CIAO DATE: 05/02

Modern U.S. Civil-Military Relations: Wielding the Terrible Swift Sword

David E. Johnson

Institute for National Strategic Studies
National Defense University

July 1997

Introduction

On November 30, 1995, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry testified before the House International Relations and National Security committees on the commitment of U.S. ground forces to the Former Yugoslavia. The commitment, crafted in Dayton, Ohio, had been avoided for some 4 years. Perry carefully discussed the mission, rules of engagement, and exit strategy for U.S. forces. ¹

Perry explained the rationale for the deployment — an opportunity to end the bloody conflict, further American interests in the region, and prevent the spread of the war to neighboring nations. He clearly defined the mission of the Implementation Force (IFOR) as "to oversee and enforce implementation of the military aspects of the peace agreement." ² He pointedly stressed the strictly military nature of IFOR's mission, and noted that IFOR would not be involved in "civilian programs rebuilding the infrastructure, revitalizing the economy, bringing refugees back for resettlement and providing for free elections." ³ Perry also discussed the military capabilities of IFOR:

We are going in with a well-armed and well-trained force and with robust rules of engagement. The U.S. ground contingent is built around the 1st Armored Division. Nobody should doubt that the 1st Armored Division is capable of taking care of itself. The 1^st AD's Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, artillery and Apache helicopters will be sufficient to take on any opposition in the region. ⁴

Perry further promised that military commanders would "have access to as much NATO air power as they require." ⁵ Finally, Perry put a time limit on the deployment — American troops would be out of Bosnia in one year, even if the civil functions IFOR was charged to protect were not accomplished.

A December 1995 article in the Washington Times examined the "huge say" U.S. military leaders had had in crafting the provisions of the Dayton agreement. It quoted several anonymous administration officials as believing that the agreement "was carefully crafted to reflect demands from the military . . . . Rather than be ignored... the military, as a price for its support, has basically gotten anything it wanted." ⁶ The article also speculated that the administration had listened so intently to its military leaders for reasons that were "part political cover, part lessons learned from the Somalia debacle and Haiti, part reflection of the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina." ⁷

This essay will argue that the demands placed by military officers on the provisions of the Dayton agreement reflect a steady increase in the influence of military officers in crafting defense policy, rather than the recognition of any lessons learned in Somalia or Haiti. Furthermore, this increased authority of the military — and the resultant deterioration in civil-military relations — is largely the result of the lessons drawn by the military from the American experience in Vietnam. In effect, Somalia and Haiti serve only to reinforce in the minds of military officers the validity of the Vietnam lessons, rather than provide new insights. And the essential lesson of Vietnam was that only professional military officers can formulate the fundamental principles governing the application of American military power, or military doctrine.

In the United States, military doctrine can be thought of as a paradigm, similar to the paradigms employed by scientific communities described by Thomas Kuhn in his classic study The Structure of Scientific Revolution. Kuhn described scientific paradigms in two ways. First, in a sociological sense, paradigms defined "the entire constellation of beliefs, values, techniques, and so on shared by the members of a given community." ⁸ Second, the paradigm provided "exemplary past achievements" that gave "the concrete puzzle solutions which, employed as models or examples, can replace explicit rules as a basis for the solution of the remaining puzzles of normal science." ⁹

Kuhn also described how paradigms change. Essentially, they shift when they fail to provide solutions to the problems against which they are applied. These conditions of failure, or anomalies, can result in two responses. First, the community can "devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict." ¹⁰ Thus, the anomaly remains such and is not the basis for a fundarnental rethinking of the validity of the paradigm. Second, if the discontinuities are clearly not solvable within the existing paradigm (a situation Kuhn calls a crisis), a new paradigm will emerge. In the latter case, Kuhn asserts that a paradigmatic revolution has occurred. ¹¹

Kuhn's logic resonates in the comprehensive definition of U.S. military doctrine contained in Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces, in that doctrine "offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war." ¹² While the services are not unsophisticated, monolithic entities marching blindly to the beat of a rigid set of rules, their "institutional essence" is defined by their doctrine. ¹³ In short, doctrine is the frame of reference that fundamentally defines the activities of each of the Armed Forces by:

• Prescribing the shared worldview and values as well as the "proper" methods, tools, techniques, and approaches to problem solving within and among the Services.
• Providing a way in which the Services view themselves.
• Governing how the Services deal with each other and with other governmental and nongovernmental agencies.
• Prescribing the questions and the answers that are considered acceptable within the institution or school of thought covered by the paradigm.

Although each Service is a unique institution, with its own ruling paradigm, a unifying theme that has fundamentally shaped American military doctrine since the mid-1980s is the criteria that govern the decision to commit American forces to combat. These criteria were publicly announced by Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger during a November 1984 speech before the National Press Club, "The Uses of Military Power." Mr. Weinberger enunciated "six major tests to be applied when we are weighing the use of U.S. combat forces abroad." ¹⁴ They were quite explicit:

1. First, the United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies . . . .
2. Second, if we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly, and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all. Of course if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly . . . .
3. Third, if we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. And we should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives. And we should have and send the forces needed to do just that . . . .
4. Fourth, the relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed — their size, composition and disposition — must be continually reassessed and adjusted as necessary. Conditions and objectives invariably change during the course of a conflict. When they do change, then so must our combat requirements. We must continuously keep as a beacon light before us the basic questions: "Is this conflict in our national interestS." "Does our national interest require us to fight, to use force of arms?" If the answers are "yes," then we must win. If the answers are "no," then we should not be in combat.
5. Fifth, before the U.S. commits combat forces abroad, there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress. This support cannot be achieved unless we are candid in making clear the threats we face; the support cannot be sustained without continuing and close consultation. We cannot fight a battle with the Congress at home while asking our troops to win a war overseas or, as in the case of Vietnam, in effect asking our troops not to win, but just to be there.
6. Sixth, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort. ¹⁵

The Weinberger Doctrine, inherently restrictive in its criteria, became further constrained in application by the so-called Powell Doctrine. This corollary to the Weinberger Doctrine, crafted by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, demands the use of overwhelming force when American military power is committed:

to operate with overwhelming force, based not only on the quantity of forces and materiel committed, but on the quality of their planning and skillfulness of their employment. Properly trained and motivated forces with superior technology, executing innovative, flexible, and well-coordinated plans, provide a decisive qualitative edge. Careful selection of strategic and operation priorities aids concentration at the decisive point and time. Action to affect the enemy's dispositions and readiness prior to battle and to prevent enemy reinforcement of the battle by land, sea, or air also promotes concentration. The purpose of these and related measures is to achieve strategic advantage and exploit that advantage to win quickly, with as few casualties and as little damage as possible. ¹⁶

The Weinberger and Powell Doctrines both seek to capitalize on the strengths of the American military paradigm. Both, however, also make military considerations paramount in the political-military decisionmaking process of when to commit American military forces to combat and how they will be employed once committed. Consequently, both clearly have significant implications for civil-military relations. These doctrines, however, are products of an American military paradigm that was fully defined in World War II and that faced its only potential crisis in Vietnam.

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Notes

Note 1. William I. Perry, "The Deployment of U.S. Troops to Bosnia, Prepared Statement of Secretary of Defense William J. Perry to the House International Relations and National Security Committees, Nov. 30, 1995," Defense Issues 10, no. 102. Back

Note 2. Ibid. Back

Note 3. Ibid. Back

Note 4. Ibid. Back

Note 5. Ibid. Back

Note 6. Warren P. Strobel, "This Time Clinton Is Set to Heed Advice from Military," Washington Times, December 1, 1995, 1. Back

Note 7. Ibid. Back

Note 8. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press), 175. Back

Note 9. Ibid. Back

Note 10. Ibid., 78. Back

Note 11. Ibid., 66-91. Back

Note 12. Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the US Armed Forces (Washington: National Defense University Press, 1991 ), 6; emphasis in the original. Back

Note 13. Morton H. Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1974), 28. I rely on Halperin's definition of "organizational essence" when I refer to "institutional essence." Halperin notes that: "Organizations have considerable freedom in defining their missions and the capabilities they need to pursue these missions. The organization's essence is the view held by the dominant group in the organization of what the missions and capabilities should be. Related to this are convictions about what kinds of people with what expertise, experience, and knowledge should be members of tile organization." Back

Note 14. Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, rev. ed. (New York: Warner, 1991), 453; emphasis in the original. Back

Note 15. Ibid., 453-54; emphasis in the original. Back

Note 16. Joint Pub 1, 22-23; emphasis in the original. Back