|
|
|
|
|
|
CIAO DATE: 9/00
Nigeria: Country Profile
Background Paper
November, 1996
Nigeria, Africa's most populous nation, was a pioneer in the movement for African independence. In past centuries, its territory was home to a series of powerful and technically-advanced societies, renowned for their artistic, commercial, and political achievements.
Today, Nigeria remains one of Africa's most influential countries. Its vast oil reserves and unique human resources create the capacity for enormous prosperity and regional leadership. The fate of its struggle for democracy and national unity will have profound implications for the entire continent. Both the potential and the obstacles are on the giant scale of the country itself. British conquest brought together within Nigeria's borders a wide range of cultures and ethnic groups. The colonial "unity," however, was a top-down authoritarian creation. In spite of the efforts of the nationalist movement for independence to foster a sense of national identity, particularly after World War II, building a nation based on popular participation remains a work in progress.
There are solid foundations for democratic culture and a diverse civil society. Nigeria has a rich array of private entrepreneurs, energetic and diverse communications media, labor unions, professional associations, a literary scene with world-renowned authors, religious bodies, and many other groups that have contributed to a sense of national identity and pride.
It also has a history of military repression, civilian corruption, and ethnic tensions. Currently it is dominated by a military regime which has no solution for economic problems and only the thinnest veneer of "transition" painted over systematic denial of democratic rights. As in many other African countries, Nigerians awaitand struggle fora "second independence" that will bear real fruits in political participation and economic progress.
Section 1: Current Policy Issues
The most urgent issue is democracy, understood not only as an end to military rule but also as the establishment of responsive political institutions which promote accountable government, prevent corruption, respect human and civil rights, and ensure popular sovereignty.
For most Nigerians, the pressing problems of everyday survival are the highest immediate priority. Since the oil boom of the 1970s, Nigeria's economy has been in crisis despite continued expansion in oil production. The real income index for urban households dropped from 166 in 1980 to 71 in 1986. The exchange rate for the naira has dropped from one to a dollar in 1985 to 79 to a dollar in 1996. And the list of dismal statistics could go on (see additional sources in "Selected Resources" below). Without the establishment of accountable government, however, the chances of addressing other pressing problemssuch as the deterioration of living conditions and the collapse of once outstanding educational institutions- -are very low.
Nigeria has abundant human as well as natural resources to address its problems. Many of its outstanding leaders, however, are instead in prison or in exile. The prerequisite for addressing other problems is having a government that works and is accountable to the Nigerian people.
Nigerian hopes for a return to civilian rule were dashed when the military regime annulled national elections after votes were counted in June 1993. Since then repression has escalated to unprecedented levels, culminating in the execution of environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues in November 1995. Military ruler General Sani Abacha peddles another complex "transition" program, while internal protest is repeatedly quashed and the international community pays only sporadic attention.
Like the anti-apartheid movement in the early 1970s, the Nigerian pro-democracy movement is faced with the challenge of building a coalition that can isolate a systematically abusive regime and promote a democratically accountable alternative. The situations differ in many respects, most notably in the lack of a racially-defined barrier between oppressor and oppressed. Nevertheless, the movement for democracy in Nigeria has similar strengths and faces comparably formidable obstacles as did its South African counterpart twenty years ago.
Despite repression, human rights and environmental groups, trade unionists, educators, and others inside Nigeria continue to resist authoritarian rule. Internal opposition has been supported by a large and well-educated group of Nigerians living abroad, just as the South African exile community played a key role in the anti-apartheid struggle. International human rights groups and environmental groups have joined with Africa advocacy groups in focusing world attention on Nigeria.
In 1993, and again in 1995, the international community and African leaders, including South African President Nelson Mandela, also responded with intensified political, diplomatic, and economic pressure on the Abacha regime to secure the release of imprisoned leaders, to permit the return of exiled activists, and to facilitate the identification of a durable solution to Nigeria's political crisis. The United States, the European Union, and the Commonwealth imposed limited sanctions on Nigeria, including a ban on arms sales and visa restrictions on Nigerian officials. There has also been increased international support for Nigerian organizations working for democracy and human rights.
These pressures have had more symbolic effects than substantive impact. They have fallen far short of more comprehensive sanctions demanded by Nigerian pro-democracy forces. Legislation introduced in the US Congress, but not yet voted on, would authorize additional economic sanctions, while still not including a comprehensive embargo on Nigerian oil.
Sanctions proposals have been vigorously opposed by oil companies. Since the discovery of oil in the Niger River delta in 1958, Shell Oil and other international oil companies have caused extensive environmental damage to this area, the homeland of the Ogoni people and other minority groups. Environmental and human rights groups accuse the companies of collaborating with the Nigerian military regime to stifle opposition to the industry s activities.
When public attention and the media spotlight shifts off of Nigeria, diplomats tend to revert to business as usual, relying on the false hope that quiet diplomacy with the Nigerian government will eventually bring about the promised transition to civilian rule and avert further crises. The military regime is running a well-financed public relations campaign to convince African-Americans and others that it is sincere about change. Real progress toward democracy is unlikely, however, unless more significant steps are taken to weaken the military regime and to strengthen popular democratic forces.
Representatives of pro-democracy groups within Nigeria, hampered by difficulties of communication and recurrent repression, are best contacted when travelling or through overseas representatives. The following is a short list of U.S.-based contacts for those willing to get involved in supporting the struggle for democracy in Nigeria. Many more sources can be found on or through the Web sites listed in the "Further Resources" section of this paper.
-
The United Democratic Front of Nigeria (UDFN) was formed in March 1996 at simultaneous summit meetings in South Africa and Norway, as a common platform of pro-democracy organizations. Contact points in the U.S. include (1) the Nigerian Democratic Movement, P.O. Box 91291, Washington, DC 20090; tel: 202-806-4793; fax: 202-806-4632; e-mail: ndmorg@cldc.howard.edu; contact: Bolaji Aluko; and (2) the Organization of Nigerians in the Americas, P.O. Box 200985, Austin, TX 78720-0985; tel: 512-335-0287; fax: 512-471-1061; e-mail: julius@jeeves.la.utexas.edu; contact: Julius Ihonvbere. Other Nigerian pro-democracy groups can be located through the Web addresses in the "Further Resources" section.
-
The International Roundtable on Nigeria (IRTON) is an informal association of human rights, environmental, labor, and US-based Nigerian pro-democracy groups working to help Nigerians restore a rights-respecting, accountable government. Its meetings are coordinated through the Government Affairs Office of Amnesty International USA, 304 Pennsylvania Ave SE, Washington DC 20003, tel: 202-544-0200, Ext. 234; fax: 202-546-7142. Contact: Adotei Akwei.
-
The Africa Fund, which took a leading role in the campaign for local and state government action against the apartheid regime, is now involved with other groups in similar actions to support the Nigerian pro-democracy movement. Africa Fund, 17 John St., New York, NY 10038; tel: 212-962-1210; e-mail: africafund@igc.apc.org; contact: Michael Fleshman.
- Of the U.S.-based environmental organizations, the Sierra Club is currently most actively engaged in the Shell Boycott, working with representatives of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) and other groups. Sierra Club, 408 C St., NE, Washington, D.C. 20002; tel: 202-675-6691; e-mail: stephen.mills@sierraclub.org; web: http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/Nigeria/index.asp; contact: Stephen Mills, Human Rights and Environment Campaign Director.
Section 2: Capsule history (pre-1960)
Although the areas of savanna and coastal forest which make up contemporary Nigeria have been inhabited for thousands of years, archeology and linguistics give us only fragmentary glimpses into most of that history. By approximately 2500 to 2000 years ago, iron-working cultures, such as the Nok, were thriving in central and southern Nigeria. The Nok produced sub-Saharan Africa's earliest terracotta sculptures of human figures, establishing what was to become an important tradition of highly-skilled artistry, preserved in many later West African societies. Linguistic evidence also shows that the Nigeria-Cameroon border area was likely the source of the Bantu group of languages, which covers most of sub-Saharan Africa and which is linked to the spread of iron-working.
Over two millennia, and particularly between the 11th century and European colonial conquest in the late 19th century, the area in and around Nigeria was home to a number of sophisticated and influential societies. Among the most important were the northeastern kingdom of Borno, the Hausa city-state/kingdoms of Katsina, Kano, Zaria, and Gobir in northern-central Nigeria, the Yoruba city-states/kingdoms of Ife, Oyo, and Ijebu in southwestern Nigeria, the southern kingdom of Benin, and the Igbo communities of eastern Nigeria.
Extensive trading networks developed among these societies, and northwards across the Sahara. By the 11th century, new links to the equally prosperous societies of North Africa flourished as Muslim merchants of diverse ethnic origin crossed the Sahara with camel caravans. This contact also facilitated the spread of Islam in Borno and the Hausa states of the north.
Portuguese explorers arrived off the coast of modern-day Nigeria by the 1470s. Soon, European powers were regularly exchanging spirits, cloth, hardware, guns, and gunpowder for slaves along the West African coast. Slavery in various forms existed in West Africa before the Europeans arrived, as it did in most other parts of the ancient and medieval world. With the slave trade across the Atlantic, however, the volume, the commercialization, and the brutality all expanded on an unprecedented scale. Customary rights and privileges that slaves retained in many local societies were stripped away.
In 1500, Africans and persons of African descent were probably a minority of the world's slave population. By 1700, they had become a majority of the world's slave population. As many as eleven or twelve million of the estimated eighteen million or more slaves exported from Africa since 1500 came from West and Central Africa. Along with Angola, the Bight of Benin (western Nigeria) and the Bight of Biafra (eastern Nigeria) were key points of embarkation for slave ships over a long period of time. The centrality of the Nigerian coast in the North Atlantic slave trade is evident in the continuing influence of West African culture in the Caribbean and North America.
The consequences of the slave trade were devastating. How much the trade diminished total African population is disputed, but the most serious effects were social and political. The trade helped foster wars, raiding, and exploitation of the weak by the powerful. Rulers and cultures who were reluctant to participate were edged aside by Big Menrulers or merchants who used the system to increase their power and profits.
During the 19th century, the abolition of the slave trade cleared the way for expansion of trade in agricultural produce from Africa to Europe, particularly palm oil from the West African coastal areas. The coastal enclave of Lagos became a British colony in 1861, a center for expansion of British trade, missions, and political influence. Late 19th century and early 20th century Lagos was also a center for educated West African elites who were to play prominent roles in the development of Pan-Africanism as well as Nigerian nationalism.
In northern Nigeria, Muslim reformer and empire builder Uthman dan Fodio established the Sokoto Caliphate in the early 19th century over the Hausa trading states. A predominantly Fulani aristocracy ruled over the majority of Hausa-speaking commoners, including both merchants and peasants. Expansion of agriculture, trade, and crafts made this area probably the most prosperous in tropical Africa in the 19th century, engaged in trade both to the coast and through the traditional routes over the desert to North Africa.
At the end of the 19th century, Britain began aggressive military expansion in the region, in part to counter competition from other Western countries and to break down monopolies which local traders had established in commodities such as palm-oil, cocoa, and peanuts. Britain declared a protectorate in the Niger delta in 1885 and sponsored creation of the Royal Niger Company in 1886. A protectorate was declared over northern Nigeria in 1900. Despite the loss of sovereignty, however, the strong political and cultural traditions of these societies initially enabled many to accommodate nominal British rule with little change in their way of life.
Just as in the United States, the late 19th and early 20th centuries marked a resurgence of racism in the British colonial empire. Educated Africans were excluded from the civil service, and African entrepreneurs were discriminated against. Top-down colonial authority was put in place through what was called "indirect rule," which used existent or invented traditional authorities to govern African communities. "Chiefs" became the agents of colonial rule, while checks and balances that often had previously constrained their authority were diminished.
The slogan "Divide and Rule" helped guide administration as well as conquest. Although the North and South were formally consolidated in 1914, disparities of education and religion were reinforced. In the North, the British limited Christian missions, restricted education, and reinforced the feudal rulers. In 1939, Eastern and Western Nigeria were separated, leading to the structure of three separate regions which was in place at independence. Within each region, one ethnic group predominated-the Hausa-Fulani in the North, the Yoruba in the southwest and the Igbo in the southeast. The system fostered rivalries not only between the regions, but also between the dominant group and "minorities" within each region.
Resistance to colonial rule took many forms until independence in 1960. Nnamdi Azikiwe, who died in 1996 at the age of 91, was one of the continent's leading nationalists. Women's resistance to taxation led to a revolt in Aba in eastern Nigeria in 1929 and to massive protests in Abeokuta in the west in the late 1940s. The Islamic populist movement led by Aminu Kano in the north opposed not only British rule but also the feudal aristocracy.
The political scene leading up to independence, however, was dominated by three regionally based parties: the National Council for Nigeria and the Cameroons (NCNC) in the east, the Action Group (AG) in the west, and the conservative Northern People's Congress (NPC) in the north.
Section 3: Capsule history (post-1960)
At independence on October 1, 1960, Nigeria remained an uneasy federation of distinct regions. The "political class" of each region used its authority to harass opponents and to pursue its own interests. At the federal level, the Northern People's Congress, led by northern region premier Ahmadu Bello and federal prime minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, was the leading force in a coalition with the NCNC, while the AG was excluded from power. After openly corrupt elections in 1964, the NCNC was also excluded from national power. The gap between the rich and the poor widened, and protests mounted.
In January 1966, middle-ranking members of the Nigerian military staged an attempted coup. This was suppressed by federal troops, but resulted in the installation of a military junta, led by Igbo officers. Regional animosities flared, prompting massacres of Igbo-speakers living in the north. The following year, eastern leaders responded by declaring a separate Republic of Biafra, igniting a three-year civil war. Despite intense ethnic polarization and perhaps as many as one million killed during the war, the winning federal government followed a policy of non-retribution. Subsequent division of Nigeria into smaller states produced larger representation for ethnic groups other than the big three.
Successive military governments promised to return Nigeria to civilian rule, but it was more than a decade before Lt.-Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo fulfilled this commitment. They also promised to end civilian corruption, but General Murtala Muhammad, the most energetic in the drive against corruption, was in office only for less than a year in 1975-76 before an abortive coup attempt resulted in his death. In 1979, Shehu Shagari, leader of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN), was elected president of the Second Republic. However, neither the regional tensions nor the issue of corruption had been resolved. The Shagari regime was notoriously corrupt and incompetent. On December 31, 1983, the armed forces again deposed the government. The coup, led by Gen. Muhammadu Buhari, initially enjoyed the support of many Nigerians, who had become disillusioned with the corruption of civilian officials.
In the 1970s and 1980s, rising oil production and sharp increases in world oil prices brought a boom in oil revenues. Oil moved from 58 percent of exports in 1970 to consistently over 90 percent in the years after 1973; over the same period it jumped from 26 percent of government revenue to a range between 60 percent and 82 percent. Neither the government nor the economy could handle the sudden growth; corruption, mismanagement, and rising indebtedness left the economy shattered when oil revenues dropped again. While a minority grew rich, living conditions for ordinary Nigerians became more and more precarious.
When Gen. Ibrahim Babangida assumed power in 1985, the military government again promised to restore democracy. Despite initial indications of the military s commitment to this goal, hopes for a swift transition began to fade by the end of the decade. The schedule was repeatedly revised and the government made increasingly intrusive attempts to "manage" the process of political party formation.
The electoral system imposed two political parties created by the military: the National Republican Convention (NRC) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP). Both parties chose wealthy Muslim businessmen to run for president. The NRC candidate was Bashir Tofa, from northern Nigeria; Chief Moshood Abiola, from the southwest, was the candidate for the SDP. Although both had been approved by the military, Abiola, a flamboyant media magnate and philanthropist, was seen as potentially more independent.
Nigerians eventually went to the polls on June 12, 1993 in what observers deemed one of the most peaceful and orderly elections in Africa in recent years. Abiola won 58 percent of the vote, including majorities in 22 of Nigeria's 31 states. Even in the north, he won 43 percent of the vote, carrying 4 of the 11 northern states. On the eve of the announcement of the election results, Gen. Babangida suddenly annulled the election. The decree precipitated a political crisis and cleared the way for Gen. Sani Abacha to seize power on November 17, 1993. Pro-democracy advocates, including large numbers who were not political supporters of Chief Abiola, maintain that the June 1993 vote, as the legitimate democratic expression of the Nigerian nation, across ethnic and regional lines, must be the basis for any return to democratic rule.
Gen. Abacha has presided over a rapid deterioration of respect for civil and human rights. Although he has echoed the perpetual assurances of a return to civilian rule, he devised a protracted and centrally-controlled transition process guaranteed to keep him in power at least until late 1998. Local government elections held in March 1996 were boycotted by pro-democracy groups which saw the tightly regulated poll as an attempt to lend legitimacy to Abacha's discredited transitional process.
The Abacha regime has detained, indefinitely, thousands of labor leaders, pro-democracy activists, human rights advocates, and other political opponents, including President-Elect Abiola and the former head of state, Gen. Obasanjo. Chief Abiola's wife, Kudirat Abiola, and others prominent in the campaign for justice and democracy have recently been the victims of assassination or attempted assassination. Efforts by minority groups to secure greater autonomy and control of Nigeria's natural resources have been brutally suppressed, particularly in the oil-rich southeast where the government executed writer and environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other leaders of the Ogoni people in November 1995. At the same time, the country faces a deepening economic crisis, aggravated by the failure of World Bank-sponsored structural adjustment program and the systematic misappropriation of oil revenues by Nigeria's ruling elite.
Section 4: Fast Facts
| Official Name | The Federal Republic of Nigeria |
| Area | 356,669 miles² (923,768 km²), roughly twice the size of California |
| Population | 105,300,000 (est. 1993) |
| Date of Independence | October 1, 1960 |
| Capital | Abuja (pop. 305,900, est. 1992) |
| Major Cities | Lagos (pop. 10,287,000), Ibadan (1,295,000), Kano (699,900), Ogbomosho (660,600), Enugu (500,000) (Lagos est. 1995; others est. 1992, except Enugu, est. 1986)[1] |
| Geographic Features | Nigeria is situated in the tropics with an average temperature is 90° F (32° C). Annual rainfall varies from 98" (2.5 m) in the southeast to 24" (0.6 m) in the north. Coastal forests cover the southern regions, giving way to savanna in the north. The Niger River flows from the northwest to join the Benue River in central Nigeria, then turns south form a fertile delta as it empties into the Gulf of Guinea. 35.6% of the land is arable and 12.4% is wooded. |
| Official Language | English |
| Other Major Languages | Hausa (20.9%), Yoruba (20.3%), Igbo (16.6%), Fulani (8.6%) |
| Major Subsistence Resources | Rice, maize (corn), taro, yams, cassava, sorghum, and millet |
| Major Commercial Resources | Sub-Saharan Africa's leading producer of oil, which accounted for 97.9% of total export earnings in 1992. Cash crops include cocoa, peanuts, oil palm, and rubber |
| Gross National Product (GNP) | US$29 billion (0.45% of US) in 1993. Ranked 3rd in Africa behind Algeria and Egypt. |
| Real Gross Domestic Product per capita | US$1540 (6% of US) in 1993. Nigeria ranks 21st in Africa, 17th in sub-Saharan Africa. |
| Total external debt | US$32.5 billion in 1993 (112% of GNP). Debt service costs were equal to 29% of the value of goods and services exports (1992). |
| Human Development Index(1) | 0.400 (US=0.940), ranked 137 (US=2) of 174 countries. |
| Status of women | Gender-Related Development Index(2) = 0.380 (US=0.923), ranked 108 (US=4) of 137 countries. Women comprise approximately 36% of the wage-earning labor force. |
| Education Profile | School is free and compulsory for students 6-11 years old up to junior secondary school. In 1991, 76% of children attended primary school and 23% attended secondary school. Adult literacy rate 54%; male literacy 64.7%; female literacy 43.8% (1993). A once distinguished university system has deteriorated due to repression and underfunding. |
| Health Profile | Life expectancy is 52.2 years for women and 49.0 years for men (1993). Infant mortality is 84 per 1,000 live births (1993), under five mortality is 191 per 1,000 (1994), maternal mortality is 10 per 1,000 (1993). 36% of children under the age of 5 are malnourished. There is one doctor per 5,882 people (1988-91). Public expenditure on health in 1990 was equivalent to 1.2% of GDP. |
| Religious Affiliations | Muslims 47.2% (mostly in the north and west), Christian 34.5% (predominantly in the south; 50% Catholic, 50% Protestant), 18% traditional religions. |
[1] Like other figures on this page, the population data for Nigeria's cities are estimates;
most are likely to be low, given that urban areas have grown rapidly in recent years,
[2] The Human Development Index (HDI) has been developed by the United Nations Development Programme to assess a country's achievement in developing the basic human capabilities of its citizens. It incorporates a number of social indicators related to health, education, and standard of living. It is an average figure and does not reveal distributional inequalities within a particular country.
[3] The Gender-Related Development Index is similar to the HDI, but it takes account of inequalities in achievement between women and men. As a result, a country's GDI falls if either the achievement levels of both women and men decline, or if the disparity between women and men increases.
Section 5: Further Resources
There is a rich array of information and analysis on virtually all aspects of Nigerian politics and society, from both Nigerian and non-Nigerian sources. The recent publications and Web sites listed below are only a few suggested starting points.
In Print
The books marked with * are available by special order on-line from the Internet bookstore Amazon.com. Those marked with ** are in-stock at Amazon.com. Just click on the linked ISBN number for the book to go to the book's entry on the amazon.com site and process your order. Amazon often offers discounts on many books in stock
- * Said Adejumobi and Abubakar Momoh, eds. The Political Economy of Nigeria under Military Rule (1984-1993). Harare: SAPES Books, 1995 (Available from African Books Collective, Oxford, UK). 359pp. Paperback ISBN 1-77905-036-4. Wide-ranging collection of articles by fourteen Nigerian scholars based inside the country.
- * Barbara Callaway and Lucy Creevey. The Heritage of Islam: Women, Religion and Politics in West Africa. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994. 222pp. Paperback. ISBN 1-55587-414-2. Covers Senegal and northern Nigeria, with sections on education, family life, and economics as well as political empowerment.
- * Tom Forrest, Politics and Economic Development in Nigeria. Boulder: Westview Press, 1995. 286pp. Paperback. ISBN 0- 8133-2427-0. $22. Provides a clearly written analysis and chronological overview, as well as extensive references to other works.
- Human Rights Watch/Africa, Nigeria"Permanent Transition": Current Violations of Human Rights in Nigeria. New York: HRW/Africa, September 1996. 52pp. Their latest report on the human rights situation in Nigeria.
- * Julius Ihonvbere, Nigeria: The Politics of Adjustment and Democracy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994. 231pp. Hardback. ISBN 1-56000-093-7. Although much of it was written before 1993, this is still a very useful overview by a Nigerian scholar and pro-democracy activist.
- * Chikwenye Okonjo Ogunyemi, Africa Wo/man Palava: The Nigerian Novel by Women. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 353pp. Paperback. ISBN 0-226-62085-9. $17.95. Far more than a literary analysis, this study reflects on the role of women and men in the struggle for freedom.
- ** Ken Saro-Wiwa, A Month and a Day: A Detention Diary. New York: Penguin Books, 1995. 238pp. Paperback. ISBN 0-14-025914-7. $10.95. The last memoir by the environmental activist executed by the military regime in November 1995.
- ** Wole Soyinka, The Open Sore of a Continent: A Personal Narrative of the Nigerian Crisis. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 170pp. Hardback. ISBN 0-19-510557-5. $19.95. The Nobel Laureate and political activist's passionate analysis and reflections on nationhood in Africa and the world.
On the Internet
Since Web sites change rapidly, this short list of U.S.- based sites should be supplemented with additional sites found through general Africa references and Web searching toolsfor a quick guide see APIC's background paper Africa on the Internet (http://www.africapolicy.org/bp/inet.html). The major e-mail/newsgroup sources on Nigeria (naijanet and soc.culture.nigeria, which largely duplicate each other) are extremely voluminous and often contentious. They are recommended only for persons already quite knowledgeable about both Nigeria and on-line culture.
- The Association of Concerned Africa Scholars (ACAS) has an extensive section of action-oriented material on Nigeria (http://www.prairienet.org/acas/siro.html), with archived documents as well as links to other sites.
- Chuck Odili's Home Page, entitled Nigerian Information Resources Online ( http://odili.net/nigeria.html), covers a very broad range of material, making use of the latest Internet bells and whistles.
- The Sierra Club ( http://www.sierraclub.org/human-rights/Nigeria/index.asp) has up-to-date information on the Shell boycott and related environmental issues.
Video
"Delta Force," produced in 1995 by Catma Films in London, is a powerful presentation of environmental destruction and repression in Ogoniland, with extensive footage shot by Nigerian activists and smuggled out from the area. Contact the Sierra Club for information on obtaining copies in the U.S. The transcript of "The Drilling Fields," produced a year earlier by the same production company, is available on the Web at: http://www.oneworld.org/owbt/drilling_video.html.
Section 6: "Sweet Mother"
Nigeria's rich cultural tradition stretches back into pre-history and remains a live resource in confronting the nation's problems today. To explore beyond the ancient and recent snippets in this section, check out the links here and in the previous section as well.
|
|
|
Nok terracotta (fired clay) sculptures are among the oldest known African sculptures, dating back some 2500 years. The Nok culture, also among the first in the world to smelt iron, centered on the Jos plateau in northern Nigeria. It was from roughly the same area that Bantu languages spread throughout central, eastern and southern Africa. The images reproduced here, along with other background on Nok, can be found on the Web in the African Art course of Dr. Olu Oguibe (http://www.arts.usf.edu/~ooguibe/newafrica.htm) The site is no longer available.
|
Sweet Mother
Sweet mother I no go forget you
Sweet mother I no go forget you
When I dey cry, my mother go carry meshe go say,
When I won sleep, my mother go pet me,
When I dey hungry, my mother go run up and down. Sweet mother I no go forget you for the suffer wey you suffer for me
When I dey sick, my mother go cry, cry, cry,
O, she go beg God,
If I no sleep, my mother no go sleep,
Sweet mother I no go forget you,
You fit get another wife, you fit get another husband, And if I forget you, therefore I forget my life and the air I breathe.
And then on to you men, forget, verily, forget your mother, From song lyrics by Prince Nico Mbarga, 1976. Prince Nico Mbarga, born of Nigerian and Cameroonian parents, recorded this highlife song, reportedly one of the biggest African music hits ever. "Tellingly, it is more widely recognized than the Nigerian national anthem," writes literary critic Chikwenye Ogunyemi (African Wo/man Palava, p. 287). "I wish that it were the national anthem, because of its ability to draw people together." [1] pikin - child [2] chop - eat Credits: Prince Nico Mbarga and Rocafil Jazz; record without title. Produced in Nigeria by Roger's All Stars 1976. ASAPLS 6, Decca France 278.159. Available on CD on Aki Special, Ro under Records (1987) CD 11545. This CD is also available for sale at Amazon.com. |
|
No Longer Our Own Country
We have lost it,
Our sacred trees have been cut down
Where are the tall trees
We will expect in old age
But we will not perish in this other country.
Tanure Ojaide, 3-5 October, 1986 Tanure Ojaide, born in the Delta area of Nigeria, was Africa Regional Winner of the Commonwealth Poetry Prize in 1987. He has published numerous works of poetry and literary criticism. |