It is possible that the peace process has no future under a Likud government. With the Israeli elections behind us and a Likud government in power, there remain many doubts as to the future of the Arab-Israeli peace process in the hands of the new Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu. Such a conclusion, however, may be too hasty, and indeed the national pastime in Israel since the 29 May elections has been to try to fathom just what Netanyahu intends to do.

Before concluding that this government will not genuinely pursue peace, we must consider a number of factors. Netanyahu is not working in a vacuum; there will be some restraints upon his activities which may press him toward a genuine effort to complete the peace process.

Pressures Toward Peace?

(1) The first and perhaps most important restraint is that of Israeli public opinion. The results of the elections were not an indication that the Israeli public does not favor the peace process. Even if though the fate of this process was at issue in these elections, the voting public for the most part did not believe it was making a choice between continuing or halting this process. The contrary was true. A majority of the Israeli public -- usually around sixty-five percent -- support the Oslo Accords. In fact, a study of virtually all the public opinion polls on security issues over the last twenty-eight years has indicated a steady shift amongst the public to what could be termed a "dovish" view. ₁ Just after the 1967 Six-Day War over eighty percent of Israelis opposed ceding the territories for peace; but by the late 1980s and early 1990s over fifty- five percent favored such a trade. This was a gradual shift in opinion, the only dramatic upswing occurring during the Intifada. Even support for the idea of a Palestinian state increased, from some twenty percent willing to accept such an option in 1987 to a forty per cent in 1995. By the time the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993, the Israeli people were ready for compromise. In the ensuing three years, support wavered, depending upon events (namely terror attacks), but it never fell below the fifty percent mark, and it normally varied between sixty and sixty-five percent.

The fact that the public wanted peace was clear to both candidates for the Premiership. The fact that the majority of Israelis supported the peace process is what prompted Netanyahu, as the election campaign began, to abandon his proclaimed opposition to the Oslo Accords and promise their implementation. Thus both major parties campaigned on the slogan of peace; most voters believed (and many on both sides of the political divide continue to believe) that neither candidate would veer significantly from the path laid out by Oslo or even the effort to engage Syria in the peace process. The only issue in the mind of the public was security, defined by how fast (or slowly) and in what ways the peace process would be continued. ₂ The conclusion, therefore, may be that public opinion could prevent Netanyahu from straying from the peace negotiations. One should not, however, count on a no-confidence vote to enforce this opinion, for under the electoral reform, a no-confidence vote for the governing coalition will dissolve the Knesset as well -- and there are few politicians who will be willing to risk another election, at least until the last year of their office. Yet, public opinion could still be an important factor, since a politician, including a Prime Minister, who wants to be reelected in four years may feel compelled to proceed genuinely toward peace.

(2)A second restraining factor often mentioned both in Israel and abroad is that of American pressure. Netanyahu places great value on the relationship with the United States, as evidenced not only by his American background but by the fact that he journeyed to the United States to meet with President Clinton only days after his government was in place. It would appear unlikely, however, for Washington to bring significant pressure on an Israeli government in a run-up to US elections. That may be why we heard Clinton and Secretary of State Warren Christopher mouth the Likud election slogan of "Peace with Security," in their talks with the new Israeli government. Whether there will be pressure after the elections is difficult to determine at this stage.

It is also not certain that American pressure would have any effect on Netanyahu's government. There is a traditional disdain in the Likud, and part of its electorate, for dependence upon the United States and especially for dictates from outside. Whereas there is a history of Labor governments' bowing to American pressures, the Likud has proved itself generally willing to ignore them. ₃ The outstanding case was that of the U.S. loan guarantees that Prime Minister Itzhak Shamir was willing to forego in 1991 so as to continue his settlement policy in the occupied territories. Since these loans were intended to assist in the absorption of the hundreds of thousands of Russian immigrants to the country, Shamir's decision most likely contributed to the Likud's loss of the 1992 elections. ₄ It is not clear, however, that any lesson will have been learned from this, although it is also uncertain that past Likud behavior will be repeated in the future.

(3) A third restraint upon Netanyahu, preventing too great a digression from the peace process, may be in the economic sphere. The past three years saw a significant peace dividend for the Israeli economy. With the prospect of stability, foreign investment in Israel increased, and economic opportunities opened up as Israel was accepted into much of the Muslim and Arab world. The number of countries maintaining relations with Israel virtually doubled in this period, leading to commercial ventures, trade agreements, tourism, and other economic benefits, along with and in part emanating from Israeli participation in region-wide economic conferences. It was quite clear that such acceptance, certainly in the Muslim and Arab world, was the direct result of Israel's agreements with the Palestinians. The fact that Qatar and Oman have now suspended accords made with Israel early in 1996, are probably only the first signs of the kind of economic penalty Israel is likely to experience if it is perceived to be abandoning or purposely stalling the peace process. The sharp fall in the Tel Aviv stock market (and of some Israeli companies on the New York exchange) demonstrated the volatility of the situation. Inasmuch as Netanyahu has focused a good deal of his policy since the elections (he barely mentioned it before being elected) on a massive economic reorganization and reform based on full privatization, he may be sensitive to the economic price connected with failure to bring the peace process to fruition.

(4) A fourth restraint that could influence Netanyahu is Jordan. The peace with Jordan is extremely popular in Israel. Of all its neighbors, and even before the founding of the State of Israel in 1948, the Jordanians were always the least averse to dealing with Zionists. Aside from the Six-day War, which was of course fatal for Jordanian control over the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Amman was not a party to the post-independence wars between Israel and the Arab states. Nor was terrorism from Jordan a frequent occurrence, particularly after the bloody expulsion of the PLO from that country in 1970. The peace with Jordan is also fully supported by the Likud and its constituents, in some cases perhaps because of the belief that Jordan, with its two-thirds Palestinian population, can be the future "Palestinian State" rather than the West Bank. Whatever the reasons, the popularity of the peace with Jordan does lend weight to pressures King Hussein might bring were the peace process to falter. Jordan like Egypt has a stake in the fulfillment of the process, and, while it has no obligation toward (or regard for) Syria, it does feel bound by the Palestinian issue. It may be expected, therefore, to bring some pressure, although it is, obviously, unclear as to how effective such pressure would be on Netanyahu.

(5) Finally, there are other factors arguing in favor of a Netanyahu interest in reaching peace. There are those who say that the young Prime Minister wants to go down in history as the man who brought peace; there are those who say that, like Menachem Begin before him (or Nixon), it is a right-wing leader who can make the historic compromise. Even if one were to accept the idea that Netanyahu had anywhere near the stature, moral authority or popular support Menachem Begin had, it must be remembered that Begin did not give up "Eretz Israel" (Land of Israel, namely the West Bank) but rather the Sinai. Using this logic, Netanyahu could be expected, at most, to make a deal over the Golan, but not peace with the Palestinians. Moreover, while it is incontestable that a right-wing leader could make peace, and have a somewhat easier time in selling it to the public than a left-wing leader, the question is not if he can but if he will.

It is said that Netanyahu is a pragmatist, rather than an ideologue like Shamir, or Begin. If this is the case, some or all of the above factors may well guide him, reluctantly or otherwise, to bring the peace process to fruition. There are, however, a number of other factors which militate against this.

Likud Intransigence?

(1) The first major impediment which might stand in the way of Netanyahu taking the kinds of steps necessary for the achievement of peace is the ideology, platform and history of his party, Likud. The Likud basically stands for the idea of Greater Israel or, put negatively, opposition to any concession regarding the territory of the Land of Israel (Eretz Israel). When it comes to Eretz Israel, its position has been one of "peace for peace." This is based on the underlying belief in what Americans might call manifest destiny, or, in the case of Israel, the historic and religious right of the Jewish people to the Land of Israel. It is also based on the idea, tactically, that if Israel proves its overriding strength to the Arabs and "holds out," the Arabs will ultimately accept Israel's presence -- without any territorial compromise. In this view, those who are willing to sacrifice land for peace are merely faint-hearted or, worse, capitulationist. Further, there is the idea that "the Arabs only understand force" so that by compromising, Israel would be demonstrating weakness which, in turn, would merely invite Arab aggression. There is, therefore, little if anything in the Likud's philosophy, past or present, that would allow for the territorial agreements in the West Bank necessary to a peace accord with the Palestinians. Nor is there anything there to prevent -- indeed the opposite is true -- further exploitation and settlement of this territory by Israel.

(2) A second impediment, no less important than the first, is the composition of the government, both in terms of personalities and the Likud's coalition partners. In addition to individuals such as Raphael Eitan (Raful) and Ariel Sharon, along with other more palatable but nonetheless maximalists such as Beni Begin and Dan Meridor, there are parties in the governing coalition that vehemently oppose any territorial compromise much less self-determination for the Palestinians. Raful's Tsomet Party, which linked with the Likud for the elections, and especially the National Religious Party (NRP), which more than any other party represents the settler population, are hard-line components of the coalition. Their views coincide with those of the Likud on Greater Israel and were clearly reflected in the coalition guidelines. They can be expected to bring a great deal of pressure to bear should Netanyahu look as if he is willing to make a compromise.

It is true that Netanyahu has more power than any previous Prime Minister as a result of the electoral reform, and he also has tried to introduce a Presidential type of concentrated decision-making power. However, the Israeli system is still built upon a coalition form of government, with actual voting by the coalition members of the government (what would in the US be called members of the cabinet) in decision-making. The new Prime Minister was made amply aware of this even as he tried to put his government together on the basis of merit rather than party considerations. Therefore, even with the added powers accorded by the reform, Netanyahu will not be free of the ideological and political restraints placed upon him by his coalition partners. And some of these can be expected to oppose many of the steps necessary for the achievement of peace.

(3) A third impediment may be Netanyahu's electorate. While many people voted for him believing that he would have little choice (or inclination) to follow any but the policies already introduced by Labor on the peace accords, the core of his sup- porters against former Prime Minister Shimon Peres came from the settler movement and its radical religious supporters. They may not be particularly numerous ₅ , but this highly vocal and active group has a forceful way of making its opinions known, and possibly accepted. For this reason, it constitutes an important part of Netanyahu's electorate that he may not want to risk alienating.

(4) Finally, there are the views of the Prime Minister himself, which may provide an impediment to fulfillment of the Oslo Accords and the achievement of peace. As noted above, Netanyahu was opposed to Oslo from the outset and through the Oslo II agreements of 1995, changing his official position only in time for the elections. There is nothing, however, in any of his statements, writings or speeches to indicate a willingness to make concessions. He has clearly stated not only his opposition to a Palestinian state but also to separation and anything more than what could be called functional autonomy for the Palestinians to run daily matters in their cities (and possibly villages). He is adamantly opposed to even discussing a formalization of the rights of Palestinians in East Jerusalem, and he has rejected the principle of territory for peace as a basis for negotiations with the Syrians as well as the Palestinians.

Netanyahu's Plan For Peace?

It is far from clear exactly what Netanyahu intends to do, but he may be following a plan that he reportedly presented to President Clinton in their talks in Washington in early July and sent to Arafat. While claiming to intend full implementation of Oslo, the plan actually does alter these accords in several ways. It changes the timetable, creates pre-conditions, refuses to meet with Arafat except under certain conditions, postpones redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) -- throwing the Oslo II accord open to renegotiation regarding redeployment. It also suspends the negotiations for a final status agreement.

Stage One

According to this three-stage plan, the first stage is to close all institutions of the Palestine Authority in (East) Jerusalem. While this issue is not covered by the Oslo accords, there was an accompanying letter from Peres, as Foreign Minister, ensuring the continued function of PLO offices in the city. The term "institution" is used by the government presumably so as to include Orient House, which has been a major target of the Likud for some time. Any activity there remotely connected with the Palestine Authority, including consultations attended by members of the Authority or the Palestine Council, such as Hanan Ashrawi or Saeb Erakat, have been banned; if they persist, Orient House apparently will be closed. Further, it is difficult to determine just what constitutes an institution of the Palestine Authority. The term could refer, obviously, to direct organs of the Authority, such as the police or a ministry, but it could also be construed to include recipients of Authority funds, for example, the Palestine broadcasting service.

The second element of the first stage is to ensure that there is no terrorism. The previous government had also demanded action against terrorism, as did the Oslo accords. In fact, following the Hamas and Islamic Jihad attacks in late February-early March, the Palestine Authority had cracked down on terrorism. As part of the plan, however, the prevention of terrorism becomes a pre-condition for continuing the process. Moreover, it is vague about how to determine that the condition has been met. Are there specific acts the Palestinians must undertake, such as particular arrests or handing over of suspects; does it mean that there have been no attempts even if foiled; how long does one wait to rule that the absence of terrorism has been assured?

Stage Two

Leaving this issue open-ended, stage two is, apparently being approached. At this stage, provided there is no terrorism, the level of talks with the Palestinians is to be raised. Presumably the meeting between Foreign Minister David Levy with Arafat at the Erez checkpoint on 23 July is the beginning of this step. Similarly there is to be an easing of the closure barring Palestinians from entering Israel proper. The government has announced that it will gradually raise the number of Palestinians allowed to work inside Israel from 25,000 to the 60,000 permitted prior to the closure imposed in March. Also in stage two will be resumption of the government's support for international financial aid to the Palestinian Authority (although suspension of this support violated the commitment made by the previous government, without preconditions).

Stage Three

At the third stage, provided there is no terrorism, the government will open discussion on the issue of the redeployment of the Israeli Defense Forces in Hebron. This step is also apparently being undertaken at this time, although according to Oslo II there should have been no need for discussion. The plan for redeployment, originally scheduled by Oslo II for March 1996, was not only thoroughly worked out, the IDF was already prepared for the move prior to the elections and by the mid-June date to which the redeployment had been postponed by Peres. It is probably safe to say that some kind of altered withdrawal will be worked out for Hebron, constituting, perhaps, only a minor violation of Oslo. However, according to the plan, once the Hebron redeployment is resolved, discussions will be opened regarding the additional redeployments. These are redeployments scheduled by Oslo II to begin in September, whereby the IDF is to expand its withdrawal from the cities of the West Bank (area A) to withdrawals from currently shared areas outside the cities (Area B). It would appear that the government plans to renegotiate Oslo II, and one must wonder if it actually intends to withdraw the army from additional territory in the West Bank, beyond the cities already evacuated and parts of Hebron, though it could hand over the functioning of villages to the locals (a minimum required by the arduous negotiations that took place in 1995).

Will The Peace Process Be Derailed?

Only after all of this, stage three will see the commencement of the final status talks. The Oslo Accords call for these negotiations to begin no later than May 1996 and to be completed within three years. Actually the Labor government had fulfilled the first part of the obligation, opening the talks on time and recessing them until after the elections. The Likud would appear to have suspended these final status negotiations, pending the implementation of its various stages and conditions, in clear violation of Oslo.

As far as the Israeli public is concerned, a slow-down in the implementation of Oslo is acceptable; for many it is even desirable. There are some questions, however. First, is this merely a slowdown, and if so for how long, or is it an inten- tional and indefinite stalling, similar to that admittedly planned by Shamir in the negotiations opened in Madrid in 1991? Secondly, will -- or can -- the Palestinians tolerate a slowdown, and for how long, given the likely accompaniment of a weakening of Arafat's authority and a rise in Palestinian frustration? This issue is no less complicated by the fact that both problems (Arafat's authority and Palestinian frustration) had already been aggravated by the long and difficult closure imposed by the previous government, to say nothing of the less than satisfactory nature of the Oslo II agreement in the eyes of the Palestinians, the failure by Israel fully to implement its obligations under Oslo, particularly in the release of prisoners, and the continued Israeli occupation of most of the West Bank and parts of the Gaza Strip.

Thirdly, there is the question as to whether or not certain things will happen actually to derail the whole process. There might be a move by the settlers to establish new settlements, and/or expropriate additional land and water, in the West Bank and in Jerusalem. Indeed, such moves , which could hardly be resisted by Netanyahu and his coalition, have already begun in both areas (e.g., the takeover of additional Palestinian houses in the village of Silwan in East Jerusalem the day after the Israeli elections). In response to the government’s subsequently announced plans for the expansion of settlements, Arafat has called upon the Palestinians to resist “by any means.” Failure fully to redeploy the IDF, long delays and dragged out negotiations or intransigence on critical issues in the final status talks all threaten to derail the peace process. And somewhere in these events there will be a terrorist attack. An attack is almost a certainty inasmuch as even the Israeli army of occupation was never able entirely to prevent terrorism. Moreover, one may expect the ranks of the Palestinian extremists (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine -- which opposed the peace process) to grow in response to the delays, frustration, land expropriation, settlement activity and so forth. Indeed it is virtually certain that the process would be set back as the result of a terrorist attack. Then the Israeli army may return to cities in the West Bank (possibly temporarily, for security reasons). In response to the situation -- as a result of possibly any of the above occurences -- there will be clashes with the Palestinians, and, ultimately, full-scale intifada (this time with armed resistance) on the part of the Palestinians.

A fatal flaw in Netanyahu's three-stage plan is that it hinges upon the issue of terrorism. Terrorism is the one single factor which most determined the outcome of the Israeli elections; Netanyahu has chosen the absence of terrorism as the major condition permitting movement toward peace. Yet terrorism is not the real problem. Israel has lost approximately 500 persons to terrorism since its establishment in 1948. But it has lost over 11,000 combatants in war. War, not terror, is Israel's greatest security problem, and security can only come with peace.

The second fatal flaw in Netanyahu’s strategy is that Israel is still faced with the basic difference between the Labor Zionist tradition and those of the Revisionists, embodied today by Labor and the Likud, respectively. ₆ This is an ideological difference between Labor’s traditional concern for the quality of the society to be built by the Jews in the Land of Israel, on the one hand, and, the Revisionists' dedication to the territory of the Land of Israel. In practical terms, it is the difference between a willingness to trade "land for peace" and holding out for "greater Israel." The Likud believes that the Palestinians will ultimately have to accept Israel, and its conquests, agreeing to "peace for peace." It fails to recognize that there are two peoples, Israelis and Palestinians, laying claim to this same piece of land. The two million Palestinians are neither going to disappear nor indefinitely suffer occupation, giving up any idea of freedom. An Intifada will break out. Over time the Arab states will be unable to maintain a normalization with Israel and ultimately there is a strong chance of another war. For the forseeable future, the election of the Likud puts an end to the realistic prospect of peace, and most certainly there will be more terrorism.

Note 1: Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir, The Dynamics of Israeli Public Opinion on Peace and The Territories, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, 1993 and Ya'cov Shamir and Michal Shamir, " Trends in Israeli Public Opinion on the Subject of Territories and Peace: Constraints and Preferences" in Dan Caspi, Communications and Democracy in Israeli Society, Kibbutz HaMeuchad, forthcoming, in Hebrew. Back.

Note 2: There were many other aspects of the elections, most notably the large sectoral vote which resulted from the reform instituted in these elections (separate ballots for Knesset parties and for the Prime Minister). These sectoral votes (for the religious parties, an ethnic religious party, an immigrant party and the Arab parties) were not connected with the peace issue; most of these parties would have gone with either major party in a coalition. Inasmuch as Labor won more seats than the Likud, were it not for the reform, the party setting up the coalition would have been Labor. Back.

Note 3: In 1975, for example, Kissinger suspended contacts with Israel for six months, until then Prime Minister Rabin agreed to his proposals for an interim agreement with Egypt. Back.

Note 4: The Russians voted for Labor. This was probably the kind of protest vote expected from immigrant groups, as evidenced by the fact that the Russians voted overwhelmingly for their own party in the 1996 elections, also as a protest vote. Back.

Note 5: There are roughly 130,000 settlers; it is difficult to determine how many radical religious supporters they have from among the the ultra-orthodox or national religious inside Israel. Back.

Note 6: Actually the Revisionists are the forefathers of Herut, the larger, dominant party in the Likud, which also contains the remnants of the Liberal Party. Back.

Note *: Dr. Galia Golanis the Jay and Loni Darwin Professor of Russian and East European Studies in the Political Science Department of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. A frequent media commentator, she is a spokesperson for Peace Now and a member of the executive of Meretz. She is presently a visiting scholar at the Center for International Relations at UCLA. Back.

Note **: Working Paper #11 for