CIAO DATE: 05/02

Searching for Partners: Regional Organizations and Peace Operations

William H. lewis and Edward Marks

Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

June 1998

Peacekeeping iis a U.N. Invention

So declared Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali in 1994. ¹ Indeed, peacekeeping emerged in the post-Cold War period as the "most prominent U.N. activity." The organization was freed of the shackles placed upon it by superpower rivalry, that heretofore had rendered U.N. machinery inoperative in coping with local crises and was suddenly becoming "the center of international efforts to deal with unresolved problems of the past decades as well as the array of present and future issues." Between 1988 and 1993, more than a dozen new peacekeeping operations were launched, involving more than 70,000 military and civilian personnel for field operations, at an annual cost to the United Nations in excess of $3 billion.

Why this sudden explosion of U.N. peacekeeping activity? Relaxation of Cold War restraints was partially responsible, but it coincided with a sea change in attitudes toward the nation-state. "The norms governing intervention have evolved," as Barry Blechman put it. ² Governments have come under increasing scrutiny and criticism for failure to adhere to a growing body of international standards in areas formerly considered purely internal matters, for instance, human rights and political freedom. However, while world opinion is more willing to consider intervention in principle, it is also increasingly leery about military intervention in practice except in extreme cases, such as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Many governments have attempted to square this circle by calling on the United Nations as the legitimizing authority for intervention.

This approach is especially useful when dealing with crises not solely political or military but those where a serious humanitarian emergency exists. Here the United Nations has the potential to accomplish things no other international organization or ad hoc coalition can do. In theory, at least, it can deal with modern plagues, assist refugees, and help countries cope with natural disasters. However many of these emergencies reflect the failure of governing institutions to address effectively deep-seated economic and political problems. These problems, natural and manmade, have recently and increasingly overlapped, creating "complex emergencies," which have sometimes overtaxed U.N. competence and capability. Somalia (1993), Bosnia (1994-95), and Rwanda (1994) were dramatic examples of this development. On the other hand, the U.N. operation in Cambodia demonstrated that, with adequate international support and political will, the United Nations could fulfill an important intervention role on behalf of the international community. The 1997 internal crisis in Cambodia pointed, however, to the need to treat at length with extreme factionalism to assure postelections stability.

The expansion of U.N. peacekeeping or peace enforcement activities through Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter has caused the United Nations to run into trouble. The question of the use of military force by the United Nations, both with respect to competence and to legitimacy, has not been fully answered, as was shown in Somalia and Bosnia. The use of force is difficult enough when viewed in clearcut political situations that can be considered threats to international peace and security, but force becomes even more complex when applied to humanitarian and resettlement concerns. For instance, does uninvited humanitarian assistance constitute intervention in violation of Article 2(7) of the U.N. Charter relating to interference in tile domestic affairs of sovereign member states, and to what extent is such intervention to be justified when governments brutalize their populations or cannot provide minimal services to their citizens?

Although there was a lack of an international consensus on such questions, fairly broad agreement existed that some increased level of international cooperation under U.N. auspices was needed to deal with the epidemic of emergencies that erupted with the end of the Cold War. U.N. missions were called in and sent off with a handful of vague mandates involving some form of expanded or second-generation peacekeeping, usually combined with responsibility for dealing with life-threatening challenges to populations, and often with a charge to re-establish minimal government controls. Not surprisingly, the U.N. system suffered severe setbacks as it became clear that the system had only a limited capacity to deal with complex crises. As the United Nations found itself overburdened and underfunded in the years following 1988, a number of member states pushed for extensive reform and reorganization, with special emphasis on humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping. In due course, three new departments were created by combining, amalgamating, and expanding existing units and creating new elements:

• Department of Peacekeeping Operations
• Department of Political Affairs
• Department of Humanitarian Assistance

These changes had been urged on the Secretary-General by concerned member governments that were wrestling with such operational questions as augmenting U.N. field mission capabilities, organizing the diverse and divergent U.N. agencies concerned with peace support and humanitarian assistance, and arranging for more effective coordination among the U.N. system, member states, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). Beginning in 1990, the reforms led to the expansion or introduction of numerous relevant capabilities in the U.N. system: interagency cooperation and coordination, joint financial appeals, mission planning staff, 24-hour situation room and communication system, training arrangements, and a rudimentary intelligence-sharing system.

As these reforms were implemented, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali pursued two complementary initiatives. First, in his 1992 Agenda for Peace report, he attempted to provide a comprehensive concept of U.N. peacekeeping; reaction from governments produced modifications and amendments to his original approach, amendments that essentially distinguished between U.N. authorization for intervention in the name of peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, and U.N. implementation of the same. Most governments clearly believed that Chapter VII forceful intervention is best left to ad hoc coalitions to conduct, albeit with U.N. Security Council authority.

In 1994, the Secretary-General reached out to regional organizations in an attempt to energize more active cooperation between them and the United Nations under Chapter VIII of the Charter. Arguing that U.N. resources were, and would likely remain, inadequate to meet all needs, he called on regional organizations to merge their efforts. Although two meetings of leaders were held in New York and the subject remains under consideration, little concrete has resulted, However, several governments remain interested in pursuing increased regional peacekeeping. The United States is actively engaged in organizing support for the Organization of African Unity, and the Russian Federation claims to be creating a regional collective security organization among the former members of the Soviet Union.

While these initiatives were underway, the number of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations expanded, and a perception of U.N. incompetence emerged. In the past 2 years the number of operations and personnel deployed has been sharply reduced as member states have cut back on their support. Nevertheless it is obvious that the United Nations will not return to its "traditional peacekeeping" days but will continue to be called upon to act on behalf of the international community. Under what conditions the United Nations will be involved, and to what degree regional organizations the subject of this study — will participate are yet to be determined.

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Notes

Note 1. Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs 71, no. 5 (Winter 1992/93). Back

Note 2. Barry M. Blechman, "Emerging from the Intervention Dilemma," in Managin8 Global Chaos, ed. Chester A. Crocker et al. (Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1996). Back