Jerusalem

As we know Israel came to control Jerusalem in stages -first, in '48, the western side, mostly the then fashionable residential district (Upper and lower Baq'a, Katamon, Talbieh, Mamilla and Shama'a, parts of Abu Tor, of Musrara and of Rehavia); the surrounding environs to the west, southwest and northwest (Lifta, Deir Yassin, Ein Karem, El-Malha) and the heart of the then-modern commercial center; and later in '67, the Old City with its surrounding environs to the north, east and south. Israel's development in Jerusalem, east and west, did not however begin in real earnest until after '67. As we also know, Israel's post-'67 intensive development program involved a housing and associated infrastructure in a now unilaterally annexed and expanded territory across the Green Line, which was obviously designed in such a manner as to:

We also all know that while this feverish Jewish construction activity was underway, a similarly feverish policy was applied to deny building permits for the Arab population, which had doubled in size over the 27 year period since '67. On average the total sum of housing unit permits made available to the Arab residents of Jerusalem over the entire 27-year period (not exceeding 7500), equals the annual rate of such permits made available to Jewish construction. Even so, the major part of the permits given to Arab residents came against the background and in the context of the forced evacuation of Arab inhabitants from the Jewish or Mogh-rabi quarter of the Old City. ₁  In population terms, the corollary to the construction efforts basically transformed the demographic landscape, placing as many as over 150,000 Jewish inhabitants across the Green Line, and making the eastern part of the city almost equally divided between its Arab and Jewish residents. As an aside, it should be noted that, together with this figure which many observers seem to gloss over, Israeli settlers in the occupied territories presently number well over a quarter of a million inhabitants.

Israel's blatant discriminatory policy so offensively stands out that I do not believe one needs to waste too much time in trying to prove it. The relatively recent, heart-rending protestations of the territorially-strangled Im Touba residents against the planned extension of the Gilo to the east is but an example.

It may seem strange, against the background of this political and human affront, that a Palestinian Jerusalemite, whose sensitivities have become so over-politicized, and whose national existence in the city seems threatened should nonetheless still regard as the saddest part of this overall development onslaught to be the ravishing of the hills, valleys, and countryside of the city. Religious design may still posit Jerusalem as the terrestrial gateway to the divine world, as evidence, in Islam for example, through the story of the ascension--a tradition whose significance seems universally unappreciated. But looking today on Jerusalem's cement and mortar landscape, as indeed on its human landscape, it is hard to entertain some doubt on the matter, or at any rate not to feel saddened by the disappearance of that unique fusion of sunlight and earth texture in which the entire pastoral surroundings basked.

I hope the day will come, after a political settlement has been finalized, when minds will turn to preserving the spiritual distinctness of Jerusalem and its environs. But my mission in this brief presentation is less to mourn the past or the present as it is to provide a few sketches of a possible future. In doing this, I am afraid I shall not go much beyond the ideas I have already sketched in various places. ₂  

Briefly, my personal approach to the Jerusalem problem, like that to the Palestinian problem more generally, is guided by a principle which Palestinians do not in general savor, namely, the de facto existence of Israel on the map; and another principle which the Israelis do not in general savor, namely, that "the goods" must be equitably shared between Israelis and Palestin-ians. Without either of these two principles as an ingredient in the co-existence formula to be designed, I fear that residents of the city--as indeed of the country--will most likely discover that theirs is the gateway to hell rather than to celebrate bliss. But also, without these two ingredients in any possible compromise formula, I feel it wouldn't be necessary to ask anyone to speculate about peace in the first place--one side or the other can simply bring about what they desire by force, if they can; neither principles of reason, nor principles of morality need be brought to bear on the subject.

But if one were to bring those principles of reason and morality to bear, then it becomes obvious that Palestinians and Israelis must find a formula in which they can equitably share goods.

In the country at large, as also in Jerusalem the metropolis, two distinct approaches may be considered. Rights may either be divided distributively among individuals, or they may be spliced among collective entities or groups. If one looks at the country as a whole, the distributive approach would imply that each Palestinian and each Israeli would have equal political rights. These would include the right to exist in one's home in security as an individual, The right to be repatriated to one's home if one is deprived of the first right, and the right to be a full citizen--meaning, to be a participant to the constitutional extent possible in the determination of one's future, and to be equal in that respect with everyone else who is a citizen of the state. The application of a distributive system like this would obviously mean the establishment of a democratic, bi-national and multi-religious polity, after adjustments are introduced to compensate for rights--especially repatriation--that cannot be literally applied.

On the same equitable or parity scale, but approached from the opposite end, that of separating or splicing rather than that of integrating and sharing, rights can be divided between the collective entities or groups to which individuals belong, thus between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples, and thus in the form of two separate states.

The same principle of sovereign parity can be applied to the Jerusalem metropolis, again with the same choice between two approaches. Either the right to sovereignty is divided distributively among Jerusalemites, regardless of citizenship or present residence status. ₃  Or it is divided through separation and splicing between the two polities, Israel and Palestine. On the first approach, the city's sovereignty will belong to it and will be exercised primarily by its citizens rather than by their states, through a multi-national and multi-religious government. Special rights and privileges can of course be established for the two respective states, Israel and Palestine, and, to a lesser, or perhaps in a different degree, for other countries in the region and the world. Such rights and privileges, in the case of Israel and Palestine, might indeed include the right to regard the unified city as their capital, respectively, in which to seat their governments. But to all intents and purposes, the city will enjoy a corpus separatum status conferred upon it by the two states, and conformed by the international community. Within the borders of this entity, (whose exact extension and shape can be mutually determined by the two states wishing to take this approach) special care would have to be given to maintain the religious and ethnic balance of the residing individuals and groups, whether politically, demographically, or developmentally. Given the two national groups already in existence, it may be argued that a more realistic version of this model would in fact be better expressed through the aggregate distributive rights being equitably or equally operated or exercised directly by the two states, in the way two persons or more might share in the operation of a computer service program, rather than indirectly through their respective citizens. But even as the respective states share, it is understood on this approach that each would be exercising or operating sovereign rights de primo to the city and its residents, in whom these rights are distributively divested.

On the second approach, the city's sovereignty can be spliced de primo between the states, each declaring the part falling within its territorial province as its capital. The guiding principle in determining a borderline should be the same as that which is deemed operative in the Arab-Israeli talks, namely, the '48 demarcation line, or the Green Line, as it has come to be called. While this Green Line can be used as a guiding principle, agreed upon border adjustments can be envisaged whose purpose is to cater for historical or newly emerged anomalies, and whose underlying bartering philosophy is reciprocity. Indeed, ingenuity might allow future negotiators to regard such a line as being of two kinds, a main continuous line, and a series of secondary, scattered-islands demarcating lines. Additionally, while such a line may be regarded as a borderline demarcating where two territorial limits meet, it need not itself be more than an invisible or "imaginary" line, and the highest degree of porosity across it can be maintained, whether in municipal or in commercial functions.

Observe from what has been said that there is a logical point of departure for any border adjustments (spatial location) or border definitions (functional role) which may be posited in the context of a settlement: in one instance (the first) this logic dictates that each side decide how much of its territory to regard as part of the polis; and the focus of border questions would thus be on the outlying borderline, the overall shape and nature of the city. But in the second instance the focus of border questions (functional and locational) would naturally be on the location and nature of the international border running along the midst of the city, and which divides between the two separate states. And just as there is such a logical point of departure, there is also a blatant illogicality in presuming to address one set of questions if the point of departure does not provide the appropriate basis for it.

The two "theoretic" models I outlined can be regarded as extreme versions lying on opposite ends of the same parity spectrum. In outlining them however, I already hinted at the ways and means that either of them can be worked upon, through the introduction of various adjustments or modules, so that the model as a whole can be made to grow towards the opposite side of the spectrum. Indeed, it might be argued, given the needs and sensitivities associated with Jerusalem, that a "perfect" model would be one which is to all intents and purposes a mixed version of the two. In this third model, a basic sovereign line may be kept which is porous (or permeable) and invisible enough on one hand to allow for a maximization of sharing; but which is substantive enough on the other hand to allow for the required degree of separation. It may be continuous enough to maintain an adherence to the historic green line; but discrete or disjunctive enough to allow for the existence of disjoined or scattered sites of sovereignty. In this way, parity of sovereign rights can be maintained as a basic principle, but the correct mixture of dividing and sharing, separating and integrating, will optimize the benefits accruing to the two communities from the implementation of these rights. It should be noted, at all events, that the nature of such a line will be a function of the nature of the overall borderline between Israel and Palestine, and conversely, for as long as two separate polities continue to exist. Totally porous state-lines, on the other hand, will render any special features in the Jerusalem lines redundant.

Translated into practical terms, Palestinian sovereignty over eastern Jerusalem, or Israeli sovereignty over western Jerusalem, can still be made to be consistent with a continually undivided city, and with an extended and joint municipal government, or joint function of two separate municipal governments, which would operate those sectors--like sewerage or fire-fighting or street lighting or tourist aid and facilities or forestration or public health--whose enjoyment by the citizen and benefit is non-exclusive -indeed, whose enjoyment and benefit with respect to one citizen is a function of their available benefit and enjoyment by others; and whose operation is not culture-sensitive. Culture, political and religious-sensitive matters can be operated by two separate municipal governments. Various forms of cooperation can be envisaged, as well as various possibilities of representation and sharing. The city can be the seat of two capitals and systems of government, but it can have its own single court of law supervised by a judiciary body whose members are seconded respectively by the two states, and whose legal framework, adapted appropriately from the two respective legal systems is adjusted to address the unique status and dealings of the city's Israeli and Palestinian residents. Also speaking in practical terms, such a formula would address and rebalance some otherwise jarring anomalies, such as the presence of a Jewish cemetery lying within Pales-tinian jurisdiction on the eastern side, and a Moslem cemetery lying within Israeli jurisdiction on the western side; or of divided Abu Tor or Sur Bahir; or of a jutting enclave deemed religiously essential to one side or the other. Indeed, it is not logically, physically, or politically impossible to design a formula that would address "minimalist reasonable requirements" on both sides, and any such formula, being an advanced form of this unique mixture of separation and integration, may well serve as an attractive model for the overall relationship between the two states. In any case, it would have to be remembered that, to the extent the separating line is made invisible and economically insignificant, while at the same time maintaining a fairly visible and economically significant line between the two states, the outlying metropolitan borderline endowing the city with a special status will be enhanced.

A major problem that will have to be confronted in this effort is demography; and in particular, the Jewish settlers who have come to reside across the Green Line and within the environs of Jerusalem. I would like here to assert that I do not personally feel comfortable with the notion of legitimizing Israel's de facto transformation of the demographic status quo of the eastern part of the city. Thus neither option--of incorporating such inhabitants into Palestinian sovereign territory, or of annexing such quarters to Israeli sovereign territory--seems to me to be readily palatable. Yet, I have already alluded to the possibility of at least some adjustments in borderlines, and it goes without saying that the porosity of the border, allowing for the free movement of capital, goods and personnel, will in any case make it possible for residents, whatever their nationality, and wherever they reside, to move freely. The basic ingredients for a compromise on this issue, therefore, are obvious, but it would have to be addressed in the same spirit of reciprocity and mutual benefit that all other issues have also to be addressed. I am certain that future negotiators will not be in want of possible suggestions in this area.

Be that as it may -and it may be a long while before the two sides finally settle on the most suitable level of mixture and separation--the other aspect to be addressed by both sides will have to be Jerusalem's universal character.

Jerusalem's universal (and religious) character can be maintained through declaring the city to be a violence-free and demilitarized zone, a sanctified area that provides free access to all pilgrims and visitors at all times, where properties and worshippers belonging to foreign churches enjoy total religious immunity, where the rich mosaic of different religious quarters is enhanced and supported, and where the international community can through the United Nations continue to have a unified symbolic presence and representation, possibly on Jebel al-Mukabber still, by way of indicating the jealousy with which the peace of the city is to be guarded.

It is not beyond the imagination to envisage the introduction of an honorary role to the distinguished international public figure to be appointed as UN representative, perhaps endowing her with a special Jerusalem title that would reflect the recognition by the people of Jerusalem of their city's international character.

Beyond that, however, it is difficult for me to see the value now of an internationalization program of the kind envisaged in the UN partition plan.

My final comment has to do with the immense compensating effort which has to be undertaken by all concerned, once a settlement is agreed upon, in order to bring Palestinian Jerusalem infrastructurally up to the standard enjoyed by Israel Jerusalem. This will involve a massive program of renovations in the Old City, in the various neighboring Arab quarters, as well as an environment-sensitized development of the commercial centers. Residential construction must also be undertaken, informed again by an environment-sensitize plan. Many considerations call for such a program, not least of which being the need to create that symmetry between the various neighborhoods which would facilitate human harmony in the city. In financial terms, the reconstruction effort cannot be immense by any international standard. But its human and political value will be immeasurable.

Still on the human front, I believe the time must also come and the effort undertaken to establish a multi-religious higher institute for the study of the region's civilizations, where scholars from different national and religious backgrounds not only can jointly work on the pluralistic history of Palestine and its civilizations, its peoples and its archeology; but also where a true endeavor can be undertaken by these same scholars to engage in an appreciation of the Abrahamic religion, the source of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.

I mention this point here because I believe that Jerusalem's future peace can only be guaranteed if, additionally to any political or geographic settlement which is worked out, a serious effort is made in the sphere of historical and religious re-construction. The fact that the three contending religions derive their roots from the same divine message is one which can either help aggravate an already unhealthy state of dissonance and friction, or be a source of convergence and harmony.

I will end by saying that I have, in the final analysis, only presented my personal ruminations on the subject. I hold on to them because of two complementary reasons: (a) I believe that without them a Jerusalem settlement is not possible; and (b) I believe that without a Jerusalem settlement a lasting peace in the area is not possible. With them, both a settlement and a peace is possible.

About the Author:  Sari Nusseibeh is President of Al-Quds University in East Jerusalem. He received his undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics from Oxford University and his doctoral degree in Islamic Philosophy from Harvard University.

During the years 1978 to 1990, Sari Nusseibeh worked as a lecturer at Birzeit and Al-Najah Universities in the West Bank. In 1993-1994, he spent a year as a visiting fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C.

Among his publications, Dr. Nusseibeh has written Palestine: A State is Born, No Trumpets, No Drums, co-authored with Mark Heller, and But Was it Just?, co-authored with J. Elshtaine and others. His most recent contribution, in Arabic, is a work on the concept of Freedom, published by al-Saqi in London, England. Back.

Note 1:  Called the "Jewish Quarter", it is in fact claimed that more than 70% of the ownership of property in that area is Arab. However, prior to '48, Jews did reside in that property as tenants or, in some cases, as landlords. Soon after the war ended in '67 the Israeli authorities razed the entire quarter to the ground, to make room for the construction of what is now called "the Jewish Quarter". Arab residents from that Quarter, as from other areas in the Old City, who were thus forced to move out eventually settled in a new housing project in Beit Hanina (the Nusseibeh project) which the Israelis allowed, or they moved to a new refugee camp in the Shu'fat district. The history of Jewish versus non-Jewish presence in the city in often shrouded in ideological as well as religions mist. In relatively "recent" history, it is worth pointing out Z. Nusseibeh's recent work in which there is a reference to two significant aspects in this context: a) The Jewish population surge in Jerusalem only occurred in the 19th century in response to the rise in Zionist ideology; and b) it was the Caliph Omar who enabled Jews for the first time and after a prolonged banishment to set up residence in the city. Back.

Note 2:  See, for example, Proceedings of the April 1993 UN sponsored meeting on Jerusalem published by the Department under the title Jerusalem: Visions of Reconciliation.  My contribution there was published in the English al-Fajr in the 3rd. May '93 issue. I had already made similar suggestions in No Trumpets, No Drums, as well as in a brief article in Tikkun in May '91. Back.

Note 3:  The reference here is to Palestinian Jerusalemites who are denied the right to return, or to live in their ancestral city. These include the estimated 60,000, and their descendants, who were forced to leave in '48; as well as an indeterminate number who left after, and since '67, and whose preference would have been, and remains, to return to live in the city. Back.