CIAO DATE: 02/02

'Decommissioning' and Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland: Lessons for the Arms Control Community

Dr. Andrew Latham
and
Ms. Jessica Huie
Department of Political Science, Macalester College, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA

1999 - 2000

The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)

Introduction 

Over the last decade or so, 'micro-disarmament' and related arms control and confidence-building measures have played an important role in the resolution of a wide range of civil, ethno-political and other protracted social conflicts. The success of such measures in advancing the cause of post-conflict peacebuilding, stabilization and reconciliation in contexts as diverse as Cambodia, Mali, El Salvador and Bosnia have led some analysts and policy practitioners to argue that arms control must now be considered a crucial and integral element of any conflict resolution process. Indeed, it is now widely believed that, absent an effective arms control and disarmament regime, political and diplomatic settlements to protracted social conflicts are either impossible to negotiate or exceedingly difficult to sustain over time.

Northern Ireland is an example of a protracted (if relatively low-level) social conflict that until recently had proven to be particularly resistant to political settlement. Since the early 1990s, however, considerable progress has been made toward resolving the conflict, and in 1998 a negotiated framework (the so-called Belfast Accords or Good Friday Agreement) for ending hostilities and promoting post-conflict peacebuilding and intercommunal reconciliation was agreed. Reflecting both political conditions in the region and the evolving common sense regarding micro-disarmament, arms control (euphemistically labelled 'decommissioning' in the Northern Ireland context) has been an important element of the peace process. This raises the following questions: have micro-disarmament negotiations and agreements contributed to the process of conflict resolution in Northern Ireland? If so, to what extent? If not, has the issue been a relatively unimportant dimension of the overall dynamic of conflict resolution, or has it been a more salient impediment to the negotiation of a workable and sustainable settlement of the conflict?

This paper assesses whether the micro-disarmament negotiations and arrangements associated with the Belfast Accords have advanced or retarded the peace process in Northern Ireland. The paper begins with an overview of the historical origins of the 'decommissioning' issue, mapping out the basic positions of the main parties to the conflict. It proceeds to a discussion of the Belfast Accords, focusing in particular on the role of arms control in the negotiations preceding the agreement. It then addresses the impasse over decommissioning that developed in late 1999 and the apparent resolution to this impasse in the Spring of this year. The paper concludes by assessing the impact of decommissioning on the peace process and sketching a number of generalizable lessons for the broader arms control community.

The Origins of the 'Decommissioning' Issue

According to one knowledgeable observer, the issue of decommissioning was 'present at a relatively early stage in the peace process, but the initial priority was to obtain an IRA [Irish Republican Army] and loyalist [protestant paramilitary] ceasefire.' The priority for peace-makers was to help end paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland, and there was a belief that a cessation of violence by the IRA would be forthcoming if it were linked to involvement in political talks. In 1993, the possibility for Sinn Fein's involvement in talks was introduced through the Downing Street Declaration. This document, announced jointly by the British Prime Minister, John Major, and the Irish Taoiseach (Prime Minister), Albert Reynolds, introduced, for the first time, 'the possibility of addressing the constitutional and security problems together as part of a peace package.' In exchange for an IRA cease-fire for at least three months, the document stated that any constitutional change in the status of Northern Ireland would require the approval of the majority of its people. The Downing Street Declaration 'explicitly offered Sinn Fein entry into political discussions about the future of the Province provided IRA violence stopped.' It both recognized the importance of arms in Irish Politics and underscored the principle of consent (the acceptance that the future of Northern Ireland would be decided by its people). At this point, the definition of decommissioning was not clear, and the term was explicitly chosen for its vagueness. It was feared that the term 'disarmament' would by construed by the IRA and other paramilitary groups as a signal of surrender. By 1993, '"taking the gun out of Irish politics" was seen not only as an important confidence-building measure, demonstrating good intent and a commitment to democratic and peaceful means, but as an essential pre-requisite to the ending of the troubles.' Problems would soon arise, however, concerning what exactly what it meant to 'take the gun out of Irish Politics.'

In 1994, in response to the Downing Street Declaration, the IRA declared a cease-fire, which was soon followed by loyalist cease-fires. This air of non-violence set the stage for the 1990s peace process in Northern Ireland. However, the issue of what precisely constituted 'decommissioning' prevented any talks from beginning. The Downing Street Declaration stated that in the circumstances of 'a permanent end to the use of, or support of, paramilitary violence...democratically mandated parties which establish a commitment to exclusively peaceful methods and which have shown they abide by the democratic process, are free to participate fully' in the peace process. The two main groups involved in the conflict, the Unionist and the Nationalists, interpreted this condition in the Downing Street Declaration differently. The Unionists, those in favor of Northern Ireland remaining a part of the United Kingdom, felt that decommissioning meant a complete disarmament of terrorist (IRA) weapons and was a necessary demonstration of any real shift to non-violence. They contended that 'the retention of weapons was incompatible with a permanent end to the use of, or support for, paramilitary violence.' Supporters of the IRA, and many other Nationalists, believed that decommissioning meant an end to paramilitary violence by institutionalizing cease-fires. In keeping their arms silent, 'the IRA's view was that the cease-fires were declared without preconditions. IRA leaders pointed out they had not been defeated. They would not have declared a cease-fire if they had known decommissioning was a prerequisite for Sinn Fein's involvement in inclusive negotiations.' Nationalists, especially Sinn Fein and the IRA, argued that the Down Street Declaration called for an end to paramilitary violence, not a destruction of weapons. They contended that a cessation of violence met the principles of non-violence set forth in the Declaration. This disagreement over interpretations of decommissioning and the Downing Street Declaration proved great enough to prevent peace talks from beginning.

Decommissioning and the Good Friday Agreement

The British and Irish governments feared that the cease-fires would be suspended if some sort of resolution to the decommissioning issue was not found. On November 28, 1995, the two governments announced the establishment of an International Body, chaired by former US Senator George Mitchell, to 'identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning; and report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that.' The International Body was made up of three individuals: George Mitchell from the United States, Harry Holkeri from Finland, and General John de Chastelain from Canada. The group was commissioned for the explicit purpose of finding a settlement to the decommissioning issue, as decommissioning had already become an impediment to the quest for a peaceful resolution to the troubles in Northern Ireland.

In collecting information for their final report, it became clear to the group that the differences between the Unionists and Nationalists would prove to be a strong barrier to the peace process. The Unionists felt that decommissioning should begin before talks started. Unionist officials expressed their concern that 'certain parties would take part in political negotiations without their associated paramilitary groups having started to decommission.' The Unionists refused to enter into talks with Sinn Fein before decommissioning; they refused to sit at a table with an organization that they associated considered to be associated with (if not made up of) terrorists. On the other side, the Nationalists asserted that talks should be held before any decommissioning of arms. They felt that decommissioning should be addressed in the same context as all confidence-building measures, which would be developed through the talks process. For Nationalists, 'the overriding issue was their insistence that north-south bodies and power-sharing must underwrite any move to reinstitute a Northern Ireland Assembly nationalists wanted the removal of the British army and its installations, and a complete review of the RUC.' Nationalists were fearful that decommissioning before talks would decrease their political power in the peace process. It again seemed as though decommissioning would prevent the peace process from continuing. The Unionists felt that they should not have to talk with terrorists; the Nationalists felt that they should not have to surrender to the Unionists and the British.

With the knowledge of the different opinions regarding decommissioning, the International Body established six principles of democracy - later known as The Mitchell Principles - which became the foundation for the handling of decommissioning in the final peace agreement. The International Body suggested that all participants in the peace negotiations should commit to:

democratic and exclusively peaceful means of resolving political issues; to the total disarmament of all paramilitary organisations; to agree that such disarmament must be verifiable to the satisfaction of an independent commission; to renounce for themselves, and to oppose any effort by others, to use force, or threaten to use force, to influence the course or the outcome of all-party negotiations and to resort to democratic and exclusively peaceful methods in trying to alter any aspect of that outcome with which they may disagree; and to urge that 'punishment' killings and beatings stop and to take effective steps to prevent such actions.

It is important to note that The Mitchell Principles did not state whether decommissioning (or disarmament) should take place before or after talks. As with the Downing Street Declaration, the Principles basically called for a commitment to the end of violence in Northern Ireland. While The Mitchell Principles did suggest that decommissioning should mean disarmament, they did not set a timeline or a definition of paramilitary organizations- points to be brought up by the IRA and Sinn Fein later in the peace process. The Report of the International Body was not well-received by the Unionists or the Nationalists. The Unionist were displeased that the Report did not suggest that decommissioning begin before talks. The Nationalists were disappointed by the Report's suggestion of an elected body. Less than three weeks after the submission of the Report, the IRA ended its cease-fire by bombing Canary Wharf in London. In hopes of preserving the peace process, John Major announced in a joint communique that he had taken 'account of the differing positions of the parties and the view of the International Body' and felt that 'an elective process would offer a viable and speedy route to all-party negotiations.' The Communique suggested that decommissioning by paramilitary groups would not be required for its associated party to enter into talks; however, Sinn Fein would not be allowed into negotiations until the IRA reinstated its cease-fire. The IRA declared a new cease-fire on 20 July 1997, several months after talks had begun, and Sinn Fein joined the negotiations.

Following months of difficult negotiations, agreement was reached and on 10 April 1998 the parties to the talks signed the Belfast Accords. This agreement provided concessions to both the Nationalists and the Unionists. According to General de Chastelain:

the nationalists had been guaranteed inclusive government with a power-sharing Executive and mandated north-south bodies. ... Unionists wanted an elected assembly and they would have it. They also wanted a time limit on the complete decommissioning of all paramilitary weapons, and that was set for a date two years from the time of the referendums. All had wanted confidence-building measures enacted and these were built into the Agreement..

It was now felt that the issue of decommissioning had been resolved: all participants in the talks agreed to the total disarmament of paramilitary organizations within two years of the referenda that were to be held in both Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic to ratify the agreement.

As newspapers worldwide heralded the success of the negotiations and the end of 'the Troubles' in Northern Ireland, decommissioning again showed signs of becoming a threat to the peace process. About a month after the signing of the Belfast Accords, the IRA responded publicly to the agreement:

It remains our position that a durable peace settlement demands the end of the British rule in Ireland and the exercise of the right of the people of Ireland to national self-determination. ... Let us make it clear that there will be no decommissioning by the IRA. This issue, as with any other matter affecting the IRA, its functions and objectives, is a matter only for the IRA, to be decided upon and pronounced by us.

The IRA maintained that it never agreed to decommissioning. In their view, any type of disarmament by the IRA would only occur after the British presence in Northern Ireland had ended. In spite of this declaration by the IRA, the Unionists and the Nationalists agreed to continue with the institutions set forth in the Belfast Accords. Again, it seemed as though the peace process could continue despite the continuing emergence of disagreement on the issue of decommissioning.

The Decommissioning Issue Today: Impasse and Resolution

By February 2000 the IRA had not begun disarmament and seemed unlikely to meet the Spring 2000 deadline, placing sever strains on the peace process. By mid-February, the Northern Ireland Executive had been suspended, and direct rule from London was re-instated. The Unionists blamed the suspension of the institutions set forth in the Belfast Accords on the Nationalists, Sinn Fein and the IRA, stating:

[the decommissioning] deadline is an integral part of the Belfast Agreement, and if the Irish Government is prepared to change such a fundamental part of the terms of the agreement, then it would have serious repercussions for the unionist community. We were told that the agreement was not a menu from which we could pick and choose, and if republicans are now going to be permitted to further delay on decommissioning, then everything else must be on the table for renegotiation, including police reforms and the Patten report.

The Unionists felt betrayed by the suspension of the Northern Ireland Executive, contending that the Nationalists had not kept to the commitment to decommissioning. Sinn Fein and the IRA continued to blame the Unionists and the British government for using the decommissioning issue as a reason to break the peace process. The IRA claimed that 'those who have once again made the political process conditional on the decommissioning of silent IRA arms are responsible for creating the current difficulties and keeping the political process in a state of perpetual crisis.' The IRA argued that they had remained faithful to their commitment to non-violence as set forth in the Downing Street Declaration, and accused Unionists of trying to break the peace agreements by placing unnecessary focus on decommissioning. Gerry Adams, the head of Sinn Fein, stated that Sinn Fein

remain wedded to our objective of taking all of the guns out of Irish politics. This is a collective responsibility and there is no special onus on our party to do this above and beyond the responsibilities of every other party in this process. We will continue to do our best but if a British government, with all of its military firepower and muscle, could not get an IRA surrender in 30 years of war, then unionist leaders or British minister cannot expect a Sinn Fein leadership to do it for them.

While they recognized that decommissioning was ultimately important for peace in Northern Ireland, Sinn Fein contended that attempts to focus on a lack of IRA decommissioning were nothing more than an effort by anti-Agreement forces to frustrate and de-rail a peace process that they fundamentally opposed. All parties involved in the process leading to the Belfast Accords were upset with the suspension of the institutions it provided. It seemed as if there were no solutions to the issue of decommissioning in Northern Ireland, and it was feared that the this issue would ultimately lead to the collapse of the peace process and a return to violence.

With the suspension of the Northern Ireland Executive and the seemingly imminent collapse of the Belfast Accords it seemed as though the issue of decommissioning had finally derailed the peace process. But as each party blamed the other for the impasse, the IRA made a surprising move just two weeks before the 22 May 2000 decommissioning deadline. The IRA leadership announced a new policy on decommissioning:

The IRA leadership will initiate a process that will completely and verifiably put IRA arms beyond use. We will do it in such a way as to avoid risk to the public and misappropriation by others and ensure maximum public confidence...the IRA leadership has agreed to put in place within weeks a confidence-building measure to confirm that our weapons remain secure. The contents of a number of our dumps will be inspected by agreed third parties who will report that they have done so to the Independent International Commission...the dumps will be re-inspected regularly to ensure that the weapons have remained silent.

The IRA statement came as a surprise to many, and seems to have provided a way out of the impasse that had developed around the decommissioning issue. A few days after the IRA announcement, RUC Chief Constable Ronnie Flanagan announced that there would soon be 'a scaling down of the British army presence in Northern Ireland- including the planned demolition of two structures in south Armagh.' This was followed in relatively short order with an announcement by the UUP that the IRA confidence-building measures, while far from constituting an entirely satisfactory resolution to the decommissioning problem, nevertheless provided the basis for reinstating the Assembly and Executive and otherwise proceeding with the implementation of the Belfast Accords. In sum, it seems that the IRA demarche has effectively cut the gordian knot of the decommissioning issue, thus averting a potentially disastrous breakdown of the peace process.

Conclusions: Lessons for the Arms Control Community

The intertwined histories of the decommissioning issue, the broader peace negotiations and the on again-off again paramilitary cease-fires often seem no more that a snarled skein of ideology, partisan politics, and diplomatic jockeying. But, taken together, these histories in fact reveal patterns that help clarify the role of arms control in the Northern Irish peace process - and that potentially suggest several broader insights that are of direct relevance to the wider arms control community. Somewhat more specifically, three general conclusions can be drawn from the Northern Irish peace process. First, viewed 'objectively', micro-disarmament was never a crucially important aspect of the peace process in Northern Ireland. Both the Unionists and Republicans, of course, imbued this issue with enormous significance. On the one hand, the Unionists maintained that disarming the IRA was necessary both as a practical security matter and as evidence of a real commitment to peaceful politics. On the other, the IRA viewed decommissioning as symbolic surrender and thus as anathema. They also argued that, unless and until a political resolution to the conflict had been agreed, it would be strategic folly for the IRA to disarm unilaterally (i.e. while the security forces remained active and fully deployed). As both the RUC and British Army made clear, however, micro-disarmament - even if it involved the decommissioning of a relatively large proportion of the IRA arsenal - would not materially affect the IRA's capacity to re-initiate political violence; for, given the nature of the global light weapons market, even if the IRA were to hand in all its weapons, there would be no way to prevent it from re-arming in the future should it so desire. Simply put, then, the claim by both Unionists and Republicans that substantial decommissioning would hobble the IRA were without factual merit. Decommissioning could never provide Unionists with the security assurances they desired - a fact made known to the Unionist leadership by senior members of the security forces; nor could even substantial disarmament seriously undermine the military capabilities of the IRA - a fact surely grasped by Republicans. While the issue would come to have great symbolic significance, it is clear that as a practical matter decommissioning was a marginal aspect of the overall peace process.

A second conclusion is that, despite the objective immateriality of the decommissioning issue, anti-Agreement forces within the Unionist camp were able to exploit decommissioning-related anxieties within their community in order to impede - and very nearly de-rail - the peace process. Simply stated, almost from the beginning anti-Agreement Unionists were able to persuade a majority within the Unionist community that decommissioning mattered greatly and that IRA participation first in the peace talks and subsequently in the new institutions of governance should be made conditional upon their prior disarmament. Pro-Agreement Unionist such as Ulster Unionist Party leader David Trimble were ultimately able to convince moderate Unionists that this was impossible and that the most that could be achieved was a more or less symbolic disarmament initiative, but the issue had already been elevated to the point were no Unionist could be seen to treat the issue lightly or 'give in' to the Republicans. This severely circumscribed the manoeuvering room of those Unionist leaders who saw the issue as being one that would resolve itself once the Good Friday Agreement had been implemented. It also provided the anti-Agreement forces with an issue that they could raise again and again at crucial junctures to frustrate efforts to overcome various obstacles on the road to peace.

A third conclusion is that the IRA could have easily outmanoeuvred the anti-Agreement forces by offering to hand over a few token weapons. This was the position of many Nationalists - including senior Sinn Fein officials like Gerry Adams who had been involved in both the peace negotiations and the new institutions of governance - who argued that even a token act of decommissioning would provide pro-Agreement Unionists with the political capital and cover they needed to temporarily bypass the decommissioning roadblock and move the peace process forward. Ultimately, however, the IRA was prevented from making such a gesture by a 'strategic culture' that framed all such acts of disarmament as symbols of surrender not to be countenanced by a guerilla army that viewed itself, if not as victorious, at least as undefeated by the British security forces. Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, decommissioning was viewed by the IRA leadership and many other Republicans as unnecessary. The IRA ceasefire, they argued, had held throughout the negotiations, obviating the need for any sort of decommissioning or disarmament. Viewed from this perspective, Unionist demands that the IRA disarm were viewed at best as obstructionist and at worst as an attempt to inflict a potent symbolic defeat on the IRA. For these reasons the IRA leadership steadfastly refused to undertake even a token surrender of weapons, despite arguments from many moderates in the Nationalist community argued that such a modest confidence-building measure might help break the decommissioning deadlock. Only when they hit upon the formula of 'putting weapons verifiably beyond use' was the IRA leadership able to offer a 'concession' to the pro-Agreement Unionist leadership that people like David Trimble could then use to press the claim that the Assembly and Executive should be re-instated.

Finally, what lessons can be drawn from all this for the broader arms control community? The most significant would seem to be that - despite the emerging common sense view that 'micro-disarmament' is a necessary aspect of conflict termination and peacebuilding - the importance of arms control in resolving protracted social conflicts is in fact contingent on a variety of factors. Simply stated, there are two basic perspectives on the importance of micro-disarmament. The first argues that disarmament measures are necessary in terms of building confidence and security. On this view, micro-disarmament is a necessary adjunct or precondition to political efforts end protracted social conflicts. The second maintains that such arrangements are ultimately of only marginal importance to any peace process. The argument here is that disarmament cannot take place until the underlying roots of political conflict have been addressed, but that once this has been accomplished the paramilitary violence will wind down and combatant weapons will subsequently fall into disuse and disrepair. The Northern Ireland case, in contrast to much of the literature, seems to suggest that the latter perspective is more accurate - providing that certain conditions obtain. In practice, this means that in a situation like Northern Ireland - where the principal guerilla force is highly disciplined and where there is a long historical tradition of allowing weapons to rust away after periods of revolutionary or insurrectionary violence - a focus on negotiated micro-disarmament arrangements is not only unwarranted but ultimately counter-productive. It was never the case in Northern Ireland (as it was in, say, South Africa) that in the aftermath of the conflict large quantities of weapons were going to flow into criminal hands. Indeed, this was concern was never raised even by those Unionist most insistent upon IRA disarmament. As a result, the peace process would have been better served had the decommissioning issue never been placed on an already crowded negotiating agenda. Of course, this may have been politically infeasible given the (purposefully cultivated) resonance of the issue with substantial portions of the Unionist community. But, absent deliberate efforts on the part of anti-Agreement Unionist to frustrate the peace process by pressing the decommissioning issue at several critical junctures, it is conceivable that the exact same political agreement (minus the extremely weak decommissioning arrangements that have recently been agreed) would have been negotiated several years earlier.