CIAO DATE: 09/04

National Space Policy: Has the U.S. Air Force Moved the Goal Posts?

Theresa Hitchens

Center for Defense Information

May 2004

I have been asked to talk today about U.S. Air Force space weapons plans, and the underpinning policy, strategy and doctrine now being used to justify what is a significant shift in direction of U.S. national space policy. I need to begin with a caveat. Reading and interpreting military planning, strategy and doctrinal papers is something of an occult art. These documents are written for a specifically trained audience, and thus are packed with arcane terminology, jargon and technical references — in essence, they are written in a kind of secret code for the initiated. Thus, it is quite difficult for a lay person to be certain that the words you’ve read mean what they seem to mean. So, my remarks here today should be seen as only one possible interpretation of the situation.

Still, even for a lay person, it is quite obvious that U.S. plans for military space have changed dramatically over the last four years since the inauguration of President George W. Bush. U.S. Air Force officials in particular have been increasingly aggressive in pushing a stragegy of “space dominance” that envisions a future that includes weapons, and warfighting, “in, from and through space.” Indeed, the latest Air Force force planning document, the November 2003 Transformation Flight Plan, explicitly cites a number of anti–satellite weapons and space–to–Earth weapons being pursued for deployment around 2015 to 2020. That may sound a long way off, but given the 10 to 15 year development cycles for most U.S. weaponry, it means that research and development is either already ongoing or will be soon if those deployment goals are to be achieved. Some of the programs listed in the plan include a Ground–Based Laser anti–satellite weapon that could be set from “stun” to “kill;” an Air–Launched Anti–Satellite Missile; a Space–Based Radio–Frequency Weapon to be used against enemy satellites; and Hypervelocity Rod Bundles, long ago knick–named ‘Rods From God,’ to strike hard and deeply buried targets from space.

What remains less clear is the justification for pursuit of these weapons based on U.S. national policy or strategic decisions regarding the future of U.S. operations in space. While President Bush has put forward a so–called “vision” for NASA and U.S. civil space exploration, no such “vision” has been forthcoming for military space — despite the fact that a unilateral U.S. deployment of space weapons would represent a significant paradigm shift in national security policy and have broad and deep affects on both national and international security. It would make the United States the first nation to break the global taboo against arming the heavens that has stood for more than 40 years; and it would fly in the face of the desire of most nations in the world to develop a treaty to ban space weapons. While National Security Council director Condoleeza Rice in 2002 launched a review of the current National Space Policy promulgated by the Clinton administration in 1996, so far only two parts have been released one covering commercial imagery and the other focused on space transportation. It remains unclear when a broader policy review focused on military space will be forthcoming.

And it may simply not matter. Because meanwhile, the U.S. military, particularly the Air Force, is forging ahead with space weapons plans. It may be that the Pentagon has decided that it isn’t necessary to have a formal Bush administration rewrite of the Clinton National Space Policy — which traditionally has been interpreted as eschewing the formal development and deployment of space weapons. Instead, I think we may be seeing a sort of policy–making by stealth. What seems to be happening is an ongoing reinterpretation of the Clinton space policy aimed at blessing weaponization, somewhat like what happened when Reagan administration declared ketchup as a vegetable under the regulations governing the nutritional value of school lunches. In other words, the Pentagon may have simply decided to quietly move the goal posts in order to pursue the “space dominance” strategy.

Given the caveats I mentioned earlier, one can find evidence of a shift in policy thinking in statements by DoD and U.S. Air Force officials, as well as internal documents, dating from the Clinton era to today. As noted, the Clinton space policy traditionally has been interpreted as prohibiting — without an explicit order from the President otherwise — the full–scale development and deployment of space weapons. The Clinton administration was widely perceived as hostile to the notion of weaponizing space. For example, Clinton killed a number of research and development projects that would have crossed the line to space weaponry, including: the space–based element of missile defense renamed by Bush 1 as “Global Protection Against Limited Strike (GPALS); the Air Force’s planned military Spaceplane; NASA’s Clementine II satellite experiment that was in part aimed at demonstrating space–based missile defense capabilities; and the Army’s Kinetic Energy Anti–Satellite Weapon (KE–ASAT).

However, the wording of the 1996 policy itself is vague — not surprising for a Clinton administration document. In essence, the policy seems aimed at hedging U.S. bets. While it stresses peaceful uses of space and downplays military uses — it also leaves open the door for the development and use of anti–satellite weapons. For example, the policy states that U.S. national security space activities should contribute to U.S. national security by “assuring that hostile forces cannot prevent our own use of space;” and “countering, if necessary, space systems and services used for hostile purposes.” It later goes on to state that “Consistent with treaty obligations, the United States will develop, operate and maintain space control capabilities to ensure freedom of action in space, and, if directed, deny such freedom of action to adversaries.” The latter phrase, “if directed,” seems to be the heart of the longstanding interpretation that a presidential decision would be needed before the military could pursue such capabilities beyond the research stage.

As recently as December 2003, at a conference in New Orleans, Rich Haver, a former Defense Department official and then–head of intelligence strategy for Northrop Grumman Mission Systems, said that while he believes space warfare is inevitable, there exist “executive orders that say we don’t want to do that. . .and there’s been a long–standing U.S. policy to try to keep space a peaceful place.”

Air Force long–range planning documents are rather complicated in how they address space weapons, but they too clearly show an evolution in thinking from the late 1990s to today. For one thing, they have over time increasingly stressed a significant distinction on policy governing “space control” assets, or anti–satellite weapons, and that applicable to on–orbit weapons designed to attack terrestrial targets, often referred to as space strike weapons. It is unclear why this bright line is being drawn — as no such line seems to exist in the National Space Policy, but it is important to note when reading Air Force documents to avoid comparing apples and oranges.

One of the first Air Force Space Command planning documents to emerge in the wake of the 1996 Clinton space policy, the 1998 Long Range Plan, is somewhat opaque as to policy governing ASATs for “negation” of enemy assets — that is the offensive part of “space control.” It notes: “The United States will need to develop national policies supporting space warfare, weapons development and employment, and rules of engagement” for the plan’s vision of future negation capabilities to be fulfilled — and later stresses that Space Command should advocate for such new policies. This seems to indicate that, in the Air Force’s view, U.S. national policy in 1998 did not support such developments.

With regard to space strike weapons, however, the Long Range Plan is unequivocal: “At present, the notion of weapons in space is not consistent with U.S. national policy.” It later notes that “no capability can be implemented until the [National Command Authority] directs this to occur” — a statement that can reasonably be read as referring to a presidential decision.

Fast forward to today, and the most recent version of the same planning document, the Strategic Master Plan for FY 06 and Beyond published in October 2003. With regard to counterspace — yet another term of art for the subset of “space control” that includes use of ASATs, the document states: “There are presently no formal U.S. policies preventing development or deployment of [counterspace] capabilities. In actuality, the President’s National Space Policy, the DoD Space Policy and the Secretary of Defense’s policy on Counterspace all require development of ‘negation’ capabilities and deployment as needed to ensure freedom of access and operations in space. However, the President and/or the Secretary of Defense approval will be required for any employment of force against enemy space assets. . .The major question in fielding [Offensive Counterspace] systems is the political will to do so.”ĘThis seems to indicate that ASATs can be deployed by the Pentagon no strings attached, and to move the point where presidential decision–making may be required from deployment to the actual use of such weapons. This is somewhat confusing however, because it seems obvious that ASATs would be used only in a conflict, and a president would have to approve the launch of any conflict.

And regarding conventional strike weapons based in space, the FY 06 Master Plan states: “Our vision calls for prompt global strike space systems with the capability to directly apply force from or through space against terrestrial targets. International treaties and laws do not prohibit the use or presence of conventional weapons in space. . . . Non–nuclear prompt global strike space capabilities are being studied. Our nation’s leadership will decide whether or not to pursue the development and deployment of conventional, space–based systems for global strike to fully exploit the advantages of space.”ĘThis seems to stop short of saying there are national policies that rule out such weapons.

The differences in the two versions are striking, and, as I noted earlier, seem to point to a major reinterpretation by the Air Force of the policy constraints under which the service is working. Whether the new Air Force reading of U.S. policy is agreed to by the Bush administration remains in question — although it must be said that there hasn’t been any attempt by National Security Council or other Bush administration officials to rebut the assertions made in the latest Master Plan and other related documents. In fact, what little discussion of U.S. national space policy has emerged over the last year or so has been instigated by non–governmental organizations and Congress — rather than by explicit policy statements or even semi–official explanations by the Bush administration. This lack of clarity about administration intentions for military space prompted the Senate Armed Services Committee, in its mark up of the Pentagon’s FY 05 budget request, to call for a sweeping Space Posture Review by DoD. The review would require the Secretary of Defense to report on the universe of military space policy, strategy, doctrine and requirements for weapon systems. If this language makes it through conference committee with the House, it would go a long way to resolve the many questions about U.S. plans for arming the heavens — and provide the basis for a congressional and public debate about the issue that is long overdue. It is my sincere hope that this happens.