CIAO DATE: 07/03

Justice and Reconciliation: Responsibilities and Dilemmas of Peace-makers and Peacebuilders

Introduction

From mid-1993 to the spring of 1994, representatives of the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) pressed exiled President Aristide and Haitian legislators to enact the broadest possible amnesty for the military leaders who had seized power in September 1991, and maintained it through the killings of thousands of Haitians. Desperate to induce them to accept a return to constitutional government, the Office of the UN/OAS Special Envoy for Haiti obtained amnesty laws from other countries as possible models—including laws criticized, and eventually formally condemned, as contrary to international law—and drafted amnesty bills for the Parliament. International pressure to adopt this legislation was applied at a time when constitutionalist legislators were subject to military intimidation, some had fled the country, others felt unable to participate for reasons of personal security, and supporters of the military elected illegitimately were participating in the senate. The culmination of these efforts came when a draft bill which would have covered all crimes stemming from the coup right up to the date the law would be promulgated was presented at a ceremony attended by diplomats and welcomed by the UN spokesperson—this at a time when egregious human rights violations were still being committed, and would thus be exempt from prosecution.

In July 1999, a peace agreement for Sierra Leone was signed in Lome. Foday Sankoh's Revolutionary United Front, which had been responsible for extreme atrocities against civilians, agreed to lay down their arms in exchange for a promise of amnesty for past acts, together with their inclusion in a new coalition government in which Sankoh's control over the country's diamond mines was formalized. The agreement was brokered by African and Western governments which did not want to commit their troops to fight to restore the control of the elected government. Although the amnesty provision had been accepted with little discussion, at the last moment the UN Secretary-General instructed his Special Envoy, who had helped to steer the negotiations and was to witness the agreement, to append to his signature on behalf of the UN a disclaimer to the effect that the amnesty provision should not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

This paper was written was written for The Legacy of Abuse: Confronting the Past, Facing the Future.

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