CIAO
From the CIAO Atlas Map of Middle East 

email icon Email this citation

CIAO DATE: 07/06

Palestinians, Israel and the Quartet: Pulling Back from the Brink?

June 2006

International Crisis Group

Abstract

Throughout years of uprising and Israeli military actions, siege of West Bank cities and President Arafat’s de facto house arrest, it was hard to imagine the situation getting worse for Palestinians. It has. On all fronts – Palestinian/Palestinian, Palestinian/Israeli and Palestinian/ international – prevailing dynamics are leading to a dangerous breakdown. Subjected to the cumulative effects of a military occupation in its 40th year and now what is effectively an international sanctions regime, the Hamas-led Palestinian Authority (PA) government cannot pay salaries or deliver basic services. Diplomacy is frozen, with scant prospect of thaw – and none at all of breakthrough. And Hamas’s electoral victory and the reactions it provoked among Fatah loyalists have intensified chaos and brought the nation near civil war. There is an urgent need for all relevant players to pragmatically reassess their positions, with the immediate objectives of:

  • avoiding inter-Palestinian violence and the PA’s collapse;
  • encouraging Hamas to adopt more pragmatic policies rather than merely punishing it for not doing so;
  • achieving a mutual and sustained Israeli-Palestinian ceasefire to prevent a resumption of full-scale hostilities; and
  • preventing activity that jeopardises the possibility of a two-state solution.

Of all the dangers threatening the Palestinians, the most acute may well be internal strife. Facing one of the most hostile external environments in its history, the national movement also confronts one of its most acute domestic crises. Even as Hamas and Fatah leaders repeatedly profess their determination to avoid violent conflict, they act in ways that promote it. Fatah, unable to digest its electoral loss, is behaving as if still in power. It treats the new government as a usurper, blatantly subverting its ability to govern, relying on its partisans’ overwhelming presence throughout the civil service and, especially, the security forces. Hamas, unprepared for its triumph, is behaving as if it remains in opposition. It invokes steadfastness as a substitute for policy and has proved incapable so far of adjusting to its new status, while introducing provocative measures of its own.

Full text (PDF, 54 Pages, 536 KB)

 

 

 

CIAO home page