CIAO DATE: 07/02

Political Economy in Security Studies After the Cold War

Jonathan Kirshner

Peace Studies Program, Cornell University
Occasional Paper #20
April 1997

Abstract

In contemporary International Relations theory, there exists a sharp distinction between international political economy and security studies. This is largely a false distinction, however, a product of peculiar circumstances associated with the cold war, and one which is becoming in-creasingly anachronistic in the post-cold war era. In order to understand international relations in this era, a re-integration of the discipline is necessary.

During the cold war, there was a certain logic to the separation of political economy and security studies. The bipolar struggle dominated the security agenda. That conflict featured two states with little economic interaction-indeed, the Soviet Union did not even have a market economy. Thus, specialists in security affairs could comfortably marginalize economic relations, with some notable exceptions, such as the study of "economic containment." ₁ Similarly, the pos-sibility of military conflicts among the advanced market economies seemed equally irrelevant in the context of the clearly drawn and stable battle lines of the cold war. Again, with specialized exceptions, such as burden sharing, ₂ students of political economy were able to minimize their concern for security. ₃

The cold war was also unique in that it featured actors-superpowers-who were much less sensitive to many of the issues that smaller but still great powers had to address throughout history, especially those associated with the political economy of national security. Super-powers, for example, did not face the budget constraints that states like Britain, France and Ger-many faced routinely and consequentially in the first half of this century. For most states, grand strategy involves making choices about interests in the context of scarcity. Similarly, due to their sheer size, dominance, and relatively small exposure to the international economy, the superpowers were less concerned about the consequences of economic interactions for pre-serving their autonomy, or calculating the distribution of relative gains, especially given the static alliance patterns of the era. ₄

Thus during the cold war, the nature of that conflict understandably but unnaturally bifur-cated the discipline of IR into the distinct spheres of IPE and Security Studies. But these extra-ordinary and unprecedented circumstances are unlikely to be replicated in the foreseeable future. In order to understand contemporary international politics, IR theory needs to "return to normal." This paper is designed to explore the relationship between the two subfields, specifically with regard to how traditional security concerns are affected by issues normally associated with politi-cal economy. ₅ It reviews three sets of issues, tracing the evolution of these questions over time. First is a review of "classical" concerns, which also serves as a reminder of the essential inte-gration of IR theory throughout history. This is followed by a consideration of modern issues, which arose as a consequence of the emergence of a truly international economy and were developed theoretically after the second world war. The third section focuses on new issues, which reflect the current manifestation of traditional concerns. A final section applies the conclusions of the theoretical parts of the paper to specific themes in the emerging international system.

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: See, for example, Gunnar Adler-Karlson, Western Economic Warfare 1947-67 (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell, 1968); Michael Mastanduno, Economic Containment: CoCom and the Politics of East-West Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992); Bruce W. Jentleson, Pipeline Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986). Back

Note 2: Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (August 1966), pp. 266-79; Lincoln Gordon, "Economic Aspects of Coalition Diplomacy-The NATO Experience," International Organization 10:3 (August 1956), pp. 529-43. Recent reviews of these issues include John R. Oneal, "The Theory of Collective Action and Burden Sharing in NATO," International Organization 44:3 (Summer 1990), pp. 379-402; and John R. Oneal and Paul F. Diehl, "The Theory of Collective Action and NATO Defense Burdens: New Empirical Tests," Political Research Quarterly 47:2 (June 1994), pp. 373-96. Back

Note 3: According to Robert Keohane, "it is justifiable to focus principally on the political economy of the advanced industrialized countries without continually taking into account the politics of in-ternational security." After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 137. Security specialists have reached complementary conclusions, following Waltz's dictum that "Never in modern history have great powers been so sharply set off from lesser states and so little involved in each other's economic and social affairs." Theory of International Politics (New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 151- 52.Back

Note 4: Joanne Gowa, "Bipolarity, Multipolarity, and Free Trade," American Political Science Review, 83:4 (December 1989), pp. 1245-56. Back

Note 5: This is not intended to dismiss the importance of "new security issues," or the expanded role that political economy will likely play there. Rather, the focus of this paper on "traditional" security issues-defined here as war fighting capability, territorial integrity, and the projection of power and influence abroad-underscores the argument that political economy and security studies must be reintegrated, even if we were to retain the most narrow definition of security. On defining security, see Richard Ullman, "Redefining Security," International Security 8:1 (Summer 1983), pp. 129-53; also Barry Buzan, People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era, 2nd ed. (Boulder: Rienner, 1991). Back