One of the greatest European historians of this century, Henri Pirenne, described the Muslim expansion in the seventh and eighth centuries as an aggression threatening Europe simultaneously from two sides. ₁ This is a blatant anachronism. Europe did not exist then; its identity had yet to be formed. Europe may have been a persona from the Greek mythology, and a vague geographical notion. Yet as a political, cultural, or religious community that could have fallen to Muslim advances, it did not exist. ₂ Pirenne projects back on to pre- European history not only the European view of history in general but, more specifically, Europe's understanding of its own history based on a supposedly formed and fixed European identity. There is admittedly much truth in Pirenne's thesis that Muslim military expansion destroyed the unity of the Mediterranean world as it had existed under the Roman Empire, and determined the development of Europe by shifting the centre of gravity of that development to the North. ₃ But the truth lies less in its historical accuracy than in its linking of European identity to Islam: Islam was essential for the formation of this identity, and remains so for its maintenance. ₄

In this pamphlet I will argue that European identity was formed not by Islam but, predominantly, in the relationship of this "northwest prolongation of the Eurasian continent" ₅ to Islam. The formation of Europe did not begin with the Muslim "universal razzia," razzia de l'Univers, ₆ as Pirenne believed, but with the holy war of Latin Christians against Muslims. I interpret the crusades as a crucial formative condition of what was to become Europe, and see them as having had a profound impact on western ideas and institutions. ₇ I focus on the formation of Western Christendom and Europe as a unity that developed a "collective identity" and the ability to orchestrate action. I will argue that this unity was, as a rule, articulated in relation to Muslims as the enemy. From this point of view, the crusades appear as "the first Western union, and the creation of a crusading army" marks "a spectacular advance toward European peace and unity". ₈

The above characterization, by a prominent historian, of the crusading warfare as a vehicle of European peace and unity cam be read with a sarcastic snicker, but I think that would be a mistake. In fact, European peace and unity were intimately linked to war -- to war against those who were perceived as threatening that unity, against enemies within and without: "infidels", "heretics, "schismatics" (who were later joined by the savages). It was Muslims who were made the enemy among all possible enemies. War against them was seen as an outlet for violence that would otherwise have ravaged Christendom and Europe, and European peace, consequently, was conceptualized as possible only on the basis of war against the enemy without. More than that, in an ominous twist of the perspective, peace and unity in Christendom and Europe began to be seen as the precondition of making war against the "enemies of the cross".

Peace was the question of power, and the crusades that required peace in Christendom and Europe were a key moment in the process of articulating pivotal power structures on the European subcontinent. The crusades shaped the relationship between spiritual and temporal powers; between papal monarchy, empire, and regnum and, in a later period, at the dawn of modernity, between the declining universal powers and the emerging sovereign states (as well as among those states themselves). By shaping relations among these entities, the crusades shaped the entities themselves. In what follows, I reconstruct these trends by examining characteristic ideas about European peace and unity at those points of history marked by shifts in the development of "political" structures. ₉ I aim to show that the development of those structures did not render obsolete the image of the Muslim Enemy against whom unity and peace had originally been established. This image was not reduced to a medieval curiosity. On the contrary, it persisted -- until today -- as a key moment of articulating and maintaining European identity.

The story I want to tell begins with peace-making. At the end of the tenth and the beginning of the eleventh century, there emerged a peace movement in what is today central France. The aim of this movement, known as the Peace of God and, in a later stage, as the Truce of God, was to end the internecine warfare and violence that plagued Western Christianity. The movement was initially led by bishops and later, in the middle of the eleventh century, its aims were embraced by the popes of the great Church reform who sought to implement them. What is of special importance for my argument is that the Church subordinated to itself warriors who, in that period, had developed into a social order; the Church thereby gained control over the use of violence. Contrary to traditional Christian doctrine, the Church had now recognized the military profession, which gave rise to a Christian military ethics. ₁₀ Warfare was gradually Christianized, and Christian militarism developed. ₁₁ The Church was increasingly willing to bless arms and sanction their use as meritorious. The peace movement was a religious movement seeking to implant upon earth "the order that God willed to prevail." ₁₂ Those who gathered on peace councils prayed to God himself to give them peace. It was to Him they made their peace oaths, and it was God who sanctioned and sanctified that peace. Those who refused to enter the peace contract (pactus pacis) would soon be accused of being the Devil's followers. ₁₃

To live in peace was the duty of all the faithful. The peace movement acted in the name of peace and unity (pax et unitas). Peace was the social bond (viniculum societatis) and Christian society, living in peace, was a unitary society. It was seen as one, unitary body; as a corpus christianorum, if not straightforwardly as the corpus christi. It followed from such imagery that, during the "truce of God" ordered by the peace movement, no one was allowed to injure his fellow Christian. ₁₄ The new commandment was clearly stated at the peace council of Narbonne in 1054, where the canons of the council proclaimed that "no Christian should kill another Christian, for whoever kills a Christian undoubtedly sheds the blood of Christ." ₁₅ The importance of this formulation can hardly be exaggerated. In a sentence, it says more or less everything that the European peace movement has continued to say in all the centuries following the Council of Narbonne. The formulation required not only that complete internal peace should be maintained in Christian society. In order for the peace movement to achieve that aim and to develop further, it also had to find "an appropriate external outlet for those whose vocation was Christian warfare." ₁₆

In fact, the society that united itself in the name of Christian charity generated hatred. Already at the beginning of the millenium, when news reached the West that Khalif Hakim (whom historians describe as mentally disturbed) had ordered the Church of Holy Sepulchre in Jerusalem to be ruined, the new "cultural unity of the West found expression in the persecution of Jews -- the first scapegoats in the gathering storm, marked by the 1010 A.D. watershed shift from inclusive to exclusive religious dynamics." ₁₇ This shift overlapped with another: the Christian world was entering the era of military offensive and expansion. Defensive wars against Normans, Magyars, and Arabs, typical of the last centuries of the first millenium, were succeeded by offensive warfare against infidels. Shaping the new reality were the reconquista in Spain; Christianization in the North and East of the European peninsula; attacks of the Pisan and Genovesian navy on Saracen strongholds in Sardinia at the beginning of the eleventh century and on Mahdia in Tunisia at its end; the Norman occupation of Sicily; and the expulsion of Greeks from Southern Italy. ₁₈ The Papacy began to encourage territorial conquests by Christians, and the middle of the eleventh century was the starting point of an incessant warfare against Islam in the Mediterranean. ₁₉ These wars had ceased to be defensive wars; it would be difficult to characterize them as just wars (bellum justum). Historians have argued that the struggle against the 'enemies of the Roman Church' by far exceeded a response that could be legitimized in terms of "necessity", ₂₀ and that Muslims had not given a pretext for those wars. ₂₁

The peace movement acting in the name of God developed into a war against those seen as ungodly. The Peace of God was accomplished through holy war. At the Council of Clermont in 1095, Pope Urban II called on all Christians to take part in the crusade. The Council was, first of all, "a peace council". The preaching of the crusade was the logical outcome, the next step of the peace movement. ₂₂ The pope enacted peace legislation with greater determination and in broader scope than had ever been done before. Peace became universal, in the sense that it was binding on the whole of Western Christendom; the new peace legislation directed the arms of Christians against the heathen. ₂₃ All versions of Urban's speech in Clermont note that the pope urged Christians to fight righteous wars against non-Christians instead of being engaged in iniquitous and fratricidal combats among themselves. ₂₄

Fulcher of Chartres reports that the pope, referring to the military successes of the Turks against the Greeks, spoke as follows: "Oh what a disgrace if a race so despicable, degenerate, and enslaved by demons should thus overcome a people endowed with faith in Almighty God and resplendent in the name of Christ! Oh what reproaches will be charged against you by the Lord Himself if you have not helped those who are counted like yourself of the Christian faith! Let those', he said, 'who are accustomed to wantonly wage private war against the faithful march upon the infidels in a war which should be begun now and be finished in victory. Let those who have long been robbers now be soldiers of Christ. Let those who have once fought against brothers and relatives now rightfully fight against barbarians'." ₂₅

Historia Iherosolymitana of Robert the Monk relates that Urban II, when he summoned the chosen race of Franks to free the holy sepulchre of the Saviour from "unclean nations", pointed at the scarcity of land and wealth in the Frankish region: "lT]his land which you inhabit [...] is too narrow for your large population; nor does it abound in wealth; and it furnishes scarcely food enough for its cultivators. Hence it is that you murder and devour one another, that you wage war, and that frequently you perish by mutual wounds. Let therefore hatred depart from among you, let your quarrels end, let wars cease, and let all dissensions and controversies slumber. Enter upon the road to the Holy Sepulchre; wrest that land from the wicked race, and subject it to yourselves." ₂₆

Guibert of Nogent fashioned these intuitions into doctrinal concepts. Very early in the twelfth century he wrote that, "[i]n our own time God has instituted a holy manner of warfare, so that knights and the common people who, after the ancient manner of paganism, were formerly immersed in internecine slaughter, have found a new way of winning salvation. They no longer need, as formerly they did, entirely to abandon the world by entering a monastery or by some other similar commitment. They can obtain God's grace in their accustomed manner and dress, and by their ordinary way of life." ₂₇ He defined the crusade as prealiim sanctum and understood holy war as a new historical phenomenon.

That the crusade was holy war par excellence is not the point of this pamphlet. Nor does it aim either to dispute that the Christian holy war was a response to jihad ₂₈ or to demonstrate that the crusades were expansionist and, as such, offensive warfare. Rather, I want to argue that the crusades were religious wars against Islam, with the Muslims portrayed not as one among many infidels, but as the fundamental enemy of Christianity. ₂₉ The essential point is that the Christian fundamentalism of the crusades was a "thrust into the heart of the Mohammedan world". ₃₀ The invention of holy war was inseparable from the construction of the symbolic enemy of the Christian republic (respulica christiana). It was through the crusades that Christianity developed into a community; ₃₁ the creation of a common enemy that was to be fought against by the united forces of all Christians -- through a war waged in God's name -Ñ enabled Christianity to become a self-conscious collectivity. ₃₂ What was new was not the awareness of Islam as the Other ₃₃ but the determination to construct that particular Other as the universal enemy, and to destroy it by systematic violence organized by the highest Christian authorities.

The conflict between Philip IV, the king of France, and Pope Boniface Vlll has been characterized as the first medieval conflict between the Church and the "state" that can be described accurately as a conflict about national sovereignty. ₃₄ Pierre Dubois, a French lawyer, was a contributor to the intellectual controversy that accompanied the comqict. ₃₅ His best known contribution to the dispute, supporting the king, was De recuperatione Terre Sancte, written in 1306. Since the publication of that treatise almost six centuries later, ₃₆ Dubois has had the reputation of a great pacifist. What he proposed was the establishment of a mechanism of international arbitration to avert war between Christian rulers. ₃₇ This arbitration was to bring about the "perpetual" and "universal" peace in Christendom -- united in "one single republic" ₃₈ -- necessary for Christians to launch a crusade to recover the Holy Land without having to worry about their possessions at home. However, beyond this pragmatic reason, peace among Christians was, above all, viewed as a moral imperative. "Internecine wars among Catholics are greatly to be deplored, argued Dubois, since in such wars many meet death under circumstances which make their status in the world to come very uncertain." ₃₉ Because wars among Christians were inadmissible, warfare had to be diverted elsewhere.

It was permissible for "righteous men" to urge and even to seek war, for such war would bring "leisure for acquiring virtue and knowledge after war is over and lasting peace has been established." ₄₀ Because, by definition, Christians were righteous, the wars they fought would bring them universal peace and harmony; they would thus become "more virtuous, learned, rich and long-lived than hitherto" -- and "more able to subjugate barbaric nations." For the wars they would make to reap such benefits would not be just any wars whatsoever, but wars against infidels. And these wars required internal peace. Christians "would no longer make war upon one another [...l land] Catholic princes, mutually zealous, would at once join together against the infidels, or at all events send innumerable armies of warriors from all directions to remain as a permanent garrison in the lands to be acquired. ₄₁

This was a vision of the good life and a declaration of war at the same time. "The whole commonwealth of Christian believers owing allegiance to the Roman Church must be joined together in the bonds of peace. United in this way, all Catholics will refrain from making war upon one another. [...] Let no Catholic rush to arms against Catholics; let none shed baptized blood. If anyone wishes to make war let him be zealous to make war upon the enemies of the Catholic faith, of the Holy Land, and of the places made sacred by the Lord." ₄₂

These views -- and the leading idea that peace among Christians was nothing but a means to wage war against non-Christians ₄₃ -- were a commonplace in this period. ₄₄ The fact that Dubois subordinated the crusade to the interests of the French kingdomÑthat he "nationalized and "secularized" it -- did not alter the basic idea.

Philippe de Mezieres has entered history as one of the promoters of the crusading idea in the fourteenth century. ₄₅ This French "politician" devoted his whole life to a single -- obsessive -- idea: to launch a crusade against the enemies of Christian faith, the Saracens, in order to recover the Holy Land. ₄₆ With this in mind, de Mezieres wished to reunite and reform Christendom. "Peace and unity among Christians" was to him "the will of God." He hoped that the French -- that is, the most Christian -Ñ king would convene a "great council and general parliament that would unite in peace and fraternal love all the Christian rulers and heal the Church schism. ₄₇ When that had been achieved, the new Golden Age would dawn and the united Christians, by whatever means necessary, would bring the schismatics and infidels, Tartars, Turks, Jews and Saracens into the true faith. Christians would liberate the holy city of Jerusalem, deliver the Holy Land, and "subjugate the world to the sacred obedience to the true cross". ₄₈

However, de Mezieres had another plan in store. He invested his hopes in the new kings of France and England -- Charles VI and Richard II -- and urged them to stop fighting each other. With great eloquence (like Erasmus avant la lettre) he described all the evils and suffering brought about by wars among Christians. He sought to prove that "the shedding of the blood of baptised Christians" was hateful to God. ₄₉ "When we shed the blood of our brothers," he warned, "we have once again killed Jesus Christ." ₅₀ Fratricidal wars had caused the Christians to lose the Holy Land, and because of this deplorable warfare they had been unable to recover it. ₅₁ And this -- a crusade reconquering the Holy Land, le saint passage d 'oultremer -- was precisely what de Mezieres had in mind. With flattering words he tried to persuade Richard and Charles that a "perpetual confederation and union in God" between England and France would lead to "peace and unity in the Church and the whole Christendom". ₅₂ And once that union and peace had been established, the two greatest Christian rulers, like beacons, would light the straight way that leads to Jerusalem. Christian people who had until then lived in the darkness of internal divisions and wars would then follow that light. Jesus had made Richard and Charles the leaders who were to take His chosen people -- "the Western Christianity (la crestiente d'occident) -- to the promised land and wrest the Holy Sepulchre out of the filthy hands of false followers of Muhammad, who was condemned in the eyes of God. ₅₃

If de Mezieres saw war among Christians as war against God, ₅₄ war against infidels was, for him, not only war fought for God, but war ordered by God. "We have to make the effort and exercise violence according to the doctrine of Saint Paul the Apostle." ₅₅ Christians had to make "good and mighty war" against the "Turks, fierce and dishonourable enemies of the faith". "To converse or disperse and destroy the false sect of Mohammed and all idolatry" was something God willed Christians to do: a "chose Dieu nous veuille ottroier!" ₅₆

After the papacy had come victorious out of the conflict between the conciliarist movement and papal monarchy, two peace/crusading projects competed for the support of Christian rulers in the middle of the fifteenth century. One is connected with Jiri z Podebrad, who was crowned Bohemian King George; the other with his adversary Enea Silvio Piccolomini, elected pope Pius 11 in 1458. While I cannot deal here with the political struggles which gave birth to these projects, ₅₇ their leading ideas are central to our story.

The peace plan of the Hussite King George ₅₈ aimed at uniting Christianity on the basis of a plurality of territorial powers, with unity and peace among them established through organizing war against the Turks (who, in the Renaissance, and with the flourishing of the Ottoman Empire, came to symbolize Muslim power). The preamble of the plan is a succinct declaration of what can be called the "European ideology". It first invokes the image of the Golden Age, of the once flourishing Christianity, blessed with men and goods, which for a long time held sway over a large part of pagandom, including the Holy Sepulchre: "in those days there was no nation in the world which would have dared to challenge Christian rule." ₅₉ Written a decade after the fall of Constantinople to the Turks, the irenic manifesto points out how lacerated, broken, impoverished and deprived of all its former brilliance and splendour Christendom had become. "When almost the whole world was strong with the holiness of the Christian religion, the astute Mohammed first led astray the exiguous Arab nation. However, when the first attempts were not opposed, he gradually acquired so many of the lost people that he subjugated very large regions of Africa and Asia and incited them to commit a most detestable treachery. And then the utterly despicable Turks, who had most recently subjugated first the famous Greek Empire and then very many Christian lands and kingdoms, abducted an almost innumerable multitude of souls from the Christian parts, took away everything as bounty, destroyed and defiled many convents and large churches, and perpetrated very many other evils." ₆₀

As expected, the invocation of am historical myth and the depiction of the present decline of the past glory, caused by a perfidious enemy, called for action, was a call to arms. "Oh, golden land! Oh, Christianity, Thou jewel of all lands, how could all Thy glory disappear in such a way, how couldst Thou lost all Thy most magnificent brilliance? Where is the vigour of all Thy people, where is the reverence shown to Thee by all nations, where is Thy royal glory, Thy fame? What good were Thy many victories when so soon Thou werest to be led in a triumphal march? What good does it serve that Thou hast resisted the power of pagan leaders when now Thou art unable to resist the attacks of Thy neighbours?" ₆₁ The writers at the Bohemiam court were eager to assure those whom they hoped would support their project that all the resources Christians needed to improve their situation existed. All that was required to mobilize these resources was amending their way of life. For their deplorable condition was seen as a sign that they must have angered His Divine Majesty by some ill deed. This called for pious acts to mollify God. And since God is just and merciful, they wrote, and "those whom He loves he corrects, castigates and leads to virtue through many adversities, we hold, turning our hopes to our Lord whose cause is at stake, that we cam do nothing more pious in our integrity [...] than to strive diligently for the establishment among Christians of true, pure and lasting peace, unity and love, and to defend the faith of Christ against the most vicious Turk." The Christian princes had been given their power m order to glorify peace, to uphold the position of Christendom, to bring the wars against the infidel to a successful end, and to guard and extend the frontiers of the Christian republic. ₆₂ There was no doubt that those who would not fight for the Lord were against Him: "if we do not want to be against Christ, we must fight for His faith and stand with Him. For the Holy Spirit damns those who do not fight on His side, who do not oppose the enemy, who do not stand like a wall to protect the House of Israel." ₆₃ And in order to be able to fight wars for God and against His enemies, Christians had to stop fighting each other and unite: "such wars, plunder, tumult, fires and murders which, alas, have engulfed Christendom almost on all sides [...] should end and be completely eradicated" so that "such kingdoms and principalities may be brought through praiseworthy unity into a state of mutual charity and fraternity." ₆₄ This charity (caritas) and fraternity (fraternitas) was exclusive. It was "our" charity and fraternity, and as such the dividing line between "us", or "all of us", and those who did not belong to us, who were outside the Christian unitas. The cult of peace, it was asserted, ₆₅ was unthinkable without justice; yet iustitia was a name of exclusion and pax the prerequisite and instrument of war. Christians had to love each other in order to be able effectively to hate non-Christians; they had to live in fraternal love to be able with united force to destroy their enemies. The "Turks", and the Turkish prince as the symbol of their political existence, were represented as the "severest enemy of the Christian name", and the European princes united in peace were made to swear that we shall not cease to pursue the enemy [...] until he is driven out of Christian territory." ₆₆

This was the theme the heretic king shared with the chief of Christian orthodoxy, his adversary Pius II. In what follows we shall see more clearly that Europe, as a self-conscious entity, was articulated through the imagined (and not only imagined) practice of cleansing itself of the Turk. From the outset, "ethnic cleansing" was integral to the concept of Europe.

Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the humanist pope Pius II, framed his European politics with a clear leading idea: the crusade against inftdels. ₆₇ After the fail of Constantinople, Piccolomini worked hard for Christians to respond to that event with proper action. Already in that period he developed the themes of his crusading policy to which he would return again and again, adding little to the conventional stock of crusading motifs. As a politician and Church dignitary, he saw Christianity as disgraced and Europe as threatened. He responded by striving to establish peace among Christians as the necessary precondition for uniting forces and declaring war on the enemies of the faith. ₆₈

As a humanist, Piccolomini portrayed the Turks as destroying Greek and Latin culture, the source of European learning and arts. ₆₉ However, great as this loss might have been, Piccolomini felt even stronger about what he saw as blows against the Christian religion. Whereas once it had reigned over the whole world, it had now been destroyed in Asia and Libya and was invaded in Europe itself. ₇₀ "We have seen the defeat of the Greeks, now we are waiting for the ruin of the Latins. [.. .] The Turkish sword already hangs over our necks, while we are waging intestine war; we are persecuting brothers and allow the enemies of the Cross to proceed against us." ₇₁

In order to turn the tide, Piccolomini called for measures not only to defend the Christian possessions but also to attack and destroy the Turks in their own territory. Such calls had been heard before, as had the claim that nothing prevented Christians from succeeding but their own negligence and dissensions. Once again, the conclusion was drawn that peace had to be made between Christians so they could go to war. ₇₂ What was new about Piccolomini was his more acute awareness of the governmental fragmentation of the West, ₇₃ and, more significantly, a growing "European" consciousness. What was new was the awareness of the fact that, in spite of the fragmentation of power, a new collective entity, "Europe," was emerging, and that its identity needed to be articulated.

Piccolomini has been credited with investing the notion of Europe -- the use of which had increased in the fourteenth and especially in the fifteenth centuries, and whose content had become more and more emotional -Ñ with political meaning. The notion of Europe began to function as the bearer of the common, political consciousness of the Occident. ₇₄ It is not difficult to perceive that the political self-consciousness of the West was articulated in opposition to the "Turkish peril": for Piccolomini and his consortes, what was under threat was "Europe". Such an understanding (the recognition that it was Europe that was threatened) required clear concepts, in any case clearer than those inherited from the past. In his geographical works, Piccolomini indeed determined European territory with greater precision than had traditionally been done. His principal achievement, however, was to both associate this definite geographical unit with Christianity and at the same time to dissociate it from Christianity. Let me explain.

In one sense, Europe was Christian Europe. Christianitas was identical with Europe; Europe was the territory of Christianity. This identification was formed on the basis of the losses of Christian territories in Asia Minor -- on the basis, that is, of the territorial diminution of Christianity. For, as a concept, Christianitas was not identical with Europe. Christianity was not only broader, conceptually speaking, than Europe; it was a universal concept. As such, it was, under the prevailing, unfavourable historical circumstances, a universality confined to a given -- and for this reason culturally definable -- geographical space. We have seen that Piccolomini contended that in the good old days Christianity ruled the whole world ("nam que totum illum orbem occupaverat"), as fitted its universal mission, for Christ came to redeem all humanity. The factual situation, with Christianity retreating to Europe, was in stark contrast with this vision. "AII that we possessed in Asia, we have lost in unsightly manner; we fled and let Mahomet gain victory." ₇₅ And yet, Christianity remained a universal religion. Europe was now the bearer of that universality. It was this conundrum in which the universality of Christianity could not be reconciled with its bound geography, and in which the Christian Occident was now seen to be encircled by a hostile world, that generated European self-awareness. The geographical space, with increasingly well-defined borders and a religious identity, had developed into a cultural space, and it therefore had to be defended from the actual -- and even more from the symbolic -Ñ threats posed by infidels. This space had to be cleansed of all that was seen as not belonging, above all, the "Turks". And the true faith had to be helped once again to live in accordance with its universalism. Christian universality, currently confined to Europe, was one of the springs of European expansion. The language in which Piccolomini spoke of the territorial losses of Christendom was a distinctively new language. It was a language of geopolitics rather than the old language of crusading. At stake were Christian possessions outside of Europe, and their fate was to be decided by military strength. In principle, or at least for propaganda reasons, Piccolomini had no doubt in the military superiority of the Christianus populus, and in those times of trial his calls to defend the faith turned easily into visions of spreading the faith and of territorial expansion, even beyond the Eastern Turkish borders. ₇₆ But what really preoccupied him were Turkish military advances. He recorded them with the eye of a geographer and the mind of a politician, in order to make it clear that the conquered territories, and the territories likely to be conquered, were European territories -- that it was Europe that was being assaulted. For Piccolommi, the threat to the political existence of Europe and the dangers to Christian religion were linked. Turkish incursions into Europe were at the same time an attack on the Christian faith. "Unless we take arms and go to meet the enemy we think all is over with religion," he warned his fellow Europeans. "We shall be among the Turks in the position in which we see the despised race of Jews among Christians." ₇₇ Thus he spelled out the new golden rule of the new Europe: Do not allow others to treat us in ihe way we treat others. Because Piccolomini analytically distinguished between Europe and Christianity, he was able powerfully to synthesise them. And because the subjugation of Europe by infidels would bring with it the annihilation of "our faith", ₇₈ the crusade Piccolomini worked for had to be of a dual nature: it had to be both a war for Europe and a war for Christianity. The war for Europe was a Christian war, and the war for Christianity was a European war. This double-edged holy war had but a single purpose: to fight Muslims and to crush them. ₇₉ With such thoughts in mind, Piccolomini, as soon as he was elected pope, convened a European congress in Mantua to deliberate, and practically defend, the Christian republic. ₈₀ The congress failed to launch a crusade and yet it succeeded in formulating a political strategy. The formula of the new -- European -- policy was simple and clear: "to chase the Turk out of Europe". ₈₁ This was not a European strategy in the sense of Europe executing a political, military and cultural programme. It was a European strategy in the sense that its aim was to build Europe. Only through this program of chasing out the "Turk," of cleansing the emerging collective body politic, could Europe itself come into being. Holy war was to be the dynamic constitutive principle of Europe.

Half a century after Pius II, who preached for the crusade in the name of humanity, ₈₂ European humanists would no longer urge that ploughshares be beaten into swords, as had Pius's zealous assistant cardinal Bessarion. ₈₃ They instead sang the Gospel of peace with such diligence that they "gave birth to a new language" -- to a "peace discourse". ₈₄ However, in this new language, some old ideas resurfaced. This is certainly the case in the writings of Erasmus of Rotterdam, the most influential Christian humanist, who has been much praised for his apparently uncompromising rejection of war. Yet as his views on the "Turkish question" show, his condemnation of war was not at all absolute. ₈₅ Erasmus feared the Turks. Against the background of their military successes his fears were not completely groundless. ₈₆ As critical as he might have been of the medieval past, he did not hesitate to repeat the conventional formulae that strife among Christians played into the hands of the Turks, and that conflicts between Christian rulers paved the road for the victories of the Turks. ₈₇ He deplored war among Christians as "a thing most cruel of all", and denounced it as "parricidal" (sic). ₈₈ If it was impossible to avoid such war, Erasmus argued, then it should be fought "at the lowest cost in Christian blood". ₈₉ War inside Christendom was nevertheless unacceptable; however, when it came to military expeditions to counter Turkish inroads into Europe, Erasmus was willing to make an exception. ₉₀ And yet it was not only on the ground of the need for defensive wars that he did not "absolutely oppose" war against the Turks. On the basis of a philosophical anthropology he not only conceded that such war was admissible -- he even recommended it. The resigned view that war might be "the fatal malady of human nature" had not yet made him despair. For if human nature really seemed "quite unable to carry on without wars" then, Erasmus rhetorically asked, why is this evil passion not let loose upon the Turks?" The rhetorical question elicited the desired answer. If war in general was not "wholly avoidable", war against the Turks "would be a lesser evil than the present unholy conflicts and clashes between Christians." ₉₁

It has been rightly pointed out that Erasmus conceded a conditional right to war outside the orbis christianus. ₉₂ This right was seen to be conditional because wars against non-Christians could only be undertaken as a last resort and, Erasmus argued, they had to be fought in a Christian way". ₉₃ What he hoped for was that the Turks would be subdued and brought to Christ: he preferred winning them over to the Christian faith to killing them. For as wicked as the Turks might be, they were nevertheless "men" (homines). ₉₄ And [by] killing Turks we offer to the devil most pleasant sacrifice, and with that one deed we please our enemy, the devil, twice: first because a man is slain, and again, because a Christian man slew him. " ₉₅

Yet even if they were "men", the Turks were barbarians, argued Erasmus. He called them monstrous beasts, enemies of the Church, a people contaminated with all kinds of crime and ignominies. ₉₆ Muhammad was to him a criminal. ₉₇ Arguably, Erasmus needed these "barbarians" in order to see himself as European. For it was only in opposition to the Turks, only when facing the "Turkish peril", that Erasmus considered himself European. ₉₈ Erasmus's intellectual achievement was to simulate the outside gaze that saw evil within the Christian/European world. That outside gaze, capable of seeing the evil within, was an evil gaze -- the imagined gaze of the Muslim. "What do we imagine the Turks and Saracens say about us, when they see that for hundred of years the Christian princes have been utterly unable to agree among tbemselves?" ₉₉ And "what can be a more pleasant sight to the Turks, than to behold us daily each slaying one another?" "Oh, there has been more than enough shedding of blood -- and not just human blood but Christian blood -- enough frenzy ending in mutual destruction, enough sacrifices by now even to hell and the Furies -- there has long been enough to gladden the eyes of the Turks." ₁₀₀

Erasmus not only invented the evil Turkish gaze which took pleasure in what was most wrong about Christian Europe. He also complemented it with his own political cardioscopy. He discovered the Turk in the heart of Europeans. That Christian Europeans, in their hearts, were like Turks was obviously the most painful thing the Christian humanist could imagine saying. In their innermost being, Erasmus proposed, Europeans were not (yet) Europeans. Because of their unchristian way of life, they carried the unchristian Other in their breasts. That is why, when the enemy is the nearest, it has to be fought hardest. For Erasmus, war against the Turks was first and foremost war against the Turk "in our hearts". This "Turk" had, first, to be driven out. ₁₀₁ If Christian Europeans were not to change their lives, reform their morals, and cleanse their hearts of the Turk, they stood no chance of overcoming the Turks. They would fight Turks like Turks ₁₀₂ -- and degenerate into Turks themselves, rather than converting the Turks into Christians. ₁₀₃

This call to Europeans to look into their own hearts, to face their evil selves, and to live in a way pleasing to God, is reminiscent of the greater jihad, understood as the struggle with the self. ₁₀₄ And yet the European's struggle with himself was not a struggle with his own evil self. The European's evil was perceived as traceable to the Other himself. The evil was not in his heart, it was not of his own making -- it was rather comprehended as a thorn in his own flesh. The evil came from without, and it was the Other endowed with a real, historic existence. Thus, the way to win the struggle with one's own self was to make war against the real Other; the purification of the European heart required the cleansing of Europe by means of war against the Turks.

Erasmus's friend, saint Thomas More, held similar views. For him the "Turkish peril" was twofold: real and symbolic. The Turks were a "shameful, superstitious sect", the "abominable sect of his lChrist's] mortal enemies", his "open, professed enemies" representing forces of darkness and Belial. ₁₀₅ The Renaissance commonplace of the bloody and cruell Turke" ₁₀₆ haunted him: "There falleth so continually before the eyes of our heart, a fearful imagination of this terrible thing: his mighty strength and power, his high malice and hatred, and his incomparable cruelty." ₁₀₇ More saw this power as threatening "the whole corps of Christendom", ₁₀₈ and he joined the chorus calling for peace and concord among Christians in order to fight the common enemy successfully and to defend God's name. ₁₀₉

The youngest among these peace-loving humanists was Juan Luis Vives, a Spanish cosmopolitan who was busy thinking about a unified Europe. The praise of "Erasmus and his friends" for their "unsurpassed [...] farsightedness and maturity of their European vision", applies especially to Vives. ₁₁₀ Vives saw Europe as suffering terrible damage because of its incessant wars. For Europe to survive, he argued, nothing less than a universal reconstruction was needed. ₁₁₁ The essential condition of such a renewal was that European princes should stop fighting each other. In Vives's eyes, wars between Christians were not wars but madness (insania, non bella). ₁₁₂ Vives's own insania was his obsession with Muslims, ₁₁₃ whose military successes he saw as resulting from discord among Christians. ₁₁₄ His writings, especially De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico, were a reveille for Europe to unite against the Turk and "rush with arms at the ready to destroy him". ₁₁₅ His vision wildly surpassed what could be seen as the liberation of European nations from the Turkish yoke. What Vives had in mind was conquest. Instead of Europeans -Ñ whom he held to be a superior race ₁₁₆ -- fighting each other for the handful of soil they could wrest from one another, they should as a united Christian army march against the Turks, crush their power and seize the abundant lands and wealth of Asia. The only relation he could conceive of to Muslims was one of warfare. ₁₁₇

Humanists' hopes for a unified Europe did not come to pass. What began to take shape, instead, was a Europe of independent sovereign states whose main concern was to establish a balance of power among themselves. But the symbolic Muslim, closely linked as it was to the earlier vision of a unitary Europe (or of a "common corps of Christendom"), did not disappear with the rise of the sovereign state. The new humanists ₁₁₈ who found inspiration in the political realist Tacitus (and no longer in the moralist Cicero) continued to think about a common European military enterprise against the Turks. Justus Lipsius, who made perhaps the greatest contribution to the restructuring of political ideas, was surprisingly conventional when it came to the "Turkish question". He saw Europe broken by incessant wars and civil strife, and believed -Ñ as he put it in his De magnitudine Romana (1598) -Ñ that "one head would be an effective force for religious unity, for the well-being of all its subjects, and for the struggle against the common enemy, the Turks". ₁₁₉ In his old age, this great humanist thought of nothing but a crusade; ₁₂₀ and if we look at this humanist movement as a whole, "the plea for European unity against the Turks was frequently made in these years". ₁₂₁

For the second generation of these new humanists -- for men like Botero, Ammirato, and Campanella -- the Christian and European unity against the Turks remained a central concern. ₁₂₂ Giovanni Botero is a good example. To his credit, he was not a pacifist. He warned the prince whom he advised in his Della Ragion di Stato, not to lay aside his arms -Ñ not only because disarmed peace is weak and the danger from without ever present, but also because war is the best means for eliminating evil spirits, keeping people occupied, and diverting them from impertinences and dangerous thoughts. ₁₂₃ Peace, for Botero, was primarily an issue of defence and maintenance of the state, and for this the armed forces were of vital importance The only question was against whom they were to be used. ₁₂₄ Botero never feared a shortage of causes of war since, in his view, there would always be enough Turks, Moors and Saracens; war against them would always be just and justified and universally lawful. ₁₂₅ Botero did not see Muslims simply as infidels. Of all infidels, they were the most alien to the Christian faith. He declared them enemies of Christianity and of the state itself. ₁₂₆ And because offense is the best defence, Botero was convinced that it was advisable to attack the Turks in their own land instead of sitting at home and waiting for them to come. ₁₂₇ Botero did not renounce the crusades. On the contrary, holy war remained on the agenda. While giving practical advice to his statesman about the "arte dello stato", and especially about offense as the best defense, he recalled the "heroic days" of the crusades, when Christian princes united and assembled great armies to attack the "Turks" with "no other interest than the honour of God and the exaltation of the Church". ₁₂₈

It seems a strange irony of history that one of the first modern political thinkers, Botero, appears as a nostalgic crusader. He looked at the loss of the Holy Land as a sad "fruit of modern politics", ₁₂₉ in which disagreements between Christians had allowed the Turks to rise to the status of a power having no rival on either land or sea. ₁₃₀ In not underestimating the Turkish power, Botero differed from his predecessors. But that great power was to him a challenge: "He who wishes to fight cannot claim that there is no public enemy against whom he may prove his valour: an enemy whose constant object is the oppression of Christianity, and whose might is such that to resist it, let alone overcome it, is to win far greater glory than can ever be achieved by bearing arms against Christians. We have the Turks at our gates and on our flanks: could there be juster or more honourable argument for war?" ₁₃₁

Not much later than Botero's Della Ragion di Stato, the famous Grand Design for unification of Europe was drafted. It was written by the French statesman Sully during his retirement and attributed by him to the late king Henry IV of France. ₁₃₂ The aim of his project was to establish French hegemony in Europe. In order that "all Europe might be regulated and governed as one great family", ₁₃₃ he wrote, Europe would first have to be rearranged -- through a process realistically described as a series of "different dismemberings", "cessions, exchanges, and transpositions". ₁₃₄ In this way, Europe would be divided "equally among a certain number of powers, in such a manner, that none of them might have cause either of envy or fear, from the possessions or power of the others". ₁₃₅ This new Europe would exclude the countries of today's Eastern Europe, and not only for religious reasons: Sully saw the peoples inhabiting these countries as partly idolaters and as partly schismatics. The important consideration was that those peoples belonged "to Asia at least as much as to Europea", and were, therefore, almost barbarous. Their very contact with the Turks and Tartars, even if that contact was fighting wars against them, rendered Poland, Prussia, Livonia, Muscovy and Transylvania "in some manner foreign in regard to those of the western part of Europe". ₁₃₆ Here we can see that when "barbarians" make war against the Turks they did not thereby become European. Such war could simply be a conflict between "barbarians" themselves. According to Sully, war against non-Christians was, nevertheless, essential for Europe. The basic idea of Sully's Grand Design was "to establish peace in Europe, and convert the continual wars among its several princes, into a perpetual war against the Infidels". ₁₃₇

This Grand Design was the reference point for abbe de Saint-Pierre, the most celebrated apostle of European peace in the eighteenth century. His idee fixe was to create "European union" and convene a permanent congress of European states through which the plenipotentiaries of the European powers would settle peacefully whatever disagreements they might have. The united Europe would make the whole world a free market functioning for the benefit of Europeans. ₁₃₈ Among other consequences, European union would resolve competitive conflicts caused b name="txt134"> ₁₃₄ In this way, Euy colonial expansion, for it would make clear that it was inappropriate for Europeans to struggle among themselves over mere "savages". ₁₃₉ For Saint-Pierre this was obvious. What was less clear was how to relate to the Muslims neighbours of Europe. ₁₄₀ Before proposing a solution he wavered between two options.

The first option was to incorporate Muslims into the European peace union by means of a European decision in which Muslims would have no say. As unequal partners, they would have to make a heavier financial contribution to the Union than the European states. ₁₄₁ For Europeans, peace would not only be good for business (it would secure freedom of trade), but good business in itself. The increase in communication that freedom of trade would bring about would gradually undermine Islam and pave the way for Christianity as the universal religion. ₁₄₂ In this way, European culture would gain sway in Muslim countries, whose political systems would be reshaped to conform to European standards. ₁₄₃

The other option Saint-Pierre had in mind was less peaceful, appearing in the content of his voluminous peace plan as the final solution of the "Muslim question". He proposed a universal crusade, the condition for which was -- predictably -- European unity, that is, an "indissoluble union of all Christian rulers" against the Turks and all other enemies. In order to demonstrate the urgency of such a defence, Saint-Pierre talked of "burning and irreconcilable hatred" -- not of Europeans towards Muslims but of "Mohammedan soldiers towards Christian peoples." ₁₄₄ He painted a picture of Europe under threat and pointed out that the greatest threat was to the papal state, the state of the head of Christianity. Saint-Pierre was, consequently, eager to imagine "an offensive union for the extermination of the Turks". He set himself the task of proving that "this project for the extermination of the Turks is not so difficult to bring about as one is used to thinking". His proof took the form of a rhetorical question: What is "more glorious and more important for Christianity than, on the one hand, to establish for ever peace between Christian rulers and, on the other hand, to actively engage in exterminating infidels?" ₁₄₅ The universal crusade Saint-Pierre dreamed of would "chase the Turk out of Europe and even out of Asia and Africa" and bring to European rulers great glory and benefits. ₁₄₆ Thus the point of the European union and peace was that it would pave "the way to the universal crusade, incomparably firmer and better orchestrated than any before". ₁₄₇

Saint-Pierre was certainly not the greatest thinker of that period. He was often ridiculed. However, his popularity and influence were considerable, and he was, in many ways, a typical man of his age. He was (with apologies to Marx and Bentham) a genius of European idiocy. None of those who are called great men passed him over in silence. ₁₄₈ He has to be taken seriously, as must his crusading project, which was not an appendix to Saint-Pierre's peace plan but an integral part of it. And even if -- as some argue ₁₄₉ -- only opportunism made him talk about the crusade, that only indicates how alive the crusading idea still was and how well it could still mobilize European politicians. The crusade was discussed in England and France when Saint-Pierre's predecessor, Duc de Sully, wrote his Enlightened Grand Design; ₁₅₀ and it was far from forgotten among Saint-Pierre's Enlightened contemporaries, among whom was no less a figure than the Marquis d'Argenson, Louis XV's foreign minister, who seriously considered the prospect of a new crusade.

But d'Argenson, who considered Saint-Pierre a "great political genius", ₁₅₁ did not want just any crusade. Rather, he took on the project of thinking out a crusading project to fit the "age of reason." His idea was to "launch such a crusade that would make us pleasing to God's gaze and also to the people". ₁₅₂ His vision was worthy of a leading European politician: "The first great revolution that is likely to happen in Europe, will be the conquest of Turkey. [...] This will be a true crusade, which will make us dear to God as well as to people." ₁₅₃ "In this way we shall step by step populate, discipline, Christianize, polish the entire habitable Earth. [...] This will be in the interest of both Heaven and Earth. This will be the great and glorious fruit of the establishment of the European republic." ₁₅₄

The writings of the symbol of the Enlightenment, Voltaire, make clear just how little these plans and images were historical anomalies. The advance of the Enlightenment did not imply the decline of the crusading mentality. Voltaire, like many lesser but not necessarily less enlightened contemporaries, desired to annihilate the Turks. ₁₅₅ He held them, together with the plague, to be the greatest curse on earth. "It does not suffice to humiliate them," he said, "they should be destroyed". ₁₅₆ As his personal correspondence shows, he deeply regretted that "the Christian powers, instead of destroying the common enemy, are busy ruining each other." ₁₅₇ Friedrich II, the enlightened Prussian Philosopher-King, must have known well his friend Voltaire, the king of philosophers, when he wrote to the old man, wishing to hearten him: "You may still have the pleasure of seeing Muslims chased out of Europe." ₁₅₈ Voltaire himself confided to the Czarina, his Semiramis of the North: "Overcome the Turks, and I will die content." He seems to have felt that his life was not really fulfilled, and that there was more he could have done: "I wish I had at least been able to help you kill a few Turks." ₁₅₉

Note 1: Henri Pirenne, Histoire de l'Europe des invasions au XVIe siecle (14th edition; Felix Alcan/Nouvelle Societe d'editions, Paris/Bruxelles, 1939), p. 19. Back.

Note 2: First sources in which rudimentary connections of the term Europe with civil structures emerge, originate in Charlemagne's period. See Francis Oakley, The Crucial Centuries. The Mediaeval Experience (Terra Nova Editions, London, 1979), p. 29; and Jurgen Fischer, Oriens - Occidens - Europa. Begriff und Gedanke Europa in der spaten Antike und im fruhen Mittelalter (Franz Steiner Verlag, Wiesbaden, 19S7). My view that Europe as a self conscious political entity was formed in the fifteenth century is especially indebted to Denys Hay, Europe. The Emergence of an Idea (2nd edition; Edinburgh University Press, 1968). Back.

Note 3: Pirenne's thesis, Pirenne, Histoire de l'Europe, p. 22; developed in Henri Pirenne, Mahomet et Charlemagne (3rd edition; Fe1ix Alcan/Nouvelle Societe d'editions, Paris/Bruxelles, 1937). For a critical revision of the thesis see: Richard Hodges and David Whitehouse, Mohammed, Charlemagne and the Origins of Europe. Archeology and the Pirenne Thesis (Duckworth, London, 1983), especially p. 175; Daniel C. Dennett, Jr., "Pirenne amd Muhammad," in The Pirenne Thesis. Analysis, Criticism, ond Revision, edited by A. F. Havighurst, (3rd edition; D. C. Heath & Co., Lexington et al., 1976); see especially p. 110; Cf. Oakley, The Crucial Centuries, p. 21. Back.

Note 4: As Pocock has put it, "Pirenne remains among the authors of the grand perception that the history of 'Christendom' and of 'Europe' is not to be understood without understanding its interactions with Islam." J. G. A. Pocock, "Vous autres Europeens -- or Inventing Europe", Filozofski Vestnik/Acta philosophica, volume XIV (1993), number 2, p. 149. Back.

Note 5: Oakley, The Crucial Centuries, p. 21. Back.

Note 6: Pirenne, Histoire de l'Europe, pp. 19-20. Back.

Note 7: Cf. H. E J. Cowdrey, "The Genesis of the Crusades: The Springs of Western ldeas of Holy War", in The Holy War, edited by T. P. Murphy (Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1976), p. 27: "One of the most powerfully formative periods in our common culture, outlook, and institutions". I subscribe to Brundage's view, that "[b]y the end of the Middle Ages the holy war had become a model for expansionist campaigns by European Christians against non-Europeans and non Christians in all parts of the world", James A. Brundage, "Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers', in The Holy War, edited by Murphy, p. 124; as opposed to Pocock who sees the crusades not as a 'model but as a by-product" of "Frankish and Christian eastward expansion", Pocock, "Vous autres Europeens", p. 148. Back.

Note 8: Joseph R Strayer, The First Western Union, in Strayer, Medieval Statecraft and the Perspectives of History (Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 333-334. Back.

Note 9: The question is whether it is anachronistic to speak of "politics' in the pre-modern period. Cf. especially Nicolai Rubinstein, "The history of the word politicus in Early-Modern Europe", in The Languages of Political Theory in Early-Modern Europe, edited by A. Pagden, (Cambridge University Press, 1987); and Maurizio Viroli, From Politics to Reason of State. The acquisition and transformation of the language of politics 1250-1600 (Cambridge University Press, 1992). Back.

Note 10: Georges Duby, "Les laics et la paix de Dieu", in I laici nella "societas christiana" dei secoli XI e XII, Miscellanea del Centro di studi medioevali (Societa editrice Vita a pensiero, Milano, 1968), p. 459. Back.

Note 11: Cf. Colin Morris, The Papal Monarchy. The Western Church from 1050 to 1250 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1991), p. 143 sq. The classical reconstruction of this process remains Carl Erdmann, Die Entstehung des Kreuzungsgedankens (W. Kohlhammer Verlag, Stuttgart, 1955). Back.

Note 12: H. E. J. Cowdrey, "The Peace and the Truce of God in the Eleventh Century", Past & Present, number 46 (1970), p 50 Back.

Note 13: Hans-Werner Goetz, "Protection of the Church, Defense of the Law, and Reform: On the Purposes and Character of the Peace of God, 989-1038", in The Peace of God. Social Violence and Religious Response in France around the Year 1000, edited by T. Head and R. Landes, (Cornell University Press, IthacalLondon, 1992), p. 276. Back.

Note 14: It was explicitly pronounced that it was Christians who were to be protected from injury. Hartmut Hoffmann, Gorrsfriede und Treuga Dei, Monumenta Germaniae historica, Schriften, volume 20 (Anton Hiersemann, Stuttgart, 1964), p. 84. Back.

Note 15: ibid., p. 95. Back.

Note 16: H. E. J. Cowdrey, "The Peace and the Truce of God", p. 53. Duby, "Les laics et la paix de Dieu", pp. 459- 460, commented on Narbonne that "le chevalier avait recu de Dieu mission de combattre. Desormais, il ne lui fut plus permis de le faire qu'a l'exterieur de la communaute chretienne, qu'a l'exterieur du corps du Christ et contra les ennemis de la foi". I. S. Robinson, The Papacy 1073-1198. Continuity andlnnovation (Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 327, has cited recommendation given by Abbo de Fleury around 1000 A.D.: "Warriors ... do not fight against each other in the womb of their mother, but wisely attack the enemies of the holy Church of God."; Cf Erdmann, Die Entstehung, p. 86. Back.

Note 17: Richard Landes, "Between Aristocracy and Heresy: Popular Participation in the Limousin Peace of God, 994-1033", in The Peace of God, edited by Head/Landes, p. 210. Back.

Note 18: Cf. Erdmann, Die Entstehung, pp. 88 sq. ,109 sq., 267 sq.; Morris, The Papal Monarchy, p. 134 sq.; Hans Eberhard Mayer, The Crusades (2nd edition; Oxford University Press, 1993), p. 17 sq. Back.

Note 19: Morris, The Popal Monarchy, p. 147. Back.

Note 20: ibid., p. 145. Back.

Note 21: Cf. Mayer, The Crusades, pp. 5-6. Back.

Note 22: Duby, "Les laics et la paix de Dieu", p. 460. Back.

Note 23: I. S. Robinson, The Papacy, p. 326; The canons of Clermont "prescribe, for the first time in the history of the Peace of God, a perceptual peace within the whole of Christendom", Cowdrey, "The Peace and the Truce of God", p. 57; The council of Clermont "was epoch-making. It was not only the first notable attempt of the papacy to adopt and universalize the Peace and Truce, but it was also the climax of a series of great French peace councils", Loren C. Mackinney, "The People and the Public Opinion in the Eleventh Century Peace Movement", Speculum, volume V (1930), p. 200. Back.

Note 24: D. C. Munro, "The Speech of Pope Urban II at Clermont, 1095", The American Historical Review, volume IX (1905), number 2, p. 239. Back.

Note 25: Historia Iherosolymitana, I. 3 English translation: Fulcher of Chartres, A History of the Expedition to Jerusalem 1095-1127, edited by H. S. Fink, (The University of Tennessee Press, Knoxille, 1969), pp. o6-67. Back.

Note 26: English translation in Western Awakening. Sources of Medieval History Volume II (c 1000-1500), editeo by C. T. Davis, (Appelton-Century-Crofts, New York, 1967), pp. 148-149. Back.

Note 27: Historia quae dlcitur Gesta Dei per Francos, edita a venerabili Domno Guiberto, abbate monasterii Sanctae Mariae Novigenti, in Recueil des historiens des croisades. Historiens occidentaux, Book I, volume 4 (Imprimerie national, Paris, 1879), p. 124 English translation by H. E J. Cowdrey, "Cluny and the First Crusade", Revue benedictine, volume 83 (1973), p. 294. Back.

Note 28: There is a suggestive parallel between Christian holy war and the Muslim jihad, but "[n]o one to date has been able to demonstrate a direct influence of the one upon the other." James A. Brundage, Holy War and the Medieval Lawyers, p. 103. Back.

Note 29: Franco Cardini, "La guerra santa nella cristianita", in "Militia Christi" e Crociata nei secoli Xl-XIII, Miscellanea del Centro di studi medioevali (Vita e pensiero, Milamo, 1992), p. 396. Back.

Note 30: Erdmann, Die Entstehung, p. 295. Back.

Note 31: Raoul Manselli, "La res publica cristiana e I'Islam", in L'Occidente e I'Islam nell'alto medioevo, Settimane di studio del centro italiano di studi sull'alto medioevo (Presso la sede del centro, Spoleto, 1965), p. 136. Back.

Note 32: Cf., ibid., pp. 133, 135-136. Back.

Note 33: Cf. Marie Therese d'Alverny, La connaissance de l'lslam en Occideut du IXe au milieu du XIIe siecle", in L'Occidente e I'Islam nell'alto medioevo, volume II; Norman Daniels, Islam ond the West. The Making of an Image (2nd edition; Oneworld, Oxford, 1993), pp. 11-23; R W. Southern, Western Views of Islam in the Middle Ages (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962). Back.

Note 34: Brain Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State 1050-1300 (University of Toronto Press in association with the Medieval Academy of America, Toronto/Buffalo/London 1988), p. 174. Back.

Note 35: see Richard Scholz, Die Publizistik zur Zeit Philipps des Schonen und Bonifaz' Vlll. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der politischen Anschauungen des Mittelalters (Ferdinand Enke, Stuttgart, 1903). Back.

Note 36: De recuperatione terre sancte. Traite de politique generale par Pierre Dubois, avocat des causes ecclesiastiques au bailliage de Coutances sous Philippe le Bel, edited by Charles V. Langlois, (Alphonse Picard Editeur, Paris, 1891). I quote from the Euglish translation, Pierre Dubois, The Recovery of the Holy Land, edited by W. I. Brandt, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1956). Back.

Note 37: ibid., p. 12. Back.

Note 38: ibid. Back.

Note 39: ibid., p. 2. Back.

Note 40: ibid., p 2. Back.

Note 41: ibid., p. 70. Back.

Note 42: ibid., p. 99. Back.

Note 43: C. Lange, Histoire de la doctrine pacifique et de son influence sur le developpement du droit international, Academie de droit international, Recueil de cours 1926 (Librairie Hachette, Paris, 1927), p. 209. Back.

Note 44: See especiaily Sylvia Schein, Fideles Crucis. The Papocy, the West, and the Recovery of the Holy Land 1274-1314 (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 199l). Back.

Note 45: Aziz Suryal Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (Methuen & Co Ltd., London, 1938), p. 129. Back.

Note 46: De Mezieres, Epistre lamentable et consolatoire sur le fait de la desconfiture lacrimable du noble et vaillant roy de Honguerie par les Turcs devant la ville de Nicopoli etc., in Oeuvres de Froissart, edited by Kervyn de Lettenhove, (Imprimerie et librairie Victor Devaux, Bruxelles, 1872), volume 16, p. 507; Cf. N. Jorga, Philippe o'e Mezieres 1327-1405 a la croisade au XIVe siecle (Librairie Emile Bouillon, Paris, 1896), p. 5l2. Back.

Note 47: Philippe de Mezieres, Le songe du vieil pelerin, edited by G W. Coopland, (Cambridge University Press, 1969), volume II, p. 292; Cf Jorga, Philippe de Mezieres, p 466. Back.

Note 48: Le songe, p 296 Back.

Note 49: Philippe de Mezieres, Letter to King Richard II. A plea made in 1395 for peace between England and France, edited hy G. W. Coopland, (Liverpool University Press, 1975), p. 85. Back.

Note 50: ibid., p. 117. Back.

Note 51: ibid., p. IOO. Back.

Note 52: ibid., p. 116 Back.

Note 53: ibid., pp. 90-91, 118. Back.

Note 54: ibid., p. 119. Back.

Note 55: Epistre lamentable, p. 499. Back.

Note 56: Ibid., pp. 467, 489, 49.8 Back.

Note 57: On the conflict between Pius II and King George, see Georg Voigt, Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini als Papst Pius der Zweite, und sein Zeitalter (Georg Reimer, Berlin, 1856-1863), volume III, chapter VII; Ludwig Pastor, The History of Popes, from the Close of the Middle Ages (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1894), volume II, chapter V; Cecilia M. Ady, Pius 11 (Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini). The Humanist Pope (Methuen & Co., London, 1913), especially p. 214; The Commentaries of Pius II, edited by L. C. Gabel and F. A. Gragg, Smith College Studies in History, volumes XXII, XXV, XXX, XXXV, XLII (Northampton, MA, 1936-57), especially Book VII, p. 512 sq.; Book. X, p. 621 sq. Back.

Note 58: On King George's Tractatus pacis, see Vaclav Vanecek, "The Historical Significance of the Peace Project of King George of Bohemia and the Research Problems Involved," in The Universal Peace Orangization of King George of Bohemia. A Fifteenth Century Plan for World Peace 1462/l464 (Publishing House of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague, 1964); Jacob ter Meulen, Der Gedanke der internationalen Organisation in seiner Entwicklung 1300-1800 (Martinus Nijhoff, Haag,1917), p.108; Vaclav Vanecek, "Deux projets tcheques des XVe et XVlle siecles relatifs a l'organisation universelle de la paix: Projets du roi Georges de Podebrady et de J. A. Komensky", in *La paix, Receuils de la Societe Jean Bodin, volume XV, (Editions de la librairie encyclopedique, Bruxelles, 1961). Back.

Note 59: Tractatus pacis toi cristianitati fiendae, edited by J. Kejr, in The Universal Peace Organization of King George, p. 69. (I quote the English translation by I. Dvorak, Treaty on the Establishment of Peace throughout Christendom, ibid., but refer to the Latin original). Back.

Note 60: ibid. Back.

Note 61: ibid. Back.

Note 62: ibid., p. 70. Back.

Note 63: ibid., Cf. p. 21: "Nam qui prestare auxilia hoc tempore contra Turcos negaverit, infidelitatis proculdubio et inimicorum crucis Cristi fautorem se declarabit." Back.

Note 64: Preamble, ibid., Cf., p. 21, that in particular those wars and discord between the princes of the Church which might impede the successful ending of wars against the Turks must stop. Back.

Note 65: ibid., p. 9: "pacis cultus". Back.

Note 66: ibid., p. 13. It has to be added that King George allowed the conclusion of peace with the enemy, yet only when he is no longer perceived as a threat to the security of Christians. Back.

Note 67: Cf. Commentaries of Pius II, Book II, p. 115; Leona C. Gabel, "Introduction", in Commentaries, volume XLIII, p. xxv; Pastor, The History, pp. 19, 23, 372; Charles-Edouard Naville, Enea Silvio Piccolomini. L'uomo, l'umanista, il pontefice (1405-1464) (Edizioni Analisi, Locarno, 1984), pp. 322-323. Back.

Note 68: Cf. The celebrated letter to Nicholas V, 12 July 1453, pressing the pope "to arise, to address kings, to send legates, to exhort princes [...] to make peace with their co-religionists, and to move with united forces against the enemies of the saving Cross." Quoted in Ady, Pius II, pp. 125-126. The crusading encyclic issued in September 1453 called Muhammad the son of Satan and red dragon of the Apocolypse, and sultan Muhammad the herald of Antichrist. It declared that, during the holy war, peace or truce must reign in whole Christendom. Cf. Voigt, Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini, Volume II, p. 95. Back.

Note 69: See Letter to Nicolas of Cusa, 21 July 1453, in Enea Silvio Piccolomini, Papst Pius II. Ausgewahlte Texte aus seinen Schriften, edited by B. Widmer, (Benno Schwabe & Co., Basel/Stuttgart, 1960). Back.

Note 70: "Magnum est hoc detrimentum, sed multo majus illud, quod fidem Christianam comminui et m angulum coartari videmus. nam que totum illum orbem occupaverat, jam ex Asia Libiaque profligata neque in Europa quiescere permittitur." ibid., p. 448. Back.

Note 71: ibid., p. 450. Back.

Note 72: ibid., p. 452; Cf. Commentaries of Pius II, Book III, p. 213; Book Xll, p. 819, and elsewhere. Back.

Note 73: Piccolomini complained that Christendom had no head which all would obey; that the Pope and the Emperor had become fictitious entities; that every town had a king; and that it was difficult to imagine how to lead to war so many heads: "Christianitas nullum habet caput, cui parere omnes velint; neque summo sacerdoti neque imperatori, que sua sunt, dantur. nulla reverentia, nulla obedientia est. tanquam ficta nomina, picta capita sint, ita papam imperatoremque respicimus. suum queque civitas regem habet tot sunt principes, quot domus. quomodo tot capitus, quot regunt Christianum orbem, arma sumere suadebis?", Letter to Leonardo dei Benvoglienti, Mai October 1454, in Enea Silvio Piccolomini, edited by Widmer, pp. 454-456. Back.

Note 74: Hay, Europe, pp. 73, 86-87; Werner Fritzmeyer, Christenheit und Europa. Zur Geschchte des europdaischen Gemeinschaftsgefuhls von Dante bis Leibniz (Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, Munchen/Berlin 1931), pp. 27-28. Back.

Note 75: Letter to Cusa, 1. c, p. 448 Back.

Note 76: ibid., pp. 452-454. Cf. Commentaries of Pius II, Book II, pp. 215, 226; Book VIII, pp. 528-529. Back.

Note 77: ibid., Book Xll, p. 823. Back.

Note 78: ibid., Book II, p. 192 Back.

Note 79: ibid., Book XII, p. 811. Back.

Note 80: ibid., Book II, p. 117; Book VIII, p. 515. 0n the Congress, see Pastor, The History, chapter II; Voigt, Enea Silvio de' Piccolomini, volume 3, chapter I; Commentaries, Books II, III. Back.

Note 81: "in dieta Mantuana [...] decrevimus, ut Turchum de Europa divino adjutorio fugaremus. Hay, op. cit., Europe, p. 85, has pointed out the difference between this program and the old crusading objective of recapturing the Holy Land. Cf. Commentaries, Book XII, p. 816: Turks were to be "compelled to move out of Europe"; and, Mahomet was to be "conquered and utterly driven out of Europe". Back.

Note 82: In his speech in Ancona, Pius II addressed Christians with the following words: "O stony-heartened and thankless Christians! who can hear all these things, and yet not wish to die for Him who died for you. Think of your helpless brethren groaning in captivity among the Turks, or living in daily dread of it. As you are men, let humanity prompt you to help those who have to endure every sort of humiliation. Quoted in Pastor, The History, p. 332. Back.

Note 83: Now those who blaspheme against the Holy Ghost and commit the unforgivable sin of denying by word and sign that Christ is the Son of God must be punished by God's right hand, Now ploughshares must be beaten into swords, now the tunic must be sold amd the sword bought, now must thy zeal blaze forth, now must thy Paul's blade be whetted, that by thy power and aid, working through the mightiest princes of the west, the faith which thou didst preach and approve, by which thou didst become the father of all, may be defended and the Church founded on the rock that is Christ may prevail against the gates of hell through the authority and testimony of our Lord, Jesus Christ, who is very truth." Bessarion's oration at the ceremouy in honour of the head of St. Andrew, Commentaries of Pius II, Book VIII, p. 539. Back.

Note 84: Ben Lowe, "Peace discourse and mid-Tudor foreign policy", in Political Thought and the Tudor Commonwealth Deep structure, discourse and disguise, edited by P. A. Fiddler and T. F. Mayer, (Routledge, London/New York, 1992), p. 130. Back.

Note 85: Erasmus addressed this issue repeatedly, and in 1530 he dedicated to it a special treatise: Vtilissima consvltatio de bello Tvrcis inferendo, et obiter ennaratvs Pslamvs XXVIII, in Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, section V, volume 3, edited by A. G. Weiler, (North-Holland, Amsterdam-New York-Oxford-Tokyo, 1986). Cf. Weiler, "Einleitung" to his edition in Opera omnia, section V, volume 3, pp. 3-4; and A. G. Weiler, in "La Consultatio de Bello Turcis inferendo: une oeuvre de piete politique," edited by J. Chomarat, A. Godin, J. C. Marigolin, Erasme. Acts du colloque international (Tours 1986) (Librairie Droz, Geneve, 1990). Back.

Note 86: Otto Herding, "Erasmus -- Frieden und Krieg", in Erasmus und Europa, edited by A. Buck, (Otto Harrassowitz, Wiesbaden, 1988), p. 25; Weiler, "La Consultatio", p. 105. Back.

Note 87: "Turcas non sua pietate, nou sua virtute, sed nostra socordia potissimum huc vsque creuisse." Consultatio, p. 38; Ep. 1819, quoted in Weiler, "Einleitung", pp. 10, 15; Herding, Erasmus", p. 25; Kurt von Raumer, Ewiger Friede. Friedensrufe und Friedensplane sit der Renaissance (Karl Alber, Freiburg/Munchen, 1953), pp. 5-6. The formulation which Erasmus used in a letter to king Sigismund I of Poland (Mai 1527): "Nunc haec monarcharum inter ipsos conflictatio Turcae viam aperuit (Ep. 1819, quoted in Weiler, "Einleitung", p. 10), echoes Pius II's lament, as quoted in Toffanin, "Introduzione", in Pio II (Enea Silvio Piccolomini), Lettera a Maometto II (Epistola ad Mahumetem), edited by G. Toffanin, (R. Pironti & figli, Napoli, 1953), p. xii: "Siamo trafitti dalla nostra e dall'altrui spada; tutti siamo procuratori dei Turchi e spianiamo la via a Maometto." In a letter to John Rinck (17 March 1530), Erasmus referred positively to Bessarion and Pius II. Ep. 2285, in Opvs epistolarvm Des. Erasmi Roterodami, volume VIII, edited by P. S. Allen and H. M. Allen, (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1934), p. 385. Back.

Note 88: "Yet from whence commeth it into our minds, that one Christian man should draw his weapon to bathe it an another Christian man's blood? It is called parricide, if the one brother slay the other", Dulce bellum inexpertis. I quote from J. W. Mackail's edition, Erasmus against War (The Merrymount Press, Boston, 1907), p. 33. Back.

Note 89: Institvtio principis christiani, in Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, section IV, volume 1, (North- Holland, Amsterdam, 1974), p. 214. Back.

Note 90: "This is not to say that I absolutely oppose war against the Turks if they attack us." Dulce bellum inexpertis: omitted in Erasmus against War, p. 57, and quoted in Robert P. Adams, The Better Part of Valor. More, Erasmus, Colet and Vives, on Humanism, War, and Peace, 1496-1535 (University of Washington Press, Seattle, 1962), p. 209. Cf. Herding, "Erasmus", p. 25. Back.

Note 91: Qverela pacis, in Opera omnia Desiderii Erasmi Roterodami, section IV, volume 2 (North-Holland, Amsterdam, Oxford, 1977), p. 90. English translation in A Complaint of Peace Spurned and Rejected by the Whole World. Querela pacis undique gentiun ejectae profligataeque, edited by B. Radice, Collected Works of Erasmus, volume 27 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London, 1986), p. 314. Back.

Note 92: Herding, "Einleitung" in his edition of Institutio, 1. c., p. 109. Back.

Note 93: Erasmus against War, p. 55; Consultatio, pp. 52, 58. Back.

Note 94: Consultatio, p. 52. Back.

Note 95: Erasmus against War, pp. 55-56. Back.

Note 96: Ep. 2285, Opvs epistolarvm, 1. c., p. 384. Back.

Note 97: A. Renaudet, Etudes erasmiennes (1521-1529) (Librairie E. Droz, Paris, 1939). Back.

Note 98: L. E. Halkin, "Erasme et l'Europe", in Commemoration nationale d'Erasme. Actes (Bruxelles, 1970), p. 99; Cf. Consultatio, pp. 52-58. Back.

Note 99: Institutio, p. 217. English translation: The Education of a Christian Prince. Institutio principis christiani, edited by N. M. Cheshire and M. J. Heath, Collected Works of Erasmus, volume 27 (University of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London, 1986), p. 286. Back.

Note 100: Querela pacis, 1. c., p. 98 (A Complaint of Peace, p. 320). 'Then they curse the Turks for being godless aud unchristian, as if they could be Christians themselves while committing these crimes or as if there could be anything more agreeable for the Turks than the sight of Christians putting each other to the sword. " Querela pacis, p. 84 (A Complaint of Peace, p. 310). Back.

Note 101: "Si nobis succedere cupimus, vt Turcas a nostris ceruicibus depellamus, prius teterrimum Turcarum genus ex animis nostris exigamus, auaritiam, ambitionem, dominandi libidinem, nostri fiduciam, impietatem, luxum, voluptatum amorem, fraudulentiam, iram, odium, inuidiam, et his gladio Spiritus iugulatis sumamus animu vere christianum, atque ita si res postulet sub vexillis Christi militemus aduersus Turcas homines, et eodem propugnatore vincemus.' Consultatio, p. 62; Cf. Erasmus letter to Peter Gilles, 28 January 1530: "imminet Turca ceruicibus nostris". Ep. 2260, Opvs epistolarvm, 1. c., p. 332; Cf Weiler, 'Einleitung', p. 21. Back.

Note 102: "Turcae pugnamus cum Turcis". Consultatio, p. 52. "Now oftentimes we, being ill, fight with the evil. [...] if we set aside the title and sign of the Cross, we fight Turks against the Turks." Erasmus against War, pp. 55-56. Back.

Note 103: Institutio, p. 218; Cf. The Handbook of the Christian Soldier. Enhiridion militis christiani, edited by C. Fantazzi, Collected Works of Erasmus, volume 66 (Umversity of Toronto Press, Toronto/Buffalo/London 1988), p. 11: Without a moral/religious reform, that is, "[i]f we cannot put our hearts into something of the sort, we shall degenerate into Turks long before we convert the Turks to our way of thinking." Back.

Note 104: W. Montgomery Watt, "Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War", in The Holy War, edited by Murphy, p. 155, quotes sufi Sufyan ibn-'Uyayna (d. 814) who "is reported to have said that the jihad in the way of God consists of ten parts, of which only one is fighting against the enemy while other nine are fighting against the self. Tbe same thought was expressed in another way by Sahl at-Tustari (d. 896) when he remarked, 'We have returned from the lesser Jihad to tbe greater Jihad,' and then on being questioned added, 'The greater Jihad is the struggle against the self.''' Back.

Note 105: Thomas More, A Dialogue of Comfort against Tribulation, The Yale Edition of Selected Works (Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1977), pp. 196, 197, 198, 236. Back.

Note 106: C. A. Patrides, "'The Bloody and Cruell Turke': the Background of a Renaissance Commonplace", Studies in the Renaissance, volume X (1963). Back.

Note 107: A Dialogue of Comfort, p. 6. Back.

Note 108: A Dialogue of Comfort, pp. 8, 40; Cf. Franklin L. Baumer, "England, the Turk, amd the Common Corps of Christendom", The American Historical Review, volume L (1944), number 1. Back.

Note 109: If "God hath caused them [Christians] to agree together in the defence of his name", this would make "a common power in defense of Christendom against our common enemy". A Dialogue of Comfort, p. 40. Back.

Note 110: Carlos G. Norena, Juan Luis Vives (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 223; Adams, The Better Part of Valor, p. 264. Back.

Note 111: "Puesto que en una tan prolija serie de guerras que, con fecundidad increible, han nacido las unas de las otras, toda la Europa sufrio danos gigantescos y en casi todos los ordenes esta necesitada de una grande y casi universal reconstruccion." Concordia y doscordia en el linaje humano (De concordia et discordia in humano genere), in Juan Luis Vives, Obras completas, edited by L. Riber, volume II (M. Aguilar, Madrid, 1948), p. 75. Back.

Note 112: De la insolidarto'ad o'e Eurq7a y o'e la guerra contra el Turco (De Europae dissidiis et bello turcico), in Obras completas, volume 11, p. 48; Cf. Rafael Gibert, "Lulio y Vives sobre la pa2, La pai, Receuils de la Societe Jean Bodin, p. 159. Back.

Note 113: Norena, Juan Luis Vives, p. 225. Back.

Note 114: De la insolidaridad de Europa, pp. 43, 46, 50. Back.

Note 115: ibid., p. 50. Back.

Note 116: Even dogs are fiercer in Europe than in Africa. ibid., p. 58. Back.

Note 117: De la insolidaridad de Europa, p. 52; Gibert, "Lulio y Vives sobre la paz", p. 159; Norena, Juan Luis Vives, pp. 225, 226. Back.

Note 118: Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572-l651 (Cambridge University Press, 1993), chapters 1-3; Cf. Tuck, "Humanism and Political Thought", in The Impact of Humanism on Western Europe, edited by A. Goodman and A. MacKay, (Longman, London/New York, 1990). Back.

Note 119: Tuck, op. cit, Philosophy and Government, p 62 Back.

Note 120: Antoine Coron, "Juste Lipse juge des pouvoirs politiques europeens a la lumiere de sa correspondence", Theorie et pratique politiques a la Renaissance, XVIIe Colloque international de Tours (J. Vrin, Paris, 1977), p 454. Back.

Note 121: Tuck, Philosophy and Government, p 62 Back.

Note 122: Cf ibid, p 65-82; Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the Political Imagination Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and Political Theory 1513-1830 (Yale University Press, New Haven/London, 1990), pp 46-54. Back.

Note 123: Giovanni Botero Benese, Della Ragion di Stato Libri Dieci. Con Tre Libri delle Cause della Grandezza, e Magnificenza delle Citta (Venetia, 1589),II, 6; III, 3 (if not otherwise indicated, I quote this edition); and Giovanni Botero The Reason of State and The Greatness of Cities, edited by D P Waley, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1956), p 78 (not in 1589 edition). Back.

Note 124: Della Ragion di Stato, I, 8 Back.

Note 125: "e non mancheranno mai, e Turchi, e Mori, e Saraceni, contra' quali si possono giustamente ad operar l'armi." ibid., IX, 2; "uniuersalmente a tutti lecito il guerreggiare contra heretici come contra infedeli." Della Ragion di Stato, 1606 edition, X, 9. Back.

Note 126: Della Ragion di Stato, V, 3; cf 15-16. Back.

Note 127: Della Ragion di Stato, Vl, 7. Back.

Note 128: ibid, VIII, 14. Back.

Note 129: "Ecco il frutto della moderna politica." Della Ragion di Stato, 1606 edition, X, 9; Cf. Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason in der neueren Geschichte, edited by W. Hofer, (4th edition; R Oldenbourg, Munchen/Wien, 1976), p. 81. Back.

Note 130: Della Ragion di Stato, 1606 edition, X, 9. Back.

Note 131: ibid., (I quote Waley's translation, 1. c., p. 222). Back.

Note 132: I quote English translation of the edition prepared by abbe de l'Ecluse, which circulated in the period I discuss: Memoirs of Maximilian de Bethune, Duke of Sully, Prime Minister to Henry the Great. Containing the History of the Life and Reign of that Monarch, And his own Administration under Him, 5 volumes (London, 1757). The critical edition by D. Buisseret and B. Barbicke. Les Economies Royales de Sully (Librairie C. Klincksieck/Librairie de la Societe de l'histoire de France, Paris, 1970, sq.), has not yet reached the time of the Design. On the Design, see Christian Pfister, "Les Economies Royales' de Sully et le Grand Dessein de Henri IV," Revue historique, volume 19 (1894), numbers 54, 55, 56; and Theodor Kukelhaus, Der Ursprung des Planes vom ewigen Frieden in den Memoiren des Herzogs von Sully (Verlag von Speyer & Peters, Berlin 1893). Back.

Note 133: Memoirs, volume V, p. 124. Back.

Note 134: ibid pp. 141, 143. Back.

Note 135: ibid., pp. 143-144. Back.

Note 136: Memoirs, volume III, p. 169. Back.

Note 137: ibid., p. 150. Back.

Note 138: Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe (Utrecht, 1713); I use Simon Goyard-Fabre's edition: Abbe' de Saint-Pierre, Projet pour rendre la Paix perpetuelle en Europe, Corpus des oeuvres de philosophie en langue francaise (Fayard, Paris, 1986), [referred to as Projet], pp. 152, 155; Projet de traite pour rendre la paix perpetuelle entre les souverains chretiens, pour maintenir toujours le Commerce libre entre les Nations: pour afermir beaucoup davantage les Maisons Souveraines sur le Trone. Propose autre fois par Henry le Grand Roy de France. Agree par la Reine Elisabeth. par Jaques I, Roi d'Angleterre son Successeur, & par le plupart des autres Potentats d'Europe (Utrecht, 1717); I quote the same modern edition [referred to as Projet de traite], pp. 647-648, 683. Back.

Note 139: Memoires pour rendre la paix perpetuelle en Europe (Cologne, 1712), p. 134; Projet, pp. 209-210; Cf. Observations sur les colonies eloignees, in Saint-Pierre, Ouvrajes de politique (Beman, Rotterdam, 1733-41), volume X, pp. 279-280. Back.

Note 140: For Saint-Pierre's views on Muslims, see especially Discours contre le Mahometisme, in Ouvrajes de politique, volume V; "Aneantissement futur. Du Mahometisme & des autres Religions humaines par le progrez continuel de la Rezon humaine universelle", Pensees diverses, in Ouvrajes de politique, volume XIII, p. 203 sq. Back.

Note 141: Projet, pp. 161 sq., 374; Projet de traite, p. 549; Memoires, pp. 111-112. Back.

Note 142: Projet, p. 282. Back.

Note 143: Projet, p. 385; Projet de traite, p. 692. Back.

Note 144: Projet de traite, p. 557. Back.

Note 145: ibid, p. 613. Back.

Note 146: ibid., p. 689; Cf. p. 690. Back.

Note 147: ibid., p. 693. Cf. Vue generale des efets merveilleux que produiroit necessairement en Europe Le Nouveau plan de Gouvernement des Etats,. in Ouvrajes de politique, volume VI, pp. 326-327. Back.

Note 148: Edmond Silberner, La guerre dans la pensee economique du XVIe au XVIIIe siecle (Librairie du Recueil Sirey, Paris, 1939), p. 161. Back.

Note 149: ibid., p. 179. Back.

Note 150: Baumer, Baumer, "England, the Turk, and the Common Corps of Christendom", p. 46; Kukelhaus, Der Ursprung des Planes, pp. 47 sq., 56 sq., 144 sq. Back.

Note 151: Memoires et journal inedit du marquis d'Argenson, Ministre des affaires etrangeres sous Louis XV, publies et annotes par M. le marquis d'Argenson (P. Jannet, Paris, 1858), volume V, pp. 215, 259 sq., 270 sq. Back.

Note 152: Memoires et journal, p. 384. Back.

Note 153: Journal et memoires du marquis d'Argenson, edited by E. J. B. Rathery, Librairie de la Societe de l'historie de France (Chez Mme Ve Jules Renouard, Paris, 1859), volume 1, Appendice, pp. 361-362. Back.

Note 154: Memoires et journal, p. 385. Back.

Note 155: Henry Meyer, Voltaire on War and Peace. Studies in Voltaire and the Eighteenth Century, volume CXLIV (The Voltaire Foundation, Thorpe Mandeville House, Banbury, 1976), p. 99. Meyer wished to excuse his author, especially the views he expressed in connection with Catherine II's war against the Turks in 1768, by saying that "the peace-loving philosopher utters a few heretical words", ibid., p. 92-93. Back.

Note 156: Quoted in Meyer, ibid., p. 49. Back.

Note 157: ibid., p. 82. Back.

Note 158: Friedrich II to Voltaire, 29 February 1773, in Voltaire's Correspondence, edited by T. Berterman, (Institut et Musee Voltaire, Les Delices, Geneve, 1953-65), volume LXXXIV, p. 136. Back.

Note 159: "Je voudrais avoir du moins contribue a vous tuer quelques Turcs". Voltaire to Catherine II, quoted in Meyer, Voltaire on War and Peace, p 49. Back.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: The research for this pamphlet was assisted by an award from the Social Science Research Council of an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellowship on Peace and Security in a Changing World. Earlier versions of the essay were presented at the CSD Seminar, to the Bosnian Forum in Ljubljana, in March 1994, and in the Department of Arabic Studies, American University in Cairo, in May 1994. For their help and comments I would like to thank Julia Dvorkin, Lynne Jones, John Keane, Bridget Cotter, and Whitney Ball. Back.