CIAO DATE: 11/04

Norway: An Outsider — For How Much Longer?

Bjrn Tore Godal
Member of Norwegian Parliament
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Norway

Occasional Paper Series No. 30

Before the European Union Studies Center
City University of New York

April 19, 1999

European Union Studies Center

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I feel privileged, indeed, to be able to address you at a time when the minds of all of us are so focused on the profound challenges of the European continent. The tragedy in Kosovo provides the dramatic backdrop of my remarks that shall attempt to discuss the position of Norway in a broader European and transatlantic perspective.

My predecessor as a foreign minister of Norway, the late Johan Jrgen Holst, had a basic point of departure in all his deliberations on Europe. He stressed the need for the nations of Europe to curb the nationalism that has led to two world wars in this century, the need to develop a community that unites the peoples of Europe regardless of ethnic differences. His vision of Europe was one in which identity and autonomy could be safeguarded in a community founded on diversity, equal rights and opportunities. He observed: Security in Europe and globally cannot be competitive. It must be a shared value. Or to rephrase it: If your neighbor feels unsafe, you are not safe either.

Since the demolition of the Berlin Wall we have seen profound improvements in the transatlantic security environment. Free and democratic nations of Central and Eastern Europe seek membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and in the European Union. Regional cooperation across old divides is developed, as we see it in the Baltic and in the Barents areas in northern Europe. The Founding Act of cooperation between NATO and Russia was negotiated and signed in parallel with processes leading up to the decision to admit Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO. Disarmament and huge obligations to reduce nuclear and conventional arsenals in an east-west context have been undertaken, although important agreements have still to be ratified.

I doubt whether NATO’s founders could have imagined that the Alliance one day would resort to military force outside the territory of its member countries in order to protect civilians from attack and prevent brutal ethnic cleansing. The Serbian regime’s treatment of the ethnic Albanians in Kosovo over many years has now created a conflict that threatens peace and security. This was established by the UN General Assembly and by the Security Council last autumn, with Russian support. The international community could not remain passive in the face of these events. Bombing in itself does not bring about peace, but is now seriously degrading the Serb military and physical capacity to support new atrocities against the Kosovar Albanians. Lasting peace though can only be brought about by political agreements in the spirit of Rambouillet, where also Russia participated. An international military force under efficient command is the only way to secure the safe return of refugees to their native land in Kosovo.

Following last week’s relatively successful meeting in Norway between the US Secretary of State and the Russian foreign minister and in view of the serious damage inflicted upon the Serb military capacity, I am moderately optimistic. NATO and EU foreign ministers, as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Chairman in Office of the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe, my successor as Norwegian Foreign Minister, are now all very seriously engaged in informal talks to pave the way for a cease fire and a political solution. When a peaceful solution has eventually been reached, we must be prepared to provide not only humanitarian assistance but also huge resources for social and economic construction. We must do what we can to enable the whole of the former Yugoslavia to become integrated into the transatlantic and European community of values. Let us not forget, in the turmoil of Kosovo, that also the Serb nation and the Serbs have legitimate rights. Otherwise they might find themselves compelled to share destiny with President Milosevic. The psychology of war normally compels people to rally around their elected leader. We should in a longer perspective make it possible for them to leave him and come to terms with the fact that he is responsible for war crimes and should be dealt with accordingly.

Allow me, before entering into the intricacies of being a European outsider, to make a few observations, which I believe, provide common ground for both American and Norwegian foreign and security policy efforts in the last five decades. The transatlantic relationship has underpinned European and Norwegian security throughout the Cold War, and NATO and an active US involvement in Europe have been the backbones of this relationship. Let us see this in a historic perspective. Until 9 April 1940, when the Germans attacked, Norway felt that it was best served by neutrality. The USA tended to think similarly until Pearl Harbor. Traditional neutrality and none-committal attitudes are outdated as foreign and security guidelines. The lessons of Bosnia and Kosovo have taught us that this is equally important in the new Europe. US leadership and close ties across the Atlantic are necessary if we are to find viable solutions to new challenges.

The US was among the first to realize that today’s challenges cannot be met by yesterday’s measures. Washington has been the driving force behind the effort to adapt NATO to the new security situation. The initiatives to establish the North Atlantic Co-operation Council and the Partnership for Peace, as well as the enlargement process and the effort to establish a special relationship between the Alliance and Russia, all originated in Washington. I know that this constructive approach stems from a conviction that US security and US interests cannot be separated from those of Europe. In terms of security, the US remains a European power, and practically all responsible European leaders welcome its contributions in charting the course forward, although a few noises from time to time can be interpreted otherwise. Believe me, mostly they are for domestic consumption.

The US has been firm in underlining that this does not reduce the need for a new kind of burdensharing within the Alliance. The European allies have responded to the call to take more responsibility for their own security and decided to further develop the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). For Norway it has been essential that this should not compromise the transatlantic link and NATO’s position as the core institution of European security. We are pleased with the principle decision to develop the ESDI within NATO, in order i.a. to avoid a duplication of military structure.

Security in the post Cold War era is much more than the counting of warheads, missiles, tanks and military capabilities. The risk of a major war or traditional wars between states is not our main preoccupation. However, regional conflicts, ethnic and social tension, economic problems and environmental degradation are all emerging as sources for inherent and open threats to European security and stability. Basically this is not a new lesson, at least not for the US. Your nation initiated and embarked upon the most ambitious plan ever for European reconstruction, the Marshall plan, following the destruction of World War II. Europe is now better placed to do the job by its own efforts, but transatlantic support as well as the assistance of international financial institutions are sorely needed.

Norway is prepared to do its part of the job in Europe as in the transatlantic global context. Do I feel comfortable with our set of tools and our possibilities to undertake the necessary obligations? Yes and no.

Norwegians are probably more preoccupied with geographical concerns than many others. The importance of distance and location is more prominent when you have only a few inhabitants per square kilometer and when your long, narrow country, turned upside down by its southernmost point, reaches south of Rome. Norway’s geographical location at the point of intersection between the transatlantic, the European and the Russian dimension, enhances our possibilities of making an active contribution in developing new means of co-operation across former dividing lines. We are founding members of NATO, but for decades up to the recent enlargement we were the only NATO member with a common border with the Soviet Union and Russia. The first steamers of Northern Norway were not bound southwards for Oslo, they made trade and transport to Archangels in Northern Russia until the Russian revolution brought that to an abrupt end. The fact that Soviet troops under Stalin liberated Northern Norway from the Germans and then peacefully left, created a basically more relaxed attitude in Norway than in many less fortunate European nations which eventually cam under Soviet domination.

With the aim of stimulating co-operation between Russia and the West in the fields of trade, economic development and cultural and environmental affairs, Norway has initiated a broad venture in the north - under the auspices of the so-called Barents Council of foreign ministers and the Barents Regional Council of regional leaders. This collaborative effort includes Russia, all the Nordic countries and the European Union, while the Untied States and some European nations participate as observers.

We have seized the opportunity to forge new relations by building new transnational networks between schools, civic organizations, businesses and municipalities. Within the Barents region, the rhetoric of co-operation has been followed by actual co-operation. On both sides of the border between Norway and Russia people feel the impact of the new networks.

Norwegian and Russian business establish joint ventures in trading with each other, although progress is slow and cumbersome. Norwegian and Russian engineers co-operate to make industrial production cleaner and more cost-efficient. Russian fishing vessels are landing their catches in Norwegian ports or seeking repairs at Norwegian shipyards. Norwegian telecommunications technology is literally bringing people together in parts of Northwest Russia. New roads are under construction. Educational and cultural exchange is expanding rapidly.

On the Kola Peninsula, the United States, Norway, countries of the European Union and Russia are co-operating to clean up radioactive waste from the Russian Northern Fleet and its ice breaker Fleet. Co-operation on the dismantling of more than a hundred Russian nuclear submarines, and the safe handling and ultimate disposal of the resulting radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, are particularly important challenges. These problems cannot be solved without ambitious multilateral CO-operation. On the military side, trilateral (US-Norway-Russia) co-operation has been established to address environmental problems in the Arctic, including nuclear safety. Norway highly appreciates the very active role the United States has taken in these fields through the Departments of State, Defense, and Energy, as well as the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Norway and Russia have a bilateral agreement on nuclear safety co-operation. This agreement will also help facilitate other countries’ involvement in these endeavors, since it offers third parties the same rights as Norway. The ultimate aim is to transform this bilateral agreement into a multilateral "umbrella" arrangement, covering all countries and all nuclear safety projects in Russia.

What will make a large-scale modernization of Northwest Russia possible, is the development of close economic ties with Norway, the Nordic countries, the European Union and the United States. Oil. gas, and minerals will be at the center of this new economic relationship. We have discussions about the potential for closer co-operation between Norwegian and Russian companies as regards petroleum activities in the Barents Sea.

You have probably realized by now that I see our Russian dimension on the positive side of our political balance sheet - as a promising long-term possibility where we can make a positive contribution towards broader European and transatlantic goals. This perspective has been reiterated and supported both by president Yeltsin and, not least, by Prime Minister Primakov whom I met frequently when he was Foreign Minister. I am equally happy to report that my former European and American colleagues have been eagerly following our experiences, realizing that our Russian neighborhood gives us something to share which is of value to others.

Am I seriously suggesting that Norway’s long-standing role as a staunch supporter of transatlantic relations, close ties with the United States - and our reborn Russian connection is a sufficient answer to our concerns? Definitely not. Necessary and essential, but not sufficient.

I have a hard time explaining to fellow Europeans, particularly in the applicant states of Central and Eastern Europe, that Norway in referendum, as the only European nation, has said no to membership in the European Union not only once, but twice, a membership so eagerly sought by everybody else. (I have met Americans with a somewhat more cynical view: Why should you join that mess?)

Are we traditionally isolationists in European affairs? No. We were among the first as far as the immediate neighbors are concerned. The Nordic nations established a formal co-operative council of their parliaments in 1952. The goals were to maintain and improve close cultural and economic relations. To this end the Nordic Council has promoted unrestricted movement of people between our countries. Nordic citizens cross these borders without passports or visas. Our free-of-charge education systems have been co-ordinated to allow any Nordic student to study in other Nordic countries. We can even find work and settle permanently in other Nordic countries, without work permits. The public health and social security systems have been co-ordinated to provide for any Nordic citizen living in or even visiting any other Nordic country. Most other European nations, EU members included, have been slower in these fields.

Despite all that we have in common, we have chosen - or have been compelled to choose - different paths in international affairs. While Norway, Denmark and Iceland are members of NATO, Sweden and Finland remained neutral throughout the Cold War and are still formally unaligned. But to the astonishment of many they joined the European Union following the 1994 referendums, while Norway did not. Iceland never raised the issue and remains outside. We are apparently on different paths, despite all that unites us.

This presents a great challenge to Nordic co-operation. Many issues traditionally seen in a Nordic context must be handled in a broader European context. The elimination of national barriers, which the Nordic countries achieved years ago, is being duplicated in Europe. Now the Nordic systems will have to be made compatible with the common European systems.

Formal Nordic co-operation still continues to promote the distinctiveness of Nordic culture and identity. It also serves to facilitate and co-ordinate our relations with neighboring regions, including Continental Europe, the Baltics and Russia. And Norwegian resources are matched with Nordic and EU resources in the High North for optimal effect.

Has the Nordic perspective been our only European contribution? No. Since World War II, Norway has played an active part in the development of European regional co-operation. We participated from the outset in the successful launching of General George Marshall’s great plan, in the OEEC - which later became the OECD - and in the Council of Europe.

Norway was also among the founding members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which was established in 1960 in response to the EEC.

For more than a decade, EFTA was the largest trading group in Europe. Since then, most of the EFTA members - including three of our Nordic neighbors as already indicated, and the UK, Spain, Portugal and Austria - have joined the European Union. Today, EFTA consists of Switzerland, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway.

Norway’s relations with the European Union have for decades been a dominant theme in our domestic political debate - ever since 1961, when we first applied for membership in what was then called the EEC. In two referendums, in 1972 and 1994, the governments’ proposals for Norway to join the European Union were voted down by close margins: 53% versus 47% in 1972, 52% versus 48%. (I won the first, and lost the latter!)

There is a tremendous amount of research on why this happened. I will give you my account, in brief. First, the word "Union" in itself has a bad connotation in the Norwegian language. Denmark and Sweden dominated Norway during 5 centuries of unions. "Union" to many means to be subordinate to others. Modern Norway is a young nation with more national pride for better and for worse than many others. Second, Norway is better off than most nations. We like to share, but it is easier to mobilize support for third world countries than for Brussels or for European solidarity. Many felt bigger European powers would grasp our resources. Many feared EU membership would weaken our economy and our welfare system, and reduce the political influence of rural Norway in our nation’s affairs. A predominant slogan was: It is far down to Oslo, but much further to Brussels. Third, while the fall of the Berlin Wall and of the Soviet Union opened for a political surge towards the west in Finland and in Sweden after years of neutrality, Norwegians always felt to be a safe partner in the west. The meaning of security was perceived differently. To some in Norway, the strong bond with the United States was even an argument against joining the European Union.

We have no EU membership, but are we real outsiders? Although not present at the EU negotiating table in Brussels, Norway participates fully in the economy of Europe through the agreement known as the European Economic Area (EEA). Norway is an integrated part of the Union’s market in which there is unrestricted movement across borders of people, capital, goods and services. Four fifths of Norway’s trade is with members of the European Union. The EEA agreement assures that the Norwegian business sector basically operates under the same general conditions as its European competitors.

This remarkable arrangement was perceived and negotiated on the basis that the EFTA countries Sweden, Finland and Austria together with Norway, Iceland, Switzerland and Liechtenstein would need time to consider EU membership. It was a political and an economic gesture by the Union, but it was also in its best long term interest, EFTA being a close trading partner. In spite of close contacts in the EFTA circle, it came as a surprise that Sweden, Finland and Austria unilaterally changed their mind, left the EEA lane and went for rapid full membership.

But we managed to secure the essence of the EEA agreement and the set up of a number of EEA institutions, a Ministerial council, a permanent committee, court and surveillance institutions and broad participation in literally hundreds of EU working experts groups preparing, improving and regulating the inner market.

In brief: We take part in the decision shaping, but not in the decision-making. Do we find that difficult? Those who are concerned with principles certainly do. There is certainly a democratic deficit. But the nitty-gritty of policy making and public administration tend to support common sense solutions and not much drama is seen. Are we compelled to accept EU decisions and proposals when they are presented to the EEA decisive bodies? No, but so far we have accepted them all. A formal veto is possible, but could, dependent on the importance of the issue, trigger off EU counter measures. Many vetoes could challenge the whole concept of the European inner market, based on joint rules, or rather the Norwegian participation in that market. This is not a likely development. After all public concerns in the fields of environment, health, veterinary rules, etc. are similar in most European countries and would tend to support consensus based rules. The EEA agreement and our well-developed bilateral relations with the EU countries provide a stable framework for co-operation with our trading partners and neighbors in Europe.

But obviously other major challenges to an outsider are not automatically met by the present arrangements. On the contrary. We are all familiar with the headlines: EU enlargement, the European Economic and Monetary Union and evolution of a closer Defense and Security co-operation within the European Union. In these paramount fields Norway is formally a third country. Obviously this is a serious handicap. There is no Norwegian voice around the table when decisions shaping the future of Europe are made. Even skeptical Norwegians have to realize that the EU is the most vital force for change in Europe.

Enlargement may take time, but the likelihood of 6-10 new Central–, East– and South European nations to become members within the first decade of the next millennium is high indeed. They will have to agree on burdensharing, regional and agricultural policies, voting rules, size of the European Commission and a number of other difficult questions. Present member countries in the south may feel that enlargement will be at their expense, since the principle of solidarity redefine the number of less fortunate nations. Well to-do nations, like Germany, feel they contribute too much already. Enlargement of the EU also means that the inner market and the EEA area, including Norway, will be enlarged, eventually by 100 million new inhabitants. Only to mention one trade concern: Norway has free trade agreements with full tariff exemption for a number of fish products to Eastern Europe, whereas the EU still levies duties on imports from Norway, following the fact that fisheries and agriculture are partially not covered by the EEA agreement. Out minimum requirement will be to maintain our present share of the market, while the logic of the EU would be to include new members in their regime.

I sincerely believe that political obligation to include the new democracies of Europe will overshadow all difficulties and internal concern in the present EU member countries. Anything else would amount to almost moral misbehavior and the loss of historic opportunities. This is clearly seen by the political leadership in all EU countries.

The implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union and the introduction of the Euro on 1 January this year in one of the most far-reaching co-operation projects in the history of the EU. Even no-sayers in Norway see that stable exchange rates, less speculation and minimized exchange costs are in Norway’s interest. But the harmonization of economic policies required by the Maastricht treaty to pave the way for the EMU, was one of the main reasons to vote no in the 1994 referendum. The paradox of this being that Norway qualified according to the criteria of Maastricht, preceding the EMU, long before most EU countries did. Norwegian inflation, budget balance, public debt, etc. were well within EU requirements, not because we were told so, but because we felt this was sound management and good national householding. (That makes a big difference to many Norwegians.)

On a more serious note: Major trading partners, like Sweden, Denmark, and Great Britain do not take part in the EMU for the time being. Even with those nations onboard, there are characteristic of the Norwegian economy, which are cyclically different from most EU countries. We prosper with increased energy prices and a strong dollar to pay for the oil and gas, while net importers of energy in Europe have a reverse interest. With broad parliamentary support the present Norwegian Government is examining how Norway and the Union could collaborate to ensure that stable currency conditions continue. Obviously, membership in the EMU is possible only for EU members.

The common foreign and security policy of the EU is a major concern for us all, perhaps the biggest problem being that is not always very common. The main requirement of working procedure has been to decide by consensus. This, of course, is a safeguard preserving a regime where no vital national interest of any given EU country is ever overruled. Or put the other way round: The less ambitious always decide - and the EU moves nowhere, or is in slow motion. National EU governments pursue their own foreign policies as before or co-ordination takes an awful lot of time. On the other hand: When the EU countries really agree, it gives Europe a formidable weight. There are efforts, following the EU Amsterdam summit, to improve the situation, but I doubt that changes will be fast.

Norwegians are mixed over the issue, to the extent they really care. National independence is held in high regard, but obviously many see the need for a stronger European voice for instance in the Balkans. many also realize that the challenges in the High North, in Russia and in the Central- and East European states require a more co-ordinated European effort. Others would tend to emphasize that the free position of an outsider, Norway, makes it possible to take useful initiatives or to be a go-between. My personal experience in the EU Foreign Ministers Council, where Norway spoke and observed in a period following the completion of the enlargements negotiations and up to the referendum, is that there is sufficient room for constructive initiatives for foreign ministers with no undue pressure to co-ordinate if that could spoil a good case.

One particular concern of Norway follows the EU’s wish to develop a stronger European Defense and Security Identity (ESDI). The basic project has general support and is a necessity in today’s Europe. The emphasis will be on crisis prevention and crisis management on the lower scale of European conflicts. It should not be an alternative to NATO for the reasons that I have already indicated. The recent British-French initiative raises questions as to the future, of the Western European Union (WEU), which is now the defense component of the EU and the European pillar of NATO. There seem to be three options: First, the WEU could become part of the EU. Second, the various elements of the WEU could be split between the EU and NATO. And third, the WEU could continue as an independent organization.

Norway is now an associate member of the WEU, a stronger status than EU members like Sweden, Finland and Denmark which are observers. Norway’s interest were safeguarded when the WEU decided in April 1997 that associate members are to be treated in the same way as full members in situations where the WEU makes use of NATO resources. This has given us an opportunity to participate in the European share of the work on security policy in Europe. A full integration of the WEU into the EU would weaken our status and isolate us from the European security environment unless arrangements are found where established rights are secured. There seems to be a willingness among leading EU member states to address those concerns, and we are particularly pleased that the US Secretary of State has reiterated that this is a precondition for the US support of the project.

The processes of change in Europe do not follow a straight course with well-defined time limits. The trends point in different directions and there is always considerable uncertainty attached to them. My perspective is not the United States, but a Europe more able to meet the challenges that cannot be handled by the nation-state alone. Seen in a historical perspective there is little reason to doubt that we shall see increased co-operation and integration to meet the transitional challenges of peace and security, economic and social development and a sustainable environment.

Norway alone outside, together with Russia and a few others, is unthinkable. We would be politically insulated while fully affected by decisions and developments around us. But it may take time and will depend largely on the general processes of enlargement and internal developments in the EU itself. The 1994 referendum defines our position up to the next parliamentary elections in the year 2001. It took 22 years, from 1972 to 1994 to improve the support for membership by 1%. Mathematics could indicate another 44 years to do the trick! Public opinion polls indicate support for a more rapid procedure.

I believe most political parties, including my own, the Labor Party, will keep the options open in party platforms to be adopted at party conventions preparing the 2001 elections. This could indicate a renewed effort towards the end of the next parliamentary 4-year period or somewhat later.

In the meantime, we do have a set of tools at our disposal: a strong commitment to peace and security, to the Atlantic Alliance, to peace-keeping and conflict resolution. We have the potential of our Russian neighborhood and a strong Norwegian economy. And we are part and parcel of Europe, although with self-inflicted limited voting rights. It could definitely have been worse.