CIAO DATE: 05/02

Prospects for Peace in Afghanistan: The Role of Pakistan

A regional proxy war is being fought on Afghan soil. Unless the main states involved — Iran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan — reach a consensus on how Afghanistan should be governed and terminate their political, military and financial support to the warring parties, the conflict is unlikely to end. Because of its continuing support to the militarily ascendant Taliban, Pakistan currently holds the key to initiating movement towards a political compromise. Until recently, Pakistan has been unwilling to consider any solution besides a complete Taliban victory. But recent political and economic changes in Pakistan suggest new possibilities for a reduction in its support to the Taliban and initiation of a meaningful dialogue with its neighbors, which may be the first step to restoring peace in Afghanistan.

Regional Context

The conflict in Afghanistan has entered its twentieth year and shows no sign of abating. In 1998, the Taliban scored impressive military victories that consolidated their hold over almost the entire country except for the difficult terrain of the Panjshir valley, which remains under the control of the opposition military leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. These military advances resulted in a sharp deterioration of relations between Iran and the Taliban, on the one hand, and between Iran and Pakistan on the other. Both countries support opposite sides in the Afghan conflict. The northern opposition to the Taliban, which was previously fragmented among several factions, is now under the control of Massoud, who continues to fight with the support of his external patrons. None of the internal Afghan parties is anywhere close to negotiating; the only game being played is on the military battlefield.

This conflict has important regional dimensions. Pakistan continues to support the Taliban politically and militarily in an effort to establish a friendly, if not client, Pashtun-based regime in Afghanistan. Pakistan's long-standing policy of supporting Pashtun political forces in Afghanistan was generated from a belief that such a government could provide Pakistan with strategic depth vis-à-vis India and quell Pashtun nationalist forces at home. The recent Taliban military victories in Afghanistan have heartened important segments of the Pakistani policy establishment, which regard their support for a Pashtun front sympathetic to Pakistan's interests as finally bearing fruit. These elements include government officials as well as a variety of quasi-official and private actors with tremendous influence on the course of the Afghan war.

Pakistan's Afghan policy has traditionally been executed by the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), a quasi-military intelligence agency that was created by General Zia ul-Haq at the start of the Afghan war. Over time, ISI operatives have become increasingly involved in informally creating policy towards Afghanistan as well as executing it. During the Cold War, the ISI tended to favor a military victory by a Pashtun commander, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of Soviet forces, the ISI budget for Afghan operations declined because of reduced U.S. support. But the Benazir Bhutto government's strong support for the Taliban and their military advances rejuvenated ISI backing for this newest united Pashtun front. Considerable support for the Taliban has also been generated from private, informal networks of religious schools (madrassas) that are supported by funding sources in Saudi Arabia, and private transportation and drug trafficking networks. These networks of private support have developed through tribal affiliations that facilitate commercial activity, as well as a strong pro-Sunni ideology that is propagated by certain Islamic political parties, particularly the Jamiat-e Ulema-i Islam (JUI), in Pakistan. Saudi Arabia's interest in supporting a conservative Sunni Islam in the region has been to counter pockets of Shi'a influence that are supported by Iran.

Iran, which is the primary supporter of the Afghan northern opposition forces, shows little inclination to allow a Taliban consolidation of power in Afghanistan. Iran's interests are guided by its aversion to a radical anti-Shi'a regime taking root on its border, as well as by its broader strategic goal of becoming an important regional power-broker. Iran's desire to prohibit a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan also coincides with the interests of the Central Asian states — notably Uzbekistan and Tajikistan — and Russia, which fear the possible domestic instability that may be caused by an extremist Islamic regime in their region. A regional proxy war is therefore being waged on Afghan soil.

In the absence of a change in regional political dynamics and a move towards a political consensus among the key states involved in supporting one or other side, the Afghan conflict is likely to continue and intensify. While none of the regional states wishes to dismember Afghanistan, they have not together reached an effective consensus that will allow for a resolution of the conflict.

Political and Economic Conditions in Pakistan

Pakistan, which is one of the key players in the Afghan conflict, needs to take important steps towards reaching a compromise with Iran and the other countries that are opposed to a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. These steps include creating internal unity in favor of a moderate policy towards Afghanistan, curtailing military support to the Taliban, and reining in the private sources of support to the Taliban. At the same time, Pakistan must open a dialogue with its neighboring countries towards finding a mutually acceptable political dispensation in Afghanistan.

Pakistan's support for the Taliban, besides souring its relations with most of its regional neighbors, is also having severe internal political consequences. While its Afghan policy has been guided by domestic power brokers that have a strong interest in a Pashtun-led Afghanistan, the support provided to the Taliban has politically destabilized Pakistan. The flow of refugees, drugs, arms and the growth of terrorism that are attendant with the Afghan conflict have threatened Pakistan's internal stability for the past two decades. But the most worrying effect now is the recent political spillover of religious extremism into Pakistan.

There has been a notable increase in sectarian, or Shi'a-Sunni, violence in parts of Pakistan, especially Punjab. While sectarian divisions have existed in Pakistan for many years, they are now militarized in a way not previously seen. These sectarian groups are supported by external sponsors that are primarily from Saudi Arabia and Iran. A spate of new Sunni extremist parties have emerged, which are cut out of the same cloth as the Taliban. The same madrassas have generated and supported the Taliban as well as these groups. Many of these Sunni sectarian groups have fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan, as well as in Kashmir. They share a common philosophy, rooted in the Deobandi school, that is strongly anti-Shi'a. For the time being, the growth of Sunni extremist groups is primarily in Pashtun-dominated areas, such as Malakand, and their battleground inside Pakistan is Punjab, for example Jhang, where the population includes a significant population of Shi'as.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif's recent calls for an Islamic system in Pakistan, and his introduction, in parliament, of the fifteenth Constitutional amendment that calls for the introduction of shari'a, do not correspond with the agendas of the religious extremist parties, which reject the current democratic political system altogether. All of these groups, including the less radical Islamic parties such as the Jamaat-i-Islami, rejected Sharif's call, which they viewed as a political ploy to enhance his own authority rather than a genuine attempt to establish an Islamic political and legal system in the country.

Two levels of political opposition to the government therefore now exist. The traditional opposition, composed of political parties that have parliamentary representation, seeks increased autonomy on the basis of ethnicity within the existing federal system. The new opposition of extremist sectarian groups wishes to overthrow the present system in favor of a religious regime. The government's response to both these opposition forces has been to suppress them by bringing under its own control the major state institutions, notably the military. It suspended the provincial parliament in Sindh and imposed military courts, a practice Sharif plans to replicate in the other three provinces to combat growing insecurity, and inducted the military to run large civilian public sector institutions, such as the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA). However, the government has had far greater success in suppressing the opposition political parties than the religious extremist groups, which continue to resort to terrorism as the vehicle of their political opposition. In fact, under growing pressure from the Islamic political groups, shari'a has for the first time been formally enacted as the law of the land in four districts of the NWFP.

Poor economic conditions are also contributing to the growth of radical opposition, especially among the urban lower- and middle-classes that find extreme sectarian and ethnic political parties a convenient platform to channel their grievances. The increasingly dire economic situation in the country is a result of both long-term factors and recent developments. The long-term factors include a narrow tax base, a massive debt burden, the bulk of public spending on the military and debt servicing, a dependence on foreign direct investment for development, and the almost total dependence of the Afghan economy on Pakistan, which results in higher prices in Pakistan for basic commodities. During 1998, this structurally precarious position was worsened by the decline in foreign investment, which was in turn intensified by sanctions imposed on Pakistan after its nuclear test in May, and the government's response of freezing all foreign currency accounts and threatening to default on its foreign debt obligations.

While sanctions have been eased, primarily because the U.S. fears domestic instability in Pakistan, the recent IMF bailout package for Pakistan was only a band-aid. More important has been declining confidence in the country's economic and political future among the professional and entrepreneurial middle class, which is the engine of economic modernization in the country. As the legitimate economy shrinks — because of lack of capital due to declining foreign investment, low credit-worthiness, spiraling corruption at all levels, and the loss of external markets — the illegal economy is likely to expand. This will have severe social consequences in Pakistan and the region, in the form of proliferation of drugs (there are currently almost 2 million drug addicts in Pakistan) and weapons.

Implications for Afghanistan

At the moment, none of the Afghan factions believes in a negotiated settlement, although the opposition, which is currently on the defensive, has argued for creating a federal structure that would effectively divide the country into autonomous zones controlled by the various warring factions. The Taliban believe that there should not be any accommodation with opposition forces, which they view as being responsible for the destruction of the country following the Soviet withdrawal. They remain bent on total military conquest, and their ideology — which is strongly rooted in Pashtun tradition and an extremist interpretation of Sunni Islam — gravitates towards establishing Sunni, Pashtun domination over Afghanistan.

Ethnic relations have further deteriorated since the massacres of Taliban prisoners of war by a faction led by General Malik in 1997 and the subsequent killing of Hazara civilians in Mazar-i-Sharif by the Taliban in 1998. There appears virtually no possibility of a "broad based government" being cobbled together among these factions in the future; any political settlement in Afghanistan must evolve a decentralized model of governance.

Moreover, beyond ensuring basic security in the areas under their control, the Afghan warring factions have little or no capacity to provide effective governance in a peacetime context. Only if the regional involvement in fuelling the Afghan war declines can the far more difficult project of political, economic and social reconstruction of Afghanistan begin.

A reduction in Pakistan's official and private support to the Taliban, accompanied by a similar reduction in Iranian and Central Asian support to the Afghan opposition, may help create conditions leading to a military stalemate among the warring Afghan parties. Such a stalemate is a prerequisite for any meaningful negotiated political settlement in Afghanistan.

Prospects for a change in Pakistan's support to the Taliban and its involvement in a meaningful regional dialogue are mixed. The present debate in Pakistan on Afghan policy is centered around two possibilities: either continue to support the Taliban in its bid to consolidate power (the hard-line view), or find alternate Afghan leaders that will continue to be aligned with Pakistan's interests (the moderate view). The moderate view is informed by a growing despair over Pakistan's fraying relations with its regional neighbors as well as the growing internal threat of "Talibanization." For the time being, the hard-line view continues to prevail in Pakistan's policy-making apparatus.

Prime Minister Sharif's consolidation of power and his closer relations with the military leadership suggest that he now has greater control over foreign policy than was previously the case. In early 1998, Sharif attempted to bring together the Taliban and the opposition for talks, but hard-line elements involved in formulating Afghan policy prevailed in their view that Pakistan should not waver from its support for the Taliban. However, the strong pro-Taliban views held earlier are beginning to be diluted by a growing realization among Sharif and his advisers that the domestic costs of Taliban support, namely the growth of radical Sunni groups and sectarian violence, may seriously destabilize Pakistan. In other words, moderate voices in the policy establishment are becoming louder.

There are two prerequisites for any change in Pakistani support for the Taliban and the opening of a meaningful dialogue with its regional countries. First, there is a need for unified decision-making by the Pakistan government and a clear shift in influence from the hard-line to the moderate elements. Sharif's attempts to establish closer links with the military suggest a movement in the direction of unifying multiple centers of decision-making power. Second, the government must rein in the autonomous groups — including parts of the military establishment, madrassas along the Afghan border, and private transport and drug trafficking networks — that continue to supply the Taliban with arms, logistics, and money. This will be far more difficult, especially since the Sunni sectarian groups are growing in number and strength.

The time to take these steps is now. Nawaz Sharif's position appears unassailable for the moment, having built a strong partnership with the military, and the next national elections are not due for another three years. However, Pakistan's politics are rarely static, and political change may come suddenly in a form other than parliamentary elections. This could happen because of divisions within the ruling party, attempts on Sharif's life by opposition elements, as recently occurred in early January 1999 at the hands of a militant Sunni group, or a change in the military's favorable dispensation towards the Prime Minister. All these factors point to a persistent and growing fear of increasing internal instability in Pakistan. Such change may also close the present window of opportunity in redirecting Pakistan's Afghan policy.

IPA Senior Associate Ameen Jan's research seeks to understand the driving forces behind the conflict in Afghanistan. This research is intended to help develop creative options for international efforts — by the UN, governments, NGOs and others — in support of a lasting settlement to the Afghan conflict. In this context, Jan visited Pakistan from 13 December 1998 to 11 January 1999 as part of his ongoing effort to understand the regional dimensions of the conflict in Afghanistan. He met with various commentators on Afghanistan and Pakistan, heads of research institutes in Pakistan, and a range of Pakistani professionals. This visit was a follow-up to two earlier trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan, in January 1998 and February March 1998, during which Jan met with Pakistani government officials, Taliban leaders, UN and NGO officials working in Afghanistan, foreign donors, and a wide range of Afghan civilians. He also met with opposition northern alliance representatives in London and New York in 1997 and 1998. On his return to New York, a small IPA policy forum on Afghanistan was arranged on 25 January 1999 with various experts, around the UN Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi. Jan published two newspaper articles on 6 and 7 January 1999 in DAWN (Pakistan's largest circulation English daily paper) entitled, "Resolving the Afghan Imbroglio: Iran, Pakistan Hold the Key," and "Resolving the Afghan Imbroglio: Time for a Serious Dialogue."