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How Militarization Drives Political Control of the Military: The Case of Israel
Center for Studies of Social Change
New School for Social Research
The Working Paper Series
Observation of state-military relations in Israel reveals an apparent paradox: Within a period of about seventy years, the more the militarization of Israeli society and politics gradually increased, the more politicians were successful in institutionalizing effective control over the Israel Defence Forces (IDF, and the pre-state organizations). Militarization passed through three main stages: (1) accepting the use of force as a legitimate political instrument during the pre- state period (1920-1948), subsequent to confrontation between pacifism and activism; (2) giving this instrument priority over political-diplomatic means in the state's first years up to the point in which (3) military discursive patterns gradually dominated political discourse after the 1967 War. At the same time, political control over the IDF was tightened, going from the inculcation of the principle of the armed forces' subordination to the political level during the pre-state period to the construction of arrangements working to restrain the military leverage for autonomous action.
That intersection has not been explored yet by students of society-military relations in Israel. So far, a few scholars have described the dynamic militarization of Israeli politics, but they have refrained from analyzing its consequences on political control over the IDF (see Barzilai, 1992; Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1988; Kimmerling, 1993). On the other hand, the proponents of military sociology have contributed to an understanding of the nature of the convergence between the IDF and the political sphere, including the manufacturing of arrangements of political control. They, however, overlooked, even downplayed, the concurrent militarization of politics (see Halpern, 1962; Horowitz, 1977; 1982; Lissak, 1984a; Peri, 1983; Perlmutter, 1969; Schiff, 1992; 1995).
Two problems arise from the existing scholarship. First, accounts of the different structures of control, be they civilianization (Horowitz, 1982; Lissak, 1984a), the partnership between politicians and generals (Peri, 1983), or military-civil concordance (Schiff, 1995), have not asked what explains the military's acceptance of its subordination to the political level relative to alternative options. Simply put, any analysis of power relations should start from this point. Militarization-produced gains for the military which, arguably, accounted for this process also set the cultural-political boundaries within which political-civilian institutions control the military. This is the second scholarly oversight. After all, even in countries categorized as "garrison states" (see Lasswell, 1941) militaries are somewhat controlled (Aron, 1979), but control is confined to a previously constructed cultural-political structure bounding decision- making to a narrow range of alternative options.
Yet students of civil-military relations in Israel have mirrored a general, theoretical lacuna. Scholars who have scrutinized the mechanisms by which militaries are subordinated under political control have refrained from tackling the linkage between this process and the concurrent militarization that characterized the crystallization of the modern state (see Edmonds, 1988; Finer, 1976; Harries-Jenkins, 1973; Huntington, 1957; Janowitz, 1971; Lissak, 1984b; Luckham, 1971; Sarkesian, 1984; Segal et al., 1974; Stepan, 1988; Van-Doorn, 1976; see also Shaw's criticism of military sociology: 1991, 73-76). At the same time, the rise of militarism is perceived as a process by which the military ascended over civilian institutions (see for example Albrecht, 1980; Vagts, 1959) or, at least, civil forces were piloting militarization without impacting on political control (see for example, Aron, 1979; Geyer, 1989; Mills, 1956; Regehr, 1980).
Structural relations of exchange between the military and civilian-political institutions, arguably, ought to be examined. With respect to the case of Israel, my argument is that militarization, by increasing the (pre-)state's capacity to extract resources and mobilize legitimacy for military buildup, worked to shape relations of exchange between the military and the civilian (pre-)state institutions. Within this framework, the IDF exchanged cumulatively acquired multiple rewards ensuing from militarization (such as material resources, social prestige, and political power) for its acceptance of political control. If it had not done so, the military might have lost those gains. Those gains thus functioned as engines of political control: they imposed limitations on the military's leverage for behaving in defiance of the state civilian agencies, and, simultaneously, set new limitations added to the former ones. Relations of exchange, I emphasize, embody a structural pattern rather than overt, direct bargaining between state agencies and the military over the terms of exchange. In short, contrary to what has been surmised by most of the students of military-civilian relations in Israel, state agencies molded arrangements of control over the IDF not despite but due to the militarization of society and politics. At the broader theoretical level, contrary to the existing scholarship on militarization, as long as militarization increases the state's capacity to extract internal resources concurrently with the military's gains, militarization works to restrain the autonomous power held by the military, rather than bolstering this power.
I will proceed in laying down a theoretical framework drawn upon the school of state formation. Building on this framework, the second section scans the militarization-incited construction of multiple engines of political control. From this analysis, in the third section, I infer several general theoretical conclusions.
Furthermore, social groups, who had previously mustered the resources allocated to the military, (such as money collected by taxes, or free time extracted by conscription), attained/demanded access to political control over the military in exchange for their contribution, hence furthering civil sectors in relation to the military (Tilly, 1985b; 1992, 192-225). Democratization was a likely result of this bargaining (Tilly, 1995). Therein lies the modem military's distinctiveness as compared with its traditional forbearer, which had been both virtually autonomous and closely affiliated with, and funded by, particularist power centers. Yet, conditions to restrain militaries were not created in the absence of militaries' dependence on civil bureaucracies, be it because the military buildup was funded by an external power (as in many Third World countries) or because the mode of organization of the major social classes in society impeded the state's extraction (as in some Latin American countries). Nor did group pressures to attain access to political control in return for military participation emerge (see Giddens, 1985, 249-254; Tilly, 1992, 192-225).
Military buildup prescribes militarization of the political discourse, which the school of state formation overlooks. Militarization refers to the process in which preparation for war is regarded as normal social activity, at its height even a desirable social activity (Mann, 1987, 35). Regardless of its origins (see more below), only owing to militarization could the state, albeit unintentionally, legitimize the military's needs, giving them priority over other, civilian, needs. Militarization took several forms central to which is the universalist-national substance given to military activities such as the state's exclusively defining the boundaries between "friend" and "enemy," "internal" and "external" (see especially, Blain, 1994; Schmitt, 1976: Tilly, 1985b), the exemption of the military from competition with other equal organizations due to the principal of "monopoly on the use of violence," the military service-stimulated granting of citizenship (Burk, 1995; Janowitz, 1976), etc.
Militarization, by which military buildup was sustained and legitimized, worked, paradoxically and indirectly, to restrain the military's leverage for autonomous action via institutionalization of political control. As for the military, through militarization it gained both materially and symbolically in exchange for being subordinated to political control. Needless to say, in the absence of the military's material dependence on civilian institutions, militarization, whether engineered by generals or by civilian politicians, would further bolster the military's autonomy vis-a-vis politicians.
Militarization is measured by the extent to which the routinization of war preparation is reflected in the ascendancy of military thought over civilian political thought. Military thought perceives the employing, or threatening to employ, of violent force as the main pillar on which interstate relations are grounded, be they competitive or cooperative relations. Proponents of civilian political thought, on the contrary, prefer the employing of diplomacy to ground interstate relations on nonviolent pillars such as economic interests, international law, etc. Since I deal with political processes, my definition is centered on the political dimension of militarism, rather than cultural or economic dimensions. Rather, since militarism is defined differently by several scholars, my study is focused on the dynamic process of militarization, not the ultimate, hence highly debated, phase of militarism.
Political control over the military is measured by the extent to which the military's activities--military operations, budget, selection of weapons systems, mode of organization, mode of recruitment, etc.--are monitored by the main civilian state agencies, directly or through public participation. Considering that this model explains the existence or absence of political control in diverse countries regardless of their specific political system, it might be applied to the case of Israel as well.
Arguably, to the extent that militarization of Israeli politics took its course, the political control over the military became tightened, as figure 1 shows.
Political control was structured by the cumulative creation of limitations imposed on the military autonomy, functioning as controlling engines as I will now show.
Engine 1: material dependency
After World War I, the Jewish political community (the Yishuv) began taking shape in Palestine under the British Mandate. The community was comprised of thousands of immigrants, primarily from Eastern Europe, who had come to Palestine beginning in the late nineteenth century. The Zionist project stimulated hostile interaction between the Jewish settlers and the Palestinians who inhabited the country before the Zionist enterprise was launched. Hostile inter-communal competition gave rise to the emergence of military formations, central to which was the Haganah ("Protection"), established in 1920 by Achdut Ha'Avoda (the "Unity of Labor" party), the political party which led the Yishuv labor movement at the time.
This decision, among the first milestones in molding the Israeli pre-statist frame of rule, was the outcome of a debate between two schools of thought: The relatively pacifist Ha'Poel Ha'Tzayir ("The Youth Laborer," one of the Yishuv labor parties), which advocated the establishment of a Zionist homeland based on agricultural settlements, and the activists of Poalei Zion ("The Zionist Laborers") who called for the establishment of a Zionist homeland through the use of violent force, among other means. In 1917, the latter even encouraged members of the Yishuv to volunteer for the British Army in order to free Palestine from Ottoman rule. This debate was decided in favor of the activist school (Shapira, 1988, 362). Accordingly, the Yishuv political discourse gradually acquired a force-oriented character, giving legitimation to the use of force. Concomitantly, this milestone also marked the constitution of a politically controlled Haganah--established by a political party, monitored by the most organized organ of the pre-state society, the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labor), and which drew its personnel from the labor movement. Owing to the power held by the labor parties from the outset, they could neutralize previously established military organizations that strove to keep their political autonomy as underground organizations, such as the Ha'shomer ("The Guard") and its subsidiary organizations. Relying on self-recruitment and self-collection of resources, these organizations could not endure in the face of the Haganah's advantages stemming from partisan sponsorship.
It is time to emphasize that this paper bypasses the exploration of the origins of Israeli militarism and refrains from judging whether it developed as a reaction to an external situation (i.e., the Arabs' approach toward the Zionist project) or whether it played a role in shaping the stand taken by the Israeli side in the Arab-Israeli conflict, as the proponents of Israeli militarism imply (Carmi and Rosenfeld, 1988; Ben-Eliezer, 1995; Kimmerling, 1993), or how rhetoric impacted on the escalation/de-escalation of the conflict as constructivists might argue (see Wendt, 1992 at the theoretical level). Rather, (1) by addressing milestones in which debates raged about foreign-military policies, I imply that rhetoric played its role in shaping attitudes, primarily ruling out certain alternatives and legitimizing the chosen policies. External occurrences as such are not sufficient to mobilize support; more important is the discursive interpretation through which social agents grasp objective facts. It is not to judge historically, however, whether the Israeli side could solely shape the Arabs' attitude toward more pacifist avenues, or whether force-oriented rhetoric signified an overreaction to an exogenous reality (see Levy, forthcoming). Most importantly, 2) I focus on the consequences of a given discursive evolution for the increasing political control, not on the structural setting for the construction of rhetoric.
Militarization-driven political control became more pronounced during the 1930s and 1940s. As escalation of the violent conflict between Jews and Palestinians took place, upgrading from a local and sporadic to an inter-community conflict, pacifist orientations gradually declined and the legitimacy of violent means to implement policy was accepted (Gertz, 1988, 271-284; Shapira, 1988, 51-52). Political discourse became limited to a discussion of the operational aspects of the use of force in addition to the political means. This was nowhere more blatant than in the foundation of the Palmach, the militant elite organization made up of the cream of the Yishuv's youth under the Haganah's supervision, initiating an activist approach toward Palestinian communities and the British rulers (see Ben-Eliezer, 1984; 1995). Moreover, the slowly widening base of conscription reached its peak in 1947; even before the state had been officially established, compulsory conscription of the Yishuv's youth was announced (Pail, 1979, 84-99). This further contributed to the inculcation of force-oriented values among the Yishuv's members. The dual identity of "citizen-soldier" on a national scale was thereby constructed, shaping the functional identity of the individual as both a member of a political community on one hand, and a member of a military organization on the other.
Concurrently, as perceived military needs grew during the 1930s, the labor parties ran a semi-voluntary fund (Kofer Ha'Yishuv) to raise money from the Yishuv members in order to underwrite the Haganah's activity instead of the previous local mechanisms of self-collection. To ensure the fund's success, the labor parties joined forces with the center-right parties, which had been affiliated with the bourgeoisie. In return, the labor parties, which so far had exclusively controlled the Haganah, agreed to share with the center-right through a parity board (Horowitz and Lissak, 1978, 51). The pre-military thus became a Yishuv-controlled organization rather than one controlled by the labor parties alone. Formally, it was subjected to the National Council, the autonomous civil authority of the Yishuv which represented most of the political parties. Finally, in the mid-1940s, arrangements were made to finance the Haganah by means of semi-voluntary taxation and by the Jewish Agency which was the pre- state's supreme institution, instead of fundraising (Horowitz and Lissak, 1978, 51; Pail, 1979, 24-34). Owing to the new resources the Haganah gradually became an organized, unified military (witness the mass recruitment mentioned above) rather than a militia.
In sum, scarcity of resources had dual implications. First, relations of dependency were created between the political level and the main military organization for mobilizing the needed resources to energize military activity. Inferring from Tilly, since "soldiers. . . became ever-more dependent on their civilian supporters for the wherewithal of war...the autonomy and personal power of the [military] men" was decreased (1985b, 78). With the Haganah's growing dependence on the politicians, the organization's command became limited in their capacity to act other than by accepting political supervision in return for new resources. Under these conditions, the principle of political supervision over the pre-military organization was consolidated even before the formal establishment of the state. As for the other underground organizations resisting the formal authority of the Yishuv institutions--the IZL (a National Military Organization) and LHI (Israel Freedom Fighters)--lacking resources, they were denied the capacity to accumulate power relative to the Haganah. Second, since the labor parties could not shoulder the funding of the Haganah alone, a sturdy affiliation between this military organization and a particularist sector was averted. Had these things not happened, the state established in 1948 could have encountered difficulties in imposing civilian control over the military. Conversely, the state's success was no more blatant than in its realization of monopoly control of the means of violence in 1948-49 through smooth dismantling of the underground organizations.
Material dependence endured and was backed by new engines.
Engines 2 and 3: social prestige and political partnership
With the establishment of the state and the conclusion of the 1948 War, which the young state conducted against the forces of the Arab countries, militarization and increasing political control marched together again.
With the formal establishment of the state the IDF was constituted on the basis of the Security Service Law (1949), which originally imposed two years of compulsory service on most Jewish youth at the age of 18. Conscription was egalitarian as it encompassed men and women, veteran citizens and new immigrants, although Palestinian citizens and ultra-Orthodox Jews were exempted. A large reserve army was also established, composed of conscripts obligated to do several weeks of reserve duty every year in order to maintain their combat readiness.
With the constitution of the IDF on mass foundations, the military-political elite, inspired by a mixture of professional and political reasons, laid the foundations for establishing a universalist army rather than an army affiliated with the labor parties as advocated by Mapam, an alliance of left-wing parties (on the considerations leading to this choice see Barnett, 1992, 161, 169-176; Ben-Gurion, 1971, 31-43; Horowitz, 1987; Neeman, 1985; Segev, 1986, 267- 273; Teveth, 1971, 368-369). The IDF became subjected to the personal accountability of David Ben-Gurion, the first Prime Minister and Minister of Defence; he neutralized Mapam's attempts to intervene in military affairs by preventing access of political parties to security issues through the cabinet and the Knesset (the Israeli parliament) (Peri, 1983, 49-69).
In practical terms Israel conducted a foreign policy based upon the carrying out of reprisal raids against neighboring Arab states. The raids were a reaction to infiltrations of Palestinian refugees from Egypt and Jordan into Israeli territory. Israel's response to the infiltrations escalated and reached its peak in the initiation of the Suez War (1956). This policy marked the ascendancy of the military school of thought, represented by Ben-Gurion, over the diplomatic school, represented by Moshe Sharett, the Foreign Minister (and Prime Minister in 1954-55). Sharett perceived the thrust toward peace, or at least the preservation of Israel's standing in the eyes of the Western powers, as cornerstones of Israeli policy. Hence he advocated defensive-diplomatic measures to deal with the border frictions. Ben-Gurion, by contrast, (like the IDF's senior commanders), believed that the Arab states had not forsaken their desire to destroy Israel. Israel therefore had to deter the Arab states by military buildup and responding strongly to the cross-border infiltrations. As for relations with the international community, Israel's isolated position required it to demonstrate an independent policy (Morris, 1993, 227-236; Sharett, 1978, 966-967).
This force-oriented preference was echoed in the political discourse taking the form of Mamlachtiyut (statism) the state ideology. Mamlachtiyut emphasized the state's historical responsibility for ensuring the community's existence in the light of the Arabs' threat in an eternal war of the "few against many" (Gertz, 1995, 13-34) with the military revered as the modern incarnation of the heroic biblical tradition (Liebman and Don-Yehiya, 1983, 83-98). By ascribing the birth of the state to the potency of the military organizations, Mamlachtiyut played down the contribution of the Yishuv civil elites to the state's establishment, emphasizing instead the role of military organizations. This was reflected in the displacing of the symbol of the "pioneer," the primary criterion in the Yishuv for evaluating social activity (personal and collective), with the ''fighter'' as a prestigious status symbol (see, Gertz, 1985-6, 269; 1988, 280-281; Kimmerling, 1971; Keren, 1983, 81-85; Peled, 1992; Shapira, 1992, 365-370).
Discursive militarization was tellingly articulated by Chief of Staff General Moshe Dayan, in his famous eulogy for a kibbutz member who was killed by infiltrators from the Gaza Strip in April 1956. "It is our generation's fate," said Dayan, "it is our choice in life to be ready and armed, strong and unflinching, lest the sword slip from our grasp and our lives be cut off" (quoted in Benn, 1988, 46-49). Dayan thus conferred eternal, perhaps metaphysical, meaning on the use of force, and in fact subordinated the very existence of Israel to the use of force. Equally significant, the fact that he was a professional soldier contributed to the injection of a force-oriented thrust into the political discourse as a routine, normative subject. Another discursive expression was the extension of the idea of "security" into salient civilian areas such as immigration, settlement, technology, education, and more (Ben-Eliezer, 1994, 57). Activity in those spheres was often determined by military needs, though this was camouflaged by the habitual use of the term "security" rather than "military." Consequently, as Ben-Eliezer indicates, war preparation became the major mechanism of political mobilization during the state's first years. Add to this the civilian roles taken by the IDF such as establishing settlements, educating immigrants' children, etc., and the Israeli society became a "nation-in- arms" (Horowitz, 1982; Lissak, 1984a). Seen within this context, the IDF could determine the social hierarchy in a manner in which social groups could parlay their position in the army into civilian status: witness the social dominance acquired by conscripts drawn from the agricultural sector relative to the inferior status of those who were excluded from military service such as Israeli Palestinians, ultra-Orthodox Jews, and youngsters from distressed social groups (see Aronoff, 1993, 52-54; Horowitz and Kimmerling, 1974).
In short, Israeli political discourse was increasingly militarized. Whereas in the Yishuv discourse the right to use violence was presented as a cardinal instrument of policy implementation backing diplomatic means, with the Arab-Israeli conflict taken as a given (Ben- Eliezer, 1995; Shapira, 1988, 46-54), now the use of force was transformed, taking on symbolic and not only instrumental value, overshadowing political means. Consequently, the boundaries of political discourse were narrowed again: No longer centered on issues of pacifism vs. activism or even military means vs. diplomacy means as equal values, the new discourse focused on the force-oriented implementation of the activist approach. Internalizing the new discursive patterns, the left-wing parties gradually took a pragmatic stand toward the Israeli activist approach to the Arab countries (see Barzilai, 1992, 59-82). The enfeeblement of the Left was also felt in the contribution made by the force-oriented discourse to the growing delegitimization of pacifist outlooks, which were linked to a shirking of the security burden. As a result, no effective peace movements positing at least dovish alternatives to bellicose policies sprang up (until the late 1970s) despite the centrality of the conflict with the Arabs in the Israeli experience (see Hermann, 1989, 204-213). Clearly, each historical milestone set new boundaries to the political discourse, in fact ruling out the previously debated issues.
With militarization reaching new heights, the country's leadership could rule out granting territorial and demographic concessions to the bordering Arab countries in return for a peace that perhaps had been attainable at this period (see Morris, 1993; Pappe, 1992; Rabinovich, 1991).
Militarization drove intensification of political control once again. Though the principle of the army's subordination to the civilian authorities was already firmly rooted in Israeli political culture, politicians during the state's first years were fearful that the army's empowerment might bring about its active intervention in politics. This underlay Ben-Gurion's rationale for discharging the majority of the 1948 conscripts and further shrinking the regular army at the beginning of the 1950s (see Segev, 1986, 150-151, 268-271; Teveth, 1971, 367-369).
Frictions between politicians and generals reached their peak when the IDF carried out the raids. The army tended to act independently in defiance of Defense Minister Pinhas Lavon, who himself displayed disloyalty toward Prime Minister Sharett (Ben-Gurion's temporary successor) during the years 1953-1954. The IDF virtually dictated to the political level a series of operations, or exceeded the politicians' framework of approval, and in some cases did not even report its cross-border activity to the prime minister (see for examples, Dayan, 1976, 150 152; Morris, 1992, 300-303; Sharett, 1978, 34-41, 446447, 514-526, 670-680). The most notorious case was the telling "mishap" in 1954 involving military activity in Egypt without clear approval from the political level (Eshed, 1979). 1
Faced with this situation, the civilian leadership considered it imperative to upgrade political supervision over the army. To begin with, Prime Minister Sharett introduced a formal procedure whereby reprisal raids would need the approval of a small ministerial forum (Sharett, ibid., 53). Ben-Gurion, after his return to office in 1955, instituted a more stringent method in the wake of the dispute triggered by the Kinneret Raid: the complete plan of every reprisal raid required his personal approval (Teveth, 1971, 428). At the same time, the division of power between the IDF and the Ministry of Defense was consolidated in a manner which diminished the former's authority in the realms of budget and procurement and made the latter unequivocally responsible for areas not directly connected with the management of operational military activity (Greenberg, 1993). On top of this, Ben-Gurion could order the army to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula when the Suez War concluded over the army's objection.
Paradoxically, the militarization of Israeli statecraft played a crucial role in this process. During the 1950s, the military buildup inflamed a fierce dispute between the IDF and the leaders of the very powerful agriculture sector. This sector, as a heritage of the pre-state defense conception, mustered a great deal of the military manpower handling the establishment of new settlements and staffing the Territorial Defense Organization--agricultural settlements functioning as forward outposts along the border (see Dayan, 1976, 180-181, 195; Sharett, 1978, 171; Bar-On, 1992, 93-95, 101-103). The sector's leaders opposed the military buildup which entailed diversion of resources and manpower from agricultural to combat units. To a large extent, the agricultural sector was supported by some of Mapai's (the ruling party) leaders who displayed resentment toward the flourishing of the military establishment against the background of its immense assumption of purely civil roles (see above), and Ben-Gurion's attempts to politically promote officers at the expanse of the party's old guard (Teveth, 1992, 231-253).
Therefore, implementation of the buildup became objectively conditional on an escalation along the borders by means of the reprisal raids, which gave security needs priority over those of the agricultural settlements with the militarization of political discourse that it entailed. Debates over the military's status thus demonstrated the IDF's growing dependence on the politicians for mobilizing the needed resources and legitimacy to energize military activity. Had the military been funded by an external power or had the country not suffered from scarcity of resources, the competition over resources between the IDF and civilian sectors which produced that dependency might have been deflected. So, owing to that dependence, the relations of exchange between the military and state civilian agencies were resolidified: The politicians acknowledged military thought, with the involved allocation of material resources, as the preferred mode for dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict in exchange for ensuring the IDF's loyalty. For illustration, when the raids were being conceived and planned, Prime Minister Sharett maintained that opposition to the army's moves might encourage officers to reject the government's authority, like the "breakaway" underground organizations--the IZL and LHI--in the Yishuv period (Sharett, ibid., 1205). 2
The army, for its part, accepted the politicians' unquestioned authority in exchange for huge material and human resources, allowing it to maintain a massive, long-term buildup, beyond the direct needs of the early 1950s. But militarization spelled out new gains serving as engines of political control beyond material dependency: By accepting its political subordination, the army showed itself to be without political interests or inclinations, acting universalistically on behalf of the entire Jewish political community. It could then produce net prestige from its warfare activity. Conversely, had the IDF intervened openly in politics (similar to many of its Third World counterparts in the same period) and, doing so, become a target of open political criticism, it would have lost part of its social prestige, being portrayed as one corporation among others. So, alternative channels for attainment of prestige worked to reduce the officers' motivation to act hyper-autonomously.
Furthermore, prestige, as a restraining effect, was entwined with the mass character of the IDF: The more the military became a mass military, the more it could fulfill civilian roles on which its social centrality was grounded. At the same time, this militarization also worked to minimize development of a separatist orientation in the officer corps. Indeed, openness and fragmented boundaries characterized the relations between the IDF and civilian society. The more those tendencies prevailed, the less alienation could have developed by which officers might cling to acting in defiance of the politicians authority (Lissak, 1984a, 9; see also Feld, 1968 on European militarism as an antithetic case).
Building on its growing prestige, the IDF's third gain was the acquiring of capacity to leave a powerful impact on civilian statecraft, in fact forming relations of partnership with, rather than instrumental obedience to, the political institutions without resorting to overt intervention (Peri, 1983). Again, owing to the enhancement of political control, Ben-Gurion and his associates could downplay the Mapai leaders' call to block the military empowerment which were nurtured by concern about an autonomous army. Indeed, the IDF was targeted less and less by the parties.
Engine 4: political mobility
Militarization elicited new engines of political control following the Six-Day War. It broke out in June 1967 shortly after the entry of the Egyptian Army into the Sinai Peninsula and the closing of the Straits of Tiran. These events served as the casus belli for an Israeli attack against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The war was a blitzkrieg, at the end of which Arab armies were vanquished and Israel conquered the Sinai Peninsula, Gaza Strip, West Bank, and the Golan Heights.
The outstanding aftermath of the war was the intense militarization of the political discourse. True, the seeds of this process had already been planted during the 1960s, when the government prescribed a rigid casus belli for any Israeli-initiated war, leading to the Israeli attack in June 1967 (see Horowitz, 1973). But the process took a blatant discursive form only after the war. In this period, Israel's leaders were driven by a desire to ensure total security by means of control over part of the occupied territories in any future political solution against the perceived Arab threat. The preference for the status quo over a political solution showed a blurring of the military goals and their subordination to political ends, as the military logic of "worst case analysis" overshadowed the political logic of taking risks in return for convertible political assets (Kimmerling, 1993, 136). The "state of siege" in which Israel found itself became accepted as though forced upon it and as one which could not be changed. The upshot was that Israel's existence was made conditional on the preservation of territorial assets (military thought) and not on the attainment of political settlements (civilian-political thought) (Wald, 1987, 202-206).
With reference to the optimal political settlements, concepts such as "security borders" and "strategic depth" were the buzz words of both the Left and the Right (Shapiro, 1991, 151- 159). This was well illustrated in the military character of the peace plans that were put forward. The best-known of them was the Allon Plan, drawn up by Deputy Prime Minister and retired general Yigal Allon. Considered relatively moderate, the Allon Plan was nevertheless based on military rather than political principles (Allon, 1989, 16, 43). Indeed, even the symbols that distinguished the Right from the Left were based on a security approach toward the continued occupation of the territories. An overview of social issues was distinctly lacking (Arian and Shamir, 1983). Consequently, the military style--authoritative, decisive, and simplistic--dominated the civilian culture (Gertz, 1985-6, 275-276).
The rhetorical change in the political discourse was accompanied by massive settlement in the territories conquered by Israel along with a reluctance to accept political solutions involving complete return of those territories. In the mid-1970s, the issue became shrouded in religious-metaphysical terms by ultra-nationalist religious groups, which toughened the force- oriented profile. In practical terms, Israel placed obstacles in the way of the option to withdraw from the territories it had occupied in the Six-Day War (1967) in return for peace treaties, or for interim agreements, at least with Egypt, that might had been attainable and could have prevented the October War (1973) (see Shlaim, 1994, 41-47; Touval, 1980, 71-77).
Insofar as the political discourse reflected the crushing military victory, many civilian groups put their trust in retired generals regarding decision about national security affairs. As those generals also became electoral drawing cards, the major parties made efforts to recruit them. Several generals even occupied ministerial positions, such as Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Ezer Weizmann, Ariel Sharon, and others. As for the officers, they converted their growing prestige into political status through which they could inject their worldview into civilian policy-making (Peri, 1983, 111-114).
Political discourse thus became a military discourse in every respect, becoming more narrow then ever. The prewar political discourse conferred dominance on the use of violence to cope with political problems, but in the post-1967 discourse military thought achieved exclusivity; military terms supplanted civilian-political ones. The 1950s dispute between the diplomatic vs. military schools of thought (within the boundaries of an essentially activist approach) was displaced by disputes within the military school.
Although the autonomous character of civilian politics was undermined, greater political supervision over the army was institutionalized thanks to the same very process: A new militarization-created engine was now the entry of retired officers into politics in addition to the working of former engines. So, politicians, some of them former senior officers (or assisted by such), sharpened their scrutiny of the army although they paid the price of greater penetration of military thought into the political sphere. This was accompanied by institutionalization of regulations regarding the initiation of military operations. The end result was that the army was no longer able to initiate military activity with the same independence that had been so pronounced in the lead-up to the Six-Day War especially under Defence Minister Moshe Dayan (see Ben Meir, 1995, 101-102, 128; Handel, 1994, 554-555; Horowitz, 1982; on the lead-up see Yaniv, 1994, 187-193). The IDF for its part, practically exchanged the officers' ability to convert their military prestige into political status after their retirement for self-restraint vis-a-vis the political level. Beyond the other effects pertinent to the pattern of exchange, open intervention in politics would have also created difficulties in gaining the support of politicians whose stand affected the officers' political promotion (see Peri, 1983, 137-138 on the case of Israel; and Mills, 1956, 285 on the American experience; Vagts, 1959, 308-309 on European militarism; Harries-Jenkins, 1973 on the case of Victorian Britain). A clear linkage then was created between the officers' potential civilian occupations and the social prestige conferred upon the army (see, by comparison, Feld, 1968). Conversion of social prestige into political status at the individual level thus added a new dimension to the relations of exchange between the state, civilian institutions, and the military. Militarization, by which the military profession became an electoral asset, thus worked again to increase political control as well.
Importantly, though American aid became massive in scale following the 1967 War, covering about 40 percent of the defense budget (Trop, 1989, 52), this did not tarnish the ascendancy of civilian politicians over the military inasmuch as this process took place only in the 1970s when arrangements of political control had already taken root. On the contrary, the IDF's dependence on the political level grew insofar as Israeli citizens shouldered the main burden, hence the intensification of competition between the military and civilian institutions over the allocation of resources. This elicited a new engine of political control.
Engine 5: expansion of political participation
Central to the mid-1970s and more pronounced from the 1980s on was the expansion of political participation, a new engine of political control. As the burden of shouldering the conflict became heavier after the 1967 War, soldiers (reservists and soldiers' parents) took to political protest. About 4000 fatalities in 1969-1993, comprising about 0.1 percent of the total Jewish population, a considerable extension of both compulsory and reserve service, and a rise in the defense budget to about 16 percent of the GDP compared with about 8-10 percent in the 1960s covering mainly by Israel citizens (Trop, 1989, 52), all exemplified the growing burden. At the same time although military participation was extended, the participants lacked compensation insofar as the IDF demonstrated military deficiency in the October War and the Lebanon War (1982-1985), eroding the prestige conferred on military participants. Furthermore, the security burden became more and more incongruent with the consumerist values with which Israeli society was infused from the late 1970s onward owing to the 1967 War-produced rise in standard of living (see Gottlieb and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1985).
Consequently, the more the security burden increased without a symmetric quid pro quo, the more groups could invoke their military contribution in order to make multiple demands pertinent to military policies. Groups and individuals who were not taking part in military service or who preferred to invoke civil values, however, were less eligible to legitimately participate in the public discourse (Kimmerling, 1993, 130). 3 Militarization, however, which accounted for the growing burden, also propelled political participation by which the military became further monitored. Clearly, until that milestone the Jewish citizenry did not play any active role in monitoring military activities but passively tolerated military policies as such.
Evidently, two significant moves were directly triggered by protest groups and worked to formally cement political control. In 1973 the government established, for the first time, a judicial commission of inquiry (the Agranat Commission) to investigate the military's functioning in the October War, in which the army had been surprised by an Arab attack. The commission's findings brought about the dismissal of several generals, including General David Elazar, the Chief of Staff. Subsequently, the job done by this commission was completed in the aftermath of the Lebanon War (1982-5) by the work of the Kahan Commission. This commission was established in late 1982 to determine responsibility for the massacre perpetrated by the Christian Phalange in the Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra and Shatilla in Beirut, which, at the time of the event had been under the control of the IDF. The 1983 commission's report held liable the political level for the event, in addition to the military one. Much of the blame was cast on Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, who was forced to resign. Effectively, the Kahan Commission laid the formal judicial foundation for the responsibility of the political level for the army--a topic which had been left vague by the Agranat Commission nine years earlier.
Similarly but indirectly, the appearance of peace movements contributed to setting limits on the IDF's functioning (Inbar and Sandler, 1992, 6). Among them were Peace Now, established in 1978 (see Bar-On, 1985) and Yesh Gvul ("There's a Limit"). The latter protested during the Lebanon War (1982-1985) and more forcefully the Intifada (the 1987-1993 Palestinian resistance against Israel rule in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip), advocating conscientious objection in the face of the IDF's attacks on the civilian population (see Menuchin and Menuchin, 1985).
Other groups, assisted by the press, amplified their monitoring of military policies. Press and parents' scrutiny of accidents in military operations; reservists' critique of the distribution of the military burden, generating legislative attempts limiting the IDF's powers to call reservists up; homosexuals' and women's successful struggle to lift limitations on their military promotion; the press' scrutiny of issues of budgets, nominations, military performance, etc., were among the manifestation of this trend. Consequently, the IDF found itself more and more being pushed to adjust to a civilian set of considerations under the pressures of civilian groups (see at the theoretical level Harries-Jenkins, 1981) .
Jealous of its internal integration, social status, and its human and material resources, the IDF traditionally rebuffed attempts to tarnish its universalist status by becoming embroiled in politics. So now at the vortex of political storms penetrating into its ranks and undermining its professional posture, the military shifted its traditional force-oriented stand toward a more moderate one. Self-restrained use of military force, along with considerations of international politics, was the result, impacting on the turn to de-escalation. A prime example is 1993-1995 interim agreements with the Palestinians. These and other moves were supported by the IDF command. Interestingly, the IDF, by supporting peace moves, helped erode its own long-term social status. But only a military whose officer corps' civilian promotion relies to a large extent on the military's present social status might smoothly adjust its professional considerations to socio-political, dynamic change. No wonder then that the IDF command downscaled its participation in diplomatic moves inasmuch as it found that activity of this kind drew political criticism from right-wing parties. In short, demilitarization now showed its first signs.
Relations of exchange then dressed in a new form: in exchange for retaining its universalist status, the military checked its activity not only vis-a-vis politicians but also social groups. Still, the old form persisted as the agreements with the Palestinians were formulated in military terms under the auspices of high-ranking generals who took an active part in conducting the diplomatic talks following an intermezzo of the Foreign Ministry's secret talks in Oslo. So, the military exchanged political subordination for partnership in steering foreign policies.
FIGURE 2: THE MULTIPLE ENGINES OF POLITICAL CONTROL
Figure 2 sums up the multiple engines of militarization-incited political control.
Clearly, each engine of political control generated a new one: Material dependency generated resources through which Israel could take advantage of geopolitical conditions to reinforce its regional status. As the ensuing military achievements were translated into the IDF's social prestige and partnership between the military and politicians, they further locked the IDF within frameworks of political control. Owing to those gains, the powerful IDF could lead up the 1967 War, its achievements now translated into political promotion of officers in addition to the former gains but with sirnilar restraining effects. But when the ascendancy of the military mind- set, now among the factors prolonging the state of war, produced social burdens, this drove further restrictions over military action by means of political participation. This time, however, further control entwined with demilitarization.
The manner in which militarization drives political control over the military is a neglected subject and so merits broader elaboration far beyond the boundaries of the case in point. Historically, the formation of the modern state involved enormous militarization with a concurrent evolution of subordination of militaries under political control (see mainly, Giddens, 1985; Tilly, 1992). However, scholars have not addressed either the overall meaning of militarization, mainly within the social and cultural domains as it is projected by the proponents of militarism (see for example Albrecht, 1980; Geyer, 1989; Vagts, 1959) or the entwined dynamic evolution of the arrangements of control. After all, it is the militarization of political discourse which gives meaning to social agents' taking part in war preparation through which they can convert their participation into political action. Likewise, proponents of military sociology have contributed a great deal to illuminating the issue of political control but have failed to link the underlying process to the rise of militarism, especially in the Western world; militarism-dominated trends in the Third World with their clear impediments to the monitoring of militaries, however, have been largely addressed (see for example Huntington, 1968; Luckham, 1971; Finer, 1976; Edmonds, 1988; Stepan, 1988; see also Shaw for criticism of military sociology: 1991, 73-76).
Faced with this lacuna, I suggest that we formulate the relations between militaries and civilian agencies in terms of structural relations of exchange, whereby the military accepts the politicians' supervision for political, symbolic, and material resources, by themselves drawn upon the extent to which the socio-political sphere is militarized. Instead of conceptualizing the relations as civilian power exercised over the military as it has traditionally done, exchange suggests that each side, simultaneously, gains and forgoes assets, material and symbolic alike, through the creation of institutional arrangements. Consequently, the military's stand in accepting/rejecting political supervision is further understood as long as its structural limitations to act otherwise and the losses that it entails are put at stake. At the bottom line, each side's satisfaction with the overall consequences, intended and unintended alike, fuels its motivation to cling to the created structural relations. Further, the offered perspective addresses the dynamics of the evolution of the institutional arrangements according to changes in each side's power, hence the extent to which the military depended upon civilian agencies.
At another level, by linking militarism with political control, formal arrangements do not appear as a sufficient condition for effective control. Rather, the searchlight is put on the cultural-political boundaries within which those relations of control are structured, and hence, the level in which the military mind-set is privileged over civilian-dominated statecraft regardless of, even stimulating, that control. Changes in that setting through which the military loses part of its capacity to practically bound decision-making thus merit attention. The prevailing transformation of the world order toward a more pacifist one is an invitation to re-address the whole issue; the case of Israel is instructive in this respect.
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Note 1: Viewed from a broader perspective, a shift from political control by those political networks from which the State-Building and Extraterritormilitary command drew to state control might engender problems of this kind up to the point of reinstitutionalization. See for example Mann's (1994, 436-440) argument about similar effects of the shift undergone by European armies following the nineteenth century's revolutionary wars marking autonomization of militaries vis-a-vis the old regimes' networks. Back.
Note 2: Boldly put, needs pertinent to political control over the military were not the driving force behind bellicose policies (as claimed by Ben-Eliezer 1995, 227-279, 309-310 on the relations between the Palmach/young IDF and the Yishuv/state elite in the years 1948-1949), but (1) were among the considerations impinging on doctrinary annulment, and (2) were a by-product of the bellicose policy. Back.
Note 3: Borrowing from economic terms, the higher the price of protection sold by the states to its citizens (consumers), the higher their motivation to restrain the state by means of collective action, aimed to increase accessibility to information on the supplier's (state) performance (see Lake, 1992). Back.
