Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival

Avery Goldstein

Browne Center for International Politics

September 1996

It has become nearly conventional wisdom that China is the post-Cold War world's emerging great power that poses the most difficult questions for the future of international security. Whether scholars, pundits, or policy-makers are interested in environmental impact, human rights, economic affairs, or traditional military-security issues, most who think about the dynamics of the international system in the twenty-first century believe it essential to consider the rise of China and its implications. ₁ This essay focuses mainly on the military-security dimensions of this topic of intense interest, exploring first, the basis for claims about China's growing power and second, the expectations about its significance that are rooted in relevant strands of international relations theory.

Perhaps the interest in China's international role should not be altogether surprising, inasmuch as it is a country that has long met three of the least malleable attributes viewed as among the traditional prerequisites for membership in the great power club-- vast territory, rich resources, and a large population. And, in the course of the past century, other key requirements for international influence have been successively added. By the mid-twentieth century, the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) resolved a century-long pattern of internal political disunity and ended a series of varied foreign encroachments on the country's sovereignty. During the Cold War, the new regime's leaders gradually enhanced their international prestige and eventually overcame attempts at diplomatic isolation to assume their role as the sole legitimate representatives of the Chinese state on key international bodies, most notably the United Nations Security Council. In addition, during the Cold War the CCP invested heavily in the rapid development of the modern era's military badges of great powerdom-- nuclear warheads and the ballistic missiles to deliver them.

As the Cold War ended, however, China remained a "candidate" or "potential" great power because the communist regime had failed in its efforts to promote domestic development that could provide the basis for economic and military clout at world-class levels. A vast army supplied with obsolete conventional, and crude nuclear, weaponry relegated China to the ranks of the second-ranking powers, and among them perhaps the least capable. ₂ But while the Soviet Union was retrenching internationally and then imploding, a new leadership group in Beijing instituted a series of sweeping reforms that resulted in high-speed growth-- both quantitative expansion and qualitative improvements. ₃ By the time the Cold War international landscape cleared, China was more than a decade into an apparent economic takeoff that led many to extrapolate in ways pointing to the seemingly inescapable conclusion that China was destined finally to add the last pieces to its great power puzzle. ₄ Beijing would have the wealth and expertise to be a leading player in international economic affairs, assets that would also provide the foundation for a large, first-class military capability. In short order, many who had comfortably spoken about a Chinese great power some time in the future began uncomfortably to worry about the implications of a China sooner, rather than later, having the ability more aggressively to pursue in its own interests. Often, those thinking about this prospect believed it spelled trouble for international security, at least in the East Asian region and perhaps beyond. ₅

So goes the story. This essay analyzes the conventional wisdom in two respects. First, I examine its basis. Is China's power increasing? If so, as seems obvious, in what sense has it been increasing? To what extent do the claims of a rising China reflect "reality" as opposed to perceptions? What accounts for divergence between objective indicators and judgments about China's power? Second, I examine the key interpretive question. So what? What are the expected consequences of China's rising power, real or imagined, for international security? To do this, I present the inferences from major strands of international relations theory that suggest China's growing power may be dangerous, as well as those that suggest it may not be.

A number of caveats are in order. First, the core topic of this article, "power," is a highly contested term, the debate about whose meaning cannot possibly be resolved in this space. ₆ Indeed, its contestability in part reflects the interesting issue at hand, the way varying interpretations of power may influence theoretical expectation as well as policy. Second, and perhaps ironically, in this case it is easier to deal with the theoretical-interpretive issues than the empirical ones. Although measurement problems are often hard to handle when dealing with sensitive national security affairs, in the Chinese case the usual political and methodological problems are exacerbated by the obsessively secretive nature of the CCP regime. The CCP has changed much about the way it runs China since it initiated its reform program, but it has not warmly embraced the notion of transparency in the military-security realm. ₇ Indeed, opacity in the Chinese case compounds the uncertainty in debates about changing Chinese capabilities, past, present, and future. Finally, this essay is very much a crude first-cut at gathering facts and interpreting their significance.

Interpreting China's Power

How is one to assess China's power? Although this might seem a methodologically straightforward exercise, even if one that faces serious practical problems, there are, in fact, important differences in the meaning conveyed by references to China's power at the end of the twentieth century. Some discuss its power in absolute terms. Such descriptions provide a snapshot of the quantity or quality of current Chinese capabilities (e.g., standard of living, military assets, trade volume). Given the size of the country's population, it has long been easy for huge numbers to suggest the importance of patterns of consumption, expenditure, or military personnel without much apparent need for further elaboration. But for analysts whose interest in China has been piqued by recent developments, this sort of static, absolute measurement of capabilities is not of much use. For those interested in changes in China's power, relative assessments are essential.

Even among those undertaking such comparisons, however, there are fundamental differences in the types of assessments analysts provide. Broadly speaking, there are two ways to distinguish work that discusses power in relative, as opposed to absolute, terms. One is whether the analysis is national or international in scope. A national assessment is one in which the analyst draws comparisons between a state's current and past capabilities, the sort of developmental story often told in the area studies literature. An international assessment is one in which the analyst draws comparisons between one state's capabilities and others', the sort of "great game" story often told in various genres of the international relations literature. A second broad distinction can be drawn within the realm of international assessments. They may entail either synchronic comparison of current capabilities relative to other states (depicting a current balance of power, for example), or diachronic comparison that traces changes in such relations over time (depicting the rise and fall of great powers).

Power Estimates

Those familiar with the literature focused on the Chinese "miracle" will recognize that, with a few important exceptions discussed below, most chronicles China's alleged growing power by either describing the country's current capabilities, implicitly suggesting their impressiveness, or more often by identifying significant changes relative to China's own past. These accounts set forth measures of what William Wohlforth has termed "estimated power," looking at indicators that many believe are the building blocks of international influence. ₈ The two most important sets of indicators in the Chinese case have been economic and military statistics.

Economic . Economic statistics describing the size or growth rate of China's aggregate and per capita GDP, identifying changes in the volume of China's international trade, as well as changes in the composition of imports and exports provide a startling picture of change since 1978. During the 1980s, China's GDP doubled in size and by the mid-1990s was doubling again. ₉ Though per capita levels remain low, here, too, statistics reveal increases that only partly reflect the fundamental improvements in the standard of living of most of China's citizens, changes better captured by statistics that detail patterns of consumer behavior. ₁₀ Over the same time span, China's trade volume ballooned from $38.2 billion to more than $200 billion. ₁₁ Equally impressive the composition of imports and exports shifted during the reform era as China went from being an exporter of raw materials and importer of foodstuffs to being an exporter of labor-intensive consumer goods and an importer of industrial products. ₁₂ Moreover, a string of trade surpluses led to stunning increases in the country's foreign exchange reserves. ₁₃ In short, statistics indicated a remarkable increase in the quantity of China's involvement in international trade and an equally remarkable change in the quality of this involvement as the country was transformed from a reluctant, small scale international economic actor, into an eager, larger-scale participant playing the role other East Asian, export-led growth economies had pioneered. And as will be noted below, the statistical portrait of an emerging economic dynamo was enhanced by circumstances that had nothing to do with actual economic activity, but instead a switch in an international organization's accounting procedures, and the fallout from China's response to the acute political crisis of communism that began in 1989.

Military . The focus on an emerging China's military capabilities lagged behind the interest in economic performance. Certainly, those specializing in the Chinese military wrote about basic changes in force structure and doctrine that were initiated beginning in the early 1980s, ₁₄ but it was only in the early 1990s that a broader community began to pay increased attention to the indicators suggesting quantitative increases and qualitative improvements in China's military capabilities. Following a decade during which the PLA's budgets were kept relatively low as domestic economic development was accorded highest priority, after 1988 China's government announced a succession of large peacetime increases in the officially announced military budget. Although part of the increases were, as Beijing claimed, designed to offset the effects of inflation and a decade of relative neglect, most analysts concluded that the official increases, combined with the many hidden sources of PLA revenue that comprise its funding base, reflected a serious effort at upgrading China's armed forces. ₁₅ Aside from changes in the PLA's budget, changes in weaponry pointed in the same direction. China not only continued to invest heavily in developing indigenous systems, but also took advantage of the collapse of the Soviet empire to purchase selected equipment, most notably SU-27 aircraft, and allegedly to recruit the services of the former Soviet Union's economically strapped military-scientists. ₁₆ As China aggressively pursued a share of the international market for launching satellites, it invested in improved ballistic missile technology and continued a program of nuclear warhead testing that would permit the deployment of a new generation of strategic weapons. And aside from changes in funding and equipment, during the reform era, especially in the 1990s, China began to realize some of the organizational changes for the military discussed during the 1980s-- in particular the refashioning of PLA units for combined arms operations, the creation of rapid deployment forces, and a vision for a maritime capability that extended well beyond China's immediate coastal waters. ₁₇

In short, by the mid-1990s China's military profile, like its economic profile was dramatically transformed. Reports suggested the country's military was shifting from a massive land-based force (equipped with obsolete weapons suited to implausible scenarios of large-scale invasion) buttressed by a crude and very small, if still terrifying, nuclear retaliatory force, to a modernizing conventional army (absorbing the lessons of recent military operations, most importantly Operation Desert Storm). ₁₈ China's PLA was upgrading the technology at its disposal, preparing for plausible contingencies of engagement in regional conflicts over disputed territory, and developing a more sophisticated, larger intercontinental nuclear capability. And, as with the portrait provided by economic statistics, some events beyond China's control augmented the apparent significance of these changes in military capabilities, especially the fact that these changes occurred during the early 1990s when many other major powers were reducing defense budgets, agreeing to cuts in the size of their nuclear arsenals, and abiding by a moratorium on nuclear testing in anticipation of adopting a comprehensive test ban treaty. Even without any rigorous comparison, prima facie evidence suggested China was bucking the trend of military downsizing in the "new world order."

But if statistics told a story of rapid Chinese economic and military growth during the period after 1978, in and of itself, the importance of such a national assessment for international security is not self-evident. Most of the concern among policy-makers outside China, and most of the interest among scholars, reflected in the various theoretical arguments presented below, depends on the significance of changes in capabilities in relative terms that entail international comparisons, especially those that track changes in relative standing over time. In this regard, analysts have offered little hard evidence, and most of that focuses on improvements in China's economic, rather than military position relative to other states. Instead, the interest and concern with China's alleged rise, seems to driven more by changes in what Wohlforth labels "perceived" power than changes in "estimated" power rooted in international economic and especially military comparisons.

Perceived Power

What accounts for the perception that China is in the process of a rapid rise to great power status? Wohlforth's work explains that such perceptions are not entirely detached from reality, but are clearly shaped by factors that go beyond available data. One element influencing such assessments is historical context. In the case of China, history has established the expectation that it is a country in some sense deserving a place in the ranks of the great powers. Part of this expectation is rooted in China's role as regional hegemon during much of its imperial history. Part, however, is rooted in the anointing of China as at least a candidate great power by others during the mid-twentieth century.

During World War II, mainly at the behest of the Roosevelt administration encouraged by the Republic of China's Chiang Kai-shek, China was initially included as one of the big four allies participating in summits planning grand strategy to defeat the Axis. The divergence between this lofty formal status and the reality of China's power limitations clearly bothered Britain's Churchill, and ultimately China's wartime great power role lost most of its substance. ₁₉ Yet after the war the fiction of Chiang's regime as a great power endured in the symbolic form of its seat allegedly representing China on the UN Security Council through 1971, again a status based on U.S. support rather than tangible capabilities. And when the People's Republic of China replaced the ROC as the internationally recognized representative of China in the early 1970s, the government in Beijing was once more anointed a great power in the emerging international system, again by a United States government that believed its strategic interests were served by bolstering China's status, the country's clearly deficient economy and obsolete military equipment notwithstanding. ₂₀

In short, the expectation seemed well established. China had once been and should once again be a great power. In the terms of cognitive theorists, "great power China" was an unfilled concept; analysts were prepared to accept evidence that the promise was at last being realized. ₂₁ In such circumstances, there may be an inclination to exaggerate the significance of limited data to fit one's anticipated interpretation. In the economic sphere this inclination may have been further fed by the emergence in the 1970s of the concept of the "Asian tigers," rapidly industrializing countries following patterns of export-led growth. Just as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore had in modified ways repeated the Japanese miracle, once Chinese reforms seemed to have transformed the country's economic foundations, it became feasible and then fashionable to see evidence of high-speed growth in Chinese GDP and exports as confirmation that China was yet another East Asian country filling this role. ₂₂

A second factor that may fuel a perceived rise in power that outstrips objective indicators, is the rate of change that accompanies growth from a low level. ₂₃ In economic terms, China's growth rates were impressive, and resulted in genuine improvements in the people's standard of living as well as the country's aggregate wealth. But the perception of breathtaking economic change was enhanced partly because the opening of the country in the post-Mao era enabled observers to grasp just how impoverished the country had been since the initial period of post-revolutionary recovery in the early 1950s. Maoist propaganda had obscured the long-standing failure of the CCP regime to tap what most believed were the country's economic strengths. When the Dengist leadership did so, and high rates of growth were achieved, it was easy to conclude that this was the beginning of a period during which the country's potential would be realized, rather than a burst resulting from policies and efforts that could not be sustained. The perception of China's economic future was not, then, that it would be characterized by a significant downward correction or a leveling off, but rather that rapid growth would continue as China quickly rose through the ranks of the world's leading economies. The perception of the robustness of China's growth trajectory was reinforced by the CCP's success in riding out the storm of international outrage following the suppression of domestic protests in 1989 and then surviving the collapse of communism in the former Soviet empire. Defying many analysts' short term expectations of internal decay, stagnation, or the reversal of economic reform policies, in relatively short order, Beijing resumed and then in 1992 accelerated the shift to a market-based economy posting the high growth rates and expanding trade volumes that have drawn attention in the mid-1990s. ₂₄

In military terms, the low level from which growth began generated a similar dynamic. Unlike ignorance of China's true economic conditions during the Maoist era, however, there were few illusions about the backward state of China's armed forces before Deng's reforms. It was well known that the PLA had obsolete versions, or very limited numbers of most of the accouterments of a great military power. Rectifying these deficiencies was going to require much more than marginal increases in investment and deployment. When China began seriously to initiate modernization of the PLA in the late 1980s, both through domestic production and the purchase of selected systems from more advanced foreign military manufacturers, it marked a new departure, but only a first step in what would be a long journey, as the Chinese might put it. ₂₅ As important as the immediate impression of a concerted buildup, was the projection that China's growing economic strength would provide the wealth and technology to sustain the sort of military modernization drive necessary for the PLA to become a world class force. Unlike the Soviet Union that had tapped a huge proportion of its stagnant economy in a desperate effort to stay in the game of superpower military competition, the relatively small fraction of national wealth devoted to China's defense effort (even when the highest estimates for budgets are used) together with robust economic expansion, suggested substantial room for increasing the country's military capabilities at a pace that would narrow the gap between China and the world's leading military powers.

A third, related, influence augmenting the perceived significance of China's efforts to modernize its armed forces, was the extent to which improvements were concentrated in capabilities that seemed militarily most decisive for playing the role of a great power. ₂₆ The ongoing efforts to modernize China's missiles and strategic nuclear warheads, to fashion a usable power projection capability, and in successive steps to transform the PLA Navy from a glorified white water, to a green water, to a genuine blue water force whose range of operation backward state of China's armed forces before Deng's refogradually expanded from the immediate coastal areas, to ever more distant island chains suggested that Beijing was not going to be satisfied with a military adequate only for the minimal tasks of dissuasion by territorial self-defense and deterrence. ₂₇ Instead, the military investment program appeared to be designed to provide the state with the resources to play a more active international role, the role of an authentic great power.

And finally, a fourth influence feeding a perception of China's rise that runs ahead of changes in its actual capabilities is the role of catalytic events. Though more could be listed, two events most decisively transformed perceptions of China's international standing and likely future role. First, the perception of China's economic robustness was dramatically altered in May 1993 when the media widely reported a revision in the method by which the International Monetary Fund would calculate national wealth. The decision to switch from calculations based on currency exchange rates to one that relied on the purchasing power parity (PPP) method, resulted in reports that China's GDP was actually four times larger than previously thought. Normally, the esoterica of economic methodology and the decisions of international organizations would draw little public attention. In this case, however, the implications were portrayed as a breathtaking change in the world economic order as it was, and would be. China immediately advanced from the tenth largest GDP in the world to third, narrowly behind Japan, and on a course to surpass the United States early in the 21st Century. ₂₈ Nothing had actually changed overnight, of course. Indeed, the higher figures associated with the purchasing power parity method had been put forward in less visible publications prior to the IMF announcement. ₂₉ And for those China experts and business people familiar with the situation on the ground, the reports merely corrected what had long been understood to be the old statistics' gross understatement of the economic vitality of the large areas of China that had benefited from the reforms. ₃₀ But for others, these reports were a wake-up call that helped crystallize the view of China as East Asia's newest economic dynamo.

The second catalytic event, actually a series of events more extended in time than the PPP story, was the reactivation of the dispute over Taiwan in 1995 and especially 1996. Fearful of permitting Taiwan's leadership to pursue a more independent international role, Beijing responded to what it saw as dangerous U.S. complicity in this effort by abandoning the fruitful cross-straits diplomacy that had characterized the early 1990s relationship. Instead, China tried to signal relevant audiences in both Washington and Taipei (party leaders and the voters in parliamentary and presidential elections) that it would not tolerate a drift toward, let alone an outright declaration of, independence. Between the summer of 1995 and the spring of 1996, Beijing deployed ground, air, and naval forces to the region, staged military exercises including the repeated launching of missiles disrupting the sea lanes around the trade-dependent island, and apparently floated a thinly veiled threat about the risk of nuclear escalation that could touch the American homeland should the U.S. become directly involved in any cross-straits confrontation. ₃₁ These measures crystallized the perception that China was a country prepared to use whatever capabilities it had to pursue its international interests. ₃₂ Though sober defense analysts noted that Beijing lacked a military capability to do more than frighten the Taiwanese and their trading partners, these actions seemed to confirm concerns about the PLA's modernization program, especially its power projection component, concerns aroused with less fanfare by Beijing's earlier efforts to pursue its claims to disputed territory in the South China Sea ₃₃ . Though some in the foreign policy elite had been talking about China replacing the former Soviet Union as the U.S.'s principal great power security concern and military planning contingency prior to the mid-1990s, the Taiwan Straits confrontation of 1995-1996 seemed almost certain to be a watershed in shifting the perception of a wider audience. ₃₄ Its significance has little to do with capabilities displayed; if anything, the episode confirmed the relatively disadvantaged state of China's current military forces. ₃₅ Instead its significance was the way it served to catalyze the belief that China's first steps in modernizing its military should be interpreted as foreshadowing a trajectory of growth that had not been fully appreciated.

China's Self-perception

The above discussion addresses some of the reasons for change in the way the outside world has been viewing China. How do these changing views fit with China's self-perception? Absent real-time declassification of internal Chinese documents and greater access to policy-makers than is currently available, much analysis of Chinese views must be inferred from circumstantial evidence or interpretation of policies and statements that may, or may not, reflect actual beliefs. ₃₆ With such limitations in mind, I offer the following brief sketch, partly because such views are relevant to the theoretical arguments presented in the second part of this article.

As China's economy has expanded and become more integrated with global trade and investment, Beijing's view of its international position has changed from that of the early 1980s. At the beginning of the "opening to the outside" China played the role mainly of economic suitor, attempting to entice foreign investors with preferential tax arrangements, a large supply of relatively inexpensive, submissive labor, and the ever present lure of a potentially huge domestic market's demand for consumer goods. By the mid-1990s, Beijing seemed to be moving beyond viewing itself in the role of suitor. Having established its economic credentials, China has begun to act as though it views itself as an emerging major player, one that has the strength to more aggressively negotiate, though not stipulate, the terms on which it will participate in the international economy. Beijing's hard bargaining to gain admission to the World Trade Organization (WTO) as a charter member without relinquishing its demand that it be granted the favorable status of a developing country, reflect the attempt to become a force in the councils of economic power while retaining the advantages China has enjoyed during the early stages of its economic takeoff. ₃₇ The CCP also seems to be more confidently playing what it sees as its stronger hand of economic cards as a diplomatic tool. In the past, China was the state threatened with economic sanctions as punishment for various policy infractions, most notably the recurrent U.S. warnings that most-favored-nation trading status would be revoked if Chinese domestic and international behavior did not meet certain standards. By the mid-1990s, China was not only continuing to stand fast against such economic pressure; despite prior claims that political disagreements should not complicate mutually beneficial economic exchange, Beijing was using its own economic leverage to signal unhappiness with U.S. charges against China on weapons proliferation, and more importantly, the Clinton administration's ambivalent policy in the Taiwan straits. ₃₈ Without overstating the changes so far, Beijing's behavior suggests that it sees itself in a transition from "object to subject" in the international economy, a shifting self-perception already visible in its activism within the APEC forum, one that will likely inform the role China plays once it joins the WTO and be fully completed when China decides the time is ripe to join the G7.

In the military realm, China's view of its international role has also been changing. The shift here is from the role of a survivalist state scrambling to use its limited capabilities as it seeks to adjust to the givens of its precarious position in a dangerous environment, to the role of a thriving state basically secure against foreign threats, and instead seeking to employ its growing capabilities to shape, as well as cope with, a fluid, if still potentially dangerous environment. This major change is the shift from the role China was constrained to play during the Cold War to the position it is attempting to craft for itself in the post-Cold War world.

During the Cold War China saw itself, correctly, as outclassed in a system dominated by rival superpowers. The CCP regime's goal was to ensure its survival through varying combinations of self-reliant military preparation (maintaining the forces to support a strategy of dissuasion by conventional deterrence while developing the nuclear alternative) and grudging dependence on the support of one superpower against the threat posed by the other. ₃₉ Although the Cold War dynamics at work were driven by more than just Beijing's efforts, China did accomplish its broad objectives as a series of American and then Soviet threats were parried, and the activism of each alleged "hegemon" in East Asia declined.

The waning of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, led to a shift in China's military-strategic goals at the same time the country's economic takeoff was beginning. China's military strategy was to serve the goal of China reclaiming its rightful role among the world's great powers, one able to more self-reliantly advance the country's international interests. This goal would be achieved by a two-pronged approach-- cultivating independent economic and military strength that reduces the need for the sort of unpalatable dependence on powerful allies that characterized China's Cold War security policy, while at the same time trying to prevent foreseeable international roadblocks on the path to greatness Beijing plans to follow. The former task, self-strengthening, is easy to grasp, if hard to accomplish. The latter, diplomacy for the emerging great power, requires some clarification.

China's diplomatic challenge is to prevent three undesirable outcomes. First, China needs to prevent the U.S. from maintaining its de facto hegemony in East Asia, though a continued U.S. presence in some respects is desirable. Second, China needs to prevent Japan from becoming a full-fledged great power rival in East Asia. Third, China needs to prevent lesser regional actors (small and medium ASEAN powers, Russia, and India) from siding with a rival U.S. or Japan in ways that could result in the country's strategic encirclement. These three challenges are complicated by their own interconnections and partial incompatibility (e.g., a reduced U.S. role may encourage others to hedge their bets against China through patterns of alignment and armament) as well as their collective incompatibility with the other prong of China's strategy for becoming one of the international system's great powers. China's success in promoting economic development and military modernization is inherently worrisome, if not provocative, because of the security dilemma that prevails in the anarchic international realm (a topic to which I return below). It is not easy for big states to repeat the virtuoso performance of Bismarck who at least temporarily postponed the more adverse reactions to growing German power. Early indications are that Beijing lacks the subtle diplomatic skills that will be necessary for it to succeed in such an effort. Determined pursuit of its interests in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits and insistence on nuclear weapons testing while others observed a moratorium, exacerbate the security dilemma rather than mitigate it. These sorts of actions have married the inevitable concerns that stem from thinking about future Chinese capabilities with behavior that raises doubts about intentions. The result is an effect that is unsettling for other relevant actors, Beijing's reassurances about its modest international aspirations notwithstanding. ₄₀

Fit Between Estimated Power, Perceptions, and Reality

A state's estimated power and perceived power, that is, the fit between various data usually thought to reflect the influence a state can bring to bear internationally and the beliefs of policy-makers about such influence, is unlikely to coincide. The degree of disparity varies for reasons discussed with reference to the Chinese case above, but in addition is also likely to vary directly with the occurrence of events that provide for the hard test of actual competition in the international arena. Crises, militarized conflicts, and wars provide the best guide to real power relations; the absence of such direct tests provides the greatest leeway for faulty estimates as well as distorted perceptions. ₄₁

Power tests, enabling China and others to assess the country's ability and determination to act on its foreign policy preferences, were relatively frequent during the first three decades of the People's Republic of China's existence. The Korean War quickly rectified any perception that the new communist regime was too weak or distracted to respond to what it saw as a threat to its vital interests, and with force sufficient to discourage even the most powerful adversary. Although the sacrifices undertaken in Korea may have established that Beijing commanded the power necessary to dissuade its enemies, the Taiwan Straits crises of 1954-55 and 1958 revealed mainly the limits of China's ability to project power for the purpose of altering the status quo and the risk averseness of its otherwise radical leaders when facing a great power opponent. ₄₂ The brief, successful war with India in 1962 established China's standing as the dominant land power among the states on the East and South Asian mainland. Yet, Beijing's retreat in the face of Soviet threats after China initiated military action on their common border in early spring 1969, clarified the enduring limits of China's power when measured against that of a global superpower, regardless of Beijing's entry into the nuclear club. These limits were revealed again in 1979, at another moment of high Sino-Soviet tension, when China decided to launch a pedagogical war against Moscow's Vietnamese ally in order to teach Hanoi that there was a price to be paid for its expansionism in Indochina. Unexpectedly, the lesson learned was instead that China's PLA had languished since its glory days of the 1962 war with India; its obsolete equipment and inexperienced troops were not even up to the limited objectives set for it against a smaller, proximate, land power.

After 1979, however, seventeen years passed before there was anything that might qualify as a clarifying event testing China's ability to wield international influence. Moreover, 1979 also marked the beginning of the reform program that has triggered the claims of China's growing power. The absence of serious crises, let alone military clashes, means that while all can agree that the reforms are producing a stronger China, analysts can debate, but not resolve the key question, "How much stronger?" In some ways this situation parallels that Wohlforth observed with regard to Russia just prior to World War I, when perceptions of Russian power began to diverge significantly after 1910, as a domestic reform program took hold during a period that lacked the sorts of clarifying international events (crises and wars) the country had experienced during the preceding decade. ₄₃ For Russia, of course, WWI provided the ultimate test of the results of its reforms. For China, there has not yet been any comparable test, though the Taiwan straits "military exercises" in 1996 provided some information. First, it confirmed that Beijing was prepared, as it had repeatedly stated, to use force, if necessary to ensure the island's future political reunification with the mainland. Second, it demonstrated that the PLA had the ability to rely on missiles to coerce Taiwan, either through disrupting its economic lifeline of trade, or through engaging in a campaign of strategic bombardment designed for punitive purposes. Such a capability can serve to frighten the Taiwanese in order to dissuade them from moving towards independence or, if dissuasion fails, could serve as the means to compel Taiwan to reverse steps that Beijing finds intolerable. Third, the military exercises revealed the continuing limitations of the PLA to actually project power, even in China's backyard. Analysts observing the exercises noted that the PLA could not muster the capability to launch an invasion of Taiwan that could succeed at reasonable cost, whether or not the United States chose to assist the island in its defense. ₄₄ And the Clinton administration's naval maneuvers together with guarded warnings to China indicated that despite the ambiguity of U.S. diplomacy since the 1972 Shanghai Communique Beijing should anticipate some sort of American military response, relying on forces against which China still could not match up. ₄₅

China's Growing Power: Theoretical Expectations

China's power is clearly on the rise, though current estimates and perceptions may well exaggerate the speed and extent of the change. Much of the attention paid to this trend, regardless of possible inaccuracies in its precise nature, is rooted in the concern that the rise of China could make international politics more dangerous-- that in some way it may pose a threat to what has been the "long peace" prevailing among the great powers since World War II. ₄₆ In this second part of the article, I consider the theoretical grounds for such worries. I briefly examine three broad strands of theorizing that justify concern, and three that may provide a basis for tempered optimism about the consequences of China's growing international stature.

Why China's Growing Power May Be Dangerous

Hegemonic Instability Theories . Three major arguments focus on the dangerous consequences of the rise and fall of dominant states in the international system. ₄₇ One such argument is offered by Robert Gilpin, who depicts international relations as a political system in which governance functions are performed by a leading state that draws on its wealth, power, and status to set the rules of the game. ₄₈ The hegemonic power in a particular historical era plays this role until the foundation for its dominance erodes-- a result of domestic problems, the draining burden of system management tasks, or the diffusion of capabilities on which its economic and military advantages were based. As other states acquire power commensurate with that of the hegemon, they chafe at the incongruity between their capability and their subordinate status. This provides the basis for conflicts over governance of the system and, historically at least, for the great power wars Gilpin labels "hegemonic wars" that settle the issue of transition from one era to another.

A second argument that focuses on the ominous consequences of an emerging great power is the power-transition theory set forth by Organski and Kugler. ₄₉ Similar in many respects to Gilpin's argument, the power-transition model envisions a hierarchy of contending states in an international system whose distribution of benefits reflects the interests of the system's dominant actor (the hegemon). As a consequence of trends in national rates of development, a strong contending state becomes "unwilling to accept a subordinate position in international affairs when dominance would give them much greater benefits and privileges." ₅₀ The challenger, believing it has the power to recast the international hierarchy, is likely to be the aggressor in a major war "to redraft the rules by which relations among nations work." ₅₁

What is the expectation about China's growing power that one would derive from this logic focusing on status-capability incongruity as the source of dangerous great power conflict? Presumably, the expectation is that an ever more capable Beijing will demand a larger role in the management of international affairs hitherto dominated by the world's leading power, the United States. To the extent the United States resists, either because it is unaccustomed to accommodating others' international interests in governing the system or because it is fearful that others' gains come at the United States' expense, the stage is set for a hegemonic struggle, with China, if it, and not Japan, is in fact the country that will have the economic and military resources to press its demands in the opening decades of the twenty-first century. The events of the 1990s ostensibly lend credence to this line of reasoning.

The coincidence of the end of the Cold War and the deterioration of Sino-American relations caused by the 1989 crackdown at Tian'anmen Square resulted in the sorts of shifts Gilpin might expect. China has more vociferously than ever rejected what it sees as United States' efforts to impose its values on the rest of the world, especially political rights associated with liberal democracy. Beijing's response to international criticism of its human rights record, for example, has been to counter with an alternate international standard of human rights focusing on dimensions (especially social welfare, and social order concerns) that it claims is better suited to many countries, especially in the Third World and Asia, an alternate vision typified by China in the reform era. ₅₂ In economic affairs, China has also railed against what it sees as United States' manipulation of the process by which China hoped to gain membership in the World Trade Organization. ₅₃ On the American side, recurring trade deficits with China of the sort that had often led to fears about Japan's economic gains at U.S. expense were arousing concerns in Washington as the Chinese economy boomed in the mid-1990s. And in military affairs, remarkably early in the post-Cold War era the United States became concerned about China supplanting the defunct Soviets as a potential threat. However dominant the United States might appear to be in what many labeled a unipolar system, this was a hegemon already nervously looking over its shoulder at China. A virtual American ally in the last two decades of the Cold War, in the 1990s China was becoming a prominent planning contingency for assessing the adequacy of the United States strategic nuclear arsenal. ₅₄ In short, though not yet the intense sort of rivalry one expects to see preceding a hegemonic showdown, the warning signs that Gilpin and Organski and Kugler would look for are there. ₅₅ And, it should be added, there is the potential in the Sino-American rivalry for the status-capability incongruity to be intensified by an issue not relevant to the earlier Soviet-American rivalry. Should the Chinese sense that they are being denied their rightful role in an international system the United States continues to dominate, they may come to believe that part of the reason is racial or cultural bias. Much as the Japanese (correctly) believed that racism established an extra hurdle for them to clear in their early twentieth century rise to international prominence, the Chinese may interpret what they see as efforts to freeze them into the position of a second-class great power as at least partly motivated by racism. ₅₆

The third theory that alerts one to the potential dangers of a rising China is balance-of-power theory. Unlike the portrait of international life offered by Gilpin and Organski and Kugler, balance-of-power theory suggests that hegemony is not viable because self-interested states will act to counter aspiring hegemons. ₅₇ If one state's power increases significantly, others respond, either by increasing their own power (through national investment and arms buildups), or by forming coalitions with other states concerned about the potential or actual threat posed by the rising power. If necessary, states may resort to warfare as a means for drawing on their individual and collective resources to deal with what they conclude is an intolerable concentration of power at the disposal of a rival who threatens their security. In short, self-interested behavior is expected to frustrate the drive for hegemony if it is attempted, but this redressing of emerging or feared imbalances may involve fighting great power wars.

Balance-of-power logic leads to the expectation that China's rise will trigger a reaction among those most concerned by the uses to which that power can be put, especially if it is believed that the country may harbor hegemonic aspirations. China's robust economic expansion, revived effort at military modernization, and relatively unyielding stance on international disputes in which it has been entangled in the 1990s have increased the anxiety of Beijing's East Asian neighbors. ₅₈ Although the urgency of the task of responding is reduced because the real fear is the possibility of a future Chinese grab for hegemony, there have already been rumblings of the sort balance-of-power theory would predict, including reactive arms buildups in the region and the search for allies to compensate for limits in national strength (most notably, the still tentative consultations among ASEAN states, and the reaffirmation of the U.S.-Japan security treaty). East Asian fears of Chinese hegemony have deep historical roots in the region's experience with China's dominance prior to the arrival of Western imperialism in the nineteenth century. ₅₉ Although, as Stephen Walt has emphasized, great power in and of itself may not be deemed a threat that calls for some response, geography as well as history suggest that fears of Chinese hegemony will be hard for Beijing to allay. If so, lesser regional actors will have incentives to court great power allies with the capability to balance China. To the extent China's regional behavior is deemed to be an indicator of broader international aspirations, extra-regional great powers will have incentives to respond. ₆₀ Would such a process be dangerous? All that balance-of-power theory can say is that aggressive Chinese behavior will strengthen the incentives for others to respond, in ways that are indeterminate. War is not inevitable, but it is an option if diplomacy backed by military power is ineffective, failing to slow threatening increases in Chinese power, or if China's rivals view a sustained balancing effort as intolerably burdensome, or if China itself believes it has no other way to pursue its international interests (whether modest or ambitious) in the face of concerted opposition.

Security dilemma theory . Perhaps better understood not as a theory, but simply an inference from balance-of-power theory about the consequences of life for self-regarding actors in an anarchic realm, the security dilemma refers to the situation in which states' efforts to enhance their own security threaten others', whether or not anyone currently harbors hostile intentions. Arm to protect oneself at the risk of provoking others to arm as well, or refrain from arming to avoid triggering such a reaction at the risk of heightened vulnerability? Why should this dilemma exist? In providing for their own security why don't states simply refrain from actions that others may fear? If restraint and reassurance were fully credible, then the dilemma would indeed evaporate. Nonaggressive states could clearly explain the security measures they embraced and sign contracts ratifying their statements. In such a world, only the increased power of aggressive, or uncooperative states would require a response. Analysts who emphasize the dilemma's consequences, however, stress that its importance lies in the fact that it arises even among status quo oriented, cooperative states. It arises because unavoidable uncertainty about the future combined with the difficulty of establishing binding commitments under anarchy, leads states to hedge their bets against potential dangers since failing to do so could prove so costly. As each state confronts the dilemma, it gives rise to cycles of self-regarding behavior that drive arms races and the competitive formation of opposed alliances. ₆₁

At worst, the security dilemma generates the sorts of "conflict spirals" and arms races that can sometimes increase the risk of war. At best, the intensity of the dilemma can be mitigated by beliefs about the ease of defensive efforts, that reduce the incentives to match others' increasing capabilities, or by weapons technology that enables states to distinguish between increases most useful for self-defense and those that carry the possibility of offensive use. ₆₂ But whatever its level of intensity, the security dilemma will be aggravated when each state believes the other's fears are not merely unfortunate, but unjustified, or worse still, an insincere posture designed conceal its own suspicious motives, probably an aspiration for the power to support aggressive behavior. The reaction to that interpretation is likely to be surprise, if not indignation. Each party will then be inclined to impute malign intentions to the other and more inclined to hedge its bets according to the logic of the security dilemma.

Unfortunately, China's position in East Asia at the turn of the century is one where the influences intensifying rather than mitigating the security dilemma are at play. It is intensified both by actual changes in Chinese capabilities, by others' interpretations of those changes, and China's reaction to the reaction it has evoked. In terms of capabilities, Beijing's increased investment in air and naval forces useful for projecting military power beyond the mainland means that it is difficult for others to interpret the buildup as exclusively or permanently defensive in nature, especially in a context where there is disagreement about what constitutes the status quo. ₆₃ China's reassertions of sovereignty over waters and territory from the Diaoyutai (Senkakus) to Taiwan to the Spratlys, the perception that China is developing the military might to support these claims, and the limited military probes it has already undertaken, all contribute to consternation in Tokyo and the capitals of the ASEAN countries, and most openly in Washington D.C. by those who see this as the portent of things to come. Concern is rooted in the usual sorts of anxieties states confront in the international system, but especially for Japan and the ASEAN countries, is exacerbated by a history that raises fears China may aspire to reprise its role as regional hegemon. ₆₄ Though the need for a dramatic short-term response may be minimized by the distance China must yet travel to acquire a truly offensive capability, the belief in the accuracy of projections of China's economic growth that can fund a significant buildup has already triggered a scramble for ways to hedge against the possibility of a China threat, Beijing's repeated reassurances about its benign intentions notwithstanding. ₆₅ States invest in modernizing their own arsenals, and try to ensure the continued engagement of the United States as the ultimate hedge against an uncertain future. ₆₆

How does China react to this? Officially, at least, it sees the fears as at best, groundless, and at worst as disguising the interest others have in keeping China down. ₆₇ In terms of capabilities, Beijing sees its own relative weaknesses, not its emerging strengths. Though proud of the accomplishments of economic reform, it perceives itself as a developing country, or more accurately as one that is still far behind the most advanced industrial states. Militarily, China perceives itself also as significantly trailing the world's leading states, and at only the beginning of a long process of modernization, a process constrained by the priority accorded domestic economic development. In terms of China's recent regional behavior and what it reveals about intentions, Beijing views its policy statements and limited military efforts in the East Asian theater as merely efforts to ensure the preservation of vital national interests (indeed, in Beijing's view, addressing internal rather than international problems), not the assertion of expansive claims-- a self-perception consistent with interpreting China's future role as a status quo, not revisionist, great power.

When others express concern about Beijing's current behavior and its lessons for the future, China detects sinister intentions behind what it deems exaggeration of its capabilities and misinterpretation of its motives. Thus, Japan's critical reaction is not simply an understandably prudent response in an uncertain world, but rather an indication that, as some Chinese had long suspected, Tokyo will break the constraints resulting from its defeat in World War II to become a normal great power and China's principal rival in East Asia. ₆₈ Negative American reaction to China's improving military capabilities that clearly lag far behind those of the U.S., and to Chinese regional military activities that have little bearing on vital American interests, suggests that the U.S. may seek to contain China in a fashion that threatens Beijing's definition of its vital national interests. ₆₉ U.S. "defensive" military assistance to Taiwan, and support for Japan that goes beyond forestalling an expanded independent international role for Tokyo, also manifests hostile intent. ₇₀ Similarly, any encouragement for a revival of the Cold War, anti-China role for ASEAN, even in a modified form, will be seen as another piece in a U.S. strategy of containment cum encirclement, Washington's official rhetoric about engagement and ensuring regional stability notwithstanding. ₇₁

In sum, viewed through the prism of the security dilemma, the situation between China and its neighbors is one where the risks of malign mutual perceptions seem likely to feed worst-case (or at least "bad-case") planning. Spirals of conflict will result if others hedge against the more dangerous future Chinas they can imagine, and China interprets such behavior as an unprovoked indicator of hostile intent. The result is made likely when other states' policies are based on perceptions of China's capabilities that run ahead of reality, or simply exceed the estimates Beijing would make about its own power. The result is also made likely when China resists moves toward transparency in the military sphere, clinging instead to a tradition of opacity that may have once served a weak China's strategic interest in maximizing the uncertainties confronted by its more powerful adversaries. ₇₂

Flawed Great Power Theory . Two strands of international relations theory suggest that China poses risks for international security not because of its growing capabilities, per se, or because of the untoward effects of life under anarchy, per se, but rather because it is a flawed great power. In short, while other great powers may behave responsibly, the Chinese regime is the sort that is likely to wield its power in ways that threaten international security. One such approach suggesting that a powerful China could make for a more dangerous world is democratic peace theory. Drawing on ideas outlined by Immanuel Kant, and refined by Michael Doyle, the versions of democratic peace theory that have been set forth since the late 1980s assert that peace prevails among liberal democratic states for a variety of reasons (usually some combination of the following: a shared political culture that emphasizes the nonviolent resolution disputes, mutual respect for the policies of the legitimate authorities representing each country's citizens, an interest in maintaining the political context that permits international commerce to thrive, institutionalized restraints on the leader's ability to employ the state's power for the interests of a minority, accountability of the regime to the people who are the ones that will be asked to make the ultimate sacrifice in the event of war). ₇₃ The theory, and the evidence, also suggests that the democracies' are not particularly pacific in their relations with non-democracies. Absent the stipulated institutional constraints and values, the leaders of non-democracies may choose force to pursue their international interests and the democracies are apt to justify a response in kind, either in self-defense or in order to expand the zone of peace by defeating and then converting the adversary.

What are the implications for the significance of China's emergence as a great power? Clearly, China is a country lacking in the liberal democratic values and institutions assertedly conducive to peaceful relations with liberal democracies. The reform program has focused principally on transforming the economy, not the polity. Though people's lives are much less regimented than they were in the Maoist era, and opportunities for political participation are expanding, the People's Republic of China remains an authoritarian regime with an official ideology and a single legal ruling party. The CCP leaders continue to reject liberal democratic values, a determined rejection reflected most visibly through its willingness to resort to whatever level of force is necessary to solve domestic problems (summary executions to deal with civil and criminal violations of the law; harassment and torture to deal with dissidents, military force when necessary to suppress organized protests in minority territories like Tibet or Xinjiang and, of course, in the Chinese heartland during June 1989). Foreign policy decision-making in China, especially decisions on important international security matters, is not much constrained by institutions, but rather monopolized by at most, a small group of leaders only loosely accountable to a slightly larger elite. ₇₄ Thus, even if (as is unlikely) the potential economic and personal risks of military conflict over China's assertive claims in the Taiwan straits and South China Sea made such policies unpopular, there is little prospect of such opposition altering policy. According to democratic peace theory, the CCP leaders, accustomed to force as an acceptable option for the resolution of political problems, can act recklessly or foolishly without serious fear of the sorts of domestic political repercussions with which democratic leaders must cope. Against such a state, the democratic great powers will feel justified in meeting force with force because they cannot conclude sound agreements with an adversary lacking respect for legal niceties, or because it can be argued they are opposing a tyrant's illegitimate policy one may rightfully despise, not the wishes of the people that liberal democrats must respect. As long as China was a authoritarian minor power, the risk to international security was relatively small and manageable (see Korea and Vietnam); if China becomes an authoritarian great power, it not only remains outside the zone of peace, but also becomes a potential belligerent in a great power war.

The other theory that draws attention to China because it may be a flawed great power, is the "democratic transition theory" detailed by Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder. Their argument explains why regimes undergoing a transition from authoritarianism to democracy are the ones that may pose the greatest dangers to international security. In such regimes the interplay of the social remnants of authoritarian life with the requirements of political competition increases the attractiveness of expansionist, belligerent, or aggressive foreign policies as a way to tap into parochial and nationalist sentiments to garner political support. ₇₅

China has hardly made much of a shift in the direction of democracy, so the relevance of this line of reasoning remains to be seen. The concern here is with the implications of what some see as the likely liberalizing political consequences of continued economic development. What if an ever more prosperous China begins to democratize? The apparent growing strength of nationalism among the Chinese people in the 1990s, including the young, suggests that it may provide not only a crutch on which an ideologically barren CCP regime can lean, but also a litmus test for aspiring leaders if genuine participation in the process of political selection is expanded. Most worrisome is the fact that contemporary Chinese nationalism, in addition to manifesting pride in the accomplishments of the reform era, also evinces a streak of popular resentment at alleged mistreatment by foreigners. ₇₆ Encouraged by the CCP's standard account of China's history of victimization from the time of the British Opium War through the brutal Japanese invasion and occupation during World War II, this negative aspect of Chinese nationalism is an obvious "hot button issue" competing politicians will be tempted to push. ₇₇ If so, to the extent public opinion constrains a democratizing China's future leaders, they may find it difficult to compromise in conflicts with other states when the issues at stake touch on sensitive nationalist legacies. This constraint would justify pessimism about the prospects for peaceful resolution of disputes over Taiwan, for example, if the U.S. is viewed as the stumbling block, or over maritime rights and territorial claims if Japan is one of the principals.

As important, especially in the earliest stages of democratization, Mansfield and Snyder's theory indicates the need for political competitors in a democratizing regime to gather support from social forces that played key roles in the authoritarian era, especially the military. In China, as elsewhere, the military has played a vital political role, at least twice rescuing the CCP from possible collapse (during the Cultural Revolution and in 1989). Despite indications early in the reform era that a professionalizing PLA would remove itself from participation in politics, the weakness of political institutions in China has kept the military in the position of, at a minimum, kingmaker. Even though formal arrangements exist for civilian (party) control of the military, few believe their effectiveness exceeds the personal power of the individuals filling the posts. When a political leader, such as Mao or Deng, who commands the respect of key military leaders serves as Chairman of the Military Affairs Committee or the Central Military Commission, the problem is minimized. But the era of the political-military giant in China is over. As the country shifts from what had been decades of nearly one-man rule to increasingly collective leadership, arguably a small step towards democratization, those who hope to lead will need to earn the support of the PLA. Such support will require a commitment to continuing the military's modernization program. More ominously, it may require a willingness to permit the military to demonstrate its credentials as a professional fighting force, rather than a tool of domestic suppression. ₇₈ With few glorious episodes since the war in Korea, aside from weapons tests, some in the PLA's top ranks may insist that political leaders permit it to demonstrate its renewed strength in engagements for which it is well prepared. Thus, perhaps reinforcing public opinion in a democratizing China, the institutional interest of the military elite may adversely affect the prospect for peacefully resolving the various disputes with other states over maritime and territorial claims in China's "near abroad." The pride expressed after the missile tests in the Taiwan Straits during March 1996, suggests such concerns may not be fanciful. In any case, the democratic transition theory serves as a cautionary note for those who believe that desirable domestic political trends in China will necessarily improve the prospects for peace in East Asia. Even if the democratic peace theorists are correct that a fully democratic China would enter the zone of peace, Mansfield and Snyder warn that an increasingly powerful China going through the difficult process of transition to democracy could be a mighty force for disruption.

Why China's Growing Power May Not Be So Dangerous

Economic Interdependence . Often combined with democratic peace theories, interdependence theories of various sorts have argued that (at least when the future is not too heavily discounted) economic self-interest in an increasingly integrated world economy reduces the expected utility for relying on military force to resolve international disputes. Put otherwise, the opportunity costs of war are too high when one will be harming a valued economic partner and the benefits of war are much smaller in an era in which the foundations of economic and military power depend less on seizable assets like the quantity of labor and natural resources and more on knowledge and its technological fruits. ₇₉ Both the theoretical coherence of and empirical warrant for this line of reasoning has been challenged in an extensive debate whose content falls outside the scope of this essay. ₈₀ But if one grants the validity of the interdependence argument, it serves to bolster optimism about the consequences of China's rising power for international security. The principal characteristic of China's emergence in the late twentieth century is its rapid economic development fueled by dramatically increased levels of international trade and investment. Although the statistics are debated, they indicate a Chinese economy that is impressively interdependent with the global economy. ₈₁ Sharp reductions in China's international economic activity would seriously damage the country's ability to sustain its high rates of growth, a fact easily understood by leaders in Beijing. Concern about the international economic consequences of China's foreign policy may not prevent Beijing from pursuing what it believes are its national interests, but it may constrain the means employed. China's policy toward Hong Kong as the 1997 reversion approaches, and more importantly its attempts to minimize the need for the actual use of military force in resolving the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes arguably reflects not just the PLA's limitations, but also the recognition of the price that may have to be paid if Beijing provokes a sanctioning response by its most valued American, Japanese, and European trade partners. While critics of interdependence theory would note the weakness of such responses in the past, the theory's adherents might point to the way even weak responses by major economic actors have compelled Beijing to contemplate the economic fallout from its military-security policy. China's arms may not be tightly chained by economic concerns, but may yet be loosely bound in ways that are conducive to international peace. ₈₂

Democratic peace theory(II) . I have already suggested democratic peace theory's pessimistic inferences about the consequences for international security of an increasingly powerful, authoritarian China. Yet the theory may also provide grounds for optimism among those who see an inexorable logic linking increased prosperity, the establishment of a market-based economy, and democracy. Although resting on a belief about the nature of political development that is not part of the core of democratic peace theory, the elements of this connection are prominently featured in the theory. And their presumed interconnectedness has been manifest in a U.S. foreign policy that claims democratic peace theory as its theoretical justification. Since the late 1980s, U.S. administrations have reiterated the alleged fact that democracies do not fight one another, and have argued that constructive engagement, especially economic intercourse, serves as a force for progressive political change by an empowered citizenry or a growing middle class. ₈₃

In the China case, the increase in the number of actors with a self-interest in establishing the institutional context for a thriving market economy (both in terms of domestic requirements and international involvement) especially the rule of law, are deemed a force for democracy. China either moves towards democracy to sustain its economic vitality, in which case democratic peace theory argues it becomes a member of the pacific union, or the failure of political reform will hamstring economic growth, and the country's rise to great power status will stall, in which case it poses a less significant threat to international security than many now anticipate. ₈₄

Nuclear peace theory. Of the strands of international relations theory that provide room for optimism about a future in which China emerges as a full-fledged great power, what might be termed "nuclear peace theory" offers a justification for the strongest claims. Bernard Brodie, Robert Jervis, and perhaps most forcefully, Kenneth Waltz, among others have argued that the advent of nuclear weapons, especially thermonuclear weapons that can be loaded atop ballistic missiles, have revolutionized international politics by fundamentally altering the costs of conflict among the great powers. ₈₅ Because none can confidently eliminate the risk of unacceptable retaliation by its adversary, nuclear powers cannot engage one another in military battles of the sort that have a real potential to escalate to unrestrained warfare. ₈₆ Thus, in its purest form, nuclear peace theory argues that among the great powers the nuclear revolution has established a robust buffer not only against general war, but limited war as well, and even a serious constraint on crisis behavior. Moreover, nuclear peace theory suggests that because the lessons of the nuclear revolution are so compelling, so simple to grasp, indeed allegedly hard to ignore, its effects will prevail regardless of the many complicating influences that might otherwise lead states into wars with their rivals. In short, concerns about power transitions, counterbalancing aspiring hegemons, conflict spirals, and flawed regime type, however relevant to an analysis of the old conventional world, are misplaced in the contemporary age because the nuclear revolution has fundamentally altered the expected utility of great power military conflict in ways that will strongly inhibit even war prone states. Uncertainty about relative capabilities may, as Geoffrey Blainey argues, once have led states to fight wars as a way of resolving their disagreements about bargaining strength with reasonable expectations of managing the unfolding process of violent exchange sensitive to costs and benefits. Nuclear weapons have rendered relative comparisons pointless because what matters is the certainty that warfighting requires risking a short-order catastrophic outcome whose probability cannot be managed in the old ways. ₈₇

Applied to the China case, the nuclear peace arguments suggest that the alarmist implications for international security of China's rise to power have been overstated. The other strands of international relations theory that identify the potential dangers ahead, in fact, have only identified sources of conflict and tension; they have not identified the causes of future war. Conflict may be a necessary condition for war, but it is far from sufficient. Unless analysts can convincingly explain why the nuclear constraints on decision-making would not apply for a Chinese decision-maker and his counterpart in a rival great power, the crucial last step in the argument remains to be made. ₈₈ In this view, Chinese probes against Taiwan, adventurism in the South China Sea, and elsewhere in East Asia are feasible only as long as the risk of an escalating armed conflict with the U.S. is virtually zero. Once a risk-laden military engagement becomes a serious possibility, both Beijing and Washington would feel the same pressures to find a negotiated solution that Washington and Moscow did during the various Cold War crises. This approach, then, says little about the level of hostility that will characterize China's relations with the rest of the world. It only suggests reasons why even worst-case scenarios that foresee future Sino-American interactions replicating the earlier Soviet-American pattern, should not overlook the distinctive incentives on the parties in a nuclear world to keep their conflicts within bounds. ₈₉ While Cold War is possible, in this view, hot war is nearly unthinkable. Whether the nuclear peace theorists' impeccable logic holds up to the test of experience, or is tantamount to whistling past the graveyard, remains to be seen.

*******

This essay has briefly explored the nature and significance of China's growing power. Although China's economic and military capabilities have clearly been on the rise over the past seventeen years, the extent to which the perceived increase is grounded in reality is not so clear. Moreover, for the most part the available evidence details increases relative to China's own past, rather than changes in capabilities relative to other key actors in the international system. For students of international relations, that is either ironic or unfortunate since changes in relative capabilities are what the field's theories deem important when they discuss the significance of "power" in world politics. Especially with regard to assessments of increased military capabilities, the empirical warrant for a conventional wisdom that demands a focus on China as an imminent great power is, as yet, not established. However impressive the accumulation of new and improved armaments, reorganized military units, and revised doctrine, analysts need to provide more evidence that demonstrates whether China's PLA is actually catching up to, merely keeping pace with, or perhaps falling still further behind the system's major powers. Without such evidence, any leap to judgment based on what can only be termed premature extrapolation is risky, not just for academics but public policy as well. As implied in the comments of those cautioning against aggressively trying to contain a presumed "China threat," the danger of creating a self-fulfilling prophecy that is costly first in treasure (as military budgets are increased) and later in blood (should one have to live up to the requirements of one's strategy) is not to be taken lightly.

Yet, at least for scholars, it is worth thinking about the likely implications if the conventional wisdom about China's rise proves to be broadly correct, in the long-, if not the short-run. Disturbingly, most of the relevant theoretical arguments examined in this essay raise red flags about the dangers an increasingly powerful China may pose for international peace. The one theory, nuclear peace theory, that offers the strongest reasons for optimism is not likely to be very reassuring to many. Accepting its conclusions requires confidence in claims about a deterrent logic whose empirical validity is established by demonstrating the significance of nonevents (i.e., the counterfactuals of history.) ₉₀ Perhaps the most encouraging feature of nuclear peace theory is that, at least in its pristine form, its predictions do not depend on academic advisers or policymakers digesting and endorsing its deterrent logic. The costs of rejecting the inferences from nuclear peace theory may be high in terms of treasure, but given the tight constraints on great power military engagement it stipulates, they should not be high in terms of blood.

Finally, assessments of China's role as an emerging great power, and thus its potential significance for international security, need always acknowledge the importance of an issue only loosely connected to current patterns of economic and military growth-- the country's future political coherence. Until the violent crackdown on demonstrators in 1989, few China experts concerned themselves with the possible collapse of the communist regime or disintegration of the nation-state. In the immediate wake of the events in Tian'anmen Square, speculation about such extreme outcomes was rampant. But the success of the CCP in weathering the domestic and international pressures it faced in 1989 and 1990 has again shifted the balance, so that by the mid-1990s most expect gradual, rather than convulsive, political change for China as it moves into the post-Deng Xiaoping era. However, the sobering experience of the unexpected collapse of the Soviet empire has weakened whatever confidence political scientists may have had in their ability to anticipate the evolution of even ostensibly well-entrenched regimes. Thus, heavily qualified, rather than firm predictions are the order of the day. ₉₁ Visions of an international system in which China plays a leading role may well be taking for granted answers to questions about political coherence that are at least as vexing as those about economic and military capabilities. And given the as yet insufficient empirical warrant for current conventional wisdom about trends on these latter dimensions, it seems prudent to hedge one's bets on China's prospects as a great, let alone hegemonic, power, and the purported consequences this might have for international security in the next century.

Footnotes

Note 1: Capturing the key dimensions of the most recent China-mania, the February 18, 1996 New York Times Magazine, carried as its cover story, "The 21st Century Starts Here: China Booms. The World Holds Its Breath." By Ian Buruma, Seth Faison, and Fareed Zakaria. And the editors of International Security, sensitive to market demand, have published a new edited volume of selected articles entitled, East Asian Security, whose largest section is a collection of major articles under the heading, "The Implications of the Rise of China." Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller eds., East Asian Security (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). The new wave of scholarly interest in East Asian security and China emerged in about 1992-1993. Just two years earlier, such matters received relatively short shrift in one of the first serious comprehensive overviews of the post-Cold War world landscape. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," International Security, Vol.15, No.3 (Spring 1991), pp. 5-53. Back.

Note 2: France and Britain, the other true second-ranking powers during the Cold War, both developed and maintained more sophisticated nuclear deterrents, and higher quality conventional armed forces than China. Though Germany and Japan eventually had the economic wherewithal to play the role of second-ranking powers (indeed economically outshining France, Britain, and China), they did not, largely as a consequence of the political constraints resulting from their defeat in WWII. On the notion of "second-ranking powers " during the Cold War, see Avery Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security: Some Lessons from the Second-Ranking Powers During the Cold War," Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 15, No. 4 (December 1992), 478-479, 519. Back.

Note 3: The nature of the new development strategy falls outside the scope of this essay. Its basic elements were set forth early in the period, however. They are "enlivening the domestic economy" (dui nei gao huo) and "opening to the outside" (dui wai kai fang). Essentially this amounts to a shift from a domestic economy that emphasized centralized command planning to one that emphasized giving play to market forces, and an international economic policy that shifted from a position of near autarkic isolationism to broad-based integration with international society to garner the direct economic benefits of trade and investment, as well as the indirect benefits from cultural and scholarly exchanges. For concise accounts of the dramatic changes that amounted in its architect's (Deng Xiaoping) words to a "second revolution," see Harry Harding, China's Second Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987); Kenneth Liberthal, Governing China (New York: W.W.Norton, 1995); Nicholas R. Lardy, Foreign Trade and Economic Reform in China, 1978-1990 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992); Nicholas R. Lardy China in the World Economy (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1994). Back.

Note 4: The Economist suggested that the "next world order" would be one in which "[a] strong America, an advancing China, a struggling Russia and an uncertain Europe make up the new quartet of big powers." "The New World Order: Back to the Future," Economist, January 8, 1994, p. 23. Back.

Note 5: The centrality of China in the U.S. view of the future international order is clearly reflected in U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher's May 1996 speech to the Council on Foreign Relations. "'American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship' Address by Warren Christopher," Federal Department and Agency Documents, May 17, 1996, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., from NEXIS Library, Lexis/Nexis, Reed Elsevier, Inc., (hereafter, NEXIS). For the emerging scholarly interest and concern, see Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No.3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94) pp. 34-77; Denny Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon: China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168; Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol.19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194; Ross H. Munro, "The U.S. and China: On a Collision Course," Foreign Policy Research Institute Wire Vol. 3, No. 5 (December 1995). Back.

Note 6: For a brief introduction to the debate and references to some of the key positions, see William Curti Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), esp. pp. 3-10. For some of the classic approaches to measuring the power of states in the international system, see the overviews provided in international relations textbooks for U.S. undergraduates. Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, fifth edition, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), esp. p. 375-377. Joshua S Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994), esp. pp. 74-75. Back.

Note 7: Their reluctance may be sensible to the extent others' inflated estimates provide them with a dissuasiveness that exceeds what might be expected based on actual capabilities. See Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security," pp. 485-91, 500-503; Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), p. 31n. 92; China has made token efforts at enhancing transparency, most notably issuing a defense White Paper in 1995. See "Zhongguo de Junbei Kongzhi yu Caijun," Renmin Ribao (Haiwai ban), November 17, 1995, pp. 2-3. Its contents were not very revealing, however, going little beyond familiar policy positions and rhetoric on arms control and disarmament. See Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96), pp. 43-78. Christopher Bluth, "Beijing's Attitude to Arms Control," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1996, pp. 328-329. Yet it would be hard to overstate the increase in accessibility to Chinese sources, written and human, since the Dengist reform era began in 1979. Western scholars have been able to interview relevant policy-makers, Chinese academics, and military personnel, to gather the increasing volume of Chinese publications, as well as to obtain many imperfectly controlled "internal-circulation-only (neibu)" materials often discovered on the shelves of China's bookstores. David Shambaugh, Gerald Segal, Thomas Christensen, and Alastair Johnston have been some of the pioneers in the community of Western international relations scholars exploiting such previously untapped sources. Back.

Note 8: William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," World Politics, Vol. 39, No. 3 (April 1987), pp. 353-381. Back.

Note 9: See Lieberthal, Governing China, p. 126; also "Statistical Communique of the State Statistical Bureau of the People's Republic of China," released annually each March and available in Beijing Review. Back.

Note 10: See discussion of changes in the average family's diet, and the broadening pattern of ownership (quantitative change in the numbers per household) of increasingly modern consumer goods (qualitative change from simple items like watches and radios, to refrigerators and washing machines, to color televisions, VCRS, and computers). Dong Li and Alec M. Gallup, "In Search of the Chinese Consumer," The China Business Review Vol. 22, No.5, (September 1995), p. 19, from NEXIS; "China's Urban Dwellers See Life Through Color TVS, Beijing," Xinhua News Agency, May 2, 1996, from NEXIS; "Diversifying Consumer Purchases in China," COMLINE Daily News Electronics, June 18, 1996, from NEXIS; Renee Lai, "Shoppers Set Their Sights on Life's Little Luxuries," South China Morning Post, July 11, 1996, from NEXIS. Nevertheless, vast sections of the Chinese population remain mired in poverty. See Patrick E. Tyler, "In China's Outlands, Poorest Grow Poorer," The New York Times, October 26, 1996, Page A1., NEXIS. Back.

Note 11: See Lardy, China in the World Economy, p. 2. For 1996 China anticipated a total trade volume of $280 billion. "China Confident in Fulfilling Foreign Trade Target for This Year," Xinhua News Agency, July 9, 1996, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 12: Lardy, China in the World Economy pp. 29-33. Back.

Note 13: By August 1996, China ranked fifth in the world in foreign exchange reserves at $84.3 billion. "Japan's July Forex Reserves Set Record for 29th Month," Japan Economic Newswire, August 1, 1996, from NEXIS. This was up from roughly $15 billion at the end of the 1980s. Nicholas R. Lardy, "The Future of China," NBR Analysis, Vol. 3, No. 3 (August 1992), p. 7. Back.

Note 14: See Paul H.B. Godwin, The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity and Change in the 1980s (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983); Harlan Jencks, "'People's War Under Modern Conditions': Wishful Thinking, National Suicide, or Effective Deterrent?" China Quarterly, No. 98 (June 1984); Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Chinese Defense Establishment in Transition: The Passing of a Revolutionary Army?" in A. Doak Barnett and Ralph N. Clough (eds.), Modernizing China (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Charles D. Lovejoy and Bruce W. Watson (eds.), China's Military Reforms (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986); Ellis Joffe, The Chinese Army after Mao (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Larry M. Wortzell (ed.), China's Military Modernization (New York: Greenwood Press, 1988). Back.

Note 15: Figures on China's military spending range from the low official report of about $8 billion, to foreign analysts' estimates exceeding $100 billion. For a concise, yet thorough, discussion of the technical and practical complexities of estimating Chinese defense spending that result in such hugely different results, see "China's Military Expenditure," The Military Balance 1995-1996 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.270-275. Other publications that regularly estimate Chinese defense spending include the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency's, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office) and SIPRI Yearbook Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (New York: Oxford University Press). On the trend in spending, see David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 54. See also Phillippe Massonet, "Exercises Point to True Size of China's Military Budget, Say Experts," Agence France Presse, March 21, 1996, NEXIS. Back.

Note 16: Stories alleging other attempted Chinese purchases include those that refer to technology and hardware relevant to in-flight refueling (Iran), jet fighter aircraft and advanced avionics (Israel), aircraft carriers (CIS and Spain), SS-18 heavy ICBM and nuclear warhead testing computer simulation technology (Russia, Ukraine). See "U.S. Warns Russia, Ukraine," UPI, May 21, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp.; "The Sino-Russian Arms Bazaar," Jane's Intelligence Review, July 1996, p. 330; "Asia's Arms: Racing," The Economist, February 3, 1996, p. 29; "China Exploded More than Two Warheads, Paper Says," Reuters, June 12, 1996, clari.tw.nuclear, ClariNet Communications Corp.; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), p. 202. Back.

Note 17: Yet, organizational changes in the PLA have outstripped the deployment of the equipment necessary to make them effective, especially with regard to rapid reaction units. See David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 53. In addition, some analysts believe that China's Soviet institutional legacy of a well-insulated military-industrial complex, together with the decentralizing impact of the market economic reforms limit the country's ability to diffuse the benefits of imported and domestically developed military technology. See Eric Arnett, "Military Technology: The Case of China," SIPRI Yearbook 1995: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp.359-386. For a survey of many of the facets of current changes in the PLA, see "Special Issue: China's Military in Transition," China Quarterly, No. 146 (June 1996). Back.

Note 18: Every visitor to China since February 1991, including the author, who has had discussions with Chinese military officers and analysts, has reported the profound transformation of attitudes towards high-technology weapons that resulted from observing Allied performance against the Iraqis in Operation Desert Storm. It remains to be seen whether the recent revision in some estimates of the effectiveness and efficiency of smart weapons will dampen Chinese determination to pursue such costly capabilities. See Tim Weiner, "'Smart' Weapons Were Overrated, Study Concludes," New York Times, July 9, 1996, pp. A1, 14. The subtitles to the article summarized its main points: "War Boasts Were Wrong," "Review of Persian Gulf Combat Questions the Priorities of Pentagon's Arms Policy." Back.

Note 19: Prime Minister Churchill was shocked at the Americans' inflated perception of China. In one of his classic studies of grand strategy in the Pacific War, Herbert Feis recounted Churchill's views: "The Prime Minister found '...the extraordinary significance of China in American minds, even at the top, strangely out of proportion. I was conscious of a standard of values which accorded China almost an equal fighting power with the British Empire, and rated the Chinese armies as a factor to be mentioned in the same breath as the armies of Russia.' He made it clear that the thought this judgment foolish; in his later words, 'I told the President how much I felt American opinion overestimated the contribution which China could make to the general war....I said I would of course always be helpful and polite to the Chinese, whom I admired and liked as a race and pitied for their endless misgovernment, but that he must not expect me to adopt what I felt was a wholly unreal standard of values.'" Herbert Feis, The China Tangle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 11. Allied policy eventually adjusted to the reality of the limited military clout of Chiang Kai-shek's China. China was simply to be discouraged from seeking a separate peace with Japan in order to ensure that large numbers of Japanese troops would remain tied down in operations on the Chinese mainland. Back.

Note 20: On the heralding of China's great, possibly superpower status, at the time of Nixon's pathbreaking visit to Beijing, see Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 130 Ironically, perhaps, China's role in the event of a war with the SU would , as in WWII almost certainly have been to tie down the enemy's forces on a second front. Back.

Note 21: On unfilled concepts, see Robert Jervis, "Hypotheses on Misperception," World Politics, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April 1968). The opening subheading ("This Time It Is Real") for Nicholas Kristof's Foreign Affairs article, reflects this longstanding expectation. In "The Rise of China," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5 (November/December 1993), pp. 59-74. Back.

Note 22: See Jim Rohwer, "Rapid Growth Could Make China World's Largest Economy by 2012," South China Morning Post, November 28, 1992, p. 1., from NEXIS. The leap to judgement, whatever its accuracy, is not limited to economic assessments of China. During the 1990s, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, Vietnam, and to some extent India were at various points pegged as "the next hot countries." Back.

Note 23: See Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power," p. 374. Back.

Note 24: Indeed, China's continued determination to make whatever adjustments are necessary to sustain a strategy of export-led growth has recently been reflected in the policy changes announced by Wang Chunzheng, Vice-minister of the State Planning Commission in mid-1996 after a sluggish first half. "China Uses Tax Rebates, Loans to Boost Exports," Reuters, July 23 1996, clari.world.asia.china.biz, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 25: Overstating the significance of a prospective adversary's military capabilities is not without precedent in the U.S. Worst-case estimates leading to exaggerated United States predictions of imminent Soviet capabilities that repeatedly failed to materialize on schedule (e.g., advanced bombers, ICBMs, aircraft carriers, sophisticated tanks) were a prominent feature of the Cold War. For discussion of the "bomber gap" and "missile gap" episodes, see Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). For a sober assessment of the limited real improvements in Chinese military capabilities relevant to some of its most prominent international disputes, see Michael G. Gallagher, "China's Illusory Threat to the South China Sea," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 169-194. David Shambaugh estimates that development of the sealift and airlift necessary for effective rapid deployment forces is at least two decades away. See Terry Atlas, "China's Military Big, Maybe Not So Mighty," Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1996, p. 1., from NEXIS. Yet Shambaugh also discusses the military buildup in the 1990s putting the PLA on "the verge of a great leap forward." See "Growing Strong: China's Challenge to Asian Security," Survival, Vol. 36, No. 2 (Summer 1994), p. 57. Back.

Note 26: On the way growth in particular sectors may have influenced perceptions of Russia's power prior to WWI, see Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power," p. 374. Back.

Note 27: On China's naval plans, see John Downing, "China's Evolving Maritime Strategy," Parts I and II Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (March 1996), pp. 129-133 and Vol . 8, No. 4 (April 1, 1996), pp. 186-191; "PLANs for the Predictable Future," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 3, No. 5 (May 1996), p. 6, from NEXIS. Ta Kung Pao, a pro-China newspaper in Hong Kong, reported that "China is paying more attention to offense and to working with land and sea forces in training new air force pilots" a shift away from its "old philosophy of air force training and operations emphasiz[ing] defense of airspace and coordinations with land forces" according to its "interview with China Air force command Academy Vice Dean of Studies, Zhang Jiali." "China Air Force Changes Training Goals," UPI, July 24, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 28: Steven Greenhouse, "New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China Into Third Place," New York Times, May 20, 1993, p. A1, from NEXIS. "Revised Weights for the World economic Outlook; Annex IV," World Economic Outlook (May 1993), International Monetary Fund, Information Access Company, a Thomson Corporation Company, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 29: Without attracting much attention, in 1988 the Washington Post reported that the U.S. Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy was filing a document with President Reagan that used the purchasing-power parity method and suggested a much larger Chinese GNP currently and in the early 21st century. "U.S. Report Projects China's Economic Rise in 2010," Xinhua General Overseas News Service, January 12, 1988, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 30: See Jim Rohwer, "Rapid Growth Could Make China World's Largest Economy by 2012," South China Morning Post, November 28, 1992, p. 1., from NEXIS. See Lardy, China in the World Economy, pp. 14-18, for competing estimates of Chinese GDP and his attempts to evaluate their merits. The more bullish view on the Chinese economy is summarized in William H. Overholt, The Rise of China (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1993). Back.

Note 31: On the events leading up to the missile test in March 1996, see Patrick E. Tyler, "Beijing Steps Up Military Pressure on Taiwan Leader," New York Times, March 7, 1996, pp. A1, 10. During the March 1996 tension in the Taiwan straits, it was reported, and subsequently denied, that lower-level Chinese officials had raised the possibility of nuclear retaliation against Los Angeles should the United States attack China. The threat was interpreted by Chas. Freeman, the former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense, to whom it was apparently made as simply "'realistic caution that the United States no longer has a free hand against China,'as it did before China developed nuclear weapons of its own." Jim Wolf, "China Aides Gave U.S. Nuclear Warning, Official Says," Reuters, March 17, 1996, clari.tw.nuclear, ClariNet Communications Corp. See also Patrick E. Tyler, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, January 24, 1996, p. A3. Back.

Note 32: For others these actions left little doubt about the alleged "China threat." Floyd D. Spence, Chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee, articulated the sentiment in support of Resolution 148--Defense of Taiwan: "Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of the resolution. For beyond the immediate threats China poses to Taiwan, I am concerned about the emerging pattern of aggressive Chinese behavior....The Chinese provocation in the Taiwan Strait is but a single, short act in what promises to be a longer drama as China forces its way onto the global stage...." Spence calls for thinking about a long-term strategy, rather than leaping at containment of a presumed threat, but his comments include a list of reasons to worry (citing recent Chinese behavior and military modernization). "Testimony March 20, 1996 Floyd d. Spence Chairman House National Security, Security Challenges: China," Federal Document Clearing House, Congressional Testimony, Federal Document Clearing House, Inc., from NEXIS. U.S. House of Representatives Speaker, Newt Gingrich, began citing the nuclear danger China posed as an important reason for the U.S. to develop a limited ballistic missile defense system. David Morgan, "Gingrich Calls for U.S. Defense Against Nuclear Attack," Reuters, January 27, 1996, clari.tw.nuclear, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 33: China's Xinhua news agency claimed that the war games near Taiwan in March 1996 and those over the preceding year had provided "clear proof" of the fruits of PLA modernization, in particular, as an unidentified Beijing commander stated, that the war games were "practice for 'decisive, highly co-ordinated and sudden' assaults on islands." Jeffrey Parker, "China Taiwan Drills 'Proof' of PLA Modernization," Reuters, March 19,, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. For China's claims about the success of its missile tests, see the comments by Li Qianming, deputy commander of the PLA's Second Artillery Forces, "China Claims Readiness for 'Future War'," UPI, March 18, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. These exercises and China's final series of nuclear tests provided an opportunity for Tokyo's political leaders to express their concern about the countries' bilateral relations. In a review of the background to currently rising tension in modern Sino-Japanese relations, Nicholas Kristof reported the views of Kazuo Aichi, a former Cabinet member and prominent member of Parliament: "There's a growing attitude in Parliament that we need to take a tougher line toward China." And another official told Kristof, "For the last 100 years, our focus in foreign affairs has been on America. From now on, it will have to be China." Nicholas D. Kristof, "Tension With Japan Rises Alongside China's Star," New York Times, June 16, 1996, p. E3. But most striking was the addition to the 1996 Japanese defense White Paper referring to the importance of thinking about China: ``The situation must be watched with caution in terms of promotion of nuclear weapons and modernisation of the navy and air forces, expansion of naval activity and heightened tension in the Taiwan Strait as seen in the military drill near Taiwan." (Brian Williams, "Japan Sees China As Growing Military Challenge," Reuters, July 19, 1996, Clar.world.asia.china.). See also Gerald Segal, "The Taiwanese Crisis: What Next?" Jane's Intelligence Review, June 1996, pp. 269-270. Back.

Note 34: This has been reflected in various attempts to prescribe the appropriate strategy for dealing with the new challenge, usually portrayed as a choice between "containment" and "engagement." See David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China," in which the author recommends engagement as the only realistic option, though not one likely to fulfill the hopes of its more optimistic proponents. Gerald Segal calls for a middle ground that combines pressures and inducements he labels "constrainment." See "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Spring 1996), pp. 107-135. His prescription shares much with George Kennan's original vision of containment, though not its more aggressive interpretations. For a discussion of the different Cold War policies that were labeled "containment" see John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). For another proposal for nonprovocative containment in the wake of China's July 21, 22, 1995 M-9 missile tests in the Taiwan straits, see "Containing China," The Economist, July 29, 1995, pp. 11, 12. See also "China Goes Ballistic," The Economist , July 29, 1995, p. 23. Back.

Note 35: See Patrick E. Tyler, "Shadow Over Asia: A Special Report; China's Military Stumbles Even As Its Power Grows," New York Times, December 3, 1996, p. A1. Back.

Note 36: As indicated above, access to documentary sources has improved, though problems of selectivity in a filtering process controlled by the CCP authorities remain. The written record is augmented by greater possibilities for interviews by the few scholars who have cultivated the proper contacts. Still, the difficulties of Chinese officials' biased self-reflection, and the remaining limits on the scope of interviewing exacerbate problems scholars confront even in more open polities. Back.

Note 37: China has decided for now not to attempt to join the G7, probably something it would otherwise desire, but not if it would discredit its claims to being a developing country entitled to preferential trading arrangements. See "China Bucks G-7 Membership, Wants WTO," UPI, July 2, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. The notion of China that should be invited to join the G7 was stimulated by the revision in IMF calculations in 1993. See "New Tally of World's Economies Catapults China Into Third Place," New York Times, May 20, 1993, p. A1, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 38: Beijing decided to select a European consortium and a Singapore firm to build China's new 100-seat aircraft, a major decision that surprised U.S. aircraft manufacturers believe was influenced by deteriorating Sino-American relations. Rajiv Chandra, "China: European, U.S. Aircraft Producers Compete for Boom Market," Inter Press Service, July 19, 1996, NEXIS. Back.

Note 39: On China's varying alliance behavior, see Avery Goldstein, "Discounting the Free Ride: Alliances and Security in the Postwar World," International Organization, Vol. 49, No.1 (Winter 1995), pp. 39-73. Back.

Note 40: Thus, China's and Japan's mutual perceptions mirror each other. China's fears about Japan are based on observation of Tokyo's current capabilities and Beijing's beliefs about Tokyo's future intentions; Japan's fears about China are based on observation of Beijing's current intentions and Tokyo's beliefs about Beijing's future capabilities. Back.

Note 41: Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power," pp. 377-378. Back.

Note 42: The most recent scholarship on the Taiwan Straits Crises depict Mao Zedong's initiatives as carefully calibrated probes, manipulating tension, rather than reckless attempts to rely on force to quickly resolve this legacy of the Civil War. See especially Thomas Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-58 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996). Back.

Note 43: Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power," pp. 377-378. Back.

Note 44: See "Report Raps China Military," AP, February 8, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp.; Peer Slevin "China Could Not Easily Overwhelm Taiwan, Analysts Agree," Philadelphia Inquirer, February 16, 1996, p.. A4; Terry Atlas, "China's Military Big, Maybe Not So Mighty," Chicago Tribune, March 12, 1996, p. 1. A May 1996 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence study concluded that China's March 1996 military exercises in the Taiwan strait were part of a series beginning in 1994 designed to prepare for the contingency of invading Taiwan. It also judged the PLA incapable at present of carrying out a successful invasion. See Jim Wolf, "U.S. Navy Says China Rehearsed Taiwan Invasion," Reuters, November 11, 1996, clari.world.asia.china., ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 45: Prior to the Chinese missile exercises in the Taiwan straits in March 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry, issued statements of concern, not firm warnings to Beijing, a flexible approach that was heavily criticized by one of his predecessors (Caspar Weinberger) as weakening deterrence. See "Perry Criticized on Taiwan," Associated Press, February 28, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. On July 22, 1996, President Clinton restated the U.S. position: "I will reiterate: We support a one-China policy, but we support a peaceful and only a peaceful resolution of the differences between Taiwan and the Republic of China (sic)...." Paul Basken, "Clinton: U.S. Wants 'Peaceful' one-China," UPI, July 23, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Similarly, National Security Adviser Anthony Lake reiterated the long-standing official "one-China policy," during his visit to China in July 1996, but a senior official accompanying him while stressing that the problem "is an issue to be resolved by the two parties independently," added that the United States "only insist[s] that this be done peacefully." (emph. added). "U.S. To Stick To 'One China' Policy" UPI , July 9, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 46: The "long peace" is the term John Lewis Gaddis applied to the Cold War, accurately labeling the remarkable stretch of international history in which the system's great powers did not directly clash in war. John Lewis Gaddis, "The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System," in Sean M. Lynn-Jones (ed.), The Cold War and After (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1991), pp. 1-44. Back.

Note 47: Hegemon is simply used to indicate the dominant position of the most powerful state in the international system. Debates about precise definition of the term, especially the extent of the superior power a hegemon must possess to qualify for the title, are important, but not essential for examining the logic of the arguments presented here. Back.

Note 48: Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981). A more detailed historical discussion that mirrors the logic Gilpin depicts, is contained in the popular book by Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage, 1987). Back.

Note 49: A.F.K. Organski, and Jacek Kugler, The War Ledger (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Back.

Note 50: Ibid., pp. 19-20. Back.

Note 51: Ibid., p. 23. Gilpin, by contrast does not argue that either the rising or the falling power should be the "aggressor." War and Change in World Politics. Back.

Note 52: The Chinese position on human rights is restated in the official media whenever criticism is forthcoming, and is also set forth when the issues are raised at high-level meetings with Western leaders such as the APEC forum and the International Commission on Human Rights. China has also condemned U.S. leadership on environmental issues. Probably in reaction to the U.S. decision to deny Eximbank backing for American companies' participation in the controversial Three Gorges dam project, President Jiang Zemin stated, "We firmly oppose some advanced countries using so-called environmental diplomacy as a pretext to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries." "China Attacks 'Environmental Diplomacy,'" Reuters, July 16, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 53: On July 21, Li Zhongzhou, director-general of international trade at China's Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation repeated the accusation that the U.S. was being unreasonable: "It is unjust to exclude China from the WTO only because China fails to meet certain standards set by a particular country...." "China Slams U.S. Demands for WTO Entry," UPI, July 21, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. As noted above, because China insists on admission to the WTO under the more lenient terms granted a developing country, Beijing cannot at the same time agree to, let alone demand, a place at economic table of the world's advanced industrial countries, the G7. If the Gilpin line of reasoning holds, however, this position should change after the WTO matter is resolved. Back.

Note 54: On China in post-Cold War U.S. military contingency planning, see William W. Kaufmann, Assessing the Base Force: How Much Is Too Much? (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992); Michael O'Hanlon, Defense Planning for the Late 1990s (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1995). China's reluctance to sign a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty whose verification regime would greatly advantage the technologically superior U.S. reflected the tensions emerging from the competing concerns of a dominant military power and a rising one. See Jane Macartney, "China Hopes Test Treaty Can Be Concluded This Year," Reuters, July 13, 1996, clari.tw.nuclear, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 55: Trying to set the pecking-order record straight, during the March 1996 Taiwan Straits Crisis, U.S. Defense Secretary William Perry stated, lest anyone think otherwise, "Beijing should know that while they are a great military power, that the premier military power in the Western Pacific is the United States." Gilles Campion, "United States and China fire first salvo in Asia-Pacific Supremacy Race," Agence France Presse, March 25, 1996, from NEXIS. In contrast, Henry Kissinger has bluntly stated that the U.S. "needed to reconcile itself to China's growing power and to accept that it could not remake the world in its own image.." Mure Dickie, "Kissinger Tells United States to Go Back to Basics on China," Reuters World Service, April 18, 1996, from NEXIS. A central task for U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph Nye's talks with senior Chinese defense officials in November 1995 was reportedly to clarify that Taiwan President Lee's visit to the U.S. was not an indicator of an emerging U.S. policy to contain China and to "assure China that the United States was not trying to check its emergence as a regional power." "Nye: U.S.-China Talks on Track," AP, November 17, 1995, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 56: Sensitivity to such influences in international relations may have been reawakened by Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72 (Summer 1993), pp. 22-49. Back.

Note 57: See Waltz, Theory of International Politics and Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York, Columbia University Press, 1959). For a revision that complicates Waltz's parsimonious theory of power relations by considering the factors that determine whether power will be deemed threatening, see Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988). Back.

Note 58: For a representative piece in this vein, see Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon"; Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," p. 69; Ross H. Munro, "The U.S. and China." Back.

Note 59: Still, the response to China's international renaissance remains mixed, since balancing only makes sense if states can muster sufficient resources, individually or collectively. Absent great power allies, self-interested East Asian states may conclude they have no alternative to accommodating Chinese interests Back.

Note 60: Japan could take the lead in such a countervailing coalition, but the domestic and regional legacy of its behavior during the Second World War, will make this difficult. For a view that deems the Clinton administrations reaffirmation of security ties with Japan as an acceptable alternative, see Charles Lane, "TRB from Washington: Re-Orient," The New Republic, May 20, 1996, p. 6. Back.

Note 61: On the security dilemma, see John H. Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 2, No. 2 (January 1950); Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 186-187; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978); Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-495; Thomas J. Christensen, and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990),pp. 137-168. Back.

Note 62: See Jervis, "Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma;" Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Back.

Note 63: Power projection capabilities, i.e., offensive weaponry, need not reflect an offensive strategy; it may simply reflect a belief in the necessity for forward defense in the event of conflict. Nevertheless, as David Shambaugh has noted, the dynamics of the security dilemma operate: "From China's perspective, its current build-up is a legitimate effort to acquire armed forces commensurate with its rising status as a global economic power and protect its perceived national interests. But from the perspective of many of China's neighbors an alarming trend has begun." "Growing Strong," p. 44. Back.

Note 64: Tomoyumi Kojima, Professor at Keio University, helped craft a report of the Japan Forum on International Relations Inc., entitled "The Future of China in the Context of Asian Security: For a New Sino-Japanese Relationship." As he put it, "The issue is how Japan and Asia can prevent the development of China into a military superpower" with hegemonic aspirations, a possibility that "cannot be discounted should the traditional and historical 'Chinese chauvinism' join forces with the remnants of communist ideology." Lauren Freedman, "Wary Eye Case on China's Growing Power: Close Ties Urged, But 'China Chauvinism' Remains a Concern," Nikkei Weekly, February 6, 1995, p. 18, Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Inc., from NEXIS. Back.

Note 65: In these early stages, the response includes steps to appease as well as steps to resist growing Chinese power. On the complex motives and patterns of the arms buildup in East Asia since the end of the Cold War, see Desmond Ball , "Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/1994)pp. 78-112. "SE Asians Arming Up to Protect Their Resources," Reuters, January 29, 1996, clari.tw.defense, ClariNet Communications Corp. For the fine line between balancing against, and avoiding provoking China that ASEAN states must walk unless they are sure of U.S. commitment, see former Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew's comments: "Most East Asian nations want the United States to remain in the region....If the United States and its stabilising effect are not around in 20 years, Asian leaders will take care not to antagonize China." "Singapore's Lee Warns of Growing Power of China," Reuters, February 24, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Shortly afterward, Lee suggested that the U.S. and Japan "join forces in a military-industrial counterweight to China's growing power." See Gilles Campion, "United States and China Fire First Salvo in Asia-Pacific Supremacy Race," Agence France Presse, March 25, 1996, from NEXIS. Recently, Vietnam and the Philippines reacted strongly to China's unilateral assertion of expanded territorial waters in the South China Sea, perhaps reassured by the U.S. spring 1996 announcement of it long-term commitment to military involvement in East Asia. "Asian Reaction Swift to China's Maritime Expansion," Reuters, May 17, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. But more recently, the Philippines Defense Secretary, Renato De Villa, received assurances from Premier Li Peng that Beijing "has no intentions to project its armed forces in territories outside China." "Manila: No War Over Spratlys," UPI, August 3, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Back.

Note 66: Thus, most were happy with the U.S. policy reiterated on several occasions in Spring and Summer 1996, that the U.S. will remain engaged in East Asia and maintain its major military presence at its current size, including 100,000 troops. See President Clinton's speech to the Japanese Diet in "Clinton: Japan, U.S. Must Continue to Be Partners," The Daily Yomiuri, April 19, 1996, from NEXIS; also "United States to Retain Strong Presence in Pacific: Christopher," Agence France Presse, July 23, 1996, NEXIS; John Hall, "Lake Upbeat on U.S.-China ties," UPI, July 11, 1996, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 67: At every opportunity, Chinese officials attack the "China-threat theory." In the wake of the military exercises in the Taiwan Straits, Defense Minister Chi Haotian, in comments to U.S. Undersecretary of Defense Walter Slocombe "dismissed as absurd...Western theories saying China's military threat to world peace is growing along with its economic might." "China Defense Minister Says Threat Theory Absurd," Reuters, June 27, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. See also David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong," p. 43. For Chinese criticisms of the "so-called 'China threat theory'" in connection with the People's Republic of China's increasing military spending, see Benjamin Kang Lim, "Beijing Slams West for Playing up China Threat," Reuters, November 3, 1995, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. Typical of China's perspective was the front-page editorial in the official newspaper of China's military, Liberation Army Daily, responding to criticism of the People's Republic of China's penultimate nuclear weapons test: "'The United States and other countries...plan by shifting China's nuclear tests into the international eye to cover up their plot to maintain a nuclear threat and to monopolise nuclear superiority..... ...[The article indicated that the] real threat to world peace was not posed by the so-called China threat, but those hegemonistic powers that tried to 'contain' other nations." Jane Macartney, "China Army Wants Nuclear Arms Destruction, Test End," Reuters, June 13, 1996, clari.tw.nuclear, ClariNet Communications Corp. See also Wang Jisi, "U.S.-China relations in the Context of Regional Stability," PacNet No. 24 (June 14, 1996), Pacific Forum CSIS, Honolulu, Hawaii; Hans Binnendijk, "U.S. Strategic Objectives in East Asia," Strategic Forum, No. 68 (March 1996) Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, p. 3. Back.

Note 68: Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52. On his trip to South Korea, China's President Jiang Zemin warned, "We must be vigilant against Japanese militarism....Japan should have a correct view of history." "China's Jiang Zemin Warns Against Japan Militarism," Reuters, November 13, 1995, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. And criticizing Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto's visit to the Yakusune shrine to the Japan's war dead, China's official Xinhua news agency claimed that such actions "can only make people believe that today's Japan...is increasingly ignoring its own history of aggression.... ...His action undoubtedly represents a green light to some people who would advocate militarism...." "China Media Say Japan Shrine Boost to Militarism," Reuters, August 1, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. See also Gerald Segal, "China Takes on Pacific Asia," Jane's Defence '96 The World in Conflict, pp. 68-70. Back.

Note 69: See David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong," Back.

Note 70: Thus, China condemns the idea of the U.S. providing or assisting in the construction of theater ballistic missile defenses for Taiwan, Japan and possibly others, viewing it as an attempt to neutralize the one military capability in which China has some strength. Nevertheless, the U.S. has approved sale of a "modified version of Raytheon's Gulf War-tested Patriot anti-missile system" to Taiwan and Raytheon may use Taiwan as a regional missile maintenance hub for its clients in the Asia-Pacific market. "Raytheon Mulls Missile Maintenance Hub in Taiwan," Reuters, July 28, 1996, Clari.tw.defense, ClariNet Communications Corp. Such military assistance to Taiwan will supplement ongoing arms sales approved at the end of the Bush administration (150 F-16s) that have provoked criticism and warnings from Beijing that Washington is violating prior agreements to gradually reduce such sales. "China Says Future U.S. ties Hinge on Taiwan," Reuters, February 8 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. With the cooperation of the United States, Japan continues to mull further investment in an advanced theater high-altitude area defense (THAAD) against ballistic missiles. High cost (perhaps 25% of Tokyo's defense budget) and uncertainty about its effectiveness against a North Korean threat that may never materialize have delayed a final Japanese decision. Though there were reports (later denied) that North Korea had passed a threat to Tokyo through Washington "that Pyongyang could fire four atomic missiles at Japan," China almost certainly will view any move to develop THAAD as being a long term plan to deal with a long term threat, i.e., China's growing missile capabilities, not just the immediate Korean problem. See Todd Crowell, "Asia Launches a Missile Race," Christian Science Monitor, July 25, 1996, Clari.tw.defense, ClariNet Communications Corp.; "Japan Denies Specific Knowledge of N. Korea Nuclear Warheads," Reuters, June 11 1996, Clari.tw.nuclear., ClariNet Communications Corp. Holly Porteous, "China's View of Strategic Weapons," Jane's Intelligence Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (March 1996), p.134-37. Back.

Note 71: See David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China."; "Growing Strong," pp. 49-50. During his visit to the Philippines, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, described U.S. China policy as "mainly one of engagement, hoping they'd be drawn into regional and international institutions...in ways that will give them a stake in stability...(and) an incentive to be a responsible neighbor rather than a disruptive one." But Lord added that the U.S. was not "naive" and would be hedging its bets against a relationship that is going to be "sweet and sour for the foreseeable future," by maintaining a regional military presence. "China Building Up for Spratlys-- U.S. Official," Reuters, January 23, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. In testimony before the House International Relations Committee Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Admiral Richard C. Macke, U.S. Navy Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Command, states his support for wary engagement: "China continues to increase the pace and scope of its military modernization program....Is China a threat? A threat is comprised of both capability and intention. Improved Chinese military capabilities, given China's robust economic growth, are inevitable. I believe they desire a stronger economic and political influence in global affairs and see military strength as supporting to those ends....Through...engagement...we can uphold our own vital interests while encouraging China to match its military modernization with a 'modernized' perception of its role in the region and the entire globe.... I personally believe the best approach to be coordinated engagement.... Meanwhile, recognizing the unpredictability of long-term intentions, we will maintain military readiness and our broad array of security relationships with all countries in the region." Federal News Service, June 27, 1995, Federal Information Systems Corporation, from NEXIS, emphasis added. Similarly trying to clarify the Clinton administration case for engagement, Secretary of State Warren Christopher rejected calls to contain the China threat, as well as Chinese accusations that the U.S. "really seeks to contain and weaken China." "'American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship' Address by Warren Christopher," Former President George Bush has strongly endorsed constructive engagement as the best way to keep Sino-American relations from turning "sour." "Bush Calls for Closer U.S.-China Ties," UPI, June 26, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. And Henry Kissinger, in the estimation of Gaddis, one of the practitioners of containment who adhered closely to George Kennan's original vision, has sharply criticized calls for containing China, inasmuch as it is a country that "was not currently threatening its neighbors," and added that a "country which does not expand does not have to be contained." Mure Dickie, "Kissinger Tells United States to Go Back to Basics on China," Reuters World Service, April 18, 1996, from NEXIS. Back.

Note 72: On the role of ambiguity and deterrence in China's nuclear strategy see Goldstein, "Robust and Affordable Security;" and Chong-pin Lin, China's Nuclear Weapons Strategy (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1988). On the importance of increased transparency to mute security dilemma dynamics, see Desmond Ball, "Arms and Affluence," pp. 106-108. David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong," p. 55. Back.

Note 73: The debate about the merits of each element in this list, and indeed, about the empirical warrant for the claim about a zone of peace among liberal democracies is vast. Some key representative pieces include: Michael W. Doyle, "Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs," Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 12 (Fall 1983), pp. 323-353; Michael Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (December 1986), pp. 1151-1169; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); John M. Owens, "How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 87-125; David E. Spiro, "The Insignificance of the Liberal Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994), pp. 50-86; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 2 (Fall 1994); pp. 5-49; Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, "Polities and Peace," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 2 (Fall 1995), pp. 123-146. Back.

Note 74: Routine foreign relations are increasingly handled by the relevant bureaucratic experts. For early trends in this direction, see A. Doak Barnett, The Making of Foreign Policy in China: Structure and Process (Boulder : Westview Press, 1985). But as long as he was physically and mentally able, Deng Xiaoping, like Mao Zedong before him, made the key foreign policy decisions. Whether any of the putative successors will assume this role, or, as seems more likely, will be part of a small collective decision-making group remains to be seen. In neither case would China's foreign policy elite face an effective system of institutional accountability to the broader Communist Party elite, let alone the Chinese people. And since some in the small elite believe that the West is engaged in a campaign of "peaceful evolution" designed to subvert communist rule without a fight, resisting democratic influences from abroad could become a contributing cause for international conflict. See David Shambaugh, "Growing Strong," p. 50; David Shambaugh, "The United States and China: A New Cold War?" Current History, Vol. 94, No. 593 (September 1995), p. 244. For a more recent summary of the division of responsibilities among the foreign and security policy elites, see David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China," pp. 196-201. Back.

Note 75: Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995) pp. 5-38. Back.

Note 76: Some of the more disturbing, if colorful, language of revived Chinese nationalism is cited by Gerald Segal, "China Takes on Pacific Asia," Jane's Defence '96 The World in Conflict, p. 67-68. See also Allen S. Whiting, "Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng," China Quarterly, No. 142 (June 1995), pp. 295-316; Michel Oksenberg, "China's Confident Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65 (1987), Special Issue, pp. 501-523; Jonathan Unger, ed., Chinese Nationalism (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1996). Back.

Note 77: David Shambaugh, "The United States and China," p. 247. Back.

Note 78: For an interpretation of the Taiwan straits military exercises of 1995 and 1996 that highlights the political incentives for China's Foreign Minister (Qian Qichen) and President (Jiang Zemin) to defer to military hardliners, see Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China?" pp. 190-191. Back.

Note 79: For classic views examining the changing economic costs and benefits of warfighting, see Norman Angell, The Great Illusion (London: William Heinemann, 1914); Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, second edition, (Boston: Scott, Foresman and Co., 1989); John E. Mueller, Retreat From Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War (New York: basic Books, 1989). Back.

Note 80: See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Myth of National Interdependence," in Charles P. Kindleberger (ed.), The International Corporation (Cambridge, Mass: M.I.T. Press, 1970); David Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power," International Organization, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Spring 1980); Robert J. Art, "To What Ends Military Power?" International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring 1980), 3-35; Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, third edition (New York: The Free Press, 1988); Peter Liberman, "The Spoils of Conquest," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 125-153. Back.

Note 81: Estimates of total trade volume as a fraction of GNP significantly. See Lardy, China in the World Economy, p. 18. Back.

Note 82: A fair analysis of the logic of economic interdependence would have to take into account also the argument of its critics about the dangers of the vulnerability its adherents applaud. In the China case, the dangerous attractiveness of valued natural resources, especially oil, in disputed territories must somehow be weighed against the interest in not disrupting broader patterns of trade and investment. Back.

Note 83: See comments by President Clinton and National Security Adviser Anthony Lake cited in Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," p. 5. Back.

Note 84: Though not quite making this argument, Thomas Christensen draws a similar conclusion about the transformative effects of economic interdependence and the uses to which China's future military power is likely to be put (Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik"). See also the sequenced linkage between economic and political reform in East Asian states presented by William Overholt, The Rise of China. Back.

Note 85: Bernard Brodie, War and Politics (New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., 1973), esp. chap. 9; Kenneth N. Waltz, "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (September 1990), pp. 731-745; Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981); Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986); Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989) Back.

Note 86: Two caveats: First, a strategic revolution does not eliminate the possibility of accident, inadvertence, or irrational decision-making resulting in the initiation of conflict. The existence of nuclear weapons does, however, provide strong incentives to minimize the likelihood of such undesired outcomes. For relevant issues in the debate on this topic, see Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate (New York: W. W. Norton, 1995). Second, the nuclear revolution may not be eternal. The nuclear strategic era will end when technology emerges that definitively renders the destructive power of nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," to use President Reagan's apt phrase inaptly applied to his Strategic Defense Initiative. Back.

Note 87: The argument about assessing capabilities is Blainey's, though he does not embrace the arguments of the nuclear optimists. Blainey, The Causes of War. Back.

Note 88: Nuclear peace theorists would dismiss the recent Chinese interest in a nuclear war-fighting capability described by Alastair Johnston, as the typical attempt to "conventionalize" nuclear strategy that often emerges among military planners whose job it is to think about how to use the state's armed forces purposefully. Johnston, "China's New 'Old Thinking'" If Johnston is capturing an emerging trend in China's strategic circles, it is a pattern that previously emerged in the United States and Soviet Union during the Cold War, especially as it became feasible for planners to envisage the availability of more, and more accurate, nuclear weapons. But, according to nuclear peace theorists, such conventionalization is at best irrelevant, and at worst recklessly wasteful, but not strategically destabilizing because of the robustness of the dominant deterrent logic that will prevail when leaders are forced to make war/peace decisions. Wasteful spending yielding uselessly large arsenals, however, can arguably increase both the small risks and the large consequences of accidental or inadvertent nuclear use. For a more pessimistic view of nuclear weapons' likely effects in East Asia, see Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry." Back.

Note 89: It certainly appears that Sino-American relations are settling into a pattern reminiscent of the less intensely hostile periods of the Soviet-American Cold War. United States Secretary of State Warren Christopher's effort to establish a process of regular high-level consultations between Chinese and U.S. officials, and gingerly move towards arranging a summit meeting between the two countries' leaders resonates with the diplomacy of relaxed periods during the Cold War. See Carol Giacomo, "Christopher Seeks Common Ground with China On Ban" Reuters, July 23, 1996, clari.world.asia.china, ClariNet Communications Corp. See also Christopher's comparison of such exchanges with those characterizing Soviet-American relations "[e]ven in the darkest days of the Cold War." "'American Interests and the U.S.-China Relationship' Address by Warren Christopher." Back.

Note 90: There is, of course an extensive literature on the logical and empirical validity of deterrence theory. For an introduction to some of its key elements, see Christopher H. Achen and Duncan Snidal, "Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies," World Politics, Vol. 41, No. 2 (January 1989), pp. 143-169, as well as other articles in the same issue. Back.

Note 91: Still, the competing perspectives are sometimes clearly articulated. See Jack Goldstone, "The Coming Chinese Collapse," Foreign Policy, No. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 35-53; Huang Yasheng, "Why China Will Not Collapse," Foreign Policy, No. 99 (Summer 1995), pp. 54-68. Arthur Waldron, "After Deng the Deluge: China's Next Leap Forward," Foreign Affairs Vol. 74, No. 3 (September/October 1995), pp. 148-153. For a thorough survey of the wide range of perspectives, and a judicious assessment of their plausibility from the vantage point of the mid-1990s, see Richard Baum, "China After Deng: Ten Scenarios in Search of Reality," China Quarterly, No. 145 (March 1996), pp. 153-175. Back.