Russia, Its Neighbors, and an Enlarging NATO

Richard G. Lugar, Chairman and Victoria Nuland, Project Director

Council on Foreign Relations

December 1996-March 1997

Acknowledgments

The Chairman and Project Director wish to thank a number of people who helped make this project possible. Dooley Adcroft, our program associate at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, provided invaluable support to the Task Force at every stage, including arranging our four meetings in Washington between November 1996 and March 1997 and shepherding this Report through the comment collection and editing process. At the Council's New York headquarters, we are also indebted to Les Gelb and April Wahlestedt for their support for the project, to Mike Holtzman for his enthusiastic management of the press, and to Michael Weber for his careful editing of the text. At the Council's Washington office, our thanks go to Morton Halperin, Margaret Sloane, Susan Tillou, David Bloom, and Kristen Lomasney for their kindness and assistance as we put the Report together.

Special thanks are due to Kenneth Myers, of Senator Lugar's staff, for his wisdom and help in managing the project and his tireless attention to every detail. We are particularly grateful to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott for meeting with the Task Force in January and to Eric Edelman, Secretary Talbott's executive assistant, for his advice and technical support as the project proceeded.

Finally, we would like to thank Ronald Asmus, Steven Hadley, Arnold Kanter, and Robert Zoellick for their help in drafting sections of the Report and for their wise counsel throughout the process.

Statement of the Task Force

NATO's decision to enlarge comes at a time of historic opportunity. As a direct result of the leadership of the last three American presidents, we end this century of war, tyranny, and division on the European continent with the chance to create a stronger North Atlantic alliance with a Europe of market democracies that are secure, at peace, and cooperating economically.

Just as our investments during the Cold War led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, our investment now in Europe's future will make a dramatic difference to our own security. NATO's decision to enlarge is a key element of that investment. When in July 1997 the Alliance issues invitations to additional European states, it will be offering to extend the zone of stability and security that Western Europe has enjoyed for 50 years to some of the continent's most fought-over territory.

Our investment in Russia's transition has been no less important. Our security and the security of every nation in Europe will be greatly affected by whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a fully democratic state, at peace with its neighbors, and integrated into Europe. Yet Russian leaders see the enlargement of NATO as a threat not only to Russian security but also to the success of Russia's transformation. They claim that far from stabilizing the continent, NATO enlargement will create a new dividing line by extending the military alliance to their borders; this, in turn, will give opponents of reform in Russia new ammunition to see the West as an enemy.

The Task Force was asked by the Council on Foreign Relations to look at this dilemma and to determine whether Russia's concerns could be managed and its internal transition bolstered without slowing or stopping NATO enlargement. We were also asked to address the security concerns of the Baltic states and Ukraine, given the history of their relations with Moscow, Russia's anxiety about their relations with NATO, and their understandable desire for closer ties with the Alliance. We did not debate the question of whether NATO should enlarge, both because NATO has already made that decision and because we agree that NATO enlargement will contribute to a Europe that is stronger, more stable, and a better partner for the United States.

The Task Force concluded that the enlargement of NATO and improved NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible, despite continued Russian opposition to enlargement. We agreed that it is in the interest of the United States to try to achieve both, so long as we negotiate from a position of strength and do not allow the Alliance to be held hostage in any manner by Moscow. If Russia accepts and reciprocates the cooperation offered by an enlarging NATO, Russian reform will benefit and European security overall will be enhanced, as will the climate for closer ties between the Alliance and Russia's neighbors. The Helsinki summit in March 1997 offered some hope that Russia now understands its interest in reaching an agreement with NATO.

The Task Force further agreed that while preserving and enhancing its role as the preeminent military and political alliance on the continent, an enlarging NATO must encourage and be imbedded in a larger trans-Atlantic effort to improve security and prosperity for all Europe's democracies, old and new. NATO enlargement should proceed in parallel with other efforts to deepen security and economic ties across the continent, including expansion of the European Union, an enhanced role for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, new strategic arms control initiatives, strengthening of NATO's Partnership for Peace, and adaptation of the Alliance itself. The results of all these initiatives will dictate the shape of Europe for the next century.

Similarly, Russia's concerns about how NATO enlargement will affect the evolving security order should be addressed in the context of all the processes of change underway in Europe. As such, the Task Force looked not only at how NATO could engage Russia but also at how conventional forces in Europe (CFE) adaptation, strategic arms control, NATO's internal adaptation, and NATO's process of enlargement could reassure Moscow, without dangerous concessions from the Alliance or the United States.

We concluded that the United States and the Alliance can offer Russia a significant package of reassurances about its security and role in the new Europe that makes sense on its own merits without compromising NATO's effectiveness or independence. At the same time, the Clinton administration and the Alliance must at every stage of the negotiations remain vigilant regarding Russian efforts to stop or stall expansion, to turn NATO into a social club or debating society, or to have a veto over its decisions. NATO's core mission of the collective defense of its members must not be diluted in any manner. We must also guard against arms control or other concessions to Moscow in the vain hope of buying its acceptance of enlargement. All NATO-Russia and U.S.-Russia political or security arrangements must be reciprocal. At the same time, the United States and its allies should take steps to reassure the Baltic states and Ukraine that they will not be left in a security no-man's land between their former overlord and NATO. If we do these things, it will then be up to Russia to choose whether to cooperate in crafting the new Europe and benefit from it, or to isolate itself.

Specific conclusions and recommendations of the Task Force follow.

How NATO Enlarges

• We endorse NATO's decision to invite additional European states to join the Alliance at the Madrid summit in July 1997 and its commitment that they will be full members, not "second-class citizens."
• We agree that an enlarged NATO does not threaten Russia; in fact, Russia can benefit from the increased stability it will bring to Central and Eastern Europe.
• We concur that NATO enlargement will not require a change in NATO's nuclear posture, and, therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members.
• We concur with NATO's decision to carry out its collective defense mission by ensuring interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces in member states at this time.
• Concerning future enlargement, we recommend NATO affirm that it remains open to the possibility of other new members; Alliance selection of future members should depend on the strategic interests of NATO members, its perception of threats to security and stability, and future members' success in completing their democratic transitions and in harmonizing their political aims and security policies with NATO's.

NATO Adaptation

• We point to NATO's significant progress in adapting to the new Europe as further proof to Russia that the Alliance does not threaten it.

• In fact, we note that Russia has already benefited from NATO adaptation. These benefits include: the dramatic changes in NATO force posture, cuts in troop levels by more than 725,000, and the 90 percent reduction in theater nuclear weapons; creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to facilitate Alliance cooperation with former Warsaw Pact states and European neutrals; NATO's decision to undertake peacekeeping missions, including its cooperative efforts with Russia and other PFP states in Bosnia; adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept, which can be used for future cooperation with Russia.

Engaging Russia

• We believe NATO should continue offering ideas to draw Russia closer to the Alliance to deal with mutual security concerns in a reciprocal fashion, to support Russia's consolidation of a nonimperialist and stable democracy, and to reassure Moscow that NATO does not seek to isolate or weaken Russia.
• Specifically, we endorse efforts to negotiate a NATO-Russia charter and a consultative mechanism that will offer both sides incentives to cooperate on shared problems such as nonproliferation, aggressive nationalism, territorial disputes, security and safety of nuclear weapons, and peacekeeping.
• That said, we strongly caution the administration and the Alliance against even the appearance of trying to compensate Russia for NATO enlargement or allowing Moscow to weaken or hamstring the Alliance in any way. Specifically, NATO-Russia arrangements must not: stop or slow NATO enlargement; give Russia an actual or de facto veto over NATO decision making, or the ability to stall or divide the Alliance; create second-class citizens in the Alliance or exclude any PFP participant from future consideration for NATO membership; subordinate NATO to any other decision-making body or organization; dilute the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Council or preclude any Alliance member from calling for a meeting without Russia present.
• We support the goal of completing a NATO-Russia charter that meets the above criteria by the time of the July 1997 NATO summit. If this is not possible, NATO should keep the door open to cooperation with Russia, so long as Moscow does not turn away from reform or pursue hostile policies.

CFE Adaptation

• We believe we now have a unique opportunity to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new security situation in Europe in a way that will facilitate both NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation.

• To this end, we support the general direction of NATO's recent proposals for adapting the treaty, including eliminating its bloc-to-bloc character in favor of national limits and reductions in the amount of equipment it permits all signatories.

• That said, we caution the administration and NATO states to ensure, as negotiations proceed, that all geographic limits are reciprocal and that future equipment limits in the central area do not make de facto second-class citizens of the new Alliance members.

• We further caution against any agreement that would isolate Ukraine or make it more vulnerable to Moscow's pressure.

• We also urge that the revised limits in no way impinge on NATO's ability to extend a full security guarantee to other potential members in the future.

• Finally, we argue strenuously against setting an arbitrary deadline for the conclusion of the negotiations or linking such a deadline to the timetable for NATO enlargement.

Nuclear Arms Control

• Although the linkage between NATO enlargement and nuclear arms control is more political than strategic, we believe the U.S.-Russia arrangements with regard to START II and START III reached at Helsinki have improved the climate for Russian acceptance of the first tranche of enlargement as well as for Duma ratification of START II, while also advancing the United States' own security interests.

The Baltic States and Ukraine

• We believe the Alliance must continue to reject vigorously any efforts by Moscow to dictate the terms of the Baltic states' or Ukraine's relations with NATO and to exercise a veto over their future membership.

• We also urge the administration and the Alliance to offer reassurances to the Baltic states and Ukraine that they will not be discriminated against as a result of their history and geography. These reassurances could include:

Confirmation that NATO's open door policy applies to all PFP states, including the Baltics and Ukraine; affirmation that the United States recognizes and shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of all the institutions of Europe, including the European Union and NATO, and will assist them in that goal; conclusion of a NATO-Ukraine agreement to deepen practical cooperation over the coming years, particularly until Ukraine decides whether it will eventually seek Alliance membership; increased efforts to deepen the involvement of all four countries with NATO through active participation in the Atlantic Partnership Council and PFP planning and training exercises designed to create the capability to deploy and operate forces with NATO in all regional contingencies; reaffirmation that no state may claim a sphere of influence over another state and that territorial claims are inadmissable under the Helsinki Final Act.

Note: The Statement and the Background Report of the Task Force reflect the general policy thrust and judgments reached by the group, although not all members necessarily subscribe fully to every finding and recommendation. Please see pages 38-40 for additional and dissenting views.

Members of the Task Force

• Ronald Asmus* is a Senior Adviser to the Assistant Secretary for European and Canadian Affairs. During the proceedings of the Task Force, he was a Senior Analyst at RAND, where he wrote widely on European security issues.
• Robert D. Blackwill* teaches foreign and defense policy at Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government. He was Special Assistant for European and Soviet Affairs to President George Bush from 1989 to 1990. His latest book is Allies Divided: Transatlantic Policies and the Greater Middle East (1997).
• Charles Gati is Senior Vice President of Interinvest and a Fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute of Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies. A specialist on Central Europe and Russia, he served on the State Department's Policy Planning Staff in 1993-94.
• Craig D. Hackett* is a Military Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. Colonel Hackett's previous assignment was as the TFXXI Aviation Brigade Commander at Fort Hood, Texas.
• Stephen J. Hadley is a partner in the Washington, D.C., law firm of Shea & Gardner. He was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy from 1989 to 1993 and has served on the National Security Council staff.
• Fred Hiatt* is an Editorial Writer and former Moscow Co-Bureau Chief for the Washington Post.
• Richard C. Holbrooke is Vice Chairman of Credit Suisse First Boston. He was Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs from 1994 to 1996 and Ambassador to Germany from 1993 to 1994.
• Arnold Kanter* is a Senior Associate at the Forum for International Policy. He served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1989 to 1991 and as Under secretary of State for Political Affairs from 1991 to 1993.
• Adrian Karatnycky is President of Freedom House, a nonpartisan, nonprofit organization that promotes democracy, the civil society, and the rule of law and monitors human rights, political rights, and civil liberties around the world. Mr. Karatnycky coordinates Freedom in the World, the annual survey of political rights and civil liberties.
• Catherine McArdle Kelleher* is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia. Prior to assuming her duties at the Pentagon, Dr. Kelleher served as Secretary of Defense William J. Perry's Personal Representative in Europe and Defense Adviser to the U.S. Ambassador to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Brussels, Belgium.
• William Kristol is the Editor and Publisher of the Weekly Standard. He served as Chief of Staff to Vice President Dan Quayle during the Bush administration and Chief of Staff to Education Secretary William Bennett during the Reagan administration.
• Richard G. Lugar, a Republican, is the senior United States Senator from Indiana and a senior member of the Senate Foreign Relations and Intelligence Committees.
• Kenneth A. Myers III is a Legislative Assistant for National Security Policy to Senator Richard G. Lugar. The issues he covers include Nunn-Lugar, Nunn-Lugar-Domenici, arms control, and foreign policy toward Europe and the former Soviet Union.
• Victoria Nuland is the 1996-97 State Department Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. She was Executive Assistant to Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott from 1994 to 1996 and a political officer at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1991 to 1993.
• Thomas R. Pickering* is Under secretary of State for Political Affairs-Designate. During the proceedings of the Task Force, he was President of the Eurasia Foundation. From 1993 to 1996, he was Ambassador to Russia.
• Carla Anne Robbins* is a Diplomatic Correspondent at the Wall Street Journal.
• Peter W. Rodman is Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center for Peace and Freedom. He served as a Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from March 1986 to January 1987 and as Director of the State Department Policy Planning Staff from April 1994 to March 1996.
• Jeremy D. Rosner* is Special Adviser to the President and Secretary of State for NATO Enlargement Ratification. During the proceedings of the Task Force, he was a Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and during 1993-94 served as a Special Assistant to President Clinton on the staff of the National Security Council.
• Gary Rubus* is Deputy Director for International Negotiations on the Joint Staff. Brigadier General Rubus was U.S. Defense and Air Attache in Moscow from 1991 to 1995.
• Brent Scowcroft* is President of the Forum for International Policy, a nonprofit organization that advocates American leadership in foreign policy. He was National Security Adviser to President Bush from 1989 to 1993.
• Stephen Sestanovich* is Vice President for Russian and Eurasian Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He worked on Soviet affairs at the National Security Council from 1984 to 1987 and the State Department from 1981 to 1984 and has published widely on Russian-American relations.
• James B. Sitrick is Senior Partner at Coudert Brothers, where he was Chairman from 1982 to 1993. As Chairman, he was responsible for Coudert Brothers opening, in February 1988, the first private law office in the (then) Soviet Union.
• Roman Szporluk is the M.S. Hrushevsky Professor of Ukrainian History at Harvard University. He also serves as Director of the Ukrainian Research Institute.
• James B. Steinberg* is Deputy National Security Adviser to President Clinton. He served as Chief of Staff of the State Department from November to December 1996 and Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff from March 1994 to October 1996.
• Michael Van Dusen is the Democratic Chief of Staff of the Committee on International Relations of the U.S. House of Representatives.
• Marybeth P. Ulrich is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the U.S. Air Force Academy. Major Ulrich's specialty is the democratization of civil-military relations in postcommunist states.
• Anne A. Witkowsky* is a Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control on the National Security Council staff. She served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1989 to 1993.
• Paul D. Wolfowitz* is Dean of the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of The Johns Hopkins University. He was Under secretary of Defense for Policy from 1989 to 1993 and served earlier as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs and as U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia.
• Robert B. Zoellick* is Executive Vice President of Fannie Mae. He served as an Under Secretary of State from 1989 to 1992 and later as Deputy Chief of Staff at the White House during the Bush administration.

• Rapporteur - Dooley Adcroft is a Program Associate at the Council on Foreign Relations.

Note: Institutional affiliations are for identification purposes only. *Individual participated in the Task Force discussions but chose to be an observer or was not asked to endorse the Statement or Background Report because of his or her official capacity. *Individual largely concurs with the Report but submitted an additional view. *Individual does not concur with the Report and submitted a dissenting view.

Background Report

1. Introduction

NATO's decision to expand comes at a time of historic opportunity. As a direct result of the leadership of the last three American presidents, we end this century of war, tyranny, and division on the European continent with the chance to create a stronger North American alliance with a Europe of market democracies that are secure, at peace, and cooperating economically.

Just as our investments in NATO during the Cold War led directly to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, our investment now in Europe's future will make a dramatic difference to our own security. NATO's decision to enlarge is a key element of that investment. When the Alliance issues invitations to additional states in July 1997, it will be offering to extend the zone of stability and security that Western Europe has enjoyed for 50 years to some of the continent's most fought-over territory.

Our investment in Russia's transition has been no less important. Our security and the security of every nation in Europe will be greatly affected by whether Russia succeeds or fails in becoming a fully democratic state, at peace with its neighbors, and integrated into Europe. Yet Russian leaders see the enlargement of NATO as a threat to Russian security and to the success of their country's transformation. They claim that far from stabilizing the continent, NATO enlargement will create a new dividing line by extending the military alliance to their borders; this, in turn, will give opponents of reform in Russia new ammunition to see the West as an enemy.

Despite this dilemma, the Task Force concluded that the enlargement of NATO and improved NATO-Russia relations need not be incompatible. We agreed that it is in the interests of the United States to try to achieve both. At the same time, we must negotiate from a position of strength and should not allow the Alliance to be held hostage to Russian views in any manner. If Russia accepts and reciprocates the cooperation offered by an enlarging NATO, Russian reform will benefit and European security overall will be enhanced, as will the climate for closer ties between the Alliance and Russia's neighbors. The Helsinki summit in March 1997 offered some hope that Russia too now understands its interest in reaching an agreement with NATO.

NATO enlargement and improved NATO-Russia relations can accelerate a constructive process of change underway on the continent. Western Europe's interlocking system of political, security, and economic institutions, built during the Cold War to protect and strengthen the West while containing the Warsaw Pact, is adapting to new opportunities. The overall goal is to integrate the new democracies of Europe into these institutions as those nations become ready to assume the responsibilities of partnership. NATO expansion is a key component of that adaptation, along with the Partnership for Peace, the European Union's decision to enlarge, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe's broadened role in peacekeeping and democratization, and adaptation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, among other initiatives. All these processes are designed to spread the zone of stability, cooperation, and prosperity across the continent, and they are mutually reinforcing.

The Task Force believes that NATO enlargement will make a substantial contribution to the creation of a Europe that is stronger, more stable, and a better partner of the United States. The Alliance's internal adaptations will also help maintain NATO's effectiveness in promoting the collective defense of its members under new circumstances while better empowering the organization to conduct new missions. NATO's decision to enlarge in stages, however, beginning with an invitation to a few new members at the Madrid summit in July 1997, recognizes that not all the new democracies are equally ready or willing to be security allies. Some states may never be ready. Moreover, it will take time for NATO itself to incorporate fully the first tranche of new members. At the same time, NATO must not prejudge the future or draw new lines in Europe by preemptively excluding any European state from cooperation or future membership.

Unfortunately, this has not stopped Russia's leadership from seeing NATO expansion as a hostile act or from working against it. Russia has also pressured its close neighbors, the Baltic states and Ukraine, to think twice before deepening cooperation with NATO. The Alliance, in response, has correctly declared that no outside state can have a veto over its decisions, including decisions on when and how to expand. NATO has repeatedly stated that expansion is not directed against Russia, that Russia and its neighbors can benefit from the enhanced stability and security in Central Europe that enlargement will bring, and that NATO is interested in formalizing broader cooperation with Russia through a NATO-Russia charter.

NATO's offer to negotiate a charter with Russia and to pursue conventional forces in Europe (CFE) adaptation recognizes that while Russia cannot veto enlargement, it does have concerns about how expansion will affect the evolving European security order. That order has three interconnected elements: 1) the evolving role and missions of NATO as the preeminent military and political alliance on the continent; 2) the conventional and nuclear force balance; and 3) the structure of political decision making in Europe. As it has begun to recognize that it cannot stop NATO enlargement, Russia has sought concrete reassurance that NATO has changed to reflect the times, that the Alliance will not seek military advantage over Russia through enlargement, and that Moscow will have a voice in key decisions about the future of the continent.

The Task Force endorses the Alliance's decision to try to address these concerns through a NATO-Russia charter and CFE adaptation, while it rejects Moscow's efforts to dictate the terms or pace of enlargement. We believe that the goal of NATO's engagement with Russia should not be to provide "compensation" for enlargement. Rather, it should be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship that serves U.S. interests by building on the opportunities offered by a new Europe, a Russia in transition, and an adapting NATO. Furthermore, it would be in no state's interest for Russia to use NATO enlargement as a pretext to turn its back on greater integration with Europe or continued reform at home. But NATO's willingness to reassure Russia must be reciprocated and must not compromise the integrity of the Alliance. Nor must NATO allow its interest in cooperating with Russia to weaken its fundamental mission as a manifestly potent alliance to defend equally all members, old and new, from any external threat that may arise.

The Task Force further recommends that NATO expansion and negotiations on a NATO-Russia charter be accompanied by an intensified effort to improve U.S.-Russia relations in the areas of arms control and economic cooperation. Although the next steps on START II, START III, Nunn-Lugar funding, and economic assistance must not be formally linked to NATO enlargement, Russia's fears about enlargement can be allayed by a conviction that its security and economic problems are being taken seriously.

In this Report, the Task Force presents and analyzes the key components of a successful U.S. and Alliance posture toward Russia and its neighbors, the Baltic states, and Ukraine, as NATO begins to expand. It does not debate the question of whether NATO should enlarge. This Report assumes NATO has made that decision in the affirmative. We look now to the accompanying issues the Alliance should address to maximize the chances that enlargement will proceed as smoothly as possible and does not threaten the member states' parallel goal of ensuring that all the democracies and market economies of Europe are integrated and united.

2. How NATO Enlarges

The way NATO enlarges will have a profound effect on stability and security across the continent. Successful enlargement should improve the security climate throughout Europe. For this reason, NATO itself spent more than two years deciding how to enlarge and has only made conclusive decisions about the first stage of the process.

On July 8-9, 1997, President Clinton and the leaders of the other 15 members of the Alliance meeting in Madrid will invite three or more countries to begin negotiations to join NATO. The Alliance will almost certainly select Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary as new members; Slovenia, once part of the former Yugoslavia, is another possible candidate; and France will press for Romania's accession. NATO expects to complete the accession negotiations with new members by the end of this year, and wants all Alliance members to ratify enlargement by 1999. As a practical matter, this timetable suggests that the U.S. Senate will formally take up the question of NATO's new members during 1998.

The Task Force recognizes that the process of NATO's enlargement poses two important strategic issues beyond the question of which states join. First, the arrangements and expectations for the new members can greatly influence what type of alliance and organization NATO can become. Second, the decisions NATO makes about the integration of its new members, the scope and pace of any future enlargement, and its relations with Russia, Ukraine, and other neighboring states will shape the security, the political, and even the economic development of the Euro-Atlantic region. So how NATO enlarges matters a great deal.

The Task Force believes strongly that the new members of NATO must be full members of NATO. The publics of the United States and other current member states need to know that their governments are extending a security guarantee, as stated in Article 5 of the Washington (NATO) Treaty, to consider an "armed attack against [one or more] of them . . . an attack against them all" and to take such action "as deemed necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area." To back up this guarantee, NATO must have the freedom to deter attacks against its new members and, if need be, to defend them. If NATO pledges its security guarantee, it must mean it.

The new members, in turn, must recognize that they have reciprocal obligations. Today, NATO is an alliance of democracies, sharing political values as well as defense obligations. Its new members must foster the internal societies and display the external behavior expected from democracies. In particular, new members must complete the reforms of their militaries and intelligence services so they can be fully integrated within NATO's military command arrangements. The new members must make their militaries interoperable with NATO's forces--particularly in terms of policies, doctrine, and procedures--so they can contribute both to the common defense and to NATO's new missions. They must also pay a fair share of costs of these efforts.

To encourage this full integration within the Euro-Atlantic community, the Task Force believes the United States should urge its European colleagues to expedite the membership of the new allies within the European Union (EU). Recognizing that full EU membership depends on a staged process of political and economic integration, the EU should nevertheless hasten the development of trade and investment networks that will strengthen these new democracies.

The Task Force supports NATO's statement that "new members . . . will be expected to support the concept of deterrence and the essential role nuclear weapons play in the Alliance's strategy." We also concur that enlargement will not require a change in NATO's nuclear posture, "and therefore, NATO countries have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members . . . and we do not foresee any future need to do so."

The Task Force also supports NATO's statement that under current conditions it does not intend to station permanently "substantial combat forces" in new member states. Instead, it will focus on interoperability, integration of national defense forces, and the capability for reinforcement to meet its defense commitments to new members. Other issues concerning the size, nature, stationing, and deployment of conventional forces should be addressed in negotiations to update the CFE. By addressing conventional force issues in that context, NATO can stress the importance of mutually reinforcing reciprocal security obligations for all the European states and avoid "singularizing" NATO's new members.

NATO must also signal its intentions toward other countries, including those that seek membership, those that have not decided whether to apply, and Russia, which may react vigorously to successive waves of enlargement.

There are three main schools of thought on the future of enlargement. The first approach, preferred by the Clinton administration, would leave the door open to all countries (including Russia), not impose preferences or preselect candidates, and, in theory, let applicants' aspirations and abilities to meet Alliance standards set the scope and pace. A second model would enlarge in a fashion roughly parallel to the European Union's "widening," pointedly leaving Russia and Ukraine out of the Europeans' vision of its future community. The third view would limit enlargement to a small number, based on strategic and geopolitical criteria, so as to maintain NATO's cohesion as a security and defense organization, match NATO's membership with the vital interests of its current members, and minimize conflict with Russia.

Each of these approaches raises important questions about the future security structure in the region, NATO's purposes, and NATO's capabilities to perform its changing missions. In sections 4 and 7 of this report, we address the specific challenges of engaging Russia and the treatment of the Baltic states and Ukraine, respectively.

The Task Force concluded that NATO should state that it is open to the possibility of having other new members but also that it has made no decision on inviting others to join. NATO should also state that selection of its future members, if any, will depend on: 1) the NATO members' determination of their strategic interests; 2) actions taken by prospective members to complete their democratic transitions and to harmonize their policies with NATO's political aims and security policies; and 3) NATO's perception of threats to security and stability. This statement will have the benefit of clarifying security expectations--the "rules of the game"--at a time of uncertainty. It makes clear that NATO intends to remain a serious defensive military alliance and not slip into a loose collective security society. It draws again on the principle of reciprocity, both to encourage prospective members to align themselves with NATO's values and policies and to signal Russia that threats will be counterproductive. It suggests enlargement will be a careful, deliberate process, with consideration of all security interests and with incentives for a Russian policy of cooperation with the Euro-Atlantic community. Finally, it seeks to avoid misleading aspirants, pointing to a positive future with NATO (whether or not as a member), while also expecting them to undertake the hard work of building reasonable relations with their neighbors.

This statement needs to be backed by a redoubling of the efforts NATO has already made to build individualized Partnership for Peace programs as well as common projects to address mutual concerns. Through these efforts, NATO can both contribute to the security of the whole region and assist the political-military transitions of individual countries. Acting in concert with the EU, NATO should perceive its enlargement as the building of a stronger shoulder from which to reach out to countries to the north, east, and south.

3. NATO Adaptation

Since 1990, NATO has been adapting its doctrine, missions, and force structure to the post-Cold War Europe. Adaptation has become an issue in the NATO enlargement debate for three main reasons: 1) Russia claims NATO has not changed enough to prove that the current Alliance is not a threat, let alone that a larger NATO will not threaten Russia; 2) some NATO countries (particularly France) have threatened to hold up NATO enlargement in order to gain leverage over the way NATO's adaptation proceeds; and 3) some Western opponents of enlargement want to defer it on the grounds that NATO's internal evolution must be completed before nations that are candidates for membership can know what kind of alliance they are being to join and so as not to provoke an already uneasy Russia.

In contrast to these views, the Task Force believes that NATO's adaptation has advanced far enough and its future direction is well enough established to reassure all parties. In particular, the Task Force points to the following significant NATO decisions as proof of the seriousness with which the Alliance is pursuing adaptation and of the absence of a threat posed by NATO to Russia or any other state:

*Adoption in 1991 of a new Strategic Concept of countering not a single overwhelming threat but a variety of potential--rather than near-at-hand--threats, and reducing significantly the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's strategy. This was accompanied by a reduction in the inventory of NATO theater nuclear weapons deployed in Europe by 90 percent, from about 10,000 weapons at the height of the Cold War to well under 1,000 weapons.

*Authorization in 1992 to support peacekeeping activities authorized by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe or the United Nations on a case-by-case basis. Ultimately, this led to NATO's involvement in Bosnia.

*Dramatic changes in conventional force posture from massive, fixed forces to smaller, more flexible multinational forces. The United States reduced its forward presence in Europe from 325,000 to 100,000 troops. Its European NATO allies cut their own force levels by more than 500,000 troops. The NATO countries are now 20 to 30 percent below the equipment entitlements authorized under the CFE Treaty.

*Adoption of more flexible arrangements for command and control, reduction of NATO headquarters and staffs, and, in 1993, adoption of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. CJTF permits the formation of multinational, multiservice task forces capable of rapid deployment to conduct limited duration peace operations beyond NATO's borders, under either NATO control or European command through the Western European Union, for operations in which the United States chooses not to participate. This allows the Europeans to make use of NATO infrastructure and support for a European-only operation.

*Establishment in 1991 of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and in 1994 of the Partnership for Peace (PFP) to facilitate NATO cooperation with former Warsaw Pact states and, in the case of PFP, with European neutrals to increase transparency in defense planning and budgeting; deepen cooperation through joint planning, training, exercises and peacekeeping; and develop interoperability and ensure democratic control of defense forces.

The Task Force believes that it should be clear to Russia from the adaptation described above that the NATO alliance, always a purely defensive alliance, is in no way directed against Russia. The Alliance has been consistent and vigorous in its effort to encourage reciprocal and mutually beneficial relationships with non-NATO states. It has pressed hard to include Russia among those states. It has made this promise concrete in the close cooperation that has occurred between NATO and Russian forces in the IFOR operation in the former Yugoslavia.

The Task Force further believes that it is in Russia's interest for the process of NATO adaptation to continue. Adaptation has already improved the security climate throughout Europe. Potentially its new tools and instruments could be used cooperatively with Russia in dealing with instabilities on Russia's own border.

4. Engaging Russia

As it begins enlarging, the Alliance has also pursued a parallel track of deepening its engagement with Russia by offering to negotiate a NATO-Russia charter and a regular NATO-Russia consultative mechanism. The Task Force believes that it is in both NATO's and Russia's interests for a democratic Russia to be part of the Euro-Atlantic community and regularize its cooperation with the Alliance. For this reason, NATO should continue to offer ideas to draw Russia closer to NATO, to deal with mutual security concerns in a reciprocal fashion, and to support Russia's consolidation of a nonimperialist, peaceful democracy.

That said, the Task Force believes that the goal of NATO's engagement with Russia must not be to provide compensation for enlargement. Rather, it should be to forge a new NATO-Russia relationship that builds on the opportunities created by the end of the Cold War and Russia's internal transformation. The true test of a NATO-Russia understanding is that it has merit in its own right separate from the enlargement issue. A NATO-Russia relationship can nevertheless also help reassure Russia about the Alliance's true purpose and motivations with regard to enlargement.

The Task Force believes that a reciprocal, balanced NATO-Russia relationship would serve basic U.S. national interests. Russia's future is a key factor touching on core U.S. security interests not only in Europe but globally. A democratic Russia that views Western institutions as open to accommodating its legitimate interests is more likely to be a cooperative and constructive partner than a Russia that feels isolated and humiliated.

Should Russia's experiment in democracy fail or should Moscow threaten U.S. interests in Europe or elsewhere, then the focus of U.S. and NATO policy would shift. NATO should do nothing in its engagement with Russia or other nonmembers that would hamper its ability to respond to a future threat. That said, deeper NATO-Russia cooperation is the logical extension of a policy aimed at helping Russia consolidate its own democratic transformation.

The Task Force hopes that Russia will carefully consider its geopolitical position and recognize its interests in drawing closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. At the same time, NATO should continue to explain to Russia why the Alliance believes its expansion will be beneficial to European security overall. Moscow should not slip into the false logic of comparing NATO with concerts of aggressive, hostile states. NATO serves an enduring purpose and does not require a Russian threat, residual or otherwise, to survive. If Russia is not ready to face these facts today, the Task Force recommends that NATO remain open to cooperation and closer ties as long as Russia does not pursue hostile policies.

Against this backdrop, the Task Force believes the objective of a NATO-Russia charter should be to underscore the commitment of both NATO members and Russia to transcend the vestiges of earlier confrontation and to work together to strengthen cooperation, build trust, and enhance stability and security across the Euro-Atlantic area. Such a charter should commit NATO and the Russian Federation to strive for a lasting and inclusive peace in Europe. It should affirm the shared commitment of both sides to the creation of a stable and democratic Europe without dividing lines or spheres of influence. It should acknowledge and build on the principles that both NATO members and the Russian Federation have already pledged to respect in documents such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the Helsinki Final Act, and various documents of the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe.

Specifically, the Task Force believes a NATO-Russia charter should:

• Acknowledge the vital role of democracy, political pluralism, respect for human rights and civil liberties, and free market economies in providing the foundation for cooperative security;

• Affirm the signatories' respect for the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all states in Europe, which includes recognizing that borders are inviolable except by peaceful, consensual means;

• Acknowledge the right of all European countries to choose freely their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance;

• Commit the signatories to the prevention of conflicts and the settlement of disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force for the purpose of aggression;

• Create maximum transparency in their respective defense policies and military doctrines.

The charter should also affirm the willingness of both NATO members and Russia to work together wherever possible to address the new security challenges of the post-Cold War era, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, persistent abuse of human rights, and unresolved territorial disputes. The Task Force believes that such a charter should be approved at the highest political level to underscore the commitment of both sides to seek a new and fundamentally different relationship between NATO members and Russia. It should not, however, be a legally binding document requiring parliamentary ratification.

The Task Force believes that NATO-Russia consultative arrangements should be based on the principles of identifying common opportunities, offering incentives for cooperation, and expecting reciprocity in commitments and actual behavior. The opportunities for cooperation with Russia are ample. NATO members and Russia have mutual interests in stemming the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. We want to ensure the security and safety of nuclear weapons and materials, especially as the implementation of arms control agreements leads to the dismantling of weapons. Indeed, the Nunn-Lugar program has demonstrated the United States' willingness, under the appropriate conditions, to back up these interests with financing.

NATO and Russia might be able to expand their cooperation in peacekeeping operations, building on the experience in Bosnia. NATO and Russia could also pursue regimes for military transparency and share experience in the effective establishment of democratic civil-military relations. To create the appropriate incentives, the Task Force recommends that NATO concentrate on specific projects with Russia. Serious cooperation could then lead to deeper ties. If Russia instead becomes adversarial, the arrangements could be dropped with no costs to NATO.

The Task Force believes it is equally important to underscore for Moscow and the NATO allies, as well as for the American public, what a NATO-Russia charter and consultative mechanism should not do. NATO-Russia arrangements should not lead to a delay in NATO's enlargement plans. A NATO-Russia agreement should not give Russia a veto. The Task Force believes NATO must proceed carefully to ensure that the new arrangements also do not create de facto obstacles to NATO decision making and operations, dilute the effectiveness of the North Atlantic Council, or create "second-class citizens" in the Alliance. The NATO-Russia charter must not subordinate NATO to any other decision-making body or organization, and it must not exclude any Partnership for Peace member from possible future NATO membership. The consultative process should not hamstring NATO with requirements that enable Russia to break down NATO's internal deliberations with stalling or divisive techniques. Any Alliance member needs to be able to call for a meeting without Russia present, and NATO must retain the ability to make decisions without involving Russia or other nonmembers. NATO must have the freedom to act promptly.

The Task Force recommends that NATO also build on its existing mechanisms to reach out to Russia and other nonmembers, including the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace. Alliance members may also consider adjusting existing standing links with the Russians, for example as part of the OSCE, the Balkans Contact Group, the UN Security Council, or the G-7 process. Indeed, the Task Force stresses that a vision of Russia in the Euro-Atlantic community must extend beyond NATO and its structures. The greatest challenges Russia faces today--especially those involving economics, crime, and internal cohesion--can be better addressed through non-NATO mechanisms.

In sum, the Task Force concludes that NATO's enlargement should be accompanied by a parallel effort to demonstrate the West's willingness to draw Russia closer to the Euro-Atlantic community. Indeed, we would want to engage Russia on these issues even without enlargement. The vision NATO presents should be one of mutual interests pursued through reciprocal cooperation. It then will be up to Russia to determine whether it shares this outlook and wishes to engage. NATO should not seek to pursue Russia through concessions that undermine the Alliance's effectiveness or the pursuit of its aims for regional stability, security, and prosperity. That course would be bad for both NATO and Russia.

5. CFE Adaptation

The Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) has been an important instrument for winding down the military confrontation in Europe that was a principal feature of the Cold War. The Task Force believes we now have a unique opportunity to adapt the CFE Treaty to the new security situation in Europe in a way that will facilitate both NATO enlargement and NATO-Russia cooperation. Because the former Soviet army has always disliked CFE and considered it inequitable, some have argued that amending it now would be a concession to Russia or a price we should not have to pay for Moscow's acquiescence to NATO enlargement. The Task Force rejects this logic and argues that it is in the interest of the United States, NATO, and Russia to update the CFE Treaty in a significant and constructive way to ensure its continued viability and its stabilizing influence in the Europe of the 21st century.

In light of the dramatic developments that have occurred in Europe since it was negotiated, the CFE Treaty should not be exempted from the kind of change that is occurring in so many other European political, economic, and security institutions. In particular, the Task Force believes it is appropriate to eliminate the bloc-to-bloc character of the original treaty in favor of national equipment ceilings and to reduce dramatically the amount of military equipment that will be permitted throughout the treaty area. While some have expressed concern that these reductions would be proportionately greater for NATO, they will simply extend the principle of asymmetric reductions that the Soviet Union was forced to accept when the treaty was first negotiated.

With regard to timing, however, the Task Force finds it is unrealistic to expect that a negotiation involving more than 30 countries and very technical military matters could be concluded prior to NATO's making a decision in July 1997 to invite additional states to membership. Nor would the Task Force support acceding to possible future Russian insistence that CFE adaptation be accomplished before either the date of invitation to new members or the actual entry of those members into the NATO alliance. To permit Russia to hold up the entry of new members into NATO on the grounds that CFE adaptation has not been completed would be to accord Russia exactly the kind of veto over NATO affairs that is clearly unacceptable.

The Task Force supports the general direction of NATO's recent proposals for adapting the CFE Treaty. As a general matter, it would emphasize the need for reciprocity and transparency in the adjustments that are made. We do have some concerns, however, that relate to three aspects of CFE adaptation as the negotiations proceed.

First, NATO has proposed limits on the ground equipment that could be deployed in a central part of Europe defined as Belarus, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Ukraine (other than the Odessa region), and the Kaliningrad region of Russia. As the negotiations proceed, we caution against singling out the potential new members of NATO for special restrictions, thus according them de facto second-class citizenship within NATO. It is one thing for NATO to make a unilateral statement, as it has recently done, that it has no present intention or need to station permanently substantial combat forces on the territory of new member states. It would be another matter for it to accept legal limitations on its ability to station equipment on the territory of these states as part of an adapted CFE Treaty. While NATO would not be precluded from stationing forces on the territory of these states under its current proposal, such deployment would be constrained by the individual territorial ceilings that apply to the equipment of both stationed and indigenous forces.

It is certainly useful to have such a limitation with respect to the Kaliningrad region of Russia. Russian forces, permitted by a pliant Belarus to be stationed on its territory, would presumably be subject to the national ceiling applicable to Belarus, but such a deployment could be viewed by Poland, for example, as an attempt to intimidate it. The Task Force believes this consideration needs to be taken into account by NATO negotiators as they elaborate the terms of the NATO proposal. It is possible that NATO's proposed provisions covering cooperative military exercises and temporary deployments in emergency situations, as well as ensuring adequate headroom in the national ceilings of the Central European states, may resolve this issue, as well as the previously mentioned concern about limits on new NATO members.

Second, this special central region could be viewed as isolating Ukraine. Moscow would not be prevented from building up forces in the old Moscow military district adjacent to Ukraine, and Kiev could find itself unable to respond. It may be that in the negotiation of the revisions to the CFE Treaty, an arrangement can be found to allay any possible Ukrainian concerns by some special limitations along the Russian/Ukrainian border.

Finally, in negotiating changes to the CFE Treaty, NATO negotiators must keep in mind the possibility of a further enlargement of NATO membership. It must make sure that whatever revised CFE limitations it negotiates will permit NATO, should it so decide, to extend to additional countries security guarantees on which NATO can make good even under the provisions of a revised CFE regime.

6. Nuclear Arms Control

Russian rhetoric notwithstanding, the linkage between NATO enlargement and nuclear arms control is much more political than strategic. The Task Force believes, however, that there are at least two good reasons to support the new initiatives on nuclear arms control centered on START II and START III that the United States advanced at the Helsinki summit: 1) serious proposals to deal with the stated Russian concerns about START II will help neutralize criticisms that NATO enlargement is part of a larger U.S.-led Western effort to keep Russia in a state of enduring inferiority and will help improve the climate within which an accommodation can be reached; and 2) these initiatives should improve the prospects for Duma ratification of START II, a step that will serve U.S. as well as Russian interests.

The nuclear weapons issues of concern can be divided into "strategic" issues, which fall within the scope of the START I and START II treaties, and "nonstrategic" issues. Currently, Russia deploys a much larger number of tactical nuclear weapons than does NATO. Moreover, key Russians more than once have threatened to increase reliance on these weapons as what they say would be a natural response to being overmatched by an enlarged NATO.

Nevertheless, the Task Force supports the decision to focus U.S. near-term objectives on strategic nuclear arms control and to limit discussion of nonstrategic weapons to confidence-building and transparency measures for two reasons: 1) the very disparity in nonstrategic nuclear weapons undermines U.S. negotiating leverage; over time, the United States might well be able to negotiate substantial reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons, but those talks will be controversial and protracted--precisely the features we do not want to add to current exchanges about NATO enlargement; and 2), arguably more important, trying to finalize agreement on the nonstrategic nuclear weapons issue now would be a near-perfect invitation to Moscow to use the issue to negotiate legally binding prohibitions on what NATO could and could not do with respect to infrastructure improvements and the stationing of weapons and forces on the territory of its new members.

By trying to constrain one of the few areas of Russian superiority, it also would confirm the suspicion in the minds of many Russians that NATO really is bent on their country's long-term subjugation. The excessive numbers of Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons may well require action, but this is not the place to address these concerns.

With respect to strategic arms control, the Helsinki agreement seeks to address the stated Russian criticisms of the START II treaty, including charges that START II reductions are too expensive for Moscow given its current financial straits and that the treaty is "unequal." The Task Force supports the administration's decision to take a package approach to these issues in order to improve the prospects for Duma ratification of START II and to enhance the climate in which NATO and Russia engage on issues related to Alliance enlargement.

Key elements of the package include:

• Addressing the "START II-is-unaffordable" objections by extending the deadline for achieving START II-mandated reductions from 2003 to 2007, coupled with removal and remote storage of warheads slated for elimination by December 2003. Because this constitutes a substantial change to START II as ratified by the U.S. Senate, it is appropriate that the administration submit it for re-ratification after the Duma acts.

• Increased U.S. support for early deactivation of Russian weapons through the Nunn-Lugar program.

• Agreement on a set of "principles" for START III negotiations with the following main components: the talks will commence immediately after START II enters into force and their goal will be to reduce strategic nuclear warheads on both sides to 2,000-2,500 by December 31, 2007.

Overall, this package moves the nuclear arms control agenda in directions that serve U.S. national interests while responding to the stated Russian concern about post-START II uncertainties by setting a firm target date and force level for START III. Together, these elements should provide new incentives for Duma ratification of START II and help to neutralize the claims of Russian hardliners that the United States seeks to weaken or further impoverish Russia.

7. The Baltic States and Ukraine

The Alliance's stated purpose in enlarging NATO is to enhance stability in Europe as a whole, not just in one part of the continent. In this regard, the Task Force devoted considerable attention to the special concerns and vulnerabilities of the Baltic states and Ukraine, not least because Russia has publicly opposed their future membership in NATO, and they fear being left in a permanent security vacuum between the Alliance and Russia.

The Task Force notes that the NATO enlargement process has already led, through self-selection, to different groupings of states. Some PFP Partners have expressed no interest in joining the Alliance. Others have declared their aspiration but are currently not realistic candidates. Still others have made substantial progress toward demonstrating their willingness and ability to shoulder the responsibilities of membership but have not yet achieved everything required to create a consensus among existing members that would lead to an invitation for accession. Currently, 12 states in Central and Eastern Europe have expressed their desire to join NATO eventually: Albania, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia.

The Task Force believes the likelihood that a first round of enlargement will be limited to a small group of countries reinforces the need for the Alliance to have a credible and effective policy toward those countries not invited to start accession negotiations at the Madrid summit. Thus, it is critically important that the United States and its NATO allies develop an effective policy to insure that NATO enlargement improves the security climate across all Europe, including for those countries not included in this first round.

The Task Force believes the Baltic states and Ukraine must be at the forefront of such an Alliance strategy. This must include a vigorous rejection of claims by Russia or any other nonmember to dictate the terms of NATO's relations with these states. In short, a NATO-Russia partnership is only possible if it is balanced by an equally strong NATO commitment to support the independence of countries such as the Baltic states and Ukraine.

The dilemma facing the United States and NATO on the Baltic issue is the gap between what the Baltic states seek, what the Alliance is currently prepared to do, and what Russian officials say Moscow will not tolerate. The Baltic states want to join NATO. For reasons of geography and history, they are more exposed to Russia's geopolitical weight than many other NATO aspirants, and they feel especially vulnerable to any signs of Russian encroachment on their sovereignty and independence. Moreover, unlike other European candidate countries, they must build credible defenses from scratch.

While Baltic leaders increasingly recognize that they may not be ready for membership in the first round of NATO enlargement, they want the decision on whether they eventually join the Alliance to be based on their own performance, rather than on Russian objections. They want a symbolic commitment from the United States that Washington shares their aspirations and wants to see them succeed in becoming full members of all Europe's key institutions, including the EU and NATO. Absent such a commitment, they fear that support for them in the Alliance will remain lukewarm indefinitely.

Ukraine, on the other hand, is not now seeking NATO membership and has declared its neutrality. It does want, however, greater integration into Europe and closer ties with NATO, and it has not foreclosed the possibility of applying for NATO membership in the future. A country of over 50 million people occupying a strategic location in Europe, Ukraine has considerable importance for NATO and NATO-Russia relations. The very fact of Ukrainian independence has made NATO enlargement easier politically and far less costly militarily. Along with the liberation of Central and Eastern Europe, an independent Ukraine has provided the West with strategic leeway and warning time in dealing with Russia and has made it easier to integrate the new democracies in the region into the EU and NATO. Ukrainian independence is an important reason why NATO currently sees little need to deploy either nuclear weapons or significant numbers of foreign combat troops on the territory of new NATO members. If an independent Ukraine disappeared, the underlying premise of current NATO defense planning as well as the parameters within which current defense arrangements for an enlarged NATO are being considered could be altered.

The Task Force recognized that Ukraine's significance results not only from its size and location but also from the fact that it is still a state in the making. Its internal weaknesses are a potential source of regional instability. While Kiev has taken important steps to consolidate reform, Ukraine is still in the process of nation building and solidifying its national identity. Its commitment to deeper economic reform will be a key factor in its future, and the United States should therefore continue to offer Kiev significant economic assistance tied to performance. While Ukraine is unlikely in the foreseeable future to be fully integrated into the major Euro-Atlantic political, economic, or security structures, the success or failure of those structures and Europe's stability depend in important respects on Ukraine's democratic and market transition.

Today, the overarching goal of Ukrainian foreign policy is to build a stable neighborhood that allows the internal consolidation of Ukrainian reforms to take place. Kiev wants enlargement to occur in a gradual or evolutionary fashion that permits Ukraine to stabilize and the West to develop and give content to pan-European structures. Ukraine also wants the Alliance to reduce its emphasis on the military component of enlargement, defuse the nuclear issue, and build a constructive relationship with Russia. At the same time, Kiev wants to negotiate its own agreement with NATO that codifies and deepens its relationship with the Alliance.

After examining all these considerations, the Task Force recommends that the administration and NATO recognize the special situation and requirements of the Baltic states and Ukraine and that these be reflected in policy. Specifically, the Task Force recommends that the United States:

• Confirm that NATO's open door policy also applies to the Baltic states and Ukraine, and that all states in Europe have the right to choose freely their security arrangements, including treaties of alliance. No country has a veto over NATO's decisions.

• State that the United States recognizes and shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of all of the institutions of Europe and the trans-Atlantic community, including the EU and NATO, and will pursue policies designed to help them prepare to meet the conditions of membership.

• Negotiate a NATO-Ukraine accord that underscores the commitment of the United States and its NATO allies to building closer relations with Ukraine in parallel with efforts to construct a NATO-Russia partnership.

• Strengthen the Atlantic Partnership Council to allow these countries also to become more deeply engaged with NATO and to have an appropriate voice in European security.

• Enhance the Partnership for Peace process in a fashion that allows these countries the full opportunities and responsibilities afforded NATO members, short of an Article 5 commitment, and to assist them in their efforts to prepare themselves better to meet the responsibilities of eventual NATO membership.

• Maximize their involvement through CJTFs in the planning and training for non-Article 5 operations in order to create the capability to deploy and operate forces together in regional contingencies.

• Recognize that building regional stability means reaching out to and achieving good-neighborly relations with Russia. The Baltic states' prospects for eventual membership will also depend on their commitment to integrating the Russian-speaking minorities, resolving residual border issues with Russia, and pursuing good-neighborly relations with their neighbors. At the same time, the United States and its allies should carefully monitor any Russian attempts to exploit these issues in order to acquire a de facto veto over the future security alignments of these countries.

• Reaffirm that no state may claim a sphere of influence over another state and that territorial claims are inadmissible under the Helsinki Final Act.

8. Conclusion

As the foregoing recommendations illustrate, the administration and the NATO Alliance have it within their power to offer Russia a "fair deal" that goes a long way toward meeting Moscow's security concerns, without slowing enlargement, compromising the integrity of NATO, or making second-class citizens of new Alliance members or the other nonallied states in Europe. Russia, in turn, has within its power the ability to prove its commitment to trans-Atlantic cooperation by taking "yes" for an answer to its pleas for reassurance that NATO and the West do not seek to contain or isolate it.

In summary, the Task Force offers one overarching caution to the administration and the Alliance and one to Russia in this complex period. To the administration and the Alliance, we say that while cooperation with a democratic Russia has independent merit, the pursuit of it must not slow, change, or sidetrack NATO's own plans to enlarge, to maintain its core missions and prerogatives as a defensive alliance, to take independent decisions, or to cooperate freely with any other nonmember states in Europe. Nor should the pursuit of arms control become an end in itself. All political and security undertakings, whether they are made bilaterally or multilaterally, must be strictly reciprocal.

To Russia, we urge that it look carefully at its own geographic position and make a calculated decision in its own interest to accept the hand of cooperation that NATO has offered. The Helsinki summit offers some hope that Moscow is in the process of making this calculation. The alternative for Russia is not to derail NATO's plans but rather to isolate itself from the major, positive changes underway in Europe. If Russia cannot accept NATO's offer of cooperation now, the Alliance should not slam the door after the Madrid summit. But Moscow should not expect the negotiating climate or its leverage to improve with time. The West will move on with the business of adapting Europe without Russia's cooperation, if Moscow so chooses.

Finally, we note that NATO expansion and deeper NATO-Russia relations both have value for the United States and for the Alliance if they are pursued properly. A zero-sum debate about them therefore misses the point. The best outcome for the United States and the Alliance is for both tracks to succeed. This is also the best outcome for states like the Baltics and Ukraine that must live between an enlarged NATO and Russia for the foreseeable future.

Additional and Dissenting Views Comment

We believe this is a good Report that we hope will be of use to the Clinton administration and Congress as they consider the next steps of NATO enlargement.

We are writing this separate comment to emphasize three additional points. First, the Alliance should ensure that during the period between its selection of new members and the treaty ratifications that formally admit them, the candidate members have at least all the privileges Russia might receive through the charter and consultative arrangements; it would be ironic if for the next year or two, Russia enjoys closer ties to the Alliance than Poland.

Second, we urge the Task Force to include an explicit statement that NATO should station some modest forces on the territories of new members to support their full political and security integration; given all the statements of negative intentions toward new members, we should also state straightforwardly what NATO should do for them.

Third, we are not clear what the Statement means when it says "that the U.S. . . . shares the aspirations of the Baltic states to become full members of . . . NATO, and will assist them in this goal." If it means the United States has already decided to admit the Baltic states into NATO, with implementation depending solely on Baltic actions, then we disagree. As a collective defense alliance, not a collective security association, the members of NATO, especially the United States, must not accept new members unless the Alliance is willing to defend them, including by going to war if necessary. Nor should the United States cede its freedom to make a determination on future Alliance members at the appropriate time, considering future circumstances. The United States can state and demonstrate its strong interest in Baltic security and integration within the Euro-Atlantic community without promising (or perhaps misleading) the Balts at this moment that we will back their Alliance membership later. We prefer the three-part statement on selection of new members as stated in section 2 of the Background Report.

Robert B. Zoellick and Paul D. Wolfowitz

Comment

The Task Force Report correctly takes the NATO decision to enlarge as a given; second-guessing that decision at this point would be a disservice to the national interest. There can be no assurance, however, that this decision will in fact result in a Europe that is stronger, more stable and a better partner of the United States, rather than in an Alliance whose core purposes have been fatally undermined. Whether the desired goals of NATO enlargement are achieved will depend on how successfully the United States and its NATO allies maneuver among the competing interests and conflicting objectives of the various protagonists that are outlined in this Report. In the end, the difference between success and failure will depend on the skill, effort, and luck that the United States and its allies bring to the implementation of the NATO enlargement decision.

The issue of further NATO enlargement beyond those countries invited to join at the July Madrid summit is a difficult and controversial one. In this connection, it is worth emphasizing that any subsequent invitations to additional countries to become NATO allies should be based on strategic and geopolitical criteria, so as to maintain NATO's cohesion as a security and defense organization and match NATO's membership with the strategic interests of its present members. The number of countries in Europe that meet these criteria is likely to be small, and some nations are unlikely ever to satisfy them. In any event, it will take some time before the issue of additional members even arises as a practical matter because of how long it will take for NATO to incorporate fully those countries that are invited at the Madrid summit to join the Alliance.

Arnold Kanter

Comment

I believe there should be a significant pause before any second tranche of new NATO members. This would allow the Alliance the opportunity to assess and absorb the effects on NATO's planning, procedures, and decision making of the first group of entrants. Any other potential new Alliance members would be considered only after this protracted phase beginning in 1999, in which it is assured that an even further enlarged Alliance would not lose its effectiveness.

Robert D. Blackwill

Dissenting View

I dissent from the Report. I believe it suggests heading in the wrong direction. First, it does not leave open the possibility for a "pause" after the first tranche of new members is invited to join NATO, a pause which could, in effect, become permanent. The kind of unlimited expansion implicit in the Report would be a disaster. If there are to be no limits on membership, that inevitably means all countries which aspire to join NATO--perhaps even including Russia--eventually get in. Such expansion would destroy NATO as we know it. NATO should not be the vehicle for building a greater Europe. It is a special-purpose organization and should be kept that way. Second, as a defensive alliance, NATO also should not be the counterpart of any single country, which is the problem with a NATO-Russia charter. The proper foundation for Euro-Atlantic building is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, not NATO. The preferred approach for engaging Russia directly is bilateral, with the United States taking the lead in forging relations with Moscow that encourage continued political and economic reform internally and responsible behavior externally.

Brent Scowcroft