Military Doctrine and Political Participation: Toward a Sociology of Strategy

Wars produce contrasting effects on the state's status in the domestic arena: they bolster its internal control but, at the same time, create opportunities for collective action of which domestic groups can take advantage and weaken state autonomy. As the case of Israel suggests, within the confines of geo-political constraints, states modify their military doctrine to balance the two contradictory impacts. The main purpose of the paper is to lay the foundation for a Sociology of Strategy by drawing on the case of Israel.

The Two-Faced War: A Conceptual Background

States produce power from wars. A state's monopoly on the use of the societal means of violence is the ordering principle of its internal control (Weber, 1972, 78). Monopoly control over violence is also the basis of a state's sovereignty relative to other members of the international system. Sovereignty, in turn, gives the state powers of coercion over internal activities (see Schmitt, 1976; Tilly, 1985a; Thomson, 1994). In practice, states exploited the state of anarchy in the international system that unintentionally resulted in the creation of bureaucratic coping mechanisms (Tilly, 1985b; see also Lake, 1992).

Historically, needs originating externally and state rulers' manipulation of domestic power centers worked together to centralize the modern state. The introduction of massive artillery and gunpowder in warfare in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries propelled state agencies to extract resources for military buildup whenever (competition-oriented) geo-political conditions necessitated and/or permitted it (Tilly, 1985a; 1992). Conscription was imposed on the domestic population when growing needs for disciplined manpower could no longer be met by mercenaries (Thomson, 1994). The state then became the exclusive entity able to underwrite and maintain a military (Andreski, 1971, 98-99; Finer, 1975; Tilly, 1985b; Weber, 1972, 221-223). At the same time, state activities, aimed at preparing for and legitimizing war, also became a lever for internal state expansion. Civilian bureaucracies dealing with mass conscription, tax collection, military production, and territorial centralization were products of this process (see Barnett, 1992; Hooks, 1990; Hooks and McLauchlan, 1992; Giddens, 1985; Jaggers, 1992; Mann, 1988; Porter, 1994; Skocpol, 1988; Tilly, 1992).

Administrative power was also evident in the ability of the state to penetrate and regulate societal relations which was due in part to civilian roles the military assumed. Among the impacts of that penetration were: 1) shaping the criteria for granting citizenship (see Janowitz, 1976); 2) internalizing habits of discipline and obedience among the individuals subjected to military rule and thus assisting in molding the entire social order (see Foucault, 1977, 139-170, and Mitchell, 1991a, 92-94 for interpretation of Foucault); 3) providing a new source for individual commitment and loyalty, in many cases overshadowing former objects of those attitudes and cutting the individual off from traditional ties such as ethnic groups. This also results in the inculcation of loyalty towards the state, a process which is especially significant during state-building (see for example Harries-Jenkins, 1982; Migdal, 1988, 23); 4) affecting the state's capacity to regulate interethnic/interclass relations in the civilian sphere by monitoring groups' differential access to positions in the armed forces (Enloe, 1980).

But war-making had a contradictory impact as well. Drawing from approaches focused on collective action, "state building creates an opportunity structure for collective action of which movements take advantage" (Tarrow, 1994, 62). Within this framework, mass mobilization, by bringing together many people, produced new channels of communication. Moreover, the heavy burden of war also provided both opportunity and target for political action (ibid., 65-68).

Historically, the scope of citizenship in Europe increased from the end of the eighteenth century onward in return for the imposition of direct statist rule with the constitution of mass armies based on conscription of the domestic population rather than mercenaries (Thomson, 1994). Social groups then capitalized on their participation in war and in preparation for war, which encompassed taxation, production, and particularly conscription (hereafter: "military participation"), to claim and attain political and material resources and/or rights from the state. As for the state, it was willing to accede as a means to mobilize for war. Consequently, wars accelerated the allocation of civil, political, and social rights to those who had borne the burden of war (Andreski, 1971; Feld, 1975; Janowitz, 1976; Marwick, 1988; Tilly, 1994; 1995; Titmus, 1976, 75-87). After all, as "the voice of the people is heard loudest when governments require either their gold or their bodies in defense of the state" (Porter, 1994, 10).

War-incited growth in the living standard together with the stimulation of social demands propelled state expansion to meet the new demands and so forth. At the extreme, states lost a great deal of their autonomy over internal agents and, hence, became more constrained by those agents' preferences (as state-centered theories have conceptualized state autonomy, see for example Krasner, 1978, 10; Skocpol, 1985) and even experienced a crisis (see for different versions dealing with Keynsian state crisis: Brittan, 1975; Crozier et al, 1975; Habermas, 1975; O'Connor, 1973; Offe, 1975; Wolfe, 1977).

It follows that the state, in fact, copes with a structural tension, stemming from the contradiction between the accumulation of power by means of war and the creation of an opportunity structure for political action that undermines state autonomy, i.e., the contradictory impacts of military participation. Force-oriented behavior on the part of the state thus not only serves its needs for internal control but, on the contrary, this behavior might actually increase the political costs of internal control. If this is so, how does the state in practice deal with this dilemma? The underlying schools leave us in the dark with regard to this question.

Going one step further, the state can aggravate or mitigate this structural tension by modifying its military doctrine, hence modifying the volume of military participation, as figure 1 summarizes.

FIGURE 1: MODIFYING MILITARY DOCTRINE

According to the neorealists, military doctrine embodies rational action on the part of the state in dealing with the perceived anarchic nature of the international system (see mainly Waltz, 1979). Accordingly, military doctrine explicitly deals with military means -- the character and methods of employment alike--which are available to the state. This multiplied by previously created resources and calculated by the effects state's behavior might have on its adversary by choosing either defense or offense (Glaser, 1994/95; Posen, 1988).

Nevertheless, military doctrine reflects not only rational calculations but also reflects and affects, simultaneously, the distribution of power in the society mainly through the pattern of recruitment. From this pattern derived the power held by the military itself and the groups controlling and staffing its ranks and the social order aimed at extracting the resources needed to maintain this mode of recruitment. Hence, under the constraints of the geo-political arena, military doctrine is crafted by internal, political processes whereby state agencies (including the military itself) and social groups bargain over the levels of military participation.

Bargaining may take three forms (sometimes simultaneously), each of which impacts groups' capacities to participate in shaping the polity and are inspired by the actual or expected outcomes of military participation:

1. A direct discourse on military doctrine as the cases of the U.S. and France exemplifies. Traditional debates between the left and right in France about the length of conscription (with implications for the use of armed forces for domestic purposes) attest to the important role domestic considerations play in shaping the mode of military service within the confines of previously constructed political and military culture (see Kier, 1995; Silver, 1994, 321-329). Likewise, the libertarian American political culture "largely considered obligatory military service to violate the social contract between citizens and the nation" (Silver, 1994, 330), because of the very nature and the power it grants to the government. Invoking this cultural pattern, the Congress and social movements occasionally impeded presidential attempts to extend recruitment during peacetime and played a leading role in the abolition of the draft in 1973.
2. A blatant attempt to disempower peripheral groups by preventing access to arms. Demobilization of Afro-Americans from the U.S. Military after wars exemplifies this pattern (Enloe, 1980, 68-75). This paper, however, is focused on the third, one that is neglected in scholarship:
3. A political process that directly shapes presumed military affairs but actually, in an indirect and covert manner, determines the extent of the military burden and, hence, the level of military participation. Two main issues are at stake: (a) Changing offensive/defensive methods: Defensive tenet prolongs war by allowing for a protracted defense posture until reserve/rear-based forces can be mobilized and reach the front to mount an offensive. By contrast, an offensive doctrine eliminates this time-consuming process by means of a preemptive strike or a preventive war. The war is thus potentially concluded more quickly and is consequently of shorter duration. This permits the reduction of civil participation in wars, which in turn, vitiates the potential political claims to be made by the participants in return for having taken a part. (b) Altering the armament composition of the military: Infantry soldiers engage in direct contact with the enemy-victim. Arguably, soldiers who had experienced face-to-face combat are more likely to be motivated to act politically after the war because they become aware of the human meaning of war for victims and victimizers alike. If so, the more soldiers distanced from their enemy-victim, the more likely their political consciousness remains dormant (see Barnet, 1972, 13-15 on the Vietnam War).

By changing doctrine according to this line and in reaction to the impacts of military participation on political participation, states in practice balance the contradictory impacts of military participation. If the state empowers social groups through its military doctrine, i.e. giving groups access to political power via arms, it might also disempower groups by reducing this access through the very same methods. Put differently, if intensive military participation might be translated into political action, lower military participation, ceteris paribus, might lower the intensity of political participation. However, whereas state agencies and social groups are highly conscious of empowerment as we may infer from the cases of the U.S. and France, disempowerment is in many cases an unintended consequence of a state rational action.

I will therefore blend the underlying arguments of statist theoreticians, IR scholars, and the proponents of culture-centered approach (such as Kier and Silver) to move one step farther by using the case of Israel as an illustration. The next sections present the main milestones through which Israel's military doctrine was developed. The concluding section infers from the case in point broader theoretical implications.

The Evolution of Israel's Military Doctrine

The Arab-Israeli conflict originated in the frictions which emerged between Jews and Palestinians in Palestine mainly under the rule of the British during 1918-1948. Palestinian resentment towards Jewish immigration into Palestine was the direct stimulus to an intercommunal conflict. Similar to other historical instances, the conflict was instrumental to the crystallization of the pre-state pattern of rule, by which the Jewish elites established centrist institutions dealing with the mobilization of the community for the carrying out of the conflict. Both the need to establish a separate labor market, as a means to provide employment to the Jewish immigrants, and to deal with scarcity of territorial resources were functional factors in this regard. Both processes -- the development of the conflict and the evolution of the Jewish control structure -- culminated with two major events in 1948: the establishment of the State of Israel and the outbreak of war between the Jewish community and the neighboring Arab states. Taking advantage of the high capacity for mobilization and extraction of resources, the Jewish state achieved victory over the Arab armies. This also marked the conflict's transformation from the intercommunal to the interstate level (see mainly Shafir, 1989; Kimmerling, 1976).

Faced with the management of enduring conflict with Arab countries perceived as fundamental hostile from 1948 onward, Israeli governments opted for methods that intentionally aimed at ensuring two contradictory goals: 1) bridging the gap between Israel's perceived demographic and territorial inferiority vis-à-vis the Arabs countries, and 2) reducing the social burden of the conflict to permit Israeli society to embark on a normal road of state building. Still, the latter also worked unintentionally to reduce political participation of social groups. In other words, I will argue that by disempowering social groups, the state was able to manage the conflict autonomously and became empowered by the very management of war. On the other hand, when the prolongation of the war empowered those groups the state lost part of its autonomy. De-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict entwined with reorientation of military doctrine was the result.

Two main methods were instrumental. First, the state worked to lighten the burden upon reserve soldiers (i.e., civilians) by making future wars shorter due to both adopting an offensive doctrine and increasing the burden upon the regular (conscripted) army. Second, the state converted its infantry-based army into a force founded on armor and air power, and, subsequently, to one partially founded on state-of-the-art technology.

I will enumerate four main phases through which Israel's doctrine was developed: 1) infantry-based defensive orientation during the state's first years, 2) transformation to armor- and air-force-based offensive thrust during the 1950s-1970s and, 3) following the doctrine crisis of the 1970s-1980s, 4) the 1990s moves toward de-escalation of the Arab-Israeli conflict entwined with reliance on technology-based weapons systems.

1. Reorientation from Defensive to Offensive Posture

The 1948 War was the epitome of mass, military participation: Most adult males were mobilized, part of the female population was called up, and noncombatant civilians were also involved, as the nature of the conflict and Israel's geo-political conditions blurred the distinction between front and rear. However, military participation saw gradual decline from that point. To begin, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was reorganized. Two years of compulsory service were imposed on most Jewish youth at the age of 18. Conscription was egalitarian as it encompassed men and women, veteran citizens and new immigrants, albeit it excluded Palestinian citizens and exempted ultra-Orthodox Jews. The army's core was a small regular army, comprising primarily conscripts, with the officer corps and part of the professional echelon staffed by career personnel. A large reserve army was also established (inspired by the Swiss model), composed of conscripts obligated to do several weeks of reserve duty every year in order to maintain their fitness as soldiers in case of war. The standing army, according to this model, functions as the "manufactory" of the reserve army as well as the initial forces assigned to curb an enemy's attack until mobilization of the reserves can be completed.

The military-political elite thus preferred a small standing army backed up by a large, well-trained reserve force to a large standing army and a small, untrained reserve force (a model posited by some generals), or a small, elitist army backed up by a larger reserve forces (a model posited by the left-wing, see Gelber, 1989; Shapira, 1985, 18-61). This model facilitated a maximum extraction of manpower as a means to bridge the gaps between Israel's perceived inferiority vis-à-vis the Arab countries in both territorial and demographic terms, but without overburdening the civilian sectors. Indeed, the government discharged the majority of the 1948 conscripts. A decrease in the military burden was also achieved as the chosen model facilitated abbreviation of a war's length owing to the high level of readiness of the reserves, who could move quickly to the offensive following a brief defensive stage (see Barnett, 1992, 161, 169-176; Neeman, 1985). By contrast, the use of untrained reserves would delay a transition to the offensive until they could be readied, while reliance on an elitist army entailed further increase of the burden upon the reserves. They would have been assigned to missions which are beyond the small standing army's capacity.

In concordance with this capacity, a defensive doctrine was formulated by which Israel would not initiate a war. Should war erupt, the standing army will act to curb the enemy until the mobilization of the reserves, when the fighting will be carried into the enemy's territory. The war must be kept short owing to the state's economic and political constraints (Wallach, 1987).

The decrease in military participation was further advanced by two moves. Beginning in 1954, and more acutely after the Czech Arms Deal by which Egypt was supplied with Soviet modern armament (1955), the defense establishment began to formulate an offensive doctrine to meet the new Arab challenge of a "second round" of war. Whereas the defensive approach dictated an "absorption" of an Arab-initiated attack, the revised, offensive doctrine prescribed an initiation of war by means of a preemptive strike or a preventive war. Indeed, the offensive conception was ultimately given expression in the Israeli-initiated Sinai Campaign/Sues War (1956) in which Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip. Subseuently, institutionalization of this doctrine found its expression in formulation of a rigid casus belli for an Israel-initiated war, notably based on the entry of a foreign army into Jordan and the entry of Egyptian forces into the Sinai (see Horowitz, 1973).

Beyond deterring the Arabs and confronting regional uncertainty, shortening a future war caused the shift in military doctrine. To recall, offensive posture shortens war (see Levite, 1988, 65-66). Moreover, the state drew on conscripts, rather than reserves, for the growing needs of manpower, either by the drastic downsizing of non-combat missions, or by extending the compulsory military service from 24 to 30 months (Ben-Gurion, 1971, 71-72, 93, 175-178). Together with arrangements that ensured a rapid shift to a war footed by the civilian sector (Kimmerling, 1985), the offensive doctrine permitted Israel to move swiftly from a routine situation to a situation of war and vice versa. This also worked to reduce the social costs of managing the war. Overall, the state's dependence on the reserves thus decreased (on the doctrinary change see, Aronson and Horowitz, 1971; Handel, 1973, 21-36; Horowitz, 1979; 1985; Levite, 1988, 65-66; Morris, 1993; Shimshoni, 1988, 34-122).

Since adjustment of military doctrine involved a change in the composition of the army from infantry-based to armor-based backed by massive air-force, it was the second mode by which military participation was curtailed. The growth of armor, artillery, and air capabilities meant relying on weapons that create distance, hence alienation, between the fighter and his victim. The resulting desensitization to war's human meaning reduces the likelihood that military participation will be converted into political action.

In a similar fashion, military buildup did not exceed boundaries that might have overburdened the society, hence the polity. Utilizing the secret reactor that had been established in 1958 with French cooperation, nuclear weapons apparently began to be developed and became available in 1969 (see Aronson, 1992, 83-111; Dowty, 1975; Evron, 1987, 17-21). With the military buildup backed-up by nuclear weapons, there was no need for the state to further increase the conventional military, hence military participation, beyond the level that was actually materialized.

Overall, the state could manage the external conflict with greater autonomy. Indeed, the immediate results were pronounced in the Sinai Campaign. It was managed as an "elite war." Conceived and planned in complete secrecy by Prime Minister Ben-Gurion and a few advisers, it was not brought to the cabinet for approval until almost the eleventh hour. The upgrading of the army's offensive capability in the years preceding the war enabled a lightning operation to be mounted, with most of the burden falling on the standing army. Casualties were negligible--230, 0.01 percent of the total population (Sussman, 1984, 14) and the civilian rear was unharmed. The government was therefore in a position to bow to the pressure of the superpowers and order a speedy withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula without arousing significant domestic opposition.

State autonomy was not the only thing at stake. Due to war-making, the state could advance its internal empowerment (I neglect the question about the extent to which this affected the state's external moves). To begin, the assertions made by proponents of state formation hold true with respect to the case of Israel, namely, the war contributed to the development of civilian bureaucracies dealing with mass conscription, tax collection, and military production (see Barnett, 1992, 155-176). Yet state's internal expansion was of more crucial importance in the case in point since the state's empowerment involved a clash between state agencies and the political parties with Mapai, the ruling party, in the center. The latter assumed quasi-statist functions during the period which antedated the state's establishment in domains such as education, immigration absorption, regulation of the labor market, and more (see Kimmerling, 1993; Migdal, 1989). Owing to the management of war, the state consolidated its preferential status over the party power centers.

at another level, the statist ideology, Mamlachtiyut, which inculcates the idea that the state is a supreme entity over partisan forces, drew part of its power from the IDF. Its very mass-based, universal conscription worked to inject the ideological conception that the IDF functioned as an interethnic "melting pot," as only in the military could all Israeli Jews meet on equal terms, without social barriers (see Ben-Gurion, 1971, 42-43). Clearly, the ethos of "melting pot" played a leading role in the state's absorption of the influx of Oriental Jews from Arab countries during the 1950s. Despite their deprivation by state agencies, the Orientals' very participation in the prestigious, mass military service signified an "entry ticket" into the society, thus mitigating interethnic tensions (see Levy, 1994).

The buildup of a mass army, moreover, created a channel for direct dialogue between the state and its citizens through an organization which was a meeting point for most Jewish youngsters. Interaction between the IDF and Israeli society was structured along "fragmented boundaries" (in Luckham's 1971 term): civilian values highly penetrate the military, and vice versa, along several dimensions due to the civilian roles taken by the IDF (Ben-Eliezer, 1994; Lissak, 1984). Consequently, citizens were affected bit by bit by state-controlled channels of communication supplanting the pre-state party-controlled social networks (see Galnoor, 1982). Through those channels, the military became a key mechanism for inculcating collective values among young people and, thus, playing its part in conservatizing them (Ben-Eliezer, 1993). At another level, the reorientation from defensive to offensive posture prompted a diversion of manpower from the party-based agricultural movements who had held control over part of the manpower for their purposes (a unit known as the Nahal) to the combat units. In consequence, the state gained direct control of its draftees, without resorting to the mediation of a sectorial power center.

In sum, reorienting the military doctrine, the state successfully balanced the production of power from war-produced intensive military participation and the reduction of the intensity of political participation. Still, military doctrine involved an innate problematic as the 1967 Six-Day War reveals.

2. From 1967: Expanding the "Security Margins"

In May 1967, Egypt sent a large force into the Sinai Peninsula. This was a violation of a bilateral, tacit arrangement that Sinai would remain demilitarized, a violation that looked to Israel like a clear casus belli (Horowitz, 1985, 71). The situation then snowballed. Israel called up its reserves and asked the powers to bring about Egypt's withdrawal from Sinai. Egypt exacerbated the crisis by causing the removal of the U.N. forces that were stationed in Sinai and by blocking the Straits of Tiran to Israeli navigation at the end of May. In response, Israel continued to mobilize, finally calling up the entire army.

During the "waiting period" for war, public criticism of the government for its inaction while the reserves were mobilized and the economy was paralyzed, was voiced loudly. Groups called for a cabinet reshuffle. Such an attempt at intervention by extra-elite groups in the extremely sensitive national-security sphere was remarkably unusual within the Israeli political culture of the period. Ultimately, the combined pressures brought about the appointment of General Moshe Dayan, the prominent chief of staff during the Sinai Campaign, as defense minister on June 1, 1967. Therein lay the inner weakness latent in the Israeli military doctrine: not only was the government's reaction bound to force-oriented action by formulating a rigid casus belli, but further, although an offensive doctrine was formulated, the government in practice reacted within the limits of a defensive posture, i.e., keeping reservists on a full-war footing but idle for a lengthy period. Moreover, the political costs could have greatly increased had the reservists been discharged without seeing action. So, once the government formulated a rigid casus belli that relied on a call-up of reservists, its hands were tied in dealing with the crisis other than by vigorous military means.

Dayan's appointment tipped the scales in favor of a war initiative within four days, after five weeks of a "waiting period." On June 5 Israel launched a surprise preemptive strike on Egyptian airfields together with a ground thrust across the Sinai that was soon extended to the Jordanian and Syrian fronts. The war ended in six days with a massive Israeli victory marked by the destruction of the fighting Arab armies and the conquest of large territories.

Grasping the lesson of the war, the government revised the military doctrine, central to which was the displacement of "preemptive strikes" by "defensible borders" (Horowitz, 1985, 72-73). Accordingly, Israel's leaders attempted to hold a part of the occupied territories even after any future political solution to ensure total security against the perceived Arab threat. These territories furnished Israel with strategic depth, distancing the border (and the enemy) from the main population centers and hence, downplaying the necessity of civil defence, which had been acute as long as the boundaries between rear and front were blurred. From this approach derived Israel's longstanding reluctance to make territorial concessions. To a large extent, the existence of nuclear capabilities beginning in 1969 backed up this status quo-based military doctrine, even though Israel shrouded its nuclear deterrence capability in ambiguity (Aronson, 1992, 123-137). With this revision of military doctrine, no longer was it necessary to define rigid "red lines" and to cling to the idea of the preemptive strike, as became clear in October 1973, when Israel absorbed an Egyptian-Syrian attack and only afterward contained it.

Concurrently, the size and armaments of the IDF were adapted to the new situation of Israel's presence in extensive territories and the needs of deterrence, as the Arab states continued to brandish the military option for securing their return. In contrast to the pre-1967 offensive orientation, the IDF was organized in line with a conception that was simultaneously offensive and defensive. This required a major expansion of armor, artillery, and air-force, particularly of the regular army (a move that was further set in the aftermath of the October War, 1973) (see Wald, 1987, 233-240). At the same time, the more convenient borders and nuclear capability reduced the need to increase the army, beyond what had already been effected.

With the updated security conception, conditions were created simultaneously to increase and decrease the state's internal autonomy vis-à-vis social groups in managing the external conflict. Owing to the absence of rigid casus belli and the upscaling of the standing army, the state was less dependent on mobilizing reserves, i.e., civilians. The shortage of state autonomy, which had been so blatant in the "waiting period," was thus rectified. And together with the enlargement of the regular army and the intensification of the use of weapons that created distance between the combatant and the enemy, the potential for military participation to shape political consciousness was mitigated. Indeed, an appearance of consciousness of this kind, albeit a minor one, was Fighters' Talk (The Kibbutz Movement, 1967), a compendium of responses to the war by the elite among the soldiers--the young generation of the Kibbutz Movement. Being mostly infantrymen (as their testimonies confirm), they agonized over the morality of their behavior in the war, which had frequently contradicted their civilian principles.

A long-term outcome of the augmentation of stae autonomy was felt in the Lebanon War (1982). This War was initiated by Israel to eradicate the Palestinian quasi-state that had been formed in Southern Lebanon and that was perceived as a threat to the Israeli population living by the border. For the first five months of 1982 the army sought a pretext for initiating the war to obtain the cabinet's go-ahead as long as the IDF's and Defense Minister Ariel Sharon's bellicose agenda was opposed by the majority of the cabinet members. Indeed, on more than one occasion Israeli troops were moved to the border region even before the cabinet gave the green light to launch the war in June 1982 (see Schiff and Yaari, 1983, 11-124).

Nevertheless, the government was able to set in motion a lengthy lead-up to war without generating political opposition, even though the government was dominated by the right-wing Likud Party who had faced resistance from the leftist Peace Now Movement (see below). Two major factors account for this expression of the state's increased autonomy in the military arena. First, the massive military buildup--focusing on the regular component of the military--enabled the government to launch a large-scale military offensive without calling up reserve forces, while the a regular army is by nature obedient and politically uninvolved. Consequently, potential protest from reservists was virtually precluded. In the apt phrase of Peace Now activist, a "gigantic symposium" of reservists on the impending war, like the great debate that characterized the "waiting period" before the Six-Day War, was averted. As a result, Peace Now was rendered ineffectual on the eve of the war (cited in Edelist and Maiberg, 1986, 324-325).

Second, opposition was also muted by the impact of the technologization of armaments on military-political thinking. The lead-up to the Lebanon War involved the use of the air force and artillery to strike at Palestinian civilian targets. In each episode the IDF's activity produced heavy Arab civilian casualities. Yet this was not perceived as controversial because the improved technology of the 1980s ensured the combatant's remoteness from the victim. For the same reason, soldiers were unlikely to turn to protest after their discharge and there was no documentation of events liable to shock political and public opinion. Consequently, even though the preparations for the war went on for almost a year and the public was aware of the government's intentions in part, there was no effective political opposition to the idea of launching a war. In practice, the very nature of the lead-up helped to create a partial consent by the main political parties to the initiation of war.

As for the civilian sphere, the state's empowerment in the post-1967 period was felt again in the same domains as in earlier periods but also in other domains owing to the war's outcomes. Most important was the role played by the occupied territories in creating state-controlled reservoirs of resources such as low-paid workers, market for trading goods, and lands (see Shalev, 1992, 270-271). Utilizing those resources, the state could improve the main social groups' standard of living and dissolving the economic crisis it had experienced in the 1960s. Moreover, the war enabled the state to repossess its supreme status vis-à-vis civilian forces who had utilized the military calm between the years 1956-1967 to claim resources and rights from the state. A slowdown of the liberal trend was the result (see Levy and Peled, 1994).

On the other hand, by refraining from a clear-cut decision between offensive and defensive postures, conditions were laid out to increase the security burden: Israel maintained military force for an offensive but at the same time deployed forces on forward defensive lines, neglecting the advantages of strategic depth, in addition to the human and financial burden entailed in so massive a military buildup. Arguably, a sharp decision could have reduced costs even without advancing peace options. So whereas for the short term the state still balanced between the confrontational attributes of its military doctrine, the underlying innate tension tipped the scale in favor of the counter direction. It was in this moment that the state overstepped the point of balance between administering military participation-produced political control and military participation-produced political participation which undermined state autonomy. The post-1967 wars signified this moment.

3. The 1970s-80s: Growing Costs Induce Doctrine's Accommodation

Contrary to the state trend towards reducing the burden of carrying out the conflict, the post-1967 wars represented a gradual increase in that burden due to the prolongation of the conflict and the deficiency the IDF displayed in the battlefields. To begin, during 1969-1970, the lengthy War of Attrition was fought along the Suez Canal. This war started because of Israel's continued occupation, and particularly the decision to hold the east bank of the Suez Canal as a rigid defensive line, thus preventing the waterway's reopening. In response, Egypt launched the war in order to get the canal reopened to civilian shipping (see Bar-Siman-Tov, 1988; Wald, 1987, 195; Yariv, 1985, 21-23). This round was completed in the October War (1973). It broke out with a surprise attack executed simultaneously by Egypt and Syria. Therein lay the weakness of the post-1967 military doctrine. It undermined IDF alertness and, thus, allowed for a surprise attack because of the reliance on strategic depth.

Subsequently, blatant in the Lebanon War was the government's eroding of its smooth initiative by expanding the original, partially agreed, goals of the war to include the reshaping of the political order in Lebanon, a move that entailed an unsuccessful military clash with the Syrian army stationed in Lebanon. Within this political framework, the IDF was forced to remain on south Lebanon's land for almost three more years as a conquering army, suffering heavy losses. Eventually, in 1985 Lebanese Shiite groups were successful in their resistance to the Israeli occupation when the government ordered the IDF to withdraw without achieving a formal agreement with the Lebanese government to assure the security of the Israeli population (see Horowitz, 1983). A same scenario repeated itself in the Intifada that erupted in 1987--the violent uprising by the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip against Israel's military rule. Then, it became clear that the IDF had a limited capacity to contain the uprising but not to annihilate it (Inbar and Sandler, 1992).

Manifestly, the post-1967 wars overburdened the carrying-out of the conflict. First, the total casualties of Israel were about 4,500, more than 0.15 percent of the total Jewish population. Second, a considerable extension of military service occurred during the years: Compulsory service for males was extended from 30 to 36 months during the War of Attrition; the expansion and altered nature of reserve duty, with routine-security assignments on a large scale, added to the original exclusive function of preparing for war. In general, this burden became 60-100 percent higher than the levels of the 1960s (measured by the yearly crude length of reserve duty), leading some to emigrate from Israel (Cohen, 1988). Subsequently, the military burden undermined public faith in the equitable distribution of the military burden among the members of the society (Arian, 1995, 62-65, 70). Third, the state's investment in security increased from about 8-10 percent of the GDP in 1957-1966 to about 11-16 percent in 1967-1972 and to about 16 percent of the GDP after 1973 (Berglas, 1986, 176; Trop, 1989, 52). Consequently, direct taxation of the GNP rose from 12 percent in 1967 to 24 percent in 1976 (Barnett, 1992, 229).

Paradoxically, as the consumerist middle class grew due to the economic boom incited by the 1967 War, its motivation to continue shouldering the burden of war decreased. The state, for its part, encountered difficulties in compensating this strata. Symbolically, battlefield gains paled in the face of blunders, diminishing the prestige of several groups that participated in the military. Materially, the state suffered from a fiscal crisis which was very evident in the increase in the national debt from about $980 million in 1965 to more than $9 billion in 1978, mainly attributable to military costs and the growth and sustenance of a high level of standard of living (Ben-Porath, 1986, 20-21). The growing American aid rising from $76 million in 1968 to about $1,250 million in each of the years 1974-1980 (Berglas, 1986, 183) partly helped deal with the national debt (Barnett, 1992, 231). The military burden, however, left in the state's hands very few resources to promote economic growth contrary to the past aftermath of wars (Shalev, 1992, 236-306). And on top of this, the Intifada, by disrupting both the entry of Palestinian workers into Israel and the Jewish colonization and other economic activities in the occupied territories, caused serious economic problems. It in fact nullified the 1967 War's material gains.

Notwithstanding these costs, political action could have been possibly delayed or mitigated had the IDF not deviated from the original balances implicit in the military doctrine. Critical were three contradictions stemming from the reality of a durable war: First, the IDF placed a heavy burden on infantry units contrary to the former trends, fighting in outposts along the Suez Canal and executing police missions as an occupation force in South Lebanon, West Bank, and Gaza Strip. Second, because of the wars' duration and scope, it was the reserves who bore the brunt of the burden. This was no more evident than in the Lebanon War in which this burden nullified the effect that had been achieved in the war's initial phase when the regular army carried out the main assignments. Third, offensive doctrine also aimed at shortening wars as a means to reduce internal costs. Boundless implementation, however, that had not considered the extent to which these wars being politically debated between left-wing and right-wing, brought about growing political costs internally (see Horowitz, 1987).

Similar to past experience in Europe and America, the state created through the wars a political opportunity structure for collective action embracing two processes (see, at the theoretical level, Tarrow, 1994, 62-99). First, the more military participation was extended without symmetric quid pro quos, the more groups could invoke their military contribution in order to make multiple demands pertinent to military policies. Indeed, most of the new political groups were initiated and composed of discharged, reserve soldiers who related their political action to their military experience. As for the second process propelling collective action, the 1967 war-incited rise in the standard of living brought higher levels of education, greater exposure to the media, and more leisure time--elements that tend to heighten public awareness and stimulate political involvement (see Sella and Yishai, 1986, 49).

Almost as soon as the guns fell silent in October 1973, vociferous protest movements sprang up, demanding the government's resignation for its mishandling of the war. These protests were notably initiated by reservists who had fought in outposts along the Suez Canal, mainly infantrymen who had experienced the most horrible events during the War's first days. At a latter stage, the most prominent political movement was Peace Now Movement. It was an extra-parliamentary mass movement founded in 1978, urging the government to show greater flexibility in order to expedite the peace process, which had taken a dramatic turn following the visit to Israel by Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat. Peace Now was a movement of the social elite. Its leaders emphasized their military record and in its name participated in the political discourse, containing the right-wing's attempts to discredit pacifist claims (see, Bar-On, 1985).

Protests intensified following the Lebanon War and the Intifada. New forms of anti-war political action took place beyond Peace Now's activities: protests organized by reservists and senior officers in uniform during their duty in Lebanon while other reservists preferred to take part, immediately after their discharge, in the permanent rally that ran in front of Prime Minister Menachem Begin's house; soldiers' parents also demonstrated against the IDF's presence in Lebanon, calling themselves "Parents against Silence" (see: Feldman and Rechnitz-Kizner, 1984; Wolfsfeld, 1988, 124-134; Zukerman-Bareli and Bensky, 1989). Finally, the Yesh Gvul ("There's a Limit") Movement composed of reservists advocated conscientious objection in the face of the IDF's attacks on the civilian population in Lebanon and the occupied territories (see Menuchin and Menuchin, 1985; Menuchin, 1990).

In practice, protests were focused on the boundaries of the use of violent force as a political instrument. Center-left groups portrayed the expanded goals of the Lebanon War (reshaping the political order in Lebanon) as a "war of choice," geared to achieve political objectives in the absence of an existential threat to the state's security. This, ostensibly, differentiated it from the previous wars of "no choice." Similar forms found their expression during the Intifada when the IDF found itself again at the center of a fierce political controversy. The IDF was criticized by the left for its use of violence against civilians. On the other hand, the right criticized the military for its impotence vis-à-vis the Palestinians, demanding elimination of formal limitations on military action (Lustick, 1993, 409-417; Shalev, 1990, 141-142).

Other forms of protest also emerged among the right-wing, namely Gush Emunim and the Jewish Oriental groups. Gush Emunim ("Bloc of the Faithful") was founded in 1973 by religious youngsters. They tried to exploit their military contribution, which stood out in the Six-Day War and afterward, as a lever for substantive political involvement, notably, to put forward the idea of settlement in the occupied territories (Levy and Peled, 1994, 221). At the same time, triggered by their heavy losses during the three post-1967 wars, second and third generation Orientals engaged in ethno-social protest against their disadvantaged social position. They expected increased social status in return for their military contribution, as one of their activists put it: "It was precisely in the Lebanon War that a gross disparity revealed itself between the equality in victims and comradeship in battle, and the inequality in the society between the Oriental class and the Ashkenazi [the dominant] class" (Idan, 1983, 41). Against this background, in the 1980s, waves of ethnic protest occurred, triggering a change of ruling parties in 1977 and even a slide towards violent clashes, particularly during the Lebanon War (see, by comparison, Smith, 1981, who identified the effects of lengthy war on shaping ethnic identities).

Clearly, the more political disputes over the use of military force intensified, the more Israel's capacity to use force declined. The state bureaucracy and the military establishment enjoyed lesser autonomy to operate the military, and hence to mange the conflict, because they had to carefully calculate the expected political outcomes. Grasping these lessons, the self-restrained use of military force, along with considerations of international politics, was reflected in several instances. To illustrate, the Likud-led government adopted a relatively moderate policy in the Intifada, evident in its reluctance to use massive firepower to quell the uprising. In this case, the IDF's concern about internal integration increased in the face of growing political debates which might permeate its ranks; after all, soldiers from both political camps took part in dealing with the Intifada. Crucial then was the declaration by Chief of Staff General Dan Shomron in 1988 that the struggle with the Intifada could be resolved only by political, not military, means. He thus blocked political pressures to quell the uprising vigorously by marking the boundaries of the use of military force at a level that might have lessened the affect on IDF unity (see Ben Meir, 1995, 114; Lustick, 1993, 412).

A similar scenario of self-retrain repeated itself during the GulfWar, which was initiated in 1991 by an American-led international coalition against Iraq. Israel was not a formal part of the coalition but was subjected to Iraqi missile attacks aimed at Israeli cities, causing considerable property damage, although only a few people were killed. However, Israel refrained from retaliation under American pressure despite the wishes of the Defence Minister Moshe Arens (Arens, 1995, 177-217). Finally, the Labor-led government displayed from 1992 a similar pattern by refraining from employing massive ground operations against the Shiite militia in South Lebanon.

Going one step farther, the greater the indecisiveness about the use of force, the less credible Israel's deterrent was (Inbar and Sandler, 1992; 1995). And the more the capacity to use force and deterrence shrunk, the fewer the options were for the state to craft any policy other than de-escalation of the conflict, even for the purpose of restoring the deterrent (see Yaniv, 1989). New opportunities that presented themselves in the global arena made this option further workable: The regional system seemed to be significantly changed by the decline of the Soviet Union, formerly the Arabs' chief ally, impairing the military power of both Syria and the PLO. A sharp decrease of defense expenditures in the Arab world (Inbar and Sandler, 1992, 5), a deep crisis in the PLO, and the disintegration of the united Arab front against Israel following the Gulf War signified the diminishing threat posed by the Arab states bordering Israel. Add to this the Arab states' acknowledgement of Israel's unquestionable military supremacy (to a large extent owing to the latter's nuclear capabilities), and Israel had an opportunity to settle conflicts from an advantageous position. On the other hand, the potential nuclear capabilities gradually acquired by Iraq, Iran, and Libya, however, could have nullified these advantages. Time worked against Israel.

In short, within the confines of geo-political limitations and opportunities, de-escalation of the conflict entwined with revision of military doctrine became the most viable option to recreate the balance between the state's capacity to maintain military participation and the mitigation of the political participation that military participation ensued. It is noteworthy again that balancing between contradictory attributes of military doctrine might be the result of de-escalation, not the driving force behind de-escalation which is a far more complicated process.

4. Israel's Revised Doctrine: De-Escalation Blended with Low-Labor Warfare

The embarkation on a process of de-escalation--beginning with the Egyptian-Israeli Peace accord (1979), proceeding with the unilateral withdrawal from part of Lebanon (1985), and the 1993-1995 peace moves with the Palestinians--signaled a reorientation of Israeli military doctrine. Underlying this process is the establishment of regional security institutions through which Israel would share with Arab armies the maintenance of its own security. Israel then switched from a "zero-sum-game" which had previously inspired its methods of self-reliance to a new approach. Several arrangements signaled the new approach: 1) Israel sponsored a mercenary army in South Lebanon, the South Lebanon Army, which defended Israel's northern border against the Shiite Muslim groups. 2) Regional cooperation was established to curb radical Muslim countries. 3) A new division of labor in the Palestinian-populated territories was created through which Israel retained its formal, sovereign rule over the territories while control over the hostile population was assigned to the new Palestinian Authority.

By having done so, de-escalation permits a diversion of resources previously required to manage the conflict in the proximate geographical arena to the procurement of munitions that would serve to meet long-distance potential nuclear threats (see Benn, 1993; Makovsky, 1996, 102-103). Manpower involved in maintaining the conflict, moreover, will be considerably reduced and a selection-based army is then more likely to replace the conscript army. That is so because the interstate conflict will diminish when managed with a different weapons system, especially one that relies on strategic systems and weapons based on technology, knowledge, and information (such as precision guided weapon, see Yaniv, 1994, 389-390; Yogev, 1989) instead of labor-intensive systems. In short, the Gulf War inspired a "third wave" of military technology, as it is termed by Toffler and Toffler (1993). Embarking on explicit nuclear deterrence might be an option as well.

Indeed, data from 1995 reveal that the IDF in practice adopted selective methods of conscription evidenced by disqualification from military service of about a third of the Jewish population (Haberman, 1995). Parallel to that change, diversion of resources from the military buildup to private consumption from 1985 onward brought about a decline from 16 percent of the GDP in 1974-1982 to about 8 percent in 1995 (Ha'aretz, April 3, 1996, 5).

In practical terms, the gradual revision of the military doctrine was apparent both in the 1993 Operation Accountability and 1996 Grapes of Wrath, campaigns mounted against Hezbollah militia when friction between the fundamentalist Lebanese-Shiite movement, the IDF and the Israel-sponsored South Lebanon Army increased in southern Lebanon. In these operations the conception called for "transferring fire to the enemy's territory"--supplanting the traditional doctrine of "transferring the war to the enemy's territory." The new approach involved the use of state-of-the-art technology, particularly in air power and artillery, to attack targets without endangering Israeli ground forces. Israel in fact achieved its short-term military objectives. At the same time, the operations which caused hundreds of Lebanese civilian casualties and inflicted tremendous damage did not arouse significant domestic political opposition. By using weapons systems that heightened the level of alienation between fighter and victim, political costs were reduced. Israel again grasped the lessons of the Lebanon War.

By revising its military doctrine the state might regain part of its autonomy to employ military policies by lessening its dependence upon mass conscription drawn from politically aware, middle-class groups. That is especially so as the long-distance nuclear threat might keep the Arab-Israeli conflict viable, and even expand it into a Jewish-Muslim conflict. Consequently, the state would retain part of the war-produced gains by maintaining war preparation toward an "abstract belligerence," Wolfe's term (1984, 245) to describe American politics during the Cold War, combining force-oriented rhetoric with minor demands for sacrifice (see also empirical support in Russett, 1989, 176-179).

Conclusions

Israel's military doctrine underwent three transformations pertinent to its domestic effects as figure 2 summarizes.

FIGURE 2: THE EXCHANGE BETWEEN MILITARY PARTICIPATION AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

From 1948 to the 1970s, instrumental to state empowerment was the gradual transformation from a defensive, infantry-based army to an offensive, armor- and air-force-based one, and from a small standing army dependent upon reserves to a large standing army. Owing to the durable balance between the conflicting effects of military participation, the state could maintain the state of war while delaying the moment in which it has to pay the political costs needed to de-escalate the Arab-Israeli conflict. Going beyond this balance typified the second transformation which took place in the 1970-1980s. The growing military burden-produced political participation in the post-1967 period undermined the state capacity to steer its military policies autonomously. In the third transformation, modification of military doctrines by de-escalating the conflict interlocked with the transition to a technology-based, selective conscription. This trend might help the state regain its autonomous control of the military sphere.

To a large degree, figure 2 mirrors other cases in the Western world to which the process described in Figure 1 is applicable. The sturdy linkage between war-making and state-making also elevated democratization: Mass mobilization of the local population under the state's direct auspices strengthened the power of civilian bureaucracies supplying people relative to the military. In exchange, participants in wars demanded rights and citizenship interwoven with protection from arbitrary state action. Subordination of the military to civilian control was the result (Tilly, 1995).

Wide political participation and limitations imposed on military action engendered the downscaling of wars. As some scholars maintain, democracy might restrain war-prone orientations against other democracies (Lake, 1992; Russett, 1990; Russett and Maoz, 1990; Weede, 1992). But as the cases of the Vietnam War and Lebanon War suggest, democracy restrains warfare against non-democratic states as well. Within the confines of global possibilities, domestic changes then stimulated many democratic states to trade their military doctrine of a mass, conscription army to a technology-, even nuclear-based volunteer military.

A nuclear-based doctrine permitted the state both to call its citizens to participate and, at the same time, to prevent them from engaging in public action. The minimal access to armaments of this kind played a key role in constructing a model of "perverse democracy", in Wolfe's terms (1984), or as Mann (1987) has put it, a "spectator sport militarism." There, the political community is well-informed about wars and armament but participates only indirectly. If so, "... wars...are not qualitatively different from Olympic Games. Because life-and-death are involved, the emotions stirred up are deeper and stronger. But they are not backed up by... commitment..." (ibid., 48). Consequently, the more technology employed in place of human combatants, the more states acquired the autonomous capacity to maintain war preparation and even to initiate war, as they faced, to a lesser extent, political resistance originated from military participation (see Shaw, 1988, 45-46).

For example, grasping the lesson of the Vietnam War (see Barnet, 1972, 13-15), the U.S. initiated the Gulf War as a "Third Wave" war. Remoteness of the combatant (becoming an "operator") from his victims, and the shift from labor-intensive to technology-based weapon systems are central to this shift. Waging a "clean war" externally and internally alike, the U.S. as their Western counterpart came closer to the underlying point of balance. "Third Wave" armaments also enable states to avoid stimulation of internal resistance to nuclear weapon. At the same time, strategic reorientation also led to the strengthening of defensive capabilities. They might increase military participation in the case of war. However, as the likelihood of immediate war decreases, a defensive posture paves the way for short-term reduction of military participation.

To sum up theoretically, military doctrine is also the mechanism by which states unintentionally regulate the volume of military participation within the previously constructed geo-political and domestic political conditions. The bargain between state groups created impediments for keeping certain methods of war preparation. But bargaining may also serve as the impetus for incorporating technological innovations and the alteration of defensive/offensive methods (as the shift in Israel from war to de-escalation suggests).

Nevertheless, the underlying exchange between military participation and political participation and their implications for state autonomy is invisible. It has partially been addressed by scholars but without addressing the strategic implications of those relations, and completely neglected by statesmen. Only when elites suspect non-elite groups as disloyal to the existing political order (Afro-Americans until the late 1940s, for example), that exchange becomes tangible. This neglected dimension of the relations between states and social groups merits further conceptualization. A sociology of strategy is needed.

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