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Controlling the Invisible: The Deficient Political Control of the Modern Military
Center for Studies of Social Change
February 1995
Acknowledgements
I thank Charles Tilly for many helpful suggestions to earlier drafts of this paper.
Introduction
The subjectivist, agent-centered view of the state, focusing on its character as a phenomenon of decision/policy making, has currently been criticized by Timothy Mitchell (1991), who offered to portray the state as a structural effect of social practices. The false image of the state as a free-standing entity opposes to, and apart from, the society seemed to Mitchell as the outcome of those practices rather than as a reflection of actual reality. This paper proposes to posit an alterative approach to the subjectivist one as is reflected in the literature, dealing with different aspects of political control over the armed forces, mainly the four different schools of state formation, military sociology, modernization, and militarization.
In the first section the schools, from which this paper draws, will be introduced in order to outline the basic critique and arguments. Then, I will analyze the relation of exchange, formed between the military and the state (section two), and stipulating the military's capacity to take part in impacting social practices in the state's service (section three). The fourth and fifth sections introduce two levels of control, formal versus substantive, and describe their mutual relations, toward more general theoretic arguments, to be dealt with in the last section.
Conceptual Background
Central to the academic discourse on state-society-military relations is that the modern state has drawn its power from its monopoly on the use of the society's violent resources (Weber, 1972, 78). Indeed, that component pertains to the raison d'être of the modern state: Preventing violent hostile relations between different social groups and, at the same time, to exclusively defend its citizens against a violent external threat.
This exclusivity has given the state internal supremacy over other forces, nowhere more blatant than in its ability to extend control into sectors and power centers which, in the premodern era, had enjoyed a high level of autonomy, and to direct social-civil activities according to the state-defined goals (see Giddens, 1985; Mann, 1988; Tilly, 1992). In a similar fashion, the state could exploit existential fears to create bureaucratic mechanisms for coping with those fears, such as mass conscription, tax collection and territorial centralization. The centrality of these mechanisms increased insofar as militaries introduced massive artillery into the military arena from the 16th and 17th centuries. They, then, drived the state's civil agencies to deal both with extraction of material resources in favor of militaries' buildup (Tilly, 1985a; 1992), and, subsequently, with conscription of the domestic population insofar as growing manpower needs could no longer be met by mercenaries (Thomson, 1994). The state, then, became the exclusive entity able to underwrite and maintain the military (Andreski, 1971, 98-99; Weber, 1972, 221-223; Finer, 1975; Tilly, 1985b). Therein lay the modern military's distinctiveness as compared with its traditional forbearer, which had been both virtually autonomous and closely affiliated with, and funded by, particularist power centers.
The effort to establish civilian administrations, aimed at extracting the resources needed to maintain militaries, inwardly strengthened the state vis-a-vis the military, which to a large degree became dependent on the state's resources. Moreover, state agents granted political power to social groups who had previously mustered those resources in exchange for their contribution, hence, furthering the civil sectors in relation to the military. Consequently, the militaries' buildup competed with civil sectors, and the creation of military domination over those sectors had been averted (Tilly, 1985b; 1992, ch.7).
Tilly (ibid) and Giddens (1985, 249-254), against this background, draw a distinction between Western and Third World militaries, with regard to their relations with state civil bureaucracies. In the Third World, the militaries' dependency on civil bureaucracies did not develop because the armed forces' buildup was funded by an external power. Consequently, militaries could enhance their autonomous status vis-a-vis civil authorities and even establish an autonomous infrastructure, functioning as a surrogate for civilian systems. In that situation, no real obstacle was erected to military intervention in politics.
Clearly, this analysis lays the foundation for understanding the formation of formal political control over militaries in Western and Third world countries alike, focusing on the institutional arrangements formed between the military and the state civil bureaucracy. The purpose of these arrangements has been to restrain the military's leverage for autonomous action in order to guarantee that it would act within a circumscribed repertoire of roles, e. g., activities ensuring the security of the state from external threat, devoid of any internal political role. Implicitly, these scholars introduce the concept that separation of the military from politics, which is necessary to sustain the liberal character of the democratic state, has been actually structured within the Western model of state building.
The weakness of these proponents of state formation, however, is that they have confined their focus to the visible dimension of state-military relations, whereby the military's professional action is politically controlled, or expected to be so, by formal-institutional means. True, militaries fulfill professional, "pure" military roles in the state's service, but their activities impact social, cultural and political domains beyond the military one. These impacts are only partially visible.
To illustrate, militaries, as the proponents of modernization have contended, fulfilled a latent function as efficient agents of modernization, particularly within the framework of state building (see, for example, Fidel, 1975; Stepan, 1978; Harries-Jenkins, 1982; Bienen, 1983). This activity is controlled, either potentially or practically, by political authorities. They engage in strategic decisions as, for example, which policy of recruitment should be employed, a decision that, indispensably, affects the military's social composition, hence, its ability to modernize social groups. Nevertheless, by "switching" the analytical-paradigmatic framework, one may claim that the military intended action as an agent of modernization has an unintended consequence: It, in fact, structures power relations in the interethnic domain, an impact which is also invisible to the agents involved (see, for example, the theoretical critique on the school of modernization by Enloe, 1981). The military's visible, intended agenda is therefore politically controlled; however, a great deal of its impacts is partially invisible. This dimension has been overlooked by the scholars, regardless of their paradigmatic inclinations in other fields.
The school of sociology of military has shared a similar approach. This school has concentrated on military organizations and their relationships within the sociopolitical environment, seeking to identify the mechanisms which guaranteed effective formal political control over the military's visible activities (or hindered its creation, mainly in Third World countries, being viewed as deviant cases). Yet, the scholars have remained divided as to which mechanisms are most effective: bureaucratic-political mechanisms (Huntington, 1957; Luckham, 1971; Harries-Jenkins, 1973; Edmonds, 1988: Stepan, 1988), social mechanisms (Janowitz, 1971; Larson, 1974 ; Segal et al, 1974; Sarkesian, 1984; Lissak, 1984), or cultural ones (Finer, 1976; Van Doom, 1976; see also the general critique of sociology of military by Shaw, 1991, 73-76). Even the proponents of the study of militarism have, implicitly, shared the same view. Most of them have addressed the impacts of military action in constructing a military culture within democratic and authoritative regimes alike. Still, they have focused on the visible impacts of military action on civil spheres such as political participation (Geyer, 1989), communication (Mann, 1987; Shaw, 1991, 76-82), economy (Mackenzie, 1983; Kaldor, 1984), masculine domination (Enloe, 1988 ), and general cultural impacts (See Eide and Thee, 1980). Nevertheless, the invisible impacts on power relations remained overlooked, or, as in the writing of Mackenzie and Kaldor (ibid), the role played directly by the military has been neglected.
If so, the existing literature has failed to distinguish between visible and invisible consequences of military action. Hence, the scholars also failed to distinguish between two different levels of political control: In practice, the scholars have outlined the structure of formal political control, which fits neatly within the visible dimension; but they have not furnished us with concepts to analyze the manner in which the invisible impacts of military action are controlled by the political community. This level of control would be conceptualized hereafter as substantive control.
By elaborating the discussion of both Tilly and Giddens (ibid), I contend that militaries have exchanged their political subordination (formal control) for universalist status, beyond material resources. This status permitted the state to use the armed forces for internal needs through their very impacts, invisibly and unintentionally, on social power relations, divorced from effective political control, i.e. substantive control. Militaries, then, accepted, in fact, the reduction of their political autonomy, but not their political impacts, or, the increase in formal control for a decrease in substantive control.
State-Military Relations
Inferring both from Tilly and Giddens (ibid), my argument is that structural relations of exchange, involving the state civilian agencies and the military, have been formed since the historical appearance of the modern state. As it will be recalled, the state alone became capable of accumulating the needed resources for maintaining the military. In practice, state bureaucracy has undertaken the responsibility for war preparation, that is to mobilize the needed material and human resources that made war an implementable political instrument (Barnett, 1992), while the military concentrated on using these resources for operating the war itself.
Equally significant, the state also awarded the military great prestige, beyond material resources, at several levels. First, the state alone acquired the legitimacy to define the boundaries between "friend" and "enemy", "internal" and "external" (see especially, Schmitt, 1976: Tilly, 1985b), and therefore to give universalist-national substance to military activities. Clearly, those differentiations were echoed in the military discourse. This was a part of what Blain calls "politics is war," the strategy employed by political movements to mobilize social support by invoking military rhetoric. This found its expression in "discursive features associated with systems of differentiation, objectives and aims, tactics, institutionalization, and rationalization," (Blain, 1994, 828). Moreover, by using force-oriented discourse that symbolized the military, the state could legitimize the military's needs, giving them priority over other, civilian, needs. The modern state was therefore different from the traditional forms of rule, which had granted only limited substance to military power due to an absence of clear-cut political categories for equating the threat/defense of the individual with the threat/defense of the community.
Secondly, the mass character of the modern military, resting on professional rather than affiliational foundations (Huntington, 1957, 19-58), and on the mobilization of a domestic population rather than mercenaries (Thomson, 1990; 1994), furthered the military universalism. yet, it was also stipulated by state's ability to. Thirdly, the underlining principal of "monopoly on the use of violence" means that militaries, unlike civilian institutions, have a function divorced from competition with other equal organization. Finally, military's prestige was pronounced in linking the granting of citizenship with military service (Janowitz, 1976), particularly in the wake of wars, which accelerated state allocation of social rights to those who had shouldered the burden of war (Andreski, 1971; Titmus, 1976, 75-87; Marwick, 1988). Militaries themselves were also allocated privileges in return for battlefield achievements (Edmonds, 1988, 36). Clearly, mobilizing material resources and awarding prestige were drawn from the political discourse which, (the focus of the next section).
Paradoxically, therein lay the conditions to restrain the military and to subject it to political control, as an exchange for its gains in accepting the political institutions' supervision. First, since "soldiers... became ever-more dependent on their civilian supporters for the wherewithal of war... the autonomy and personal power of the [military] men" was decreased (Tilly, 1985b, 78). Secondly, as Tilly (1992, ch. 7) argues, with respect to European state formation, social groups, who had previously mustered the resources allocated to the military, (such as money collected by taxes, or free time extracted by conscription), attained/demanded access to political control in exchange for their contribution. Examples are many movements, composed of veteran soldiers, demanding, in fact, to take part in shaping the military's modus operandi, and, thereby, contributing to reduce its autonomous action (see, Rycroft, 1975 on the Vietnam veterans against the war, and Bar-On, 1985 on the Peace Now Movements in Israel, and more illustrations below).
Thirdly, at the structural level, enjoyment of prestige has been stipulated, to a large extent, by sustaining the universalist image of the military, primarily its aloofness from politics. Visible political leanings displayed by the officer corps, or political intervention exceeding the narrow bounds of the military profession, could have impaired that status and shown the military to be merely one corporation among others.
Fourthly, inasmuch as militaries have been forced to compete with the civilian sectors over mustering human, material and symbolic resources, they have been inclined to keep their image as an entity standing above the sectoral division of the society, unlike their counterparts in civil sectors. Moreover, armed forces have been more and more criticized both for spending money that otherwise could be better used to provide public material resources and awarding prestigeservices, and for maintaining defense industries that impede productive economic development, both processes were indispensable outcomes of militarization. Consequently, erosion in the legitimacy of militaries driving militaries to further fortify their universalist image as "the military is legitimate only insofar as its existence and use of power has been agreed to by society as a whole" (Harries-Jenkins, 1981, 237). Viewed from another perspective, the more the military gained resources in terms of the increased creation of a civilian-owned military industry and of mass conscription, the more the officers interacted with civilian institutions, but within a framework of dependency and competition rather than of domination. Consequently, not only was militarization at work, but civilian values increasingly penetrated the military along several dimensions as well; hence, the potential that separatist inclinations would be displayed by military men has actually been reduced, insofar as military institutions adopted more and more civilian attributes (see Lissak, 1984).
Finally, the ability of the officers to convert their military prestige into political status after their retirement disinclined them to intervene openly in politics while they were still in uniform. Otherwise, the prestige they obtained from the military's universalist image, and which would confer on them political status, might have suffered. Open intervention would have also made difficulties in gaining the support of politicians whose power affected the officer's political promotion (see, explicitly, the case of the British officers during the Victorian era, Harries-Jenkins, 1973, and, implicitly, Mills, 1956, 285 on the American experience; Vagts, 1959, 308-309 on European militarism; and Pen, 1983, 137-138 on the case of Israel). In other words, the military elite took a part in defining the social value of the military profession which, in itself, defined the "value" of the retired officers in the civil labor market (see Feld, 1968).
The institutionalization of political control over the military then became a common interest of the sides involved, neither of which had necessarily been aware of the pattern of exchange described above. The military elite benefitted directly from symbolic and material resources and therefore became motivated to act within the formal limits of civil politics. The state, for its part, augmented the centralism of its civil agencies insofar as it took control over the military. However, there was an additional gain: The control of a universalist military could be exploited for invisible missions, advancing the expansion of statist control. This was the other dimension of these relations of exchange.
The Invisible Impacts of Military Action
The modern military has served the state's internal control. The concept of the state refers to the administrative complex which structures, through its very action, inequitable power relations, embedded in social practices. Within the statist framework, the military acts intentionally, visibly and in politically controlled mode to meet its formal assignments, as the professional operator of external violence on behalf of the state, constrained by social and political limitations. However, the impacts of this action go beyond the professional domain and are felt in civilian domains such as political discourse, social discipline and ethnic-class reproduction, in which military action constructs inequitable social power relations. These impacts are unintended, invisible and basically devoid of political control. True, both the military action and the behavioral forms in those domains are visible; however, either the long-term impacts of military action on power relations or, naturally, the social-political structure itself are invisible to the major agents involved. Consequently, the military itself and the operating state are not necessarily aware of the real meaning of their action, hence, the difficulty in monitoring this action politically. Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that "invisible" does not mean intended covert agenda. Action of this kind is embraced in the visible dimension (yet, might be temporarily invisible to some politicians), and even supposed to be exposed as a means to control the military. On the other hand, unintended consequences are not necessarily undesirable ,nor are they a perverse outcome (in Hirschman's terms, 1991, 11-42), but sometimes even an indirect realization of agents' interests.
I will describe three significant impacts, and then analyze their relevance to state-military relations. These impacts are military's both invisible and unintended impacts on social life in the state's service, deficient of political monitoring. For that reason, many other impacts are brushed aside, such as stimulation of political action by discharged soldiers, undermining the state's autonomous power; visible impacts of military service on labor market; militaries' formal engagement in social reforms or restoration of internal order, etc.
1. The Discursive Impact
Militaries were used for internal political purposes, due, paradoxically, to their image as institutions holding a politically-free profession, devoid of sectoral inclinations, as C.W. Mills (1956, 200) put it:
"From the standpoint of the party politician, a well-trained general or admiral is an excellent legitimator of policies, for his careful use often makes it possible to lift the policy "above politics", which is to say above political debate and into the realm of administration.. politicians thus default upon their proper job of debating policy, hiding behind a supposed military expertise..."
Accordingly, the process, in which military thought prevailed over the politics in the U.S. during the post World War II era, was partially traceable to this military image. The process was furthered due to the entry of retired officers into politics; in fact, driven by the officers' tendency to convert their military prestige into political power. The impact was that civil politics were undermined as the retired generals imposed their military worldview on civil politics (see Mills, ibid, 285; Vagts, 1959, 308-309; Pen, 1983, 137-138; Shapiro, 1991, 156-157).
Itself the product of a process, in which one side's success in mobilizing support (in this case the military establishment and its outside supporters), entails the imposition of its "political formula" on the political discourse, discursive action also had an enormous impact on state empowerment. It legitimized the state's preoccupation with violence, propelling its internal expansion even beyond the process suggested by the proponents of state formation. Force-oriented discourse also served the needs of coping with internal crisis situations, that is, when the state's capacity to meet growing demands from social groups was eroded.
Concretely, several impacts are worth mention, emanating from bolstering the state' 5 preferential position vis-a-vis civil society forces. By grounding its legitimation on the ability to use violence, the state could internally adopt a "pacific" method of rule, without needing to resort to violence, as distinct from the traditional patterns of rule (Giddens, 1985, 192). Methods of this kind have actually reduced the subject's capacity to resist the operation of power, hence, the state's stable, internal control was bolstered. Moreover, at its extremist form between 1914-1945, the state achieved total domination over the political space when militarism marked the collapse of boundaries between politics and the military within the state and between state and society, as the latter was mobilized by the state for the war effort (see Geyer, 1989, 71-81). Here again the discourse, taking the form of militarism, played a significant role as Geyer (ibid, 71) put it:
"This was no longer old-style militarism. "Professional soldiers" and "managerial" governments set in motion the militarization of Europe and militarized social movements gave their efforts legitimacy".
A similar pattern found its expression in the U.S. during and after the World War II. Wolfe (1977, 186-199) claimed that the rhetorical garb in which America cloaked its stand in the Cold War - - its self-portrayal as the defender of the Free World -- was even more meaningful than the warfare itself, and relegitimized the state's internal power. It was illustrated in the growing capacity of the state to expand its authority inwardly, primarily, to intensively extract civil resources and to direct the private industry, a domain that had previously been excessively autonomous vis-a-vis state intervention (Hooks, 1990; 1993; 1994; Hooks & McLauchlan, 1992). Concomitantly, the effort, during the 1950's, for preparing the home front for civil defense against a Soviet nuclear threat, was used, in practice, to regiment the American public and to expand the supreme, penetrative power of the state upon the degree to which it occupied a physician-like position vis-a-vis the public (Oakes, 1994).
Similarly, the military discourse in Israel during the 1950's extended the idea of security into saliently civilian areas such as immigration, settlement, technology, education, and more (Ben-Eliezer, 1994, 57). Activity in those spheres was often determined by military needs, though this was camouflaged by the habitual use of the term security rather than military. Consequently, as Ben-Eliezer identifies, the preparation for war became the major mechanism of political mobilization during the state's first years.
Consequently, the more the force-oriented symbols became central, the more the state could, in practice, curb peripheral social movements. Young (1984) for example, illustrated how, during the 20th, alienated social groups had actually grasped the state's authority, as their protest against the social order was mediated by their direct opposition to war. Another example adduced by Pedersen (1990) who demonstrated how the British feminists justified their demand for equality of material rights following World War II by arguing that motherhood is as much a national service as soldiering. In this case, the prominence of militarist values mitigated, in fact, the feminist ideological challenge. More impacts would be introduced in relation to social reproduction.
In sum, the military, serving as a legitimator of the state's violent preoccupations, actually assisted in fostering the state's internal expansion. This was reflected in other domains as well.
2. The Disciplinary Impact
Militaries work to train their draftees for discipline "in order that their optimum of physical and psychic power in attack may be rationally calculated" (Weber, 1972, 254). Viewed from a larger perspective, Foucault (1977) placed the modern military within the complex of disciplinary mechanisms, formed during the transition from the traditional to the secular-modern social order, such as factories, hospitals, and schools. These institutions, through their very work, inculcated habits of discipline and obedience among the individuals subjected to their rule. Within this framework, the military employed several unique techniques, for example: the accurate learning of details; the definition of both spatial and circulating boundaries of action; the timing and measurement of outputs; the designation of conditions for advancing from one level of training to another; the employment of punishment mechanisms based on hierarchy, endless repetition, and discrimination between individuals according to their behavior rather than by means of physical constraint; the habituation of group exercises which structure an individual's dependence on the collective, and coordinated patterns of movement, thereby creating informal means of punishment (Ibid, 139-170).
These techniques, according to Foucault, internalized discipline by making the individual the subject of his own training, that is the discipline worked from within not from outside. Hence, discipline became objective, and as such, it reduced dependence on external means of coercion to a minimum, which also reduced subject's capacity to resist the operation of power. In this way, the operation of power became a mechanism which shaped order, and not only maintained it, by using visible means of punishment characteristic of the traditional era.
The military, although it has intentionally and visibly acted to meet its professional assignments to convert the individual from a young citizen into an efficient soldier, in fact supported the assimilation of individuals into the framework of the modern order, instead of retaining its former status as confrontation with an external order. Accordingly, Mitchell (1991) elaborated some of Foucault's assertions by relating the military's disciplinary power to the unique character of the modern state, that is:
"... The new military methods... produced the disciplined individual soldier and, simultaneously, the novel effect of an armed unit as an artificial machine. The military apparatus appeared somehow greater than the sum of its parts.. .A similar two-dimensional effect can be seen at work in other institutions of the modern nation state.. .On the one hand individuals and their activities, on the other an inert structure that somehow stands apart from individuals, precedes them, and contains and gives a framework to their lives" (ibid,93-94).
This is the two-dimensional distinction between the institutional system of the state and the methods of organization and control, simultaneously, molding and being molded by the state (see also Giddens, 1982, 222-223).
Military discipline has been also an effective mechanism for providing a new source for an individual's commitment and loyalty that, in many cases, overshadowed former objects of those attitudes. This mechanism cut off the individual from traditional ties, such as local frames of rule, clans or ethnic groups and, at the same time, inculcates loyalty toward the state. This process is especially significant during state building (see, for example, Harries-Jenkins, 1982; Migdal, 1988, 23).
3. The Ethnic-Class Reproductive Impact
The military acquired a universalist-egalitarian image stemming from its unique status within the state as indicated above, primarily its mass character, being supported by the use of mass conscription by many states until the second half of the twentieth century. Consequently, militaries impacted peripheral groups' behavior at two interrelated levels. At the first one, the military's prestige stimulated peripheral social groups to grasp their very (actual or potential) military participation as a symbolic resource, more accessible than other symbolic and material resources that had been unattainable for them. Marx identified this orientation in his "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" (1963), in which he showed that the peasants' service in the army of Napoleon III bestowed upon them social prestige, albeit a false one, as he put it:
"The army was the point d'honneur of the small-holding peasants, it was they themselves transformed into heroes, defending their new possessions against the outer world, glorifying their recently won nationhood, plundering and revolutionizing the world. The uniform was their own state dress; war was their poetry;the small holding, extended and rounded off in imagination, was their fatherland, and patriotism the ideal form of the sense of property" (ibid, 130).
That was a basic element of the peasants' loyalty to a social order that in fact vitiated their class interests. Moreover, the prestige that had accrued to military service inclined peripheral groups to side with militarism as it imbued their military status with social worth (see the discussion by Tocqueville, 1967, 59-64, on the American army). Mann (1987), following that point of view, notes that the introduction of mass conscription in the European armies at the end of the 19th Century conferred the status of membership in the political community on the middle class. Consequently, this class supported belligerent actions that nonetheless conflicted with its own social interests. Subsequently, the same trend was demonstrated in the support given by labor movements to bellicose inclinations insofar as conscription of workers had gradually been increased (see Best, 1989, 24-25). Moreover, military production brought about a convergence of interests between the business corporations and the trade unions as it became a mechanism of creating\keeping jobs (see Marcuse, 1964, 33-34). In sum, the military played a significant role in mobilizing the peripheral social groups to support the capitalist order, and, thus, contributed to the reproduction of this order.
At the second level, the peripheral groups, notwithstanding their orientation, have not attained equal status within the military in relation to that of the dominant groups. An inequitable ethno-class functional division of labor was, then, shaped in many militaries, granting dominance to the same social group who had acquired dominance outside the military (such as the WASP groups in the U.S., the European-originated groups in Israel, and other dominant ethnic groups in ethnically divided societies, as it was portrayed by Enloe, 1980). In many cases, dominant groups impeded the peripheral groups' promotion within the military and even the recruitment itself (Enloe, ibid). Nevertheless, that structure did not provoke social protest and was even perceived as a legitimate structure by the social agents involved. The underlying perception was that this structure had existed precisely in a mass, seemingly egalitarian-rational military, inculcating its personnel with the idea that their individual status was determined by objective, achievement-oriented criteria inherent in the military's needs, rather than by ascriptive criteria of ethnic-class affiliation. To move one step farther, dominant groups could, thereby, utilize their status within the military, mainly when they had gained military achievements in battlefield, to legitimize their social power outside the military, as the telling linkage between participation in war and allocation of social rights suggests. This was at the root of the latter's impact in aiding the reproduction of the ethnic-class division of labor.
This military mode of action was certainly not a conspiracy, nor were its carriers aware of its possible connection with the reproduction of interethnic-interclass relations. Military leaders acted according to their lights to build the military, as an intended, visible and monitored action. They thereby turned to mass conscription but, inevitably, the creation of a modern military meant that the ostensibly rational, objective criteria determining an individual soldier's status were in fact geared toward the education, values, and primary skills of the dominant groups.
The combined consequence of the military work at the two levels was that, peripheral groups sometimes turned to struggle for attaining access into the military, perceiving it as both a promising and reliable channel of social prestige and mobility. By preferring this pragmatic strategy they, in fact, mitigated the potential ethnic-class struggle, and thus, actually and unintentionally, played a role in perpetuating their own inferiority. (When groups opted for an opposite strategy, namely, to resist war and military service, they, again, downscaled their social resistance, as indicated by Young, 1984).
For example, American Blacks came up with the slogan "the right to fight" in the 1950's. They perceived military service as a significant channel of social mobility, in comparison with the civil channels which were closed to them (Moskos, 1970, 108-111; 1984, 142-143). Thus, the enhanced social value of military service -- a development that had been nurtured by the force-oriented discourse, prevailing at the period-- actually helped mitigate social tensions, as the Blacks channeled their protest to the military arena and thus downscaled their protest in other arenas.
The same strategy (with similar impacts) was adopted by the Israeli Black Panthers in the 1970's. They were appalled by the huge social gaps that had been existed between the second and third generations of Oriental immigrants and the veteran Ashkenazi (European) population. One of their major demands was to be drafted. Implicitly, they internalized the legitimate rules of the game in Israeli society, including military service as the supreme criterion for the allocation of rewards, a kind of "entry ticket" into the society (Etzioni-Halevi, 1975, 505). This strategy reflected the Israeli military's supreme social status which enabled it to play a significant role in reproducing the interethnic power relations within the Israeli Jewish community.
The groups' tendencies were congruent with the European socialist conception originating in the thought of Marx and Engels, who advocated, during the middle of the 19th century, broader military conscription as a source for channeling resources to the working class. Their approach inspired the viewpoint of the European left-wing parties for decades, despite its inherent paradox (see Chorley, 1973, 248; Neumann & Hagen, 1986, 279-280).
These were the major domains in which the military served the state. All of them were an outcome of an intended and visible policy, being controlled by the political civil authorities and aimed at fulfilling the military professional tasks. Nevertheless, the consequences went beyond and effected several civil domains, devoid of the awareness of the actors involved, hence, out of the reach of political control.significant role in reproducing the interethnic power relations within the Israeli Jewish community.
Arguably, the military's ability to fulfill these services was conditional on sustaining its image as a universalist, professional organization, as figure 1 sketch.significant role in reproducing the interethnic power relations within the Israeli Jewish community.
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This image presents the military as subordinate to legitimate political authorities i.e., acting according to a professional code of political neutrality, deficiency of particularist political inclinations. This image practically reduced the social actors' capacities to shape their consciousness with regard to the military's engagement in expected civil domains, a consciousness that might set in motion a political debate over the military's functioning. Clearly, open military intervention in politics would have hindered military officers' from presenting their opinion as a professional rather than a politically-loaded one. Visible political engagement would have also engendered youngsters' resistance to military discipline (or even to resist conscription), perceiving it as a political discipline. Under the same conditions, the military would have lost its attractiveness in the eyes of peripheral social groups when its ethnic-class bias was reveal. Indeed, these consequences were actualized especially in situations of military failures, in which trends of demilitarization prevailed (see below).
Maintaining the universalist image was thus conditional upon avoiding actions which could damage the military's unique status by imbuing it with particularist political tendencies. This task accomplished by subjecting the military to effective political control. Again, this was an unintended consequence as well: Politicians worked to bolster their administrative capacity, entailing, as it will be recalled, effective supervision over the military; but, in fact, they also unintentionally set the military to serve the state's internal needs. Those services were the assets attained by the state in return for its beneficent approach to the military, as the relations of exchange demonstrate.
Regimentation of the military thus exceeded the boundaries of institutional mechanism of state bureaucracy-making. In other words, the fortification of the professional ethos of the military men --to draw boundaries between politics and military and to subject the military to visible "Objective Control" in Huntington's terms (1957, 84-85) -- was paradoxically the process which facilitated the military's invisible engagement with politics.
Based on this analysis, I would offer to elucidate the concept of political control of the military by subdividing it into two levels: formal control versus substantive control.
Formal versus Substantive Control
The subdivision between formal versus substantive control suggests that within each state, political control is permanently exercised along two levels simultaneously, but at different degrees of dosage. Figure 2 introduces the schematic picture.
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Formal control, the explicit focus of the sociology of military, and the implicit one of state formation school, deals with the control of the military as an organization, in order to confine its functioning to a state-formulated repertoire of activities. The outcome of those arrangements of control is molding an instrumental military in the "ideal" sense of the term, devoid of any permeability to partisan influence (i.e. "Objective Control," as is suggested by Huntington ,1957, 84-85). This type is labeled as high formal control. Formal control concentrates on the operational dimension of military actions, e.g., operation planes, policy of conscription1 alert, budget, armament, appointments of high-rank officers, etc. Although the practices of control implemented through formal, organizational channels, social and political groups might attain or demand access to these channels as a means to influence the outcomes of control, be it through the press, lobbying, demonstrations, etc, such as the emergence of American protest groups during the Vietnam War. Formal control thus deals with the direct political control over the military's visible and intended action. Situation whereby the military is enjoying broad autonomy vis-a-vis civil authorities, like the Third world type or the premodern Western model, we will be labeled as low formal control.
Substantive control, on the other hand, deals with the control gained by social groups over the state's invisible use of the military for internal control missions, especially within the domains introduced above, in which military action produces unintended impacts. This level of control is, in fact, the societal control over the role played by the state, as a mechanism for the monopolistic management of the means of violence, in shaping the social-political order by using the military. Itfollows that while formal control is a tangible mechanism, substantive control is an abstract mechanism, exercised only through the political discourse, and cannot be increased or decreased through formal procedures such as legislation. Still, activity at this level might affect formal channels, but it is an indirect impact, issued from political discourse with a deep cultural meaning. Utopian substantive control is, then, realized when political discourse carries on by the major social groups, dominant and peripheral alike, fully aware of the invisible dimension of state violent action. Since utopia generally remains as such, we expect to find social groups, which, throughout their very political action, also raise new issues on the political agenda. Indeed, the activity by some peace movements is indicative of an action with partial awareness. Against this background, Shaw (1988, 104-107) called for a link between the anti-war movements (as the historical, unsuccessful CND in Britain) and the radical social movements, as the target is not violence alone but the state-society relations that incubated the organization of violence. The optimal outcome is a strategic change that affects not only, or not necessarily, operative variables, but notably the role played by the armed forces and/or by the state's control of violence in shaping the social order. By this, one may infer that a high level of substantive control was formed.
The antithetical type to the utopian one, the lowest profile of substantive control, is, accordingly, militarism. This is a non-rational value system, holding the value of war as a goal in and of itself (Vagts, 1959, 13-14); and being inculcated, as noticed above, in several civil spheres beyond political discourse, such as culture, education, communication, sexual power relations, and more. The essence of militarism lay in its apprehension of the use of force as part of the natural state of affairs by members of the community. As this ideology embedded as an institutionalized norm, cultural limitations are set to raise questions concerning the meanings and alternatives of the force-oriented statecraft. Accordingly, militarism becomes a mechanism of domination, of internal expansion of the state, and of neutralizing civil society groups, as is described above. In this case, not only is the force-oriented behavior of the state not disputed, but the military's activities as well. The military then can be exploited by the state for the latter's internal needs without disturbance.
As will be remembered, the two levels of control exist simultaneously. Activity at one level might affect activities at the other. Moreover, activity that is supposed to effect one level might effect the other. If so, transitions from one box to the other, on figure 2, are to be expected. However, it is worth emphasizing that the term "transition" represents a general trend, rather than a "terminal station".
The Relations between the Levels of Control
In situations of state building or state coping with internal crisis, we may expect to find an inverse relation between the two levels of control (transition from box 1 to 2). State making, as argued above, constantly fuels a growing trend toward militarization of the political discourse. Consequently, members of the political community are denied opportunities to participate in a substantial discourse concerning both the visible and the invisible use of force by the state, hence, substantive control over the state declines.
For example, in the U.S., the political discourse dealing with the Cold War portrayed the war as a predetermined pattern. The American approach was therefore accepted as a policy forced upon the country by an external entity while America lacked a real capacity to shape the situation autonomously. Consequently, only a few people could really challenge the dominant approach and address the alternatives (Paterson, 1971). Clearly, this situation reinforced the military establishment, hence, its ability to invisibly serve the state's internal expansion as it was described above.
In Israel, the political discourse, as it was formulated during the state's first years, portrayed the establishment of the state as an act of military heroism. It emphasized military symbols, while downplaying the civilian forces' part in state making, and ingrained the use of force with almost metaphysical gravity. Internalizing this spirit, the left-wing parties took a pragmatic stand on the Israeli activist approach toward the Arab countries, culminating in the Israel-initiated Suez War (1956), thus, they were actually sucked into the political consensus of which force-oriented statism was at the center (see Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1989; Barzilai, 1992, 59-82). The enfeeblement of the left was also pronounced in the contribution made by the force-oriented discourse to the growing delegitimization of pacifist outlooks, having been portrayed as an orientation toward shirking of one's national-security duties. As a result, no effective peace movements had sprang up despite the centrality of the conflict with the Arabs within the Israeli experience (see Herman, 1989, 204-213). Consequently, the military could serve the state's internal control in domains such as political mobilization and intrethnic relations.
Paradoxically, the militarization of political discourse increased formal control (transition from box 1 to 2). It shaped the conditions for creating the structural relations of exchange between the state and the military, in which the assimilation of force-oriented discursive patterns appeared in tandem with a restraint of the military organization. There again Mills (ibid) describes the instruments available for politicians to control the military, albeit their preference not to extract the use of them, thus, legitimated the military's engagement in steering the foreign policy.
In Israel, the growing power of the military also paved the way for institutionalizing political control over the military, and rules were formalized delineating the military's authority to initiate operations autonomously (see examples in Bar-Zohar 1975, 1066; Teveth 1971, 428). To illustrate the two-level linkage, insofar as this trend increased, the military enjoyed ever-more political influence, reaching its zenith after the Six Day War (1967). Then, re-institutionalization of arrangements delimiting the military leverage to initiate military operations took effect (see Horowitz, 1982; Pen, 1983, 137-138). Paradoxically, being shielded by its political subordination, military professional considerations have been portrayed as apolitical (or "above politics" to use Mills' dicta). Under this guise, the Israeli military could inculcate its worldview in the political realm; in fact, taking part in transforming the political discourse to a military discourse (Shapiro, 1991, 151-159). Furthermore, the Military's influence has been also pronounced in the institutionalization of arrangements that ensured its taking part in formulating the political-strategic doctrine. This took the form of officers' attendance in cabinet meetings, participation in diplomatic negotiations, etc. In short, relations of partnership between the political elites and the military establishment have been constructed, rather than relations of instrumental obedience (Pen, 1983). Consequently, both in the U.S. and Israel, the militaries accumulated political power owing to their inclination to accept political control, part of it ostensible.
In Germany, the crystallization of the unified state under the leadership of Bismarck from the 1860's, brought about, simultaneously, a gradual militarization of the new state with the creation of mechanisms to control the military. The militarization was expressed in establishing a broad coalition of political forces, supporting the military buildup concomitantly with military industrialization. That process ran in tandem with the tightening of civil control on the military. It was particularly felt in institutionalizing procedures of approving the military budget by the Richestag (the Septennat) --hence, enhancing the military's dependency on the Chancellor as a mechanism for mobilizing the needed political support --, and by constituting the Ministry of War (two means that had partially evolved from the Prussian state and were affected by growing political participation in the new German state). Nevertheless, these and other means of control did not erect significant obstacles to the militarization of the German politics with a universalist army in the center (see, Craig, 1955; Ritter, 1972; Kitchen, 1975). Similar processes were at work in other countries such as Russia and China in which tighten formal controls were implemented by the militant ruling parties (see Luckham, 1971, 23-24 on "apparatus control").
At the structural-discursive level, as a result of increased political supervision over the military, the focus of the political discourse shifted, from the question of the legitimacy of the state as a violent apparatus and the manner in which it used the military, to a discussion of how to optimize formal control over the taking-for-granted mechanisms of violence. Within this instrumental discourse, issues such as budget and purchase/manufacturing of new weapons systems were at the center. As a consequence, the force-oriented political discourse, by focusing on an instrumental rather than a coherent ideological worldview, had the effect of dismantling political consciousness rather than instilling it as a holistic system. In short, as formal control increased substantive control decreased.
At the micro level, the entry of retired officers into politics has not only been reflected in the penetration of military thought into the political sphere. The politicians, some of them former senior officers (or assisted by such), sharpened their scrutiny of the military. The end result was that the military lost a greater part of its operative-professional autonomy (see Horowitz, 1982 on the Israeli case, and Mills, ibid, on the U.S. military establishment). This operative-professional autonomy also drawn from a significant mechanism that had been created by controlled militaries as a means of self-compensation for losing political autonomy. This was the formulation of offensive doctrines, based on executing mass mobilization and operating modern weapons systems. Doctrines of this kind giving the military more autonomy vis-a-vis the politicians, owing to the complicated character of the operative planes, themselves wrapping in deep secrecy, beyond legitimizing growing material needs (Posen, 1988, 47-50). The mode in which the German controlled military was embroiled in World War I, through the steering of Schlieffen Plane, (see Levy, 1986) lends support to this argument. Accordingly, the more generals were forced to face military-skilled politicians, the more this autonomy eroded.
Yet, these relations between the levels of control (the transition from 1 to 2) could not be created in Third World countries, in which, as both Tilly and Giddens (ibid) indicated, conditions for creating the structural exchange mechanism of state-military relations have not been shaped. The state encountered difficulties in allocating not only material resources to the military, but also symbolic resources. Indeed, the state awarded prestige to the military but it was of low-value, awarded by a "weak" state, deficient a universalist status unlike its Western counterparts. On the other hand, the militaries themselves frequently claimed to represent the national interest better than the civilian officials did, as militaries were, indeed, the only framework wherein different social groups met, hence, embodying the nation more profoundly than state agencies. As Dietz (1991, 224) put it, "the military perceived the state to be distinct from the government".
Thus, Third-World militaries created "from within" an autonomous symbolic resource. Combining this evolution to the recalled martial autonomy of those militaries, one may understand why militaries were less motivated to accept the control of state civil agencies (see on the state weakness Mirsky, 1981; Nordlinger, 1977; Migdal, 1988). This orientation was furthered insofar as militaries were constituted on ascriptive rather than universalist foundations. Consequently, they were not only less competent to fulfill civil roles but -- denied a universalist status -- also less motivated to stay aloof from politics. Consequently, in situations of internal crisis, Western states had more leverage not only to expand the state's use of force to meet needs of internal control (at least discursively), but also to increase the formal control over the armed forces, and thereby to benefit from the armies' invisible missions. In Third World states, on the other hand, only the first part of the equation is expected, whereas the concurrent increase of military intervention in politics seems likely as well.
The pattern of inverse relations was still at work even when the process was running under conditions of social change within a "built" state, whereby liberal\materialist\ pacifist values partially supplanted the force-oriented ones. In this case, the military and some social groups, as Feld claimed (1968), relating to West Europe from the late 19th to early 20th centuries, were disputed whether the military profession is standing above civil politics. The marginalization of military values propelled militaries (or at least a part of their personnel) to express alienation toward the new political culture, which had impaired the militaries' social status. That orientation even brought about military intervention in politics and support for nationalist political parties, inasmuch as militaries had played an active historical role in state-building as in Germany and France. In short, increasing substantive control might create the potential for jeopardizing the underpinnings of formal control. Accordingly, there was a possibility of transition from 2 to 3; however, the end result remains within 2, but, as we shall now see, in a better position toward 4.
Increasing substantive control might generate another impact as well. This process entails increasing dispute over the military expanded roles, especially against the background of military failures, giving rise to trends of demilitarization. France, for instance, saw during the 19th and 20th centuries several debates over the preferred model for military conscription. By raising these debates, political groups, especially from the left-wing, actually questioned the military action at the substantive level beyond the formal control one, namely, the roles fulfilled by the French military beyond its professional ones. Those roles were not necessarily invisible but partially visible, intended and politically directed such as repression of laborers and intervention in shaping foreign-colonial policy (see Silver, 1994). In Germany this trend was even more pronounced. The World War I failure stimulated the appearance of antimilitarist movements concurrently with the infiltration of interclass tensions into the military. The latter phenomenon found its expression in the Italian army as well (Geyer, 1989, 92-94). Consequently, the Great War played a significant role in recrystallizing some European states inwardly (Tilly, 1993, 9-11).
These instances support the underlining argument that linked the military's universalist image to its ability to serve the state inwardly. The cases suggest that as military involvement within the civil sphere becomes blatant, social groups are more inclined to question its social role, hence, undermine the state's capacity to exploit the military internally. The existence of increasing substantive control is then apparent when issues of war and peace and of the military's status are meaningfully debated rather than presented as self-evident. But it follows that the debate might impact processes that go beyond the original debated issues. Moreover, groups, by intending to increase formal control, might, in practice, increase or decrease substantive control and vise versa, inasmuch as the military's available resources and visible roles are drawn from the profile of militarization, and again, vise versa.
Contrary to this period, from the 1960's Western militaries became more inclined to accept their own diminution, indicated in the reduction of mass conscription (transition from 2 to 4). The very constitution of the Western military on mass foundations restricted its leverage vis-a-vis state agencies, even when, paradoxically, the latter lowered the military's mass profile.
Under conditions of a transformation from totalitarian\authoritative regime to democracy civil politics is more likely to be reinforced (transition from 1/2 to 4). This process involves augmentation of both formal and substantive control, as the political groups, those associated with the political change, might hold the military liable for sustaining the old regime, and thus, to acquire global legitimation for the new regime as well. In this situation, the military would find it difficult to resist the new trends as it epitomizes a failing political formula. The formation of a new political discourse concomitantly with new arrangements of formal control in several states, such as Germany and Italy in the 1950's, Spain in the 1970's and Argentina in the 1980's, exemplify that pattern of relations between the levels of control.
Conclusion
By subdividing the concept of political control over the military into two levels: formal control versus substantive control, the comprehension of state-military relations is arguably expanded. The element common among current scholars, it will be recalled, is confining the concept of control solely to the formal level, whereby the military's visible and intended action is politically controlled. They thus, implicitly, have internalized the view that effective formal political control is a sufficient condition to ensure the separation of military from politics. In this paper I propose to question this seeming separation by exploring the invisible consequences of military action. My conclusion is that precisely that separation was at the root of the state's power to unintentionally activate the military to serve its internal control system, i,e, political needs, while concealing this use by underscoring the military's professional, instrumental and universal orientations. Discussion of political control entails, thereby, a distinction between the mechanisms which are suitable to control the military's visible action, i.e., formal control, and those suitable to control its invisible action, i.e., substantive control. This paper suggests that only by embracing the two-dimensional character of political control, can a comprehension of state-military relations be obtained.
Furthermore, the distinction between visible and invisible impacts of military action suggests that state-military relations are two-dimensional rather then one-dimensional. Tackling these relations entails an analysis of complicated relations in which the state has been served by the military in several domains beyond the purely professional one. Accordingly, the paper offers to deal with state military relations in terms of exchange rather than of a definite outcome of historical process, where exchange involves social prestige in addition to material resources. The advantage of this approach lies in its ability to analyze the manner in which the state has been able, albeit unintentionally, to utilize the military for its internal missions, with the assimilation of political control as one of the exchangeable resources. Here the discussion addressed questions such as: To what extent has the military benefitted from its subordination vis-a-vis the state civilian administration? Have those relations been profitable from the side of the state itself, beyond the administrative gain of taking control of the military?
Tackling these issues further illuminates the neglected linkage highlighting the apparent contradiction between two processes-- the enhancement of the state' 5 control over the military concomitant with the militarization of the modern state. The paper demonstrates that this contradiction emanates from the very nature of modern state making, which, on the one hand, underscored the centrality of the military institutions, exclusively operating the communal violence, i.e., existence; while on the other hand, through the very implications of the former's action, created conditions by which the political autonomy of the military has been decreased, mainly and paradoxically, due to its gains from the state. Here, by bringing into play the neglected variable in the school of state formation, i.e. military discourse, militarism could be treated as an exchangeable resource, rather than as a cultural phenomenon alone. This resource has been exchangeable within state-military-social groups' relations of bargaining : The state "produces" the resource through its control over communal existence. It "allocates" this resource to the military, the tangible implementator of the state's abstract responsibility, in return for political subordination. However, several social groups "consume" this resource, endowing them with national pride and prestige, and/or a framework of identification, and/or a sense of communal belonging and more. The problematic of these trilateral agents to acknowledge that pattern of bargaining has precluded the transition from box 2 to 4. If so, as it was already implied, militaries indeed accepted the reduction of their political autonomy, but their political impacts have increased owing to their social power.
My debate with the existing approaches exceeds the boundaries of the issue of political control, as it was initially presupposed. It is an argument against both the boundaries of politics and the essence of the modern state. By underscoring the separation between the military and politics, scholars limit politics to a visible exercise of power in the public arena by the state as an agency, a subjectivist view of the state, in Mitchell's terms (1991). Accordingly, militaries are apolitical as long as they adhere to their professional repertoire and accept formal, civil political dominance. Unlike this approach, politics might be related to all social domains which involve power and domination, including (or maybe particularly) the invisible dimension of public sphere, beyond governmental action. The proponents of that approach deal with the state not only as an agency but also as a structure of power relations which affects both state agencies' formal action and the social practices, in which the agents' orientations toward the state and toward other agents are shaped (see for example: Isaac, 1987; Wendt, 1987; Mason, 1990; Mitchell, 1991). Accordingly, military action is a political action as long as it affects power relations by its very nature of work, albeit invisibly and unintentionally. That is despite the seeming separation between military and politics, which is applied to the operative, visible action but not to its invisible impact on power relations.
It follows that real depolitization of military action involves not only its formal subordination but also its substantive diminution. Indeed, mass militaries have gradually declined as pacific trends in the industrial world prevailed, concurrent with the assimilation of high-tech weapons systems at the expense of standard arms (an addition example of the linkage between the two levels of control). The state thus has moderated its pressures on its youth, as illustrated in the abolition or reduction of the period of compulsory service. That trend has simultaneously supported and been supported by the emergence of an orientation toward autonomous political action among the young generation, as witnessed by the pacifist and "green" movements in Europe (Shaw, 1991, 184). Indeed, the pacifist trends signified a real increase in the political community's substantive control over the state's violent action, due to the convergence between raising new, "dissensual" issues on the political agenda and the demise of mass armies (solidifying the transition from 2 to 4). This process inevitably decrease the military's invisible impacts on social domains through, primarily, the declining linkage between citizenship and military service. We, then, may conclude that political control, in the formal meaning of the term, had proved ineffectual inasmuch as it worked within the confines of state administrative channels and consensual force-oriented discursive patterns. Only by exceeding those limits, can more effective political (substantive) control be formed.
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