|
|
|
Map of Europe |
Email this citationCIAO DATE: 5/99
East Central Europe: The Unbearable Tightness of Being
In this paper I propose to consider the long term security landscape of a group of countries known generally as East Central Europe or, less accurately but more familiarly, as Eastern Europe. This group comprises former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, excluding Russia/ex-Soviet Union and, of course, East Germany but including Albania, a sometime member of the WTO, and countries which were never a part of the organization, namely, the Yugoslav successor states, as well as ones which were not WTO members qua states, namely the Baltic countries 1 The underlying premise of this paper is that East Central Europe, today as in the past, finds itself situated or “mapped,” in a security as well as in a broader sense, in two positions: either as “middle” ground or as “periphery.” These are more than strategic options. They are modes of understanding, of self-understanding, even modes of being. Neither the “middle” nor the “peripheral” position is a comfortable one, although in the immediate future the East Central European states seem to be putting their bets on the illusory security of peripheralization rather than on the uncertainties of the middle.
As well-seasoned air travelers, we all try to avoid the middle seat in long distance flights. The prospect of being squeezed in for interminable hours between two strangers, especially ones of substantial proportions, is a daunting one. Historically speaking, East Central Europe sees itself as having suffered precisely this fate. The grand narrative, astonishingly alike for many of the people of the area, reads something like this: Pressure from the West, driven by a series of Germanic states, pushed the Slavs back from the Elbe almost to the Vistula. This process which was already underway in Carolingian times was still continuing under Bismarck, not to mention its most aberrant manifestations during World War II. Even in areas, which escaped (from) outright Germanization, Germanic influence was pervasive in all areas of life. Arthur Koestler recounts a dinner conversation with a lady who, in reply to the question “what is the most beautiful German city?” answered “Prague.” She had a point but not one, which offers much comfort to the inhabitants of that Golden City. And whatever other changes have occurred, geography remains. If it is no longer true that one can see Berlin from the top of Warsaw’s Palace of Culture, this is only because pollution now obstructs the view.
In addition to pressure from the West, East Central Europe is conscious of its extreme vulnerability from the East. The barbarians who streamed into Western Europe at the beginning of the modern era have been forgotten or domesticated. The Norseman is not a figure of terror but a cute icon for Haagen-Daz ice cream. But the situation in East Central Europe, as seen by inhabitants of that area, is quite different. The barbarians who swept in from the Eurasian plane continued to descend onto East Central Europe long after West Europeans had ceased to look over their shoulders. As in the West, some nomadic invaders did settle down in East Central Europe, notably the Magyars and the Bulgars. For the most part, however, they remained the aliens of fearsome legend. As Londoners listen to Big Ben, the inhabitants of Cracow tune in to their hourly Heynal: a trumpet medley interrupted at the precise moment that, purportedly, a Tatar arrow pierced the original trumpeter’s call in the 13 th century. 2 And although invaders all hailed from the distant Eastern steppes they entered East Central Europe from the South as well. The Osmanli advance deep into the area blends in popular consciousness with earlier razzias, whatever the later achievements of the Ottomans.
Moreover, (this story goes) once these Eastern invaders had been pushed back to the obscure sites from which they had emerged, East Central Europe encountered not stability on its Eastern frontier but a new drive westwards from the post Muscovite Russian state. This advance was not of particularly long duration. It began with Ivan IV’s Livonian wars in the late 16 th century and it had stabilized by 1815 with only an occasional excursion thereafter (for example, 1848 in Hungary) before resuming on a large scale in 1944. The impact of this Russian advance, substantial in itself, was heightened by its identification with earlier archetypes. The classic essay by the Polish Nobel Prize winner and Berkeley professor Czeslaw Milosz, The Captive Mind (1953), allegorizes the coming of communism in terms of a new Tatar invasion, as do other literary works from the communist period (for example, that remarkable surrealistic novel, Tadeusz Konwicki’s, The Small Apocalypse ). Indeed, the Russian/Soviet as neo-Tatar is one of the most consistent tropes of East Central European popular culture. Czech post-invasion posters in 1968 showed Brezhnev with pronounced oriental traits; in 1981 rumors flew in Warsaw that the people imposing martial law were not Poles but Soviets disguised in Polish uniforms and recognizable, of course, by their Asiatic features.
In this way, Pechenegs, Tatars, Turks, Muscovites and Soviets all merge in one great continuum where they mingle with Teutonic Knights, Prussians and Hitlerites (the politically correct term for the most recent Germanic invaders). The panorama is awe-inspiring and, at least to the inhabitants of the region, convincing.
East Central Europeans have put a brave face on the predicament of being caught in the middle. Looking eastward they have proclaimed themselves Antemurale Christianitatis , a term of varying relevance and uncertain distinction. Looking westward, they have extolled purported Slavonic specificities (or the equivalent for the non-Slavonic East Central Europeans). German historians have referred to Zwischeneuropa, no doubt the inspiration for the felicitous title of Alan Palmer’s history of this area, The Lands Between . Intellectuals and politicians as well have translated “middle” into “center” and have spun an ideology of “Central Europe.” Many have been seduced by this construction and some, such as the Czech author Milan Kundera, have used their imaginative talents to transform this unhappy region into a repository of all-European values. In the final analysis, however, being “in the middle” is hardly the same as being “at the center.” The center imposes itself upon history whereas the middle is subjected to it.
During the half-century of Communist domination the place of East Central Europe as the “middle ground” lost much, but not all of its relevance. To be sure, Edward Benes’ postwar efforts to build a Czechoslovak bridge from East to West collapsed woefully. Yugoslavia, like Albania and, in a different sense, Romania developed into sui generis formations, anomalies rather than intermediate points between East and West. Nevertheless, the East Central European members of the “socialist camp” retained something of their “middle” position. As the USSR changed, the East Central European countries changed faster. The place of East Central Europe as a halfway house reasserted itself in ever so many ways, whether it was in technology transfer, cinema or even in political life. In spite of common socialist façades, travelers in Budapest, or even in Sofia, could never mistakenly believe themselves to be in Moscow.
After the end of communism it was the dangers rather than the opportunities of being in the “middle” that loomed largest. A renascent Germany reappeared in the West, satisfied to be sure but not so satisfied as to give up its interest and interests in the East. A weakened Russia could still send shivers down the spine of the East Central Europeans. In the case of the Baltic States these fears might have some foundation. In other cases they were frissons of remembrance or anticipation. Indeed, the chief spectre now was not so much aggression from one side or the other (or both) but the fear that Russia and the West would come to terms with each other at the expense of East Central Europe. Even serious politicians evoked “Yalta” darkly and chafed at what they saw as the West’s undue solicitude — and generosity — vis-à-vis Russia’s problems. 3
East Central Europe has also recently been reminded of its middle position in other unwelcome ways. The area has become a halfway station for international migration and international crime. It is both a landing point and a launching point for illegal migrants from the Third World or from the East who alight there in their quest for a better life. It is increasingly difficult for these migrants to break through to the West but this does not prevent them from coming, from trying their luck, and, when unsuccessful, from remaining in the area. As Germany and the rest of the EU reinforce “fortress Europe” type measures, westward migration stops here. East Central Europe has also become a thriving stopover and branch plant in the circuits of international crime, from car theft through prostitution to the arms business and the drug trade. 4 Weak, disoriented states with an uncertain rule of law, economic distortions fostering corruption, and a civic pride in outsmarting the bureaucracy, all contribute to maintaining this unsavory situation. Once again, sitting in the middle seat is not the best place to be.
At times in the past East Central Europeans have had the illusion that they might exploit their middle position by playing both sides against each other. This was the disastrous policy of Poland’s Colonel Beck in the interwar period. It was Romania’s option in two world wars as well as under Ceausescu. Even this illusion is lacking today (mercifully?). The relation of forces between East and West, more specifically between Russia/CIS and NATO, is so incommensurate that although East Central Europe considers Russia’s/CIS’s weight heavy — indeed, far too heavy for it to bear — there can be no semblance of balancing, even on a regional scale. Only the reckless, such as the Serbs, even try to exploit East/West rivalry (and little good it does them).
Ultimately, East Central Europe today knows no alternative strategies or ideologies to those offered by the West. Commentators have argued that the revolutions of 1989 produced not a single new idea. 5 The regimes that emerged from them have turned out to be radically imitative of the West, shunning even the incipient elements of intellectual and moral autonomy (such as the “civil society” construct) that arose under late communism and proclaiming “normalcy” (?) to be the greatest revolutionary value. 6 These new regimes have put all their chips on assimilation to Western models of economic and political organization and on integration within Western institutions. At the same time, they are unwilling to acknowledge that the only possible mode of rapprochement with the West is that of peripheralization. In attempting to flee the uncomfortable middle ground between East and West, East Central Europe is seeking a place in the West, which can only be a place on the edge of the West.
East Central Europe as periphery is, therefore, this region’s alternative mode of being. Peripheralization here is not an unalterable given but is historically conditioned. In the 13 th century Prague was more populous than Paris and three centuries later Poland’s Baltic grain trade was a pillar of international commerce. Since the reorientation of European economic activity toward the Atlantic and overseas, however, this region has become progressively more of a backwater. 7 East Central Europeans are loathe to put blame on the inexorable laws of economic development, preferring to see the causes of their misery in such exogenous factors as Turkish domination or Soviet exploitation or else in political perfidy, native or foreign. Whatever the causes, East Central Europe’s position as the edge of Europe — as both limes and fines — defines the character of the area. It imposes the standards, economic and cultural, which East Central Europeans seek to attain, even as they know that they will necessarily fall short of them.
Next to the narcissism of the “middle” lies the resentment of the “periphery.” There is a peculiarly shrill tone to East Central European claims to Europeanness, from the imitativeness of architecture and taste to the adoption of ideologies. 8 In the past, Western artifacts — nationalism, Marxism, anti-Semitism, to name but a few — acquired vehemence as they moved progressively eastward. Today too, the recently unshackled free marketer ministers of the East outdo their western counterparts in zeal and conviction. Only Vaclav Klaus, the resilient Czech ex-premier and now National Assembly president, can combine utter scorn for the term “social” and mystical veneration for the term “market” when speaking of the “social market.” 9 Only Leszek Balcerowicz, the father of Polish shock treatment and now again deputy prime minister, can say, in all earnestness, that the great mistake of this century has been that we have not taken Adam Smith seriously enough. 10
The wholehearted recognition of a peripheral position imposes one strategy and excludes all others. Once the East Central Europeans decided that the sole measure of their identity and well-being would be their proximity to Western Europe, now defined as Europe tout court , they could move in only one direction: hence, the rush to join whatever Western/European institution would have them and the siege of those which closed their doors. The East Central European states were already members of the OSCE so this was hardly a prize. The Council of Europe was so eager to recruit that it was not particularly difficult to enter. However, satisfaction at membership in the Council was soon marred by the fact that unworthies, notably Russia, were also accepted within it. The true grail was, obviously, NATO and the EU. In regard to these the quest still continues, with crusading ardor on the part of the new elites. 11
To be sure, there are security and material considerations involved in the quest for membership of NATO and the EU. An insurance policy against a resurgent Russia, free mobility of goods and citizens, as well as handouts from the Common Agricultural Policy and other EU programs, these are all desirable goals. The premise underlying the quest for membership, however, is the conviction that by joining these institutions East Central Europe will reenact the history of Western Europe over the last fifty years. These countries will cover — at an even more accelerated pace, it is hoped — the passage from impoverishment and trauma to prosperity and security that has made Western Europe such a showcase. When Madeleine Albright defends NATO expansion by saying that we must do for “for Europe’s East what NATO did 50 years ago for Europe’s West,” her words are sweet music in Warsaw, Prague, Budapest and the other capitals of post-communist Europe. 12 They are, in my view, a siren song.
It is utterly improbable that the future course of development will reenact the developments of the postwar past. Not only because present-day East Central Europe is not postwar Western Europe but because Western Europe is no longer the homogenous unit that signed the Washington and Rome Treaties, in the heyday of the Cold War and on the threshold of an unparalleled economic boom. Viewed from afar, in space and time, the ups and downs of (West) European integration melt into a single narrative of steady achievement. The story of NATO is one of steadfastness and interallied cooperation crowned by the peaceful demise of the redoubtable adversary. These are tales the East Central Europeans love to hear, over and over again. They are bedtime stories, however, not scripts for the future.
Indeed, though the East Central Europeans would have history repeat itself the West is doing its best to see that it will not. NATO expansion will bring about with it, formally or informally, the dilution of security guarantees. Whatever is said, Bratislava or Bialystok will not be defended as Brussels or Brest would have been. 13 And if NATO has learned to look the other way in the face of the Greek-Turkish conflict, it will have to avoid embarrassment, even at the cost of promoting incoherence, by disregarding the numerous bilateral conflicts that the new members will bring with them. EU adherence too will come in measured doses with internal differentiation, acknowledged or disguised, in the shape of variable geometry and concentric circles. 14 It is possible that the historic discrepancy between Western and Eastern economic indices which has been growing for several centuries will be halted or even reduced in the future, although all previous attempts, capitalist and communist, have failed to do so. 15 Even in the best of circumstances, however, the discrepancy will not be erased, as this would require boundless economic development in the East and economic stagnation or decline in the West. The East Central European countries will continue to rage at their inferiority even as they remain persuaded that their only salvation lies in becoming ever more like the objects of their resentment.
Fundamentally, the impotence of East Central Europe lies not in its obsolescent economies or its outmoded mindsets. Its weakness resides in the fact that, whether these countries see themselves as lying in the middle, between inimical powers, or at the periphery of a world to which they would wish to belong, they cannot perceive themselves as constituting a unit with common interests. These countries are either self-referring or other-referring, they are not group-referring. Even efforts at partial integration, such as the Yugoslav and the Czechoslovak federations, have proven too broadly encompassing or not broadly encompassing enough. Today, the countries of the region are not prepared to make common cause, whether it be in the race for EU membership or for NATO expansion. Tomorrow, when they are members of these organizations it is likely that attitudes of rivalry and suspicion towards one’s regional neighbors will persist, with consequences for these organizations as a whole. Security in East Central Europe requires establishing the fact that, whether it be a middle ground or a periphery, East Central Europe is also a region whose component parts must come together in a shared project specific to it. As long as the countries of East Central Europe fear and resent each other as much as they fear and resent outsiders, there is little prospect for durable security in the area.
Endnotes
Note 1: In broad terms we are speaking here of the countries between Russia andGermany. These numbered seven in 1990 and today number fifteen with thedivision of Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia as well as the return to sovereigntyof the Baltic states. Belorussia and Ukraine are excluded from this list forreasons, which would require another paper. Back.
Note 2: Norman Davies, Europe:A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996. p. 365. Back.
Note 3: Flora Lewis, reporting on the World Economic Forum’s Third Central andEast European Economic Summit in Salzburg writes: “There is a growingresentment that the West is being too generous, too tolerant of Russia’sbumbling, corrupt, unproductive reforms. ‘A second Yalta,’ one Polehas called it, demanding that the West ‘crack down’.” InternationalHerald Tribune,26 June 1998. And, in case there is any doubt as to how high up suchcomplaints are to be found, see foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek, “DieNachwirkungen von Jalta rückgängig machen,” IDM[Institut für Donauraum und Mitteleuropa] InfoSonderheft,“Erweiterung der Europäischen Union: Erwarterungen derBeitrittsländer (1998),” pp. 10 – 11. Back.
Note 4: A recent joke portrays a tourist poster with the following legend: “visitBosnia-Herzegovina. Your car is already there.” It could be applied toother countries of the area as well. Back.
Note 5: François Furet, cited (approvingly?) by Ralf Dahrendorf, Reflectionson the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto & Windus, 1990. p. 23. Back.
Note 6: For a well-aimed critique of the ‘civil society’ construct seeKlaus von Beyme, Transitionto Democracy in Eastern Europe. New York: St. Martin’s, 1996 Back.
Note 7: Seethe collection of essays edited by Daniel Chirot, TheOrigins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Back.
Note 8: As a recent work puts it delicately with reference to art and architecture,“Divided and diverse themselves, the people of the region were open toadopting forms that had been made elsewhere and to translating them to theirown purposes,” Thomas Da Costa Kaufman, Court,Cloister and City: The Arts and Culture of Central Europe 1450-1800. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995, p. 463. This is true not onlyfor the Catholic countries of the area covered by Kaufman but also for theOrthodox ones which draw on other, mainly Byzantine inspirations. Back.
Note 9: My comments are based on personal observation of Klaus’ performance atthe annual Crans-Montana Forum. But see also the interesting portraits byMichael Orenstein, “Vaclav Klaus: Revolutionary andParliamentarian,” EastEuropean Constitutional Review7:1 (1998), pp. 46-55, Stephen Holmes, “The Politics of Economics in theCzech Republic,” EastEuropean Constitutional Review 4:2 (1995), pp. 52 — Hans-Joachim Hoppe, “Vaclav Klaus —Ministerpräsident der Tschchischen Republik. Ein Porträt.” Osteuropa43:11(1993), pp. 1083-1087. Back.
Note 10: “Der grösste Fehler unseres Jahrhunderts war, Adam Smith nicht erstgenug zu nehmen. Denn Probleme der Arbeitslosigkeit sind auf exzesivesStaatseingreifen zurückzuführen. Es is falsch, diese Probleme demfreien Markt anzulasten.” Leszek Balcerowicz, “Kapitalismus undKultur,” IWM[Institute for Human Sciences, Vienna] Newsletter60 (February-April 1998), p. 2. One would think that among all the mistakes ofthe century, one could find more grievous ones. Back.
Note 11: The extent to which NATO expansion, EU enlargement and, indeed, other aspectsof the post-communist order may be elite rather than popular projects isbrought out in numerous surveys. A Eurobarometer opinion poll in 1995 chalkedup only 26% of Hungarian respondents as believing that “the future oftheir country will be most closely tied to the European Union,” cited byD. N. Nelson, “Hungary and its Neighbors: Security and EthnicMinorities,” NationalitiesPapers26:2 (1998), To be sure, such scores are lowest in Hungary of all thepost-communist countries but they represent a difference of degree notorientation. Analogous conclusions from earlier surveys are drawn in Klaus vonBeyme, Transitionto Democracy in Eastern Europe. Back.
Note 12: Cited by Robert W. Tucker, “Reflections of a Repentant Sinner,” TheNational Interest51 (Spring 1998), p. 127. Back.
Note 13: Is this what Ramsay MacDonald meant in addressing the League of Nations in 1924in a speech which made little of an impression at the time? “Pacts or nopacts, you will be invaded. Pacts or no pacts, you will be crushed. Pacts orno pacts you will be devastated. The certain victim of the military age andmilitary organization of society is the small nationality that trusts upon itsmoral claim to live. Evil will be made upright and entirely free to do itswork if you fling yourself once more into the security which has never made yousecure since the world started,” cited by Zbynek Zeman with AntoninKlimek, TheLife of Edvard Benes 1884-1948,Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, pp. 93-94. Back.
Note 14: To be sure, those charged with reflecting upon the integration of thepost-communist countries into the EU vigorously reject the notion of“partial membership.” The alternative they offer, that ofenlargement by stages, represents a sort of partial (non)-membership over time.See Horst Günter Krenzler, TheEU and Central-East Europe: The Implications of Enlargement in Stages. Policy Paper 97/2. European University Institute: Robert Schuman Centre Back.
Note 15: See the seminal article by Andrew Janos, “The Politics of Backwardness inContinental Europe,” WorldPolitics61:3 (1969), pp. 325-358, as well as Chirot’s edited volume cited, TheOrigins of Backwardness in Eastern Europe. Back.
