CIAO DATE: 09/04

U.S. Weaponization of Space: Implications for International Security

Theresa Hitchens

Center for Defense Information

October 2003

It is clear that under the administration of President George W. Bush, the United States is on a pathway toward becoming the first nation to put weapons in space. The consequences of such a major shift in long–standing U.S. policy — which since the Eisenhower administration has eschewed the deployment of space weapons — for U.S. and international security, while not completely predictable, are likely to be widespread and deep seated.

The United States is undoubtedly the world’s leading space power, both commercially and militarily. And the U.S. military is the world’s most sophisticated when it comes to the use of space for national defense and projecting global power. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the United States at the end of 2001 had nearly 110 operational military–related satellites, compared to 40 for Russia and 20 for the rest of the world combined. The United States outspends the rest of the world by vast amounts in the military space arena, accounting for almost 95 percent of global military space budgets in 1999, according to statistics put together by the French space agency CNES.

But the combination of the U.S. reliance on space assets and the fact that inevitable march of technology is leading to broader access to space for other international actors has piqued concern in U.S. national security circles about potential vulnerabilities in space. While I would argue that official and semi–official assessments up to now have tended to “hype” current and emerging threats — for example, the exaggerated claims of the January 2001 Report of the Commission to Assess United States National Security Space Management and Organization about an impending space “Pearl Harbor” — there are reasons for U.S. military leaders to be worried about protecting space assets.

At the same time, there are equally strong reasons for the U.S. national security apparatus to consider the possible downsides of moving toward space weapons — either for defense of satellites or for terrestrial power projection. These downsides include technical hurdles, cost repercussions and the potential effects on U.S. relations with the rest of the world, as well as international stability.

First of all, even though most other nations technically trail behind the United States in use of space, it is inconceivable that other space powers, particularly China and Russia who continue to see their global role as in part balancing U.S. power, would allow the U.S. military a space weapons hegemony. While both nations currently have official positions in favor of banning space weapons, unofficially both have made clear that a unilateral U.S. move toward space weaponization would force them to rethink their own military space policies and programs. Indeed, there is some evidence that China is already attempting to hedge its bets regarding space weapons, by undertaking basic research and studying tactical options for its own use of anti–satellite weapons. It is fairly reasonable to expect that if a space arms race were to erupt among the United States, Russia and China, other emerging space powers would feel pressured to also compete — in particular, India, Pakistan and Iran.

Some in the United States downplay the likelihood of a serious space arms race (or at least a race that the United States couldn’t easily win), given the U.S. technological edge and the high costs of developing and, more importantly, maintaining on–orbit weapon systems. That said, U.S. military officials often express concern about the spread of technology and the growing number of space actors. According to U.S. Air Force officials, there are eight to 10 countries using space assets for military purposes, including Russia, China, France, Britain, Indian, Japan, Israel and Brazil. In addition, the growing sophistication and availability of dual–use commercial technologies such as ground–imaging mean more and more nations will have access to space–based military capabilities.

Still, the basic physics of space mean that other nations seeking to challenge or degrade U.S. space capabilities do not necessarily have to seek a level playing field with U.S. space power, or even have a highly sophisticated space program. Reasonably low–tech methods to counter or attack on–orbit systems — such as detonation of a nuclear weapon in Low–Earth Orbit using a mid–range ballistic missile — already exist or are rapidly emerging. Further, especially if the United States were to move all the way to the deployment of space weapons against terrestrial targets, even non–space powers might feel threatened enough to seek other asymmetrical means of deterring the use of U.S. force against them, such as weapons of mass destruction, methods to damage ground–facilities or communications links used by U.S. space assets, or even the development of terrorist operations.

The negative consequences of a space arms race are hard to exaggerate, given the inherent offense–dominant nature of space warfare. Space weapons, like any thing else on orbit, are inherently vulnerable and, therefore, best exploited as first–strike weapons. Thus, as Michael Krepon and Chris Clary argue in their monograph, “Space Assurance or Space Dominance,” the hair–trigger postures of the nuclear competition between the United States and Russia during the Cold War would be elevated to the “ultimate high ground” of space.

Furthermore, any conflict involving ASAT use is likely to highly escalatory, in particular among nuclear weapons states, as the objective of an attacker would be to eliminate the other side’s capabilities to respond either in kind or on the ground by taking out satellites providing surveillance, communications and targeting. Indeed, U.S. Air Force officials participating in space wargames have discovered that war in space rapidly deteriorates into all–out nuclear war, precisely because it quickly becomes impossible to know if the other side has gone nuclear. Aviation Week and Space Technology quoted one gamer as saying simply: “[If] I don’t know what’s going on, I have no choice but to hit everything, using everything I have.” This should not be surprising to anyone — the United States and the Soviet Union found this out very early in the Cold War, and thus took measures to ensure transparency, such as placing emphasis on early warning radars, developing the “hotline” and pledging to non–interference with national technical means of verification under arms control treaties.

Aside from questions about the wisdom of space warfare, there could be other, more immediate consequences to the weaponization of space. Remembering that the global value of satellites to world commerce is huge and growing, it is conceivable that even overt planning by some nations of space weapons could have a negative impact. Most commercial systems, including those used for communications, are not seriously hardened against jamming, much less given protections such as extra fuel for maneuvering against kinetic energy ASATs or hardening against nuclear explosions. And given that the current military space powers are highly dependent on commercial providers for much of their communications needs, especially in wartime (as evidenced by the Iraq war, where more than 80 percent of the bandwidth used by the U.S. military came from commercial providers), vulnerable commercial systems could be chosen as the “softest targets” for first attack. Thus, insurance rates would likely skyrocket if insurers were to feel that commercial assets might be threatened by space warfare; if commercial providers felt the need to take extra protective measures, those would have costs too.

While the costs to industry and their pass–on to consumers (including governments) might be bearable for developed countries, developing countries would have a more difficult time using space assets in areas such as communications and agriculture. Developing nations are already concerned about their future access to orbital slots and usable radio–frequency spectrum, and officials from some nations worry that space weaponization by developed nations could make it more difficult for developing countries to achieve the benefits provided by space assets. Some have suggested that developing countries might actually attempt to block the weaponization of space by interfering with the ability of planned military satellites to get through the International Telecommunications Union’s complex regulatory regime that provides agreed usage of orbital slot and radio–frequency spectrum. The breakdown of the voluntary ITU system for sharing space could result in chaos as nations compete for orbital real–estate.

Another non–military arena that could suffer from space weaponization is the civil space arena. International cooperation in the scientific exploration of space — exploration that one day could benefit all humankind — is based on the relatively free dissemination of data and sharing of technology. This is a largely “trust–based” community of public and private scientists. What happens to this cooperation if the major space powers become extremely suspicious about each other’s motives; wouldn’t the testing and use of weapons in space be bound to threaten ongoing scientific programs?

There is another critical reason to worry about the testing and deployment of space weaponry — short of their actual use: space debris. While the United States with its jump on technology is largely shying away from kinetic energy ASATs, other less–wealthy nations are not likely to forgo this most simple of ASAT options if the U.S. proceeds with such programs. Indeed, U.S. officials maintain that China is exploring the use of so–called space mines based on kinetic energy attack. The Soviet Union, for example, focused its ASAT efforts on relatively simple co–orbital interceptors that exploded near the target. Unfortunately, blowing up satellites in orbit creates space debris — which is already a problem for commercial and military users of space alike. Even tiny pieces of space debris, because of the high speeds of objects colliding in orbit, can seriously damage a satellite or space–platform (such as the International Space Station or the Hubble Telescope). In fact, a poor state could wreak havoc with a ballistic missile loaded with a payload of sand or small gravel bits that could be dispersed in orbit. While the degree of space pollution caused by on–orbit testing would depend on the orbital altitudes of the tests, as well as other factors, it is safe to say that an increase in KE testing in space would ipso facto result in more debris. At a time when space scientists are already concerned about finding ways to reduce debris creation, for fear that in the long–term debris pollution could make some orbits inhospitable to satellites, this does not seem a wise practice to encourage.

In conclusion, U.S. moves to weaponize space would come laden with a wide array of risks — risks that cross the spectrum from strategic, tactical, political and economic — to global security and international stability. It is therefore imperative for the community of nations to begin more seriously discussing what can be done now to avoid this dangerous path.