CIAO DATE: 09/03

Container Security Report

Michael May, Dean Wilkening, and Tonya Putnam

The Center for International Security and Cooperation

January 2003

 

Abstract

This report by the Stanford Study Group on Container Security examines how to apply existing technology and resources most effectively to prevent the transport of illicit nuclear materials for use in terrorist activities by means of international commercial shipping.

Description

During the week of August 18-23, 2002, the Center Cooperation (CISAC) of the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Stanford University hosted four summer studies sponsored by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. One of these studies, the Container Security study, examined how to apply existing technology and resources most effectively to prevent the transport of illicit nuclear materials for use in terrorist activities by means of international commercial shipping.

The Container Security group focused on the detection of nuclear weapons and special nuclear materials (SNMs),1 but it also considered challenges particular to detecting forms of radioactive material that could be used in other types of terrorist attacks, including radiological dispersal devices (RDDs, or "dirty bombs"). Issues associated with the illicit transport and import of chemical and biological contraband for use in terrorist activity were not considered. The study brought together physicists, engineers, and social scientists with experience on issues that included nuclear detection and radiography, port and container security, systemsengineering, and international relations. The study group was kept small and tightly focused in order to make a concrete contribution in the short time available. This report encapsulates the conclusions of the weeklong study. This study was conducted at an unclassified level and drew exclusively upon information available in the public domain. As a rule, the sample technical approach described in this report incorporates commercial equipment and technologies currently available. However, in a few cases the approach recommends equipment that has not yet been developed for use in the commercial sector but which is within the range of existing technical expertise.

 

Full Text (PDF, 44 pages, 1.9 MB)