Similarly the WFP reports that among the 69 governments contributing to its programs in 1997, eight were from Africa but their contributions accounted for less than 0.03% of the total (Annex 1). Meanwhile, emergencies in Africa consumed almost 50% of donor assistance during those years.

The narrow multilateral source of aid raises questions about the importance that governments accord to supporting multilateral humanitarian assistance. The level of disinterest is difficult to ascertain but when an emergency overwhelms national capacities, affected governments do call on the UN system for assistance, irrespective of their previous financial and political support. When this occurs, the UN agencies and the affected governments are ultimately reliant on a few countries for assistance. In 1993, the Executive Secretary for the UN Economic Commission for Africa went so far as to exclaim that the people of Africa have become chronically vulnerable and dependent on international charity for survival. ₁₆ Aid dependence can erode the legitimacy of elected governments and it also undermines real participation. As a result partnership arrangements between the international community and affected governments or involved regional organizations become difficult to nurture.

A burden-sharing approach that is firmly based in a sense of partnership could improve these conditions in the following ways. First, a more widely shared burden might increase the aggregate level of financial resources available for humanitarian action. Second, burden-sharing could improve cooperation and coordination, thereby heightening attention to unmet needs and sectoral imbalances. Finally, if countries within the region share the costs for relief aid, burden-sharing can have a positive influence on stimulating preventive action and developing a more coherent approach for humanitarian action.

 

Section 2: Regional Responses to Regional Problems

The burden-sharing debate, if it is to be moved forward constructively, needs to be informed by an understanding of the capacities and potential for humanitarian action within Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations. This section profiles the continent’s principal organizations and includes information on their mandates, selected economic and demographic indicators of their member states, and their institutional mechanisms for peace and security, and relief operations.

Africa’s intergovernmental institutions have grown in number in the wake of the de-colonization process. Yet, very few intergovernmental organizations have mandates covering humanitarian affairs, and even fewer still have the means or mechanisms to finance humanitarian action. When intergovernmental cooperation for these purposes has occurred, it has been generally on an ad hoc basis and reliant on extra-regional resources. In recent years, however, African states are pursuing efforts to develop and strengthen regional and sub-regional systems for humanitarian action.

In addition to the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the principal continental organization, each of Africa’s geographic regions currently hosts a sub-regional organization: the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) in the North; the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) in Central Africa; the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the West; Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) in the East; and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in the South. Combined, the members of these sub-regional organizations constitute the membership of the OAU. ₁₇

In contrast to the OAU’s broad mandate, these sub-regional organizations are devoted primarily to economic development. Belatedly, and sometimes reluctantly, they have assumed a mandate to deal with humanitarian issues. The ability and capacity of these organizations to undertake peace and security operations and relief operations varies markedly. This section investigates these variations by highlighting basic economic and demographic data and then by exploring regional arrangements for humanitarian action.

Table 1 lists selected economic and demographic indicators of OAU member states grouped by their respective sub-regional organizational affiliation ₁₈ . The general indicators recognize the economic size and population distribution. The fiscal data suggests whether or not member states are likely to have resources to finance regional initiatives and whether their ability to do so is improving. External debt figures gauge whether past expenditure has been financed by government revenues, while debt service ratios indicate the current drain borrowing has had on the economy. Finally high aid levels highlight regional dependence on external sources to meet development objectives and food requirements.

Table 1: OAU Member State Profile, Organized by Membership in Sub-Regional Organizations

	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP)1			Debt		Aid
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop. ('95 thousand)4	Weighted GNP p.c. ('95 US$)4	80-85	91-95	No. countries improved (+) / worsened (-)	Debt Service ('95, % of X G&S***)2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP)4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP) 4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, as % Cereal Imports) 3
AMU
Av. totals	91764*	70937*	1294	-7.06	-2.28	5 (+) / 1 (-)	27.33	90.50	5.61	3.28
ECCAS
Av .totals	18883*	83786*	226	-6.06	-11.06	0 (+) / 10 (-)	12.60	197.08	34.09	20.55
ECOWAS
Av. total	66511*	208003*	320	-9.34	-5.54	12 (+) / 4 (-)	23.06	129.76	18.40	13.81
IGAD
Av. totals	18067*	142633*	127	-9.97	-6.22	4 (+) / 2 (-)**	20.20	99.54	14.21	53.49
SADC
Av. total	165953*	175465*	946	-4.72	-5.64	8 (+) / 6 (-)	35.54	128.65	16.05	29.31
* Aggregate totals. ** One country data not available. *** % of X G&S = export of goods and services. Sources: 1 African Development Bank, 1997. African Development Report. Oxford: OUP. Table 5.3. 2 World Bank, 1997. World Development Report 1997. Oxford: OUP. Table 17. 3 United Nations Development Program, 1997. Human Development Report. Oxford: OUP, Table 14. 4 OECD, ‘Indicators’, at <http://www.oecd.org/dac/Indicators/htm/tables.htm.>

In terms of the regional variations, Central Africa (ECCAS) and the Horn (IGAD) are the poorest regions in terms of GNP per capita. Their member states have the highest frequency of fiscal deficits; only four of the seventeen countries in these two regions have improved their fiscal balances. In the area of aid dependence, IGAD countries are the most heavily reliant on food aid, while foreign aid represents one third of ECCAS’ combined GNP. ECOWAS and SADC are important organizations simply because of the numbers of peoples they represent and combined size of their economies. However, Western and Southern Africa are heavily indebted regions and have high debt servicing ratios (measured as a percent of exports of goods and services). By contrast, AMU member states are not heavily reliant on aid, have the highest average GNP per capita but relatively high debt service payments. These variations illustrate salient regional differences and influence, but in no way determines, the ability of the organization to contribute towards humanitarian assistance in light of apparent needs.

2.1 Organization of African Unity

The OAU was founded in 1963 to promote African unity and solidarity. It is foremost a political forum, a ‘coalition intermediary’ for African states. Its continent-wide scope makes it the principal political forum in Africa. The continent’s gradual but uneven transition to democratic leadership has helped to restore the legitimacy of OAU member states and consequently the OAU’s authority. According to Salim Salim, the 1997 Harare Sessions of Council and Summit demonstrated “great momentum to … efforts aimed at promoting its peace and development agenda. ... The Summit also portrayed the image of an Organization which is ready to assume its share of responsibilities in fulfilling the aspirations of its continent and peoples.” ₁₉ Its ability to realize its responsibilities is though somewhat constrained by the fact that arrears in OAU membership dues, although decreasing, represent slightly more than half of the organization’s $60 million 1996 – 1998 budget.

Peace and security operations

The OAU Charter strongly upholds state sovereignty and respect for non-interference in member state domestic affairs. Consequently, the OAU has undertaken peace-making and peace-building initiatives on an ad hoc basis. Only recently and in exceptional circumstances has the OAU undertaken peacekeeping operations and condoned peace-enforcement interventions.

Among the OAU’s peace-making activities are its fact-finding and mediation missions. The OAU Secretary General, as a matter of course, offers his good offices for conflict mediation. The OAU has attempted to mediate conflicts with mixed results in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Zaire, Sudan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea. The International Panel of Eminent Personalities investigating the causes and atrocities committed in the Rwandan genocide is an important example of the OAU’s widening range of post-conflict peace-building activities. The increasing use of OAU election monitors is another, and suggests that states are loosening the strict application of non-invention in domestic affairs.

Only very recently has the OAU become involved in peace-enforcement and peacekeeping. The first OAU military response to a domestic conflict was the 1981 Inter-African Force to Chad. The financial, legal and political problems resulting from this mission led some within the OAU to doubt the organization’s capacity for such action. However, insufficient international response to subsequent African crises has forced the OAU’s hand to act. Recent examples include OAU peacekeeping missions to Rwanda following the Arusha Agreement, which was subsequently taken over by the UN in October 1993. Five African countries shared the burden of this mission by fielding a battalion (800 soldiers). Shortly thereafter, the OAU organized and deployed the OAU Military Observer Mission to Burundi (OMIB), maintaining relative order until the 1996 Buyoya coup d’etat enveloped the country in chaos. Although OMIB has been cited as an OAU success story, the fact that it was largely funded by non-OAU countries, has “both set an important precedent for future OAU conflict management activities, and created a dilemma for the OAU as external funding necessarily diminished its control over missions.” ₂₀ The OAU’s inability to assume and sustain the entire financial burden of its initiatives has been one factor that has undermined its effectiveness.

Seeking to improve upon its ad hoc and crisis-driven reaction to regional crises, the OAU in 1993 established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. The Mechanism provides for a new organizational structure with a mandate to prevent and resolve conflicts. According to Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe, it was created “because Africans have come to realise that peace and stability are the sine qua non of the socio-economic development programmes of their continent.” ₂₁

The Mechanism is under the political direction of the Central Organ, a committee of member states that meets at the level of Heads of State, Ministers and Ambassadors, annually, twice yearly and monthly, respectively. These are the Mechanism’s deliberative and policy making bodies. The operational arms of the Mechanism are the good offices of the OAU Secretary General and the Conflict Management Division of the OAU Department of Political Affairs.

The Conflict Management Division has three sections, (i) the Conflict Prevention and Research Section, (ii) the Conflict Resolution, Defense and Security Section and the (iii) Military Section. To augment the Division’s work, the Conflict Management Center is currently being developed to monitor conflict situations in Africa. The Center will also provide the Secretariat and policy-making bodies with information on potential Special Envoys, Special Representatives of the Secretary General, and election observers; monitor the impact of conflicts in Africa (refugee flows, internal human displacement, environmental degradation, etc.); and generally act as the OAU’s institutional memory on conflict issues.

Strengthening the capacities of these specialized organs could greatly enhance the OAU’s ability to prevent and mediate African conflicts. The OAU has also discussed the feasibility of developing a standing peacekeeping force but it is unlikely to take concrete steps in this direction in the near term. At the present moment, the OAU Secretariat is not pushing for a continental stand-by force but is encouraging sub-regional organizations to develop their own peacekeeping capacities.

Relief operations

The majority of the OAU’s relief work is undertaken by its refugee bodies: (i) the Commission on Refugees, (ii) the Coordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees, and (iii) the Division for Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs.

The Commission on Refugees was established in 1964 to examine Africa’s refugee problem and make recommendations to the OAU’s policymaking body, the Council of Ministers. This Commission has a mandate to provide assistance to refugees, to conduct fact-finding missions, and to coordinate member state relief assistance and humanitarian appeals. It has authorized numerous missions that include Algeria, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea, Liberia, Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. Since its inception the membership of the Commission has expanded from the original ten countries to all OAU member states.

The Coordinating Committee on Assistance to Refugees is under the political direction of the Commission on Refugees. The Coordinating Committee is comprised of OAU representatives, UN agencies (UNHCR, WHO, UNDP, UNECA, UNESCO, and WHO) and NGOs. It coordinates action among these organizations and mobilizes support for capacity building projects. The implementation body is the Division for Refugee, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs, which receives its political directives from the Coordinating Committee. Its duties include upholding the OAU refugee convention, undertaking education and training activities, and keeping the international community informed on the refugee situation in Africa.

2.2 Arab Maghreb Union (AMU)

Attempts to establish a North African sub-regional organization date back to the 1960s but the Treaty establishing the AMU was ratified only in 1989. The main purpose of the AMU is economic integration and joint planning in the areas of agriculture, industry, food security, and trade. The Secretariat has a small annual budget of $1.7 million.

Table 2: AMU General Indicators

member State	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP)1			Debt		Aid		Poverty Lines4
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop. ('95 thousand)4	GNP p.c. ('95 US$)4	80-85	91-95	Change (+ / -)	Debt Service ('95, % of X G&S)2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP) 4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP)4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, %of Cereal Imports)3	Survey Year	Population below $2/day (%)
Algeria	44800	28109	1580	4.60	-2.80	-	38.70	94.27	0.80	0.30	1995	18
Libya	n/a	5043	n/a	-16.70	0.00	+	n/a	9.12	0.02	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mauritania	1058	2274	460	-9.00	-2.50	+	21.50	215.02	24.83	10.68	1988	68
Morocco	29526	26524	1120	-9.30	-2.60	+	32.10	74.46	1.81	0.77	1990	20
Tunisia	16380	8987	1820	-4.90	-3.50	+	17.00	59.60	0.58	1.38	1990	23
Total	91764	70937
Av. Totals			1294*	-7.06	-2.28		27.33	90.50	5.61	3.28
* Weighted average. Source: see Table 1

The AMU has the smallest population base and the highest average per capita GNP of the five sub-regional groupings. Member state fiscal balances are favorable, and the region is not heavily reliant on aid or food aid. These favorable conditions aside, the AMU has not been an effective organization in promoting its principal objective of economic integration. Tunisia, historically the political force for regional integration, has been less inclined recently to champion the AMU cause. ₂₂ The deep political and security crisis in Algeria and the international isolation of Libya have also reduced regional cooperation.

Peace and security operations

As with other regional organizations, non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states is a pillar of the AMU Treaty. Whereas the OAU and some sub-regional organizations have begun to view domestic conflicts as a threat to regional security, and been willing in some instances to give precedence to human security over national sovereignty, the AMU has not altered its original position. Given the prolonged dispute over the Western Sahara, border tension between Morocco and Algeria, and Tunisia’s distrust of Libyan policy towards it, ₂₃ AMU member states are unlikely to develop a collective action mechanism, let alone a specialized agencies to coordinate humanitarian interventions.

Relief operations

The AMU Council of Foreign Affairs Ministers has four specialized Ministerial Commissions. The work of one of these commissions, the Ministerial Commission on Food Security is relevant to reducing vulnerability to natural disasters. However, the AMU Secretariat cannot act on the Commission’s recommendations because the latter does not have the technical competency or resources to implement projects. Once the AMU establishes, as envisioned, a regional development bank to finance projects, the Commission’s work may evolve into AMU sponsored projects.

2.3 Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS)

Established in 1981, ECCAS aims to promote cooperation and regional development. The objective of ECCAS is to improve the quality of life within the region, to foster economic cooperation, and to build peaceful and closer relations among member states. This will be a challenge since the sub-region has been afflicted by many international and civil wars in recent years. The organization employs 71 full-time staff. Its budgetary details were unavailable for this report.

Table 3: ECCAS General Indicators

member State	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP) 1			Debt		Aid		Poverty Lines4
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop. ('95 thousand)4	GNP p.c. ('95 US$)4	80-85	91-95	Change (+ / -)	Debt Service ('95, % of X G&S) 2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP)4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP)4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, %of Cereal Imports)3	Survey Year	Pop. below $2/day (%)
Burundi	1008	6264	170	-1.10	-3.0	-	n/a	100.55	20.22	45.71	n/a	n/a
Cameroon	8645	13288	570	0.50	-6.7	-	20.10	116.52	5.88	0.88	n/a	n/a
C. African Rep.	1122	3275	350	-3.80	-7.10	-	6.80	93.91	14.98	1.92	n/a	n/a
Chad	1152	6448	160	-3.60	-8.9	-	5.90	99.00	26.72	28.00	n/a	n/a
Congo Rep.	1768	2633	610	-7.00	-12.4	-	14.40	349.92	16.33	13.95	n/a	n/a
Congo Dem. Rep.	n/a	43848	140	-3.40	-17.0	-	n/a	178.94	3.42	32.81	n/a	n/a
Equatorial Guinea	152	400	440	-5.40	-7.9	-	n/a	175.78	21.47	n/a	n/a	n/a
Gabon	3839	1098	3820	2.80	-2.4	-	15.80	112.46	3.12	n/a	n/a	n/a
Rwanda	1152	6400	180	-3.00	-7.4	-	n/a	87.85	56.04	n/a	1983	89
Sao Tome and Principe	45	132	320	-36.60	-37.8	-	n/a	655.87	172.67	n/a	n/a	n/a
Total	18883	83786
Av. Totals			226*	-6.06	-11.06		12.60	197.08	34.09	20.55
* Weighted average Source: See Table 1

The quantitative figures that stand out for ECCAS member states are their relatively high dependence on food aid, high external debt, and worsening fiscal balances. The region also has the second lowest GNP per capita. Combined, the ECCAS grouping is not in a favorable position to mobilize resources for the humanitarian assistance needs facing most of its members.

Peace and security, and relief operations

Despite the wave of crises in the region, ECCAS has not developed a specialized organ devoted to humanitarian issues. Its Section of General Affairs does have a security mandate but the secretariat does not have a reactive capacity. Similarly the Section on Agriculture and Industry investigates agricultural production and trade issues but there is no system in place for regional food distribution in times of food shortage or for emergency response.

2.4 Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)

The ECOWAS treaty was signed in Lagos in May 1975. The primary objective of the organization is to create an economic and monetary union although its activities extend to agriculture, industry, natural resource management, health, and social programs. West Africa has a relatively strong tradition of intergovernmental cooperation, reflected by the region’s numerous multilateral institutions. In a move to rationalize intergovernmental cooperation, state representatives agreed at the 1990 Banjul Summit to incorporate other West African sub-regional organizations under ECOWAS’ framework. This bolstered ECOWAS’ importance as the primary intergovernmental organization in the sub-region.

However, Lansana Kouyate, the Executive Secretary of ECOWAS has criticized member state leaders for their partial support of the organization. Exact budgetary details are unknown but one recent account estimates that member states owe $30 million in arrears. ₂₄ Since the organization’s annual operating budget is approximately $10 million dollars, these arrears severely hamper its activities. ECOWAS employs approximately 200 people.

Table 4: ECOWAS General Indicators

member State	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP) 1			Debt			Aid		Poverty Lines4
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop. ('95 thousand)4	GNP p.c. ('95 US$)4	80-85	91-95	Change (+ / -)		Debt Service ('95, % of X G&S) 2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP)4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP) 4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, % of Cereal Imports)3	Survey Year	Pop. Below $2/day (%)
Benin	2035	5475	360	-10.60	0.30	+		8.40	93.19	14.61	14.02	n/a	n/a
Burkina Faso	2392	10377	210	-0.40	-0.30	+		11.10	68.09	19.36	17.27	n/a	n/a
Cape Verde	365	380	1000	-31.10	-9.00	+		n/a	53.98	28.01	n/a	n/a	n/a
Gambia	352	1113	320	-8.50	0.10	+		14.00	125.87	12.10	32.48	n/a	n/a
Ghana	6669	17075	350	-19.80	-5.10	+		23.10	99.59	10.72	2.04	n/a	n/a
Guinea	3630	6591	540	-0.40	-3.50	-		25.30	93.99	10.05	7.55	1991	50
Guinea-Bissau	275	1069	240	-21.50	-12.3	+		66.90	353.24	59.94	2.94	1991	97
Cote d'Ivoire	9240	13978	660	-8.40	-8.30	+		23.10	192.87	12.04	12.02	1988	55
Liberia	n/a	2733	n/a	-9.80	-17.0	-		n/a	120.49	13.11	n/a	n/a	n/a
Mali	2450	9705	250	-6.40	-3.80	+		12.60	121.41	21.86	24.29	n/a	n/a
Mauritania	1058	2274	460	-9.00	-2.50	+		21.50	215.02	24.83	10.68	1988	68
Niger	1980	9028	200	-6.30	-4.40	+		19.80	92.38	14.37	20.65	1992	92
Nigeria	28938	111273	220	-1.20	-8.40	-		12.30	120.61	0.88	n/a	1992-93	60
Senegal	5100	8312	540	-4.30	-1.30	+		18.70	92.79	13.24	2.76	1991-92	80
Sierra Leone	756	4510	170	-9.20	-4.30	+		60.30	118.86	24.86	21.28	n/a	n/a
Togo	1271	4110	300	-2.60	-8.90	-		5.70	113.72	14.36	11.59	n/a	n/a
Total	66511	208003
Av.total			320*	-9.34	-5.54			23.06	129.76	18.40	13.81
* Weighted average Source: See Table 1

The combined population of ECOWAS member states makes it the most populated sub-region in Africa. Where data are available, the majority of the population is income poor. ECOWAS member states receive relatively high levels of aid but the food aid component of this aid is low. In 1994 cereal food aid as a percent of imported cereals came to 13.8%, a modest figure considering the region’s history of food insecurity. Member state fiscal balances have improved, but the region’s average external debt is the highest in Africa, and its debt-servicing obligations are the second highest.

Peace and security operations

The original ECOWAS treaty was silent on the issue of regional security. The 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance on Defense (MAD) changed this by calling for collective action in the event of inter-state and domestic conflicts. MAD envisioned the development of the following organs for collective action: (i) the Authority of Heads of State and Government, (ii) the Defense Council, (iii) the Defense Committee, (iv) the Allied Force of the Community, and (v) the Deputy Executive Secretary for Military Matters. These institutional structures were to be located within the ECOWAS secretariat.

The MAD Protocol entered into force in 1986, but not until March 1998 did ECOWAS member states establish guidelines for the creation of a permanent mechanism for conflict prevention, management, resolution, and peace-keeping. ₂₅

The absence of a permanent mechanism did not prevent ECOWAS from undertaking peace and security operations. Led by Nigeria, the ECOWAS Military Observer Group (ECOMOG) has undertaken peace-enforcement and peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Sierra Leone. More recently, the Guinea-Bissau government requested that ECOMOG intervene to stop a mounting rebellion.

On humanitarian grounds, there was a clear need to intervene in Liberia and Sierra Leone but some member states, particularly Francophone ones, were concerned by Nigeria’s dominant role and its motives for military intervention. A recent ECOWAS report indicated the following shortcomings of ECOMOG’s initial interventions: the use of force was not legally authorized; ECOMOG was not sufficiently multinational; and, the ECOWAS Secretariat did not have proper command and control over the operation. ₂₆

ECOMOG has received much attention because it was the first sub-regional organization in Africa to undertake a peacekeeping operation. In October 1998, ECOWAS Heads of State endorsed a proposal to create the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-Keeping and Security, which will make ECOMOG a permanent stand-by force. The ECOWAS Mechanism will come into effect in the year 2000, pending the full implementation of the provisions of the Protocol of Non-Aggression (1978), MAD (1981), and Article 58 of the ECOWAS Revised Treaty.

Importantly, the ECOWAS Mechanism makes a direct link between peace and security operations and relief operations. The provision of humanitarian assistance will come under the mandate of the new Department of Operations, Peace-Keeping and Humanitarian Affairs and ECOMOG will be the main implementing entity. The authors of the Mechanism recognize that ECOWAS has neglected to provide relief assistance when humanitarian crises arise and that providing assistance can be both a preventive and a conflict management measure. When the Mechanism becomes operational, for the first time ECOWAS will have a mandate for humanitarian action backed by a stand-by force that can be deployed when a conflict “threatens to trigger a humanitarian disaster, poses a serious threat to regional security, [or] following the overthrow of a democratically-elected government". ₂₇

Relief operations

(i) Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS).

Until the ECOWAS Mechanism becomes operational, the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), will continue to be the principal organization in West Africa for relief operations. The Francophone members of ECOWAS founded CILSS after the 1972-73 Sahel drought. It has since developed operational and research capabilities in food security, natural resource management and agricultural development. These competencies are based in three centers located in different member states. From its modest origins, and with considerable external donor support, it has created an important base of knowledge on how to cope with drought and prevent famine.

2.5 Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD)

The IGAD started in 1986 as an organization devoted to countering famine and coordinating development initiatives in the Horn of Africa. This initial focus was expanded in 1996 to include political and humanitarian affairs, and economic cooperation. IGAD considers conflict prevention, management and resolution a priority area and has begun developing programs with external support. In a move to coordinate this support, the IGAD Partnership Forum, representing donor and multilateral development agencies, was established in 1997.

The Horn lacks a history of sub-regional cooperation so IGAD represents an important departure for government cooperation. The organization’s $2 million annual budget is met by assessed contributions from member states. Its operational budget is reliant on external aid, which comes primarily from the IGAD Partnership Forum members. ₂₈ IGAD has thirty permanent staff and three program directors.

Table 5: IGAD General Indicators

member State	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP) 1			Debt		Aid		Poverty Lines5
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop. ('95 thousand) 4	GNP p.c. ('95, US$)4	80-85	91-95	Change (+ / -)	Debt Service ('95, % of X G&S) 2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP) 4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP)4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, %of Cereal Imports)4	Survey Year	Population below $2/day (%)
Djibouti	n/a	601	n/a	-2.90	-8.50	-	n/a	63.44	21.41	n/a	n/a	n/a
Eritrea	343	3574	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	6.70	25.27	49.82	n/a	n/a
Ethiopia	5640	56404	100	-6.00	-7.60	-	13.60	93.66	16.21	77.59	1981	89
Kenya	7476	26688	270	-5.80	-4.80	+	25.70	86.40	7.78	16.40	1992	78
Somalia	n/a	9491	n/a	-21.30	-4.50	+	n/a	181.05	11.44	n/a	n/a	n/a
Sudan	n/a	26707	n/a	-9.70	-8.30	+	n/a	204.57	4.16	12.92	n/a	n/a
Uganda	4608	19168	240	-14.10	-3.60	+	21.30	60.94	13.19	110.71	1989	92
Total	18067	142633
Av.totals			127*	-9.97	-6.22		20.20	99.54	14.21	53.49
* Weighted average Source: see Table 1

 

The Horn has a long history of food insecurity, produced by drought and numerous regional conflicts and civil wars. Even in the absence of drought and war, one hundred and forty million people inhabit and farm a region where 80% of the land is classified as arid or semi-arid and where environmental damage has left almost half the land unproductive. IGAD member states have high incidences of poverty and the highest average dependence on food aid in Africa. Most member states have improved government fiscal balances but these are still negative.

Peace and security operations

IGAD’s Division of Political and Humanitarian Affairs promotes regional dialogue to prevent, manage and resolve international and domestic conflicts. This Division is currently developing a Program on Conflict Prevention, Resolution, and Management that seeks to institutionalize consultations and decision-making processes; create a conflict early-warning mechanism; and, coordinate peace-building efforts. ₂₉

Even without a tested or institutionalized system in place, IGAD has been involved in mediating regional conflicts. The highest political body, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, has appointed mediators to the Sudan and Somalia conflicts with the consent of interested parties. In both cases, the chances of IGAD playing a decisive role in ending the protracted conflicts are slim. Notwithstanding, IGAD had a minor breakthrough in the Sudan conflict in 1997 when it brokered the Declaration of Principles that established a framework of future negotiations. These talks are continuing but the out-break of famine in 1998 and resumed fighting have side-lined the peace talks. IGAD’s role in Somalia has encountered less progress. The cause of Somalia’s derailment lies, according to a recent Ethiopian assessment, in the “proliferation of initiatives coupled with the lack of the necessary resolve on the part of the faction leaders". ₃₀ It is interesting though that IGAD, despite the lack of resources, its recent creation, long standing rivalries among its members and recent armed conflicts that this new institution functions at all. It is an encouraging sign that those member states at war (Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and Somali factional leaders) have called on IGAD’s good offices to mediate their disputes.

Relief operations

There is a need for IGAD to take a leadership role in the Horn because this region lacks an intergovernmental coordinating body for humanitarian action. IGAD currently operates the Early Warning Food Information System for Food Security and acts as a contact point for information on desertification control. However, it has not been a major actor in coordinating relief operations in Sudan or Somalia, where relief assistance has been dominated by international humanitarian operations. The scale of these responses such as Operation Lifeline Sudan requires complex information and coordination systems and substantial financial resources. At present, IGAD lacks such capacities and it would be unrealistic to suggest that it would be able to mount a multi-million dollar relief operation in the medium to long term.

2.6 Southern African Development Community (SADC)

SADC was originally an informal ‘conference’ consisting of Southern African states when Zimbabwe established it in 1980 to advance regional economic cooperation and form a political bloc against the then-apartheid government of South Africa. In the early 1990s, the political context in South Africa began to change. In 1992, the ‘frontline states’ adopted a new system for regional cooperation that took into account South Africa’s political transition and new challenges facing the region. SADC, for example, took on the responsibility for developing a regional food security and a regional security system. The core operating cost of the Secretariat is covered by member states. Its budget for 1993/94 was $4.9 million.

Table 6: SADC General Indicators

member State	General			Fiscal Balance (% GNP)1			Debt		Aid		Poverty Lines4
	GNP ('96, $US mil.)	Pop.('95 thousand)4	GNP p.c. ('95 US$)4	80-85	91-95	Change (+ / -)	Debt Service ('95, %of X G&S)2	External Debt ('95, % of GNP) 4	Net aid ('95-'96 avg., % of GNP)4	Cereal Food Aid ('94, %of Cereal Imports)3	Survey Year	Pop. below $2/day (%)
Angola	4428	10772	240	-9.40	-23.60	-	12.50	373.82	17.76	45.68	n/a	n/a
Botswana	4530	1450	3210	6.00	6.30	+	3.20	15.46	1.89	4.00	1986	61
Congo D.R.	n/a	43848	140	-3.40	-17.00	-	n/a	178.94	3.42	32.81	n/a	n/a
Lesotho	1540	1980	650	10.30	3.30	-	6.00	96.49	8.87	15.15	1986	74
Malawi	1666	9757	160	-9.50	-8.20	+	25.90	166.73	33.88	40.32	n/a	n/a
Mauritius	3718	1122	3410	-8.40	-2.60	+	9.00	45.38	0.52	0.78	n/a	n/a
Mozambique	1296	17423	80	-21.80	-5.90	+	n/a	466.52	78.83	64.52	n/a	n/a
Namibia	3000	1545	2250	-4.30	1.30	+	n/a	1.78	5.36	23.21	n/a	n/a
Seychelles	490	75	6760	10.80	-5.50	-	n/a	40.94	3.11	n/a	n/a	n/a
South Africa	131140	36956	3550	-3.30	-6.00	-	n/a	16.45	0.28	n/a	1993	50
Swaziland	1053	900	1230	-2.30	-2.40	-	n/a	22.43	3.84	n/a	n/a	n/a
Tanzania	3552	29646	160	-8.80	-5.70	+	27.70	118.24	18.39	60.51	1993	46
Zambia	3600	8980	340	-13.60	-4.80	+	174.40	183.42	41.79	31.43	1993	98
Zimbabwe	5940	11011	540	-8.40	-8.10	+	25.60	74.55	6.83	4.00	1990	68
Total	165953	175465
Av. Total			946*	-4.72	-5.64		35.54	128.65	16.05	29.31
* Weighted average Source: see Table 1

SADC member states are relatively prosperous countries (the war-torn countries of Angola, Congo and Mozambique aside). As a sub-regional grouping, it is second to the AMU in terms of average GNP per capita. However, member state debt burdens are high and those of the war-torn countries and of Zambia and Malawi are clearly unsustainable. Political instability and civil strife continue to affect several SADC countries. Food shortages and droughts are recurring problems.

Peace and security operations

SADC’s Organ on Politics, Defense and Security was established in June 1996 after several earlier efforts to create a common security regime had failed. The Organ is designed to coordinate existing government agencies rather than to establish comparable capacities within the SADC Secretariat. Although still in its infancy, the Organ has many tasks and objectives. It is responsible for meditating conflicts, conducting preventive diplomacy, and, more recently, developing a regional peacekeeping capacity. ₃₁

SADC member states have begun regional peacekeeping training exercises. Building on such initiatives, delegates to the 20^th Inter-state Defense and Security Committee recommended recently that SADC should develop a permanent SADC multinational peacekeeping force. ₃₂ This March 1999 announcement follows a year long feasibility study that examined operational and legal issues relating to the use of force. These politically difficult issues confronted member states in their debates whether to intervene collectively to help the Democratic Republic of Congo repel armed incursions of forces from Rwanda and Uganda. SADC did deploy a force after the OAU was unsuccessful in securing a cease-fire agreement and was unwilling to launch a peace-enforcement operation. Like ECOWAS’ first military deployment, SADC’s Congo intervention was the source of internal disagreement. The SADC peace force planned inauguration is for January 2001.

Relief operations

SADC has developed considerable technical capacity in food security and early warning systems. The Regional and National Early Warning System in Harare monitors food reserves and climatic conditions to predict food shortages. This information is disseminated widely to member states, external governments and international organizations by SADC’s operations and communications center in Johannesburg. SADC also has several agricultural and environmental units that develop and promote sustainable agricultural practices. SADC agriculture ministers are expected to ratify soon the establishment of a new crop sector unit to spearhead food production and marketing initiatives in the region. The crop sector, to be hosted by Zimbabwe and located within SADC’s Food Security unit, would be charged with the promotion of output, protection, processing, storage and utilization of all crops to enhance food security. During the 1992 Southern African drought, SADC was involved in providing relief assistance but it has not developed a specific program on humanitarian relief. Most of the organization’s capacity is oriented toward preventive rather than reactive action, although the proposed peacekeeping force is likely to have a dual purpose role and be active in the provision of humanitarian assistance.

The preceding sections have identified institutional structures at the regional and sub-regional level that have a humanitarian component. The OAU, SADC, IGAD, and ECOWAS have responded on an ad hoc basis to humanitarian emergencies, and they are each beginning to create, or have created, permanent mechanisms. Presently the OAU offers the best institutional framework for managing and mobilizing resources for peace and security operations in Africa. However, the OAU has indicated that it would rather devolve responsibility for military operations to sub-regional organizations. CILSS, SADC and the OAU refugee bodies have established capacities for preventing and mitigating natural disasters and to a lesser degree, relief assistance and rehabilitation. Once the ECOWAS Mechanism and SADC peace force are operational, Western and Southern Africa will have a complementary system for preventing and reacting to conflict and natural disasters. Similar developments have yet to materialize in Northern, Central and Eastern Africa.

2.7 Partnership arrangements

For the most part, partnership arrangements that seek to bolster humanitarian assistance capacities in Africa are undertaken on a project by project basis with community-based organizations, local or national government agencies serving as collaborating partners. Very few technical assistance projects are geared toward enhancing the capacity of intergovernmental organizations. Those that are, are mostly oriented toward increasing Africa’s peacekeeping capacity. The rationale for building capacities from the national level down to the local level stems from the fact that the environment, health, agriculture, rural development, and public works, to name a few areas of relevance to humanitarian action, remain the responsibilities of national and local governments. As such, multilateral, bilateral and NGO development cooperation is designed to strengthen the capacities within states rather than within intergovernmental organizations. Unfortunately this prevailing model has largely failed to develop a regional humanitarian system. Capacities at the regional level are needed to deal with the regional dimensions of humanitarian emergencies. Moreover a regional system will be needed if Africa is to assume more responsibility for humanitarian action or will be required if the international community shifts more of the humanitarian burden to Africa.

If supported properly by member states and international donors, the evolving regional and sub-regional structures have an excellent opportunity to enhance Africa’s contribution to humanitarian action. Partnership arrangements forged between the international community and governments and civil society organizations can facilitate this incipient process but direct support to regional organizations should be increased and conceptually improved. The partnership arrangements discussed below are primarily with regional organizations and focus on (i) peace and security operations, and (ii) relief operations to illustrate current accent of collaborative efforts.

(i) Peace and security operations

The UN Security Council has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security but Articles 33 and 52 of the UN Charter mandates a role for regional organizations in conflict prevention and mediation. The model of subsidiarity envisioned in the Charter and the hoped for collaboration between the UN and regional organizations in this area did not materialize during the Cold War period. In 1992, however, Boutros-Ghali’s Agenda for Peace encouraged regional organizations to take a leadership role in solving regional conflicts.

A basis of a new peace and security agenda is being developed by the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peace-Keeping Operations (DPKO) to guide UN / regional organization cooperation. It foresees the UN maintaining its policy-making, diplomatic, control and command functions and regional organizations taking a greater lead role in conflict prevention, and, in the event of armed conflict, mount peacekeeping operations. ₃₃ In other words, the UN intends to devolve responsibility to regional organizations for the operational and financial aspects of peace and security operations. In the few circumstances where this, ‘sub-contracting’ model has already been applied, it has encountered financial, control and accountability problems. ₃₄ Still, some officials consulted for this report, while recognizing such concerns, felt that only through such arrangements could African initiatives materialize and develop.

Following the publication of An Agenda for Peace, Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan have enhanced UN collaborative efforts with African regional and sub-regional organizations. The nature of actual and envisaged cooperation is focused toward enhancing African regional capacities for peacekeeping and peacemaking. ₃₅ The UN has established a liaison office at OAU headquarters in Addis Ababa, sponsored numerous training and technical exchanges between the two organization to nurture cooperation and to facilitate coordination to prevent, contain and resolve conflicts. Annual meetings now take place between officials from the United Nations and OAU Secretariats, chaired jointly by the two Secretary-Generals, and the UN has hosted several meetings with African states and the OAU to develop a cooperation framework for training, peacekeeping and diplomatic initiatives.

The UN has lent political, materiel and financial support to several regional and sub-regional initiatives. For example, the UN supported the African-led mediation efforts on the Bakassi Peninsula dispute in Togo, helped to finance the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic, and supported former President Nyerere’s mediation efforts in Burundi. The UN has endorsed and supported financially the inter-African force in the Central African Republic, and has sent a small UN observer group to the ECOWAS-led ECOMOG mission in Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In the area of peace and security, many donors have urged African countries to take the lead in conflict prevention, management, and resolution. France, Britain, and the US have all developed training programs to enhance peace and security capacities of individual states. The French have launched their ‘Re-enhancement of African Peace-keeping Capacity’ program. The British Army and the Foreign Office are providing peacekeeping training and materiel to military colleges in Ghana and Zimbabwe under their African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. The objective is to have these military staff training colleges run regional training programs. The Zimbabwe military college ran its first training unit in April 1997 when 1,600 troops from eleven Southern African countries participated. The US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) aims to train ten battalions in peacekeeping operations. The ACRI project began in 1997, and by March 1998, Senegal, Uganda, Malawi and Mali had completed the first stage. Ghana and Ethiopia have scheduled joint training exercises in 1998. Each participating country will receive approximately $1.2 million to cover training and equipment costs.

Despite the genuine interest in creating a standing African peacekeeping force, establishing one will face political, logistical and financial problems. At present, twenty-two African states (less than half of Africa’s 56 countries) contribute to UN peacekeeping operations. While this suggests tepid support to international peacekeeping, Salim Salim’s 1998 Annual Report to the 34^th OAU Summit welcomed an enhanced African military capacity for peace and security operations, though he was critical of the bilateral nature of miltary training. He further noted that the selection of some participating militaries to the exclusion of others posed a threat to regional unity and security. Moreover, these projects were building peacekeeping structures outside the command and control mechanisms of existing regional organizations, such as the OAU’s Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution. ₃₆ Regardless of these concerns, the combination of donor interest and the receptiveness for military training among participating African countries is likely to make this form of cooperation enduring. The small scale of these training exercises, however, will not significantly alter the burden for peace and security operations. Africa’s peace and security capacity is likely to remain dependent on external support for some time. The financial costs of multinational training exercises, maintaining peacekeeping equipment, and ensuring the interoperability of this equipment will place a future burden on African states.

Some argue that transferring military response capacity to Africa is conceptually flawed. MacFarlane and Weiss, in their study of regional security mechanisms, question the argument that regional organizations have a comparative advantage in managing conflict. Regional organizations might have greater familiarity with the issues and greater self-interest in peace but MacFarlane and Weiss suggest that these attributes are likely more than offset by the disadvantages resulting from partisanship and local rivalries. ₃₇ Consequently, they recommend that the UN maintain its preeminent role in security issues. The political divisions evident in SADC resulting from its Congo intervention, contested land claims and ensuing border tensions affecting all Maghreb countries, and the Francophone - Anglophone division within ECOWAS, are a few examples supporting MacFarlane and Weiss’ thesis.

The partisanship and local rivalries MacFarlane and Weiss refer to in the military field are paralleled in the management and delivery of relief assistance. Nevertheless, there is a corresponding need for a regional rapid response capacity for relief operations. A regional relief response capacity would have several merits, not the least of which would be response time and the ability to coordinate relief operations at a regional level. Currently, though, donor partnership arrangements seem more inclined to finance and support such capacities for peace and security operations than for relief operations.

(ii) Relief operations

Existing partnership arrangements to enhance Africa’s capacity to undertake relief operations (prevention, relief rehabilitation and mitigation) are predominately bilateral efforts between governments rather than collaborative arrangements with regional organizations. This approach is reinforced by humanitarian aid flows that are delivered directly to governments issuing an appeal or channeled through UN agencies (i.e., WFP, UNICEF or UNHCR) or NGOs. Consequently, regional organizations have a very minor role in planning, implementing or coordinating relief operations. Yet, humanitarian crises usually transcend national borders and overwhelm the capacities of national governments. Where government capacities are weak and the causes of humanitarian emergencies are shared, there is a strong case for supporting a regional humanitarian system.

To date, collaboration with regional organizations for relief purposes has focused on prevention, including famine prevention projects, food security initiatives, and early warning systems. For example, in 1994 the US developed its Greater Horn of Africa Initiative (GHAI) that sought to coordinate efforts of US government agencies working with IGAD, its member states and civil society organizations in the region. Currently, both the US and the European Commission are providing technical assistance and financial support to IGAD programs and projects in the Horn. Similar support for regional programs was forthcoming for SADC’s food security and early warning system. Both SADC’s and IGAD’s early warning systems enable the agencies to develop contingency plans and keep external humanitarian agencies informed.

These partnership arrangements are patterned after their forerunner, the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS), which is now one of the most developed institutions of its kind in Africa. When CILSS was established in the early 1970s it was in a similar position to IGAD today with uncertain political and financial support from member states. In the case of CILSS, the Club du Sahel, a forum of OECD donors, provided ongoing support to strengthen its capacities. CILSS’ contribution to reducing food insecurity gradually improved but proved unable to cope with the repercussions of the 1985 drought. CILSS, an organization devoted to prevention, was ill equipped to deliver and coordinate relief assistance when the drought led to widespread malnutrition and starvation. The response of the international community was woefully inadequate; food aid was not coordinated and arrived late, undermining grain markets the following year.

As a result of the 1985 failures and at the request of CILSS Ministers, a Network for the Prevention of Food Crisis in the Sahel was created in 1985. The Network is a permanent but informal mechanism for information exchange between CILSS and the Club du Sahel. It serves as a focal point for exchanging food security projections, discussing mitigation strategies, and coordinating relief assistance. The Network links CILSS’ specialized agencies for food security planning and monitoring with the FAO/WFP and USAID early warning systems, as well as with other technical services provided by other donor agencies. The Network’s effectiveness in bringing officials from these institutions together, both for annual meeting and in times of need has been recognized by the WFP as a model of institutional cooperation for strengthening humanitarian action. As the evolving partnership arrangement between CILSS and Club du Sahel demonstrates, ₃₈ strengthening CILSS’ own technical capacity is as important as nurturing collaborative ties among governments and other organizations. The links the Network established are required for effective humanitarian action. CILSS’ history offers this lesson for IGAD and SADC, and potentially for AMU and ECCAS, if these organizations demonstrate an interest in developing a capacity for relief operations.

The donor emphasis on strengthening prevention strategies is logical since prevention eliminates or reduces the high cost of providing relief assistance. In theory, early-warning systems can provide timely and accurate information on potential or actual disasters that, in turn, can improve the reaction time and the overall response. Miskel and Norton argue that early-warning systems are conceptually sound but their case studies of the Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire crises of 1996, indicates that early-warning is not sufficient. ₃₉ In light of the tragic repercussions of the international community’s belated or inadequate response, partnership arrangements should work to build a reactive response capacity at the regional level, where organizations are better situated and more responsive to humanitarian needs than are more distant and removed donors.

Prevention and response capacities for peace and security, and relief operations must be developed concurrently. This balanced approach recognizes the interdependence of these components for effective humanitarian action. Likewise, donor assistance should ensure that regional disparities do not emerge and that bilateral partnership arrangements complement the work of regional arrangements. Clearly to what extent this is needed or advisable is context specific but military training for peacekeeping, information systems, contingency planning and response mechanisms should all be linked to and involve regional arrangements. Donor agencies should support the promising developments in ECOWAS and SADC but this support must not neglect IGAD’s emerging humanitarian system. Additionally, a strategy needs to be developed for the Maghreb and Central African sub-regions where capacities for humanitarian action at the regional level do not exist.

Finally, one needs to examine critically the overall coherence of donor assistance programs. Macroeconomic policies proscribed by donor countries and the international financial institutions influence the ability of national governments and regional organizations to prevent, mitigate and respond to emergencies. Structural reforms such as civil service reform, trade liberalization, and privatization of state marketing boards, telecommunications and transportation networks can work against humanitarian action. This argues for the need to examine the impact of structural reform, political and economic relations with Africa in light of the ability of government and inter-government civil servants to assume a larger responsibility for humanitarian action. Meanwhile, the arming of African militaries, foreign support repressive regimes, and the continents crippling foreign debt have undoubtedly created humanitarian needs.

 

Section 3: Financing Regional Responses to Regional Problems

Drought, famine, civil conflict, and war have profound and multidimensional repercussions on political institutions and society. Among other probable consequences they can lead to environmental degradation, macroeconomic instability, a tarnished investment climate, disrupted trade relations, and massive population displacement. These repercussions can put a tremendous burden on countries in the immediate term and can lead to serious problems for long-term recovery. Even as African governments are straining to meet the needs of their populations in health and social services, and struggling to service multilateral debt, the burden-sharing debate calls on African countries to finance a greater proportion of the cost for humanitarian action. Between 1990 and 1995 every country in Africa except two had negative average fiscal balances (Table 2 through 7), and while some African economies are growing, raising additional financial resources will require making painful fiscal re-allocations. On this trade-off, Kofi Annan correctly asks:

Are resources being diverted from other critical priorities? Of particular concern, especially to the host country, is the extent to which humanitarian expenditures diminish the pool of funds that might be available for other critical national priorities. ₄₀

Any strategy to increase the amount of financial resources within Africa for humanitarian action has to take account of government priorities and the competition for scarce public resources. At the same time, there is a need to secure a funding base independent of external support. Current financial arrangements are inadequate, selective and not sensitive to time critical needs. For example, if the Security Council authorizes a regional organization to mount a peacekeeping force, the financial onus is on the regional organization. Only a UN peacekeeping force can draw on UN funds. Similarly, UN agency emergency response funds are not open for regional organizations to draw on, and very few regional organizations have emergency funds of their own. The effectiveness and responsiveness of regional humanitarian arrangements will be influenced by the financial resources they can mobilize.

3.1 Non-African funds for humanitarian action

Over the last twenty-five years several regional organizations and development banks have established emergency funds for humanitarian action. Significantly, these resources have often been mobilized in some of the poorest regions of the world.

The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) has two lending windows for natural disasters, the Special Development Assistance Fund and the Ordinary Capital Resources, with respective resources in 1998 of $551 million and $480 million. From 1974 to December 1997, the CDB disbursed 14 loans totaling $50 million for disaster rehabilitation. CDB’s first loan for disaster preparedness was made in 1982. Most of the CDB’s financial contributions come from non-borrowing member states.

In May 1998, the CDB Board created two additional funding windows for emergency relief. In the event of a natural emergency, the Board authorized the President to give member states immediate emergency response grants of up to $100,000. These funds are administered by the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response Agency (CDERA), a sister agency of the Caribbean Community that specializes in disaster management. The Board also enabled the President to authorize soft loans of up to $500,000 to restore essential services. These changes have enhanced CDB’s rapid response capacity. ₄₁

The Asian Development Bank has earmarked two emergency rehabilitation assistance windows. One is specifically for loans up to $2 million for small island states and the other is open to all borrowing member states without a pre-set borrowing limit. Other Asian regional organizations do not have specific funds for relief, but there has been progress toward establishing a regional emergency response system. The Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, has enunciated a declaration on mutual assistance and has established an Experts Group on Disaster Management. In 1988, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) created a Food Security Reserve; by 1997 it held over 240,000 tons of grain for meeting emergencies in member countries.

In addition to these intra-regional emergency resources, inter-regional funds exist to respond to emergencies in member and non-member states. In this regard, the Islamic Development Bank, whose membership includes countries from Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Central and East Asia, has a Special Assistance Account. This Account provides relief in the form of goods and services to member countries and Muslim communities in non-member countries afflicted by natural disasters. The Islamic Development Bank has a capital base exceeding $2 billion and uses principal accrued interest to finance these humanitarian initiatives. The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), another inter-regional organization, ₄₂ established the OPEC Fund for International Development in 1976 to provide loans and grants to non-OPEC developing countries. As of February 1998 the majority of the $5 billion committed to the OPEC Fund had been disbursed as loans for development but 447 grants amounting to $236.7 million have supported technical assistance, food aid, research activities, and emergency assistance.

3.2 African financial resources

African Development Bank

In 1973, the African Development Bank’s (ADB) Board of Governors, then wholly African in its membership, created the Special Relief Fund to assist African countries afflicted by droughts and other natural disasters. The following year, this Fund’s name was changed to the Special Relief Fund for African Countries Affected by Drought. In 1991, its lending guidelines were expanded enabling the Fund to provide assistance on a grant basis to (i) institutions (national, sub-regional or international) undertaking relief operations, and (ii) organizations conducting research that would further the aims and objectives of the Fund.

As of 30 June 1998, the Fund’s cumulative contributions total $34 million. The main source of funding is the ADB and its African Development Fund.

Table 7: ADB Special Relief Fund for African Countries Affected by Drought, 1973-1998

Contributors			Beneficiaries
	UA*	US$		UA*	US$
ADB	12,860,000	17,851,480	Countries	3,612,090	5,014,087
African Dev. Fund	11,256,412	15,625,476	Research Institutes and Programs	18,203,841	25,269,480
Voluntary Contributions**	485,984	674,613.8
Total	24,602,396	34,151,569		21,815,931	30,283,566
*Unit of Account = $1.38814 US (1997) or one SDR ** All African countries plus contribution by ADB staff Source: Data supplied by the African Development Bank

OAU

In 1984 the OAU created the Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine (SEADF). It is managed and controlled by the OAU but administered by the ADB. The SEADF provides loans and grants, typically not exceeding $1 million for relief assistance and food production. As of June 1998, the SEADF has disbursed close to $25 million, the majority generated on a voluntary basis by African governments.

Table 8: Special Emergency Assistance Fund for Drought and Famine in Africa, 1984-1998

Contributors	US$	Beneficiaries	US$
OAU	9,750,000
African Countries (#34)	17,900,549	Regional Countries (#31)	24,944,430
Non-African countries	10,000
Institutions	1,477,106
Individual Contributions	1,150
Total	29,138,805		24,944,430
Source: Data supplied by the African Development Bank

The OAU’s Special Contingency Fund for Assistance to African Refugees (SCFAR) finances the operations of the Division of Refugees, Displaced Persons and Humanitarian Affairs. The SCFAR has a $600,000 annual operating budget. It receives two percent of the OAU regular budget and is open to voluntary contributions and international contributions.

Shortly after the OAU established the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, it created the Peace Fund to finance the Mechanism’s operational activities. Although the Mechanism and the Peace Fund met with considerable enthusiasm from some member and non-member states, the Peace Fund relies increasingly on non-African financial support and has had difficulty keeping a positive balance. From its inception in 1993 until March 1996, the Peace Fund received approximately $11.5 million but had a deficit. As of that time, half of the Peace Fund’s resources came directly from the OAU’s budget and voluntary contributions; non-African states contributed the remaining half. ₄₃ Several months later at the 32^nd OAU summit, Salim Salim emphasized that the Peace Fund must have a reasonable cash flow if it is to function effectively. His call for additional contributions erased the $300,000 deficit and left $3 million in the Fund by the end of 1996. As of March 1998, the Peace Fund has approximately $6 million in reserves and has raised close to $26 million to date. This total includes the following contributions: $1.5 million from African voluntary contributions, $6.6 million from the 6% annual contribution from the OAU’s regular budget, and $17.6 million from outside of Africa. ₄₄

Non-African contributions to the Peace Fund have risen from 50% in 1996 to 68% by 1998. This presents two related problems. First it creates the perception that African countries are less committed to sustaining the Peace Fund than are donors. While the international community has more financial resources than African countries, OAU member states have made the symbolically important decision to support the OAU Peace Fund by direct contribution from the OAU’s regular budget. ₄₅ In contrast, UN humanitarian assistance is voluntary. This speaks perhaps to Africa’s determination to assume greater responsibility for humanitarian action. The second problem relates to African ownership in light of greater external funds. To quote Salim Salim, “the ownership of initiatives by the Mechanism will … become questionable if non-African resources … outstrip African ones for conflict management activities." ₄₆ There is a need for more resources but where these funds originate is an important issue.

As of early 1997, approximately one-third of the Peace Fund’s expenditure had been spent on the OAU’s Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB). Other significant expenditures include, $2.5 million for procurement of military and other equipment; $1.5 million for preventive diplomacy efforts in the Comoros, Congo, Gabon, Liberia, Mozambique, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Togo; $430,000 for the Somalia Reconciliation Project; and $500,000 to ECOMOG for disarming warring factions in Sierra Leone. ₄₇

The IGAD Peace Fund was created to attract funding for regional peace initiatives, but unlike the OAU Peace Fund, its resource base is entirely reliant on non-member states. The US has been the primary donor, contributing $400,000, and some European countries have made significant grants. IGAD members have been able to raise sufficient funds to cover operating expenses but project funding remains reliant on external donors.

Both IGAD and SADC have discussed establishing a disaster relief fund. Reggie Mugwara, Food Security coordinator for SADC, commented in 1995 that the organization had been contemplating establishing an emergency relief fund in the order of $30 million. ₄₈ IGAD has also proposed setting up a fund, but with a much more modest budget of $1 million to be used for prevention, mitigation and needs assessment projects. In neither instance have the funds been developed.

Of Africa’s development banks only the ADB has a fund specifically for humanitarian purposes. This isolated case is probably a consequence of low levels of capitalization of the smaller sub-regional development banks which in turn limits their ability to make concessionary loans or grants for humanitarian action without running down their reserves. However small, humanitarian funds could be established in the Arab Bank for Economic Development, Central African States Development Bank, East African Development Bank, and the West African Development Bank. Donors might consider paying the interest on concessionary loans or grants made to borrowing countries so that these banks maintain their capital base. While the ADB and the Caribbean Development Bank do give loans for humanitarian initiatives, it is unclear whether this kind of institution is best situated to support humanitarian action or whether an arrangement between a development bank and a regional organization would be a more suitable framework.

3.3 The capacity to contribute: some projections

A burden-sharing approach has several consequences for regional organizations and their member states; they will be under increasing pressure to provide more leadership, personnel and financial resources for humanitarian initiatives. Currently, however, most African countries are strained to provide basic social services. To propose that the same governments can take the sole responsibility for financing humanitarian needs is an unrealistic expectation. Movement toward this objective is congruent with recent African leadership statements that call on Africans and African organizations to assume greater responsibility for meeting humanitarian needs and achieving development objectives. In this spirit, five projections are made to further the dialogue on how existing regional humanitarian funds can be increased and how others could be capitalized. The first three projections would raise respectable funds as a contribution to humanitarian assistance while the last two projections would yield much smaller amounts. In all cases the monies raised would signal a commitment to burden-sharing principles.

These projections follow growing scholarly and practitioner interest in developing alternative financing sources for international public goods and services. Najman and D’Orville’s review of new and innovative means to finance multilateral cooperation identify numerous potential methods. ₄₉ The most relevant of these for funding humanitarian action involve military expenditures and arms trade. Income from reducing military expenditures and taxing the arms trade has been identified as a potential source since the early 1970s. The ensuing debates have focused the social cost of military expenditure, not least of which being the arms industries’ connection to war and war’s connection to humanitarian emergencies. The arms trade has a perverse systemic connection in that Western countries profit from their arms exports, on the one hand and, on the other, dollars are recycled back to the same countries for humanitarian assistance. For this reason, a tax on conventional weapons exports to Africa and arms expenditure reductions are considered in Projections 1 to 3.

Projection 1 : How much could be raised from a humanitarian tax on arms exports? The US, UK, France, Germany and other Western Europe and NATO countries exported over $1 billion dollars worth of conventional weapons to Africa between 1993-1995. ₅₀ A ten percent humanitarian tax on arms exports to Africa would have generated $104,000,000 over those two years. This tax could be raised or lowered to account for the security needs, and materiel for regional stand-by peacekeeping forces could be exempt. A tax on arms should not discourage the development of regional peacekeeping capacities or collective security arrangements. ₅₁

Projections 2 and 3 focus solely on African defense expenditures and ask what resources could be freed up if government military expenditures were reduced.

Projection 2 : If 1% of Africa’s average fraction of GNP allocated to defense was invested in a humanitarian assistance fund during 1996, $142,652,440 could have been raised (Annex 4 Column 3). Even with such a low contribution relative to defense, this amount represents roughly 12% of the 1996 CAP requirements for Africa.

Projection 3 : If the above projection is calculated using respective country expenditures on defense in 1995, rather than the African average, $118,634,420 could have been raised for a humanitarian contingency fund (Annex 4, Column 2). Aware of the bias implied by using only one-year observations on defense expenditures, if each African country contributed 1% of the African average of defense expenditures using 1985 and 1995 figures, Africa would have set aside $155,858,440 (Annex 4, Column 4). If each country contributed 1% of the average of what their respective defense expenditures were in 1985 and 1995, $167,813,961 would have been generated (Annex 4, Column 5).

In light of the practical difficulties in collecting taxes, an alternative is for African governments and their respective regional organizations to declare that humanitarian assistance is part and parcel of national security and should be funded on a percentage base of defense expenditure.

Projections 4 and 5 compare African countries to other countries with similar per capita income levels that have made humanitarian contributions to the CAP. The projections quantify how much Africa could contribute if it bore the same humanitarian burden as other low income countries.

Projection 4 : Pakistan, with an income per capita roughly equal to the median of the distribution of African per capita GNP, ₅₂ was one of the few developing countries that contributed to the CAP in 1996. In that year, Pakistan contributed 0.0018% of its GNP (a total of $1,057,645, or 0.8 cents per capita). Annex 5 shows that if all African countries were to contribute on the basis of Pakistan’s percentage, i.e., $18 for every million dollar of GNP produced, African countries would have set aside $7,242,264 for emergency relief in 1996.

Projection 5 : Finally, annexes 6 and 7 take into consideration the heterogeneity of economic conditions of African countries. In Annex 6, countries that contributed to humanitarian assistance in 1996 are grouped by income levels, and for each level an average percentage of GNP for humanitarian assistance is calculated. Low-income countries (>$765 GNP per capita) contributed on average $19 for every $1,000,000 of GNP produced; lower-middle income countries ($766 to $3,035 GNP per capita) contributed $4 for every $1,000,000 of GNP produced; middle income countries ($3,036 to $9,385 GNP per capita) contributed $8 for every $1,000,000 of GNP produced. It is interesting to note from this data set that high income countries make the largest humanitarian contribution ($215 for every $1,000,000 of GNP produced) but that the few low income countries, those who are the least able to provide, made the second largest contribution to humanitarian assistance in GNP per capita terms. In Annex 7 these ratios are used to calculate the contributing potential of African countries. Using these income level categories, $4,040,289 would have been raised in 1996 if all African countries contributed a fraction of their GNP based on their income level.

Admittedly, projections 4 and 5 do not come close to the resources humanitarian emergencies in Africa have demanded. Projections 1, 2 and 3, however, would generate over $100 million. Divided equally among the five sub-regions, each regional organization would have more than $20 million to capitalize a humanitarian fund. This amount of start-up capital is comparable to the amount contemplated for SADC’s proposed emergency fund and far exceeds the $1 million objective of IGAD’s Peace Fund. In addition to these projections, other resource transfer schemes should be explored along the lines, for example, of debt relief or a facility akin to the IMF Special Drawing Rights that allows a country to borrow money in the event of a humanitarian emergency. ₅₃

 

Conclusion

Left alone, humanitarian action will continue to adapt to declining funding and increasing demands; humanitarian agencies will cope with their reliance on a dozen wealthy donors; and humanitarians will continue to work within a system that selectively prioritizes one country’s humanitarian needs over others of equal need. Surely, we can do better.

The burden-sharing concept is appealing because it implies wider participation and cooperation, essential principles of a strategy to revitalize humanitarian action. Increasing the role of regional and sub-regional organizations is a key component of the burden-sharing debate; successful prevention, preparation, reaction and rehabilitation initiatives often require intergovernmental cooperation. Moreover, regional organizations have the potential ability to pool resources and to coordinate action with a regional outlook. Importantly, there is a need to embed humanitarian assistance within a regional political framework. These are required features for large-scale humanitarian responses. For these reasons, the burden-sharing concept holds promise, and regional organizations are strong candidates to assume a greater share of the responsibility for humanitarian action.

This review of humanitarian capacities within Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations demonstrates that the principal intergovernmental organizations have neither the institutional mechanisms nor sufficient financial resources required to undertake the comprehensive range of activities grouped under humanitarian action. Some organizations have developed particular niches, however, and most are seeking to expand their capabilities. Another encouraging development is the current shift from a crisis-driven response by ad hoc arrangements to integrated approaches through the development of permanent mechanisms. Such permanence is likely to be more effective and provides a platform for on-going international cooperation.

Both burden-sharing and burden-shifting foresee an increased involvement of regional organizations in humanitarian affairs. Whether this regionalization of humanitarian action results in more effective action will depend on which of the two dynamics prevails. The burden-shifting option, on the one hand, would lift what is a minute financial burden for OECD countries ₅₄ and relocate it to the emerging humanitarian efforts in Africa with potentially disastrous effect. If the burden is shifted to African intergovernmental institutions and their member states that do not have the capacity to respond, the international humanitarian system will be dealt an additional set back that it can ill afford. In that framework, burden-shifting would be an affront to humanitarian principles and an abrogation of global responsibility. Burden-sharing, on the other hand, with some of Africa’s regional and sub-regional organizations could improve humanitarian action. However, Africa’s emerging arrangements for humanitarian action require support which is why the burden-sharing debate needs to address partnership arrangements and build on collaborative action within a coherent framework inclusive of security and peace, and relief operations.

 

Annex

Annex 1: Total WFP Contributions for 1997 By Donor (thousand dollars)

	Development	International Emergency Food Reserve	Immediate Response Account	Protracted Refugee and Displaced Person Operations	Special Emergency Operations	Others	Total	Africa	non- OECD
Andorra	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Australia	37,777	14,258	-	8,739	-	1,772	62,545	-	-
Australia - NGO	-	23	-	-	-	-	23	-	-
Austria	2,952	1,567	-	355	-	36	4,910	-	-
Austria - NGO	-	42	-	-	-	-	42	-	-
Bangladesh	531	-	-	-	-	-	531	-	531
Belgium	2,715	6,572	-	7,480	-	649	17,416	-	-
Bhutan	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Canada	58,906	11,677	2,158	17,797	-	819	91,358	-	-
Canada - NGO	-	1,222	-	-	-	243	1,464	-	-
Chile	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	-	100
China	1,125	-	-	-	-	-	1,125	-	1,125
Colombia	16	-	-	-	-	-	16	-	16
Cuba	-	551	-	-	-	-	551	-	551
Cyprus	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	6
Denmark	30,292	6,795	739	6,370	51	-	44,248	-	-
Djibouti	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	1
EC	31,666	114,325	-	64,336	-	26,927	237,254	-	-
Egypt	200	-	-	-	-	-	200	200	200
El Salvador	166	-	-	-	-	-	166	-	166
Finland	10,257	2,728	408	-	375	-	13,768	-	-
France	4,849	3,874	-	8,219	-	4,941	21,884	-	-
Gaza West bank	-	1	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Germany	35,028	14,211	-	18,045	868	335	68,487	-	-
Ghana	5	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	5
Greece	150	20	-	-	-	-	170	-	-
Holy See	10	-	-	-	-	-	10	-	10
Hong Kong - NGO	-	39	-	-	-	-	39	-	39
Hungary	52	-	-	-	-	-	52	-	-
Iceland	-	4	-	-	-	-	4	-	-
India	1,920	-	-	-	-	-	1,920	-	1,920
Indonesia	97	-	-	-	-	-	97	-	97
Ireland	1,792	1,708	98	687	-	-	4,284	-	-
Ireland - NGO	-	200	-	-	-	-	200	-	-
Italy	3,575	5,210	-	-	314	12	9,112	-	-
Italy – Private	-	681	-	-	-	-	681	-	-
Japan	16,600	63,662	927	17,653	-	149	98,991	-	-
Japan - NGO	-	290	-	-	-	-	290	-	-
Japan - Private	-	100	-	-	-	-	100	-	-
Korea, Rep. of	540	20,527	-	-	-	-	21,067	-	-
Lebanon	3	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	3
Malaysia	4	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	4
Mongolia	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	2
Morocco	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2
Netherlands	-	19,823	4,026	16,477	4,885	760	45,972	-	-
New Zealand	412	405	-	-	-	-	817	-	-
Norway	27,823	8,591	1,769	-	1,631	-	39,813	-	-
OPEC	-	400	-	-	-	-	400	-	400
Other	1	225	-	-	-	-	225	-	225
Panama	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Philippines	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	-	20
Philippines – NGO	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	-	20
Portugal	50	-	-	-	-	-	50	-	-
Russian Federation	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	-	20
Saudi Arabia	-	10,100	-	-	-	-	10,100	-	10,100
Slovakia	15	-	-	-	-	-	15	-	15
Slovenia	-	72	-	-	-	-	72	-	72
Spain	334	1,670	-	-	125	10,117	12,245	-	-
Sri Lanka	135	-	-	-	-	-	135	-	135
Sweden	10,471	12,690	2,469	8,836	1,392	127	35,985	-	-
Switzerland	3,448	5,375	690	6,628	1,101	500	17,742	-	-
Syria	6	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	6
Tanzania	2	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	2
Thailand	-	20	-	-	-	-	20	-	20
Tunisia	82	-	-	-	-	-	82	82	82
UK	6,199	12,959	132	12,050	233	3,216	34,789	-	-
USA	56,510	203,278	4,000	125,232	5,530	13,829	408,380	-	-
USA - Private	340	1,082	-	-	-	-	1,423	-	-
Viet Nam	18	-	-	-	-	-	18	-	18
Yemen	8	-	-	-	-	-	8	-	8
Zimbabwe	49	-	-	-	-	-	49	49	49
Total	347,147	547,138	17,417	318,902	16,505	64,431	1,311,540	341	12931
% of total	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	0.026	0.98594019
Count	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	8	38

Source: http://www.org/reports/wfpstats/97/tab16-97.html

 

Annex 2: World Donors: Population, Gross National Product, and Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance

	POPUL. (million) mid-1995	GNP (million $US 1995) 1996	GNP p.c. 1996 ($US 1995)	Hum. Assist. 1995 ($US)	Hum. Assist 1996 ($US)	Hum. Assist. p.c. 1995	Hum. Assist. p.c. 1996
Antigua and Barbuda	0.07			1,000.00		0.01
Argentina	34.70	278,641.00	8,030.00		1,121,769.00		0.32
Australia	18.10	338,832.00	18,720.00	26,199,986.00	53,796,936.00	1.44	2.97
Austria	8.10	217,809.00	26,890.00	9,358,132.00	12,410,757.00	1.15	1.53
Belgium	10.10	249,571.00	24,710.00	8,734,702.00	34,002,278.00	0.86	3.34
Canada	29.60	573,648.00	19,380.00	63,393,213.00	69,847,972.00	2.14	2.36
China	1,200.20	744,124.00	620.00	3,623,188.00	6,386,000.00	0.00	0.01
Cyprus	0.73			27,500.00	116,001.00	0.04	0.16
Czech Republic	10.30	39,861.00	3,870.00	200,000.00	223,260.00	0.02	0.02
Denmark	5.20	155,428.00	29,890.00	93,133,920.00	157,512,501.00	17.90	30.29
Finland	5.10	104,958.00	20,580.00	20,343,070.00	19,450,999.00	3.98	3.81
France	58.10	1,451,919.00	24,990.00	24,158,277.00	18,808,824.00	0.41	0.32
Germany	81.90	2,253,069.00	27,510.00	96,003,828.00	112,684,902.00	1.17	1.37
Greece	10.50	86,205.00	8,210.00	7,213,129.00	124,000.00	0.69	0.01
Hungary	10.20	42,024.00	4,120.00	8,000.00	7,519.00	0.00	0.00
Iceland	0.27	6,686.60	24,950.00	46,000.00	68,968.00	0.15	0.22
India	929.40	315,996.00	340.00	100,000.00
Indonesia	193.30	189,434.00	980.00	64,984.00	55,000.00	0.00	0.00
Iran	64.12			350,000.00		0.00
Ireland	3.60	52,956.00	14,710.00	6,732,835.00	8,644,088.00	1.87	2.40
Israel	5.50	87,560.00	15,920.00		250,000.00		0.05
Italy	57.20	1,087,944.00	19,020.00	36,954,598.00	34,717,393.00	0.65	0.60
Japan	125.20	4,962,928.00	39,640.00	157,449,600.00	125,262,558.00	1.26	1.00
Korea, Rep. of	44.90	435,530.00	9,700.00	329,460.00	3,590,000.00	0.01	0.01
Kuwait	1.70	29,563.00	17,390.00	9,590.00		0.01
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya	5.41			1,000,000.00		0.18
Liechtenstein				100,775.00	178,689.00
Luxembourg	0.41	16,896.10	41,210.00	4,727,810.00	3,122,094.00	11.80	7.80
Malaysia	20.10	78,189.00	3,890.00	125,000.00	125,000.00	0.01	0.01
Mauritius	1.10	3,718.00	3,380.00	16,697.00		0.02
Netherlands	15.50	372,000.00	24,000.00	264,871,956.00	190,071,040.00	17.08	12.26
New Zealand	3.60	51,624.00	14,340.00	997,460.00	1,635,221.00	0.28	0.45
Norway	4.40	137,500.00	31,250.00	252,608,337.00	187,445,506.00	57.40	42.60
Pakistan	129.90	59,754.00	460.00	160,000.00	1,058,651.00	0.00	0.01
Philippines	68.60	72,030.00	1,050.00	15,000.00	3,000.00	0.00	0.00
Portugal	9.90	96,426.00	9,740.00	478,074.00		0.05
Romania	22.70	33,596.00	1,480.00		345,000.00		0.02
Russian Federation	148.20	331,968.00	2,240.00	4,264,463.00	3,119,625.00	0.03	0.02
San Marino				12,579.00
Saudi Arabia	19.00	133,760.00	7,040.00	500,000.00	1,100,000.00	0.03	0.05
Singapore	3.00	80,190.00	26,730.00	20,000.00		0.01
Slovenia	2.00	16,400.00	8,200.00		12,000.00		0.01
South Africa	41.50	131,140.00	3,160.00		244,274.00		0.01
Spain	39.20	532,336.00	13,580.00	12,756,724.00	14,287,263.00	0.33	0.36
Sweden	8.80	209,000.00	23,750.00	127,851,410.00	172,087,030.00	14.52	19.55
Switzerland	7.00	284,410.00	40,630.00	41,381,074.00	29,297,070.00	5.91	4.18
Syryan Arab Republic	14.10	15,792.00	1,120.00	5,850,000.00		0.41
Thailand	58.20	159,468.00	2,740.00	69,800.00	37,000.00	0.00	0.00
Tunisia	9.00	16,380.00	1,820.00	3,044.00	31,348.00	0.00	0.00
Turkey	61.10	169,858.00	2,780.00	22,672,743.00		0.37
United Arab Emirates	2.50	43,500.00	17,400.00		2,109,745.00		0.84
United Kingdom	58.50	1,093,950.00	18,700.00	151,945,886.00	144,552,336.00	2.59	2.47
United States	263.10	7,098,438.00	26,980.00	837,230,614.00	828,259,035.00	3.18	3.14
ECHO	371.00	8,601,000.00	23,183.00	964,288,523.00	507,018,495.00	2.60	1.36
TOTAL				3,248,382,981.00	2,745,221,147.00

 

Annex 3: Africa: Summary of Data Used. Countries are ordered in terms of GNP per capita

	Defens Expenditure per capita 1985 ($US 1995)	Defense Expenditure per capita 1995 ($US 1995)	Mean value of defense expenditure p.c. 1985 and 1995 ($US 1995)	Ratio bet defense exp. 1995 and GNP 1995 ($US 1995)	Ratio bet the African average defense exp. 1995 and GNP 1995 ($US 1995)	Ratio bet the Mean value of defense exp. in 1985 and 1995 (country-by-country) and GNP 1995 ($US 1995)	Ratio bet the Afr. Average of the mean values of defense exp. in 1985 and1995 and GNP 1995 ($US 1995)
Seychelles	168	192	180.0	0.029003	0.003474	0.027190	0.004087
Gabon	108	73	90.5	0.020917	0.006590	0.025931	0.007753
Mauritius	25	12	18.5	0.003550	0.006805	0.005473	0.008005
South Africa	117	88	102.5	0.027848	0.007278	0.032437	0.008562
Botswana	47	152	99.5	0.050331	0.007616	0.032947	0.008959
Namibia		39	39.0	0.019500	0.011500	0.019500	0.013528
Tunisia	80	41	60.5	0.022527	0.012637	0.033242	0.014866
Algeria	59	44	51.5	0.027500	0.014375	0.032188	0.016911
Morocco	40	49	44.5	0.044144	0.020721	0.040090	0.024376
Cape Verde	15	9	12.0	0.009375	0.023958	0.012500	0.028184
Egypt	73	42	57.5	0.053165	0.029114	0.072785	0.034249
Lesotho	41	17	29.0	0.022078	0.029870	0.037662	0.035139
Congo	41	18	29.5	0.026471	0.033824	0.043382	0.039789
Cote d'Ivoire	10	7	8.5	0.010606	0.034848	0.012879	0.040995
Cameroon	21	12	16.5	0.018462	0.035385	0.025385	0.041626
Senegal	13	9	11.0	0.015000	0.038333	0.018333	0.045095
Guinea	12	8	10.0	0.014545	0.041818	0.018182	0.049194
Zimbabwe	28	21	24.5	0.038889	0.042593	0.045370	0.050105
Mauritania	42	12	27.0	0.026087	0.050000	0.058696	0.058819
Angola	179	28	103.5	0.068293	0.056098	0.252439	0.065992
Zambia	8	7	7.5	0.017500	0.057500	0.018750	0.067642
Ghana	7	5	6.0	0.012821	0.058974	0.015385	0.069376
Equatorial Guinea	11	5	8.0	0.013158	0.060526	0.021053	0.071202
Benin	7	4	5.5	0.010811	0.062162	0.014865	0.073127
Central African Rep.	9	7	8.0	0.020588	0.067647	0.023529	0.079579
Gambia	4	14	9.0	0.043750	0.071875	0.028125	0.084553
Togo	9	7	8.0	0.022581	0.074194	0.025806	0.087280
Kenya	17	7	12.0	0.025000	0.082143	0.042857	0.096631
Nigeria	5	2	3.5	0.007692	0.088462	0.013462	0.104065
Guinea-Bissau	17	7	12.0	0.028000	0.092000	0.048000	0.108227
Mali	5	6	5.5	0.024000	0.092000	0.022000	0.108227
Uganda	5	7	6.0	0.029167	0.095833	0.025000	0.112737
Burkina Faso	6	6	6.0	0.026087	0.100000	0.026087	0.117638
Madagascar	7	4	5.5	0.017391	0.100000	0.023913	0.117638
Niger	3	2	2.5	0.009091	0.104545	0.011364	0.122986
Chad	10	5	7.5	0.027778	0.127778	0.041667	0.150316
Rwanda	7	7	7.0	0.038889	0.127778	0.038889	0.150316
Sierra Leone	2	9	5.5	0.050000	0.127778	0.030556	0.150316
Malawi	4	2	3.0	0.011765	0.135294	0.017647	0.159158
Burundi	10	7	8.5	0.043750	0.143750	0.053125	0.169105
United Rep. Tanzania	9	3	6.0	0.025000	0.191667	0.050000	0.225473
Ethiopia	14	2	8.0	0.020000	0.230000	0.080000	0.270568
Eritrea		11	11.0	0.114583	0.239583	0.114583	0.281842
Mozambique	24	3	13.5	0.037500	0.287500	0.168750	0.338210
AFRICAN AVERAGE	31.404762	23.000000	27.056818	0.027845	0.075587	0.040955	0.088919

 

Annex 4: Potential Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance if all African Countries were to allocate 1% of the share of GNP they allocated to Defense Expenditure. Countries are ordered in terms of GNP per capita.

	Hum. Assist. African Contribution: 1% of the ratio bet defense exp. 1995 and GNP 1995 (million $US 1995)	Hum. Assist. African Contribution: 1% of the ratio bet the African average defense exp. 1995 and GNP 1995 (million $US 1995)	Hum. Assist. African Contribution: 1% of the ratio bet the average bet. defense exp. in 1985 and 1995 (country-by-country) and GNP 1995 (million $US 1995)	Hum. Assist. African Contribution: 1% of the Ratio bet the African average of the average bet. defense exp. in 1985 and 1995 (country-by-country) and GNP 1995 (million $US 1995)
Seychelles	0.142080	0.017020	0.133200	0.020022
Gabon	0.803000	0.253000	0.995500	0.297625
Mauritius	0.132000	0.253000	0.203500	0.297625
South Africa	36.520000	9.545000	42.537500	11.228579
Botswana	2.280000	0.345000	1.492500	0.405852
Namibia	0.585000	0.345000	0.585000	0.405852
Tunisia	3.690000	2.070000	5.445000	2.435114
Algeria	12.320000	6.440000	14.420000	7.575909
Morocco	13.034000	6.118000	11.837000	7.197114
Cape Verde	0.034200	0.087400	0.045600	0.102816
Egypt	24.276000	13.294000	33.235000	15.638841
Lesotho	0.340000	0.460000	0.580000	0.541136
Congo	0.468000	0.598000	0.767000	0.703477
Cote d'Ivoire	0.980000	3.220000	1.190000	3.787955
Cameroon	1.596000	3.059000	2.194500	3.598557
Senegal	0.765000	1.955000	0.935000	2.299830
Guinea	0.528000	1.518000	0.660000	1.785750
Zimbabwe	2.310000	2.530000	2.695000	2.976250
Mauritania	0.276000	0.529000	0.621000	0.622307
Angola	3.024000	2.484000	11.178000	2.922136
Zambia	0.630000	2.070000	0.675000	2.435114
Ghana	0.855000	3.933000	1.026000	4.626716
Equat. Guinea	0.020000	0.092000	0.032000	0.108227
Benin	0.220000	1.265000	0.302500	1.488125
C.Al Af. Rep.	0.231000	0.759000	0.264000	0.892875
Gambia	0.154000	0.253000	0.099000	0.297625
Togo	0.287000	0.943000	0.328000	1.109330
Kenya	1.869000	6.141000	3.204000	7.224170
Nigeria	2.226000	25.599000	3.895500	30.114238
Guinea-Bissau	0.077000	0.253000	0.132000	0.297625
Mali	0.588000	2.254000	0.539000	2.651568
Uganda	1.344000	4.416000	1.152000	5.194909
Burkina Faso	0.624000	2.392000	0.624000	2.813909
Madagascar	0.548000	3.151000	0.753500	3.706784
Niger	0.180000	2.070000	0.225000	2.435114
Chad	0.320000	1.472000	0.480000	1.731636
Rwanda	0.448000	1.472000	0.448000	1.731636
Sierra Leone	0.378000	0.966000	0.231000	1.136386
Malawi	0.196000	2.254000	0.294000	2.651568
Burundi	0.441000	1.449000	0.535500	1.704580
U.R. Tanzania	0.888000	6.808000	1.776000	8.008818
Ethiopia	1.128000	12.972000	4.512000	15.260045
Eritrea	0.393140	0.822020	0.393140	0.967011
Mozambique	0.486000	3.726000	2.187000	4.383205
TOTAL	118.634420	142.652440	155.858440	167.813961

 

Annex 5: Potential Contributions to Humanitarian Assistance if all African Countries were to contribute 0.00018% of their GNP, the rate at which Pakistan contributed in 1996 . Countries are ordered in terms of GNP per capita.

	GNP p.c. 1996 ($US 1995)	Hum. Assistance p.c. 1996	Ratio between HA and GNP 1996	HA contributions p.c. if all African countries applied the Pakistan ratio: .000018	POPUL. (million) mid-1995	HA contributions (TOTAL) if all African countries applied the Pakistan ratio:.000018
Pakistan	460	0.008150	0.000018	0.008142	129.900	1,057,645.8000
Seychelles	6,620			0.117174	0.074	8,670.8760
Gabon	3,490			0.061773	1.100	67,950.3000
Mauritius	3,380			0.059826	1.100	65,808.6000
South Africa	3,160	0.005800	0.000002	0.055932	41.500	2,321,178.0000
Botswana	3,020			0.053454	1.500	80,181.0000
Namibia	2,000			0.035400	1.500	53,100.0000
Tunisia	1,820	0.003000	0.000002	0.032214	9.000	289,926.0000
Algeria	1,600			0.028320	28.000	792,960.0000
Swaziland	1,170			0.020709	0.900	18,638.1000
Morocco	1,110			0.019647	26.600	522,610.2000
Cape Verde	960			0.016992	0.380	6,456.9600
Egypt	790			0.013983	57.800	808,217.4000
Lesotho	770			0.013629	2.000	27,258.0000
Congo	680			0.012036	2.600	31,293.6000
Cote d'Ivoire	660			0.011682	14.000	163,548.0000
Cameroon	650			0.011505	13.300	153,016.5000
Senegal	600			0.010620	8.500	90,270.0000
Guinea	550			0.009735	6.600	64,251.0000
Zimbabwe	540			0.009558	11.000	105,138.0000
Comoros	470			0.008319	0.499	4,151.1810
Mauritania	460			0.008142	2.300	18,726.6000
Angola	410			0.007257	10.800	78,375.6000
Zambia	400			0.007080	9.000	63,720.0000
Ghana	390			0.006903	17.100	118,041.3000
Equatorial Guinea	380			0.006726	0.400	2,690.4000
Benin	370			0.006549	5.500	36,019.5000
Sao Tome and Principe	350			0.006195	0.129	799.1550
Central African Rep.	340			0.006018	3.300	19,859.4000
Gambia	320			0.005664	1.100	6,230.4000
Togo	310			0.005487	4.100	22,496.7000
Kenya	280			0.004956	26.700	132,325.2000
Nigeria	260			0.004602	111.300	512,202.6000
Guinea-Bissau	250			0.004425	1.100	4,867.5000
Mali	250			0.004425	9.800	43,365.0000
Uganda	240			0.004248	19.200	81,561.6000
Burkina Faso	230			0.004071	10.400	42,338.4000
Madagascar	230			0.004071	13.700	55,772.7000
Niger	220			0.003894	9.000	35,046.0000
Chad	180			0.003186	6.400	20,390.4000
Rwanda	180			0.003186	6.400	20,390.4000
Sierra Leone	180			0.003186	4.200	13,381.2000
Malawi	170			0.003009	9.800	29,488.2000
Burundi	160			0.002832	6.300	17,841.6000
United Rep. Tanzania	120			0.002124	29.600	62,870.4000
Ethiopia	100			0.001770	56.400	99,828.0000
Eritrea	96			0.001699	3.574	6,072.9408
Mozambique	80			0.001416	16.200	22,939.2000
TOTAL						7,242,264.1128

 

Annex 6: World: Donors for Humanitarian Assistance, 1996, grouped in income classes, and ordered in terms of GNP per capita

	GNP p.c. 1996 ($US 1995)	Hum. Assistance p.c. 1996	Ratio between HA and GNP 1996	Average ratio between HA and GNP per income class, 1996
HIGH INCOME COUNTRIES: GNPp.c.>$9,386				0.000215
Luxembourg	41,210	7.800000	0.000189
Switzerland	40,630	4.180000	0.000103
Japan	39,640	1.000000	0.000025
Norway	31,250	42.600000	0.001363
Denmark	29,890	30.290000	0.001013
Germany	27,510	1.370000	0.000050
United States	26,980	3.140000	0.000116
Austria	26,890	1.530000	0.000057
France	24,990	0.320000	0.000013
Iceland	24,950	0.220000	0.000009
Belgium	24,710	3.340000	0.000135
Netherlands	24,000	12.260000	0.000510
Sweden	23,750	19.550000	0.000823
ECHO	23,183	1.360000	0.000059
Finland	20,580	3.810000	0.000185
Canada	19,380	2.360000	0.000122
Italy	19,020	0.600000	0.000032
Australia	18,720	2.970000	0.000159
United Kingdom	18,700	2.470000	0.000132
United Arab Emirates	17,400	0.840000	0.000048
Israel	15,920	0.045000	0.000003
Ireland	14,710	2.400000	0.000163
New Zealand	14,340	0.450000	0.000031
Spain	13,580	0.364000	0.000027
Korea, Rep. Of	9,700	0.010000	0.000000
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: $3036<GNPp.c.<$9385				0.000008
Greece	8,210	0.010000	0.000001
Slovenia	8,200	0.006000	0.000001
Argentina	8,030	0.320000	0.000040
Saudi Arabia	7,040	0.050000	0.000007
Hungary	4,120	0.000700	0.000000
Malaysia	3,890	0.006000	0.000003
Czech Republic	3,870	0.020000	0.000005
South Africa	3,160	0.005800	0.000003
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: $766<GNPp.c.<$3055				0.000004
Thailand	2,740	0.000600	0.000000
Russian Federation	2,240	0.021000	0.000009
Tunisia	1,820	0.003000	0.000000
Romania	1,480	0.015000	0.000014
Philippines	1,050	0.000400	0.000000
Indonesia	980	0.000100	0.000000
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES: GNPp.c.<$765				0.000019
China	620	0.005000	0.000016
Pakistan	460	0.008000	0.000022

 

 

Annex 7: Africa: Potential Humanitarian Assistance Contribution if African Countries were to contribute the average fraction of GNP allocated by corresponding income classes

	GNP p.c. 1996 ($US 1995)	Humanitarian Assistance p.c. 1996	Average Ratio of HA and GNP 1996 per income class, for those countries that contributed in 1996	HA contributions p.c. if all African countries applied the average ratio of their income class	POPUL. (million) mid-1995	HA contributions (TOTAL) if all African countries applied the ratio of their income class
UPPER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: $3036<GNPp.c.<$9385			0.000008
Seychelles	6,620			0.052960	0.074	3,919.040
Gabon	3,490			0.027920	1.100	30,712.000
Mauritius	3,380			0.027040	1.100	29,744.000
South Africa	3,160	0.005800		0.025280	41.500	1,049,120.000
LOWER-MIDDLE INCOME COUNTRIES: $766<GNPp.c.<$3035			0.000004
Botswana	3,020			0.012080	1.500	18,120.000
Namibia	2,000			0.008000	1.500	12,000.000
Tunisia	1,820	0.003000	0.000002	0.007280	9.000	65,520.000
Algeria	1,600			0.006400	28.000	179,200.000
Swaziland	1,170			0.004680	0.900	4,212.000
Morocco	1,110			0.004440	26.600	118,104.000
Cape Verde	960			0.003840	0.380	1,459.200
Egypt	790			0.003160	57.800	182,648.000
Lesotho	770			0.003080	2.000	6,160.000
LOW INCOME COUNTRIES: GNPp.c.<765			0.000019
Congo	680			0.012920	2.600	33,592.000
Cote d'Ivoire	660			0.012540	14.000	175,560.000
Cameroon	650			0.012350	13.300	164,255.000
Senegal	600			0.011400	8.500	96,900.000
Guinea	550			0.010450	6.600	68,970.000
Zimbabwe	540			0.010260	11.000	112,860.000
Comoros	470			0.008930	0.499	4,456.070
Mauritania	460			0.008740	2.300	20,102.000
Angola	410			0.007790	10.800	84,132.000
Zambia	400			0.007600	9.000	68,400.000
Ghana	390			0.007410	17.100	126,711.000
Equat.al Guinea	380			0.007220	0.400	2,888.000
Benin	370			0.007030	5.500	38,665.000
Sao Tome P.	350			0.006650	0.129	857.850
C. African Rep.	340			0.006460	3.300	21,318.000
Gambia	320			0.006080	1.100	6,688.000
Togo	310			0.005890	4.100	24,149.000
Kenya	280			0.005320	26.700	142,044.000
Nigeria	260			0.004940	111.300	549,822.000
Guinea-Bissau	250			0.004750	1.100	5,225.000
Mali	250			0.004750	9.800	46,550.000
Uganda	240			0.004560	19.200	87,552.000
Burkina Faso	230			0.004370	10.400	45,448.000
Madagascar	230			0.004370	13.700	59,869.000
Niger	220			0.004180	9.000	37,620.000
Chad	180			0.003420	6.400	21,888.000
Rwanda	180			0.003420	6.400	21,888.000
Sierra Leone	180			0.003420	4.200	14,364.000
Malawi	170			0.003230	9.800	31,654.000
Burundi	160			0.003040	6.300	19,152.000
Tanzania	120			0.002280	29.600	67,488.000
Ethiopia	100			0.001900	56.400	107,160.000
Eritrea	96			0.001824	3.574	6,518.976
Mozambique	80			0.001520	16.200	24,624.000
TOTAL						4,040,289.136

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: The conceptual basis of this report is drawn from a preliminary report by Rita Parhad and Lorenzo Garbo. Professor Garbo did the majority of the quantitative calculations in Section 3.3 and the Annexes. Shepard Forman, Cesare Romano and Stewart Patrick provided constructive critiques on earlier drafts. I would like to thank the African Development Bank, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the Organization of African Unity for responding generously to my inquiries. I would also like to thank the numerous inter-governmental and government officials, and humanitarian aid practitioners who shared their perspectives on their work and mine.  Back.

Note 2: The Paying for Essentials report and the meeting report are posted on the Center on International Cooperation’s homepage, www.nyu.edu/pages/cic. Also see, Shepard Forman, “Underwriting Humanitarian Assistance: Mobilizing Resources for Humanitarian Assistance" in Kevin Cahill (ed.), A Framework for Survival, Routledge: (forthcoming), for a cogent review of financial problems facing the international humanitarian system and proposals for reform. Peace and security operations encompass the following elements: (i)  Back.

Note 3: Peace and security operations encompass the following elements: (i) Peacemaking refers to mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or diplomatic initiatives; (ii) Peace-enforcement refers to the use of military force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to terminate acts of aggression; (iii) Peace-keeping involves military force under restricted rules of engagement to monitor a cease-fire; and, (iv) Peace-building involves rebuilding institutions and infrastructure within a country to create conditions conducive to peace and development. These operations are usually conducted by military personnel.  Back.

Note 4: Relief operations involve the following components: (i) Preparedness planning involves developing information and diagnosis capabilities and contingency planning; (ii) Mitigation requires the creation of insurance mechanisms to reduce the impact of disasters (i.e., food stockpile, agricultural diversification, building codes, sustainable resource management, etc.); (iii) Relief assistance refers to the planning and delivery of goods and services; and, (iv) Rehabilitation projects incorporate reconstruction and forward planning development strategies. Traditionally, non-military actors have undertaken these activities.  Back.

Note 5: See, Donini 1998 and MacFarlane 1998.  Back.

Note 6: See the following sources for a current selection of high level statements on the burden-sharing debate; Ernst Sucharipa comments before ECOSOC [ECOSOC 1998]; UNHCR 1998; Salim 1998 and 1998a; Boutros-Ghali 1992; and Annan 1998.  Back.

Note 7: OAU 1969.  Back.

Note 8: See Berman 1998 for supportive evidence.  Back.

Note 9: Unfortunately, this condition cannot be taken for granted. In both war-torn environments and natural disasters, humanitarian assistance has been manipulated by governments for political gain and personal profit. DeWaal 1997: Chapter 5 and 8, and Keen 1994 illustrate the political manipulation of humanitarian aid in the cases of Somalia and Sudan.  Back.

Note 10: Regional cooperation refers to government cooperation within the African continent whereas international is understood to mean non-African governments cooperating with African governments.  Back.

Note 11: The CAP measures multilateral contributions to UN coordinated appeals. Bilateral and government support to NGO’s are not included in the CAP, nor are all humanitarian emergencies. The CAP accounts for approximately 50% of the global amount raised for humanitarian assistance. CAP “requirements” are estimated requirements. This method of accounting creates a perception, which is not entirely accurate, that African countries bear a slim proportion of the burden for humanitarian action. To take one illustrative example, the burden of refugee movements, particularly internally displaced persons, is borne largely by local communities and governments. The Steering Committee of the Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda noted in 1996 that the refugee influx into Western Tanzania created substantial agricultural damage, destroyed infrastructure, particularly roads and run-ways from truck convoys and airlifts. More generally, natural resources were “strained to the point where it is possible that they will be inadequate for the local population.” The resources that refugees consume, particularly common natural resources such as wood fuel, and its ensuing environmental impact can be significant. These costs are borne largely by affected governments but are excluded from the CAP. Nevertheless as one major donor official suggested, its data provides a “good proxy for the trends in donor response to emergency humanitarian needs.” http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/index.html [United States Mission to the United Nations, 1996: 22]. For more on the CAP as a measure of aggregate funding, and a more detailed analysis of the shortcomings of current funding arrangements, see Forman and Parhad 1997, and UN 1998.  Back.

Note 12: This dramatic drop is partly due to the recent nature of some appeals and the slow response to them.  Back.

Note 13: For a quantitative account of the low record of resource mobilization for emergencies in Somalia, Afghanistan, Angola, and Iraq; and by direct organizational appeals by the World Health Organization and others, see The Financial Tracking Database For Complex Emergencies at .  Back.

Note 14: Annan 1997.  Back.

Note 15: The top ten donors by aggregate amount in declining order are: United States, ECHO, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, United Kingdom, Japan, Germany, and Canada.  Back.

Note 16: ECOSOC 1994.  Back.

Note 17: Egypt is the only country that belongs to the OAU but not one of these sub-regional organizations. The Democratic Republic of Congo is a member of two sub-regional organizations, ECCAS and SADC.  Back.

Note 18: This table is disaggregrated in Tables 2 through 6.  Back.

Note 19: Salim 1998: para. 1.  Back.

Note 20: De Coning, 1997:7.  Back.

Note 21: “A Great Continent Now Successfully Emerging From the Dark Shadow of Its Colonial History,” The Irish Times. March 11, 1997.  Back.

Note 22: Daoud, Arezki, 1997. “The Death of the Maghreb Union”, The North African Journal, October 1997. Dound records a 1997 proposal to lay-off three fourths of the secretariat’s staff but this move to further weaken the organization was defeated.  Back.

Note 23: See Holm 1996 for an extended discussion of these obstacles to Maghreb integration.  Back.

Note 24: Ejime 1997a.  Back.

Note 25: “ECOWAS Foreign Ministers End Meeting; Issue Final CommuniquÈ,” BBC Summary of World Broadcasts: Text of final communiquÈ of the meeting of foreign ministers of the Economic Community of West African States, ECOWAS, issued in Yamoussoukro, CÙte d’Ivoire, on 12th March 1998. March 17, 1998.  Back.

Note 26: ECOWAS 1998.  Back.

Note 27: ECOWAS 1998:14.  Back.

Note 28: Members include Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, UK and US.  Back.

Note 29: IGAD 1998.  Back.

Note 30: Declaration of the 17th Session of the Council of Ministers Of IGAD on the Conflict Situations in the Sub-Region (Djibouti, 15 March 1998), at (8/28/98).  Back.

Note 31: For a complete list of tasks and organization of the Organ, see Cawthra 1996.  Back.

Note 32: Ludski, Henry, 1999. “The Force Will Be With Us, Go-ahead for SADC Peace Army”, Sunday Times (S. Africa), 21 March 1999.  Back.

Note 33: Towards establishing a new peace and security framework, Kofi Annan has initiated a dialogue with Secretary Generals of regional organizations to discuss general principles. Following the first July 1998 meeting, the DPA and DPKO began developing a set of principles to guide cooperation and were discussed at working level meeting among UN and regional organization officials in January 1999. OCHA, with its responsibility for humanitarian coordination, has not integrated humanitarian issues into this agenda.  Back.

Note 34: Berman 1998.  Back.

Note 35: Annan’s report on the “Enhancement of African Peacekeeping Capacity” documents the series of reviews and reports that have informed current UN thinking; see Annan 1999.  Back.

Note 36: Salim 1998: para. 111, 109.  Back.

Note 37: MacFarlane and Weiss 1992. In contrast, a recent OECD DAC report was decidedly more optimistic of the constructive contribution regional organizations could make to conflict prevention and peace-building, see OECD 1998: 101.  Back.

Note 38: See Club du Sahel 1997 for lessons learned from two decades of international cooperation with CILSS.  Back.

Note 39: Miskel and Norton 1998.  Back.

Note 40: Annan 1998: para.60.  Back.

Note 41: Caribbean Development Bank 1998.  Back.

Note 42: OPEC members are Algeria, Gabon, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela.  Back.

Note 43: Non-African contributors include the US, Belgium, Canada, Sweden, Italy, Denmark, the U.K., Norway, Spain, Germany, Australia, Korea, Indonesia, China, the European Union, and the United Nations Development Program. See De Coning, 1997: 8-9; Ejime 1997.  Back.

Note 44: OAU 1998.  Back.

Note 45: Recall also that the OAU SEADF is automatically contributed to from OAU membership dues.  Back.

Note 46: OAU 1998.  Back.

Note 47: Ejime1997; see also De Coning, 1997: 7.  Back.

Note 48: “Drought Over Southern Africa,” The Economist. April 29, 1995, 49.  Back.

Note 49: Najman and D’Orville 1995. The different types of alternative financing arrangements include: a levy on international financial transactions, an international lottery, taxing international transactions in specific sectors (telecommunication, air travel, etc.), environmental instruments (debt-for-nature swaps), taxing non-renewable resource extraction, and instruments relating to international peace, security and disarmament. Also see the Global Policy Forums’ extensive profile of alternative mechanism and related literature, www.igc.apc.org/globalpolicy/finance/alternat/index.htm  Back.

Note 50: Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 1996: Table 3.  Back.

Note 51: See Møller 1996.  Back.

Note 52: In 1996, Pakistan reported a GNP per capita of $460. Of the African countries for which we had comparable data, 20 had a per capita GNP higher than $460, 26 a lower one.  Back.

Note 53: Najman and D’Orville 1995: 46-47, propose extending the use of IMF’s Special Drawing Rights from balance of payment support to humanitarian assistance support. Debt relief, also the domain of the Bretton Woods Institutions is another prospective source of ’funding’. The Paris Club of creditor nations decided in Dec. 1998 that Nicaragua and Honduras would not have to repay their multilateral debt obligations for three years to help these countries cope with the damage of Hurricane Mitch. There is some debate as to whether this will set a precedent for other highly indebted countries suffering from the impact of natural disasters.  Back.

Note 54: See Annex 2, columns 7 and 8.  Back.

Note 55: The sources of data used for Annexes 2 to 7: Donor Humanitarian Assistance Database: http://www.reliefweb.int/fts/donor-db/; Eurostat: A Statistical Portrait of the European Union - Facts through 1996; OECD’s statistics available at (http://www.oecd.org/std/); UNDP: Human Development Report1997; United Nations: World Economic and Social Survey 1997; World Bank: World Development Report 1997.  Back.

Note 56: Comoros, Democratic Republic of Congo, Djibouti, Liberia, Libyan, Sao Tome and Principe, Somalia, Sudan, and Swaziland have been excluded because of data unavailability on defense expenditure.  Back.