CIAO DATE: 01/02

Responding to the Threat of Agroterrorism: Specific Recommendations for the United States Department of Agriculture

The threat of biological weapons (BW) is usually associated with terrible outbreaks of human illness. Receiving substantially less attention from the media, however, is the fact that BW can also be used against agricultural targets as strategic economic weapons. Agriculture accounts for about 13 percent of the United States' annual gross domestic product.1 In 1996 U.S. cash receipts for livestock, poultry, and crops totaled more than $200 billion. An attack on agriculture could have enormous economic consequences.

Americans enjoy some of the lowest food prices in the world, spending about 11 cents per dollar of disposable income compared to 50 or 60 cents per dollar in many other countries.3 This is due in large part to the efficiency and the high health and quality standards that U.S. agriculture maintains, which keep production yields high and disease control costs low. The deliberate introduction of a pathogen-fungus, bacterium, virus, or insect pest-into U.S. livestock, poultry, or crops could cause a disease outbreak that would drive food prices up, halt valuable exports, and ultimately costs taxpayers billions of dollars in lost revenue and industry renewal costs.

For fiscal year (FY) 2000 more than $8 billion has been allocated to U.S. federal agencies for combating terrorism. The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) will receive only 0.15% of that amount, about $12 million. The president's proposed budget for FY2001 more than triples the USDA's allocation to $41 million, which, if enacted, could significantly improve the agency's ability to defend against a terrorist attack on agriculture.4 This paper suggests several ways that the USDA can to respond to this threat of "agroterrorism." The recommendations put forth are specifically intended to counter this threat, but they will also improve overall disease control capabilities, whether or not an attack occurs.

The threat of an agroterrorist attack can be countered on four levels: (1) at the organism level, through animal or plant disease resistance; (2) at the farm level, through facility management techniques designed to prevent disease introduction or transmission; (3) at the agricultural sector level, through USDA disease detection and response procedures; and (4) at the national level, through policies designed to minimize the social and economic costs of a catastrophic disease outbreak.

The four levels presented here are not independent of one another. If crops themselves are resistant to disease, or if diseases or pests can be excluded at the farm level, there will be less chance that the USDA will have to respond to an outbreak. If disease/pest control is successful at the organism, farm, and sector levels, national recovery policies will not be necessary. The threat of agroterrorism cannot be fully countered on any one level. The four levels presented in this paper correspond to four prongs of a comprehensive strategy to counter agroterrorism.

This paper begins with a short background on past agricultural catastrophes, past BW programs targeting agriculture, and the feasibility of an agroterrorist attack. It then examines each of the four levels listed above, explaining the central concerns of each and making relevant recommendations for USDA action.