CIAO DATE: 01/02

International And Transatlantic Images Of Belonging:
The United States And Europe In The 21^st Century

This topic was suggested to me by a fellow academic. Other-directedness has normally appealed to me in intellectual affairs, for it has encouraged thought on subjects otherwise not on my agenda. But I am uncomfortable on this occasion. Explaining why I feel as if I have been offered what chess players’ refer to as a poisoned pawn allows immediate highlighting of the argument to be made. This research area seems to rest on a particular set of assumptions. Belonging needs to be reimagined because the world has changed. The nation-state is being hollowed out by global forces, making traditional national identities less and less adequate. That one response to such globalization has been the creation of narrow and vicious nationalisms lends to the task of reimagining considerable moral urgency. There is a good deal of sense to this implicit sociology, so reminiscent of Benjamin Barber’s contrast between Jihad and McWorld (Barber, 1996)—although vicious nationalism has perhaps been the norm rather than the exception within European history. In these circumstances, it makes obvious sense to think about transatlantic images of belonging. Vast movements of people and capital, membership of international regimes and the legacies of a single civilisation almost dictate thinking about identities other than the national. As I was born in England but have lived for many years in the United States and Canada, it might seem that I exemplify my subject. So I have been offered the seemingly seductive proposal of doing sociology by talking about myself—for I am the evidence of what they seek to establish.

I have neither a reckless desire to bite the hand that feeds me nor any wish to deny novelties to contemporary social conditions, but nonetheless kick against these pricks. More is involved than distaste for talking about myself. Basic mapping of the terrain to do with transatlantic images of belonging suggests considerations that run counter to the assumptions identified. Much depends upon drawing a distinction between two senses of transatlantic belonging: on the one side is membership in a transatlantic political entity, whether formal or informal, whilst on the other is a sense of belonging to a society other than that of the nation-state in which one resides. The first two parts of this paper offer some consideration of these two topics, evidence being drawn—regrettably—from North rather than from South America. Concluding comments offer more general reflections on global processes, the putative decline of the nation-state and the position of the United States within the world's political economy.

Two conceptual points should be borne in mind. First, particular attention is paid to a broad range of social identities. The vast majority of social interaction in the historical record has been local; the creation of national patterns of interaction is accordingly quintessentially modern. Where national identity is passive, nationalist identity is active—especially because it has ideas about the proper conduct of geopolitics. The determination to establish that the nation has its proper ‘place in the sun’ can and has led to conflict with those with internationalist identities. In late nineteenth century Europe, nationalists sought to control and cage foreign-policy making elites whose behavior was held to be altogether too internationally responsible. Finally, international interaction and identity is, although this is not always appreciated, different from the truly transnational (Mann, 1993). Second, a warning is in order about the celebrated notion of social construction. Everything in social life, and not just nationalism, is socially constructed. But to leave matters at this point can lead to licentious voluntarism, that is, to the implicit belief that anything can be constructed at any time. Nothing could be further from the truth: social structures limit and select ideological innovation. Attention here will certainly be given to structural as much as to ideological forces.

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