Capacity Losses, Reconstruction and Unfinished Modernization: The Chemical Industry in the Soviet Zone of Occupation (SBZ)/GDR 1945-1965

Rainer Karlsch

Center for German and European Studies, University of California at Berkeley

March 1997

Abstract

Between the two World Wars, central Germany (the later GDR) was a preferred region for the foundation of new chemical plants. But after World War II, Soviet occupying troops dismantled 116 chemical plants in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. After the division of Germany became apparent, the Soviet Zone began a policy of self-sufficiency, but the chemical industry of the GDR dropped behind the West German chemical industry in the first postwar decade. After the "Sputnik shock" in 1957 and Khruschev's proclamation of an "economic race," the chemical industry in the Eastern Bloc moved into the center of the economic policy. In November 1958, the GDR enacted, as did the Soviet Union, a special chemical program. The main points of the program were the doubling of the chemical production within seven years, and an even greater increase in production of synthetic fibers and plastic. But the program failed. Decisive for the backsliding of the GDR's chemical industry was the uncoupling from the international division of labor and the integration into the East European economic zone. The GDR's Chemical Industry could find no real equivalent partner in Eastern Europe, and cooperation with the West was restricted for political reasons. The "opting for oil" of the Ulbricht-era became in the Honecker-era a policy of moving "back to coal." The maintaining of carbide chemistry finally ended in an energy crisis and an ecological fiasco.

Rainer Karlsch, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult\du\at Humboldt-Universit\du\at zu Berlin

Summary:

Since World War I central Germany (the later GDR) was a preferred region for the foundation of new chemical plants. In 1936 the plants in central Germany produced almost one third of the total German chemical production. By 1944, its share was even supposed to have increased. After the war the occupation forces had to decide whether or not reconstruction could go quickly. Soviet occupying troops dismantled 116 chemical plants in the Soviet Zone of Occupation. The remaining capacities after the dismantling should be as a total still a little higher than the level of 1936, but far below the level of 1944. The 30 most important chemical plants, among them all large I.G. Farben factories, were united in Soviet stock companies (SAG) in summer 1946.

After the division of Germany became apparent, the SBZ began a policy of self-sufficiency. The chemical industry had to use predominantly local raw materials and to restrict their imports from the western foreign countries.

As a result of the high reparation burdens; the partly forced, partly deliberate autarky policies; extensive changes in foreign trade partners; as well as the weaknesses of the system of a planned economy shaped by the Soviets, the chemical industry of the GDR dropped behind the West German chemical industry in the first postwar decade.

After the "Sputnik shock" in 1957 and Chruschstschow's proclamation of an "economic race", the chemical industry in the Eastern Bloc moved into the center of the economic policy. In November 1958, the GDR enacted, as did the Soviet Union, a special chemical program. The main points of the program were the doubling of the chemical production within seven years, and an even greater increase in production of synthetic fibers and plastic.

But, the program failed and until 1970 the transition to the petrochemical industry could not be concluded. Decisive for the backsliding of GDR's chemistry was the uncoupling from the international division of labor and the integration into the East European economic zone. GDR's chemistry could find no real equivalent partner in Eastern Europe and the cooperation possibilities to the West were restricted for political reasons.

The "opting for oil" of the Ulbricht-era became in the Honecker-era a policy of moving "back to coal". The maintaining of carbide chemistry finally ended in an energy crisis and an ecological fiasco.

The German Chemical Industry in the Twentieth Century

Panel III: "The German Chemical Industry after 1945

Rainer Karlsch: Capacity Losses, Reconstruction and Unfinished Modernization. The Chemical Industry in the Soviet zone of occupation (SBZ)/GDR 1945-1965 ₁

1. Introduction
2. Development of the Central German chemical sites
3. War damages, dismantling and change of elites
4. Soviet stock companies (SAG)
5. Reconstruction phase and 1958-Chemistry program
6. Conclusion

1. Introduction

After World War II, almost 30 % of the German chemical industry production lay in the zone occupied by the Soviets. Fifty years later, about five years after German reunification, the chemical industry of the new Federal States represented only 5 % of total German chemical production. ₂ In the meantime, the industry is recovering in the "chemical triangle" (Halle-Bitterfeld-Boehlen) from the difficult adjustment and structural crises in which this branch of industry has been mired since 1990. Without guaranties from the Federal Government that the "chemical triangle" would continue to exist and subsidies in the double-digit billions (especially for the French combine Elf-Aquitaine, which has taken over parts of the traditional Leuna-Plant near Merseburg, and the American Dow Chemical, the new owner of the Buna-Plant in Schkopau), it would hardly have been possible to succeed in maintaining and modernizing even a small part of the chemical industry in the new Federal States. The irony of history is that massive state interventions guaranteed the expansion of the chemical industry in the mid of 1930's. Again, in the 1990's only by state intervention was it possible to maintain the "chemical triangle". In view of the relatively equally distributed chemical industries throughout the four zones of occupation after 1945, what had occurred up to 1990 was clear: while the largest chemical businesses of the Federal Republic maintained themselves very well in international competition, most of the chemical plants of the GDR were in a deplorable condition.

Looking at the "rusty landscapes" at the Leuna-factory or the ash grey landscape of Bitterfeld, one might be disillusioned by these industrial ruins and by heavily polluted cities. But it did not look so hopeless everywhere as it did in Bitterfeld, the expression of defeated industrial policies. ₃ The petroleum processing plant in Schwedt/O. or the synthetic fiber plant at Schwarzheide were in part equipped with modern western technology. ₄ All in all however, the results could not be questioned: the chemical industry in eastern Germany had lost its ability to compete on the world markets long before the end of the GDR and could only continue to exist under the conditions of an isolated market.

What are the explanations for the underdevelopment that became so clearly obvious only in the 1990s? When did the irreversible decline start?

Was the branch already crucially weakened during the first postwar-years by the Soviet reparation withdrawals and by the escape of the management forces? Was it not precisely the chemical industry which the program of 1958 declared to be the most promising support for the whole GDR's economy? Why did the (incomplete) transition to petrochemicals take place in Eastern Germany a decade later than in West Germany?

Before we answer these questions, we should name the most important locations of the central German chemical industry and its development should be briefly outlined until 1945.

2. Development of the Central German chemical sites

During the second half of the 19th. century, a spectacular expansion started in the German chemical industry. The most important companies of the industry were founded after 1860 in western Germany at the Rhine, or to be precise at the Main (Bayerwerke Leverkusen, Farbwerke Hoechst Frankfurt/M., Badische Anilin- and Sodafabrik Ludwigshafen, Casella Farbwerke Mainkur, Frankfurt/M, Kalle & Co. AG Wiesbaden, Weller-ter Meer Uerdingen). ₅ Only the stock company for Aniline-Fabrication (Agfa) who had its headquarters outside the Rhine/Main region settled itself in Berlin.

After the introduction of the process of ammonia-soda by Solvay, the soda industry boomed around 1865. ₆ In 1880, the Belgian founded the Deutsche Solvay Werke AG and started with the development of a large plant in Bernburg. The production of sulfuric acid was expanded on the basis of the Lead Chamber Process few years later. ₇ Mueller and Kuehne had developed a new sulfuric acid procedure on the basis of indigenous raw material of anhydrite and gypsum, at the same time. The first sulfuric acid plants were built as early as 1850 in Oranienburg, Berlin-Koepenick and Magdeburg. Around 1900 a procedure developed by Winkler in 1875 was introduced.

Beginning in 1916 the Farbenfabrik Wolfen participated together with the Bayer AG Leverkusen in testing a gypsum-based sulfuric acid procedure.

At the end of the 19th century, in the region around Halle and Zeitz numerous brown coal-tar distillers arose. Some of the largest coal-tar distilleries were the plants in Espenhain, Boehlen, Deuben, Nachterstedt and Regis. ₈

A plant for cellulose nitrate and celluloid was built in Eilenburg near Leipzig, in 1887. Two years later, the plant of Eilenburger was converted into the Deutsche Celluloid Fabrik AG. ₉ In 1893 the Chemische Fabrik Elektron Main as well as Agfa decided to build new chemical plants close to Bitterfeld and Wolfen. ₁₀

While the Wolfener Farbenfabrik concentrated on the production of Azo-dyes, the Chemische-Fabrik Elektron AG Bitterfeld developed into a center of chlorine chemistry. The decisive factor for locating factories in the area was its proximity to the large brown coal and potash deposits. Until World War I, the region around Halle-Leipzig, emerged as a preferred area for locating chemical plants, but had not as yet achieved high levels of concentration.

Table 1: Important Central German chemical plants, founded before 1914

In 1910 Agfa built a second plant in Wolfen. In the mid 1920's fith plants - Wolfen, Premnitz, Rottweil, Bobingen and Muenchen - with more than 10 000 employees altogether belonged to Agfa. For almost 50 years, from its foundation until the end of the 1950's, the Wolfen plant was famous as the biggest European producer of films of all kinds (and until World War II was the most important competitor to the American firm Kodak.). The Agfa Filmfabrik Wolfen became famous for the development of the Agfa-color-film in 1936 and the production of the first full synthetic fibers ("PeCe-Seide" and "PeCe Faser") in the world in 1934. ₁₁ Since the 1930's, Agfa produced in Wolfen besides photographic films also cellulose and synthetic fibers.

Other chemical factories also expanded in Bitterfeld and Wolfen after the start of World War I. Simultaneously, other large factories arose in the immediate proximity. AEG constructed in 1915 what was at that time the biggest power plant in the world with a capacity of 120 000 kW. It supplied the surrounding chemical plants with electricity. ₁₂

Table 2: Central German chemical plants during World War II

Furthermore, in 1915 the Bayerischen Stickstoffwerke AG started the construction of the Kalkstickstoffwerke in Piesteritz. One year later, BASF began construction of the Ammoniakwerke Leuna Merseburg. ₁₃ The construction of this plant was regarded as the crucial breakthrough of large-scale chemical synthesis (Grosssynthesen). After appropriation of ammonia synthesis in 1917, methanol synthesis was launched in Leuna in 1923, and in 1927 hydrogenation followed using the Bergius process. ₁₄ Fertilizer production (ammonia, saltpeter) expanded greatly at the end of the twenties. The Leuna plant developed on the basis of the three large-scale syntheses into the largest German chemical plant. There worked more than 20 000 employees in the mid twenties.

The histories of the companies were also reflected in the specialty and regional sections of the I.G. Farben AG. The combine had formed four working groups: Niederrhein with its headquarters in Leverkusen, Mittelrhein (Maingau) with its headquarters in Frankfurt/M., Oberrhein with its headquarters in Ludwigshafen and Mtteldeutschland, consisting of two subgroups in Wolfen/Bitterfeld and Frankfurt/M. ₁₅

At the end of 1929, a fifth working group was founded in Berlin which from now on took over the management of the central German division's photo, synthetic fibers and plastic. ₁₆

In correspondence with its technical structure, the I.G. participated especially in brown coal and hard coal mines and also acquired its own mines. The expansion of the Leuna plants resulted in shifting I.G. Farben's coal interests to central Germany. The biggest increase was obtained through the takeover of the A. Riebeck'schen Montanwerke in 1924. ₁₇

The central German "chemical triangle" developed into a real conurbation in the 1930's. As a result of the strategic favorable location, as of 1933, the NS-war economy continued the policy of preferred settlement in the central German region to a heretofore unknown extent. The following chart demonstrates that the central German region until 1939 developed, according to the employees, into the most important chemical site in the German Reich.

Table 3: Employees in the industrial and trade corporations of the chemical industry (in 1 000) ₁₈

During the period of the armaments and war economy, the central German industrial area was favored for investments. ₁₉ Therefore by far the largest part of I.G.- investment was transferred to central Germany by 1936.

Table 4: Investments of the I.G. from 1993 to 1944 (in Mill. RM), divided to the later on occupied zones ₂₀

According almost half of the I.G.'s investments accrued to the benefit of central German factories during the NS period. The Ammoniakwerk Leuna Merseburg received the largest single share with almost 500 Mill. RM followed by the Buna-plant in Schkopau with 400 Mill. RM and the plants of Bitterfeld with 226 Mill. RM. ₂₁

Within a few years, several new plants were developed. The BRABAG, financed by private industry, but controlled by a state-affiliated corporation, developed after 1934 into the most important German fuel producer. ₂₂ BRABAG built four new hydrogen plants in Boehlen, Magdeburg, Zeitz and Luetzkendorf based on the "hydro procedure" (Bergius Pier) of the Leuna plant (1927). Its capacity amounted to more than 1,3 Mill. t fuel per year. Thereafter, the central German region had an above proportional share of the German fuel supply. ₂₃

Table 5: Synthetic fuel Plants in central Germany ₂₄

Furthermore, a total of nine Fischer-Tropsch-Facilities were constructed giving priority to the industrial area in Rhineland-Westphalia. The plant capacity of all FT-facilities amounted to 740 000 t fuel per year. ₂₅ Approximately 40 % of it went to the two central German facilities in Schwarzheide and Luetzkendorf.

Table 6: Fischer-Tropsch plants in central Germany ₂₆

After fuel synthesis, production of synthetic rubber was of outstanding importance for self-sufficiency and the war economy of the NS-Regime. The construction of the Buna I Schkopau, close to Merseburg, began on the basis of new procedures for producing butadiene in 1936.

Also the experiments in production of sulfuric acid from the twenties, which had been abandoned, were resumed. The development of a large gysum-based sulphuric acid plant at the Farbenfabrik Wolfen and another facility in Coswig/A. began in 1936. This was intended to make the German industry independent of imports of sulfuric raw materials. ₂₇

As a result of the previously mentioned investments, the regional emphasis of the chemical production shifted. The "young" central German sites gained on the expense of "older" sites at the Rhine and Main. Therefore, especially Hoechst and Bayer looked with mixed feelings at the investments in Central and East Germany. ₂₈

In 1936 the plants in central Germany produced almost one third of the total German chemical production. ₂₉ By 1944, its share was even supposed to have increased.

The war economy also led to another development, that is the separation of basic chemistry from applied chemistry in the territory of the later SBZ. Already before the begin of war, major disparities existed between these fields in the central German region. However, they did not have great importance on the overall regional association. This would change however after 1945.

Table 7: Share of the central German chemical industry of the production of important commodities of 1936 respectively in 1938 in % of the total production of the German Reich ₃₀

Table 7 shows the ranking of production: synthetic rubber, photo and cinema films and ammonia. ₃₁ Not shown, but even the share of synthetic gasoline and methanol as well as cellulose developed over proportionally since 1936. As a result of the high share of strategic products, the future of the chemical plants after 1945 was totally uncertain.

3. War damage, dismantling and change of elites

As is well known, the allied air war targeted more the center of cities than industrial areas. This did not mean that plants were safe from attack. Within the chemical industry, the fuel industry and the synthetic rubber factories were preferred targets. ₃₂ Whereas most chemical plants suffered only little war damage, the synthetic fuel plants and the Fischer-Tropsch plants were hit hard. ₃₃ The biggest damages were recorded at the Leuna plant (at least one quarter of the original estimated value of the complex). On the other side, the Buna factory in Schkopau, which is only a few kilometers away, took only a couple of hits from stray bombs.

Within the entire branch, war damage in central Germany was no more than in western Germany. The most reliable estimate pointed out an average rate of 15% of destruction. ₃₄ In addition to the destruction, one must also note the the high rate of wear and tear resulting from the war economy, which brought the chemical industry face to face with particular problems. In spite of the seemingly hopeless picture of the end of war, the prerequisites for reconstruction were not so bad. The occupation forces had to decide whether or not reconstruction of the chemical industry could go quickly. But, they instead announced a "hard peace" (Carthaginian Peace). ₃₅

Through the resolution of the Potsdam Conference, the allies settled for the most part on dismantling and/or banning the German armaments and autarky industry. The upper limits of the Potsdamer Declaration were specified according to the Industrial Level Plan of March 28, 1946. The plan restricted chemical production to just 60 % of its 1938 rate. ₃₆

Soviet occupation troops enforced this "industrial disarmament" with an unprecedented firmness. ₃₇ They dismantled more than 2 800 plants. ₃₈ In comparison: the French's dismantled 110 plants, the Americans 124, the British 433. ₃₉ Moreover, the Soviet occupying power took away almost one half of all the railway tracks. In light of the loss of substance, American economists regarded the economic structure of the SBZ as "profoundly alarming". They were worried about what would occur in the event of zonal reunification. They argued that the destroyed industry in the east would be an enormous burden for Germany as a whole. ₄₀ In the chemical industry of the SBZ 116 plants were dismantled and transported to Soviet Union. The following table presents by no means a complete overview.

Table 8: Dismantling in the chemical industry of the SBZ (in Mill. RM) ₄₁

The consequences of the withdrawal of the most important products were as follows.

1. Synthetic fuel plants (Bergius-Procedure) and Fischer-Tropsch plants (FT-plants)

   Of the synthetic fuel-plants of the BRABAG only the plant Magdeburger-Rothensee was dismantled at the end of 1946.

   The BRABAG plant Boehlen was heavily damaged by bombing raids in 1944/45. ₄₂ After the war the Boehlen plants were exempt from dismantling. ₄₃ The plant was already operating again at the end of April 1945, after the American military governor ordered on April 25 "to restore production for the civil population to the largest extent". ₄₄ Finally, at the end of September 1945 the fuel facilities resumed operation. ₄₅

   In summer 1945 the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (SVAG in Russian, SMAD in German) ordered to reconstruct also again the synthetic fuel factory in Zeitz. It produced already in August 1945 3 800 t fuel. ₄₆

   The biggest facilities of fuel production has been located in the Leuna plant. Of the Leuna capacity for fuel production, 70% was dismantled in 1946. That means 350 000 t from 500 000 t of the yearly capacity. ₄₇

   The synthetic fuel plant of Luetzkendorf, which was also heavily damaged by the war and partly dismantled, was returned to the German administrative authorities in 1947. It produced, mostly on the basis of Austrian oil, primarily lubricating oil and diesel oil.

   In 1950 the maximum production performance in Leutzkendorf exceeded its level in 1943. ₄₈ It is remarkable that the Luetzkendorfer FT-plant was shut down at the beginning of 1951, for financial reasons. ₄₉

   Two of seven Koppers synthesis gas facilities in Schwarzheide were dismantled and transported to Poland (Auschwitz). A director of the BRABAG-factory remarked: "I believe that the fiasco which the dismantling meant for Poland has now convinced the Russians completely that the dismantling of a Fischer-Tropsch plant is meaningless." ₅₀ The remaining facilities in Schwarzheide operated again in the summer of 1945. ₅₁ The same happened also to the coal-tar processing factories in Rositz, Webau, Koepsen and Goelzau which mainly produced diesel fuel. ₅₂

   Zimmermann wrote from 80% war-losses, but he is not able to give an archive file for this numeral. The flux reconstruction of the Boehlen plant after war is an indicator, that Zimmermann was wrong.

   The quick increase of production after the end of the war can only be explained if one assumes that at least half of the production capacities remained. Another factor was the prime interest of the SMAD to restore fuel production. Earlier studies greatly overestimated dismantling in the fuel industry in the SBZ. ₅₃

2. Synthetic Ammonia

   More than 90 % of all nitrogen fertilizer made in Germany was produced in the Leuna plant. The remaining production was shared by Kalkstickstoffwerk Piesteritz and the coking plants of Zwickau. ₅₄ After termination of the dismantling the Leuna plant was left less than 1/3 of its previous ammonia capacity. ₅₅

   The Kalkstickstoffwerk of Piesteritz was also hard hit by dismantling. The plant lost all of the 4 phosphorous furnaces, the most modern carbide furnaces, approximately 60 % of the mechanical equipment of the main workshop and 40% of the Linde plant. ₅₆

3. Metallurgical Aluminum

   The Bitterfeld plants were only lightly affected by war destruction. Within a few weeks, the I.G. Plant South as well as the Plant North could have taken up production again. ₅₇ However, the plants for aluminum and magnesia production were completely dismantled. Until 1950, no significant amounts of aluminum could be produced. Demand had to be met through scrap metal from airplanes and aluminum alloy. ₅₈

   By the mid 1950's a critical point had been reached. Realizing the situation, the occupation authorities finally decided to agree to the reconstruction of new aluminum plants. ₅₉ Bitterfeld and Lauta were chosen as the sites. The Bitterfeld plant still had at its disposal old electrolysis pans and a hall, but in Lauta only heavily damaged buildings were available.

4. Synthetic rubber

   Also the Schkopkau Buna plant went almost undamaged into the possession of the occupying power. The quick reconstruction of the plant was firmly pursued. Therefore, synthetic rubber could be produced again in November of 1945. The plant suffered in the spring of 1948 a severe set-back when two of its four polymerization facilities were dismantled. ₆₀ While the withdrawal amounted only to 6% of the value of the balance-sheet, the capacity for rubber decreased by 25%, and including war losses by almost 40 %, compared with 1943. ₆₁

   It cannot be definitely determined why the Soviets called into question their reconstruction strategy, which had been relatively successful so far. Probably, a part of the capacity was "sacrificed" in order to obtain a better bargaining position in the Allied control Council. In November 1947, the American military government (OMGUS) demanded that less Buna be purchased in the SBZ in order to force the Soviets to close down production, which was classified as "war important". This was actually a step in the direction of the later embargo policies embodied in the ECA-Act. The British had already criticized the purchase of Buna from the SBZ after conclusion of the Minden agreement of 1947, which regulated the commodities dealings between the zones. ₆₂ As a result of these policies, barter trade between the occupation zones - synthetic rubber from the SBZ against tires from the American or else the British zone - stopped at the end of 1947. Unlike the British and the Americans, the Soviets, however, could hardly be interested in totally shutting down synthetic rubber capacity in the SBZ. Therefore, they allowed a quick compensation for dismantling losses. ₆₃ To estimate the remaining capacities after concluding the dismantling is extremely complicated.

Table 9: War damages and dismantling of selected facilities and plants of the chemical industry of the SBZ ₆₄

The remaining capacities after conclusion of the dismantling probably were as a total still a little higher than the level of 1936, but far below the level of 1944.

Table 10: Loss of capacities in the chemical industry of the SBZ by war influences and dismantling (related to the level of 1944) ₆₅

Tables 10 shows that special shortages occurred in basic chemistry:

• Sulfuric acid production, which was underrepresented in the SBZ, fell still farther behind. The sole gypsum-based sulphuric acid facility in the plant of Wolfen was completely dismantled. Further complete dismantles occurred in Doeberitz (37 800 t), Leuna (20 000 t) and Magdeburg (53 800 t). A total of 231 600 t. ₆₆ This dismantling affected the textile industry especially.
• Soda capacity was also extremely reduced. Especially the complete dismantling of the Deutschen Solvay-Werke AG in Bernburg, with a yearly capacity of 420 000 t, has to be mentioned. The dismantling of approximately 60 % of caustic soda and 50 % of chlorine capacity was less significant. These products were disproportionately represented in the SBZ.
• Fertilizer production was badly weakened by the dismantling of about 65% of the ammonia- and 100 % of the nitric acid capacities of the Leuna plants in Merseburg. Also the nitrogen plant Piesteritz lost all of its facilities of nitric acid production, and likewise the ammonia facility was taken away in the Leutzkendorfer mineral oil plant. In addition, the phosphoric acid facility in Piesteritz (40 000 t per year) was completely dismantled and the older phosphoric furnaces in Bitterfeld were partly dismantled.
• The chemical process industry, the rubber industry and the pharmaceutical industry were also hard hit by the dismantling. The major shortages resulted from the dismantling of the only large tire plant, DEKA Fuerstenwalde, and the partial dismantling of the most important pharmaceutic producers. ₆₇

The comparison of the original value of the facilities and the take-over value of 1946/47 ₆₈ illustrates the varying extent of depreciation due to the aftermath of the war as well as to the shifting of positions between the largest plants.

Table 11: Original facility value and takeover values of selected SAG-companies (in Mill. RM) ₆₉

The Buna factory in Schkopau suffered the least significant losses. This plant was equipped with comparatively the most favorable preconditions to resume production. The film factory Wolfen also stayed, despite numerous partial dismantlings, in good working order.

All other plants suffered heavy losses. The dismantling hit the already heavily war damaged Leuna plant extremely hard. The biggest chemical plant in the SBZ therefore lost its former top position. After the dismantling, less than one fifth of the original value of the facility remained in Merseburg. Therefore the insistence at the end of 1946 of the plant management of Leuna on a complete depreciation of all facilities that had been installed before the end of the war was quite plausible. ₇₀

In view of this damage, the configuration of the management was extremely important for reconstruction. In this connection, one has to remember that a first westward migration of the central German elites took place already immediately before respectively after the end of the war. At the end of June 1945 the directors of the Central German I.G. Farben plants as well as numerous chemists and engineers left the SBZ together with the American troops, some under pressure, some voluntarily ("Grasping into the Russian zone"). ₇₁ The Americans seized 27 directors and specialists from the Bitterfeld I.G. plants, from the Leuna plant 28, from the Buna-plant Schkopau 25, from the Wolfen Farbenfabrik 8, from the Boehlener Benzinwerk 6, and from Filmfabrik Agfa Wolfen 43. ₇₂ Also in the following years executive personnel migrated. The Leuna plant had the greatest problems. Of 431 executive leaders, 310 had left the plant by 1950. ₇₃ Nevertheless, no I.G. plant was a abandoned property ("herrenlos"). In all plants new management was appointed immediately before the old directors left. ₇₄ Of the top German management a few representatives stayed in each plant, among them Dr. Esselmann, manager of the fiber department of the Agfa film factory; Dr. Petersen, head of a department of the Farbenfabrik Wolfen; Prof. Dr. Beck, head of the research department of the I.G. Bitterfeld as well as Dr. Dorrer, the vice director of the Buna plant. The above-mentioned were then almost inevitably conformed as plant-managers by the Soviet occupying administrative authorities who moved in the beginning of July 1945. Only Dr. Dorrer was replaced at fall of 1945, instigated by the social democratic workers committee. His place was taken over by Dr. Nelles who had returned from the American Zone. ₇₅

As a result, at the top of all the large chemical plants experienced chemists were in charge. They represented what remained of the top-management of I.G. Farben. Also the other new members of the plant management had mostly worked before 1945 for many years at I.G. Farben and most of them had been members of the NSDAP.

Table 12: Change of directors in the large concerns of the chemical industry in 1945 ₇₆

With the transfer of German companies into Soviet ownership, an obvious change began in the relationship between the Soviets and the old elites. They were now as far as possible exempt from the denazification. ₇₇ Representative of many similar cases, the plant manager of the Farbenfabrik Wolfen Dr. Petersen allegedly quoted: "When specialists were employed, Russians were indifferent if they had been active Nazis." ₇₈ A member of the works committee of the Synthesewerk Schwarzheide wrote in May 1974 to the chairman of the SAG-management Alexandrow, "almost all management positions" in the plant were occupied by former National-Socialists. ₇₉ Only few cases of dismissals of the management personnel occurred in the SAG-plants of the chemical industry.

It was an "elite subject to recall" which was watched suspiciously by the occupying administrative authorities and the party-machine of the SED. This elite was involuntarily tolerated and was until the end of the fifties at the top of the most important plants of the chemical industry of the GDR.

4. Soviet stock companies (Sowjetische Aktiengesellschaften, or SAG)

All large chemical companies in the SBZ, including all plants of the I.G. Farben, were occupied by Soviet units and obtained a plant commanding officer. Also some of the medium-sized chemical plants were confiscated on the basis of the sequestration orders no. 124 and no. 126 of October 30 and 31, 1945, respectively; from then on they were controlled by the German Central Administrative authorities or else by the provincial administrative authorities. At the end of 1945, the representative of SMAD for economic questions, Koval, succeeded, according to his own testimony, in convincing initially Marshall Shukov and then the Minister of Foreign Trade Mikojan and the Secretary of State Molotov of the necessity of a change in reparations policy. ₈₀ An "economic vacuum" was supposedly to be prevented. ₈₁ For this reason over two hundred large industrial companies were transferred based on the order number 167 of June 5, 1946, into SAG. ₈₂ . Its formation meant the end of the policy of the "continuation of the war by other means". ₈₃ Moreover, the SAG enabled a better control of the key position in the economy of the SBZ as well as direct planning and coordinating of reparations from current production.

Whether the Soviet Union wished with their change of course in reparation policy in the summer of 1946 to pursue a unilateral policy which would enforce the separation of Germany and (for that purpose) to keep its hands free to exploit the SBZ exclusively, or whether it wanted in spite of this change in tack to keep its options open on German policy and therefore to create a flexible instrument for that purpose, is for contemporary historians still a very controversial issue. ₈₄

The change of the Soviet reparation policy had for the chemical industry far reaching consequences. The 30 most important plants, among them all large I.G. Farben plants, were united in SAG.

When organizing it, the occupying powers kept formally to the letter of German law. The SAG was registered in the commercial register, its property was recorded in the real-estate register, taxes were paid according to German fiscal laws and the company capital was divided into stocks. However, similarites to German corporate law ended there. The SAG was not obligated to publicize and the trade of its prohibited.

Soviet economic officials acted as stockholders who acted as leaseholder vis a vis the head of the "Administrative Authorities of the Soviet Property in Germany", located in Berlin-Weissensee. Out of the earnings of the "leased companies", they had to hand over the companies' profits and "lease payments" to the headquarters. ₈₅

The "Administrative Authorities of the Soviet property in Germany" came under the authority of the "Administrative Authorities of Foreign Countries" of Moscow. The SAG companies in the SBZ/GDR can therefore also be regarded as the "elongated arm" of the Soviet Ministry for Foreign Trade.

In February of 1947, after Stalin's announcement to reduce the reparation burden and vehement criticism of the allies in the Control Council of the creation of the "Soviet Trusts", 74 companies were returned to the German administrative authorities. ₈₆ This included also plants of coal mining, fuel production, among them the lubricating-oil plant of Luetzkendorf, and 7 medium-sized chemical plants, like the plant of Rodleben and the Ruetgerswerke of Dohna. ₈₇

The following overview shows, ignoring unimportant restructuring, which SAG existed in the chemical industry until mid-1952/end of 1953, as well as when the return of the plants to the German authorities occurred.

Table 13: Index of the SAG in the chemical industry 1947-1953 ₈₈

7) SAG Erdoel AG "Derunapht", to End 1953 Sitz: Berlin

The SAG were managed and controlled by a Soviet executive board. Frequent change of top personnel was typical for the Soviet executive board. Probably, as many Soviet specialists as possible were supposed to gain experience in Germany. However, the cadre policies of the ministries and party organs were probably even more important, which led to hectic coming and going. ₈₉

German plant management was subordinated to the Soviet executive board. The German plant management stayed comparatively stable. Together with their technical competence and their management experience, this ensured relatively great flexibility towards the occupying officers.

Between 1946 and 1953, the share of the SAG plants regarding the gross production of the chemical industry of the SBZ/GDR was clearly above 50%. ₉₀ They held a monopoly on strategic products.

Table 14: Shares of the SAG companies on production -value of selected chemical products 1951 (in % of the total production) ₉₁

The SAG-companies were the most favored of any kind. They obtained higher material and electricity quotas, could gain employees through higher wages, subsidized by state budgets and had stable sales of their reparation production.

After formation of the GDR, at least the production plans were coordinated between the SAG headquarters and the State Planning Commission (Staatliche Plankommission). The possibilities for the German authorities to influence the SAG companies, however, were limited. Thus, the manager of the chemical branch of the State Planning Commission, Professor Bertsch, pointed out in an internal letter that the "the attempts of his headquarters' to obtain influence over the planning of the Leuna plants from the Administrative Authorities of the Soviet Property in Germany were vigorously stonewalled". ₉₂

After 1949, the emphasis in the Soviet reparation demands shifted clearly to the mechanical engineering and ship-building industry. ₉₃ The reparation deliveries from the chemical industry now played only a minor role. In the year of 1949, the chemical industry of the SBZ showed a balance of a total of DM-East 87,0 Mil. in the reparation plan, in other words just 8.5% of the master plan. ₉₄

Were one to conclude from the analysis of the reparation plans that the chemical industry was hardly affected by the withdrawals from current production, one would be wrong. On the one hand until the end of 1948, withdrawals in certain areas occurred to a considerable extent (films, synthetic rubber and colors); on the other hand, some of the products of chemical factories went also later into circulation as reparation commodities in an indirect form (supplies to other SAG companies, exports "on account gains" as well as deliveries to Soviet troops in Germany). Also, the occupying power tried to exploit every imaginable form of "invisible reparations" (patents, construction documents, knowledge of experts etc.) up until the return of the SAG companies to the GDR.

In fall 1945, the technological transfer began to take systematic shape. ₉₅ Technical offices and special construction offices were formed in numerous factories. These research stations, actually "islands in chaos", came under the authority of the "Administration of Studies (of the achievements) of Science and Technology in Germany" of the SMAD. Already in the summer of 1945, the Soviet Ministry of Light Industry arranged for Professor Bertsch, pointed out in an internal letter thaexample the building of a "research office". This office united in Premnitz all scientists and technicians who worked in the SBZ at the development of chemical fibers. ₉₆ Also in all other chemical plants, the Soviets set up research offices.

The employment of some of the scientists in the research offices came to an abrupt end when they were engaged in the course of the NKWD-Operation "Ossawakim" for reparations work in the Soviet Union. Even the directors of the soviet SAGs were surprised by these measures and were not able to interfere. A report of the Leuna plants commented: "The Russian plant management had absolutely full understanding for the difficulties, but had not the means, possibly also not the authority, to interfere in these actions, but also emphasized that the evacuated employees in Russia could expect especially favorable conditions... By the way the Russian director together with the German plant manager would be willing to apply to Berlin to try to let at least some of the evacuated employees stay in Leuna." ₉₇

As far as it was possible to investigate the operation "Ossawakim" included specialists from the following I.G. plants. ₉₈

Table 15: Affected German Scientists and their Relatives

It seems that only the contract conditions for the synthetic-fiber-specialists' group were clarified immediately before the Operation "Ossawakin". ₉₉ One group from the film factory helped in Schostka (northern Ukraine) to install machines and facilities which had been dismantled in Wolfen in 1946. As far as we know, the reinstallation of the film factory of Schokstka and the opening of the color-film production is one of the most successful Soviet reconstruction projects with the help of German specialists and machines. The Soviets were even more interested in the procedures and technologies for color-film production than in the installation of individual machines. Until the German specialists arrived, only black and white films were produced in Schostka. ₁₀₀

While various transfer programs of the allies ("Paperclip", "FIAT") of industrial know-how ended in the middle of 1947, comparable Soviet programs continued much longer. ₁₀₁ Therefore, the plant management of the Synthesis Plant Schwarzheide obtained at the end of 1950 from the SAG administration "Synthese" the contract to present a documentation of the Fischer-Tropsch process within two years. ₁₀₂

The following is to summarize the problems of the SAG companies: With their establishment, the decentralization of the German economy, postulated in the Potsdam Declaration, was replaced by a centralization. Although all four occupying powers wanted to break up the I.G. Farben into units as small as possible, this concept was never enforced by any of the occupying forces. ₁₀₃

There were certain similarities in the development of the chemical industry in the French Zone. As the French occupying forces, in the case of the BASF ₁₀₄ , their Soviet counterparts did not question the division of labor between the central German plants. Also they were interested in profiting from the chemical industry especially as source of reparations and practiced an intensive direct control.

What was positive about the formation of the SAG was that because of them, important plants were preserved from dismantling and maintained tens of thousand jobs. Moreover, the SAG-plants could to some extent bypass allied R & D restrictions.

But centralized economic mechanisms had a negative effect on the chemical industry under the Soviet control. Profits and losses were balanced out between the various SAG administrations and the investments were centrally planed. The investments of the chemical industry fell way short of need for replacement equipment anf for modernization of the industrial sector. ₁₀₅ The Leuna-Plant received means for investment of approximately 200 Mill. Mark between 1946 and the end of 1953. ₁₀₆ With this sum only partial reconstruction of the plant was possible. In a letter of November 1956 to the Minister of Industry, Fritz Selbmann; the plant manager, Dr. Schirmer viewed the situation retrospectively as the following: "Until 1954, the development of the chemical industry was severely neglected. The general investments for repairs and replacement amounted only to a fraction of the amortization, so that a real reconstruction of the existing plants could not take place according to plan... Because of this development, the growth of the chemical industry was remarkably inhibited, so that a set back occurred, which cannot be caught up within a few years. I estimate a 15 year set back in our technical equipment." ₁₀₇

5. Reconstruction phase and 1958-Chemistry program

Already in summer 1945, SMAD industrial policies the chemical industry focussed mainly on a few aspects, which would continue to exist more than a decade. The Soviets had a special interest in fuel, lubrication oil, synthesic rubber, tires, and films. ₁₀₈ Therefore the reconstruction of these branches as well as the coal industry had priority.

The German Economic Administrations concentrated on compensating for the severe loss of sulfuric acid and fertilizer which had come about through dismantling. Fertilizer was in such short supply that the occupying force appealed to the German Administration to close down the Leuna-fuel production for the benefit of ammonia production in 1947/48. ₁₀₉

After the division of Germany became apparent, the SBZ began a partly forced, but also partly deliberate policy of self-sufficiency. The chemical industry of the SBZ/GDR had to use predominantly local raw materials and to restrict their imports from the western foreign countries. The most important investments of the fifties were therefore the reconstruction of the gypsum-based sulfur acid factory in Wolfen, finished 1954, and the completed new building of a gypsum-based sulfur acid factory in Coswig/A. ₁₁₀ After the opening of these plants, the production of sulfuric acid was based to the tune of 80% on local raw materials. Additional autarky projects were the foundation of the VEB Jenapharm in 1950 ₁₁₁ and a 1958-program of the Politburo for "making the photo-chemical-industry independent of supplies of the Federal Republic of Germany". ₁₁₂ In the case of Jenapharm it was a matter of securing at least a minimum provision of pharmaceuticals (penicillin) for the population. In the case of Agfa Filmfabrik Wolfen the authorities wished to cut off the old connections to the Bayer-Werk of Leverkusen.

The largest portion of (the altogether small) investments were used until the end of the 1950s to compensate for losses due to dismantling and for new autarky programs. Even though important products of basic chemistry (caustic soda, nitrogenous fertilizer) reached already in 1950 or 1951/52 (sulfuric acid) their pre-war levels agaub, the reconstruction of the chemical industry was at the beginning of the 1950s still not completed. Appropriately the later chairman of the research council of the GDR (Forschungsrat), Prof. Thiessen, remarked on this matter: "If one takes a look at the plants such as Leuna, Buna, Agfa Wolfen and others, it is a real miracle that so much was produced." ₁₁₃

Depending on the initial situation, the largest chemical plants, which had reached their maximum production levels in 1943/44, were able to reach them again between 1950 and 1958.

In the case of the Filmfabrik Wolfen, achieving its highest level of production of 1941 was rendered more difficulty for several reasons: The partial dismantling, the severe lack of qualified workers and the latent problems getting hold of raw materials. Measured by output, the Wolfen Plant could only exceed the level of 1941 in 1954.

Table 16: Production of films of all sorts in the Agfa Film Factory Wolfen (in 1 000m²) ₁₁₄

Such a purely quantitative comparison ignores the fact, however, that the production of color films in the postwar era had substantially increased. In 1943, the portion of color films was 3 % of the total film production, but almost 37% ten years later. ₁₁₅ Looking strictly at the manufacturing production, an exchange of color films for black-and-white films would have resulted in five to ten times as many of the total films. ₁₁₆ As far as that is concerned, the film factory was able to compensate the postwar losses already in 1950. This is also reflected in the value of the development of production.

Table 17: Value of production (in Mill. RM/M, comparable) ₁₁₇

The restoration of the Buna-Plant Schkopau lasted until the mid 50\s?\s. The level of production of synthesic rubber from 1943 would already have been reached in 1950/1951 if it had not been for the dismantling in spring of 1948.

Table 18: Synthetic rubber production of the Buna-Plant in Schkopau 1936-1956 (in 1 000 t, rounded) ₁₁₈

Most complicated was the reconstruction of Leuna, the largest industrial plant of the GDR.

Table 19: Development of the main production of Leuna 1938-50 (in 1 000 t) ₁₁₉

The development of production between 1938 and 1950 shows how much the plant was restricted as a result of the war and dismantling. The production of methanol- and isobuthyl was in 1950 under 50% (in the case of isobutyl, under 10%) of the level of 1938. Fuel synthesis had to be closed down in 1948 for the sake of maintaining the nitrogen production, and did not reach even 30% of the pre-war level by 1950. Also the manufacturing of fundamental plastic products and washing raw materials dropped in the postwar era down to zero and stayed very small until 1950. The highest level of production of 1943 could not be reached again until 1958, if one takes all three main syntheses into account.

Table 20: Production of the three main syntheses of Leuna 1943-1958 (in 1 000 t) ₁₂₀

As a result of the high reparation burdens; the partly forced, partly deliberate autarky policies; extensive changes in foreign trade partners; as well as the weaknesses of the system of a planned economy shaped by the Soviets, the chemical industry of the SBZ/GDR dropped behind the West German chemical industry in the first postwar decade. Accordingly, their proportion of "total German production" (now of course only fictitious) dropped.

Table 21: Production of Sulfuric Acid in Germany ₁₂₁

The Tables comes to the following conclusions:

• In West Germany the level of the prewar era (1936) was clearly exceeded in 1949 for all basic chemicals except for the production of sulfuric acid. On the other side, in East Germany the production values were, except for calcium-carbide, in 1949 still far behind the prewar level. This difference is due to the great losses of dismantled plants of Central Germany.
• In all sections of the basic chemistry, with the exception of the production of calcium carbide, the share of GDR stayed until the mid 1950s behind that level of 1936, applied to all of Germany.

State investment policies concerned themselves initially with overcoming the damages from war and dismantling, but in the mid 1950's the priorities changed in the direction of extending the sector of coal and energy. The growth of the production of electric energy was until then clearly behind the overall state of the economic growth. Two "coals and energy programs" (1954-57, 1957-60) were supposed to lead to an increase of supply of energy.

In the meantime the economic policy makers of the GDR were aware that the concentration on resources of the "smoke stack industries" (steel, coal, thermal power station) interfered with the efficiency of other industrial branches. The growth dynamics decreased and the innovation weakness was no longer to be ignored. These problems were discussed in a debate concerning the nature and the main direction of the scientific and technical change in the world. The Secretary of Industry of the GDR, Fritz Selbmann, spoke of the approaching "industrial turn-over" and social scientists forecast a "second industrial revolution". ₁₂₂

Utilization of nuclear energy and the automation in the metal processing industry were supposed to be at the center of this "industrial turn-over". However, it soon became apparent that in these fields no quick success could be achieved, and the chemical industry moved into the focus of economic policy.

This branch appeared to be especially suitable for Ulbricht's vision to develop the GDR into the high-technology-country of the Eastern Bloc. His economic policies aimed, therefore, at the development of innovative branches, among others aircraft construction and mechanical engineering. The decision to develop the aircraft industry was made in 1952/54, nuclear energy plants in the mid 1950s, amd the chemical industry in 1958. ₁₂₃ The products of those branches were supposed to be used for trade in the Eastern Bloc in exchange for raw materials (fuel, iron ore, wood, and so on) and food.

Of greatest importance was the fact, that in the mid 1950's, about 2 500 renowned physicists, air craft-and missile-engineers, as well as chemists, who had been taken to the Soviet Union for reparation work, were allowed to return to Germany. ₁₂₄ The SED leaders expected that they would be instrumental for a technological change. At the same time the competition with the Federal Republic of Germany, meant that the home-comers had to be offered attractive career prospects, since otherwise their migration westward was a possibility.

The SED leaders made an effort to include the economic-technological elites into the plan of their economy and founded in 1957 the Research Council (Forschungsrat) of the GDR. The best engineers and scientists worked in this committee. ₁₂₅ The council was unmistakably a committee of the "old intelligentsia".

The connections between politics, economy and science of the 1950\s?\s can, however, not be reduced to the simple formulation of "the power of engineers and/or chemists". Also in regard to the chemical industry it would be wrong, to speak of "helpless economists", since anticipated cost reductions were the central argument for the transition to petrochemicals. In the final analysis, it was the party machine who gave the "green light" for the development of the chemical industry. In a centralized economy of the 1950s, there would also have been other options for concentrated investments.

From 1945 until the end of the 50s, the world chemical production quadrupled. The petrochemical industry developed quickly. ₁₂₆ The production of plastic materials and synthetic fibers especially was quickly increased. The growth of the chemical industry was in most industrial countries above the average growth of industry. Compared with this, the chemical industry of the GDR reflected no special dynamic growth. The central office for research and technology (Zentrales Amt fuer Forschung und Technik) presented an analysis about the productivity of various economic branches to the SED-leaders in the fall of 1957. According to it, behind the food industry, the chemical industry disposed of the highest per-head-productivity and had a comparativly large number of highly qualified workers. However, the rate of export of the chemical industry (approximately 16%) was way below that of the mechanical engineering (approximately 30%). ₁₂₇

After the "Sputnik shock" in 1957 and Chruschstschow's production of an "economic race", the chemical industry in the Eastern Bloc moved into the center of the economic policy. In February 1958 the GDR and the Soviet Union concluded an agreement concerning additional exchange of chemical goods ("SU-special program"). ₁₂₈ The GDR committed itself to deliver plastic materials (PVC), fibers, pesticides and received in return from the Soviet Union steel, aluminum, wood, and chemical raw materials. Through the "SU-special program" especially the capacity of carbide and plastic materials of the Buna Plant in Schkopau and the Electrochemical Collective Combine Bitterfeld was expanded. Three months after the signing of the "SU-special program", the leaders of the Soviet Union decided on a chemical program for the years 1959 until 1965. In November 1958, the GDR passed a chemical program as well. At the advice of Chruschstschow, Ulbricht held a conference in the Leuna Plant under the slogan "Chemistry gives us bread, prosperity, and beauty". ₁₂₉ Only one month later, the 10th assembly of the Comecon decided to build an oil-pipe-line from the Soviet Union to the European Comecon countries.

The motives for supporting the chemical industry varied. The transition to the petrochemical industry promised cost advantages. The chemical industry had at their disposal outstanding experts and a great tradition. Finally, the competition to the Federal Republic of Germany forced the SED-leaders to orient themselves towards consumption. That attention was drawn to the new buildings of chemical plants at a great propagandistic expense, had to do with the national identity of the communist leadership, as well a system which concentrates on large projects. ₁₃₀

The main points of the program were the doubling of chemical production within seven years, and an even greater increase in production of synthetic fibers and plastic. Such rates of growth could only be reached through the expansion of the petrochemical industry. But in 1965 2/3 of the chemical production were still produced on the base of carbide chemistry.

Table 22: The most important plan-data of the chemical program of the GDR ₁₃₁

By building the oil-pipe-line "Friendship", an expanded supply of oil could be ensured.

Table 23: Import of the GDR (in Mill. t) ₁₃₂

The oil-pipe-line that went from the Soviet Union into the European Comecon countries was the leading associate project of the Eastern Bloc at that time.

The biggest problem was the deficit of seamless pipes. ₁₃₃ The American government tried to use this circumstance, and achieved from the Federal Republic in the end of 1962 a pipe-embargo. But this did not hinder the work of the oil location route as much as expected. In the end of December 1963, the Erdoelverarbeitungswerk Schwedt started operation. In addition to this plant the construction of the Chemiefaserkombinates Guben and a second plant in Leuna (Leuna II) belonged to the most important new greenfield constructions. In both cases an intensive competition occured between the regional administrations and various cities about the location of the new factories. ₁₃₄

Furthermore, the "old plants" in Schkopau, Bitterfeld, Wolfen, Piesteritz and Luetzkendorf were considerably expanded. The same applied to the chemical fiber businesses in Premnitz, Schwarza and Pirna.

About 3/4 of the planned investments until 1965 went to traditional chemical locations. As a result the ambitions of the regional planners failed to use the chemical program as a compensation for the South-North difference. For reasons of costs and time the conurbation Halle-Leipzig, the center of the GDR, was preferred. ₁₃₅

Supporting measures were enacted to supplement the industrial branch program: an extensive education program, the foundation of the enterprise (Kombinat) "Bau- und Montagekombinat Chemie, Halle" ₁₃₆ and the development of the "VEB Komplette Chemieanlagen" ₁₃₇ - this enterprise was supposed to coordinate the delivery of equipment at a value of 5 Billion Mark and with the assembly instructions at 2,2 Billion Mark in 1965 - a traffic program and a program of water supply and distribution. ₁₃₈

The R & D-capacity for the chemical industry was supposed to concentrate on petrochemical procedures, and development of plastics, particularly polyethylene and full-synthetic fibers, among them polyester fiber.

From the viewpoint of basic research, conditions for these areas were not bad, since after all in the area of the GDR several important research centers remained with highly qualified scientists. ₁₃₉ However until the end of the fifties, the chemistry of the GDR did not succeed in compensating the permanent losses owing to migrations from the R & D-sphere.

Furthermore, R & D outlays were merely 1 to 2% of the total turnover of the plants, and thus far below international standards. ₁₄₀ The greatest weakness nonetheless was transforming R & D results into production. The fast-paced chemical industry was at a particular disadvantage because of the innovation barriers of the planned economy. ₁₄₁ The GDR chemistry could not cope with developing many of its own processes. On the other hand, the purchase of licences abroad was difficult because it had to be paid for in hard currency.

Old contacts helped too. So Prof. Nelles, Director of the Buna-Plant wanted to buy from Prof. Ziegler ₁₄₂ in 1958 the patent for Low Pressure-Polyethylene for 1 Mill. DM. When Prof. Ziegler heard of the offer, he responded: "I did not count on anything, but you poor wretch should get it as cheap as possible." ₁₄₃ But these were exceptions. The chemical program of 1958 represented an experiment in developing innovations under their own power. Further decline of GDR chemistry was supposed to be stopped. But already in 1960/61 the failure of the program revealed itself. As a result of the crises of 1961 and the policy of "liberating from disturbance", that is to say to decrease in reaction to the threat of the dismissal of the trade agreement with the Federal Republic, the goals for increased rates of growth had to be reduced. The directors of the chemical enterprises despaired. In an analysis for the State Planning Commission they wrote: "... we are absolutely sure that we will becoming a secondary chemical countrie, if the presently planned development will be maintained." While the central administration succeeded again in coping with a reduction of imports, the chemical industry felt more and more the lack of sufficient incentives for innovations.

Table 24: Divergence of the actual rate of growth in relation to the goals of the chemical program

Only in fundamental chemistry could the planned rate of increase be reached, whereas the plan for synthetic fibers was far below the target.

The unsatisfactory results of the chemical program led to criticism of the ministries of other branches. They insisted on a correction of the economic course in favor of mechanical engineering. But the critics could not enforce their demands. Starting 1964, the SED-leader, Ulbricht, proclaimed a second chemistry program. The structural processes of change were supposed to be continued. In spite of large investments, the results were poor.

Table 25: Shares of the chemical industry in the development of the industry of the GDR in % ₁₄₄

The chart makes clear that the new chemical industry thanks to the two programs (1959-65 respectively 1964-70) could extend ist (in any case high) share of the industrial production of the economy of the GDR. However a more than proportionate increase in investment shares of 13% to over 21% was needed to achieve this goal. ₁₄₅

The construction of chemical plants in the GDR got a major impulse at this time. On the tide of "chemicalizing", the Soviet Union placed an order with the GDR for complete chemical plants at a value of several billions of Marks. ₁₄₆

In other areas it did not look so good. Even until 1970 the transition to the petrochemical industry could not be concluded. Though concepts existed to shut down particular unprofitable procedures of the carbide chemistry, they were not implemented.

The ability of the GDR chemistry to compete dropped dramatically, despite the beginning of the structural change in the 60\s?\s. A look at their dropping share of export illustrates this well. The German chemist had in this area of petrochemical industry little experience. The directors of the chemical companies of the GDR announced to the state plan commission an increased request for imports of know how (licences, patents, chemical plants). ₁₄₇ Only a portion was approved. Many of the needed processes could also have been worked out by the GDR - the scientific potential was available for this -, but the sluggishness of the planning system demanded an average of 6-8 years to achieve the procedure of development. This long development periods collided with the investment plan. Thus the only thing left was the strenuous way of imitation from the West and of importing the petrochemical plants from the Soviet Union.

Especially in the growing branches of plastics, synthetic fibers, and pharmaceutical products, the companies of the GDR had lost their competitive because of delayed modernization. The export in the western direction occurred either at dumping prices or else only the intermediates and fuel could be sold.

In spite of increase of investments, "rejuvenating" the chemical industry did not succeed because the investment goods was not accompanied by a sorting out of outdated facilities. ₁₄₈ Consequently the maintenance costs grew.

6. Conclusion

The economic and regional structures of the chemical industry in East Germany did not change much in the last 100 years. Both World Wars led to a condensation of the "chemical triangle" in the region of Halle-Bitterfeld-Boehlen. There the plants were based on using local raw materials, which led - also after 1945 - to the continuation of the "special path" of the German chemical industry. That means, the chemical plants in East Germany continued to use the coal-based Acetylene-Chemistry.

The postwar losses in the SBZ were quite larger than in the Western Zone. From the "technological monument" of the I.G. only a torso was left. The occupying forces dealt pragmatically with it and stopped short of full destruction of the I.G. structure. The material resources and the human capital which were still available were sufficient for the reconstruction of the chemical industry until the mid 1950s. The already achieved modernization could be reproduced and well-known technologies could be improved. After completion of reconstruction, the chemical industry of the GDR was about at the technical level of the 1930\s?\s.

With the chemical program of 1958, a modernizing phase was to start. The transition to the petrochemical industry was not possible until the Soviets promissed long-term oil shipments. With these and other projects the GDR\s?\s economy was supposed to become more efficiently. At the threshold of the 60\s?\s the chemical industry of the GDR in almost all areas had indicated, however, that it had lost their competitive capability. Decisive for the backsliding was the uncoupling from the international division of labor and the integration into the East European economic zone. GDR's chemistry hardly found in Eastern Europe equal partners and the cooperation possibilities to the West were restricted for political reasons. However, for a small country like the GDR it was impossible to develop important processes and technologies on its own.

After the second oil crises 1979/80 the Soviet Union reduced its deliveries of oil to the GDR. The economic bureaucracy of the GDR reacted with a program for the replacement of heating oil and with the consolidation in the area of coal-chemistry.

Instead of the reductions in carbide-chemistry, as planned 1967, in the 1980s instead an expansion took place. To increase of productivity of the chemical industry was no longer the most important goal, but rather to reduce the oil imports. ₁₄₉ The "opting for oil" of the Ulbricht-era became in the Honecker-era a policy of moving "back to coal". Maintaining of carbide chemistry finally ended in an energy crisis and an ecological fiasco.

Notes:

Note 1: The Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) has generously sponsored this study. I would like to thank the DFG for their help. I am grateful also to Prof. Dr. Wolfram Fischer, Prof. Dr. Lothar Baar, Prof. Dr. Raymond G. Stokes, Dr. Harm Schroeter, Dr. Peter Loehnert and Dr. Frank Zschaler, primarily in reading and commenting the text. Back.

Note 2: See: "Milliarden fuer die ostdeutsche Chemie", in: Berliner Zeitung, 24.12.1996. Back.

Note 3: The writer Monika Maron has criticized the pollution of people and nature in the Bitterfeld-region in her book Flugasche", which was published in 1981. It was also a critique of the economic policy of the SED. Back.

Note 4: See: PCK AG Schwedt sowie BASF Schwarzheide GmbH, in: Privatisierte. Was aus ihnen wird, Berlin 1994, S. 55ff. und 355ff. Back.

Note 5: See: W.-O. Reichelt, Das Erbe der I.G. Farben, Duesseldorf 1956, S. 100 Back.

Note 6: See: Fritz Welsch, Geschichte der chemischen Industrie, Berlin 1981, S. 73 Back.

Note 7: See: Eberhard Richter, Die Schwefelsaeureindustrie der DDR, Diss. A Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin, 1961 Back.

Note 8: See: Welsch, Geschichte der chemischen Industrie, S. 114 Back.

Note 9: See: 100 Jahre Eilenburger Chemie-Werk, o.O. 1987 Back.

Note 10: See: Bitterfelder Chronik. 100 Jahre Chemiestandort Bitterfeld-Wolfen, Bitterfeld 1993, S. 10f. Back.

Note 11: See: Erhard Finger, Die Filmfabrik Wolfen. Portraet eines traditionsreichen Unternehmens 1909 bis 1994, Wolfen 1994, S. 29ff. Back.

Note 12: See: Produktivkraefte in Deutschland 1870 bis 1917/18, Berlin 1985, S. 152 Back.

Note 13: See: Gottfried Plumpe, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, Berlin 1990, S. 72ff. Back.

Note 14: See: Karl-Heinz Streller, Geschichte des VEB Leuna Werke 1916 bis 1945, Leipzig 1989 Back.

Note 15: See: Raymond G. Stokes, Divide and Prosper. The Heirs of I.G. Farben under Allied Autority 1945-1951, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London 1988, S. 17 Back.

Note 16: See: Helmuth Tammen, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG 1925-1933, Berlin 1978, S. 21 Back.

Note 17: See: Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 167 Back.

Note 18: Compiled from: Produktivkraefte in Deutschland 1917/18-1945, Berlin 1987, S. 352 Back.

Note 19: See: Rolf Wagenfuehr, Die deutsche Industrie im Kriege 1939-1945, Muenchen 1956, S. 19ff. Back.

Note 20: Calculated from: Stokes, Divide and Prosper, Tab. 2 Back.

Note 21: See: Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 167 Back.

Note 22: See: Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Der synthetische Treibstoff 1933-1945, Goettingen, Berlin, Frankfurt/M. 1964 Back.

Note 23: They built in the western part of Germany up to 1935 4 synthetic fuel plants, in 1938 in East Prussia, Silesia and Bohemia always 1 synthetic fuel plant.. Back.

Note 24: Compiled from: Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 284 Back.

Note 25: See: ebd., S. 286 Back.

Note 26: Compiled from: Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 286 Back.

Note 27: See: Welsch, Geschichte der chemischen Industrie, S. 126 Back.

Note 28: See: Karl Winnacker, Nie den Mut verlieren. Erinnerungen an Schicksalsjahre der deutschen Chemie, Duesseldorf, Wien 1971, S. 111ff. Back.

Note 29: See: Friedrich Stratmann, Chemische Industrie unter Zwang?, Stuttgart 1985, S. 160; Wirtschaftsstatistik der deutschen Besatzungszonen 1945-1948, Europa Archiv 1948, S. 45 Back.

Note 30: Compiled from: Statistische Praxis 1964, Nr. 2 Back.

Note 31: See: auch: Hans-Hermann Hertle, Franz Otto-Gilles, Struktur, Entwicklung und Probleme der chemischen Industrie in DDR. Gespraech mit Dr. Friedrich Goetz, Berliner Arbeitshefte und Berichte zur sozialwissenschaftlichen Forschung Nr. 81, Berlin 1993, S. 7 Back.

Note 32: See: Plumpe, I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 606f. Back.

Note 33: See: Manfred Rasch, Die Ruhrchemie AG 1945-1951: Wiederaufbau, Entnazifizierung und Demontage, in: Technikgeschichte Jg. 54 (1987) Nr. 2, S. 102f. Back.

Note 34: See: Plumpe, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 607; Stokes, Divide and Prosper, S. 52; 76; Business Archive (BA) Wolfen, Nr. 195 (Werkleitung); State Archive (LHA) Magdeburg, SAG Farbenfabrik Wolfen, Nr. 5849. In opposite to this, Welsch overvalued the war-losses. Compare: Welsch, Geschichte der chemischen Industrie, S. 171. Back.

Note 35: See: Christoph Klessmann, Die doppelte Staatsgruendung. Deutsche Geschichte 1945-1955, Bonn 1991, S. 78 Back.

Note 36: See: Auszug aus dem Kommunique der 24. ausserordentlichen Sitzung des alliierten Kontrollrates vom 28. Maerz 1948, in: Bundesarchiv (BArch), Abteilungen Potsdam, F-4, Nr. 1154, Bl. 44 Back.

Note 37: See: Rainer Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, Die Reparationsleistungen der SBZ/DDR 1945-53, Berlin 1993 Back.

Note 38: See: Pavel Kynschewskij, Moskaus Beute, Muenchen 1995, S. 44 Back.

Note 39: See: Werner Abelshauser, Wirtschaftsgeschichte der Bundesrepublik, Muenchen 1983, S. 25 Back.

Note 40: See: BArch, Stiftung Archive der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO), Zentrales Parteiarchiv (ZPA), Nachlass Grotewohl (NL 90), Nr. 337 Back.

Note 41: Compiled from: Kriegs- und Demontageverluste im Bereich der HV Chemie (Juli 1949), BArch, SAPMO, Nachlass Pieck (NL 36) Nr. 336; Die chemische Industrie in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, Bonn 1952, S. 11; BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, G-2, Nr. 10 904; Landeshauptarchiv (LHA) Magdeburg, Rep. K, Ministerium fuer Wirtschaft (MfW), Nr. 123 Back.

Note 42: See: Siegfried Zimmermann, Die Geschichte des Kombinatsbetriebes Boehlen im VEB Petrochemisches Kombinant Schwedt, Diss. A, Bergakademie Freiberg 1970, S. 109f. Back.

Note 43: The modern Boehlen briquette factory was dismantled in 1947. See: Saechsisches Staatsarchiv (StA) Leipzig, SAG-Kombinat Boehlen, Nr. 139 Back.

Note 44: See: StA Leipzig, SAG-Kombinat Boehlen, Nr. 170. This is another example, that the Americans by no means generally blocked the reconstruction of the economy in Mitteldeutschland. (See: Klaus-Dietmar Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Muenchen 1995) Back.

Note 45: See: StA Leipzig, SAG-Kombinat Boehlen, Nr. 72. Back.

Note 46: See: Unser Werk. Betriebsgeschichte des VEB Hydriewerk Zeitz, Teil I, S. 62 Back.

Note 47: See: Werksarchiv der Leuna GmbH (LWA) Nr. 693-695 Back.

Note 48: See: Friedrich-Wilhelm Matschke, Die Entwicklung der Mineraloelindustrie der DDR (unveroeff. Manuskript) Back.

Note 49: See: Die chemische Industrie in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, Bonn 1952, S. 63 Back.

Note 50: Landeshauptarchiv Postdam, Rep. 903, Nr. 2 215 Back.

Note 51: See: Matschke, Mineraloelindustrie, S. 8 Back.

Note 52: See: Die chemische Industrie in der SBZ, S. 61 and: Demontage in der Ostzone, in: Angewandte Chemie, 20. Jg. 1948; Nr. 5/5, S. 148 Back.

Note 53: See: Bundesamt fuer gewerbliche Wirtschaft, Eschborn, Die Demontagen in der sowjetischen Besatzungszone (Mitteldeutschland), Frankfurt/M. 1959 (unveroeff. Manuskript), S. 19. There the authors speak from capacity losses of 90 %. That is unrealistic in view of the archive files. Back.

Note 54: See: Die chemische Industrie in der SBZ, S. 50 Back.

Note 55: See: LWA, Nr. A1 Back.

Note 56: See: BArch Koblenz, Innerdeutsches Ministerium B 137, Nr. 641 Back.

Note 57: See: BArch, Abt. Merseburg, SAG Elektrochemisches Kombinat Bitterfeld, Nr. 5 078 Back.

Note 58: See: BArch, Abt. Potsdam, DE-1, Ministerium fuer Planung, Nr. 129 Back.

Note 59: See: ebd. Back.

Note 60: See: Gabriele Ahlefeld, Astrid Molder, Rudolf Werner, Plaste und Elaste aus Schkopau. 60 Jahre Buna-Werke, Pinneberg 1996 Back.

Note 61: See: Buna-Archiv, Rep. II/1, Nr. 85 (Werkleitung). I like to thank Heinz Rehmann (Schkopau) for his comments to this point. Back.

Note 62: See: Gunther Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948. Alliierte Einheit - deutsche Teilung?, Muenchen 1995, S. 186 Back.

Note 63: See: Rainer Karlsch, Entscheidungsspielraeume und Innovationsverhalten in der Synthesekautschukindustrie, in: Johannes Baehr, Dietmar Petzina (Hg.), Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen, Berlin 1996 Back.

Note 64: See: LWA, Nr. 693-695; BA Wolfen, Nr. 761/1; Buna-Archiv, Rep. II/1, Nr. 356; BArch Koblenz B 137, Nr. 641; LHA Magdeburg, SAG Farbenfabrik Wolfen, Nr. 6 123. Back.

Note 65: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, G-2, Nr. 1311, Bl. 88 ff.; Gustav-Wilhelm Harmssen, Am Abend der Demontagen, S. 86; Die chemische Industrie in der SBZ, S. 10f.; BArch Koblenz B 137 I, Nr. 459; Demontage in der Ostzone, in: Angewandte Chemie, 20. Jg. 1948; Nr. 5/5, S. 148 Back.

Note 66: Die chemische Industrie in der SBZ, S. 32f. Back.

Note 67: See: Rainer Karlsch, Von der Schering AG zum VEB Berlin Chemie, in: Johannes Baehr, Wolfram Fischer (Hg.), Wirtschaft im geteilten Berlin, Berlin 1995 Back.

Note 68: The large plants were transferred into SAG, mid 1946. That's why, they had to open a new balance-sheet. See: Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, S. 112f. Back.

Note 69: Compiled from: Plumpe, Die I.G. Farbenindustrie AG, S. 607; Franz Rupp, Die Reparationsleistungen der sowjetischen Besatzungszone, Bonn 1951, S. 30f; Buna-Archiv, Rep. I/1, Nr. 297 und 298; LHA Merseburg, SAG EKB, Nr. 5392. Back.

Note 70: See: LWA, Nr. A1 Back.

Note 71: See: Henke, Die amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Muenchen 1995, S. 744ff. Back.

Note 72: See: StA Leipzig, SAG-Kombinat Boehlen, Nr. 72; BA Wolfen, Nr. 101; Bitterfelder Chronik, S. 56; Heinz Rehmann, Zur Geschichte des ersten deutschen Buna-Synthesekautschukwerkes in Schkopau, in: Merseburger Beitraege zur Geschichte der chemischen Industrie Mitteldeutschlands, Nr. 1/1996, S. 27 Back.

Note 73: See: Denkschrift ueber die Lage des Chemiewerkes Leuna, BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 69 Back.

Note 74: See: BArch, Abt. Merseburg, SAG EKB, Nr. 5045 (Direktion) Back.

Note 75: See: Heinz Rehmann, Chronologie (unveroeff. Manuskript), Schkopau 1996 Back.

Note 76: See: LWA, Nr. 1372; StA Leipzig, SAG-Kombinat Boehlen, Nr. 72 Back.

Note 77: See: Rainer Karlsch, Johannes Baehr, Die sowjetischen Aktiengesellschaften (SAG) in der SBZ/DDR, in: Karl Lauschke, Thomas Welskopp (Hrsg.), Mikropolitik im Unternehmen, Essen 1994 Back.

Note 78: LHA Magdeburg, SAG Farbenfabrik Wolfen, Nr. 5 649 (Direktion), Bl. 198 f. Back.

Note 79: BArch, SAPMO, ZPA IV 2/6.02/53, Schreiben vom 7.5.1947 Back.

Note 80: See: Konstantin I. Koval, Mein Treffen mit General Draper im Juli 1947. Mit Anmerkungen von Jochen Laufer und Rainer Karlsch, in: BzG, 37. Jg. 1995/2, S. 47. sowie Fernsehinterview mit Koval vom 20. Juli 1996. Back.

Note 81: See: Jochen Laufer, Konfrontation oder Kooperation?, Alexander Fischer (Hg.), Studien zur Geschichte der SBZ/DDR, Berlin 1993, S. 63 Back.

Note 82: See: Jan Foitzik, Inventar der Befehle des Obersten Chefs der Sowjetischen Militaeradministration in Deutschland (SMAD) 1945-1949, Muenchen 1995, S. 79f. Back.

Note 83: See: Rainer Karlsch, Burghard Ciesla, Von den "Karthago-Planungen" zum Besatzungspragmatismus, in: Horst Moeller (Hg.), Besiegt oder befreit?, Muenchen 1997 Back.

Note 84: Gunter Mai, Der Alliierte Kontrollrat in Deutschland 1945-1948, Muenchen 1995, S. 165ff., interpreted the SAG-Foundation as a sign for a independent initiative. Wilfried Loth, Stalins ungeliebtes Kind. Warum Moskau die DDR nicht wollte, Berlin 1994, S. 68ff. has a opposite opinion. Back.

Note 85: See: Die sowjetische Hand in der deutschen Wirtschaft, Bonn 1952 Back.

Note 86: See: Karlsch, Allein bezahlt?, S. 129f. Back.

Note 87: See: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, C-15, Nr. 718 Back.

Note 88: Zusammengestellt nach: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, C-2, Nr. 1486, Bl. 102 ff., C-20, Nr. 607, B1. 1 ff., DE-1, Nr. 1530, Bl. 13 ff., SaechsHStA Dresden, Ministerium der Finanzen, Nr. 903, Peter J. Nettl, The Soviet Occupation Zone, S. 232 ff., Wirtschaftsprobleme der Besatzungszonen, Berlin 1948, S. 222 ff., Die sowjetische Hand, S. 82 ff. Back.

Note 89: See: Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany. A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation 1945-1949, Cambridge, London 1995, S. 29ff. Back.

Note 90: See: Werner Krause, Die Nationalisierung der wichtigsten Produktionsmittel in der Industrie der DDR, Diss. A Berlin 1957, S. 207 Back.

Note 91: Compiled from: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 31 583, Bl. 76ff. und Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1955, Berlin 1965, S. 162 ff.; Die sowjetische Hand, S. 53 Back.

Note 92: See: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 11 682, Bl. 144f. Back.

Note 93: See: ebd., C-2, Nr. 17 092, Bl. 8 ff. Back.

Note 94: See: ebd., C-2, Nr. 17 413 und 17 107 Back.

Note 95: See: Dimitri Filipowich, Militaerpolitische Aspekte der Arbeit der SMAD, Referat auf der Tagung des bildungsgeschichtlichen Arbeitskreises der Universitaet Hannover vom 28./29.10.1994 in Berlin Back.

Note 96: See: Hermann Klare, Kooperation mit sowjetischen Fachkollegen 1946 bis 1979: Ergebnisse und Erlebnisse, 1985/2 Back.

Note 97: LWA, Nr. 1195 Back.

Note 98: See: LWA, Nr. 1 195; LHA Magdeburg, SAG Farbenfabrik Wolfen, Nr. 5 628; BA Wolfen, Nr. 113 und 325 Back.

Note 99: See: Hermann Klare, Kooperation mit sowjetischen Fachkollegen 1946 bis 1979: Ergebnisse und Erlebnisse, Informationen des DDR-Komitees fuer wissenschaftliche Fragen der Sicherung des Friedens und der Abruestung, 1985/2, S. 7 Back.

Note 100: See: BA Wolfen, Nr. BA 325 Back.

Note 101: See: John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations. Exploitation and Plunder in Postwar Germany, Stanford 1990 Back.

Note 102: See: Rene Matthe, Zur Nachkriegsentwicklung des Treibstoffwerkes Schwarzheide der Braunkohle-Benzin-Aktiengesellschaft (BRABAG), Belegarbeit HUB 1992, S. 8 Back.

Note 103: See: Stokes, Divide and Prosper, Berkeley 1987 Back.

Note 104: See: Marie France Ludmann-Obier, Die Kontrolle der chemischen Industrie in der franzoesischen Besatzungszone 1945-1949, Mainz 1989 Back.

Note 105: See: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 31 583, Bl. 98 f. Back.

Note 106: See: LWA, Nr. A 204 b Back.

Note 107: See: BArch Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 11 682 Back.

Note 108: See: Horst Krueger, Zur Organisation und Leitung der chemischen Industrie 1945-1965, Berlin 1989 (unpublished Manuscript) Back.

Note 109: LWA, Nr. A1 Back.

Note 110: See: Joerg Roesler, Die Herausbildung der sozialistischen Planwirtschaft in der DDR, Berlin 1978, S. 107f. Back.

Note 111: See: Drei Jahrzehnte VEB Jenapharm, Berlin 1981 Back.

Note 112: See: Rainer Karlsch, Von Agfa zu Orwo. Die Folgen der deutschen Teilung fuer die Filmfabrik Wolfen, Wolfen 1992, S. 35 Back.

Note 113: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam F-4, MfWuT, Nr. 37 Back.

Note 114: Compiled from: BA Wolfen, Nr. 1110 (Planungsabteilung) Back.

Note 115: See: BA Wolfen, Nr. (Werkleitung) Back.

Note 116: See: BA Wolfen, Nr. 385 (Werkleitung) Back.

Note 117: Compiled from: BA Wolfen, Nr. 1 (Rechnungswesen) und Nr. 385 (Werkleitung) Back.

Note 118: Compiled from: Buna-Archiv, Rep I/1, Nr. 53, 83, 152, sowie Buna-Fiebel, o.O.u.J., S. 100 Back.

Note 119: Compiled from: LWA Jahresberichte lfd.; Nr. II/9.599, Nr. 16074; Nr. A 2265; Nr. 16 074. Back.

Note 120: Compiled from: LWA, Jahresberichte, lfd. Back.

Note 121: See: Bilanzierungsausschuss des Forschungsbeirates fuer Fragen der Wiedervereinigung (Prof. Bruno Gleitze), in: Bundesarchiv Koblenz, B 137 I, Nr. 191, Bl. 11ff. Back.

Note 122: See: Wolfgang Muehlfriedel, Zur technischen Entwicklung in der Industrie der DDR in den 50er Jahren, in: Axel Schildt, Arnold Sywottek (Hg.), Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau, Bonn 1993 Back.

Note 123: See: Johannes Baehr, Dietmar Petzina (Hg.), Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen. Vergleichende Studien zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung im geteilten Deutschland 1945-1990, Berlin 1996; Mike Reichert, Zusammenhaenge zwischen frueher Kernenergieplanung und Ansaetzen zur Loesung der Brennstoffproblematik, in: Rainer Karlsch, Harm Schroeter, "Strahlende Vergangenheit", St. Katharinen 1996 Back.

Note 124: See: Ulrich Albrecht, Andreas Heinemann-Grueder, Arend Wellmann, Die Spezialisten, Berlin 1992 Back.

Note 125: See: Matthias Wagner, Der Forschungsrat der DDR. Im Spannungsfeld von Sachkompetenz und Ideologieanspruch, Diss. A, Berlin 1992, S. 82ff. Back.

Note 126: See: Chemie gibt Brot, Wohlstand und Schoenheit, Berlin 1959, S. 21 Back.

Note 127: Calculated from: Wagner, Der Forschungsrat, S. 97 Back.

Note 128: See: BArch, SAPMO, ZPA, IV 2/2029/37, Abkommen ueber die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der DDR und der UdSSR bei der Entwicklung der chemischen Industrie der DDR und ueber Lieferungen von Erzeugnissen der chemischen Industrie in die UdSSR Back.

Note 129: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, F-8, Nr. 52-58 Back.

Note 130: See: Janos Kornai, The Socialist System, Oxford 1992, S. 195ff. Back.

Note 131: Compiled from: Chemie gibt Brot, Wohlstand und Schoenheit, Berlin 1959, S. 26ff. Back.

Note 132: Compiled from: Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR, lfd. Back.

Note 133: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 27 578 Back.

Note 134: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 13 932 Back.

Note 135: See: Joerg Roesler, Zur Industrialisierung des Nordens der DDR in den fuenfziger Jahren, in: Zeitschrift fuer Geschichtswissenschaft, 1988/11 Back.

Note 136: See: BArch, SAPMO, ZPA, IV 2/2029/37 Back.

Note 137: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 8842, Bl. 73ff. Back.

Note 138: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 4 461, Bl. 21ff. Back.

Note 139: See: Rainer Karlsch, Forschung und Entwicklung in der chemischen Industrie der DDR, Manuskript Berlin 1995 Back.

Note 140: See: BArch, SAMPO, ZPA, IV 2/904/301 Back.

Note 141: See: Kornai, The Socialist System, S. 165ff. Back.

Note 142: Karl Ziegler, director of the Max Planck Institute for Coal Research in M\du\uhlheim on the Ruhr. He licensed his invention to companies around the world. Back.

Note 143: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, F-8, Nr. 58 Back.

Note 144: Compiled from: Zwischenarchiv des Ministeriums fuer chemische Industrie, Nr. 3 172 Back.

Note 145: See: Lothar Baar, Uwe Mueller, Frank Zschaler, Strukturveraenderungen und Wachstumsschwankungen. Investitionen und Budget in der DDR 1945 bis 1989, in: Jahrbuch fuer Wirtschaftsgeschichte 1995/II, Berlin 1995, S. 68f. Back.

Note 146: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-4, Nr. 40 990 Back.

Note 147: See: BArch, Abteilungen Potsdam, DE-1, Nr. 42 819, Bl. 112ff. Back.

Note 148: See: Zwischenarchiv des Ministeriums fuer chemische Industrie, Nr. 3 172 Back.

Note 149: See: Harm Schroeter, Oelkrisen und Reaktionen in der chemischen Industrie beider deutscher Staaten, in: Johannes Baehr, Dietmar Petzina (Hg.), Innovationsverhalten und Entscheidungsstrukturen, Berlin 1996 Back.