CIAO DATE: 04/02

The European Parliament’s Role in Scrutinising Defence and Security: An Uncertain Future

Catriona Gourlay

February 1999

The International Security Information Service

Executive Summary

The European Parliament’s (EP) role in scrutinising European Union (EU) security and defence policy is currently in question. The issue of the structure and resources available for parliamentary oversight of these matters is being discussed in the context of the EP’s recommendations to the next parliament on the organisation of its work. These recommendations, to be adopted in March, will include proposals for restructuring EP Committees.

The EP’s administration favours a rationalisation of the Committee structure so as to prioritise the EP’s legislative work without increasing overall costs. In line with this reasoning, proposals include the creation of a new Committee on Enlargement and the reduction in the number of existing Committees. In order to achieve this, it has been suggested that the EP abolish its only two Sub-Committees. These both serve the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defence Policy ₁ which would, as a result, be required to take over their work. There are also suggestions to replace the Sub-Committee on Human Rights with a permanent rapporteur for human rights and the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament with a delegation for liaison with inter-parliamentary assemblies. In contrast, some Members support up-grading them to full Committees. Opinion on the fate of the Sub-Committees remains split.

It would be perverse for the EP to reduce its role in scrutinising security and defence policy just as key EU member states have revived the debate on how to best enhance EU competencies and operational capacities in this area. Recent statements by the British, French and German ministers indicate that there is a new political momentum in favour of enhanced co-operation in defence and the integration of the WEU into the EU. It is therefore likely that the next parliamentary term will coincide with a fundamental re-evaluation and restructuring of EU institutional capacities in security and defence, leading, perhaps, to a greater role for the EU in deciding and implementing military actions in closer co-operation with NATO. Moreover, the next Intergovernmental Conference might take place as early as 2000 and would provide an opportunity to facilitate (or check) these developments.

This paper argues that the only way in which the EP can maintain and enhance its role in the scrutiny of defence policy is to create a Committee for Security, Defence and Disarmament in addition to a Committee on Foreign Affairs. Such a Committee would be responsible for the oversight of developments in EU security and defence policy and the European Security and Defence Identity. The Committee should be tasked with enhancing the EP’s dialogue with the High Representative on matters of security and defence and its co-operation with national parliaments as well as inter-parliamentary assemblies. This would: allow sufficient time for informed debate on security and defence issues; improve the continuity of decision-making and, thereby, the quality of reports and recommendations; and enhance the expertise and authority of the EP in this area.

The Committee could also improve the EP’s co-operation with national and inter-parliamentary assemblies (the Western European Union Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly and the OSCE Assembly) by holding hearings with representatives from them and encouraging the harmonisation of views expressed in some WEU and EP reports. Only by pooling expertise and combining national and supranational institutional approaches more effectively can the intergovernmental development of EU security and defence policy be held democratically accountable.

 

Part I. Future challenges for EU security and defence policy

The development of the EU’s capacity for crisis management

The debate on the development of European Security and Defence Identity has been revitalised since the British adopted a new attitude to European defence co-operation last year. The so-called ‘British initiative’ was introduced at the informal EU Council in Pörtschach in October 1998 where Tony Blair called for ‘fresh thinking’ on how to co-operate more closely on defence. This was further developed in Blair’s address to the 44th Annual Session of the North Atlantic Assembly in Edinburgh in November 1998. Blair proposed that the EU’s role in crisis management be improved and the decision-making process simplified by abolishing the WEU and forging direct links between the EU and NATO. To achieve this the EU would create a fourth pillar for defence which would take over the WEU’s political tasks and organise ‘soft’ security functions such as policing, verification, election monitoring and emergency assistance, while most of the WEU’s military functions would be taken over by NATO.

While this proposal did not initially appear to support the French insistence on enhancing Europe’s independent capacity for military action, the British later dropped their objection to the integration of the WEU and EU and declared their readiness to consider the strengthening of the WEU. The convergence of French and British positions was confirmed at the Franco-British summit in St. Malo in December 1998. In a ‘Joint Declaration on European defence’ the two countries spelt out the need for ‘the Union to have the capacity of autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so.

It remains unclear from these statements whether the Europe’s military capacity will be strengthened within the framework of the WEU, but there are a number of indications that political decisions relating to European security and defence will be increasingly taken within the EU framework. For example, the first ever informal meeting of EU defence ministers took place, at the request of the Austrian Presidency, in November 1998 and Foreign Affairs ministers regularly discuss matters of European security in the General Affairs Council. The General Affairs Council is therefore likely to become a more important venue for such discussion than the bi-annual Ministerial Councils of the WEU. Moreover, Germany has long supported the integration of the WEU and the EU and, at the last General Affairs Council in January 1999, Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer suggested combining the posts of Mr or Mrs CFSP and the Secretary General of the WEU and consolidating their secretariats as a first step towards this goal.

The contention that the EU is slowly assuming the political functions of the WEU is further supported by the development of a direct relationship between the EU and NATO. In December 1998, the then President of the EU Council, Wolfgang Schüssel, met with the Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, for the first time and concluded that he was in favour of continuing regular and perhaps one day ‘formal’ contacts between the EU Presidency and the Atlantic Alliance. It is also rumoured that Javier Solana may become a European Commissioner which, even if not realised, indicates a willingness to enhance the relationship between the two organisations.

Furthermore, the next Intergovernmental Conference to carry forward the institutional reforms not dealt with at Amsterdam may well be launched during the Portuguese Presidency in 2000. This could provide an opportunity for further clarification of the relationship between the WEU and EU, following the call on the WEU and EU to develop closer institutional co-operation in Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty. Should the current momentum of proposals for strengthening European Defence be maintained, this IGC might also address the role of the European Parliament and the WEU Assembly in scrutinising EU security and defence.

The EP is the only directly elected body that can monitor developments across institutions and trans-nationally. As such, it will need to monitor these developments closely, provide adequate time and resources for their debate in Committee and for the production of reports on relevant issues.

EU action in conflict prevention, armaments and disarmament

While the EU’s institutional and operational arrangements for crisis management remain unsettled and controversial, the EU is increasingly undertaking non-military actions in response to common security and defence challenges. To name but a few recent examples, the European Council has: agreed a Joint Declaration on conflict prevention in Africa, adopted a Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and regulations for dual-use technology exports; established programmes to deal with de-mining and the illicit trade in conventional weapons; and adopted a Joint Action on small arms. The Council and the Commission have also been active in support of the rationalisation and consolidation of the European defence industry.

There is every indication that EU activity in these areas is likely to become more intense as the EU seeks to implement its recently agreed actions and programmes. For example, it is likely that the next Parliament will be required to scrutinise and encourage the EU’s implementation of the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and monitor how the applicant states, who have already signed up to its principles, will be able to implement its provisions. Similarly, the EP should respond to the recent Joint Action on small arms and the Council’s Programme on illicit trafficking and monitor their budgetary provisions and implementation by the Commission and Member States. With regards to EU conflict prevention initiatives, the EP Committees responsible for development co-operation and security and disarmament should seek to pool their expertise in the scrutiny of and support for nascent EU programmes which deal with issues such as security sector reform, demobilisation of armed forces, weapons collection schemes, police training, and customs training.

Concerted EU action is already common with regards to disarmament initiatives such as the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the agreement of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the agreement of the Treaty to Ban Landmines, and the implementation of the Chemical Weapons and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conventions.

The recent Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests testify that the current global non-proliferation regime is strained and the next five years are likely to witness thorough re-evaluation of the West’s non-proliferation strategy. Significant differences within the NATO Alliance are already in evidence. Where the US favours the development of anti-ballistic missiles capacities and counter-proliferation (pre-emptive attack against potential proliferators) the European nations have a preference for bolstering confidence in the current regime by actively engaging in multilateral disarmament initiatives. For example, non-nuclear EU states resisted heavy US pressure and abstained from or supported a resolution in the UN General Assembly calling for a package of nuclear disarmament initiatives. This cleavage in the Alliance was also demonstrated by (the reactions to) Joschka Fischer’s suggestion to review NATO’s nuclear first-use strategy. The EP should closely monitor, debate and make recommendations on the development of EU Non-Proliferation policy.

Similarly, the EU could provide invaluable assistance to implementing the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) which is due to agree a verification protocol in the next year. Without such a protocol and the agreement to fund its implementation, the BTWC will remain an unworkable statement of principle only. The EU will also need to address the issue of financial assistance for the implementation of biological and chemical weapons treaty obligations with applicant states to the EU, and third countries such as Russia. There is ample evidence that without such assistance, efforts to tackle the threat of use of biological and chemical weapons by state or non-state actors will be severely impaired. The EP needs to be fully aware of these threats and scrutinise EU efforts to meet them.

 

Part II. Scrutiny of security and defence by the EP: the status quo

The production of EP reports

The Foreign Affairs Committee is obliged to produce an annual report on the Chapter III Provisions regarding the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy and an annual report on Human Rights outside the Union. It is also entitled to produce reports in response to Commission Communications and at the initiative of its Members. Under Rule 148 of the EP, the Foreign Affairs Committee can also work on three so-called ‘own-initiative’ reports at any one time, whereas other Committees are limited to two. It is granted the ability to consider more reports than other Committees because it is the only Committee with two Sub-Committees. Own initiative reports are allocated in accordance with a points system which reflects the relative strengths of political groups.

Over the past five years, the Foreign Affairs Committee has agreed six reports on issues relating to defence and security. These reports were all discussed at least twice in an ‘exchange of views’ in the Sub-Committee for Security and Disarmament before being submitted to the full Committee for amendment. The six reports were on: the EU’s policy on the extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (Jan Wiersma, PSE, 1995); the formulation of perspectives for the common security policy of the European Union (Leo Tindemans, PPE, 1996); challenges facing the European defence-related industry, a contribution for action at European level (Gary Titley, PSE, 1997); the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the European Union (Leo Tindemans, PPE, 1998); implementing European Union strategy on defence-related industries (Gary Titley, PSE, 1998); and on strategies for using military resources for environmental purposes (Maj Britt Theorin, PSE, 1998).

The process by which these reports were formulated, debated, amended and adopted is instructive with regards to the efficiency of the current Committee and Sub-Committee structures. Preliminary debate is scheduled to take place in the Sub-Committee. This should prepare the groundwork for the decision-making process in the Foreign Affairs Committee which, accordingly, allots little time for debate. This functions well in some cases such as the Wiersma report on the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the second Tindemans’ report. For example, discussions on the second Tindemans’ report on the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the EU prompted the rapporteur to introduce significant revisions to the text in advance of the amendments procedure in the Committee on Foreign Affairs. The result was that the version submitted for amendment already represented compromise positions, and was therefore passed with relatively few amendments and overwhelming support. Thus early debate helped to ensure a coherent report and simplified the decision-making process.

Where the substance of a report is controversial within political groups, however, attempts to reconcile significant policy differences are inevitably internalised within the group structures. Where groups fail to agree a common position, this can lead to chaotic decision-making procedure. This was the case with Titley’s first report on challenges facing the defence related industries. Over 200 amendments were submitted in Committee, including many from other Socialists, and voting on amendments in Committee and the Plenary session was not in accordance with Group voting lists. In contrast, the amendment process on the second Titley report showed evidence of greater co-ordination within the Groups. The Socialist Group submitted a limited number of previously agreed amendments as did the Liberal and Green groups. Thus, where opinion on reports is divided within political groups, internal group debates are often more decisive than debates in either the Sub-Committee or the full Committee.

The passage of the first Tindemans report on perspectives for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Theorin report on strategies for using military resources for environmental purposes highlight problems associated with the division of the reporting process between two committees. In both cases the debate in the Sub-Committee was not representative of the composition of views in the full Committee. In the case of the Tindemans report, strong criticism in the Sub-Committee led to the division of the report into two parts — one on security policy, one on defence policy. Tindemans was, therefore, allegedly very surprised when his first report met no substantial resistance in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Conversely, the debates on the Theorin report in the Sub-Committee gave no indication of the amendments introduced by Foreign Affairs Committee members where these arguably resulted in the agreement of a less coherent and focused report. The absence of continuity in the reporting process therefore diminishes the democratic benefit of debate in the Sub-Committee while at the same time depriving the members of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the progress achieved at the Sub-Committee level.

These difficulties are directly attributable to the fact that the two Committees are not coterminous and they are exacerbated by the fact that Sub-Committee is dogged by chronically poor attendance which, in turn, is directly attributable to its lack of decision-making power. The division of the reporting process into two structures is therefore not ideal. It reduces the effectiveness of specialist debate in the Sub-Committee, undermines general debate in the full Committee, and further degrades transparency in the reporting process. The logical solution to these problems would be to transform the Sub-Committee into a full Committee, thereby enhancing the effectiveness, transparency and democracy of debate on security and defence. In the EP.

Monitoring EU security and defence, producing ‘urgency’ resolutions and recommendations to the Council.

Monitoring developments in security and defence

The Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament is the venue in which parliamentarians are informed of current developments within the EU, WEU, NATO and the OSCE, on disarmament negotiations within the UN and on a number of security issues relevant to the EU. Many eminent members of the above organisations as well as experts from Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and research institutes are invited to conduct such briefings and the Sub-Committee secretariat ensures that Members are provided with suitable background documentation. The Sub-Committee undoubtedly performs this educational ‘briefing’ function well and it has enhanced the ability of its Members to scrutinise the institutions of the EU, to formulate relevant questions to the Council and Commission, and to pass timely and pro-active resolutions in accordance with the urgency procedure.

Urgency resolutions

Urgency resolutions, in accordance with rule 47, are hastily agreed between the co-ordinators of political groups shortly before they are submitted for vote in the EP plenary. This process by-passes the Committee structures entirely and provides very little opportunity for members to be involved in the debate or agreement of compromise texts. Nevertheless the procedure is useful in so far as allows the EP to comment on on emerging crises in a timely fashion and it is popular with political groups precisely because they are able to control the process outside the Committee structures. However, the urgency procedure is consistently criticised for producing poor quality compromise texts and is regarded with some scepticism by Council and Commission. One way to address these concerns and to improve members’ scrutiny and involvement in the procedure would be for the relevant Committee to meet in Strasbourg to discuss the most important urgency resolutions and agree compromise texts.

While the Sub-Committee and full-Committee have no direct role in the formulation of urgency resolutions their meetings can indirectly prompt such action. There are numerous examples of effective EP urgency resolutions passed after relevant discussions in the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament. Recent examples relating Council initiatives include two resolutions calling on the Council to agree comprehensive and restrictive criteria for the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and resolutions in support of the treaty to ban landmines and in support of an increased allocation of EU funds for de-mining programmes.

Recommendations

Rule 92, providing for recommendations within the framework of the common foreign and security policy, allows the Foreign Affairs Committee to amend and agree a recommendation to the Council after which it is submitted to the vote in plenary without the possibility of further amendment or discussion. One recent example is Per Gahrton’s recommendation that the Council should explore the feasibility of establishing a civilian peace corps The Sub-Committee’s only potential role in this procedure is that it may propose that the Foreign Affairs Committee formulate such a recommendation. This rule has been applied infrequently partly because political groups prefer to use the urgency procedure over which they have absolute control. The recommendation procedure is also weakened by the fact that there is no possibility for debate or amendment in plenary.

It would seem desirable for the process of recommendation from Committee to be enhanced in the next legislature since it is more democratic and holds more weight the urgency procedure under rule 47. Adopting greater use of recommendations would be an extremely effective way of enhancing the EP’s voice in CFSP policy-making. However, it would only be possible if a full Committee was able to provide the necessary scrutiny to such recommendations.

Co-operating with other assemblies

Co-operation between the European Parliament and the Assembly of the Western European Union (WEU) and the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA) is currently conducted through the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament whereas the Sub-Committee on Human Rights co-operates with the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) and the OSCE Assembly on matters relating to human rights and the enhancing of democracy. The EP enjoys a different relationship with each of these inter-parliamentary assemblies and there are various forms of co-operation between the EP and national assemblies yet it is widely recognised that, in all cases, the relations between the EP and these inter-parliamentary assemblies could be improved.

There are also, however, obvious limits to how far increased co-operation with these assemblies can enhance the democratic scrutiny of the defence and security organisations to which they are attached. These assemblies are not directly democratically elected and therefore do not enjoy the same legitimacy as the EP. They also lack any legislative or budgetary power over the organisations to which they relate and, consequently, can only play a consultative role which provides for ineffective scrutiny.

Thus, while enhanced co-operation between the EP and these inter-parliamentary assemblies would bring positive benefits such as the pooling of expertise and the development of common recommendations to the Council, the establishment of an EP delegation for co-operation with these assemblies could not replace the effective scrutiny that a Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament could provide.

The EP’s relationship with the WEU Assembly

The EP’s relationship with the WEU Assembly has traditionally been complicated by competition between the two assemblies. Historical examples of this struggle for competence include the EP’s approval of the De Gucht Report in 1994. This proposed a three-stage take-over of the WEU Assembly’s competencies by the EP and provoked an outcry of ‘institutional cannibalism’ by the then president of the WEU Assembly. Despite an on-going debate on the existence of the WEU Assembly and the WEU’s denial of speaking rights to MEPs in the Assembly on grounds of reciprocity (EP rules do not allow WEU members to address the EP plenary) working relations between the two assemblies have improved.

To date, co-operation has consisted of the EP sending a 1-3 member delegation to observe the bi-annual WEU Assembly and report back to the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament. In turn, the WEU Members from the Assembly’s delegation for relations with the European Parliament or its Political Committee occasionally address the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament.

Both the EP and the WEU Assembly are currently exploring ways in which to improve this co-operation. The impetus for this is partly treaty-based since Article J.7 of the Amsterdam Treaty requires that the EU and WEU draw up arrangements for enhanced cooperation between them.

Practical suggestions for this were elaborated in the Tindemans report on ‘the gradual establishment of a common defence policy for the European Union’ which was carried in May 1998. These included the suggestions that the two organisations should improve the exchange of information and documents and that the EP should establish an 8-10 Member inter-parliamentary delegation responsible for relations with the WEU Assembly. Such a delegation would be tasked with: ‘considering jointly the conditions essential to the implementation of the common defence policy provided for in the . . . Amsterdam Treaty; help[ing] to improve the flow of information between the two assemblies; and facilitat[ing] the exercise by the two assemblies of the powers of democratic scrutiny conferred upon them by their respective treaties, for as long as the WEU continues to operate as an independent body.’

It has since been suggested that the inter-parliamentary delegation meet twice a year to discuss the European Security and Defence Identity and practical co-operation between the WEU and EU where such meetings could be augmented with meetings of members of both assemblies in the Foreign Affairs Committee of the EP or the Political Committee of the WEU Assembly.

The WEU Assembly is also keen to establish a working relationship with the EP. WEU members have suggested: intensifying cooperation at a Committee level; improving cooperation between rapporteurs on similar issues; improving cooperation between the political groups of the two assemblies; jointly organising specific events such as hearings; developing a common approach towards NATO; and improving their co-ordination of activities.

The next European Parliament will decide which, if any, of these proposals will be adopted.

The EP’s relationship with the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA)

The EP currently enjoys an observer status in the NAA which allows the EP delegation of MEPs to participate informally in the Assembly’s Committees and groups. The EP delegation of 1-3 members of the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament also addresses the NAA General Assembly on the EP’s positions. Informal co-operation between the Secretariat of the NAA and the Sub-Committee is good, and is characterised by routine exchanges of documents and informal meetings to discuss topical issues and joint strategies. There are currently no concrete proposals to change these arrangements. The EP’s relationship with the Parliamentary Assembly of the OSCE

The EP has been granted observer status by the OSCE Assembly. The EP’s request for full participation rights was denied although it is supported by some national delegations such as Germany and Spain. The Vice President in charge of relations with inter-parliamentary assemblies currently represents the EP at the Assemblies of the OSCE but is unable to play an active role in the proceedings. Cooperation between the OSCE and EP secretariats is very limited. There is no regular exchange of information and there are no proposals for changing the status quo.

The EP’s relationship with National Assemblies with regard to security and defence

Increased cooperation between the EP and the National Parliaments is widely supported by national governments and Protocol 9 annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam explicitly requires it. It remains unclear, however, at what level such co-operation will be intensified.

At present, there are various levels and degrees of cooperation between the EP and national parliaments. This relationship is most institutionalised in the bi-annual meetings of ‘conférence des organes specialisés dans les Affaires communautaires’ (COSAC). This is a conference comprised of those committees within the national parliaments specialising in Community affairs together with the EP. Discussions on the future of this forum have included suggestions to simplify decision-making by enabling COSAC to pass resolutions where there is no unanimity, by constructive abstention. Some view such attempts to further institutionalise COSAC as the beginning of its reorganisation into a third parliamentary chamber. The establishment of a third chamber, comprised of national MPs and MEPs, is said to have support from the German Foreign Minister and the British government although neither country has formally introduced such a proposal.

Many MEPs and MPs favour increasing cooperation between national and European parliaments at the parliamentary Committee level as is the case in the regular meetings between the EP’s Institutional Affairs Committee and its national parliamentary counterparts. Such meetings are organised and supported by the unit in the EP secretariat which is specifically devoted to the fostering and management of relations with national parliaments.

With regard to the discussions of security and defence, the direct relationship between the EP and national assemblies is limited to bi-annual closed meetings between the Chair of the EP Foreign Affairs Committee and his national counterparts. It has been suggested that this group meets more frequently, on an ad hoc basis in response to crises, but there are no current plans to realise this. In addition, at the beginning of each new Presidency, the enlarged bureau of the Foreign Affairs Committee meets with government officials and parliamentarians from that country.

Another suggestion was voiced by the leader of the Italian senate, Mr Mancino, at the November 1998 parliamentary forum of Rome. He proposed that the establishment of ‘permanent ad hoc committees within the foreign affairs and defence committees of national parliaments responsible for regular dialogue with the WEU Assembly, the North Atlantic Assembly, the OSCE Assembly and the European Parliament’.

 

Part III. Proposals for reorganising the committee structure

The debate on the reorganisation of the Committee structure of the EP was prompted by the Secretary General, Julian Priestley’s ‘reflection note on the consequences for the European Parliament and its internal organisation, of the coming into force of the Amsterdam Treaty’. This noted that the Amsterdam Treaty reinforced the Parliament’s legislative role significantly and claimed that this and other recent developments ‘will lead to a change of emphasis in the tasks, priorities and the style of the institution, towards the more traditional role of a Parliament: scrutinising, improving and deciding legislation, holding the Executive to account and exercising its budgetary powers.’ As a result, the way that the parliament plans and organises its work, and allocates resources should be in accordance with the priority for its legislative work. With regard to the structure of Committees, the Secretary General suggested that the fifth legislature should have ‘larger, and thus more representative legislative committees, with smaller Aneutralised@ non-legislative committees’.

The reorganisation debate was continued within the Conference of Presidents, the Conference of Committee Presidents and between the Groups. All these bodies were obliged to produce recommendations for the next legislature to be agreed in the March plenary session of the EP. The new parliament elected on 13 June will have no more than two weeks of group meetings to reflect upon these recommendations (without any obligation to heed them) before it votes on the structure of the fifth legislature at the July plenary session.

At the time of writing in February 1999, a number of suggestions were still in play. There was widespread agreement that the overall number of Committees be cut to 15 and that a new Committee on Enlargement, composed of the Bureaus of the Joint Parliamentary Committees of the Applicant States, be created.

Initial discussions between group leaders indicated that there was support for abolishing the EP’s only two Sub-Committees, on security and disarmament and human rights, and retaining a single Foreign Affairs and Security Committee to take over their remits. This consolidated Committee would be charged with: the coordination of all foreign policy issues; the coordination of the work of the delegations; the organisation of relations with international parliamentary assemblies; and the development of relations with the EU’s High Representative, once appointed.

Proposals regarding the parliament’s work on humanitarian, human rights and democracy activities included the suggestion that the Human Rights Sub-Committee be replaced by permanent or annual rapporteur(s) on human rights questions. Other suggestions included the maintenance of the Sub-Committee and its support by a human rights unit within the Foreign Affairs Committee secretariat.

With regards to the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament, proposals ranged from simply abolishing it, to transforming it into a delegation for relations with the Western European Union, the North Atlantic Assembly and the OSCE Assembly, to enhancing its status to that of a full Committee.

Other proposals relating to foreign affairs included the suggestions that the EP create a Vice President of Parliament responsible for External Affairs who would chair a monthly meeting of the Chairmen of the Foreign Affairs, Development and External Economic Relations Committees and the Chairman of the Conference of Delegations and the Joint Parliamentary Committees. A complementary suggestion was to create a one day external affairs plenary session to be held in Brussels during Committee week. This would be composed of the members of the above-mentioned committees and should be granted the power to act on behalf of the whole parliament on some issues.

Implications of abolishing the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament

Should the next Parliament decide to abolish the EP’s Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament, it is very unlikely that the Foreign Affairs Committee could successfully take over its role in scrutinising developments in this area. The agenda of the Foreign Affairs Committee is already overcrowded, despite the fact that matters on security and defence are generally debated within the Sub-Committee. Moreover, the Foreign Affairs Committee agenda is (rightly) dominated with discussions on the EP’s response to pressing Foreign Affairs crises where the little time remaining is often used for ‘routine’ agenda items such as reports from parliamentary delegations. It therefore seems highly unrealistic and impractical to suggest that a single Committee could allocate sufficient time and resources to foster genuine, informed debate on matters of security, defence, disarmament and human rights as well.

The likely consequences of the assimilation of the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament into the Full-Committee include:

• reduction in the EP’s ability to scrutinise and influence the Council’s initiatives in security, defence and disarmament;
• reduction in the oversight of the Commission in its implementation of security and defence policies;
• loss of relevant parliamentary expertise;
• reduction in the opportunities for improving EP relations with national assemblies and international assemblies through exchanges of views within the Committee;
• and loss of influence in arguing for greater competencies with regards to the second pillar and the proposed fourth pillar during future Intergovernmental Conferences.

In short, this would amount to a dramatic reduction in the supranational contribution to the democratic accountability of EU security and defence policy. While such a result might suit Member States who have consistently tried to limit the role of the EP in this area, it would undoubtedly exacerbate the democratic deficit which, in turn, would undermine the legitimacy of and, ultimately, popular support for concerted EU action in security and defence.

 

Part IV. Recommendations

The creation of a Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament

The EP should up-grade the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament to a full ‘Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament’. There are various reasons for this. The most obvious is simply that the importance, number, complexity and dynamic political context of EU defence and security issues warrants their thorough examination and debate by the EP. It would also facilitate the EP’s dialogue with the High Representative with regards security and defence issues.

The Committee’s competence would include, but not be limited to, the following issues:

• the development of the European Security and Defence Identity
• the development of the EU’s capacities for crisis management
• the EU’s relationship with WEU, NATO and the OSCE
• the security implications of both NATO and EU enlargement processes
• the EU’s role in consolidating the European defence industry
• the EU’s implementation and strengthening of arms export regulations and their adoption by applicant states
• the EU’s role in disarmament negotiations (UN Conference on Disarmament)
• the EU’s role in verifying and implementing disarmament agreements (NPT, CTBT, CWC, BTWC, Landmines);

In addition, the Committee would share competence with the Development Committee on issues including, but not limited to:

• issues relating to EU conflict prevention initiatives (Support for the OAU, security sector reform, democratisation)
• the implementation of the EU Joint Action on small arms (peace building programmes, assistance for the de-mobilisation of soldiers, weapons collection schemes etc.)
• the implementation of the EU Programme on illicit trafficking of conventional weapons (police training, customs training, security sector reform etc.)
• scrutiny of the budgetary provisions for EU de-mining programmes

The status of a full Committee would automatically confer the following benefits, enhancing the EP’s scrutiny of these issues:

• time to debate issues of security and defence
  As mentioned above, there is not enough time to deal with all foreign, security, defence and human rights matters in a single Committee. The creation of a Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament would facilitate the EP’s scrutiny of all these issues by making the workload of the Foreign Affairs Committee more manageable and allowing sufficient time for informed debate on security and defence issues.

• Committee decision-making powers i.e. the power to amend and agree reports ,make recommendations and initiate debate in plenary
  The Committee would be entitled to work on two own-initiative reports at any one time. This would enable the EP to report on a larger number of security and defence issues in greater depth, thereby developing its expertise in the area while liberating the Foreign Affairs Committee to consider more reports on core foreign affairs issues. Where appropriate, reports could be produced jointly with the Development Committee. In addition, the Committee could agree recommendations to the Council/High Representative under rule 46 or rule 92 and could initiate debate in the plenary. Both of these powers would enhance the EP’s ability to play a pro-active role in the development of EU security and defence policy.

Another huge advantage of the ability of a Committee to take decisions (in contrast to just preparing them as with the Sub-Committee on Security and Disarmament) is that it guarantees good attendance by MEPs and continuity in the formulation and amendment of reports. This, in turn, would improve the quality of debate within the Committee and the coherence and authority of the reports and recommendations agreed by it.

• the organisation of two hearings per year
  The Committee’s right to organise two hearings per year could be used to improve the EP’s co-operation with national and WEU, NAA and OSCE Assemblies. Small delegations from all these assemblies could be invited to participate in a joint meeting on issues of common interest.

• the establishment of a Committee secretariat
  This would be responsible for organising Committee meetings as well as the aforementioned hearings with delegations from national and international assemblies and the work of the (proposed) EP delegation to the WEU, NAA and OSCE assemblies. The secretariat would also be responsible for managing an increased flow of information between the Committee and its national and international parliamentary assembly counterparts.

Improving the rules of procedure

• Rule 46 on recommendations to the Council and rule 92 on recommendations within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
  These rules should be amended to allow for the possibility of debate and amendment of recommendations in plenary. This would ensure that the recommendations contain no factual inaccuracies and enjoy greater authority which, in turn, would encourage members to make greater use of the procedure

• Enabling Committees to hold meetings in Strasbourg
  The Conference of Presidents should revise its decision not to allow Committees to hold meetings in Strasbourg so that Committees could meet specifically to debate and agree compromise texts on the most important urgency resolutions to be submitted to the plenary. This would democratise the agreement of compromise texts and enhance their coherence and political authority.

Improving co-operation with other Assemblies

• the creation of a delegation responsible for relations with the WEU, NAA and OSCE assemblies
  The creation of a delegation of 8-10 members from the Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament to attend the bi-annual assemblies of the WEU, NAA and OSCE would improve the EP’s relations with these bodies, ensure better representation of the EP’s position and constitute a democratic gain over the present arrangement of delegations of 1-3 members.

• harmonising the views expressed in EP and WEU reports
  The EP should seek ways to harmonise the views expressed in the reports of the EP and the WEU. Accordingly, it should encourage meetings in which rapporteurs present and discuss their draft reports in each other’s committee meetings. For example, EP rapporteurs would present their reports in the Political or Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly and WEU rapporteurs would address the Committee on Security, Defence and Disarmament. In the longer term, the EP and the WEU could agree to develop parallel reporting procedures whereby both Committees started with a common text drafted by two rapporteurs, one from each assembly. These texts would then be discussed, amended, and voted on according to the normal procedures in their respective institutions. This process would enable each assembly to draw on each other’s expertise without undermining the autonomy of their decision-making procedures. It should also lead to the harmonisation of EP and WEU reports which would, in turn, enhance their ability to influence the Council/High Representative.

• holding bi-annual hearings with representatives from national and inter-parliamentary assemblies
  As mentioned above, a Committee responsible for security and defence could invite representatives of national and inter-parliamentary assemblies to hearings on matters of common interest.

 

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Endnotes

Note 1: For brevity, this Committee will be referred to as the ‘Foreign Affairs Committee’ in the rest of this paper. Back.