CIAO DATE: 04/02

From Pre-Bush to Bush to Post-Sep-11-Bush: Changes In Transatlantic Relations — The Particular Case of Germany

Dr. Michaela Hertkorn

Guest Scholar, CES/NYU
April 2002

Columbia International Affairs Online

 

Introduction

"There is the perception that, while France is a complicated country, but not posing a problem, Germany is not a complicated case, but can pose a problem." ₁

"America and Germany will never drift apart. We have never been closer. Any tensions are simply due to 'Reibungsverluste durch Nähe'. It is a relationship of grown up kids with their parents." ₂

The May/June edition of Foreign Affairs still argued, "transatlantic relations will improve only, if US leaders climb down from their bully pulpit - and Europeans resist the temptation to climb up." An article in the Economist of March 31, 01 titled "Doubts on both sides of the Atlantic." It asked, whether George Bush may succeed, where European leaders have not, in finally forging a common European foreign and security policy, ₃ and uniting Europe as a counterbalance to the States? During the European Union Summit in Stockholm of March 01, European leaders stressed the necessity to "step in", where the US either stepped back, or decided to take a more hardliner approach. ₄ Was this meant to be the hour for Europe? Would the European Union be able to match a common foreign policy with corresponding resources? ₅ What about the role of Germany as the regional key player, without whose larger financial contribution ESDP, the European security and defense policy, might be doomed to fail? A decade after its reunification, Germany arguably is still a newcomer in foreign policy. It is united, but is it sovereign? German Chancellor, Gerhard Schrüder, by late April 01 offered again a plan to remake the European Union. The New York Times of May 1, 01 speculated, whether this proposal reflected a long tradition in German foreign policy of giving up sovereignty, in order to increase, indirectly, Germany' s influence over Europe? By early October 01 even, the so-called Schroeder doctrine indicates support for the use of military and calls for Germany to become "Europe' s most important policeman." ₆

Focus of topic

The attacks on the US of Sep 11, 01 changed - one more time - the parameters defining the relationship between the US and its European allies, and particularly Germany. Policy issues of potential tensions, as the Kyoto protocol, missile defense or burden sharing in the Balkans, suddenly are not on top of the transatlantic agenda anymore. Germany, for instance, declares its post World War II era irrevocably over and NATO is confronted with its first collective case of defense ever since its foundation. ₇

Consequently, the following questions are of general relevance to this paper: What are the changes to transatlantic relations in a post-Sep-11 world? What are the main challenges the Alliance will be faced with? What will happen to all those foreign and security policy issues that had the potential to cause transatlantic tensions or misunderstandings between Germany and the US?

The author of this paper argues that not only is the pre-Bush era over, but also the so-called Bush era. This Bush era can be defined as the period after the presidential elections of 00 up to the attacks of Sep 11, 01, including Bush' s two visits to Europe in Summer 01.

1. The so-called pre-Bush era

Post-doc research at AICGS ₈ focused on the expectations, the US had regarding so-called burden sharing by the European Union in crisis regions, such as the Balkans. Corresponding discourses of foreign policy experts were considered, and the following questions addressed: Are the US and its major European allies drifting apart? Are the "ties fraying"? ₉ On what kind of foreign and security policy issues has this been expressed? Which role may a so-called anti-Americanism in Europe, particularly in France ₁₀ and Germany play in that context? ₁₁ Should America "remain Europe's Pacifier indefinitely"? ₁₂ To what extent are Europeans, and particularly Germans, aware of the potentially diminishing willingness of Uncle Sam, to pull their chestnuts out of the fire and to come to Europe's rescue? ₁₃ Which challenges does NATO face in the aftermath of Kosovo? ₁₄ What are the challenges for the US as so-called indispensable superpower? Which challenges confront the European NATO member states, and the European Union members, regarding soft and hard power? Does the US want Germany to play a stronger role, or expect it to restrict itself to a foreign policy shaped during the Cold War? To what extent are German politicians and the German public aware of these expectations?

The major two case studies in the pre-Bush era were:

• First, a common European foreign and security policy: Does ESDP represent more than European uneasiness in the aftermath of Kosovo?
• Second, the long-term stabilization in the Balkans: Can it work without continued US commitment? ₁₅

1.1 Exemplary findings from interviews in Germany

During interviews in Berlin by January 01, a security policy expert of a German foundation expressed that the only security related matter that is of crucial interest for the German public was, whether and how soon the average German possibly could bite into a curry wurst, feeling safe again? ₁₆ Ten years after the German Reunification, Germany was still quite self occupied, and on the chancellor' s main agenda so far ranked urgent domestic matters, and if foreign, further European integration. It can be argued in this context, that matters of European integration are almost about domestic politics, the further the integration of Europe goes. An article in the Economist of November 00 titled "Germany, Ja, a little proud." German chancellor Gerhard Schrüder had "admitted that his call for a German return to 'normality' might have been a little premature." Germany could not emerge from its past so easily, and "perhaps we should not even wish to." An ongoing discourse on German patriotism may show however, that the German public and its political elites have started an intense reflection on Germany' s potential role as a regional key player within the EU and NATO. Interesting enough, French Foreign Minister Hubert Védrine by mid April 01, advised Germans to self confidently formulate and pursue their foreign policy. ₁₇ Whether Germany's future foreign policy will keep focusing on regional foreign policy, or additionally will take on a global perspective, is an important question in this regard.

Germany's Ambassador to the US, by Autumn 99 stressed, Germany' s foreign policy was purely European. "The first thing, we do, is calling the French in Paris." During a personal interview in January 01, however, a representative of the German Foreign Ministry in Berlin expressed Germany was the most important partner to the US. Germany had not yet formulated its own foreign policy, but should do so. And regarding Germany' s international role: "If we want a permanent UN seat, we should be willing to share the serious responsibility, to contribute with (peacekeeping) troops, more than was the case in East Timor, where we still focused on medical troops." Political discussions of US plans to create a missile defense system so far had been dominated by ideology. Should Germany seriously wish to be threatened by missiles of Iraq or Iran? So far, there had not been an appropriate foreign policy discussion within the German public.

1. 2. Conclusions drawn from the results in question

In the analysis of the author of this paper, the< major challenge for the new US administration has been and still will be to draw on the potential of Germany. As mentioned before and outlined in the table below, Germany might theoretically possess keys to US - Russian and US - French relations, and might get Turkey to reforms.

To continue a strong US leadership and commitment in Europe that acknowledges European sensitivities has been seen as a prerequisite to enable reunified Germany to continuously mature into its growing role, without the so-called Croatia effect seen in the early 90s. In that sense, a free and safe Europe, including central and Eastern European countries, still should be a central US American national interest. ₁₈

For Germany, it seems to be necessary to become fully aware of its role, position and responsibility as a regional key player. Consequently, the potential formulation of national interests should ideally consider global issues, next to aspects of further European Union integration.

2. The so-called Bush era

The questions provided under point 1. were formulated in spring 00, months before the US presidential elections of November 00. The Bush administration had put other issues on top of its foreign policy agenda, for example missile defense. ₁₉ However, given transatlantic discourses up to the attacks of September 11, 01, ₂₀ earlier questions regarding ESDP still seemed of relevance. The overall research approach, however, needed to be adapted to a changed political landscape in Washington DC and to different policy that was relevant to the partners on both sides of the Atlantic.

This proved particularly necessary after President Bush's first 100 days in office, which the Washington Post had described as adjusting to the world. On the eve of Bush' s visit to Europe, it looked like the administration had "sharply changed course on a series of foreign policy issues, stepping up US involvement in several volatile regions while seeking to ease concern among allies about American unilateralism." ₂₁ Whether Bush' s display of charm in Europe would be able to reaffirm the whole of America' s allies was an interesting question. ₂₂ In the aftermath of Bush' s first two visits to Europe, which was perceived particularly positive in Spain, Italy and Great Britain, and given the rapprochement of Putin and Bush on NATO enlargement and missile defense, these developments had a certain impact on a latest flare up of German - French anti-Bush-anti-Americanism as portrayed in corresponding journals and newspapers.

2. 1. Exemplary findings of research on Germany

In January 01, interesting enough, many representatives in Berlin expressed that there probably was not going to be any difference concerning various foreign policy issues - of relevance to Germany - with the then still new Bush administration. One question was, whether such a statement needed to be seen in the context of political correctness? Another one was, whether the overall assumption America is America, who ever leads it, led to such an assumption? The analysis of headlines on different foreign policy issues in German newspapers during early 01 showed, that the realization finally might have kicked in, that there might have been some change. The Economist of April 28, 01 titled in this regard: "George Bush is a conservative. Some seem deeply shocked by this. Why?" The issue of the US bombing Iraq, which saw German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, eventually traveling to the US and stressing, he would not criticize the States, created waves of alarmed headlines in Germany. So did, particularly in February, the matter of the so-called Balkan Syndrome and uranium-depleted weapons, with German Defense Minister Scharping using exceptionally strong words. During the months of February and March 01, the remembrance fund and the decision of the Bush administration, not to try to regulate power plants' emissions of carbon dioxide sent further shock waves through German newspapers and had Environment Minister, Jürgen Trittin, appeal by letter to the Bush administration to respect the Kyoto Protocol. Differences became obvious with regard to North and South Korea, with the Germans feeling strong sympathy for the South Korean president, Kim Dae Jung, a noble peace price laureate. The expulsion of Russian diplomats as spies, let the Süddeutsche Zeitung of March 24, 01 title "Bully Bush" and recommend that the "strongest in a classroom better not upbeat the weaker ones." The visit of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder to Washington DC, by late March 01 was described as of cold atmosphere throughout the German press and media, quite in contrast to the Chancellor' s visit to Putin' s Russia. US American newspapers, as the New York Times, paid this second visit of a European Union head of government only limited tribute. These examples show, that the persistence of certain headlines seem to refer to more subtle stereotypes and attitudes, of the public in the countries concerned and of its political elites, which already exist and focus on certain topics. Therefore, with regard to perceptions, one result of the research at AICGS was that certain old patterns of stereotypes seem to persist to a quite considerable degree. This is probably the case in the US and in Germany. In Germany, however, perceived mistakes and social problems in the US are repeatedly and systematically referred to, as for example the death penalty. A representative of the German Bundestag made the following comment during an interview in Berlin that focused on foreign policy: "There is one thing, I would like to stress with regard to the US as indispensable superpower. They would not even meet the standard to enter the European Union, because of their death penalty. Every time I tell this my American friends, they look completely stunned". If nothing else remains, there always remains the cooling down of the US economy, which has repeatedly led to the assumption in Germany that necessary social-economic reforms now not needed to be made. This reflected a kind of stubborn attitude: we were not that wrong, and they - the US - are not that right. It arguably is a lot about psychology. In Spring 01, lexis-nexus research in German language journals with the search key word "George W. Bush", let to more than 1000 hits for the month of April 01 alone. The Kyoto protocol and partly the US weapon sales to Taiwan, which saw Germany and the Netherlands refusing to deliver their submarines to Taiwan, produced masses of headlines. Obviously, particularly in the case of Germany, its domestic tradition of strong protest movements, particularly in the peace and environmental sphere, provides a strong filter, through which US American foreign policy is perceived.

Corresponding to the findings above, the major two case studies in the Bush era were:

• Third, NATO enlargement: Will it happen without the US taking the lead? ₂₃
• Fourth, missile defense: May Bush need German support in NATO

2.2. From pre-Bush to Bush: Core hypotheses in contemporary transatlantic relations - with a focus on Germany

In the US by late 00, Senator Biden spoke of an unholy symbiosis, in which two seemingly unrelated developments on both sides of the Atlantic - that threatened to feed on each other - seriously" jeopardized "the continued military engagement of the United States in Europe." ₂₄ Antony Blinken argued that, "this phony crisis in relations only makes it more difficult to tap the full potential of the transatlantic partnership." ₂₅

The major question of the research conducted by the author of this paper has not been, whether there is a crisis in NATO. The main questions have been relating to challenges the Alliance faces today, and to what extent perceptions may play a role.

On the assumption that there might have been a certain US unilateralism before Sep 11, 01, which may have been perceived as such in Europe, the following hypotheses or conclusions could be and were drawn.

2.2.1. Conclusion I.

Depending from how this US administration handles issues, as missile defense or global warming, the transatlantic relationship in general, and US - German relations in particular may become more problematic. It may in fact lead to more anti-Americanism, than there needed to be, at a level, the two societies may already have overcome in recent years. On the other side, any exaggerations of the Europeans regarding their rapid reaction force should be avoided, too.

Rhetoric games on behalf of the Europeans and the lack of US leadership in Europe may enhance a division of labor, with the Europeans focusing on civil crisis management and the US on collective defense. Such a divide would neither be healthy for NATO, nor appropriate for the given operational and structural needs of any complex peace process. Karsten Voigt, at the Auswürtige Amt in Berlin, argued that, "NATO always has been about collective defense." ₂₇ ESDP would enable the Europeans to build capacities "next to the Americans." He stressed the Petersberg tasks. Most crises within European interest, as the Balkans needed "exactly that." He could not necessarily imagine a potential conflict in Europe, where more so-called hard power security was necessary, or where peacekeeping developed into peacemaking or full war. This question was of particular interest given recent crises in Kosovo and Macedonia. ₂₈ The last conflict escalation in Kosovo ₂₉ allowed the deduction of following hypothesis. It furthermore highlighted the continuing relevance of the two case studies the author of this paper had so far focused on, ESDP ₃₀ and the long-term stabilization in the Balkans. ₃₁

2.2.2. Conclusion II.

While some European countries seemed to acknowledge the political and economic long-term challenges of a peace process - referring to the Stability Pact - they still seemed to leave hard power security elements, to the Americans. During post-doc research at AICGS, this had been summarized as soft power acceptance and hard power reluctance on European, particularly German side. ₃₂ In the case of the Bush administration, this could be paired with US reluctance to soft power and peacekeeping. ₃₃

Does the United States need to enter into dialogue on so-called equal footing with other countries, particularly with its European allies? Do the Europeans need to match their ambitions with resources? In any case, both hypotheses favor a continued US American commitment in Europe. A strong US leadership that does not ignore so-called European Befindlichkeiten, ₃₄ should remain a central US American national interest. An article in the Washington Post of April 29, 01 argued that US engagement with Europe remained critical to help stabilize Central and Eastern European countries. Europe' s uncertainty about the future of its relationship with the US meant that NATO expansion never occurred, if the initiative was left to Europe.

2.3. From pre-Bush to Bush: Relevant questions in contemporary transatlantic relations - with a focus on Germany

2.3.1. Question I.

One major question so far has been, whether ESDP can be more than a reflection of European uneasiness, after NATO had intervened in Kosovo? ₃₅ Does ESDP represent more than an attempt to counterbalance so-called US hegemony, particularly by France and Germany, while being theoretically faced with the challenge of coercive prevention? ₃₆

As Dutch Ambassador Joris M. Vos pointed out, ₃₇ the aftermath of Kosovo left Europeans with the uneasy realization that the European Union had not been capable - even if willing - to intervene in Kosovo without the US. At the same time, it had been noticed in European capitals that more than once the US administration had faced serious difficulties in convincing Congress of the need for American intervention in European crises. ₃₈ Strobe Talbot, former Deputy Secretary of State, had poignantly described the American and European feelings about the ultimate verdict on Kosovo in a speech before the Royal Institute of International Relations in London. "Many Americans are saying: never again should the United States have to fly the lion' s share of the risky missions in a NATO operation and foot by far the biggest bill. On the other hand, many Europeans seem determined never again to feel quite so dominated by the US as they did during Kosovo, or, for that matter, during Bosnia. In the next crisis - whatever, wherever and whenever it is - our allies want a say in the conduct of operations more nearly commensurate with the political onus that they bear in supporting the war. At least, no one, on either side, is complacent about the status quo."

2.3.2. Question II.

The plan of German chancellor, Gerhard Schrüder, for a stronger European federation, led to another major question. To which extent does the continued reduction of its national sovereignty, represent an attempt to avoid the major challenges Germany is faced with, as the< regional key player in Europe? Joschka Fischer during a speech at Georgetown University on September 15, 2000 stressed, that a further European integration was the "only logical consequence of Kosovo." If Europe was to develop a common European foreign and security policy and was to be able to act firmly together, further integration was the solution. However, can the reduction of national sovereignty achieve such a goal? Given British and French reluctance to reduce their national sovereignty, the German proposal may - though arguably visionary - not only be unrealistic but also increase distrust beyond its partners. Even though, the original intent of the plan may have been to Europeanize Germany even more. ₄₀ While it can be argued that Germany has been successful in achieving its national interests within multilateralism, the reluctance to openly formulate national interests - in addition to those of the European Union - may actually form a hindrance in trust building with its neighbors. Frustration because of Germany pushing in the background the nomination of a German citizen as successor of the director of the IMF is just one example of what could be called the clumsiness of German diplomatic efforts, when it tries, occasionally, to act as a so-called normal country. ₄₁ Considerable challenges for post-Reunification Germany seem to lie in political leadership, vision and the recruitment of its political elites.

2.3.3. Question III.

The study of European perceptions regarding the foreign policy of the new administration in the US provided a third major question. What are the prospects to US - European relations? What kind of role do short and long-term perceptions on both sides of the Atlantic play in this regard? The Economist by late April 01 diagnosed a "souring of European opinion on the US" during Bush' s first 100 days. ₄₂

The Washington Post of April 28, 01 stressed that the "opening policies of the Bush administration on the Balkans, MD and global warming ₄₃ infuriated many European leaders and convinced some that the new president was pursuing not closer partnership but American unilateralism." ₄₄ European governments would "at times have their own political reasons to exaggerate US bullying." ₄₅ They were however not "imagining an inclination among some in the administration, to impose US solutions, while paying lip service to the value of American alliances". One of the lessons of the first 100 days was that even "at times of undivided US power, a president must listen to the world if he is to lead it". American foreign policy in this era of globalization was shaped as much by "the pressures and demands of allies, trading partners and adversaries as it is by domestic politics or decision making in Washington DC." ₄₆ When Michael Steiner, chief diplomatic aide to Chancellor Gerhard Schrüder visited Washington, he was "surprised to find Condoleezza Rice, the national security adviser, telling him that he must be aware that the only way to get results from the Russians was to be tough with them". ₄₇ Roger Cohen concluded, this had been one "small example of the ways, in which the Bush administration seems to be out of step in its thinking with a European Union disinclined to reopen divisions on the Continent and generally more concerned about the quality of food and the environment than possible security threats from Moscow or North Korea." ₄₈ However, the same argument could be made for the Europeans or Germans being out of touch with some of the aspects of the foreign policy of the new administration. In the aftermath of Bush' s two visits to Europe, for example, Germany reacted surprised about the warming relations between Putin and Bush after their first and second meeting in Lubliana and Genoa. ₄₉

3. The so-called post-Sep-11-Bush era

As pointed out before, after September 11 the parameters for transatlantic, and particularly German-US relations changed one more time. Policy issues that led to tensions before were not in the foreground any more. Germany declared its post World War II era irrevocably over and NATO was confronted with its first collective defense ever since its foundation.

3. 2. From Bush to post-Sep-11-Bush: Relevant questions in contemporary transatlantic relations - with a focus on Germany

The questions seemed to be, what would happen to all the foreign and security policy issues that had the potential to cause misunderstandings between Germany and the US in the longer run? Would German-US relations be strengthened by the events of Sep 11? What could Germany contribute to a coalition against terrorism and a multinational peacekeeping force? What domestic constraints existed for Germany' s current government coalition? Were we in fact - and in the longer run - all Americans? In addition, would Sep 11 strengthen European commitment in NATO or a common European foreign and security policy? ₅₀ How divided Europe particularly in this regard still is, was illustrated by the intra-European-Union irritations that followed the resigning of Italian Foreign Minister Renato Ruggiero. While Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar supported Berlusconi' s move, France and Germany criticized it as potentially "anti-European". ₅₁ What concerns future transatlantic conflicts, European or German criticism towards the detention practice of global terrorists by the US government in Guantanamo seems to set the stage for another round in "perceptions being played out along well-known rules in the transatlantic theater". ₅₂

As outlined before, a central piece of the research conducted has been and will be the continued US commitment to transatlantic relations and the world, which is crucial to a prospering Europe with Germany arguably as one of its potential power centers. ₅₃

What concerns US leadership in the world, the following four scenarios have been envisioned: First, the US does not lead, and the European Union is either unwilling or incapable to act. This was the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the early 90s. Second, the US leads, and the European Union are not capable of doing it alone or to contribute a major share. This arguably was given during the intervention in Kosovo. Third, The US assumes and claims its leadership role, and the European Union develops own security and defense capabilities. This may be the original intention of ESDP, as particularly promoted by the British and the Dutch, who have been stressing the need for ESDP not decupling from NATO. Such an arrangement would very likely strengthen NATO and see the transatlantic relationship inter-related with further European integration. Fourth, The US does not lead, and the European Union continues to develop its own security and defense policy. This carries the risk of ESDP being perceived, at least by some European countries, as independent from NATO. This may lead to a sustainable division of labor between NATO and the European Union. The French have for a long time tried to develop European hard power capabilities, separately from NATO. Germany - with its strong pacifist tradition as a domestic constraint - may well have been tempted, to regard ESDP and its Petersberg tasks ₅₄ providing a the ultimate soft power alternative to NATO hard power collective defense. These four scenarios can be applied accordingly to the three other case studies in question.

A crucial question for future research seems to be, how these four scenarios might play out in a world after 9/11? In this new era, the major case study is going to be:

• NATO enlargement/NATO forever transformed.

All former case studies can be summarized under this one. NATO has arguably been playing a considerable role in Kosovo and Macedonia and during the long-term stabilization of the Balkans. It will be of relevance in the context of further rapprochement with Russia, missile defense and the war against global terrorism in the aftermath of Sep 11, 01. ₅₅

3. 1. From Bush to post-Sep-11-Bush: Core hypotheses in contemporary transatlantic relations - with a focus on Germany

In research so far conducted, the overall assumption had been of a soft power acceptance but hard power reluctance by the Europeans and particularly Germans. ₅₆ By contrast, while Bush had argued during his presidential election campaign that the US army' s role was to win wars, instead of focusing on peacekeeping. In the ultimate aftermath of Sep 11, 01, however, it seemed this statement might very likely not prove realistic in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. ₅₇ While the US may not be able to reject so-called soft power - meaning the linking of robust peacekeeping with so-called nation building anymore, most of EU member governments may have to accept hard power responsibility. With regard to US leadership, Right after Sep 11, 01 it looked like, as if the term unilateralism had gone under together with the World Trade Centers in New York. The Bush administration acknowledged its need for Allies and focused on coalition building. An interesting question in that sense might have been, to which extent the Bush administration actually had changed its course back to the pre-Bush or Clinton era?

Some final conclusions and outlook

On the basis of all the case studies and questions mentioned before, the following conclusions regarding US leadership and a German contribution can be drawn

• During the pre-Bush era, the US administration was pro-nation building in Bosnia and Kosovo. Germany, on the other hand, still showed a relatively strong anti-war attitude. Still during the Kosovo intervention, Germany' s Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, struggled to draw a line between the principle of no more war against no more genocide; ₅₈
• During the Bush era, the new administration claimed to be against nation building and in early Sep 01 - just before the Sep 11 attacks - even threatened to not favor the prolongation of NATO' s mandate in Macedonia. Germany showed a relatively strong pro-interventionist attitude towards the crisis in Macedonia, even though, Britain and France then clearly took the lead within EU;
• In the post-Sep-11 world, the US administration may not be able to avoid nation building in its global war against terrorism. ₅₉ For Germany, Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder offered military support to the US and its war. How very much, Europeans - and particularly - Germans will prove to be on the American side, when the war stretches to other countries and lingers on, promises to stay being interesting. ₆₀

After Bush's State of the Union address, the New York Times on Jan 31, 02 titled: "Many in Europe Voice Worry US Will Not Consult Them." Josef Joffe, a German foreign policy advisor, is quoted: "There was no allusion to allies at all. However, in practical terms, the US cannot fight wars without allies. Who was taking over in Afghanistan now? It would not have cost Bush much to at least make a courtesy bow to the allies". Another article points to the reluctance of Germany to overthrow Saddam Hussein. Furthermore, Fox News comments the visit of German chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, to Washington on Jan 30/31 in the following way: "Auf Wiedersehen, Amerika! Good bye America! Germany warns the US it may stand alone". In Germany, the Sueddeutsche Zeitung, expressed sympathy to Schroeder' s task ahead: "Poor Gerhard Schroeder. It can' t be easy being the first grumpy European to appear at the throne of the freshly appointed American Caesar".

Germany's Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger, during a speech at the World Affairs Council in Washington DC on Dec 11, 01, still characterized US-German relations post-9-11 in the following way: "I cannot remember a time, when that relation was better". On his first arrival in Washington in July 01, the relationship had not been that good: "Your president was not given such good description in the European media. We were faced with many problems, like the Kyoto protocol. After September 11, it seems, I am faced with second rate problems."

It is important to stress that, while the German Ambassador made these positive comments in Washington, the German government during Dec 01 provided some contradictory signals. Germany' s social-democratic and green government coalition refused to take over the lead for the multinational peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. Berlin thereby frustrated not only Washington, but also London. The Green coalition partner also insisted in the quite artificial separation of peacekeeping command and the still ongoing war efforts in Afghanistan. German media - reflecting the government' s view in an uncritical way - insisted in labeling the multinational force as a pure UN peacekeeping force.

Throughout January 01, German news headlines continued to contrast Ischinger' s statements. Early January, the German and French media was occupied with the resigning of Italy' s foreign minister, quite in contrast to the Spanish press, for example. By late January, the so-called "inhumane treatment" and "mistreatment" of captives in Guantanamo dominated German news on the US. It was suggested that the "terror shock" had made the US "blind towards the rule of law." President Bush' s State of the Union address, and Schroeder' s upcoming visit in Washington - to explain, why Germany had refused to take the peacekeeping lead in Afghanistan - both dominated German media by the end of January. The "axis of evil" keeps causing considerable cynicism in German newspapers and magazines.

Five months after 9/11, it looks, as if German-US relations were back, where they started: Germany expresses distress about US hegemony and there is talk of NATO being badly damaged and the break apart of transatlantic relations.

As an overall analysis, throughout the three phases and what ever the policy issues in question, is the following.

Contemporary German-US relations have been and are characterized by deeper stereotypes. In that sense, they stay very well the same! Issues the transatlantic dialogue may focus on, may vary with the times and phases, depending from regional crises or the political agenda of governments. In general, the media - particularly in Germany - seems to focus on topics, or jumps on them, that reflect or confirm these deeper patterns of perceptions.

Endnotes

Note 1: Quote of a representative of a US American Think Tank, Washington DC, during a personal interview; Back

Note 2: Quote of a representative of the German parliament, Berlin, during a personal interview, Jan 01; Back

Note 3: See The Economist, March 31st - April 6th, 2001, page 46; EU falters on deregulation but summit touts bigger global role, economic leadership, DPA, March 24, 2001; EU-Gipfel in Stockholm. Im Schatten der Aussenpolitik kommen die Reformen nur langsam voran, SDA, March 25, 01. Back

Note 4: See for example Balancing Transatlantic Relations. Europe and the United States in Global Politics, SEF News, Development and Peace Foundation, Bonn, April 2001. Back

Note 5: See Analysis-EU rapid reaction force needs much more time, by Douglas Hamilton, NEWSCOM-NATO-EU-FORCE, Nov 16, 00; www.newscom.com/cgi-bin/desktop/text/tv?f=RTR/rtrworld&doc-900516 ; Analysis-New EU force toothless without arms investment, by Noah Barkin, NEWSCOM-ARMS-EUROPE, Nov 22, 00, www.newscom.com/cgi-bin/desktop/text/v/f=RTR/rtrworld&doc=905888 Back

Note 6: The New York Times, Apr 1, 01; A European Song Contest, in: The Economist, May 5th 01: "The first entry came from Germany's Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer. Almost exactly a year ago, he kicked off the Eurovision contest with a catchy little number entitled 'From Confederacy to Federation.'" See Schroeder will Europas wichtigster Polizist werden, DPA, Oct 10, 01; German Postwar Era Said 'Irrevocably'Over, The Washington Post, Oct 12, 01; Schroeder: Entscheidende Auseinandersetzung mit dem Terrorismus - Kanzler lobt vor Bundestag Zusammenarbeit mit Opposition, Agence France Presse, Oct 11, 01; "In vorderster Reihe bei der Sicherung des Friedens in der Welt"; Aussenpolitischer Teil der Regierungserklaerung Schroeders, AP Worldstream - German, Oct 11, 01; Back

Note 7: See DIE ZEIT, Oct 8, 01: After a century of total wars, Clausewitz would slowly return. The principle was politics; See 9/11 and After, Foreign Affairs, Nov/Dec 01; The Challenges Ahead: US Strategy in the War on Terrorism, Women in International Security, Oct 11, 01. Back

Note 8: See What Can Americans Expect from the New Europe? Workshop at AICGS by WIIS, Women in International Security, SAIS, School for Advanced International Studies, and AICGS, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, Washington, DC, Apr 17, 00; Cooperation or Competition? American, European Union, and German Policies in the Balkans. Workshops by AICGS, Johns Hopkins University, Feb 23 and May 4, 00; Common European Foreign and Security Policy, US National Missile Defense and the Future of NATO, Conference by FES, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Washington, DC, March 15, 00; Abwehr durch Aussitzen. Die Reise von Bill Clinton hat kein Problem gelüst, in: DIE ZEIT, 8. Juni 00; Clinton Visits Europe With Same Baggage, Trade and Missiles, That Reagan Carried, The New York Times, May 31, 2000; NATO-Partner warnen USA vor Rüstungswettlauf, FAZ, 24. Mai 00; Zu wenig NATO-Truppen in Kosovo. Klage des Generalsekretaers bei der Frühjahrstagung/Das Verhältnis Amerika-Europa, FAZ, 24. Mai 00. See Kosovo's Unquenched Violence Dividing US and NATO Allies. Friction Over Troop Delays and Persistent Strife, The New York Times, March 12, 00; Der Krach mit Amerika. Europa und namentlich Deutschland emanzipieren sich allmühlich von den USA. Das gibt Streit, so what? DIE ZEIT, 9. März 00. See Greek Leftist Battle Police in Protest Over Clinton Visit, the Herald Tribune, November 20 - 21, 99; Edward Luttwak: Sunday Comment: America Can't Believe How Useless Europe Is. The EU's Inability to Handle the Kosovo Issue Is A Scandal, CSIS, Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington DC, www.csis.org/html/op990124.html; Charles A. Kupchan: Reconstructing the West: The Case for an Atlantic Union, in: Atlantic Security. Contending Visions. A Council on Foreign Relations Book edited by Charles A. Kupchan, New York, 98. Back

Note 9: See Stephen Walt, 99; Robert Lieber, 99. Back

Note 10: See Richard Kuisel: Non-Merci Oncle Sam - The Paradox of Contemporary French Anti-Americanism, Faculty Seminar, CGES, Georgetown University, March 21 01. Back

Note 11: See Josef Joffe: Where Germany Has Never Been Before, in: The National Interest, 99, p. 45 ff. Back

Note 12: See Charles Kupchan: Rethinking Europe, in: The National Interest, Summer 99, p. 73 - 79; Charles Kupchan: In Defense of European Defense: An American Perspective, in: Survival, summer 00, p. 16 Back

Note 13:See Joris M. Vos, Presentation at CGES, Georgetown University, Oct 99. Back

Note 14: See Europe and America. Weathering the Storm. Since Kosovo, Europe and America have been going through one of their grumpy phases. This need not spell the end of the Atlantic alliance, in: the Economist, Sep 9, 00, p. 23 ff. Back

Note 15: See Germany and the United States. Considerations for the New Administration, AICGS, the Johns Hopkins University, Washington DC, 01; Robert Kagan: The World and President Bush, International Security, No. 1, Spring 01; Philip H.Gordon: Bush, Missile Defence and the Atlantic Alliance, IISS, Spring 01. Back

Note 16: See Oliver Thraenert, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, Berlin, Jan 01. Back

Note 17: See Vedrine raet Deutschen zu Selbstbewusstsein, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, April 9, 01; Back

Note 18: See Bush's European Theater. On World Stage, America's President Wins Mixed Review, The New York Times, July 25, 01: "By the end of the week, Prime Minister Tony Blair of Britain, Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi of Italy and President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia all said that Mr. Bush was right to force the world to think about a new strategic framework. We're getting used to him", a German says. The Balkan experience has convinced the Europeans of one thing: Mr. Bush can, under the right conditions, be persuaded to change his mind"; Bush, In Kosovo, Tells US Troops Role Is Essential. Reversal From Campaign, The New York Times, July 25, 01; Bush Displays Plain Talk and Charm for Europeans, The New York Times, June 16, 01; Bush's European Visit Reaffirms Ties, Yet Substantial Differences Remain, The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 01; The Ugly European. After Years of Deploring American Imperialism, the Continent Gripes About American Isolationism, The Wall Street Journal, June 18, 01; Bush's Vision for Europe, Financial Times, June 18, 01; Erstaunliche Annäherung. USA und Europa in Sicherheitspolitik einiger als vermutet, Süddeutsche Zeitung, June 18, 00; President Climbs in European Esteam, International Herald Tribune, June 18, 01; Differences on Global Warming and Missiles Can Be Bridged, International Herald Tribune, June 18, 01; Doing the Normal Thing. Can George Bush and Vladimir Putin Agree to Disagree Constructively? The Economist, 9 June, 01. Back

Note 19: See US Weighing Future of Strategic Arms Pacts, in The New York Times, May 9, 2001; Rumsfeld Plan Skirts a Call for Stationing Arms in Space, in The New York Times, May 8, 01; Bush's Nuclear Plan, in The Economist, May 5 - 11, 01; See Irritationen in der transatlantischen Debatte. Die EU als Gegengewicht zu Washington's Aussenpolitik? Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 2, 01; Der Umgang mit dem Hegemon. Europa richtet umfassenden Forderungskatalog an die neue US Regierung, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Jan 29, 01; Europa muss seine Hausaufgaben machen. Konferenz in Berlin nahm die transatlantischen Beziehungen kritisch unter die Lupe, Berliner Morgenpost, Jan 29, 01; Deutsche Wunschliste für Washington. Umfassende amerikanischen Konsultationsbereitschaft gefordert, Frankfurter Allgemeine, Jan 29, 01; Berlin will breite Debatte über US-Raketenabwehr, Der Tagesspiegel, Jan 27, 01. Back

Note 20: See New Foreign Policy Ringing In the Old. Bush Heads Abroad With Positions Looking Less Like Change, More Like Clinton's, The Washington Post, June 10, 2001: In the words of James Lindsay at Brookings Institution, "people who had expected that this administration would come in and rearrange the furniture are going to be disappointed. At the end of the day, this administration will look a lot like its predecessors." Robert Kagan expressed the "early positions staked out by the Bush administration reflected the longtime GOP critique of Clinton policies. "They came into office determined to reverse all of those policies. The tremendous extent of campaign rhetoric and eight years of Republican carping cannot so easily be translated into policies. They're now returning to the Clinton status quo." To which extent this change in foreign policy reflects the recent shift of power in the US Senate is another interesting question. See As Senate Shifts, Bush Is Expressing Optimism On Issues, The New York Times, June 6, 01. See Deep US-Europe Split Casts Long Shadow on Bush Tour, The New York Times, June 15, 01; George Bush's European Tour. A Bumpy Landing, The Economist, June 16, 01; Wanted: New Rules of the Road, the Economist, June 9, 01; Mr. Bush Goes To Europe, The Economist, June 9, 01; Back

Note 21: See A Commitment to Europe, in: the Washington Post, Apr 29, 01: "Europe's uncertainty about the future of its relationship with the US means that NATO expansion will never occur if the initiative is left to Europe. But, if President Bush makes NATO expansion a priority, it will surely move to the center of the transatlantic, offering a ready means to revitalize the alliance and ensure that democracy and American leadership define the future of Central and Eastern Europe. President Bush will make his first trip to Europe as president in six week's time. NATO expansion should be at the center of his agenda." Back

Note 22: See NATO Is Unyielding On Bush Missile Plan, The New York Times, May 30, 01: "But the French and Germans, in particular, remained skeptical along with other NATO members." By May 01, it had been the assumption of the author of this proposal that the US may not be able to circumvent Germany in NATO for the following three reasons: 1. Germany's pacifistic tradition in the post-World War and Cold War era; 2. Germany trying to appease and please France given the more problematic Franco-German relations since Nice 2000; 3. Germany's excellent relations with Russia. Without the warming up of US-Russian relations, a German-French-Russian alliance - to counterbalance the US - might have been possible. To which extent such an option had been attractive to German Chancellor Schroeder or the Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, is an interesting question. On the other hand, during a personal interview with Achim Schmillen of the Foreign Ministry in Berlin, during an interview in Berlin in January 01 he stated that "the discussion on missile defense so far" had been dominated by ideology. Should Germany seriously wish to be threatened by missiles of Iraq or Iran?" Given the corresponding consultation by the US with its Allies, the awareness may grow that there are arguments in favor of missile defense. On the other side, see: Realities Bigger Than Expectations. Bush and Putin: New Era of Trust? International Herald Tribune, June 18, 01; Pragmatic Putin Sees Advantages of US Engagement, Financial Times, June 18, 01. Back

Note 23: Even though, there are theoretically more policy issues imaginably of relevance to the transatlantic relationship. See A Commitment to Europe, in: The Washington Post, April 29, 01; Eastern Europeans Urge NATO to Include Them, in: The New York Times, May 12, 01. See A Eurovision Song Contest, in The Economist, May 5, 01; Schrüder's Europe. Not All Bad, but the German Chancellor's Bold Opening Shot May Have Misfired, in The Economist, May 5, 01: "It is true that the balance of power within the club, indeed its geographical center of gravity, is already changing - To Germany's gain and France's loss." Back

Note 24: See Unholy Symbiosis: Isolationism and Anti-Americanism, in: The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 00. Back

Note 25: See Foreign Affairs, May/June 01. Back

Note 26: See Adjusting to the World in The Washington Post, Apr 28, 01: "But they [Europeans] are not imagining an inclination among some in the administration and the Republican Party to impose US solutions while paying lip service to the value of American alliances." Back

Note 27: During a personal interview in Berlin, Jan 01. Back

Note 28: See Ex-Yugoslavia. NATO In the Middle, in the Economist, Apr 14, 01: "The five countries that have sent most men to Kosovo have different reactions to the threat. Many senior KFOR men say that the close former relations between the Americans and the Kosovar Albanians make it hard to explain now to Albanians that things have changed. The French, in the north of Kosovo, chuckle and reflect that the caution they have shown towards the Albanians since June 99 is now proving justified." Back

Note 29: During a presentation at the Annual Conference of the New York State Political Science Association, Lawrence Cline, of the American Military University and SUNY-Buffalo, stressed that such an unhealthy division already existed on a daily basis in Kosovo. Kfor troops were confronted with different approaches by their national governments. This constrained their close cooperation. In addition, each country tried to leave the difficult jobs of enforcement that were potentially more dangerous to other NATO countries. The divide between tasks in the context of monitoring and civil conflict management and more risky security tasks was obvious. See Carlotta Gall: A Balkan Day: One Step Forward and Three Steps Back, The New York Times, May 25, 01; See Presevo Clashes Worsen, in BBC World News, May 14, 01. Back

Note 30: See Paula J. Dobriansky and David B. Rivkin, Washington Post, January 30, 01: "The United States can and must maintain a first-rate military establishment capable of fighting and winning wars. President Bush articulated this fundamental truth in stating that the core US strategic mission is to deter war by preparing to win swiftly and decisively." See Angela Stent during a presentation at WIIS, Women in International Security on A Redefined Germany, March 7, 01: "Germany has understood now, that with regard to ESDP, the NATO link is important, and that the Petersberg tasks outlined by the EU are limited, since they still focus very much on civil crisis management." Criticism regarding scope and direction of Clinton's foreign policy argued the former administration had tried to provide NATO with a new agenda: peacekeeping. Back

Note 31: This relates to a situation, where peacekeeping turns into peacemaking or open war, independently from what ESDP theoretically may be about. In the words of Michael Quinlen, ESDP had mainly been pushed by Great Britain, with Germany relatively passive, before the EU summit in Nice, December 00. This refers to a presentation of Michael Quinlen at CGES, Georgetown University. Back

Note 32: Germany's current social-democratic and Green coalition government, in the aftermath of Kosovo, has made conflict prevention and civil crisis management a core topic of its foreign policy. This can be seen, from the web page of its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Auswärtige Amt in Berlin. Back

Note 33: NATO committed itself to create a new Strategic Concept for its 99 50th anniversary. In the words of Ron Asmus, this process did not start with St. Malo, but with the Berlin NATO summit of 96. Just days before the NATO summit in April 99, Fischer said that he had never "shared the view that NATO is suited for great power intervention". He added that portraying the alliance as omnipresent or omnipotent would be a mistake. While Fischer supported the NATO airstrikes against the FRY and was eager to exhibit a Red/Green policy of continuity, he clearly felt uncomfortable with any assumptions concerning future NATO interventions. He repeatedly reminded the German public that Kosovo was an "emergency that led to an emergency response, and that there wer no other alternatives. Back

Note 34: See Hague Faces Euro Split. Conservative MP Compares Schrüder's Plan with Hitler's Mein Kampf, in BBC World News, May 13, 01. See Vedrine Rät Deutschen Zu Selbstbewusstsein, Focus Magazin, April 01. Back

Note 35: As formulated particularly during the Cologne EU summit of July 99 and during the German EU presidency, as well as later during the French EU presidency with its EU summit in Nice of Dec 00. Back

Note 36: See American, German and European Military Involvement in the Balkans: Lessons Learned, Future Challenges, and Implications for Transatlantic Relations, AICGS, November 29, 00. Mary Hampton at the Air War College argues, that Europe's determination to enhance its own capability may schizophrenically contribute to a tendency, that the US redefined itself towards unilateralism, even though, this may not be intended by the Europeans. It would be a good thing, to enhance European capability. This may help to deploy troops within NATO interventions. However, the increased readiness with regard to civil crisis management and peacekeeping operations, without the US being necessary, increased some of the unilateralist tendencies in the US military. This would be very opposed to soft power interventions, as humanitarian interventions and parts of peacekeeping missions, in contrast to hard power interventions, or so-called winning a war. Back

Note 37: See Ambassador Joris M. Vos: European Common Foreign and Security Policy: How Common Can You Get? Speech at CGES, Center for German and European Studies, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, Oct 28, 99. Back

Note 38: In late spring 99, Blair proclaimed a bold new international doctrine that would justify outside military intervention in the internal affairs of governments such as Yugoslavia. His Doctrine of International Community argued that national sovereignty is less important than human rights and preventing genocide. Acts of genocide could never be a purely internal matter. The following five tests for intervention existed: "First, are we sure of the case? Second, have we exhausted diplomatic options? Third, was if military operations were sensible. The fourth asked if parties were prepared for the long term. Fifth, national interests should be involved". Back

Note 39: See A Eurovision Song Contest, in The Economist, May 5, 01: "Unlike the real Eurvision song context, no one entry will be declared the winner. The real question is whether all the different songs can be blended into a single harmony; or whether discussions at Laeken and after will turn into a discordant cacophony of clashing voices". Back

Note 40: See Germans Offer Plan to Remake Europe Union, The New York Times, April 30, 01: "There is a long tradition in German foreign policy of giving up sovereignty in order to increase, indirectly, Germany's influence over Europe". See The Economist, May 5, 01: "The German plan at first drew cross party assent at home: Germany is easily the single biggest contributor to the EU's budget - of which 80 % is spent on agriculture and regional policy. Repatriating those policies would mean that Germany paid much less towards the EU. The plan would also strengthen Germany's institutional weight relative to other countries. France has fought tooth-and-nail to ensure that, even though Germany has the biggest population of any EU country, it has no more votes in the Council of Ministers than the other big ones - Italy, Britain and, of course, France. In the European Parliament, however, the weight of German population is acknowledged with a greater number of parliamentary seats, though small countries are still over-represented. So strengthening the parliament relative to the council boosts German influence." Back

Note 41: Gerald Livingston raises the question, why "Germany insisted on making itself so small?" In a corresponding article called "Liebes Heinzellaendchen", he continues "Germany 00, this is for the Americans a country like Holland or Denmark, only a little bigger and more boring! But, that's what the Germans exactly like about themselves." Back

Note 42: See: Leak Strains Germany's Relations With US: Cable About Gadhafi Also Fuels Infighting Among Schrüder Aides, The International Herald Tribune, May 23, 2001; German Cable on Quaddafi Sets Off Dispute, The New York Times, May 23, 01; Plain Speaking, Plain Cover-Up: The Leak of an Ambassador's Cable is Causing Red Faces and Rage, The Economist, May 26, 01. See also: America and the UN: Shameful All Around. Voting the US off the UN's Human-Rights Commission is bad for human rights, bad for all concerned, The Economist, May 12, 01. See EU and US Out of Step Over Macedonia, Financial Times London, May 28, 01; Alliance Needs Stronger Action in Macedonia: Former NATO Commander, Agence France Presse, May 27, 01; Rumsfeld Worries Allies by Call for US Troops Pullout in Bosnia, The International Herald Tribune, May 24, 01; Germany Condemns Albanian Parties'Dialogue With Rebels, Agence France Presse, May 24, 01; US Official Calls Macedonian Agreement "Unfortunate", Deutsche Presse-Agentur, May 24, 01; Macedonia. Last Piece in the Balkan Tragedy, The Economist, May 19, 01 Back

Note 43: Some experts in Washington in early 01 suggested, Schrüder's visit to DC - even though perceived as cold in Germany - may have convinced Bush of the necessity to cooperate with its European allies and Japan on global warming. The focus of Schrüder's visit on MD and global warming seems to reflect Germany's own political agenda - determined largely by its current social-democratic and green coalition, and representatives of the 68s generation in today's German government. It arguably also is a sad testimony of a very limited German foreign policy. Back

Note 44: See United States: Working out the world. George Bush's emerging foreign policy seems colder, and sharper than Bill Clinton's, but it isn't either 'hawkish'or 'isolationist', in: The Economist, March 31, 01, page 23 ff. Back

Note 45: Jackson Janes at AICGS in Washington argues, that, "while there is no lack of arguments over certain policy issues in the U. S., one hears more references in Germany to the need for a tougher stance against American hegemony". What was often overlooked in Germany was "the framework of American politics that will reflect a similar array of arguments, be it over national missile defense, climate control or the death penalty. Understanding that process better would improve the chances of influencing it, something Minister Fischer" seemed to have grasped better than some in Berlin. The Economist of April 28, 01 had a similar diagnosis: "European criticism reflects in exaggerated form the criticism made of Mr. Bush at home." See the New York Times, May 7, 01. Back

Note 46: See Missile defence tops German minister's trip to US, DPA, March 6, 01; Powell praises German role on missile defence, DPA, March 23, 01; See Moving Target. Among the Unknowns about Missile Defense is who the Enemy is, The Wall Street Journal, February 9, 01; US tries defusing allies'opposition to missile defense. Rumsfeld makes a case, the New York Times, February 3, 01; Shifts in Europe pose prickly challenge to US, the New York Times, February 11, 01; US Tries to defuse Opposition of Allies to a Missile Defense, the New York Times, Feb 11, 01; "Star Wars'and Europe: the mood is shifting, the New York Times, February 4, 01; Getting defensive. America and Europe should not let missile defenses come between them, in: the Economist, Feb 10, 01, page 24. Back

Note 47: See A Wunderkind Comes To Grief in Germany, The New York Times, Nov 21, 01; See US-Sicherheitsberaterin Rice sieht "neue Aera der Zusammenarbeit", DPA, July 26, 01; Russland droht nach Bonner Klimakonferenz mit Todesstoss fuer Kyoto - Putin-Berater: Russland noch nicht zur Ratifizierung bereit - Moskau sieht nationale Interessen gefaehrdet, Agence France Presse, July 23, 01; USA und Russland einigen sich ueberraschend auf Ruestungsdialog, DPA, July 22, 01; Fuer Bush life in Genua alles nach Wunsch - Putin ein Partner von Herbert Winkler, DPA, July 22, 01; Bush und Putin wollen NMD mit Abruestungsfragen verknuepfen, AP Worldstream - German, July 22, 01; Back

Note 48: Headlines from Germany. Ambassador Talks with Bush, Presents Credentials, www.germany-info.org/news6/ARRIVE.htm<, Aug 3, 01: "Ischinger remarked that the working visits to the US by Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer earlier this year had laid important groundwork for the handling of some of the more difficult bilateral and transatlantic issues. President Bush emphasized again how important good relations with Germany are to him"; Wieczorek-Zeul kritisiert Amerikas Raketenabwehrplaene, FAZ, July 26, 01; USA wollen sich Herausforderung durch Klimawandel nicht entziehen - Powell: Bonner Klimakompromiss "fuer die USA nicht akzeptabel", Agence France Presse, July 24, 01; Der boese Geist von Genua ueberschattet Bonner Klimagipfel, DPA, July 22, 01; G 8: Globalisierung hilft allen - Plaene fuer Krisengebiete - Uneins ueber Klimapolitik - Konsequenzen aus beispiellosen Krawallen, DPA, July 22, 01; Spitzendiplomat: USA und EU Fremdeln, TAZ, July 12, 01; See Der neue US-President, Namensartikel von Karsten D. Voigt, Koordinator für die deutsch-amerikanische Zusammenarbeit, in der Berliner Morgenpost vom 18.12.00; Das Deutsch-Amerikanische Verhältnis nach der Presidentenwahl, Interview mit Karsten Voigt, im DLF, Jan 2, 01; Die transatlantischen Beziehungen nach dem Regierungswechsel in den USA, SPIEGEL ONLINE, Feb 2, 01; See Getting to Know You: Germany's Foreign Minister Fischer's Visit to Washington. An AICGS at Issue Report, Jackson Janes, March 01: "The calls for Minister Fischer to confront the US on the Iraq bombings were extensive in Berlin, especially among the Greens. However, some Social Democrats were equally vocal, despite the low-key position of Chancellor Schroeder. Fischer's predecessor in office, Klaus Kinkel, was among the critics as was CDU foreign policy expert Karl Lamers, both accused the Minister of being too soft." Back

Note 49: See Putin and Blair Seek NATO-Russia Link, The New York Times, Nov 18, 01; Bush and Putin Agree to Reduce Stockpile of Nuclear Warheads, The New York Times, Nov 14, 01; Putin Urges A 'New Level' Of the Trust With America, The New York Times, Nov 11, 01; Suddenly, Such Good Neighbors, The Economist, Nov 10, 01; Back

Note 50: See Europe's Foreign Policy. Guess, Who Wasn't Coming To Dinner? The campaign against terror has exposed the problems of building a common European foreign policy: "It was ludicrous - but quite serious. The row over who was to be invited to dinner with Tony Blair at Downing Street on November 4th exposed just how self-obsessed the EU remains, even in the midst of a world crisis. And it also illustrated just how hard it will be to forge a common European foreign and security policy", the Economist, Nov 10, 01; Back

Note 51: Aznar nimmt Berlusconi in Schutz, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Jan 9, 02; Nach dem Ruecktritt von Ruggiero Rom: Deutschland und Frankreich innerhalb der EU zu dominant, SDA - Basisdienst Deutsch, Jan 9, 02. Back

Note 52: US-Ermittler beginnen mit Verhoeren in Guantanamo; Europaeische Bedenken in Washington zurueckgewiesen, AP Worldstream - Germany, Jan 23, 02; US Botschafter weist Kritik an Lagern fuer Afghanen zurueck, AP Worldstream - German, Jan 23, 02. Back

Note 53: See Reflecting the still influential role of German protest movements, as the ecological and peace movement. It also relates to a scholarly tradition of peace activism that was shaped as protest movement in the late 68s - representatives of which are now forming the government. See When Just Causes Conflict with Accepted Means: The German Peace Movement And Military Intervention in Bosnia, Alice H. Cooper, Political Science, University of Mississippi, German Politics and Society, Volume 15, Number 3, Fall 97; Susanne Cassel: Die Rolle von Think Tanks im US-Amerikanischen Politikberatungsproze, GACVS, Washington, DC, Spring 99; Germany: Gunning for Fischer, the Economist, 24th February 01. Back

Note 54: See Europe Acts to Build Own Military Force, the New York Times, November 20, 2000; European defence. A long march, in: the Economist, Feb 17, 01, page 54. Security experts in the U.S. argue for example in this regard: " I have met nobody in Germany during various interviews, who could tell and confirm me, where the money for ESDP and EDI definitively will and would come from." Back

Note 55: See The Roles of the US Military in the New Millenium. Executive Summary of the Cantigny Conference, Robert R. McCormick Tribune Foundation and Women in International Security, Sep 14 - 15, 01; Peacekeeping and War. No, They're Not Incompatible, The Economist, Aug 18, 01;A heart-rending but necessary war, The Economist, Nov 3, 01; After the rout, The Economist, Nov 17, 01; Back

Note 56: See for example: EU Crisis Response Capability. Institutions and Processes for Conflict Prevention and Management, International Crisis Group, Brussels, June 26, 01; Back

Note 57: See for example: Afghans Wait for Portents in Bonn Talks. Factions'First Meeting Seen as a Test of Intent, The New York Times, Nov 26, 01; US and 21 Other Nations Pledge Billions to Rebuild Afghanistan After the War Ends, The New York Times, Nov 21, 01; Back

Note 58: See Michaela Hertkorn: Conflict Prevention by the US, Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands: A Comparative Analysis of Actors and Theory, Berlin, Sep 01; Back

Note 59: In an interview of Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, by Christian Amanpour, CNN, Dec 1, 01 Holbrooke outlined three general options for the Bush administration after the defeat of the Taliban/Al Qeda in Afghanistan. First, a security force provided by one nation. This would "clearly not be a realistic option"; second, a UN peacekeeping force, fully reporting to UN. Reality in Somalia and Rwanda had shown the limits and deficiencies of such an approach; third, a multi-national peacekeeping/security force, not reporting to UN, for example provided by willing national governments. This was the "most promising option". Experience in Bosnia and Dayton had shown "you have to shrug it down their throats and enforce democracy and peace, otherwise the whole thing will fall apart". Back

Note 60: See German Greens Patch Rift And Support Use of Military, The New York Times, Nov 25, 01; Germany's Government. Still Edgy. Despite Winning a Vote of Confidence, the Chancellor is Rattled, The Economist, Nov 14, 01; German Leader Calls Vote of Confidence on Role in Afghanistan, The New York Times, Nov 14, 01; Pressing Greens, German Leader Wins Historic Vote on Sending Troops to Afghanistan, The New York Times, Nov 17, 01; Germany Ready to Send Force of 3,900; Not Clear if They Would Be Combat Soldiers, The New York Times, Nov 7, 01; Back

Note 61: DPA, Deutsche Presse Agentur, Jan 23, 02 Back