CIAO DATE: 02/02

Compliance with Future Nuclear Arms Control Agreements and Implementation of Possible Declarations on Unilateral Reduction

Yuri Nazarkin
GCSP Faculty

1999 - 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Introduction

By the end of the Cold War (late 80s) and in the post-Cold War period, a great progress was achieved in providing arms control agreements, both bilateral and multilateral, with more effective compliance mechanisms in comparison with agreements concluded at earlier stages. Suffice it to compare the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (1972) and the Chemical Weapon Convention (1993): the former does not contain any international verification, which is a pre-condition for compliance, while the latter contains a very elaborated verification and compliance mechanism (see below). The explanation is evident: radical changes in the international climate made it possible to do so.

Unfortunately, now the political climate is not so benign as it was in the early 90s. And at the same time, the need for more effective compliance procedures is growing as the arms control process continues.

The first breakthrough in verification and compliance was achieved in a bilateral treaty, namely, the US-USSR Treaty on Intermediate and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF) in 1987. Multilateral process required more time and efforts for the same end. As far as the nuclear arms control process cannot remain bilateral and, sooner or later, should enter a multilateral framework, it is important to consider possibilities of compliance at that stage.

There are a lot of discussions on nuclear disarmament. There is a strong trend in favor of negotiating a treaty that would completely prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. The author of this paper is skeptical to this idea. A piecemeal approach seems to him much more practical and feasible. That is why compliance and enforcement is regarded in this paper in the context of future, partial nuclear arms control measures, and not of a comprehensive convention on nuclear disarmament.

As far as the subject of this paper is non-existing agreements, which might be concluded in the future, the author has to consider possible parameters of these agreements before he examines the issue of compliance with them.

Of course, this task cannot be achieved without summarizing and analyzing compliance procedures that exist now and are used in various arms control agreements.

Review of existing complying mechanisms and tools

There are two basic categories of means to ensure compliance: those, which are in treaties and those, which are outside.

The first category includes:

a. Verification;

b. Review mechanisms;

c. Consultative bodies;

d. Treaty implementation organizations; and

e. The right of withdrawal from an agreement,
particularly in case of non-compliance.

 

The second category includes:

f. The UN Security Council; and

g. Reaction to non-compliance outside of the UN.

 

Verification

Effective verification is an important deterrence against violations of an agreement. Any detection of a breach of an arms control agreement implies that a violator would be under certain political pressure. The more evident and better proven the breach, the stronger the pressure. Cheating is a very serious international "offence" and states, understandably, are extremely hesitant to admit it. Verification also has a confidence building effect which generates an international belief in the viability of the arms control measures and contributes to their compliance. Weak verification usually produces mutual suspicions and mistrust.

There were always suspicions about the compliance with the Biological and Toxin Weapon Convention (BTWC), particularly after the anthrax accident in Sverdlovsk (USSR) in 1979. In 1992 the Russian authorities admitted that a breach of the BWC had been committed. However, suspicions remain that Russia has not stopped its BW programme. The ineffectiveness and weakness of the verification system of the Convention do not permit either to confirm or deny suspicions.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (1963) does not provide for and even does not mention any verification measures. It just implies that each Party could use its own national means of verification. This resulted in numerous mutual accusations in violations of the Treaty by the USSR and the US. Political motives caused by the Cold War could clearly be seen behind those accusations. However, in some cases it was a linguistic discrepancy between the English and Russian versions of the Treaty, which stimulated such accusations; for the case of underground explosions, the former prohibits nuclear explosions which cause "radioactive debris" to be present outside the territorial limits of the State under whose jurisdiction or control such explosions are conducted, while the latter uses the word, if translated into English correctly, "radioactive fallout", which includes, besides debris, some other radioactive materials.

Being concluded during the Cold War, these agreements suffer from lack of adequate verification. It is important, therefore, to develop their verification systems.

A positive example in this respect is the development of the IAEA safeguards, which passed already several stages in their adjustment to new realities and requirements.

With help from American and other intelligence data the IAEA discovered that for many years Iraq had been building and operating a very large, clandestine nuclear weapon programme - a programme that the IAEA's NPT safeguards had entirely failed to detect. The routine application of the 1971 IAEA safeguards was not equipped to detect the use of these clandestine plants which did not depend on foreign supplies of nuclear fuel and did not involve any safeguarded nuclear material. When it was discovered, IAEA was given the right: (i) to make special inspections anywhere in the inspected country and not only at declared facilities; (ii) to receive intelligence information; and (iii) to have the full support of the Security Council if the state concerned frustrated its safeguards.

The Agency used these rights in 1992-93 when the Agency discovered that North Korea had not disclosed all the plutonium it had produced in one of its two research reactors. The IAEA demanded a special inspection, North Korea refused, and the IAEA declared North Korea in violation of its safeguard agreement and reported this violation to the Security Council.

A further important step was made by the IAEA in 1997 when the Agency adopted Strengthened Safeguards System, which took full account of its experience in Iraq and North Korea, as well as in South Africa where the IAEA verified the termination of the South African nuclear weapon programme.

Agreements which were concluded after the end of the Cold War provide for much more elaborated and effective verification measures. They are the Treaty between the US and the USSR on the Elimination of [Their] Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty), the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I), the Treaty on Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START II), the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT).

Each of these agreements provides for verification measures that correspond with its scope of prohibition and takes into account its specificity. However, their verification systems have much in common. The following general scheme is the basement of those systems:

a. National technical means (NTM). Their application is facilitated by undertakings not to impede verification by such means and to implement special measures, aimed at using NTM more effectively ("co-operative measures");

b. Confidence-building measures;

c. Declarations relating to weapons or actions covered by a respective agreement;

d. Various types of on-site inspections - from ad hoc or planned short-term inspections to permanent monitoring; and

e. Joint discussions of questions, doubts and suspicions arising in the course of the implementation of agreements.

Review mechanism

The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) provides for regular, each 5 years, Review Conferences. In 1995 the NPT Extension and Review Conference decided to strengthen this review process with a view to assuring that "the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized." Regular Preparatory Committee meetings during the three years before a Review Conference are supposed to be a forum to stimulate the implementation of all the purposes and provisions of the Treaty.

Other arms control treaties also provide for Review Conferences, though their review mechanisms are not as strong as that of the NPT.

 

Consultative bodies

Treaties with limited participation (2-5 Parties) usually provide for joint consultative commissions. They are:

a. Standing Consultative Commission (ABM Treaty, Art. XIII);

b. Special Verification Commission (INF Treaty, Art. XIII);

c. Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (START I, Art. XV); and

d. Bilateral Implementation Commission (START II, Art. V).

 

The Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe provides for a similar body - Joint Consultative Group (CFE, Art. XVI).

The major function of these joint commissions is to resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed. They are much less open to the public than review conferences provided for by multilateral international agreements. However, these commissions might be used as a strong tool of political pressure.

In the 80s, the US unleashed a wide political campaign against the construction of a phased-array radar by the Soviet Union near Krasnoyarsk. It was regarded by the US as a violation by the USSR of the ABM Treaty, because it was constructed at a location inside of the territory, but not along the periphery, as the Treaty requires. This issue was discussed at numerous Standing Consultative Commission meetings, the US President and other American officials of various levels raised this point in their open statements. It was a broad and very noisy campaign. As a result, the Soviet Union was forced to destroy the station.

The USSR had reciprocated with accusations that the US constructed large phased-array radars at Thule, Greenland, and near Fylingdales, England, contrary to the ABM Treaty. This point was dropped after the USSR admitted that the Krasnoyarsk radar was a violation.

In 1999 Russia raised some points of non-compliance with START I by the US. They were considered at JCIC meetings. Some leakage was made in mass media, but Russia did not make it too public and tried to solve the issues in confidential consultations.

 

Treaty implementation organizations

The major mission of such organizations is to organize and implement verification and facilitate the implementation of respective treaties. They collect information, including from states parties and through their own monitoring systems, which permit a verification judgement to be made, on which, in turn, compliance actions may be taken.

There are two arms control treaties that were signed after the end of the Cold War (CWC - 1993 and CTBT - 1996), which provide for some measures that are intended to facilitate compliance. They contain articles on measures to ensure compliance, including sanctions. Under both agreements special organizations have been established to ensure the implementation of their provisions: the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization.

These Organizations might:

a. provide a forum for consultation and co-operation among States Parties;

b. decide to restrict or suspend a State Party violating CWC or CTBT from the exercise of its rights and privileges under a respective agreement (participation in decision-making and fact-finding - under both CWC and CTBT; receiving assistance for their economic and technological development as well as assistance and protection against chemical weapons - under CWC);

c. recommend "collective measures which are in conformity with international law" to States Parties; and

d. bring the issue, including relative information and conclusions, to the attention of the United Nations.

 

In the case of the NPT, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which fulfills verification functions through safeguards agreements with States Parties to the NPT, can impose certain restrictions on its members when it discovers violations of verification requirements. It may curtail or suspend assistance, suspend membership or bring the case to the attention of the UN Security Council. The first such case happened in 1993 when a violation of the safeguard agreement by North Korea was referred to the Council.

Decision-making procedures in implementation organizations are rather complicated (usually they require consensus or, at least, 2/3 majority). Such procedures, on the one hand, make it difficult to take a decision on sanctions, but on the other hand, they are justified because they prevent frivolous or mischievous accusations from being made.

Treaty implementation organizations rely mainly on cooperative measures.

Thus, arms control agreements provide very limited tools for ensuring compliance. They are mainly of a consultative nature. Therefore, more effective measures to ensure compliance must be found outside the treaty.

 

The right of withdrawal

All arms control agreement recognise the right of each State Party to withdraw, if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject of the agreement, jeopardise its supreme interests. Non-compliance with a treaty by another party/other parties to the treaty might be interpreted as jeopardy to supreme interests. Some arms control treaties (the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty) directly provide for the right of withdrawal in case of a violation of a respective treaty.

In some other cases, warning statements on possible withdrawal, if certain conditions appear, were made before an agreement was signed. In 1991 the USSR stated that it would withdraw from START I if the US withdraws from or undertakes material breaches of the Ant-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The Russian President, in his message of presentation of START II to the Duma, made a similar statement.

Withdrawals might be regarded as the last resort. They could lead to a situation whereby discontinuing a treaty would stop its implementation. Probably, this explains why there have been no precedents of this measure in the field of arms control so far.

 

Role of the UN Security Council

The UN Security Council remains the only body which has the basic authority to consider matters pertaining to compliance enforcement of arms control and disarmament agreements. This authority derives from the fundamental functions and powers conferred on the Security Council in the Charter of the United Nations. Some arms control agreements provide that violations can or must be referred to the Security Council. As far as other arms control agreements are concerned, cases of non-compliance with them might be referred to the UN by any UN State Member as a threat to the international security under the UN Charter. However, they do not specify what actions the Council should take. The Council itself must decide on the appropriate action in each specific case in accordance with its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Veto power of the five permanent members, which often creates problems for taking decisions by the Council, might be also an obstacle to take decisions on enforcement measures in cases of non-compliance. There are attempts to eliminate this veto power. However, it is highly unlikely that such a reform could raise the efficiency of decisions of the Security Council, because disagreement by any Permanent Member(s) would make compliance with such a decision very problematic.

Decision-making on the basis of veto power is, of course, a complicated process, which requires a lot of negotiating efforts. However, when a decision is taken, it is much more effective than when adopted by simple voting. The UNSCOM, which was created by the UN Security Council res. No 687 (1991) with the task of eliminating Iraq's chemical and biological weapons and missiles, functioned with certain success. (In December 1998 it stopped its activities after being accused that some of its members abused their positions for intelligence purposes).

 

Reaction to non-compliance outside UN

Any arms control treaty is a part of a texture of inter-state relations which cannot be ignored by potential violators. All compliance enforcement measures provided for by treaties appeal in the long run to reaction of states concerned. Political, economic and financial pressure upon violators by groups of states and/or by individual states, are the most feasible and effective means of compliance enforcement. Such pressure might be more effective if it is accompanied with negotiations with the violator.

There were attempts to use also military force to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In 1981 Israel bombarded a large French-supplied research reactor in Iraq. The Israelis suspected that the Iraqi government intended to use the reactor to produce plutonium for a nuclear weapons programme. The destruction of the reactor apparently persuaded the Iraqi authorities to abandon the plutonium route and to try other routes, namely the clandestine use of various enrichment technologies. These methods did not depend on foreign supplies of nuclear fuel and did not involve any safeguarded nuclear material.

In 1993, the US proclaimed the Defense Counterproliferation Initiative, at the heart of that is a drive to develop new military capabilities to deal with the non-proliferation threat. It provides, in particular, for the possibility of using military force. As the case of the Israeli bombardment of the Iraqi reactor in 1981 shows, the use of military force might be counterproductive, not to mention the illegitimacy of such measures, if they are undertaken without a UN mandate.

Methods which are more productive combine political and economic pressure with meeting some legitimate concerns of the state in question. When in 1993 North Korea suspended its participation in NPT, besides putting strong pressure upon the North Korean Government, the US started negotiations with North Korea and concluded an agreement, under which North Korea stopped its nuclear weapon programme, agreed to dismantle its elements, including plutonium producing reactors, and resumed its participation in the NPT. In return, North Korea received two light-water reactors (they cannot produce plutonium) and, as compensation for the period of their construction, 500 000 tons of oil annually (Japan and South Korea participated financially in the deal).

The experience of the implementation of arms control and disarmament shows that:

a. Compliance is a matter of primarily political nature. Though some arms control agreements provide for measures of solving non-compliance issues, key factors of compliance are outside of agreements. They are in inter-state relations, which cannot be ignored by any state. Further involvement of all states into the system of international political and economic relations, the growth of interdependence of states in this system is the most effective way of improving compliance with treaties. It does not mean, of course, that treaties should not contain provisions aimed at strengthening compliance with them. On the contrary, in parallel with outside methods more effective procedures of compliance in treaties should be negotiated;

b. It is important to distinguish between different types of non-compliance. There might be: (i) slight procedural deviations; (ii) unilateral interpretations of some actions as violations, which might be based on different interpretations of an agreement; and (iii) non-compliance with main provisions of an agreement ("material breaches", as the Soviet statement on the ABM Treaty says). Reaction to non-compliance should be adequate to each specific case;

c. Verification should be effective enough to assure that possible accusations are well founded. It should aim to provide the optimal degree of confidence that all parties are complying with their obligations and provide sufficient information to make verification judgements when alleged cases of non-compliance arise. This puts a violator under stronger pressure. On the other hand, verification cannot be 100% effective; states parties will need to make judgements about the level of uncertainty they are willing to tolerate. Moreover, the optimal degree of verification is not 100% given steeply rising marginal costs of attempting to attain such perfection. There will always be a trade-off between the level of verification attainable and the cost (not just monetary but in terms of intrusiveness, other priorities etc);

d. The language and provisions of an agreement should be as precise and clear as possible to exclude different interpretations;

e. Unilateral use of force, without appropriate decisions of the UN Security Council, which is the only international body universally recognised as responsible for peace and security, (and when used not in self-defense) is illegal under international law and that is why it could have negative implications both for the compliance of an agreement and for the international political climate;

f. The best result might be achieved by the combination of political and economic pressure with measures that could meet interests of a violator ("stick and carrot" approach); and

g. Methods of compliance enforcement (sanctions, etc.) should be elaborated in the course of negotiations on an agreement and included into the text of an agreement or fixed in some other international document.

Compliance arrangements for a treaty on fissile materials (if concluded)

 

In August 1998 the CD established an Ad-Hoc Committee to negotiate "a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices" (FMCT).

It is evident that the talks would be very complicated, due to considerable divergence in the positions of the participants. During the course of the consultations on the mandate for this Committee, many delegations expressed concerns about a variety of issues relating to fissile material, including the appropriate scope of the proposed convention. Some delegations expressed the view that this mandate would permit consideration in the Committee only of the future production of fissile material. Other delegations were of the view that the mandate would permit consideration not only of future but also of past production. Still others held the view that the Committee's work should not only include the production of fissile material (past or future) but also other issues, such as the management of such material. Some delegations argued that the mandate does not preclude any delegation from raising for the consideration of the Ad-Hoc Committee any of the above-noted issues. Evidently they meant the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee to negotiate nuclear disarmament.

This linkage blocked the work of the CD in 1999. There are no optimistic signs for 2000 either. However, some preliminary remarks relating to compliance with a future agreement on the subject might be pertinent.

Of course, it is not possible now to foresee what verification would be provided for. It should correspond with the scope of prohibition, which is the main stumbling block now. But in any case such an agreement would call for the inspection of all enrichment and reprocessing plants in the states parties to verify that none of the fissile material produced is for weapons use. An obligation of this kind exists already for non-nuclear weapon states parties by NPT and is verified by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) under NPT-type safeguards. The involvement of the IAEA, either directly or through a special organization that might be established for the implementation of a cut-off agreement (like CTBT and CWC), would mean that the IAEA could apply sanctions to violators. In addition, the agreement might provide for sanctions from states-parties; limitation or complete cessation of co-operation with a violator in the nuclear field.

Unilateral reductions of nuclear weapons: verification and compliance

 

In late 1991 President Bush announced a number of important unilateral measures in the field of nuclear arms control, which covered to a large extent tactical nuclear weapon. President Gorbatchev reciprocated with similar unilateral measures. President Eltsin confirmed them in 1992.

Unfortunately, the world community remains uncertain about the implementation of those measures, because no verification was envisaged for them.

Of course, if a State proclaims a unilateral measure, it does not take legally binding obligations. However, it takes politically binding obligations. And if it wants that such unilateral initiatives be a weighty move and a real contribution to arms control, it should put such a move under international verification. The existing arms control agreements (INF, START) provide for effective verification measures, which might be applied, probably with some modifications, to unilateral measures if they relate to means of delivery. If they cover nuclear warheads, there are no measures to this end in the existing agreements. Hopefully, they will be elaborated for the verification of START III. However, some measures of transparency and confidence building could be used to give more certainty about compliance with unilaterally proclaimed nuclear arms reductions.

It is impossible to recognise the validity of unilateral measures without verifying them or at least without certain transparency.

Transformation of the bilateral dialogue on nuclear issues into a multilateral process: compliance arrangements

 

Compliance procedures under US-USSR (later US - Russia - Ukraine - Belarus - Kazakhstan) agreements (ABM Treaty, INF Treaty, START) were considered above (see section 2). Though there were a number of disputes on compliance with the ABM Treaty and START, compliance procedures proved to be sufficiently reliable for their solution. The same situation might be expected with START III, if and when it is concluded. But as for a more distant future, when the nuclear arms control might turn from a bilateral track into a multilateral one, more complicated situations are anticipated.

A few years ago it was understood that after START III is concluded, China, France and the UK should join the process. Now it is evident that the process will not go forward without, at least, India and Pakistan. As for Israel, it would be unfeasible to negotiate limitations or reductions of its nuclear weapons out of the regional context.

Due to different levels of nuclear weapons in these countries, it would not be possible to negotiate reductions of their nuclear arsenals. Even if the US and Russia have 1000 warheads each by that time (the lowest possible levels resulting from START III), other countries could reciprocate at that stage only by measures of qualitative and quantative limitations and restraints. However, the negotiations should cover both means of delivery and nuclear warheads.

Evidently nobody is prepared now to consider and discuss any issues relating to the preparation of such multilateral negotiations. But if intergovernmental bodies cannot do that, explorative work should be undertaken on non-governmental levels. In the course of the exploration, while considering the possibilities for reduction of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery by all nuclear-weapon states, it is important particularly to take into account the interrelationship between offensive and defensive systems. These include anti-ballistic missile systems (strategic ABM in the context of strategic ballistic missiles and tactical ABM in the context of tactical ballistic missiles), as well as anti-aircraft and anti-submarine defense systems.

There are a lot of other important questions in particular in the sphere of verification and compliance.

Methods which can be applied to means of delivery, will not be effective as far as nuclear warheads are concerned. In the case of the bilateral dialogue, the process of nuclear arms control started with means of delivery, because verification in this field, though very complicated and rather intrusive, is less complicated and intrusive than the verification of the elimination of nuclear warheads. It is covered in part by national technical means, which are the least intrusive. Their effectiveness is enhanced by "cooperative measures" (certain restraints and regulations which permit the use of satellites without hindrances). Data exchange and notifications, as well as mutual access to telemetric information during flight tests, are further important steps toward transparency. The most intrusive part of the verification system of the existing treaties (INF, START) is direct access for inspectors, under certain restraining procedures, to objects of verification. The START regime provides for on-site inspections of 14 kinds, including, in some cases, the permanent presence of inspectors. The possibility of the elimination of nuclear warheads was thoroughly discussed during the START talks, and the sides agreed not to include it into the treaty because of the extreme intrusiveness of the verification methods required for this purpose.

The methods of verification for nuclear warheads require further study. If means of delivery can be verified by measures used in the START and INF treaties, verification of warheads might be based on measures which should be worked out for START III.

Compliance mechanisms should combine tools that are used both for bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements. A permanent commission of verification and compliance should be supplemented by regular review conferences. The treaty should provide for sanctions in cases of non-compliance. They might be listed in an annex to the treaty. Decisions on their application should be made on the basis of consensus of all nuclear states parties. However, in order to avoid dead ends it might be provided that one vote is not enough for veto, there should be not less then two votes.

The UNGA regularly calls for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons within a time-bound framework through a nuclear weapon convention and insists on commencing negotiations within the CD on a phased program of nuclear disarmament.

The 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference stated in its Decision 2 that: "...Nuclear disarmament is substantially facilitated by the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States which have prevailed following the end of the cold war. The undertakings with regard to nuclear disarmament as set out in the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons should thus be fulfilled with determination".

Highly competent and authoritative experts from various countries, including France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, additionally apply pressure in favor of nuclear disarmament. The Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons in its 1996 Report on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, emphasized that "the end of the Cold War has created a new climate for international action to eliminate nuclear weapons, a new opportunity. It must be exploited quickly or it will be lost".

In July 1996, the International Court of Justice, upon the request of the UNGA, concluded that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflicts and stated that "there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control".

In 1997 an international consortium of lawyers, scientists and disarmament experts prepared and presented to the 52nd Session of the UNGA a Model Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Testing, Production, Stockpiling, Transfer, Use and Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons and on Their Elimination. It was submitted as "a work in progress setting forth the legal, technical and political issues that should be considered in order to obtain an actual nuclear-weapons convention".

In April 1997, the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, in collaboration with the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation, released the first discussion draft of a model Nuclear Weapons Convention (NWC) at the United Nations. Evidently, this draft reflects increasing demands for a Nuclear Weapons Free World and, in particular, for a comprehensive NWC as a means of achieving this goal. It contains interesting thoughts about compliance with and enforcement of nuclear abolition.

The 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan have stimulated pressure in favor of multilateral nuclear disarmament because: (1) these tests have increased the nuclear threat; and (2) India justified its tests through reference to the lack of progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. A strong indication of such pressure was the joint declaration by the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden which contained an appeal to the five nuclear-weapon states as well as to India, Israel and Pakistan to commence the process of nuclear disarmament.

In August 1996, the 28 countries of the "third world" "Group of 21" put forward a proposal for a program of action for the elimination of nuclear weapons. As one may conclude from the document, it proceeded from the assumption that nuclear disarmament can be achieved by concluding a comprehensive agreement on this subject. The document provided for measures to be implemented in three stages (1996-2000; 2000-2010; 2010-2020) towards the goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. It had much in common with M. Gorbachev's program of 1986, though it provided for 25 years for its implementation instead of the 15 years provided for by M. Gorbachev's program. The major common feature of both programs is that they present the visions of their respective authors on the subject, but, due to their overly general natures, cannot act as a basis for practical actions.

In June 1997, 26 non-aligned countries proposed the establishment of an Ad-Hoc Committee "to commence negotiations on a phased program of nuclear disarmament for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified framework of time". Under this proposal, the Ad-Hoc Committee would establish working groups to negotiate - as a first step towards a universal and legally binding multilateral agreement committing all states to the objective of complete elimination of nuclear weapons - an agreement on further steps required in a phased program with time frames leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, and a convention on the prohibition of the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.

Later, in January 1998, the delegation of the Republic of South Africa put forward a more moderate and realistic proposal to establish an Ad-Hoc Committee on Nuclear Disarmament "to deliberate upon practical steps for systematic and progressive efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons as well as to identify if and when one or more such steps should be the subject of negotiations in the Conference". This proposal received the support of the overwhelming majority of CD members, including that of many Western countries.

These proposals were blocked by the "official" nuclear-weapon states.

However, despite all these authoritative views on prospects of nuclear disarmament, the author of this paper is highly skeptical about the very possibility of concluding such a comprehensive convention even in the far-away future.

The whole scope of nuclear disarmament cannot be covered by one agreement (a convention or treaty). Of course, one comprehensive convention would allow parties to envisage coherent stages for the gradual implementation of nuclear disarmament with fixed deadlines. But on the other hand, the elaboration of a comprehensive convention would be an endless process, without practical results and with inevitable deadlocks. The bilateral process required a number of agreements aimed at reducing the nuclear threat and nuclear armaments. The achievement of results in a multilateral setting would be much more complicated and slow. That is why a piecemeal approach would be more practical; multilateral partial agreements on each stage of nuclear disarmament should be negotiated and concluded one by one, each one preparing the security and political conditions for the next agreement. This does not mean that the implementation of one agreement should be a pre-condition for the negotiations on the next one. But the signing of a partial agreement could prepare conditions for the next stage. However, it is not excluded that the implementation of a later agreement might overlap the implementation of a previous one.

Here is an illustrative scheme for such an approach:

a. An agreement is negotiated on the further reduction, under international verification, of strategic armaments by the United States and Russia. It is accompanied by obligations to all nuclear-weapon states to freeze the production and development of their nuclear armaments. Under this agreement all nuclear-weapon states will exchange information about their nuclear arsenals, and this information will be checked through verification procedures. Those parties to the Convention which are not members of the NPT will incur obligations on nuclear nonproliferation and all parties to the agreement will be subject to obligations on the non-proliferation of missile technology;

b. This agreement should also contain legally binding obligations on the basic parameters of further measures as well as an obligation to negotiate the appropriate treaty language. The basic parameters would provide for the reduction by all nuclear-weapon states of their nuclear armaments, both of nuclear warheads and of delivery systems of all ranges, including those, which constitute for the United States and Russia the category of tactical nuclear weapons. Armament levels will be established on a pragmatic basis, with due account of geostrategic balances;

c. As soon as the first agreement enters into force, the next one will be negotiated. In its turn, it should also include basic parameters for the next stage with an obligation to negotiate treaty language on the basis of these parameters; and

d. The same procedures will be repeated again until the end of the process, at which time the nuclear-weapon states will eliminate all their nuclear arsenals and all parties to the Convention, both nuclear and non-nuclear, will place all their nuclear activities under international verification.

Each agreement should provide for sanctions in cases of non-compliance.

For negotiations and implementation of such a set of agreements on nuclear arms control and disarmament, a World Conference on Nuclear Disarmament (WCND) should be convened, based upon a decision by the UNGA, with the purpose of starting negotiations on the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Its main mission would be to set up a negotiating body, which later could fulfil functions of verification and compliance, to elaborate the latter's mandate, to control its work, and to consider the final result of this work.

The negotiating body should consist of a limited number of countries. At the initial stage it might consist of the P-5, India and Pakistan. At a later stage, Israel, as well as one coordinator from each regional group (the West, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the CIS) might join the body. At that stage it would consist of 15 states, and the name of the body could be the Fifteen Nations Nuclear Disarmament Committee ( FNNDC).

FNNDC would take decisions by a qualified majority of two-thirds, including the nuclear-weapon states. The latter would have a veto power if two of them agree to say no. It could take decisions on sanctions in cases of non-compliance.

FNNDC should report to the next session of the WCND (the date and duration of this session are to be defined by the WNDC at its first session) on the status of the negotiations and on the implementation of agreements, which might be already in force. The WNDC could provide the FNNDC with further guidance.

The ultimate result of the work of the FNNDC (a draft treaty, draft treaties or a recommendation to discontinue the work of the FNNDC) is to be considered by the WNDC, which will take the appropriate decisions. WNDC would also consider disputes on non-compliance issues.

Conclusion

This paper is oriented on short-term (a cut-off agreement and unilateral measures), mid-term (the first multilateral agreement on nuclear arms measures) and long-term future (further measures leading to nuclear disarmament). It does not pretend to give forecasts or recipes for compliance with future agreements. Its only purpose is to contribute to the discussion on prospects of nuclear arms control, particularly on its most important element - compliance. As far as parameters of future agreements are not known, ideas expressed in the paper might be found as speculative and even, as far as long-term future is concerned, as fantasies. They are indeed speculative. However, they are more realistic than projects of elaborating and concluding a comprehensive convention on general and complete nuclear disarmament.

In any case, ideas of compliance with future nuclear arms control agreements, which are elaborated in this paper, are based on the previous experience on the implementation of both bilateral and multilateral arms control agreements, with due account of new characteristics of such agreements.

 

Notes

NPT/CONF.1995/32.

Report of the Canberra Commission on the Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, August 1996, p.10.

A7RES/49/75 K, 15 December 1994.

A/51/218, para. 105.

A/C.1/52/7, 17 November 1997.

International Herald Tribune, 22 June 1998.

CD/1419, 7 August 1996.

CD/1463, 12 June 1998.

CD/1483, 20 January 1998.