CIAO DATE: 06/02

US National Missile Defence: Technical Challenges, Political Pitfalls and Disarmament Opportunities

Dr. Gordon R. Mitchell

May 2000

The International Security Information Service

Executive Summary

The concept of ballistic missile defence (BMD) has a long history in the United States, with high-profile projects in evidence from the early 1960s. These projects have been characterised by enormous domestic political appeal, huge technological challenges and massive expenditure. The US governments that have pursued BMD programmes have had significantly more success in nurturing this domestic political appeal than in overcoming the technological challenges or controlling costs. Internationally, there has been little enthusiasm for BMD so the largely negative reaction of the international community to the 1999 US Missile Defense Act commitment to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) as soon as is technologically possible was no surprise.

The NMD (dubbed "Son of Star Wars") involves hit-to-kill (HTK) technology - essentially hitting a bullet with a bullet - that presents immense technical problems and demands integrated system performance still at the margins of current capabilities. Missile defence systems are largely useless unless they perform effectively the very first time, yet they cannot normally be put through the real test of genuine active service before they are installed. This was dramatically illustrated by the abysmal performance of the Patriot missile defence system in the 1991 Gulf War prior to which it had accumulated a near perfect record on the test-range.

In addition, the credibility of the tests that can be done on the NMD is questionable. This is in part due to the political pressure to deploy the NMD as soon as possible creating an artificially compressed test schedule (the "rush to failure"). It is also due to the actions of vested interests in both government and industry who have a strong incentive to suppress negative feasibility data by silencing whistleblowers

and doctoring test results (the "hush to failure""). There is already significant evidence in the public domain to suggest that the deception that surrounded the BMD programmes of the last 3 decades is repeating itself with the NMD.

The implications of any decision taken this year are therefore significant:

• The $60 billion dollars of future missile expenditure that would be locked in would have the effect of creating a committed NMD support constituency irrespective of whether it was a truly effective system or not.
• Any diplomatic risk-taking based on the belief that the US was protected from ballistic missile attack could have tragic consequences for American and European citizens alike.
• Premature deployment of NMD may create unstoppable momentum for eventual deployment of spaceborne weapons that would have offensive capability.
• As with the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) of the 1980s, the NMD creates the fear among US allies in NATO that the US is separating its nuclear umbrella from NATO, thereby splitting the alliance.

In order to implement the NMD as it is currently envisaged the USA needs to make improvements in phased array surveillance radars in the UK, Greenland and Canada. Before allowing such changes to be made, or accepting the renegotiation or abandonment of existing arms control treaties, the UK and other concerned countries would be well advised to take into account the technical feasibility of what is being proposed.

The recent world-wide surge of support for nuclear disarmament presents a window of opportunity for European NATO allies to use US-NATO NMD negotiations as a site to steer US nuclear policy into the mainstream of an emergent nuclear disarmament regime.

 

1. Background

The US Missile Defense Act of 1999 declares a policy to deploy a National Missile Defence (NMD) "as soon as technologically possible". This prospect is causing great concern in the international community. Recently, many critical editorials questioning the wisdom and timing of US plans for missile defence have appeared in the European ₁ and US press ₂ .

Despite such criticism, momentum for US NMD deployment remains strong. As over thirty years of experience has shown, the concept of ballistic missile defence (BMD) has enormous political appeal, and has been pursued with vigour by successive US administrations.

Since the early 1960s, high profile BMD promotion campaigns have been conducted to popularise missile defence systems such as Nike-X (1964), Sentinel (1967), Safeguard (1969), Strategic Defence Initiative (1983), Brilliant Pebbles (1989), Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (1991), and Patriot (1991).

In view of the great political, strategic and financial stakes involved in these projects, it is imperative that the technical capabilities of any new proposal of a similar kind be questioned thoroughly.

European citizens, opinion leaders, and government officials have good reason to scrutinise US NMD proposals with particular care. Even though NMD is designed to protect only the Continental United States (CONUS), effective operation of the system depends upon improvements in early warning surveillance radars based in Canada, Greenland, and the UK. Since these radar upgrades will require the approval of governments housing such facilities, European nations may soon be asked to become de facto participants in a US NMD that offers them no direct protection from missile attack.

 

2. The Technological Challenge

The latest blueprint for US NMD incorporates "hit-to-kill" (HTK) technology in which BMD interceptors identify, track, and collide with incoming enemy missiles. The task of "hitting a bullet with a bullet" presents immense technical problems, which are still at the margins of current capabilities.

A successful intercept requires flawless performance by radar tracking devices, interceptor guidance and propulsion systems, on-board sensors, communication links, and manoeuvring thrusters. In addition, for defence to work, all of these separate components of the NMD "architecture" must be integrated seamlessly by computers running highly complex "battle management" software programmes.

The supposition that a system can be designed ab initio to perform such intercepts satisfactorily cannot be taken for granted. Experience with all advanced weapon systems shows that extensive trials, in action or in realistic tests, are required to ensure even modest combat performance.

There are additional elements of missile defence engineering that present unique technological challenges. An effective NMD system must be built to operate in hostile and uncertain environments, where antagonists can be expected to introduce countermeasures designed to sabotage smooth operation of the system.

Moreover, such countermeasures are easily conceived and very difficult to negate. For example, IBM Research Fellow Richard L. Garwin explains that for little over $20, adversaries could defeat NMD sensors by enclosing their missiles in mylar balloons coated in aluminium-foil that would "render it unlikely that an interceptor would actually strike the warhead" ₃ .

In fact, the possibility of countermeasures has always been one of the major obstacles to the acceptance of BMD systems in the past. Detailed, systematic, and self-critical attention to this aspect of NMD engineering is an essential feature of the credibility of any new system.

These factors present a serious dilemma. Missile defence systems are largely useless unless they perform effectively the very first time, yet they cannot normally be put through the real test of genuine active service before they are installed.

The performance of the Patriot missile defence system in the 1991 Persian Gulf War is instructive in this regard, since this episode represents the only existing "test" of missile defence technology used in a live combat situation. Prior to deployment, Patriot accumulated a near-perfect record on the test range, but its performance during the Gulf War was abysmal - there is scant evidence that the system neutralised successfully even a single Iraqi Scud missile. ₄

Missile defence advocates rationalise Patriot's poor combat performance by pointing out that it was not designed to defend against targets such as the Iraqi Scud. However, such a rationalisation only highlights the difficulty of translating test range successes into wartime effectiveness. Saddam Hussein inadvertently created BMD countermeasures by modifying his arsenal of Al-Husayn Scud missiles to have greater range. The modified missiles frequently broke up into several pieces during descent, creating natural decoys that confused and overwhelmed Patriot's fire-control radar. Adversaries designing missiles with the intention of overcoming NMD will undoubtedly pursue much more challenging countermeasures.

 

3. Has NMD Been Adequately Tested?

"Product testing" conducted for the US government puts great strains on military contractors, whose credibility with their "customer" comes into question with even a whiff of unfavourable test results. In this environment, there are obvious incentives for Pentagon vendors to keep their products "smelling sweet". The huge financial stakes involved in large missile defence contracts render this dynamic so strong in the case of BMD systems that only an open, organisationally independent testing regime would seem sufficient to assure governments and peoples that sound judgements are being made about system effectiveness. Unfortunately, such a regime does not appear to be forthcoming.

While the upcoming NMD deployment decision will pivot around very complex and technical judgements, there are also more basic and antecedent judgements regarding data credibility that deserve attention. These criteria of credibility are not sophisticated; they rest on normal considerations of prudence that would apply to the most homely decisions, such as the purchase of a new car or washing machine. How well does the proposed NMD system satisfy such criteria?

To date, very few tests have been conducted on NMD's capability to intercept incoming missiles. Out of the nineteen Integrated Flight Tests (IFTs) that have been scheduled, only four have been completed, and two of these (IFT-1A and IFT-2) did not involve intercept attempts.

The IFT-3 test in October 1999 produced an apparently successful intercept, but subsequent disclosures revealed that a faulty star map caused the exo-atmospheric kill vehicle (EKV) to drift off course and home in on a decoy until the very last second, when the interceptor inexplicably veered into the target missile. In that test, "they got lucky", according to Tom Collina of the Union of Concerned Scientists. ₅

The IFT-4 test, carried out in January 2000, resulted in a missed intercept when infrared seekers on the Raytheon-built EKV failed. The next test is slated for June 2000, but all components of NMD will not be ready by then. Lockheed Martin is not expected to be finished with its EKV production booster until 2001, which would be tried for the first time in IFT-7.

Some have explained the decidedly mixed results of early NMD tests by pointing out that an artificially compressed test schedule has resulted in a politically driven "rush to failure" ₆ . Philip Coyle III, the Pentagon's own Director of Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E), cautions that the current testing timetable puts NMD on an "extremely high-risk schedule" ₇ . "They're moving too fast, heading for a deployment decision based on primitive, simple developmental tests", says Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. ₈

Even missile defence stalwarts such as Henry Kissinger agree that current testing data is insufficient to support a positive NMD deployment decision: "In the light of recent ambiguous test results and imminent electoral preoccupations, it would be desirable to delay a final technical judgement until the next administration takes office". ₉

The "rush to failure" approach codified in the current NMD timetable is connected to a related, but independent, "hush to failure" pitfall that may undermine the credibility of NMD testing data more fundamentally. Individuals and organisations with vested interests in both government and industry have strong incentives to suppress negative feasibility data, by silencing whistleblowers and doctoring test results.

The case of Dr. Nira Schwartz provides one disturbing example. As a former senior engineer at TRW (a major Pentagon contractor), Dr. Schwartz worked from 1995-1996 on computer software enabling NMD interceptors to discriminate between target missiles and decoys.

In freshly unsealed documents filed in a Los Angeles federal district court, Dr. Schwartz alleges that TRW "knowingly made false test plans, test procedures, test reports and presentations to the United States Government", then fired her when she refused to cover up such fraudulent activity. ₁₀ These charges are corroborated in an affidavit filed by retired TRW senior staff engineer Roy Danchick, as well as an official Pentagon investigation conducted by the US Defense Criminal Investigative Services (DCIS). ₁₁

.During its investigation of Dr. Schwartz's initial charges, DCIS turned up other evidence of suspicious data manipulation by TRW that took place subsequent to her dismissal. One such finding involved the handling of test data in IFT-1A, the very first NMD flight test carried out in July 1997 ₁₂ . IFT-1A was a "fly-by" experiment, designed to validate the capability of the EKV on-board sensor to "see" the target missile while in flight.

At a US Department of Defense news briefing shortly after IFT-1A, Brigadier General Joseph Cosumano called the test "a success", indicated that "[n]ominally and mechanically, everything worked exactly as scripted", then gushed, "I'm elated. This sets the cornerstone, I believe, for a good start for the program that is really three months old". ₁₃

Later, DCIS Special Agent Samuel W. Reed, Jr., filed a report that took the lustre off Cosumano's ebullient assessment of IFT-A. In his analysis of TRW's presentation of the test data to BMDO, Reed found that "TRW heavily censored the IFT-1A signature data, deleting approximately the first 20 seconds and the last 11 seconds". This deletion permitted TRW "to go from poor results in its 45-Day Report, to excellent results in its 60-Day Report Addendum". ₁₄

Reed punctuated the seriousness of this finding with the following conclusion: "There is no crime in producing a failed algorithm during a Research and Development Project. . . . The crime is in producing a failed algorithm and knowingly covering up its failure". ₁₅

 

4. A History of Deception

The contemporary salience of this evidence of fraud on the part of TRW lies in the fact that it echoes many other well-documented cases of strategic deception in the US BMD program. An independent observer might well see the TRW case as yet another episode in a long history of attempts by missile defence proponents to exaggerate BMD capabilities, conceal the technical weaknesses of missile defence systems, and disguise the actual purposes of missile defence programs.

Politically seductive but scientifically elusive, the notion of missile defence has given rise to waves of runaway rhetoric featuring technical claims that have outstripped the supporting scientific data. ₁₆

Recently declassified documents such as National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 172 ₁₇ and a Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum from April 1987 ₁₈ reveal that strategic deception was codified officially as a component of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) programme at the highest levels of government.

"This misinformation altered, perhaps profoundly, the course of and expenditures for SDI", explains Kevin O'Neill of the Institute for Science and International Security. ₁₉ Ronald Reagan's 1983 Star Wars address set in motion what the Union of Concerned Scientists' John Tirman calls an "entirely new and massive technocracy", ₂₀ a regime of scientific deception that legitimated itself by churning out technical misinformation overstating SDI's scientific feasibility. The legacy of this regime has been a long string of fraudulent science practised in the US BMD programme:

• 1984. Federal scientists rigged the Homing Overlay Experiment by placing a homing beacon on the target missile, artificially heating the target missile, and secretly installing explosives on the interceptor missile to simulate interception in the case of a miss.
• 1985. Federal scientists (including the Director of Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory) dramatically overstated the brightness and focus of X-Ray lasers in the Romano, Cottage and Goldstone tests conducted as part of Ronald Reagan's Star Wars programme.
• 1990. The Army Strategic Defense Command's news release claimed inappropriately that a Kinetic Kill Vehicle Integrated Technology Experiment (KITE) flight test validated the design of KITE's protective shroud, when in fact the shroud broke off in pieces prematurely during a flight test.
• 1991. Pentagon officials overstated the accuracy of Patriot missiles during the Persian Gulf War, exaggerated its effectiveness in post-war congressional hearings, then abused the classification system in attempts to silence critics and protect the fiction of the missile's accuracy.
• 1994. The Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO) secretly contracted a private "SDI boutique" to produce research findings discrediting a published article questioning the legality of Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) under the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Without verifying the validity of the contractor's study, BMDO then amplified its findings to high-ranking foreign audiences in official briefings.
• 1999. BMDO officials failed to disclose system malfunctions that caused an EKV to drift off course and home in on the decoy missile during an October NMD flight test.

In addition to these episodes of deceptive science, there also have been instances where US officials have misrepresented the actual nature of BMD projects to domestic and international audiences.

• 1991. Air Force officials testified at an environmental impact hearing that a nuclear-powered rocket program called TIMBERWIND had no military applications, when in fact the project had long been part of the SDI program, funded out of the ultra-secret "black budget".
• 1998. US officials introduced the HAVE STARE X-band radar into VardØ, Norway, under the pretext that the sole purpose of the radar would be to track space junk. In fact, an internal Air Force document shows the radar already integrated into the NMD Command-and-Control system

 

5. Possible Consequences of a Data-Poor and Premature NMD Deployment Decision

The previous analysis suggests that if the US proceeds with a decision to deploy NMD in 2000, such a policy will likely be based on incomplete and suspect feasibility data. This development would be nothing new, as the US government has spent roughly $100 billion on frequently dubious BMD programmes since 1983. However, a premature deployment decision on NMD is likely to shape missile defence policy for years to come and could saddle NATO with unexpected and unsavoury strategic dilemmas.

5.1. Hush to Failure

A premature decision to build NMD before it is proven to be feasible would lock in at least $60 billion in future US missile defence spending (according to a new estimate by the US Congressional Budget Office). ₂₁ Presumably, disbursement of these funds to private vendors would be contingent on such contractors demonstrating a credible track record of engineering success. However, the history of strategic deception in the US BMD programme shows that military officials and industry leaders take extraordinary measures to keep Pentagon dollars flowing, even when poor test results suggest that continued funding of beleaguered missile defence systems would be wasteful and imprudent.

Current NMD deployment plans call for no significant institutional changes in the overall leadership structure or bureaucratic make-up of the US BMD enterprise. It is reasonable to expect this enterprise to suppress unfavourable NMD test results, to silence whistleblowers, and to use the classification system strategically to protect the funding windfall of a positive NMD deployment decision.

The end result of this process could be deployment of a deeply flawed NMD system that is technically bankrupt, yet has an illusory veneer of effectiveness. Such a "hush to failure" outcome would not only pose grave security risks, it would also rival Reagan's SDI as the most lavish and wasteful "big science" programme ever funded by a government.

5.2 Tragic Choice Miscalculation

Increasingly, NMD advocates point to the possibility of "rogue state blackmail" as an emerging threat justifying rapid pursuit of missile defence. This "blackmail" scenario envisages the US embroiled in a diplomatic or military dispute where the adversary (e.g. North Korea, Iran or Iraq - armed with weapons of mass destruction [WMD]) attempts to exact concessions from the US, by threatening the US homeland with a long-range rocket attack. Despite the questionable assumptions upon which this analysis is based, let us accept the scenario for the sake of argument.

In such a tragic situation, it is suggested that NMD would preserve US "freedom of movement" by giving the US President room to call the "rogue state's" bluff. To do this, however, the President would need to have supreme confidence in the NMD system. If such confidence was based on faulty or doctored feasibility data, the stage could be set for a miscalculation of tragic proportions. Misplaced faith in an illusory missile defence shield could embolden the President to take diplomatic risks that would recklessly expose thousands (perhaps millions) of civilians to nuclear, chemical or biological attack.

This is not just a concern for Americans, since in such a tragic scenario, Fylingdales, UK and Thule, Greenland (locations of NMD early warning radars) "would become prime targets in the event of a nuclear war", says Stephen I. Schwartz, publisher of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. ₂₂

5.3 Space Weaponisation

Although official US declarations currently portray the proposed US NMD system as a limited ground-based defence, designed to intercept only a handful of missiles, a premature deployment decision could leverage the efforts of advocates for spaceborne weapons to shoehorn their projects into expansive missile defence budgets.

For example, US General Joseph Ashy, Commander-in-Chief of the US Space Command, has linked explicitly the HTK mission of BMD with plans to weaponise outer space. As journalist Karl Grossman observes, "The PR spin is that the US military push into space is about 'missile defense' or defense of US space satellites. But the volumes of material coming out of the military are concerned mainly with offense - using space to establish military domination over the world below". ₂₃

Canadian Air Force Lt. General George McDonald, deputy commander of NORAD, recently expressed serious reservations about NMD co-operation with the US, voicing the oft-overlooked point that US NMD plans may result in the weaponisation of outer space. "The concept of weapons in space is vehemently rejected by the Canadian government and most Canadians", said McDonald, who also intimated that US officials would have a hard time convincing Canadian leaders to back NMD. ₂₄

These concerns are well founded, given the frightening potential of spaceborne weapons to be used for destabilising and offensive military missions. According to US Senator Charles Robb (D-VA), "During the Reagan years advocates of the Strategic Defense Initiative ran an effective television spot featuring children being saved from nuclear attack by a shield represented by a rainbow. If we weaponise space, we will face a very different image - hundreds of weapons-laden satellites orbiting directly over our homes and our families 24 hours a day, ready to fire within seconds. If fired, they would destroy thousands of ground, air, and space targets within minutes". ₂₅

5.4 Fissures in the NATO Alliance

During the Cold War, European NATO allies feared that SDI would "decouple" the US nuclear umbrella from NATO, thus splitting the Alliance. Today, similar concerns are being raised in discussions about the proposed NMD system. For example, NATO's new Secretary-General, George Robertson, says that the European allies have already raised "a number of profound questions" about the system. ₂₆ Commenting on the security dilemmas raised by the prospect of a missile shield that would protect only the US (but not Europe), European Union foreign policy chief, Javier Solana, says "if we were not to be defended by the United States, that may risk the beginning of 'decoupling'." ₂₇ Robert E. Hunter, former US ambassador to NATO, notes that the US has not done the "painstaking political spadework" with allies necessary to place NMD in a "broad, coherent, and consistent strategic framework". ₂₈

A hasty NMD deployment decision would surely undermine prospects for such a framework to evolve in a deliberate fashion through NATO's consultative channels.

Current NMD plans call for Upgraded Early Warning Radar (UEWR) improvements to be made at US military bases in Thule, Greenland, and Fylingdales, UK. A parallel US Air Force project, designed to enhance the long-term effectiveness of NMD, calls for construction of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) on UK soil at the Menwith Hill Signals Intelligence Centre near Harrogate, North Yorkshire.

Presumably, these early warning radar upgrades would consist of replacing existing computers, graphic displays, communication equipment, and radar receiver/exciters to perform the NMD mission (i.e. identification and precise tracking of a ballistic missile launched against the US). Additionally, software programs would probably have to be re-written to enable the radars to identify different types of missiles and discriminate them from decoys or chaff.

Initial European reactions to these plans have been less than welcoming. For example, on March 4, 2000, some 300 protesters staked out the Menwith Hill (UK) base, demonstrating against construction of the US-backed SBIRS system. ₂₈ By May 2000, more than 270 British MPs had signed six separate Commons motions urging the government to have nothing to do with Washington's new anti-ballistic-missile project.

Greenland's parliament declared in November 1999 that if US NMD plans violate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty), then Greenland "can't support plans for an upgrade of the Thule radar". Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helveg Peterson backed up this declaration on February 25, 2000, clarifying that a "firm component" of Denmark's policy is that use of the Thule radar not be "in violation of international rules". ₃₀

These comments appear to reflect a serious gulf between US and NATO views on missile defence policy. While many US officials seem ready and willing to break out of the ABM Treaty (and a host of other arms control agreements) in order to pursue NMD, other NATO leaders do not share the same zeal to scrap the existing non-proliferation regime and wager their security on the technological fix promised by missile defence.

This difference of opinion could widen into a chasm in the wake of a hasty US NMD deployment decision. Such a decision would lock in long-term NMD contracts that would magnify profit motives as factors driving US NATO Alliance diplomacy. Such "dollar diplomacy" appears to have been behind recent attempts by high-ranking US officials to pressure South Korea (ROK) into buying Patriot missile batteries, even though ROK officials questioned the feasibility of missile defence and rejected the deal. ₃₁

This campaign caused unnecessary friction in the US-ROK military relationship. Similar tensions could mount in NATO if a data-poor NMD deployment decision creates financial incentives for the US to force missile defence "inter-operability" within the Alliance, regardless of European and Canadian objections. Such arm-twisting tactics might muscle EU nations into purchasing a leaky missile shield that would line the pockets of American defence contractors more than it would contribute to nuclear safety. This development would likely sap the fund of trust that underwrites NATO Alliance co-operation, thereby undercutting non-military strategies for dealing with WMD favoured by Europeans.

 

6. A New Path to Nuclear Disarmament?

The stridency of arguments offered on both sides of contemporary missile defence discussions tends to refract the debate through a zero-sum lens that frames BMD technology in absolutely good or evil light. Such either-or thinking obscures the fact that the value of missile defence depends on the context into which it is introduced.

European nations may not be able to dictate the precise character of US NMD programs, but negotiating leverage derived from their status as hosts of NMD early warning radars may afford them latitude to shape the geopolitical context into which the so-called "Son of Star Wars" is likely to be born.

When US President Ronald Reagan announced plans for SDI in 1983, many viewed the proposal as a destabilising initiative, because it promised to lock in a US advantage in offensive nuclear weaponry. Soviet defence planners feared that Star Wars would render their own nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete", leaving the US free to wield its arsenal with impunity. It was difficult for Soviet leaders to see how SDI would "pave the way to nuclear disarmament" when the US showed little inclination to give up its own offensive weapons.

This episode illustrates that "purely defensive" weapons can be highly provocative and destabilising when introduced into a climate of hostility and suspicion. However, defensive arms may have more utility as tools of peace if they are shared openly and introduced into a world where major powers are already committed to abolishing their dependence on nuclear weapons as tools of statecraft. This point was made by the unlikeliest of pro-BMD sources, nuclear abolition advocate Jonathan Schell, who wrote that "if defenses were arrayed against the kind of force that could be put together in violation of an abolition agreement, they could be crucial". ₃₂ On this logic, missile defence could work as an insurance policy against cheating that would coax all nations to disarm their nuclear forces.

Schell's suggestion raises an important question for European nations considering whether to support NMD by participating in US plans to upgrade early warning radars housed on their soil. Will such radars gather data for the purpose of bolstering US nuclear hegemony, or will they serve a more peaceful function of emboldening nations to move toward nuclear disarmament?

Europeans would do well to realise that they currently enjoy a significant measure of control over the answer to this question. Negotiations addressing the terms of US-NATO radar co-operation have the potential to shape US defence policy in significant ways. NATO members could use their leverage as providers of crucial early warning data to stipulate that their participation in US NMD would be contingent on several factors.

First, NATO members could request firmly that prior to any NMD deployment decision, the US make good on its commitment to non-proliferation by approving the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), agreeing to deep cuts in its own stockpile of offensive nuclear weapons, taking such weapons off "hair trigger" alert status, and adopting a nuclear "no first use" pledge. Such measures would help ease fears world-wide that NMD would be used to give the US an invincible nuclear arsenal. Coming on the heels of Russia's recent approval of START II and the CTBT, these steps would also create substantial momentum for further arms control, giving a boost to the emergent "New Agenda Coalition" (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden), which argued strongly for the cause of nuclear disarmament at the Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York.

Second, European leaders could fortify the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, by making their approval of US NMD plans contingent on an American commitment to refrain from research and deployment of spaceborne weapons. Such a multilateral agreement could clear the way for a bevy of collaborative ventures designed to explore peaceful uses of outer space.

Third, European participation in NMD could be predicated on the condition that all missile defence technology and know-how be shared openly with nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) signatories. This policy would have the double effect of shoring up the NPT regime and rooting out the secrecy and corruption that has plagued US missile defence efforts for the past two decades.

The task of convincing US leaders to support such measures may be an uphill struggle, given the doggedness with which US officials cling to their Cold War nuclear arsenal. "I have never seen a moment where the US seemed so isolated from the mainstream of international opinion on the nuclear weapons issue", observes William Hartung of the World Policy Institute. ₃₃

Even a cursory examination of the US negotiating stance in talks with Russia over proposed ABM Treaty modifications reveals how far American officials are behind the curve of swelling momentum for nuclear disarmament.

In ABM Treaty "Talking Points" presented by US negotiators to their Russian counterparts earlier this year in Geneva (and leaked to the public in April), the US attempts to calm Russian fears regarding NMD with the alarming reminder that "under the terms of any possible future arms reduction agreements, large, diversified, viable arsenals of strategic offensive weapons" will exist on both sides, and that forces of this size "can easily penetrate a limited NMD system of the type that the United States is now developing". ₃₄

Translated into plain terms, the US negotiating position tells Russians not to worry about NMD (because it is not reliable enough to work against their sophisticated weapons), but that just in case, Russian leaders might want to hang on to a huge nuclear arsenal (kept on "hair trigger" alert status), in order to make sure that they can overwhelm the US missile shield. ₃₅

EU leaders might consider pointing out to President Clinton the dangers of this contorted logic, when he attends a scheduled summit meeting of the European Union in Lisbon this June. This summit is likely to be Clinton's last stop before meeting with Russian president-elect Vladimir Putin in Moscow.

US Secretary of Defense William Cohen faced allied pressure for more progress on arms control at NATO ministerial meetings last December. During these meetings, Cohen listened attentively to NATO concerns, but intimated that his hands were tied by a Republican US Congress that is committed to sabotage any of the Clinton administration's plans to reverse the tide of the Cold War military build-up. Senator Jesse Helms (R-NC) recently punctuated this stance by declaring that any Clinton arms control deal inked in the final days of his administration would be "dead on arrival" in US Congress.

Such political death threats would not seem to bode well for prospects that upcoming NATO-US security talks could yield significant arms control progress. However, participants in these talks should keep in mind the fact that President Clinton has substantial authority to take unilateral measures in the name of nuclear safety. His powers as Commander-in-Chief enable him to take US nuclear forces off alert status, make a nuclear "no first use" pledge, and order his missile defence bureaucracy to adopt a policy of openness that would maximise peaceful uses of defence technology.

This latitude for independent executive action even extends to the CTBT, which many thought was irreparably jeopardised by the US Congress's refusal to ratify the treaty last year. As law scholar Garret Epps points out, there is no legal barrier stopping President Clinton from re-signing the CTBT. According to Epps, "re-signing would create an unambiguous binding international obligation not to begin a new program of testing. The only way a new Administration could void that obligation would be to renounce the treaty formally". ₃₆ European leaders concerned about nuclear safety may want to remind President Clinton of this fact during his upcoming trip to Europe, suggesting that the high road from Lisbon to Moscow might well run through Geneva.

 

7. Conclusion

We have now reached a watershed period for US missile defence, comparable in significance to earlier key decision points such as 1972 (leading up to the ABM Treaty), 1983 (the period after Reagan's Star Wars address), and 1991 (in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War). US missile defence officials plan to complete an NMD Deployment Readiness Review (DRR) by the end of July 2000. This review will assess recent results of the NMD testing programme and make recommendations regarding the pending NMD deployment decision, which could be made by President Clinton as early as this summer.

In the run-up to this important decision, the US Government is presenting NMD to the world as a "breakthrough" system capable of intercepting and destroying hostile ballistic missiles before they hit their targets. Although it is agreed that this system has not yet been fully developed and tested, the impression being given is that its technical performance - based on superb engineering and intricate computer software - will prove highly successful.

Yet, the empirical evidence drawn from the precious few NMD tests conducted to date do not support this assertion. Such tests have yielded mixed results regarding system feasibility, and raised serious questions about the capability of NMD radar and tracking components to deal with even the most basic countermeasures. Furthermore, the long history of deliberate deception by proponents of similar systems casts a long shadow of doubt over the credibility of data offered up by the official BMD establishment.

Governments and peoples throughout the world (perhaps especially those in the Europe) would do well to take into account these features of the present NMD initiative before entering into collaborative BMD agreements or accepting the re-negotiation or abandonment of existing arms control treaties. Finally, the heightened attention being given to the missile defence issue could underwrite efforts by European citizens and leaders to encourage the US to bring its nuclear policy more in line with world opinion, which is gathering steadily behind the goal of nuclear disarmament.

 

Dr. Gordon R. Mitchell is Assistant Professor of Communication and Director of Debate at the University of Pittsburgh. His book, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy, is forthcoming from Michigan State University Press and will be available this autumn in Europe through Gazelle.

This paper is adapted from the ISIS UK briefing paper Missile Defence Policy: Strident Voices and Perilous Choices, the first in a series on BMD, published in March 2000. Portions of this paper stem from a 1997 Northwestern University doctoral dissertation directed by G. Thomas Goodnight.

For further information contact the author at:
Tel: + 1 (412) 624 8531
Fax: + 1 (412) 624 1878
Email: gordonm@pitt.edu

 

Endnotes

Note 1: Since February 2000, commentaries skeptical of US NMD have appeared in the Financial Times (UK), Guardian (UK), Berliner Zeitung (Germany), Muenchener Merkur (Germany), Le Soir (Belgium), De Standaard (Belgium), NRC Handelsblad (Netherlands), and Jornal de Noticias (Portugal). Back.

Note 2: Since January 2000, editorials critical of current US missile defence plans have appeared in the Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Chicago Tribune, Cincinnati Post, Dallas Morning News, Houston Chronicle, Los Angeles Times, New York Times, Newark Star-Ledger, San Francisco Chronicle, USA Today, and Washington Post. Back.

Note 3: Richard L. Garwin, 'Effectiveness of Proposed National Missile Defense Against ICBMs from North Korea', Letter prepared for distribution to Congress, March 17, 1999; see also George N. Lewis, Theodore A. Postol and John Pike, 'Why National Missile Defense Won't Work', Scientific American, Vol. 281, August 1999, p. 36-41. Back.

Note 4: See Theodore A. Postol, 'Lessons of the Gulf War Experience with Patriot', International Security, Vol. 17, Winter 1991/1992, p. 119-171; Gordon R. Mitchell, 'Placebo Defense: The Rhetoric of Patriot Missile Accuracy in the 1991 Persian Gulf War', Quarterly Journal of Speech, Vol. 86, May 2000, in press. Back.

Note 5: Quoted in 'Pentagon Admits Problems with Missile Defense Test', St. Louis Post-Dispatch, January 15, 2000. Back.

Note 6: See Report of the National Missile Defense Review Committee (Welch Commission Report), November 16, 1999. Back.

Note 7: Philip Coyle III, Missile Defense and Related Programs Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E) FY'99 Annual Report, submitted to Congress, February 2000. Back.

Note 8: Quoted in Bradley Graham, 'Missile Shield Still Drawing Friends, Fire; Verdict on Deployment Due in Political Climate', Washington Post, January 17, 2000. Back.

Note 9: Henry Kissinger, 'The Next President's First Obligation', Washington Post, February 9, 2000. Back.

Note 10: Third Amended Complaint for Violation of False Claims Act 31, USC 3729, Civil Action CV96-3065, United States District Court, Central District of California, September 21, 1999; see also William J. Broad, 'Ex-Employee Says Contractor Faked Results of Missile Tests', New York Times, March 7, 2000. Back.

Note 11: See Roy Danchick, Declaration filed under Civil Action CV96-3065, United States District Court, Central District of California, May 18, 1999; Special Agent Samuel W. Reed, Defense Investigative Service Report (DCIS/DOD-IG), 1999. These documents (and others on the case) are archived at the Federation of American Scientists Website: http://www.fas.org/spp.starwars/program/ news00/000203-trw.htm. Back.

Note 12: IFT-1 was scrubbed on January 17, 1997, when a data-link malfunction prevented the Payload Launch Vehicle (PLV) carrying the EKV from launching. Back.

Note 13: Brig. Gen. Joseph Consumano, Statement, Department of Defense News Briefing (Subject: National Missile Defense Flight Test), July 2, 1997. Back.

Note 14: Samuel W. Reed, Jr. (DCIS), Review Letter to Keith Englander (BMDO), February 1, 1999; see also Robert A. Young (DCIS), Letter to Keith Englander, March 25, 1998. Back.

Note 15: Samuel W. Reed, Jr. (DCIS), Review Letter to Keith Englander (BMDO), February 1, 1999. Back.

Note 16: See Frances FitzGerald, Way Out there in the Blue: Reagan, Star Wars and the End of the Cold War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000); Gordon R. Mitchell, Strategic Deception: Rhetoric, Science, and Politics in Missile Defense Advocacy (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press, forthcoming). Back.

Note 17: Handed down by President Reagan in May 1985, NSDD 172 established a framework for the Pentagon's Star Wars information campaign. It required that all official statements on SDI (including those made in 'scientific channels') be cleared by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (see Christopher Simpson, 'Commentary on NSDD 172: Publicizing the Strategic Defense Initiative', in National Security Decision Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations, ed. Christopher Simpson [Boulder, CO: Westview, 1995], p. 449). Back.

Note 18: Titled 'Special Plans Guidance-Strategic Defense', this memorandum directed the Pentagon to 'improve and update deception plans covering the missile defense program's cost and abilities' (quoted in Tim Weiner, 'General Details Altered "Star Wars" Test', New York Times, August 27, 1993). Back.

Note 19: Kevin O'Neill, 'Building the Bomb', in Atomic Audit: The Costs and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, ed. Stephen I. Schwartz (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 1998), p. 82. Back.

Note 20: John Tirman, 'The Politics of Star Wars', in Empty Promise: The Growing Case Against Star Wars, ed. John Tirman (Boston: Beacon Press, 1986), p. 1. Back.

Note 21: Budgetary and Technical Implications of the Administration's Plan for National Missile Defense, Congressional Budget Office Paper (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office), April 2000. Back.

Note 22: Stephen I. Schwartz, telephone conversation with the author, May 3, 2000. Back.

Note 23: Karl Grossman, 'Master of Space', The Progressive, Vol. 64, January 2000, p. 27, see also Mike Moore, 'Unintended Consequences', Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 56, January/February 2000, p. 58-65. Back.

Note 24: See 'US NMD Lacks Approval From Canada, NORAD Deputy Says,' Jane's Defence Weekly, January 26, 2000. Back.

Note 25: Charles Robb, 'Star Wars II', Washington Quarterly, Vol. 22, Winter 1999, pp. 81-87. Back.

Note 26: Quoted in William Drozdiak, 'U.S. Warns its Allies of Growing Need for New Defense System', Houston Chronicle, December 3, 1999. Back.

Note 27: Quoted in Jane Perlez, 'U.S. Missile Plan Could Hurt Security Ties, European Says', New York Times, May 2, 2000. Back.

Note 28: Robert E. Hunter, 'Proposals for a Limited Missile Defense Create a Political Minefield', Los Angeles Times, December 1, 1999. Back.

Note 29: See London Press Association, 'UK Anti-Nuclear Protesters Target US Military Base', March 4, 2000, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS-WEU-2000-0304). Back.

Note 30: Quoted in Joergen Dragsdahl, 'Use of Key Radar Facility Conditioned on Russian Approval of ABM-Treaty Changes,' March 7, 2000, British American Security Council Website, Online at http://www.basicint.org/. Although Greenland operates under home rule, Denmark has official authority over Greenland's foreign and defence policy. Back.

Note 31: O Yong-hwan and Choe Sang-yon, 'Officials' "Displeasure" With U.S. Pressure on Weapons Deal', Chungang Ilbo, June 13, 1997, trans. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (TAC-97-164); see also Paul Richter, 'Defense Secretary Warns Seoul Not to Buy Russian Arms', Los Angeles Times, April 6, 1997. Back.

Note 32: Jonathan Schell, The Abolition (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1984), p. 116; see also Freeman Dyson, Weapons and Hope (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 71. Back.

Note 33: Quoted in Jonathan Alter, 'Swords vs. Shields', Newsweek, May 8, 2000, p. 44. Back.

Note 34: The text of these "Talking Points" is archived online at the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists website at http://www.bullatomsci.org/issues/2000/mj00/treaty_doc.html. Back.

Note 35: See Gordon R. Mitchell, 'The National Missile Defense Fallacy', Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, April 29, 2000, p. A17. Back.

Note 36: Garrett Epps, 'Restarting the CTBT', The Nation, May 15, 2000, p. 5. Back.