CIAO

From the CIAO Atlas Map of Europe 

email icon Email this citation


Expanding NATO: The Struggle For Answers and the Implications for Stability in Europe

Mark A. Lawrence

International Security Studies at Yale University

January 1997

The past weighs heavily on the debate over NATO 's eastward expansion. Hardly a scholarly article, op-ed piece or policy paper on the subject fails to make reference to the three wars -- two hot, one cold -- that broke out largely because of instability and great-power ambitions in the territory between Germany and Russia. Going further, many Western commentators point out that the collapse of the Soviet empire offers a historic opportunity to build stability in the region by accomplishing what statesmen have failed to do for over a century--establish in East Central Europe a just and lasting international order that will transform the continent's tinderbox into a peaceful extension of West European prosperity and contentment.

No one can deny this is a worthy vision. Unfortunately, the vision offers few clues as to how it can be realized, and perplexed Western governments have struggled since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 to determine the best way forward. As a result, the process of creating a new security order for post-Cold War Europe has inched ahead haltingly, with many decisions resulting more from bureaucratic inertia than a comprehensive vision of the future. Irritated by the slow pace of change, Europe's new democracies complain that the West has shown none of the decisiveness and ingenuity with which it organized a new European defense system in a comparable period after the Second World War. 1 Their disappointment is heghtened by mounting fears that the window of opportunity in the region may be closing.

The processs of expanding NATO has moved forward, however, if slowly. Most importantly, it is now clear that NATO will be the central institution for building a new security architecture for Europe. Options such as expanding the role of the Organization for Security and Copoperation in Europe (OSCE) or creating new collective-security institutions remain possibilities, but only as complements to NATO'S central role. Consensus about the alliance's continuing importance reflects not only the insistance of East Central European governments that the alliance remains the continent's best insurance policy against new threats, but also the extreme reluctance of Western governments-- even neo-Gallist France-- to diminish an institution that they believe has proved ots effectiveness for nearly 50 years.

It is also now clear that the NATO at the heart of Europe's security in the future will be an expanded NATO. Alliance heads of state and government committed themselves to enlargement at their Copenhagen summit in January 1994. Despite persistent doubts among many policy-makers and scholars, the alliance has moved along the cautious path toward expansion that it mapped out at that time. Toward the end of 1995, NATO headquarters completed a study of enlargement spelling out goals and conditions, and a few months later the alliance began holding preliminary talks with aspiring governments. 2 Recent statements by alliance leaders confirm the growing sense of inevitability. NATO enlargement "is on track, and it will happen," U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said in a major speech in September 1996, marking the fiftieth anniversary of James Byrnes's landmark sppech charting Germany's revival. 3 Moreover, the alliance has scheduled a summit meeting in mid-1997 with the intention of designating first-round candidates, setting a timetable and announcing other conditions of expansion. 4

For better or for worse, then, the alliance has answered the question of whether it will enlarge. Accordingly, the debate over the wisdom of expansion, which exercised the academic, journalistic and policy-making communities for more than two years, has lost much of its relevance. 5 The new, even more vexing problem for the alliance is how to enlarge itself -- what countries to bring in, how quickly and with what arrangements for those that are excluded. The challenge is to find the right combination of answers so expansion brings real stability to East Central Europe at an affordable price while preserving the alliance's credibility and effectiveness. Juggling these aims poses a major challenge to a transatlantic leadership preoccupied with domestic worries and budgetary constraints. The shortness of time before the 1997 summit and the serious problems encountered so far in making decisions about NATO expansion raise troubling doubts about the likelihood of hitting upon the right solutions.

This essay attempts to analyze the unfolding debate about how NATO should go about expanding its membership. In doing so, it draws mainly on arguments made in the United States, partly because the debate is sharpest and most prolific there and partly because Washington's view carries by far the most weight in NATO decision-making. The essay consists of four sections. First, it describes the five new questions confronting the alliance as it considers how to expand and moves toward the mid-1997 deadline it has set itself for decisions. Second, it explores some of the reasons why these questions are so resistant to answers. Third, the essay spells out some of the considerations that are guiding -- and will likely continue to guide -- the answers, in the absence of a single, comprehensive vision of the future. Finally, the paper will suggest where these considerations are leading NATO policy-makers and what the risks may be for Europe's future if the alliance continues down the path along which it has started.

FIVE NEW QUESTIONS Which countries should be invited to join in the first round of expansion?

At least ten East Central European countries have clamored more or less eagerly for NATO membership since shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall and sought to sell themselves as worthy candidates. In principle, any permutation of these countries might be selected for a first round of enlargement, and the alliance has consistently refused to speculate on their qualifications until exhaustive studies are complete. In practice, however, aspiring members break down into three groups that offer different constellations of advantages and disadvantages.

Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia -- the "Visegrad" countries -- comprise the least problematic group. Although Slovakia has dropped behind the others, these countries have generally achieved the highest level of political and economic reform among the new democracies of East Central Europe. They also benefit from close historical ties to Western Europe and relatively high levels of Western investment. From a military point of view, the Visegrad nations not only offer the largest and most sophisticated forces in the region, but also would be relatively defensible since they would form a contiguous bloc with current alliance territory. The sheer size and populations of these countries, along with their historical significance as the chief prizes in Russo-German conflicts, make the risks of leaving them out higher than in the case of other countries in the region.

A somewhat more problematic group of candidates for NATO membership comprises three disparate nations to the south -- Romania, Bulgaria and Slovenia. All three suffer from proximity to the turbulent Balkans, and NATO will be tempted to wait to expand into the region until the prospects for long-term stability in the former Yugoslavia are clearer. Romania's problem with its Hungarian minority and Slovenia's tensions with Italy over property ownership will give the alliance further pause, as will Bulgaria's ambivalence about NATO membership, unique among the nations of East Central Europe. 6 Nevertheless, political and economic reforms have moved ahead in these nations, and NATO membership would arguably help protect fragile gains amid Balkan uncertainties. In addition, the risk of irritating Russia is probably lowest in these countries, particularly Slovenia, which never formed part of the Warsaw Pact.

The Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania present the most difficult problem. NATO membership would arguably mean the most to these nations since they -- uniquely among the new democracies -- face a potential direct military threat from a powerful neighbor. 7 Russian extremists speak occasionally of their aim to re-annex the Baltic states, and the presence of large Russian minorities in Latvia and Estonia could provide a pretext for Russian intervention. Viewed another way, however, these vulnerabilities argue strongly against NATO accession. Membership for the Baltic countries could so antagonize Moscow as to help bring about the nightmare scenario of Russian intervention. Complicating the problem is the fact that the Baltic states may be indefensible at any bearable cost, making a sham of any NATO security guarantee. In the view of some, the best the West can offer the Baltics is upgraded relations with NATO short of membership, EU membership and some sort of regional security arrangement also including the Scandinavian countries. 8

How quickly should new members be admitted? There are essentially two schools of thought, which largely recreate the earlier debate over whether NATO should expand at all. One side asserts that a first round of enlargement should take place as quickly as possible -- by the turn of the century -- because of the pressing need to create stability into East Central Europe. 9 Economic and political reform, this argument goes, will flourish best once the young democracies can breathe more easily about their security and feel like full members of the Western club of nations. A failure to grant NATO membership would weaken reform-minded politicians, disillusion public opinion about Western intentions and discourage foreign investment. Some commentators also stress that the new democracies do face real threats from Russia, even if any risk of direct intervention remains a decade in the future. For example, William Odom, former director of the National Security Agency, argues that Russia will likely remain an unpredictable giant for years to come, perpetrating "disorder and violence" in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus, applying pressure on its Commonwealth of Independent States partners and practicing "trouble-making diplomacy" wherever it can. 10 Against such threats, he concludes, East Central Europe needs reassurances quickly.

The other school of thought suggests that expansion should take place over the longer term -- perhaps a decade to 15 years. This timetable, proponents argue, would allow time for NATO to develop a new security link with Russia and ensure that NATO enlargement comprised only one dimension of a broader set of agreements and institutional relationships that would ensure security across the continent. 11 The argument often stresses that the problems confronting East Central Europe are primarily economic, so NATO is the wrong institution to bring a quick dose of democratic stability. 12 Instead, they place far greater value on early membership in other bodies, especially the European Union. These commentators argue, furthermore, that a go-slow approach to NATO enlargement could always allow for abrupt acceleration if a specific threat from Russia or elsewhere emerged. 13 While questioning the likelihood of such a threat anywhere in East Central Europe, they point out that the areas where NATO seems most comfortable expanding quickly -- Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary -- are precisely the areas where Russian pressure is least likely.

What kind of membership should the new members have? In its September 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement," perhaps the definitive statement to date on the project, the alliance rules out any possibility of giving new adherents "second-tier" membership by qualifying the alliance's security guarantee or limiting force deployments within their borders. 14 This statement appears aimed at nipping in the bud various Russian demands that new members gain only "political" (as opposed to "military") membership in NATO, or that stationing of nuclear weapons, foreign troops or foreign armor units be forbidden on their soil. 15 The NATO study does not set down final policy, however, and the alliance could still embrace such ideas as part of a deal to make expansion palatable to Moscow. British Defense Secretary Michael Portillo, for one, has kept alive the possibility of formally distinguishing between political and military membership. 16 Another possibility for assuaging Russian fears would be a non-binding declaration by NATO or by new NATO members that no changes in the alliance's current nuclear posture were foreseen. 17

Barring any decision to limit conventional force deployments, NATO will face a wide range of options about how to mesh new member countries into the alliance's defense scheme. RAND Corporation analysts have shown that NATO can choose among three different concepts for new members, each calling for different kinds of allied commitments and different levels of spending. 18 At one extreme, the alliance could adopt a "self-defense" concept, meaning new members would be overwhelmingly responsible for their own defense, with help from foreign forces only in areas such as command, control, intelligence and logistics. An intermediate option -- "power projection" -- would involve development of an allied capability to inject large foreign forces in a crisis. Finally, NATO could opt for a "forward presence" scheme, stationing large contingents of foreign troops on the territory of new members, as in Germany during the Cold War.

What provisions should NATO make to reassure those East Central European nations that remain outside the alliance after the first round of expansion? This is easily the most important question for the more problematic applicant nations, but it is also vital for nations that may never become NATO members, especially Ukraine. 19 Reassurances for such countries are crucial for NATO, too, because of the probability that far more nations will fall into this category than are offered first-round admission. Both sides share the fear that the first wave of NATO enlargement will damage excluded countries both domestically and internationally, possibly eliminating them from candidacy later on. Domestically, East Central European governments worry that exclusion will undercut political forces that have championed reform and membership in Western institutions since the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. Their failure would risk disillusioning westward-looking electorates and clearing the way for extremism that could threaten regional stability. Failure of the Westernizers could also lead to go-it-alone foreign policies that could work at cross-purposes with broader international efforts to establish a new, cooperative security framework for Europe. Internationally, exclusion could leave nations vulnerable to economic, political and possibly military pressure from Russia.

One universally accepted answer to this problem is that NATO should continually stress that its doors remain open to future rounds of enlargement even after a first group enters. However, other possibilities -- none of them mutually exclusive -- have been suggested to give more concrete assurances. One approach is to expand NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP), a program created by the alliance in 1994. The PfP was founded not only to build military cooperation with non-member countries through information-sharing, joint exercises and peacekeeping missions such as the Implementation Force in Bosnia, but also to prepare the way for the most qualified nations to become full NATO members. In the minds of many NATO planners, PfP should be upgraded and expanded, at least for some participants who are not granted early entry into NATO, to reassure them that the alliance is still keenly interested in their security. A strengthened PfP could also serve as a signal to Russia that NATO had in no way abandoned these countries.

Another approach to this problem is to assign to other international institutions the burden of reassuring countries where NATO is not yet ready to extend its security guarantee. Organizations commonly mentioned include the OSCE, the Western European Union (WEU) and the Council of Europe, but the European Union is clearly the best candidate for a high-profile role. 20 EU membership for, say, Estonia and Romania, while NATO only expanded to Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, would help reassure all unsuccessful alliance applicants that the West was still serious about the well-being of the Baltics and Balkans. 21 Underpinning this argument is the assumption that EU-inspired economic reforms and market access will go much of the way toward satisfying the basic needs of East Central European nations and give them a sense of belonging to Western clubs. But the EU could also partly take NATO's place since EU membership would imply a strong commitment to a state's security and could serve as a deterrent to potential aggressors. Western Europe's potential security role in the East will be further bolstered if the current EU reform negotiations bring the WEU more firmly under EU auspices.

What agreements should be sought with Russia to ensure that NATO enlargement truly forms part of a new European security architecture and does not serve as a catalyst for a new division of Europe? One option, endorsed by Warren Christopher, would be for NATO to negotiate a treaty or "charter" with Moscow to lay out the parameters of future cooperation and principles for ensuring stability in East Central Europe. 22 Such an agreement, the details of which remain hazy despite discussion at NATO headquarters, might spell out the place of an expanded NATO in broader security arrangements and establish Russian-NATO consultation procedures through the OSCE. Another idea is to set up an OSCE "security council" of Russia and a handful of Western powers to manage security across the continent. 23 A NATO-Russia pact might also include non-aggression provisions, pledges of respect for borders and promises of mutual consultations.

Others suggest that such a deal would be too rigid for a Russia-NATO relationship that is fluid and bound to remain so for the foreseeable future. Instead, on this line of reasoning, NATO should seek to boost cooperation and confidence through a series of less comprehensive arrangements. Russian participation in the IFOR is one example of joint projects that might be undertaken in the future. Developing Russian-NATO cooperation on proliferation, missile defense and civil protection are other areas of promise. Further suggestions for development of harmonious relations include intensified Russian involvement in Group of Seven bodies, expanded EU-Russian cooperation and institutionalization of the "16+1" format under which Russian officials now meet regularly with NATO counterparts. 24

Yet another approach suggests that NATO has exaggerated the importance of Russian sensitivities and should rest assured that Moscow will learn to live with whatever the alliance decides about enlargement. Those who make this argument assert that Russian politicians and generals, through their frequent protests against NATO expansion, have convinced Western leaders that enlargement constitutes a major political issue in Russia and that the fate of Westernizing reformers rests largely on Western caution on the issue. In fact, they contend, the issue is not critical to most politicians and hardly registers among the everyday worries that preoccupy the Russian electorate. Moreover, some argue that Russia is sufficiently aware of its own weakness to accept -- albeit grudgingly -- whatever NATO decides to do in East Central Europe. 25 Russia might threaten to retaliate against enlargement by withholding implementation of START II or withdrawing from the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, but it would ultimately realize that such actions would boomerang by jeopardizing Western aid and fueling a standoff that Russia could not afford, especially in light of its defense preoccupations along its southern and eastern borders.

THE STRUGGLE FOR ANSWERS

One of the major challenges in finding answers to these questions is that, as the foregoing discussion suggests, the range of options is enormous. Any combination of countries, timetables and accompanying arrangements is theoretically possible, and the considerations feeding into the ultimate decisions are so many and varied that the number of reasonable permutations is not much smaller than the number of possible permutations. The alliance could reasonably choose to expand to all ten countries or to only two or three. It could move quickly or slowly. It could arm the new countries and station forces, or it could limit their membership and leave them largely self-reliant. It could attach greater or lesser importance to reassuring Russia or excluded parts of East Central Europe.

In this situation of extreme flexibility and myriad options, NATO badly needs some firm guideposts on how to proceed. Above all, such guideposts depend on the development of a clear vision of the role an expanded NATO should play in the Europe of the future. Expansion aimed at bolstering reform throughout East Central Europe will call for a different set of answers to the above-listed questions than expansion aimed at defending the region from a new Russian threat. Expansion aimed at building a strengthened pillar for a new trans-continental security system would call for still a different set of answers.

Of course, realization of a vision depends not only on NATO's clear-headedness but also on the attitudes of the other states that will have a strong say in future arrangements. Thus, the guideposts depend equally on development of confident assumptions about Russian attitudes and the course Moscow is likely to follow in the future. A cooperative and malleable Russia would call for one set of NATO decisions on enlargement; a hostile Russia would call for another. If a hostile Russia is to be assumed, NATO must try to understand its capability to threaten the East Central European nations. A Russia with the ability to undercut reform in the region or pose a real military threat would call for one set of answers; a Russia lacking that ability would call for another.

NATO's central problem in the debate over enlargement is that these conditions for arriving at logical and consistent answers to the main questions have not been fulfilled. As a result, answers set forward by the alliance to date have been so murky and hesitant as to be arguably non-existent. Why is this so? Why has the alliance, seven years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, failed to generate a clear set of assumptions to guide it as it moves toward one of the most important decisions in its history?

Perhaps the most important reason is that NATO, despite its affirmative answer to the question of whether to enlarge, has failed to answer satisfactorily the primordial question of why it wishes to do so. To be sure, the alliance has devoted a good deal of time to this question and has tried to offer answers in numerous communiquŽs and other documents since early 1994. The 1995 "Study on NATO Enlargement" lays out no fewer than three aims. One is to bring "increased stability and security" to the new democracies and to "protect their further democratic development." 26 The second is to extend to the new countries "the benefits of common defense" against real outside threats -- the mutual security guarantee that lies at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty. 27 The third is to contribute to "a broad European security architecture based on true cooperation throughout the whole of Europe." 28

The crux of the problem is that in today's Europe, these three aims, however well-intentioned, tend to contradict each other. Each of the objectives, considered individually, suggests very different answers to the major questions of enlargement. For example, the aim of bolstering democracy implies adding a large number of countries quickly and offering as many reassurances as possible to nations of East Central Europe that do not immediately join; stationing of troops would not be necessary, and reassurance for Russia would be a secondary concern. The aim of providing real defense capabilities against external threats -- most obviously Russia -- means quickly adding those countries that can readily be defended or that face the most serious risks, making relatively large commitments of foreign forces and offering credible reassurances to non-member countries. Meanwhile, the objective of building a cooperative, Atlantic-to-Urals security architecture implies slowly adding a limited number of new members, restraining force deployments and making cooperation with Russia the sine qua non of the entire project.

Such inherent contradictions suggest a lack of boldness and intellectual rigor in NATO's thinking. The alliance's inability to respond effectively to the questions posed by enlargement is not, however, entirely the result of its own shortcomings. Also contributing to the problem is the extreme difficulty of making judgments about Russia and the course it is likely to follow in the future. This is a crucial matter since assumptions about Moscow's motives are necessary before NATO can arrive at an understanding of the dangers posed to the countries of East Central Europe and the likelihood of working out a new transcontinental relationship with Russia. To be sure, Russian leaders have left little doubt about their opposition to NATO's enlargement. Confusion remains in the West, however, over what this hostility really means, whether there might be room for compromise and how the alliance should respond. No standard for judging Russian behavior is apparent. 29

Is Russian opposition the rational response of a relatively benign government sincerely trying to defend its national interests and prevent a new division of Europe? Or is it the ranting of a rejuvenated, congenitally expansionist nation that should not be appeased? If Russia were judged to fit the reasonable mold, NATO could confidently delay expansion until a broader security framework could be agreed or at least proceed with expansion in a way calculated to minimize any affront to Russia. If Russia fits the hostile mold, then NATO might choose either to ignore Russian sensitivities or go ahead with expansion in ways designed to provide maximum security for East Central European countries from dangers to the east.

Both views enjoy influential support in the policy-making and academic worlds, and no resolution is in sight. 30 For example, leading Russia specialist Dmitri Simes and RAND analyst Arnold L. Horelick assert, at least implicitly, that Russia is a country with which the West can now deal as a "normal" actor in international affairs. 31 The old expansionist drive now exists in Russia only "on the fringes of the Russian political spectrum," in Horelick's view. 32 Given the malleability of the rest of the Russian leadership, the West would be well-advised, according to this line of thought, to respect Russia as a reasonable and flexible, albeit tough, negotiating partner with legitimate interests to protect. To present Moscow with a fait accompli in East Central Europe will merely irritate Russia and squander the opportunity now open to the West to push Russia along a democratic, Western path.

On the other side, Odom and former National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski still regard Russia as a menace in the region, consumed by the same old expansionist drive as in the past. 33 A RAND study argues similarly that Russia, after showing initial promise following the 1990 demise of the Soviet Union, has steadily abandoned "Atlanticism" for old-fashioned "statism" that has driven Russian expansionism for centuries. 34 As evidence, commentators cite Russia's war in Chechnya, pressures against the other nations of the Commonwealth of Independent States and fuming about NATO expansion. Given Russia's inexorable return to old patterns, the argument runs, delaying or negotiating over enlargement amounts to appeasement and only risks emboldening Russia further.

At the root of this debate is, of course, the starkly conflicting evidence emerging from Russia itself. To be sure, the general tone of all Russia statements about expansion has been hostile. Russian President Boris Yeltsin threw down the gauntlet at an OSCE summit in December 1994 when he warned of a new "cold peace" and hinted ominously about Russia's reaction, saying: "No major country is going to live by the laws of isolation." 35 Since then, many Russian leaders have continued to threaten the West. Defense Minister Igor Rodionov warned most menacingly of all in October 1996 that Russia was preparing a package of unspecified retaliatory steps. 36 Meanwhile, however, some Russian leaders have hinted at flexibility. Russia's former security chief, Alexander Lebed, indicated periodically in 1996 that Russia could grudgingly accept NATO expansion. 37 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Yvgeny Primakov has occasionally hinted at a willingness to compromise by agreeing that East Central European countries could have "political" but not "military" membership in NATO or could be given "cross-guarantees" by NATO and Moscow. 38

Attempts to assess the attitudes of the Russian political class as a whole offer little more help in gauging the country's likely behavior. Russianist Simes told a Congressional committee in 1995 that his conversations in Moscow indicated an almost universal pragmatism about NATO and a willingness to gear any response to NATO's plans to the precise course of expansion chosen. 39 "I did not find a single person who would welcome the expansion of NATO," Simes said. "Nor did I encounter anyone who, in private conversation, would insist that this expansion would inevitably lead to a major international crisis." Brzezinski, on the other hand, wrote around the same time that the Russian political establishment was increasingly dominated by anti-Western nationalists who were seeking to re-extend Russian influence into East Central Europe and would view NATO expansion as a direct affront. 40

Uncertainty about Russia is not the only external source of confusion for the alliance as it seeks to answer the basic questions of enlargement. Less obvious but almost as difficult for the alliance is the problem of arriving at fundamental judgments about the situation in East Central Europe. Did 1989 herald a moment of unprecedented opportunity for the West to "solve" the problem of the lands between Russia and Germany by binding them permanently to Western institutions? Is a new power vacuum developing that could invite Russian or German meddling, as in the past, if NATO does not step in quickly? Or did 1989 mark the beginning of a new era (or at least potentially new), when the nations of East Central Europe, despite short-term uncertainties, might be free to solve their own problems by forging their own destinies and building a new Mitteleuropa able to stand on its own between rivals to the east and west? Answers to these questions would clearly imply answers to the basic questions of enlargement. If East Central Europe is on the verge of a new era of risky instability that can only be addressed by Western bodies, then NATO should step in quickly. If East Central Europe is capable of carving out a new role for itself as part of a continent-wide security system, then NATO should move slowly to the east and in a limited way.

At heart, the questions hinge on the validity of historical precedents. Is East Central Europe, or is it not, in danger of becoming once again a tinderbox for conflict among the great powers, as most recently in 1914 or 1939? As over Russia, commentators are deeply divided. On one side are those who rely heavily on historical models, stressing the landmark nature of the present opportunity to fill a regional vacuum that has produced so much anguish in the past. For example, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, drawing heavily on historical precedents, argues that NATO's failure to expand -- and therefore to remain the dominant force in European security matters -- would provide Russia and possibly Germany with new temptations to "fill the vacuum" in East Central Europe. 41 Bush administration official Robert Zoellick, one of the architects of German unification, is more explicit about the danger:

Both world wars of this century, following the pattern of earlier centuries, began amidst the turmoil and competitions of this area. Without a sense of security [through NATO expansion], factions may arise within the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, as they have in the past, to counter or accommodate negative forces in larger neighbors. Sadly, this response could even trigger aggression. 42

Others who argue on the basis of historical precedents see the current situation as most similar to that of the mid-1940s, and draw the corresponding lessons. Just as the West, led by Washington, responded vigorously to instability and the Soviet challenge in Western Europe by forming NATO, they argue, so now it should respond to instability and a potential Russian challenge further east by extending an institution whose successes to date are plain. This argument stresses that the U.S. interest in a peaceful, prosperous Europe remains as strong as after the Second World War, and that a failure to respond vigorously to new opportunities could undermine not just European but U.S. security in the future. "It should be clear,'' Odom told Congress, for example,

that U.S. interests include a stable, militarily secure, and prosperous Europe. That has been true in the past, and there is no reason I can see that it should be different in the future. . . . A militarily weak and divided Europe can hardly be in our interests in the years ahead. Nor can a Europe with scenes of genocide, civil wars, and other destabilizing turmoil. Our moral and political interests would be deeply damaged by such developments, and our economic interests would soon be hurt. Finally, we would probably eventually decide that we could no longer stand aside militarily. 43

On the other side are a smaller number of commentators who reject or question the validity of history as a guide to present possibilities in Europe. Liberal proponents of this view stress that Germany since 1945 and Russia since 1990 have undergone such thorough transformations that they are no longer likely to act as in the past. 44 Therefore, the danger that the two great powers would resume their historic rivalry over East Central Europe is far-fetched, and new responses are called for to cope with a region whose problems are now economic and political rather than military. To use NATO as a means of coping with Russian or German ambitions would be, in the view of former U.S. Ambassador Jack Matlock, like France's effort to prevent World War II by building the Maginot Line: "By focusing on the threats of the past, France failed to grasp the threats of the future. . . and that is precisely the mistake the advocates of rapid NATO expansion make today." 45

Some conservative commentators go much further by suggesting that not only Europe, but the whole geostrategic problem facing the West, has changed so much that the condition of East Central Europe should now be a minor consideration for the West. RAND Corporation President Jim Thomson, argues, for example, that if NATO did not already exist, no one would advocate its creation to handle security risks to the West that are increasingly global in scope and difficult to pinpoint. Threats to the West, he argues, now come from the Persian Gulf, Asia or rogue states with sophisticated military capabilities. Preserving the territorial integrity of European states -- the central aim of even a revamped post-Cold War NATO -- has little relevance. 46 Along the same line, columnist Irving Kristol asserts that the end of the Cold War has

remov[ed] Europe from the center of world politics, abolishing its potential for originating world wars, and converting the balance of power in Europe into a regional issue -- and not a particularly controversial one at that. 47

U.S. resources, and by implication those of the West generally, would be better expended on more urgent tasks.

SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS

Thus, for a variety of reasons -- contradictory aims, the Russian enigma and uncertainty about the precise nature of the opportunity in East Central Europe -- NATO has failed to arrive at a clear strategy for expanding the alliance. Until a clearer set of underlying aims and assumptions can be settled upon, the alliance is unlikely to answer the five basic questions posed by enlargement in a consistent and confident manner. The most serious problem of all, as the foregoing discussion indicates, is that the conundrums are not wholly within the control of Western policy-makers to solve. Given the chaos that characterizes Russian politics, it is highly unlikely that the West will have reached any firm guiding assumptions about Russian behavior before the landmark summit scheduled for mid-1997, even if NATO were able to sort out its own aims and attitudes toward East Central Europe.

The difficulties of decision-making do not, however, excuse the West from the need to make decisions. In fact, decisions are only becoming more urgent as the probable summit date approaches. Under such time pressure, Western governments are increasingly sidestepping the fundamental problems at the heart of the enlargement project and finding guidance in a series of relatively superficial considerations that help suggest answers to the basic questions posed by expansion. A slate of at least five such "secondary" considerations have become increasingly important to decision-making, and given the difficulties of settling on the broad principles, seem likely to become even more influential in the coming months. These considerations comprise a diverse collection of pressures, worries and perceived opportunities that tend to push alliance decision-making in one direction or another. Brief examination of each will demonstrate how these considerations are shaping alliance policy.

The first is the tremendous pressure from East Central European governments to expand quickly. Time after time over the past seven years, government leaders from East Central Europe have trooped to Washington, Brussels, Bonn and other alliance capitals to stress the importance of membership in Western institutions and to press for definite accession timetables. "We knock on the door at every opportunity," Hungarian Defense Minister Gyoergy Keleti told an interviewer in 1995. 48 East Central European statesmen have warned in more or less apocalyptic terms of the dangers of failure, ranging from prolonged economic backwardness to outright invasion by a new Russian empire. Poland's then-President Lech Walesa complained in early 1994 that NATO's go-slow approach on expansion was "short-sighted and irresponsible," adding: "We are too weak and we have to accept almost everything, but we don't forecast anything good for this concept." 49 For candidates with weaker credentials for membership, the challenge has been to stress the dangers of exclusion. Prominent Romanian politician Petre Roman, for example, warned Western legislators in 1996 of the inevitable public opinion backlash against any exclusion by the West. 50

These arguments resonate in the West for various reasons. One is the ineffable but pervasive sense of historic obligation to the nations of East Central Europe after abandoning them repeatedly to Russian hegemony -- Czechoslovakia in 1938, the Baltics in 1939, Hungary in 1956, Poland in 1980, to name just a few. Another reason is the growing sense that the window of opportunity to realize the dream of a democratic and westward-looking East Central Europe may gradually be closing. A European Union poll conducted in November 1995 showed that citizens of ten countries in the region, while overwhelmingly in favor of NATO and EU membership, were increasingly disappointed with their current governments' reform efforts. About 55 percent said they were dissatisfied with "the way democracy is developing" in their country. 51 Western governments are clearly worried by the prospect that Westernizers in East Central Europe will be replaced by other political groupings able to capitalize on popular discontent with the pace of change.

The second consideration in decision-making about expansion -- and another reason why pressures from East Central European nations resonate in the West -- is domestic politics in member nations, especially the United States. In no NATO nation, it must be said, does the issue of enlargement arouse great passions, and in many there is hardly any debate at all. But in the United States, the issue sparked a miniature duel between Republicans and Democrats to back expansion more eagerly, especially to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic. Both parties eagerly seek the support of voters of Polish, Czech and Hungarian descent -- only 6 percent of the total U.S. electorate, but potentially swing voters in key Midwestern and Northeastern states. 52 Two weeks before the 1996 election, President Bill Clinton pledged to back NATO membership for a first group of nations in 1999. 53 The promise was almost certainly a response to Republican challenger Bob Dole's campaign pledge to make the three countries full NATO members by 1998 and to Dole's accusations of "foot-dragging" by the administration. 54 In an effort to seize the initiative on the issue just before leaving the Senate, Dole pushed through legislation setting up a $50 million fund to help pay the costs of enlargement.

In other ways, however, domestic politics tends to restrain bold steps toward enlargement. An influential minority of the U.S. Senate -- an unlikely mix of conservative isolationists and liberal internationalists who see relations with Russia as the top priority -- opposes rapid or broad expansion of the alliance. Once election-year pressures to appeal to ethnic voters have passed, this minority could swell to a majority. 55 At least one commentator has pointed to the risk that the Clinton administration may be headed down the path of the Woodrow Wilson administration, which championed the League of Nations as a way to build security after World War I only to see the Senate reject U.S. membership in 1920, crushing U.S. credibility abroad and heralding an era of isolationism. 56 Opposition to NATO enlargement could also grow within those alliance countries that have only an indirect stake in East Central Europe. For countries such as Spain, Portugal, Italy and Turkey, threats from North Africa, the Middle East and terrorism are much more serious than instability in East Central Europe. Accordingly, opposition among these NATO nations, now relatively insignificant, could mount against a massive expenditure of alliance resources to the east.

The third consideration guiding NATO decision-making is the clear support of Germany for expansion to the countries along its eastern border, Poland and the Czech Republic. Politicians across the spectrum, from Christian Democrat Defense Minister Volker Rühe 57 to Social Democrat foreign affairs spokesman Karsten Voigt, 58 eagerly support expansion. It may not be the remarkable German consensus for expansion so much as the reasons cited for it, however, that catch the attention of other NATO governments. In a 1994 policy paper on European policy, Chancellor Helmut Kohl's CDU asserted that without expansion of Western institutions "Germany might be called upon, or tempted by its own security constraints, to try to effect the stabilization of Eastern Europe on its own and in the traditional way." 59

In the absence of fundamental judgments about the degree to which historical precedents remain valid, Germany's backing for expansion and its remarkable self-proclaimed worries about its potential future policies carry weight with Germany's NATO partners. Even those inclined to believe that today's Germany is a solid democratic citizen of Europe will be tempted to support a policy that would help erase any lingering possibility that the country could return to its past. In any case, Germany's worries reinforce the view set forward by Kissinger, Zoellick and Richard Burt, the former U.S. ambassador to Bonn, that the most important opportunity available to the West is the chance to cement Germany more fully into multinational structures. 60 They point out that a basic principle behind NATO -- to harness German power to the West and prevent go-it-alone German diplomacy -- remains as valid today as in the 1950s.

A fourth consideration weighing on NATO's decision is the expense -- how much it will cost taxpayers to restructure the alliance to accommodate new members and provide them with equipment and facilities meeting NATO specifications. NATO support for enlargement suggests that Western governments are prepared to bear considerable costs; however, experts have only recently turned to the extraordinarily complex work of calculating how much the total might be. Of course, the bill will depend on precisely what NATO expansion consists of -- which countries are added, how quickly, how costs are shared and to what extent force-modernization and stationing of foreign forces are deemed necessary. A 1996 RAND study estimates the cost of bringing in the Visegrad countries by the end of the century to be between $10 million and $110 million over 10 to 15 years. 61 But the study goes on to suggest that a moderate plan involving limited modernization of equipment and facilities, but no stationing of foreign troops, would mean costs to the West of about $42 million over the same time frame, or between 1 and 2 percent of current defense spending of NATO members. 62 The bottom line, according to the study, is that this is a reasonable and bearable sum, especially when compared to the costs of defending East Central Europe from aggression later.

An implication of the study, however, is that the cost of adding more than the four countries mentioned or stationing large numbers of foreign troops on their soil may run too high for Western governments that are both increasingly budget-conscious and increasingly aware that military priorities outside of Europe require an ever bigger piece of a smaller pie. Costs obviously would grow much higher in countries such as Estonia or Romania, which are militarily more backward, further away from NATO's core and more exposed to potential threats. Building a meaningful defense capability in the Baltics would be most costly of all, given the almost certain need for forward deployment of foreign forces to make a NATO defense guarantee credible. But the costs of expanding only to the Visegrad four could also run very high if a relatively large commitment of forces is deemed necessary. In a March 1996 study predicated largely on the need to prepare for war against Russia, the Congressional Budget Office concluded that expenses could be as much as $125 billion over ten years. 63

A final consideration influencing NATO decision-making is the need to maintain the alliance's credibility and coherence. On the matter of credibility, NATO certainly feels political pressure to live up to its commitment to expand. Any failure to do so would risk alienating East Central European governments and calling NATO's solemn political commitments into question. At the same time, however, alliance military chiefs worry about a different kind of credibility -- that of the defense guarantees NATO would make to new members. They point out that, whatever the West's desire to prop up democratic reform in East Central Europe, the alliance must always bear in mind that NATO membership carries a commitment to mutual defense. The alliance, therefore, must be careful to make such a pledge only to countries it is both willing and able to defend. Given doubts about whether Washington has a real interest in defending Warsaw or Prague, extending a U.S. guarantee to Riga or Bratislava will be even more open to question. 64

As to the need for cohesion, the worry is that adding new NATO members will complicate the alliance's already-complex decision-making procedures. Making decisions by consensus -- NATO's long-standing rule -- could become much more problematic with the addition of several nations with much different historical outlooks and lacking the bonding experience of the Cold War. 65 The fact that NATO is in the midst of a years-long effort to achieve the most fundamental reform in its history makes the need for harmony and consensus even greater. Perhaps the greatest danger is that the addition of East Central European nations primarily worried about the Russian threat will distract NATO from its effort to adjust to the post-Cold War era. Instead of accepting the need to adapt for the future, new members might try to push NATO back to its days as a mainly anti-Russian alliance. In this way, expansion could compromise the alliance's ability to fulfill non-traditional duties such as peacekeeping, counter-terrorism and intervention outside Europe. 66

CONCLUSIONS

Where do these "secondary" considerations lead NATO as it tries to answer the basic questions of enlargement? Gradually, they are conspiring together to push the alliance toward a particular scenario:

  • On the question of what countries should be admitted, German interests and political pressures in the United States point to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic as the clear front-runners for early membership. The demands of cost, cohesion and military credibility, along with the perils of ratification, make it unlikely that any others, even Slovenia and Romania, would be added in the near term.

  • On the timetable for enlargement, regional pressures and concerns about the closing window of opportunity, reinforced by political considerations, point to relatively quick negotiations with the leading candidates. Concerns about military credibility, cohesion and cost suggest that talks with other aspiring countries could be deferred for some time.
  • On the question of what type of membership should be offered, regional and political pressures, reinforced by the need for military credibility, dictate that the alliance, despite Russian insistence, offer only full membership, although actual near-term deployments will likely be limited.
  • On the question of accompanying arrangements for East Central European nations not immediately invited to open accession negotiations, the sense of historic opportunity, regional pressures and the need for political credibility will lead NATO to seek closer ties short of membership, probably through a strengthened PfP program.
  • On the question of arrangements with Russia, it seems likely that NATO will continue to pursue agreements or understandings to make expansion more palatable to Moscow. It is crucial to note, however, that the secondary considerations in no way suggest that this aim should be the highest priority or even an equal priority with the aim of expanding quickly to a small number of new members.

    Given the pressures and concerns that Western policy-makers must juggle, this scenario -- with every passing day increasingly likely to be realized -- is understandable and even logical. It is a sincere effort to take account of various interests that are now clear while working around the considerable uncertainties that seem likely to resist satisfactory answers for the foreseeable future. Moreover, from NATO's point of view, the unfolding scenario would amount merely to an interim solution, capable of adjustment later to take account of new realities.

    It is, however, a scenario fraught with risk, primarily because it features neither the boldness necessary to bring the region as a whole solidly into the Western camp nor the caution necessary to make possible a NATO-Russian accord. Two dangers stand out in particular. The first is that expansion around 1999, coming well before any overarching arrangement with Russia is likely, will cause the NATO-Russian relationship to deteriorate precipitously. Deterioration is probable regardless of whether post-Cold War Russia fits the "reasonable" or the hostile mold. If Russia is "reasonable," it will view NATO actions as indicating the West is not serious about its professed desire for a new overarching security system for Europe. If Russia is still the expansionist power of the past, it will obviously see a threat. Either way, Moscow's natural response will be to curtail cooperation with the West in a range of areas, not least arms control. The tragedy is that quick expansion will diminish any possibility that may now exist of Russia evolving in the cooperative, "reasonable" direction. Thus, NATO risks creating a self-fulfilling prophesy about Russian behavior.

    The second danger is that a decision to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary against a backdrop of growing NATO-Russian tension will lessen the probability of admitting other East Central European nations later. Russian protests will only grow louder after a first round of enlargement, and its threats to abrogate arms control treaties may become increasingly serious for the West. Given the great indecision that has characterized NATO's expansion discussion to date, it seems likely that NATO would have little appetite for further antagonizing Russia later by bringing in, say, Romania and the Baltics. The desirability of admitting those countries -- not to mention the possibility of winning U.S. Senate ratification -- will decrease as the prospect of having to defend Bucharest or Tallinn from real threats increases.

    The long-term effect of such a scenario could be to expose the excluded nations to Russian pressures to make alternative security arrangements. NATO will naturally try to head off that possibility by strengthening PfP and other ties to non-members, but it remains possible that excluded nations will respond to a perceived rebuff from NATO by turning away from the alliance. In short, quick expansion to only three nations strengthens the position of only those three nations and could come as a stinging rebuff not only to Russia but also the excluded nations of East Central Europe. This scenario contains seeds which, if nurtured in the right way, could result in a new division of Europe, just a little further to the east. The West may gain three solid new allies, but it risks losing as many as a dozen nations to the other side.

    Risks are not, of course, certainties, and it is possible that shrewd diplomacy by the West and perseverance among Western-oriented leaders in Russia and East Central Europe could avert all the potential pitfalls of the emerging expansion scenario. Muddling through with interim solutions uninformed by a grand vision is successful in international affairs a surprising amount of the time. This capability is especially apparent in Europe, where during the Cold War the process of building Western cooperation and keeping the peace relied on institutions remarkable for their ability to adapt their aims to ever-changing possibilities and opportunities.

    The best recipe for success may be different following the end of the Cold War, however. Never since 1945 and rarely in history has one group of countries held so much power to reshape Europe. Given the tremendous opportunity -- and the risks of getting it wrong -- the Western alliance would do well to return to basics and try to find answers to the riddles at the heart of the NATO expansion project. Why precisely is expansion necessary? What are the possibilities of inaugurating a new era of cooperation with Russia? What are the real needs of East Central Europe? Clear answers to these questions must be found before NATO can go ahead with expansion in the most confident, rational and constructive way and live up to the role it has selected for itself as the principle pillar of a new security system in Europe.

    It will, of course, take time before answers will be apparent, probably more time than the alliance has given itself under the current timetable for decision-making. NATO should be willing to push back the summit meeting until such answers begin to emerge. The risks of prolonging the process of expansion are lower than the risks of expanding in the wrong way. For now, NATO seems inclined to throw up its hands in frustration and proceed on the basis of other, less fundamental considerations as deadline pressures mount for decisions. The historic opportunity could slip away.

    Notes

    The author would like to thank the Smith-Richardson Foundation for helping to fund a year of research in Europe for this and other projects. He also thanks Paul Kennedy, Gaddis Smith, Robert Wielaard, John Borawski, Simon Lunn, Mary Elise Sarotte and members of the Yale International Security Studies seminar.

    Note 1: For example, Andrzej Krzeczunowicz, Poland's Brussels-based ambassador to NATO, compland great-power ambitions in the territory between Germany and Russia. Going further, many Western commentators point out that the collapse of the Soviet empire offers a historic opportunity to build stability in the region by accomplishing what statesmen have failed to do for a century -- establish in East Central Europe a just and lasting international order that will transform the continent's tinderbox into a peaceful extension of West European prosperity and contentment. Back.

    Note 2: NATO headquarters plans to complete the so-called "intensified dialogue" discussions around the end of 1996. The aim of these talks is mainly to help NATO assess individual countries' readiness to adjust to NATO doctrine, mesh with the alliance's command structures and bear the costs of membership. NATO ministers hope to examine the results of the talks around the end of 1996 and begin preparing recommendations for the 1997 summit. "NATO Invites East European Hopefuls to Open Exploratory Talks," The Associated Press, 30 January 1996. Back.

    Note 3: Speech of Warren Christopher, Stuttgart, Germany, 6 September 1996, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Spokesman. Back.

    Note 4: Steven Erlanger, "U.S. Pushes Bigger NATO Despite Qualms on Russia,The New York Times 10 October 1996. Back.

    Note 5: For classic arguments against enlargement, see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival 37 (Spring 1995): 34-52; Editorial, "NATO, Then and Now," The New York Times, 9 May 1995; Tom Friedman, "Eye on the Prize," The New York Times, 10 May 1995; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996): 116-129; David J. Kramer, "No Need to Expand NATO Now," Christian Science Monitor, 9 February 1995. For the case in favor of enlargement, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival 37 (Spring 1995):7-33; Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," The Washington Post, 19 December 1994; William E. Odom, "We're Right to Be Wary," The Washington Post, 28 April 1996.For classic arguments against enlargement, see Michael E. Brown, "The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion," Survival 37 (Spring 1995): 34-52; Editorial, "NATO, Then and Now," The New York Times, 9 May 1995; Tom Friedman, "Eye on the Prize," The New York Times, 10 May 1995; Karl-Heinz Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," Foreign Policy 102 (Spring 1996): 116-129; David J. Kramer, "No Need to Expand NATO Now," Christian Science Monitor, 9 February 1995. For the case in favor of enlargement, see Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival 37 (Spring 1995):7-33; Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," The Washington Post, 19 December 1994; William E. Odom, "We're Right to Be Wary," The Washington Post, 28 April 1996. Back.

    Note 6: An early 1996 poll conducted by the European Union showed less than half of Bulgarians supported NATO membership for their country. Across the 10-nation region as a whole, 82 percent supported alliance membership. The Associated Press, "East Europeans Doubt Reform Process, Want to Join Western Clubs," 15 March 1996. Back.

    Note 7: "We do not see that Russia is at the moment willing to show respect for our independence and really live with us," said Estonia's ambassador to NATO, Clyde Kull. Interview with Kull, 14 May 1996, Brussels, Belgium. Back.

    Note 8: This is the basic conclusion of the best recent study of Baltic security issues, although it also argues NATO should leave the door open to membership in the future. See Ronald D. Asmus and Robert C. Nurick, "NATO Enlargement and the Baltic States," Survival 38 (Summer 1996): 121-142. Back.

    Note 9: See any of the above-listed articles arguing in favor of expansion. Back.

    Note 10: Testimony of Lt. Gen. William E. Odom (Ret.), 27 April 1995, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO's Future: Problems, Threats and U.S. Interests: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on European Affairs, 104th Cong., 1st Session (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995), 25-29. Back.

    Note 11: See, for example, testimony of Arnold L. Horelick, 27 April 1995, in Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO's Future, 11-16. Back.

    Note 12: For example, testimony of Fred C. IklŽ, 27 April 1995, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO'S Future 20-23; testimony of Ambassador Jack Matlock, 3 May 1995, Ibid. Back.

    Note 13: Report by the Council on Foreign Relations, "Should NATO Expand?" in Wolfgang Pordzik, ed., "Zur inneramerikanischen Debatte Ÿber die Erweiterung der NATO: Kommentar und Materialien" (Washington: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 1996); Editorial, "Wrong Time to Expand NATO," The New York Times, 25 October 1996 Back.

    Note 14: "Study on NATO Enlargement," NATO Headquarters, Brussels, Belgium, September 1995. Back.

    Note 15: For Russian ideas, see Erlanger, "U.S. Pushes Bigger NATO Despite Qualms on Russia," 10 October 1996. Back.

    Note 16: "NATO: Russia Snarls," The Economist, 5 October 1996. Back.

    Note 17: This option seems increasingly likely since both NATO and East Central European governments agree. Krzeczunowicz, the Polish ambassador to NATO, said stationing nuclear weapons on Polish soil "is not on the agenda" and "completely non-topical," although he insisted NATO should retain the right to change its nuclear posture "should there be an emergency situation sometime in the future." NATO's enlargement study says: "There is no a priori requirement for the stationing of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. In light of both the current international environment and the potential threats facing the Alliance, NATO's current nuclear posture will, for the foreseeable future, continue to meet the requirements of an enlarged alliance. There is, therefore, no need now to change or modify any aspect of NATO's nuclear posture or policy, but the longer term implications of enlargement for both will continue to be evaluated." "NATO Study on Enlargement," 20. Back.

    Note 18: Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "NATO Expansion: The Next Steps," Survival 37 (Spring 1995): 7-33. Back.

    Note 19: Ukraine's security dilemmas have received mounting attention. See F. Stephen Larrabee, "Ukraine's Balancing Act," Survival 38 (Summer 1996): 109-120; Jane Perlez, "Ukraine Walks Shaky Tightrope Between NATO and Russia," The New York Times, 24 October 1996. Back.

    Note 20: NATO's enlargement study notes the important role that all these institutions could play. "NATO Study on Enlargement," 6-8. Back.

    Note 21: Asmus and Nurick, 133-135. Back.

    Note 22: Christopher said the charter "should create standing arrangements for consultation and joint action between Russia and the Alliance.... The Charter should give us a permanent mechanism for crisis management so that we can respond together immediately as these challenges arise." Christopher speech, 5. Back.

    Note 23: Asmus, Kugler and Larrabee, 23. Back.

    Note 24: Ibid. Back.

    Note 25: Testimony of Robert B. Zoellick, 27 April 1995, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO'S Future 6-11; testimony of Dmitri Simes, 3 May 1995, Ibid., 71-74. Back.

    Note 26: "NATO Study on Enlargement," 1. Back.

    Note 27: Ibid. Back.

    Note 28: Ibid., 3. Back.

    Note 29: A handful of commentators have stressed that the problem of judging Russian intentions lies at the heart of the broader expansion problem. See Council on Foreign Relations, "Should NATO Expand? Report of an Independent Task Force, 18; Horelick testimony, 19-20. Back.

    Note 30: The debate in many ways parallels the old debate among historians over the origins of the Cold War. Was Stalin's Soviet Union in the mid-1940s a "rational" great power acting in Eastern Europe merely to safeguard vital national interests, as the "traditionalists" would argue? Or was the Soviet Union, as the "revisionists" would say, an insatiably expansionist power aiming at global conquest? See, for example, Melvyn P. Leffler, "The Interpretive Wars over the Cold War, 1945-1960," in Gordon Martel, ed., American Foreign Relations Reconsidered, 1890-1993 (London: Routledge, 1994). Back.

    Note 31: Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion"; Simes testimony; Horelick testimony. Back.

    Note 32: Horelick testimony, 19. Back.

    Note 33: Odom, "We're Right to Be Wary"; Brzezinski, "NATO -- Expand or Die?" The New York Times, 28 December 1994. Back.

    Note 34: Richard L. Kugler with Marianna V. Kozintseva, Enlarging NATO: The Russia Factor (Santa Monica, Cal.: RAND, 1996). Back.

    Note 35: Sally Jacobsen, "Russia Upstages Security Summit, Accuses U.S., NATO of Isolating It," The Associated Press, 5 December 1994. Back.

    Note 36: "NATO: Russia Snarls," The Economist, 5 October 1996. Back.

    Note 37: "Lebed dédramatise l'ouverture à l'Est," Le Figaro,26 July 1996; "Le général Lebed estime que l'élargissement de l'OTAN ne menace pas la Russie," Le Monde,26 July 1996; "Lebed Says He Can Accept a Gradual NATO Expansion," The New York Times, 8 October 1996. Back.

    Note 38: Jan Petersen, "Defining Moments: Alliance Developments in 1996," Draft General Report of the Political Committee, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium, 7-8. Back.

    Note 39: Simes testimony, 75. Back.

    Note 40: Brzezinski, "NATO -- Expand or Die?" Back.

    Note 41: Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now." Back.

    Note 42: Zoellick testimony, 7. Back.

    Note 43: Odom testimony, p. 30. A similar argument can be found in testimony by Paula J. Dobriansky, 3 May 1995, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, NATO'S Future 62-65. Back.

    Note 44: On Russia, see the above-cited arguments that Russia is now a flexible and reasonable power. On Germany, The New York Times asserts, for example, that the country's "future is no longer the question mark it was in 1949. Germans have firmly chosen a peaceful and Western path." "NATO, Then and Now," The New York Times. Back.

    Note 45: Matlock testimony, 79. Back.

    Note 46: Jim Thomson, "With Einstein, U.S.-Europe links still look like the Cold War, not the global alliance we would seek if starting from scratch," Los Angeles Times, 21 March 1995. href="#txt46"> Back.

    Note 47: Irving Kristol, "Who Now Cares About NATO?" The Washington Times, 6 February 1995. Back.

    Note 48: Alex Bandy, "Hungary Looks to U.S. Officials to Spur NATO Membership," Associated Press, 19 September 1995. Back.

    Note 49: Terence Hunt, "White House Plays Down Differences Over NATO Membership," Associated Press, 4 January 1994. Back.

    Note 50: Roman warns not only of public "bitterness" but also of the risk that his country could be marginalized economically and even culturally. "The non-admission into NATO in the first wave would be a sort of "Draculization" of Romania in the eyes of its nation." Petre Roman, "The Spirit of Democracy and the Fabric of NATO -- The New European Democracies and NATO Enlargement," Draft Special Report of the Subcommittee on NATO Enlargement and the New Democracies, North Atlantic Assembly, Brussels, Belgium, May 1996, 9-10. Back.

    Note 51: "East Europeans Doubt Reform Process, Want to Join Western Clubs," Associated Press. Back.

    Note 52: Charles A. Kupchan, "It's a Long Way to Bratislava: The Dangerous Fantasy of NATO Expansion," The Washington Post, 14 May 1995. Back.

    Note 53: Tellingly, the 22 October 1996 speech took place in Detroit and preceded lunch at a Polish neighborhood diner. Alison Mitchell, "Clinton Urges NATO Expansion in 1999," The New York Times, 23 October 1996. Back.

    Note 54: Ibid. Back.

    Note 55: For the potential perils of Senate ratification, see Jeremy D. Rosner, "NATO Enlargement's American Hurdle," Foreign Affairs 75 (July/August 1996): 9-16. Back.

    Note 56: David D. Newsom, "The Go-Slow Approach to NATO Expansion," Christian Science Monitor, 24 July 1996. Back.

    Note 57: Rühe said he wants "the German-Polish border to become like the German-French border." Jim Hoagland, "Reaching Out for NATO," The Washington Post, 12 March 1995. Back.

    Note 58: Karsten Voigt, "NATO Enlargement: Sustaining the Momentum," NATO Review 2 (March 1996): 15-19. Back.

    Note 59: Cited in Zoellick testimony, 8. Back.

    Note 60: Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now"; Zoellick testimony; testimony of Richard Burt, "Hearings of the Subcommittee on European Affairs," 3 May 1995. Back.

    Note 61: Ronald D. Asmus, Richard L. Kugler and F. Stephen Larrabee, "What Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival 38 (Autumn 1996): 5-26. See also "NATO Enlargement: Affordable," The Economist, 3 August 1996. The Congressional Budget Office has estimated costs as high as $125 billion over a 15-year period, but this study assumed an immediate need to provide defense capabilities against Russia. Back.

    Note 62: Ibid., 7. Back.

    Note 63: Congressional Budget Office, The Costs of Expanding the NATO Alliance (Washington: Congressional Budget Office, 1996). Back.

    Note 64: See Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion," p. 124; Robert G. Torricelli, "A Promise Best Not Kept," Los Angeles Times, 9 February 1995. Back.

    Note 65: William Pfaff, "Eastward Expansion of NATO Looks Like a Dangerous Idea," International Herald Tribune, 15 May 1996. Back.

    Note 66: See Kamp, "The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion"; Iklé testimony; Council on Foreign Relations, "Should NATO Expand?" 4. Back.

    •  

    CIAO home page